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CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN ALABAMA
-jW^
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN
ALABAMA
By
WALTER if FLEMING, Ph.D.
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY
THE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, Agents
LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd.
1905
All righlH reserved
Copyright, 1905,
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY.
Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1905.
Norhjcoti ^rcss
J. S. Gushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith Co.
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.
TO
MY WIFE
MARY BOYD FLEMING
PREFACE
This work was begun some five years ago as a study of Recon-
struction in Alabama. As the field opened it seemed to me that
an account of ante-bellum conditions, social, economic, and political,
and of the effect of the Civil War upon ante-bellum institutions
would be indispensable to any just and comprehensive treatment of
the later period. Consequently I have endeavored to describe
briefly the society and the institutions that went down during Civil
War and Reconstruction. Internal conditions in Alabama during
the war period are discussed at length ; they are important, because
they influenced seriously the course of Reconstruction. Through-
out the work I have sought to emphasize the social and economic
problems in the general situation, and accordingly in addition to a
sketch of the politics I have dwelt at some length upon the educa-
tional, religious, and industrial aspects of the period. One point
in particular has been stressed throughout the whole work, viz.
the fact of the segregation of the races within the state — the
blacks mainly in the central counties, and the whites in the north-
ern and the southern counties. This division of the state into
** white" counties and "black" counties has almost from the be-
ginning exercised the strongest influence upon the history of its
people. The problems of white and black in the Black Belt are
not always the problems of the whites and blacks of the white
counties. It is hoped that the maps inserted in the text will assist
in making clear this point. Perhaps it may be thought that undue
space is devoted to the history of the negro during War and Re-
construction, but after all the negro, whether passive or active,
was the central figure of the period.
Beheving that the political problems of War and Reconstruction
are of less permanent importance than the forces which have
shaped and are shaping the social and industrial life of the people,
I have confined the discussion of politics to certain chapters chron-
ologically arranged, while for the remainder of the book the topi-
Viii PREFACE
cal method of presentation has been adopted. In describing
the political ev^ents of Reconstruction I have in most cases en-
deavored to show the relation between national affairs and local
conditions within the state. To such an extent has this been done
that in some parts it may perhaps be called a general history with
especial reference to local conditions in Alabama. Never before
and never since Reconstruction have there been closer practical
relations between the United States and the state, between Wash-
ington and Montgomery.
As to the authorities examined in the preparation of the work it
maybe stated that practically all material now available — -whether
in print or in manuscript — has been used. In working with news-
papers an effort was made to check up in two or more newspapers
each fact used. Most of the references to newspapers — practi-
cally all of those to the less reputable papers — are to signed
articles. I have had to reject much material as unreliable, and it
is not possible that I have been able to sift out all the errors.
Whatever remain will prove to be, as I hope and believe, of only
minor consequence.
• Thanks for assistance given are due to friends too numerous to
mention all of them by name. For special favors I am indebted
to Professor L. D. Miller, Jacksonville, Alabama ; Mr. W. O.
Scroggs of Harvard University ; Professor G. W. Duncan, Auburn,
Alabama; Major W. W. Screws of the Montgomery Advertiser ;
Colonel John W. DuBose, Montgomery, Alabama ; Mrs. J. L.
Dean, Opelika, Alabama; Major S. A. Cunningham of the Con-
federate Veteran, Nashville, Tennessee ; and Major James R.
Crowe, of Sheffield, Alabama. I am indebted to Mr. L. S. Boyd,
Washington, D.C., for numerous favors, among them, for calling
my attention to the scrap-book collection of Edward McPherson,
then shelved in the library of Congress along with Fiction, On
many points where documents were lacking, I was materially
assisted by the written reminiscences of people familiar with con-
ditions of the time, among them my mother and father, the late
Professor O. D. Smith of Auburn, Alabama, and the late Ryland
Randolph, Esq., of Birmingham. Many old negroes have related
their experiences to me. Hon. Junius M. Riggs of the Alabama
Supreme Court Library, by the loan of documents, assisted me
materially in working up the financial history of the Reconstruc-
PREFACE
IX
tion ; Dr. David Y. Thomas of the University of Florida read and
criticised the entire manuscript ; Dr. Thomas M. Owen, Director
of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, has given
me valuable assistance from the beginning to the close of the work
by reading the manuscript, by making available to me not only the
public archives, but also his large private collection, and by secur-
ing illustrations. But above all I have been aided by Professor
William A. Dunning of Columbia University, at whose instance
the work was begun, who gave me many helpful suggestions, read
the manuscript, and saved me from numerous pitfalls, and by my
wife, who read and criticised both manuscript and proof, and made
the maps and the index and prepared some of the illustrations.
WALTER L. FLEMING.
New York City,
August, 1905.
CONTENTS
PART I
INTRODUCTION'
CHAPTER I
Period of Sectional Controversy
Composition of the Population of Alabama
The Indians and Nullification
Slavery Controversy and Political Divisions
Emancipation Sentiment in North Alabama
Early Party Divisions .
William Lowndes Yancey
Growth of Secession Sentiment .
''Unionists^' Successful in 1851-1852
Yancey-Pryor Debate, 1858 .
The Charleston Convention of i860
The Election of i860 .
Separation of the Churches, 1821-1861
Senator Clay's Farewell Speech in the Senate
PAGE
3
8
10
10
II
13
14
16
17
18
19
21
25
CHAPTER II
Secession from the Union
Secession Convention Called
Parties in the Convention
Reports on Secession
Debate on Secession .
Political Theories of Members
Ordinance of Secession Passed
Confederate States Formed
Self-denying Ordinance
African Slave Trade .
Commissioners to Other States
Legislation by the Convention
North Alabama in the Convention
Incidents of the Session
27
28
31
31
34
36
39
41
42
46
49
53
56
xii CONTENTS
PART II
JVAT^ TIMES IN ALABAMA
CHAPTER III
Military and Political Events
PAGE
Military Operations 6i
The War in North Alabama 62
The Streight Raid 67
Rousseau's Raid 68
The War in South Alabama . 69
Wilson's Raid and the End of the War . . . , . .71
Destruction by the Armies 74
Military Organization 78
Alabama Soldiers : Number and Character ...... 78
Negro Troops 86
Union Troops from Alabama Z-j
Militia System 88
Conscription and Exemption ......... 92
Confederate Enrolment Laws ........ 92
Policy of the State in Regard to Conscription ..... 95
Effect of the Enrolment Laws 98
Exemption from Service 100
Tories and Deserters . . . . .108
Conditions in North Alabama . . . . . . . .109
Unionists, Tories, and Mossbacks 112
Growth of Disaffection . . . . . . . . .114
Outrages by Tories and Deserters .119
Disaffection in South Alabama 122
Prominent Tories and Deserters . 124
Numbers of the Disaffected 127
Party Politics and the Peace Movement 131
Political Conditions, 1 861-1865 . 131
The Peace Society . 137
Reconstruction Sentiment 143
CHAPTER IV
Economic and Social Conditions
Industrial Development during the War . 149
Military Industries . 149
Manufacture of Arms 150
Nitre Making 153
Private Manufacturing Enterprises .156
Salt Making 157
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
Confederate Finance in Alabama 162
Banks and Banking 162
Issues of Bonds and Notes by the State . 164
Special Appropriations and Salaries 168
Taxation 169
Impressment . . . .' 174
Debts, Stay Laws, Sequestration 176
Trade, Barter, Prices . . . . . . . , , ,178
Blockade-running and Trade through the Lines 183
Scarcity and Destitution, 1 861-1865 196
The Negro during the War 205
Military Uses of Negroes . 205
Negroes on the Farms 209
Fidelity to Masters . . . . . . . . . .210
Schools and Colleges . . . . . . . . . . .212
Confederate Text-books 217
Newspapers . . . . . . . . . . . .218
Publishing Houses . . . . . . . . . . .221
The Churches during the War . . .223
Attitude on Public Questions 223
The Churches and the Negroes 225
Federal Army and the Southern Churches 227
Domestic Life 230
Society in 1861 230
Life on the Farm .........'. 232
Home Industries ; Makeshifts and Substitutes 234
Clothes and Fashions .......... 236
Drugs and Medicines 239
Social Life during the War 241
Negro Life ............ 243
Woman's Work for the Soldiers ........ 244
PART III
THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
CHAPTER V
Social and Economic Disorder
Loss of Life in War 251
Destruction of Property 253
The Wreck of the Railways 259
The Interregnum : Lawlessness and Disorder . . . . . . 262
The Negro testing his Freedom ......... 269
How to prove Freedom . . . . . . . . .270
Suffering among the Negroes 273
xiv CONTENTS
Relations between Whites and Blacks 275
Destitution and Want, 1 865-1 866 277
CHAPTER VI
Confiscation and the Cotton Tax
Confiscation Frauds 284
Restrictions on Trade in 1865 284
Federal Claims to Confederate Property 285
Cotton Frauds and Stealing . 290
Cotton Agents Prosecuted 297
Statistics of the Frauds 299
The Cotton Tax 303
CHAPTER Vn
The Temper of the People
After the Surrender 308
" Condition of Affairs in the South '" 311
General Grant's Report . . . . . . . . -311
Carl Schurz's Report . . . . 312
Truman's Report 312
Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction .... 313
The "Loyalists" 316
Treatment of Northern Men 318
Immigration to Alabama . . . . . . . . . .321
Troubles of the Episcopal Church 324
PART IV
PRESIDENTIAL RESTORATION
CHAPTER Vni
First Provisional Administration
Theories of Reconstruction ......... 333
Presidential Plan in Operation . 341
Early Attempts at " Restoration " . ' . . . . . -341
Amnesty Proclamation ......... 349
'• Proscribing Proscription " ........ 356
The " Restoration " Convention 358
Personnel and Parties 358
Debates on Secession and Slavery 360
" A White Man's Government " 364
Legislation by the Convention 366
" Restoration " Completed . 367
CONTENTS
XV
CHAPTER IX
Second Provisional Administration
Status of the Provisional Government
Legislation about Freedmen .....
The Negro under the Provisional Government .
Movement toward Negro Suffrage
New Conditions of Congress and Increasing Irritation
Fourteenth Amendment Rejected ....
Political Conditions, 1 866-1 867; Formation of Parties
PAGE
383
386
391
394
398
CHAPTER X
Military Government, i 865-1 866
The Military Occupation 408
The Army and the Colored Population 410
Administration of Justice by the Army . 413
The Army and the White People 417
CHAPTER XI
The Wards of the Nation
The Freedmen's Bureau
Department of Negro Affairs
Organization of the Bureau .
The Bureau and the Civil Authorities
The Bureau supported by Confiscations
The Labor Problem
PYeedmen's Bureau Courts .
Care of the Sick ....
Issue of Rations ....
Demoralization caused by Bureau
The Freedmen's Savings-bank .
The Freedmen^s Bureau and Negro Education
The Failure of the Bureau System
421
421
423
427
431
433
437
441
442
444
451
456
469
PART V
CONGRESSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER XII
Military Government under the Reconstruction Acts
Administration of General John Pope ....... 473
Military Reconstruction Acts ........ 473
Pope's Control of the Civil Government 477
xvi CONTENTS
PAGE
Pope and the Newspapers 485
Trials by Military Commissions 487
Registration and Disfranchisement 488
Elections and the Convention -491
Removal of Pope and Swayne . 492
Administration of General George G. Meade 493
Registration and Elections • . 493
Administration of Civil Affairs . 495
Trials by Military Commissions 498
The Soldiers and the Citizens 500
From Martial Law to Carpet-bag Rule 501
CHAPTER XIII
The Campaign of 1867
Attitude of the Whites 503
Organization of the Radical Party in Alabama ...... 505
Conservative Opposition Aroused 512
The Negro's First Vote . . . . . . . . . -514
CHAPTER XIV
The "Reconstruction'' Convention
Character of the Convention * . -517
The Race Question . . .521
Debates on Disfranchisement of Whites 524
Legislation by the Convention . . . . . . . . . 528
CHAPTER XV
The "Reconstruction" Completed
'' Convention " Candidates . . . . . \ . . . . 531
Campaign on the Constitution 534
Vote on the Constitution 538
The Constitution fails of Adoption ....... 541
The Alabama Question in Congress 547
Alabama readmitted to the Union 550
CHAPTER XVI
The Union League of America
Origin of the Union League ......... 553
Its Extension to the South . 556
Ceremonies of the League 559
Organization and Methods 561
CONTENTS
XVll
PART VI
CARPET-BAG AND NEGRO RULE
CHAPTER XVII
Taxation and the Public Debt
PAGE
Taxation during Reconstruction 571
Administrative Expenses 574
Effect on Property Values 578
The Public Bonded Debt 580
The Financial Settlement 583
CHAPTER XVIII
Railroad Legislation and Frauds
Federal and State Aid to Railroads before the War 587
General Legislation in Aid of Railroads ....... 589
The Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad . . . . . . -591
Other Indorsed Railroads .......... 600
County and Town Aid to Railroads ........ 604
CHAPTER XIX
Reconstruction in the Schools
School System before Reconstruction ....... 607
School System of Reconstruction . . . . . . . . 609
Reconstruction of the State University . . . . . . .612
Trouble in the Mobile Schools 618
Irregularities in School Administration 621
Objections to the Reconstruction Education ...... 624
Negro Education ........... 625
Failure of the Educational System 632
CHAPTER XX
Reconstruction in the Churches
" Disintegration and Absorption " Policy .
The Methodists
The Baptists
The Presbyterians ....
The Churches and the Negro during Reconstruc
The Baptists and the Negroes
The Presbyterians and the Negroes
The Roman Catholics ....
The Episcopalians ....
The Methodists and the Negroes
ion
637
637
640
641
642
643
646
647
647
648
xyiii CONTENTS
CHAPTER XXI
The Ku Klux Revolution
PAGE
Causes of the Ku Klux Movement 654
Secret Societies of Regulators before Ku Klux Klan ..... 659
Origin and Growth of Ku Klux Klan 661
The Knights of the White Camelia 671
The Work of the Secret Orders 675
Ku Klux Orders and Warnings 680
Ku Klux " Outrages " . . 686
Success of the Ku Klux Movement ....... 690
Spurious Ku Klux Organizations 691
Attempts to suppress the Ku Klux Movement 694
State Legislation 695
Enforcement Acts 697
Ku Klux Investigation ......... 703
Later Ku Klux Organizations . 709
CHAPTER XXII
Reorganization of the Industrial System
Break-up of the Ante-bellum System ........ 710
The Freedmen's Bureau System 717
Northern and Foreign Immigration 718
Attempts to organize a New System . .721
Development of the Share and Credit Systems ...... 723
Superiority of White Farmers ... , . . . . 727
Decadence of the Black Belt 731
CHAPTER XXIII
Political and Social Conditions during Reconstruction
Politics and Political Methods .......... 733
The First Reconstruction Administration ...... 733
Reconstruction Judiciary 744
Campaign of 1868 . . . . . . ' . . . . 747
The Administration of Governor Lindsay ...... 750
The Administration of Governor Lewis 754
Election of Spencer to the United States Senate .... 755
Social Conditions during Reconstruction ....... 761
Statistics of Crime .......... 762
Social Relations of Negroes 763
Carpet-baggers and Scalawags ........ 765
Social Effects of Reconstruction on the Whites ..... 766
Economic Conditions . . 769
CONTENTS
XIX
CHAPTER XXIV
The Overthrow of Reconstruction
The Republican Party in 1874 .
Whites desert the Party
The Demand of the Negro for Social Rights
Disputes among Radical Editors
Demand of Negroes for Office
Factions within the Party .
Negroes in 1874 ....
Promises made to them
Negro Social and Political Clubs
Negro Democrats
The Democratic and Conservative Party in 1874
Attitude of the Whites toward the Blacks
The Color Line Drawn
" Independent " Candidates
The Campaign of 1874
Platforms and Candidates .
" Political Bacon "...
" Hays-Hawley Letter "
Intimidation by Federal Authorities
Intimidation by Democrats .
The Election of 1874
The Eufaula Riot
Results of the Elections
Later Phases of State Politics .
Whites make Secure their Control
The "Lily Whites" and the "Black and Tans'
The Failure of the Populist Movement
The Primary Election System
The Negroes Disfranchised •
Successes and Failures of Reconstruction
771
771
772
773
774
775
775
776
in
778
779
780
781
782
782
783
786
789
791
793
794
795
798
798
799
799
800
800
801
Appendices :
Cotton Production in Alabama, 1 860-1 900 .
Redstration of Voters under the New Constitution
804
806
Index
809
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
Alabama Money Facing 178
Buckley, Rev. C. W. "552
" Bully for Alabama '' "738
Callis, John B " 552
Clanton, General James H. ....... " 760
Clemens, J ere " 36
Confederate Capitol, Montgomery " 96
Confederate Monument, Montgomery " 96
Confederate Postage Stamps " 178
Crowe, Major James R. ....... . " 760
Curry, Dr. J. L. M. . . . , " 626
Davisj Jefferson ......... " 54
Davis, Inauguration of . . '' 96
Davis, Residence of, Montgomery " 96
Gaineswood, a Plantation Home ^^ 8
Hays, Charles " 552
"Hon. Mr. Carraway'' "' 738
Houston, Governor George S " 760
John Brown Extra " 18
Johnson, President Andrew ....... '^ 336
Ku Klux Costumes .......... 675
Ku Klux Hanging Pictures . . . , 612
Ku Klux Warning . . . , 678
Lewis, Governor D. P Facing 600
Lindsay, Governor R. B '• 760
Meade, General George G. " 476
Moore, Governor Andrew B. . . . . . . . '<• 130
Negro Members of the Convention of 1875 .... " 600
" Nigger, Scalawag, Carpetbagger " . . ... . . '< 738
Parsons, Governor L. E . . '' 600
Patton, Governor R. M '< 760
Pope, General John '•• 476
Prescript (Original) of Ku Klux Klan, Facsimile of Page of . ^' 670
Prescript (revised and amended) of Ku Klux Klan, Facsimile of Page of . 665
Private Money Facing 178
Rapier, J. T " 552
Ritual of the Knights of the White Camelia, Facsimile of Page of " 670
Shorter, Governor John Gill ....... " 130
xxi
xxu
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Smith, Governor William H. . • .
Smith, William R
Spencer, Senator George E. . , . .
Stephens, Alexander H
Stevens, Thaddeus ......
Sumner, Charles ......
Swayne, General Wager .....
" The Speaker cried out, ' Order ! ' " .
Thomas, General George H. .
Union League Constitution, Facsimile of Page of
Walker, General L. P
Warner, Senator Willard
Watts, Governor Thomas H
Wilmer, Bishop R. H
Yancey, William Lowndes
FaCi
ng
PAGE
600
336
336
476
738
566
36
130
36
LIST OF MAPS
2.
3-
4.
5-
6.
7-
8.
9-
10.
II.
12.
13-
14.
16.
17.
Population in i860 ......
Nativity and Distribution of Public Men
Election for President, i860 ....
Parlies in the Secession Convention .
Disaffection toward the Confederacy, 1861-1865 .
Industrial Development, 1 861-1865
Devastation by Invading Armies ....
Parties in the Convention of 1865
Registration of Voters under the Reconstruction Acts
Election for President, i""''
Election of 1870
Election of 1872
Election of 1874
Election of 1876
Election of 1880
Election of 1890
Election of 1902 under New Constitution
PAGE
4
6
20
29
no
150
256
359
494
747
750
755
795
796
798
799
800
PART I
INTRODUCTION
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
IN ALABAMA
CHAPTER I
THE PERIOD OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY
When Alabama seceded in 1861, it had been in existence as a
political organization less than half a century, but in many respects
its institutions and customs were as old as European America. The
white population was almost purely Anglo-American. The early
settlements had been made on the coast near Mobile, and from thence
had extended up the Alabama, Tombigbee, and Warrior rivers.
In the northern part the Tennessee valley was early settled, and
later, in the eastern part, the Coosa valley. After the river valleys,
the prairie lands in central Alabama were peopled, and finally the
poorer lands of the southeast and the hills south of the Tennessee
valley. The bulk of the population before 1861 was of Georgian
birth or descent, the settlers having come from middle Georgia, which
had been peopled from the hills of Virginia. Georgians came into
the Tennessee valley early in the nineteenth century. The Creek
reservation prevented immigration into eastern Alabama before the
thirties, but the Georgians went around and settled southeast Alabama
along the line of the old ''Federal road." When the Creek Indians
consented to migrate, it was found that the Georgians were already
in possession of the country, — more than 20,000 strong, and a
government was at once erected over the Indian counties. People
from Georgia also came down the Coosa valley to central Alabama.
The Virginians went to the western Black Belt, to the Tennessee
valley, and to central Alabama. North Carolina sent thousands
of her citizens down through the Tennessee valley and thence across
country to the Tombigbee valley and western Alabama; others came
through Georgia and followed the routes of Georgia migratioa.
3
4 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
South Carolinians swarmed into the- southern, central, and western
counties, and a goodly number settled in the Tennessee valley. Ten-
nessee furnished a large proportion of the settlers to the Tennessee
valley, to the hill counties south of the Tennessee, and to the valleys
in central and western Alabama. Among the immigrants from
Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee was a large
Total iwpulation 964,W1
Whites. ...526,271
Free Black 2,690
Slaves ..435,080
Slave holders 33,730
Negroes predominate.
^Tz^ Races about equally divided.
mi More than '^ and less than K
ai-e negi-oes.
Scotch-Irish element, and with the Tennesseeans came a sprinkling
of Kentuckians. In western Alabama were a few thousand Missis-
sippians, and into southeast Alabama a few hundred settlers came
from Florida. From the northern states came several thousand,
principally New England business men. The foreign element was
insignificant — the Irish being most numerous, with a few hundred
each of Germans, English, French, and Scotch. In Mobile and
THE PERIOD OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY
Marengo counties there was a slight admixture of French blood in
the population/
In regard to the character of the settlers it has been said that the
Virginians were the least practical and the Georgians the most so,
while the North Carolinians were a happy medium. The Georgians
were noted for their stubborn persistence, and they usually succeeded
in whatever they undertook. The Virginians liked a leisurely
planter's life with abundant social pleasures. The Tennesseeans
and Kentuckians were hardly distinguishable from the Virginians
and CaroHnians, to whom they were closely related. The northern
professional and business men exercised an influence more than
commensurate with their numbers, being, in a way, picked men.
Neither the Georgians nor the Virginians were assertive oflice- seekers,
but the Carolinians hked to hold office, and the politics of the state
were moulded by the South Carolinians and Georgians. All were
naturally inclined to favor a weak federal administration and a strong
state government with much liberty of the individual. The theories
1 Nativities of the Free Population
State or Country 1850
Alabama 237,542
Connecticut .... 91
Florida 1,060
Georgia 5^,997
Kentucky 2,694
Louisiana 628
Maine 215
Maryland 757
Massachusetts .... 654
Mississippi 2,852
New York Ij443
North Carolina . . . 28,521
Totals
Native . . . .
P'oreiirn . . . .
i860
520,026
343
1,644
83,517
1,966
1,149
272
683
753
4,848
1,848
23,504
State or Country
Ohio . . .
Pennsylvania
South Carol
Tennessee
Virginia
England
France .
Germany
Ireland
Scotland
Spain
Switzerland
1850
. . . 420,032
. . . 7.638
1850
276
876
48,663
22,541
10,387
941
503
1,068
2,639
584
163
"3
i860
265
989
45,185
19,139
7,598
1,174
359
2,601
5,664
696
157
138
i860
526,769
12,352
The total population from 1820 to i860 was as follows : —
White Black
1820 85,451 41,879
1830 190,406 117,549
1840 335,^85 253,532
1850 426,514 342,844
i860 526,271 435,080
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
NATIVITY OF PUBLIC MEN
LAUDERDALE
of Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Calhoun, not those of Washington
and John Marshall, formed the political creed of the Alabamians.
The wealthy people were found in the Tennessee valley, in the
Black Belt extending across the centre of the state, and in Mobile,
the one large towru They
were (except a few of
the MobiHans) all slave-
holders. The poorer white
people went to the less
fertile districts of north
and southeast Alabama,
where land was cheap,
preferring to work their
own poor farms rather
than to work for some
one else on better land.
But nearly every slave
county had its colony of
poorer whites, who were
invariably settled on the
least fertile soils. Among
these settlers there was a
certain dislike of slavery,
because they beheved that,
were it not for the negro,
the whites might them-
selves live on the fertile
lands. Yet they were not
in favor of emancipation
in any form, unless the
negro could be gotten
entirely out of the way
— a free negro being to
them an abomination. If the negro must stay, then they preferred
slavery to continue.
Over the greater part of Alabama there were no class distinctions
before i860; the state was too young. In the wilderness classes had
fused and the successful men were often those never heard of in the
Washington;
16 0 5 2f5J
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HENRV 0
2
\
Virginia.
Georgia,
■^ South Carolina.
North Carolina.
Kentuclty
Tennessee
-Miss, and other So. States.
WidJle States and West-
New England
Foreign
Indian
a=Loc»tion of^nti-Slavery Society before 1835
Each figure represents some person who became promi-
nent before 1865, and indicates his native state. The
location of the figure on the map indicates his place
of residence. Note the segregation along the rivers
and in the Black Belt.
THE PERIOD OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY 7
older states. A candidate of "the plain people" was always elected,
because all were frontier people. This does not mean that in Hunts-
ville, Montgomery, Greensboro, and Mobile there were not the begin-
nings of an aristocracy based on education, wealth, and family descent.
But these were very small spots on the map of Alabama, and there
were no heartburnings over social inequalities.^
Such was the composition of the white population of Alabama
before i860. No matter what might be their political affiliations,
in practice nearly all were Democrats of the Jeffersonian school,
beheving in the largest possible liberty for the individual and in local
management of all local affairs, and to the frontier Democrat nearly
all questions that concerned him were local. The political leaders
excepted, the majority of the population knew Kttle and cared less
about the Federal government except when it endeavored to restrain
or check them in their course of conquest and expansion in the wil-
derness. The relations of the people of Alabama with the Federal
government were such as to confirm and strengthen them in their
local attachments and sectional politics. The controversies that
arose in regard to the removal of the Indians, and over the public
lands, nulhfication, slavery, and western expansion, prevented the
growth of attachment to the Federal government, and tended to
develop a southern rather than a "continental" nationality. The
state came into the Union when the sections were engaged in angry
debate over the Missouri Compromise measures, and its attitude in
Federal politics was determined from the beginning. The next most
serious controversy with the Federal government and with the North
was in regard to the removal of the Indians from the southern states.
The southwestern frontiersmen, like all other Anglo-Americans, had
no place in their economy for the Indian, and they were determined
that he should not stand in their way.
Miundly, "Social Relations"; Hodgson, "Cradle of the Confederacy," Ch. i;
Garrett, " Reminiscences," Ch. i ; Miller's and Brown's " Histories of Alabama," passim ;
Saunders, " Early Settlers," passim. From 1840 to i860 there was a slight sectional and
political division between the counties of north Alabama and those of central and south
Alabama, owing to the conflicting interests of the two sections and to the lack of com-
munication. By i860 this was tending to become a social division between the white
counties and the black counties. The division to some extent still exists.
8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Indians and Nullification
For half a century, throughout the Gulf states, the struggle with the
Indian tribes for the possession of the fertile lands continued, and in
this struggle the Federal government was always against the set-
tlers. Before the removal of the Indians, in 1836, the settlers of
Alabama were in almost continual dispute with the Washington
administration on this subject/ The trouble began in Georgia,
and thousands of Georgians brought to Alabama a spirit of jealousy
and hostihty to the United States government, and a growing dis-
like of New England and the North on account of their stand in
regard to the Indians. For when troubles, legal and otherwise,
arose with the Indians, their advisers were found to be missionaries
and land agents from New England. The United States wanted the
Indians to remain as states within states; the Georgia and Alabama
settlers felt that the Indians must go. The attitude of the Federal
government drove the settlers into extreme assertions of state rights.
In Georgia it came almost to war between the state and United States
troops during the administration of John Quincy Adams, a New
Englander, who was dishked by the settlers for his support of the
Indian cause; and the whole South was made jealous by the decisions
of the Supreme Court in the Indian cases. Had Adams been elected
to a second term, there would probably have been armed resistance
to the pohcy of the United States. Jackson, a southern and western
man, had the feeling of a frontiersman toward the Indians; and his
attitude gained him the support of the frontier southern states in the
trouble with South CaroHna over nullification.
Immediately after the nulhfication troubles, the general govern-
ment attempted to remove the white settlers from the Indian lands
in east Alabama. The lands had been ceded by the Indians in 1832,
and the legislature of Alabama at once extended the state adminis-
tration over the territory. Settlers rushed in; some were already
there. But by the treaty the Indians were entitled to remain on their
land until they chose to move ; and now the United States marshals,
supported by the army, were ordered to remove the 30,000 whites
1 In all studies of the sectional spirit it should be remembered that the Southwest
was settled somewhat in spite of the Washington government and without the protec-
tion of the United States army ; the reverse is true of the Northwest.
INDIANS AND NULLIFICATION 9
who had settled in the nine Indian counties. Governor Gayle, who
had been elected as an opponent of nuUification, informed the Secre-
tary of War that the proposed action of the central government meant
nothing less than the destruction of the state administration, and
declared that he would, at all costs, sustain the jurisdiction of the
state government. The troops killed a citizen who resisted removal,
and the Federal authorities refused to allow the slayers to be tried
by state courts. There was great excitement in the state, and pubHc
meetings were everywhere held to organize resistance. The legis-
lature authorized the governor to persist in maintaining the state
administration in the nine Indian counties. A coUision with the
United States troops was expected, and offers of volunteers were
made to the governor, — even from New York. Finally the United
States government yielded, the whites remained on the Indian lands,
the state authority was upheld in the Indian counties, the soldiers Were
tried before state courts, and the Indians were removed to the West.
The governor proclaimed a victory for the state, and the 30,000
angry Alabamians rejoiced over what they considered the defeat
of the unjust Federal government.^
Thus in Alabama nullification of Federal law was successfully
carried out. And it was done by a state administration and a people
that a year before had refused to approve the course of South Caro-
lina. But South Carohna was regarded in Alabama, as in the rest of
the South, somewhat as an erratic member that ought to be disciplined
once in a while. A strong and able minority in Alabama accepted
the basis of the nullification doctrine, i.e. the sovereignty of the
states, and after this time this poHtical element was usually known
as the State Rights party. They had no separate organization, but
voted with Whigs or Democrats, as best served their purpose. Seces-
sion was Httle talked of, for affairs might yet go well, they thought,
within the Union. A majority of the Democrats, for several years
after 1832, were probably opposed in theory to nuUification and
secession when South Carolina was an actor, but in practice they
acted as they had done in the Indian disputes which concerned them
more closely.
1 Hodgson, " Cradle of the Confederacy," Chs. 2, 4, 6, 8 ; DuBose, " Life of William
L. Yancey " ; Phillips, '■' Georgia and State Rights," Chs. 2, 3 ; Pickett, " Alabama,"
Owen's edition.
10 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Slavery Controversy and Political Divisions
It was at the height of the irritation of the Indian controversy
that the agitation by the aboHtionists of the North began. The
question which more than any other alienated the southern people
from the Union was that concerning negro slavery. From 1819 to
i860 the majority of the white people of Alabama were not friendly
to slavery as an institution. This was not from any special liking
for the negro or belief that slavery was bad for him, but because it
was believed that the presence of the negro, slave or free, was not
good for the white race. To most of the people slavery was merely
a device for making the best of a bad state of affairs. The constitu-
tion of 1819 was liberal in its slavery provisions, and the legislature
soon enacted (1827) a law prohibiting the importation, for sale, hire,
or barter, of slaves from other states. For a decade there was strong
influence at each session of the state legislature in favor of gradual
emancipation; agents of the Quakers worked in the state, buying
and paying a higher price for cotton that was not produced by slave
labor ; and in north Alabama, during the twenties and early thirties,
there was a number of emancipation societies.^ An emancipation
newspaper, The Huntsville Democrat, was pubhshed in Huntsville,
and edited by James G. Birney, afterwards a noted aboHtionist.
The northern section of the state, embracing the strong Democratic
white counties, was distinctly unfriendly to slavery, or rather to the
negro, and controlled the poHtics of the statc.^ The effect of the
abolition movement in the North was the destruction of the eman-
cipation organizations in the South, and both friends and foes of the
institution united on the defensive. The non-slaveholders were
not deluded followers of the slave owners. After the slavery question
became an issue in pohtics, the non-slaveholders in Alabama were
rather more aggressive, and were even more firmly determined to
maintain negro slavery than were the slaveholders. To the rich
1 In 1832 there were eight emancipation societies in north Alabama: The State
Society, Courtland, Lagrange, Tuscumbia, Florence, Madison County, Athens, and
Lincoln. Publications, Southern History Association, Vol. II, pp. 92, 93.
2 See Hodgson, p. 7. In 1842 representation in the legislature was changed from
the " federal " basis and based on white population alone. This change was made by
the Democrats and was opposed by the Whigs. The latter predominated in the Black
Belt.
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS II
hereditary slaveholders, who were relatively few in number, it was
more or less a question of property, and that was enough to fight
about at any time. But to the average white man who owned no
negroes and who worked for his Hving at manual labor, the question
was a vital social one. The negro slave was bad enough; but he
thought that the negro freed by outside interference and turned loose
on society was much more to be feared.^ The large majorities for
extreme measures came from the white counties; the secession vote
in i860 was largely a white county vote. But when secession came,
the Whiggish Black Belt which had been opposed to secession was
astonished not to receive, in the war that followed, the hearty support
of the Democratic white counties.
Before the nulhfication troubles in 1832 there was no distinct
political division among the people of Alabama ; all were Democrats.
Those of the white counties were of the Jacksonian type, those of
the black counties were rather of the Jeff ersonian faith ; but all were
strict constructionists, especially on questions concerning the tariff,
the Indians, the central government, and slavery. The question
of nullification caused a division in the ranks of the Democratic party
— one wing supporting Jackson, the other accepting Calhoun as
leader. For several years later, however, the Democratic candi-
dates had no opposition in the elections, though within the party
there were contests between the Jacksonians and the growing State
Rights (Calhoun) wing. But with the setthng of the country, the
growth of the power of the Black Belt, and the differentiation of
interests within the state, there appeared a second party, the Whigs.
Its strength lay among the large planters and slaveholders of the
central Black Belt, though it often took its leaders from the black
counties of the Tennessee valley. This party was able to elect a
governor but once, and then only because of a division in the Demo-
cratic ranks. After 1835 it secured one-third of the representation
in Congress and the same proportion in the legislature. It was the
'* broadcloth " party, of the wealthier and more cultivated people.
It did not appeal to the ''plain people" with much success; but it
was always a respectable party, and there was no jealousy of it then,
and now ''there are no bitter memories against it." ^
1 Hodgson, Ch. i ; Debates of Convention of iS6l, passim.
2 Miller, "Alabama," p. 123.
12 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Numerically, the Whigs were about as strong as the anti-nuUiiica-
tion wing of the Democratic party, so that the balance of power
was held by the constantly increasing State Rights (Calhoun) ele-.
ment. When Van Buren became leader of the national Democracy,
the State Rights people in Alabama united with the regular Demo-
crats and voted with them for about ten years. The State Rights
men were devoted followers of Calhoun, but in political theories
they soon went beyond him. For a while they were behevers in nulh-
fication as a constitutional right, but soon began to talk of seces-
sion as a sovereign right. They were in favor of no compromise
where the rights of the South were concerned. They were logical,
extreme, doctrinaire; they demanded absolute right, and viewed
every action of the central government with suspicion. A single
idea firmly held through many years gave to them a power not justi-
fied by their numerical strength.
The Whigs did not stand still on pohtical questions ; as the Demo-
crats and the State Rights men abandoned one position for another
more advanced, the Whigs moved up to the one abandoned. Thus
they were always only about one election behind. It was the con-
stant agitation of the slavery question that drove the Whigs along
in the wake of the more advanced party. Both parties were in favor
of expansion in the Southwest. They were indignant at the New
England position on the Texas question, and talked much of disunion
if such a policy of obstruction was persisted in. Again, after the
Mexican War all parties were furious at the opposition shown to the
annexation of the territory from Mexico. It was now the spirit of
expansion, the lust for territory, that rose in opposition to the ob-
structive policy of northern leaders; and a new element was added
when an attempt was made to shut out southerners from the
territory won mainly by the South by forbidding the entrance of
slavery.
The number of those in favor of resisting at every point the
growing desire of the North to restrict slavery was increasing steadily.
The leader of the State Rights men was William L. Yancey. He
opposed all compromises, for, as he said, compromise meant that
the system was evil and was an acknowledgment of wrong, and no
right, however abstract, must be denied to the South. He was a
firm believer in slavery as the only method of solving the race ques-
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY AND POLITICAL DIVISIONS 13
tion, and saw clearly the dangers that would result from the aboHtion
programme if the North and South remained united. So to prevent
worse calamities he was in favor of disunion. He was the greatest
orator ever heard in the South. He was in no sense a demagogue;
he had none of the arts of the popular politician. Sent to Congress
in the heat of the fight between the sections, he resigned because
he thought the battle was to be fought elsewhere. For twenty years
he stood before the people of Alabama, telling them that slavery could
not be preserved within the Union; that before any effective settle-
ment of controversies could be made, Alabama and the other southern
states must withdraw and make terms from the outside, or stay out
of the Union and have done with agitation and interference. Seces-
sion was self-preservation, he told a people who beheved that the
destruction of slavery meant the destruction of society. For twenty
years he and his followers, heralds of the storm, were ostracized by
all political parties, which accepted his theories, but denied the neces-
sity for putting them into practice. When at last the people came
to follow him, he told them that they had probably waited too late,
and that they were seceding on a weaker cause than any of those he
had presented for twenty years.
Yancey was a leader of State Rights men but never a leader in
the Democratic party. Once, in 1848, when all were angry on
account of the opposition on the Mexican question, Yancey was
called to the front in the Democratic state convention. He offered
resolutions, w^hich were adopted,^ to the effect (i) that the people
of a territory could not prevent the holding of slaves before the forma-
tion of a state constitution, and that Congress had no power what-
ever to restrict slavery in the territories; (2) that those who held
the opposite opinion were not Democrats, and that the Democratic
party of Alabama would not support for President any candidate
who held such views. The delegates to the National Democratic
Convention at Baltimore were instructed to withdraw if the Alabama
resolutions were rejected. By a vote of two hundred and sixteen to
thirty-six they were rejected ; yet none of the delegates except Yancey
withdrew. Refusing to support Cass for the presidency because
he beheved in "squatter sovereignty," Yancey was again ostracized
^ Known as the "Alabama Platform" of 1848.
14 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
by the Democratic leaders.^ Now the State Rights men became
more aggressive, for they said this was the time to settle the slavery
question, before it was too late. The North, it was thought, would
not be averse to separation from the South. The Whigs began to
advance non-intervention theories, and but for the death of President
Taylor, who adhered to the free-soil Whigs, poHtical parties in
Alabama would probably have broken up in 1850 and fused into
one on the slavery question.
Growth of Secession Sentiment
The compromise measures of 1850 pleased few people in Alabama,
and there was talk of resistance and of assisting Texas by force, if
necessary, against the appropriation of her territory by the central
government. The moderates condemned the Compromise and said
they would not yield again. The more advanced demanded a repeal
of the Compromise or immediate secession. Yancey said there was
no hope of a settlement and that it was time to set the house in order.
In 1 850- 1 85 1 there was a widespread movement toward a rejection
of the Compromise and a secession of the lower South, but the political
leaders were disposed to give the Compromise a trial. To the Nash-
ville convention, held in June, 1850, to discuss measures to secure
redress of grievances, the Alabama legislature at an unofficial meet-
ing chose the following delegates: Benjamin Fitzpatrick, William
Cooper, John A. Campbell, Thomas J. Judge, John A. Winston,
Leroy P. Walker, William M. Murphy, Nicholas Davis, R. C. Shorter,
Thomas A. Walker, Reuben Chapman, James Abercrombie, and
WilHam M. Byrd — all Whigs or Conservative Democrats. The
resolutions passed by the convention were cautious and prudent,
and were generally supported by the Whigs and opposed by the
Democrats. In Montgomery, upon the return of the Alabama dele-
gation, a pubHc meeting, held to ratify the action of the Nashville
convention, condemned it instead, and approved the programme of
Yancey who again declared that it was "time to set the house in
order." The contest in Alabama was simply between the Com-
promise, with maintenance of the Union, and rejection of the Com-
1 Benjamin Fitzpatrick led the conservative element of the Democratic party and
opposed Yancey.
GROWTH OF SECESSION SENTIMENT 15
promise to be followed by secession. It was not a campaign between
Whig and Democrat, but between Union and Secession. The old
party lines were not drawn. Associations were formed all over the
state to oppose the Compromise and to advocate secession. The
Unionists drew together, but less heartily. The compact State
Rights element lost influence on account of a division that now showed
in its ranks. One section, led by William L. Yancey, was for separate
and unconditional secession; another, led by J. J. Seibels, favored
cooperation of the southern states within the Union and united
dehberation before secession.^ The State Rights Convention met in
Montgomery, February 10, 185 1, and recommended a southern
congress to decide the questions at issue and declared that if any
other state would secede, Alabama should go also.^ The action
of the convention pleased few and was repudiated by the "separate
secessionist" element. The candidates of the State Rights — now
called the "Southern Rights" — party were supported by a majority
of the Democrats. They demanded the repeal of the Compromise,
and resistance to future encroachments; they demanded southern
ministers and southern churches, southern books and papers, and
southern pleasure resorts.
The "Union" leaders were Judge Benajah S. Bibb, James
Abercrombie, Thomas J. Judge, Henry W. HiUiard, Thomas H.
Watts, Senator Wilham R. King, — nearly all Virginians or North
Carohnians by birth or descent. At the State "Union" Convention
held in Montgomery, January 19, 185 1, among the more prominent
delegates were: Thomas B. Cooper, R. M. Patton, W. M. Byrd,
B. S. Bibb, J. M. Tarleton, W. B. Moss, James H. Clanton, L. E.
Parsons, Robert J. Jamison, Henry W. HilHard, R. W. Walker,
Thomas H. Watts, Nicholas Davis, Jr., and C. M. Wilcox, — all were
Whigs, and were Virginians, North Carolinians, and men of northern
birth. This meeting denied the "constitutional" right of secession.
The Union candidates for Congress were C. C. Langdon, James
1 This division in the State Rights ranks existed until secession was actually achieved
and even after.
2 Each extreme southern state — Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina —
showed a desire to have some more moderate state act first. Some prominent men in
this convention were Yancey, Seibels, Thomas Williams, John A. Elmore, B. F. Saffold,
Abram Martin, A. P. Bagley, Adam C. Felder, David Clopton, and George Goldthwaite,
nearly all South Carolinians by birth.
l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Abercrombie, Judge Mudd, William R. Smith, W. R. W. Cobb,
George S. Houston, and Alexander White, — each of whom
denied the ''constitutional" right of secession, but said nothing
about it as a "sovereign" right.
The "Unionists" — the old Whigs and the Jacksonian Demo-
crats — were successful in the elections, but by accepting, though
disapproving, the Compromise measures, and by repudiating the
doctrine of secession as a "constitutional" right,^ they had advanced
beyond the position held by Yancey in 1848.
After the success of the "Union" party in 1851-1852, the Southern
Rights Associations resolved to suspend for a time the debate on
secession. Thereupon the "Union" Democrats resumed their old
party allegiance and the "Union" party was left to consist of old
Whigs alone. The Whigs wished to continue the "Union" organi-
zation, for they no longer found it possible to act with the northern
Whigs, and in 1852 several of their prominent leaders in Alabama
refused to support the Whig presidential ticket. On the other hand,
the extreme "Southern Rights" men broke away from the Demo-
crats in 1852 and declared for immediate secession. They supported
Troup and Quitman, who polled, however, only 2174 votes in the
state; but the Whigs and the Democrats each lost about 15,000, who
refused to vote.
And now came the break-up of old parties. The slavery question
was always before the people and was becoming more and more
irritating. Compromises had failed to quiet the controversy. The
position of the "Union" Whigs in the black counties became intoler-
able. They had to combat secession at home, and they had to guard
against trouble among their slaves caused by the abohtionist propa-
ganda. By 1855 almost all the Alabama Whigs had become "Ameri-
cans," at the same time searching for a new issue and repudiating
the principles upon which the "American" party was founded.
Again they were left alone by the antislavery stand taken by the
northern wing of this party. Yet in spite of every possible discour-
agement they held together and controlled the black counties. When
the Kansas question arose all the parties in Alabama were united
in reference to it. The doctrine of squatter sovereignty was not
accepted, but there was an opportunity, both parties thought, to
1 A dodging of the question.
I
GROWTH OF SECESSION SENTIMENT 17
win Kansas peaceably and stay the threatened separation, but the
northern methods of settHng Kansas by organized antislavery
emigration from New England paralyzed the efforts of the moderate
''Union" southerners. Similar methods were attempted by the
South, and several colonies of emigrants were sent from Alabama; ^
but by 1857 it was known that Kansas was lost.
The great debate between WilHam L. Yancey and Roger A.
Pryor in the Southern Commercial Convention held in Montgomery
in May, 1858, showed that the people of Alabama were then in
advance of their political leaders and were coming to the position
long held by Yancey and the secessionists. Pryor's position in favor
of compromise and delay had the support of nearly all the party
leaders of Alabama; Yancey, always in disfavor with party leaders,
captured the convention with his pohcy of secession in case of failure
of redress of grievances. Secession was no longer a doctrine to be
condemned unless on the ground of expediency. Whig leaders
were now becoming Southern Rights Democrats. Many Demo-
crats thought it was time to force an issue and come to a settlement ;
this Yancey proposed to do by demanding a repeal of all the laws
against the slave trade because they expressed a disapproval of slavery.
If slavery were not wrong, then the slave trade should not be denounced
as piracy. Yancey had not the shghtest desire to reopen the slave
trade, and knew that the North would not consent to a repeal of the
laws against it, yet he said the demand should be made. He believed
the demand to be legitimate, though sure to be rejected. The
national Democratic party would thus be divided and the issue
forced.^
For any purpose of opposing the Yancey programme the Alabama
"Union" men were rendered helpless by the turn politics were taking
in the North. The formation out of the wreck of the old Whig
party of the distinctly sectional and radical RepubHcan party, the
attitude of the leaders of that party, the talk about the ''irrepressible
1 For an account of one of these, see the American Historical Review, Oct., 1900.
2 General Pryor informs me that at the convention of 1858 no one understood that
there was any desire on the part of Yancey and others to reopen the slave trade. They
recognized that the rest of the world was against them on that question and were
demanding simply a repeal of what they considered discriminating laws. Yancey com-
pared the question to that of the tea tax in the American colonies. See also Hodgson,
p. 371, and Yancey's speeches in Smith's " Debates of 1861."
c
l8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
conflict" and the ''Union cannot endure half slave and half free,"
the indorsement of the ''Impending Crisis" with its incendiary
teachings, the effect of "Uncle Tom's Cabin" on thousands who
before had cared nothing about slavery, and finally the raid of John
Brown into Virginia,^ — these were influences more powerful toward
uniting the people to resistance than all the speeches of State Rights
leaders on abstract constitutional questions. After 1856 the people
were in advance of their leaders.
On January 11, i860, the Democratic state convention unani-
mously adopted resolutions favoring the Dred Scott decision as a
settlement of the slavery question. The delegation to the national
nominating convention at Charleston was instructed to withdraw in
case these resolutions were not accepted in substance as a part of the
platform. At Charleston the majority report of the committee
on the platform sustained the Alabama position. When the report
was laid before the convention, a proposition was made to set it aside
for the minority report, which va.guely said nothing. Yancey in a
great speech delivered the ultimatum of the South, the adoption of
the majority report. The vote was taken and the South defeated.
L. Pope Walker ^ announced the withdrawal of the Alabama delega-
tion and the delegations from the other southern states followed.^
Both sections of the convention then adjourned to meet in Baltimore.
Influences for and against compromise were working, and it is prob-
able that a majority of the seceders would have harmonized had not
the Douglas organization declared the seats of the seceders vacant
and admitted delegates irregularly elected by Douglas conventions
1 A branch of the Underground Railway reached from Ohio as far into Alabama as
Tallapoosa County. Kagi, one of Brown's confederates, had marked out a chain of black
counties where he had travelled and where the negroes were expected to rise. He had
travelled through South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Russell County,
Alabama, was one of those marked on his map. The people were greatly alarmed when
the map was discovered. See Seibert's " Underground Railroad," pp. 119, 160, 167, 195;
Hinton, "John Brown"; Hague, "Blockaded Family." As early as 1835 incendiary
literature had been scattered among the Alabama slaves, and in that year the grand jury
of Tuscaloosa County indicted Robert G. Williams of New York for sending such printed
matter among the slaves. General Gayle demanded that he be sent to Alabama for trial,
but Governor Marcy refused to give him up. See Brown's " Alabama," p. 167, and Gulf
States Hist. Mag., July, 1903.
2 Afterwards Confederate Secretary of War.
8 Yancey w^as willing to disregard instructions and not withdraw ; the rest of the
delegation overruled him. See paper by Petrie in Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV.
E.X'Tli. /
■;.!/;,!, I'UII'AY X/',J/T, h.r. j. j ^.•,;
Execution of Old • Brown.
TniM)OftlSDl^:AD!
*'\V Cltana for a Ilescne! I
.1 n" i^
Ci
Ml. Pv
ilL>l Oil olj John
I rime c^
juni'tlcr, and fur aH^: ;.'' . .••
^^crvile wau anioiigsi a }it(»}>L' who li:ul
never li.'.rnicd hini^liud whv live 1 n;nlr>r
llij>.inK' cuii-;ituti|.M and gMViinnieut
with lilni-oir.^ '^''^^'"'^ «-'Xvcutioit^eV^
Tlie 'lulluwii-^. n< ;>;itcb' wa-r, receivcxl,
1 'Mii^rlit, froigi tiic irl('yTa]iiii^ operator
:it Monf-ome^Jj^M'-. ('.^ I. Cli^iiie.-^
A JOHN BROWN EXTRA.
GROWTH OF SECESSION SENTIMENT
19
in the South. After the damage was done, Yancey was pressed to
take the vice-presidency on the Douglas ticket/ Douglas was
known to be in bad health and Yancey was told that he might expect
to be President within a few months, if he accepted. But it was
too late for further compromise, and Yancey toured the North,
speaking for Breckenridge. A State Rights convention in Alabama
indorsed the candidates of the seceded convention; a convention
of Douglas Democrats in Montgomery declared for Douglas; the
'Constitutional Union" party (the old Whigs and "Americans"
or "Know-nothings"), for Bell and Everett and old-fashioned con-
servative respectabihty. During the campaign Douglas visited the
state and was well received, but aroused no enthusiasm, while Yancey
was tumultuously welcomed.
As far back as February 24, i860, the legislature had passed
almost unanimously a resolution concurring with South CaroHna
in regard to the right and necessity of secession, and declaring that
Alabama would not submit to the domination of a "foul sectional
party." In case of the election of a "Black" RepubHcan President
a convention was to be called, and $200,000 was appropriated for
its use.^ A committee was appointed to reorganize the mihtia system
of the state, and so important was the work deemed that the com-
mittee was excused from all other duties. The Senate declared
that it was expedient to estabhsh an arsenal, a firearms factory, and
a powder mill. A bill was passed to encourage the manufacture of
firearms in Alabama.^ At this session seventy-four miHtary com-
panies were incorporated and provision made for mihtary schools."*
Elections returns were anxiously awaited.^ It was certain that
the election of Lincoln and Hamlin would result in secession.^ When
1 Hodgson, Ch. 15.
2 Acts of Alabama (1859-1860), pp. 689-690; Smith's "Debates," pp. 10, ii.
3 Acts of Alabama (1859-1860), pp. 681-682; Senate Journal (1859-1860), pp.
147, 176, 293, 302.
* During this session Judge Sam. Rice, in reply to John Forsyth and others who
feared that secession would lead to war, said : " There will be no war. But if there
should be, we can whip the Yankees with popguns." After the war, when he had
turned " scalawag," he was taken to task for the speech. " You said we could whip the
Yankees with popguns." " Yes, — but the damned rascals wouldn't fight that way."
5 The popular vote in Alabama was: for Breckenridge, 48,831; for Douglas,
13,621 ; for Bell, 27,875.
* Many people believed that Hamlin was a mulatto.
20
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
LIME-'
STDNt
MAD-
ISON
'TALLADECA
;CH0C
?rAw
CLARKE
.PQOSA
the news came the old "Union" leaders declared for secession and
by noon of the next day the "Union" party had gone to pieces.
The leaders who had opposed secession to the last — Watts, Clanton,
Goldthwaite, Judge, and Milliard — now took their stand by the
side of Yancey and declared that Alabama must withdraw from
the Union. Governor Moore, a very moderate man, in a public
speech said that no
course was left but for
the state to secede, and
with the other southern
states form a confeder-
acy. PubHc meetings
were held in every town
and village to declare
that x\labama would not
submit to the rule of the
"Black Republican."
A typical meeting held
in Mobile, November
15, i860, arraigned the
RepubHcan party be-
cause: (i) it had de-
clared for the aboHtion
of slavery in all terri-
tories and Federal dis-
tricts and for the
aboHtion of the inter-
state slave trade; (2) it
had denied the extra-
dition of murderers,
marauders, and other
felons; (3) it had con-
cealed and shielded the murderers of masters who had sought to
recover fugitive slaves ; (4) it advocated negro equality and made it
the basis of legislation hostile to the South; (5) it opposed protection
of slave property on the high seas and had justified piracy in the
case of the Creole; (6) it had invaded Virginia and shed the blood
of her citizens on her own soil; and (7) had announced a poHcy of
RUSSELL
WILCOX
r - - 1
\mi /'>"'""!')
h-^— -r— _— ^— _
E MONftOE/
■-IBUJX-LR--^
' / f
rm
^^-^-=^=r=l
DiLE
'n
/ /
s ^ CONECU
H
ICOVING'-
COFFEE
henry/
-^TON-— -
I
WASHING-
ELECTIOX FOR PKESIDENT, 18C0.
t><^ Majority or plurality for Breckeru-idge.
^ •' " " " Bell.
i^ " " " " Douglas.
For Bi-eckenridge 48,831.
" Bell 27,875.
" Douglas 13,651.
In Lawrence, Coosa, and Mobile Counties the vote was nearly evenly
divided. ' -
SEPARATION OF THE CHURCHES 21
total abolition/ In December, i860, the Federal grand jury at
Montgomery declared the Federal government "worthless, impotent
and a nuisance," as it had failed to protect the interests of the
people of Alabama. The presentment was signed by C. C. Gunter,
foreman, and nineteen others.^
Had the governor been willing to call a convention at once, seces-
sion would have been almost unanimous ; but delay caused the more
cautious and timid to reflect and gave the so-called ''cooperationists"
time to put forth a platform. The leaders of the party of delay
representing north Alabama, the stronghold of radical democracy,
were Wilham R. Smith, M. J. Bulger, Nicholas Davis, Jere Clemens,
and Robert J. Jemison, all strong men, but none of them possessing
the abihty of the secessionist leaders or of the former "Union" leaders
who had joined the secession party. But secession was certain, —
it was only a question as to how and when. By law the governor
was to call a convention in case the "Black Repubhcan" candidates
were elected, and December 24, i860, was fixed as the time for elec-
tion of delegates, and January 4, 1861, the time for assembly.
Separation of the Churches
Before the political division in 1861 the rehgious division had
already occurred in the larger and in several of the smaller denomina-
tions. At the close of 1861 every religious body represented in the
South, except the Roman Catholic church,^ had been divided into
northern and southern branches. The political rather than the
moral aspects of slavery had finally led to strife in the churches.
The southern churches protested against the action of the northern
1 Horace Greeley, " The American Conflict," Vol. I, p. 355. P'or a similar meeting
in Montgomery, see Hodgson, p. 459 et seq.
2 See Townsend Collection, Columbia University Library, Vol. I, p. 187. One
poor white man in Tallapoosa County welcomed the election of Lincoln, for " now the
negroes would be freed and white men could get more work and better pay." Authori-
ties for the political history of Alabama before i860: Hodgson*'s "Cradle of the Con-
federacy"; Garrett's " Reminiscences of Public Men of Alabama"; Brewer's "Alabama";
Brown's " History of Alabama " ; Miller's " History of Alabama " ; Pickett's " History
of Alabama " (Owen's edition) ; " Northern Alabama Illustrated " ; " Memorial Record
of Alabama" ; DuBose's " Life and Times of William L. Yancey" ; Ililliard's " Politics
and Pen Pictures and Speeches"; Transactions of Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, papers by
Yonge, Cozart, Culver, Scott, and Pctrie.
^O'Gorman, " History of the Roman Catholic Church in the United States," p. 425.
22 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
religious bodies in going into politics on the slavery question and
thus causing endless strife between the sections as represented in
the churches. The response of the northern societies to such pro-
tests resulted in the gradual alienation of the southern members and
finally in separation. The first division in Alabama came in 1821,
when the x\ssociate Reformed Presbyterian church excluded slave-
holders from communion and thereby lost its southern members.*
Next came the separation of the two strongest Protestant denomina-
tions, the Baptists and the Methodists. The southern Baptists
were, as slaveholders, excluded from appointment as missionaries,
agents, or officers of the Board of Foreign Missions, although they
contributed their full share to missions. The Alabama Baptist
Convention in 1844 led the way to separation with a protest against
this discrimination. The Board stated in reply that under no cir-
cumstances would a slaveholder be appointed by them to any posi-
tion. The Board of the Home Mission Society made a similar
declaration. The formal withdrawal of the southern state conventions
followed in 1844, and in 1845 the Southern Baptist Convention was
formed.^
In the Methodist Episcopal church the conflict over slavery had
long been smouldering, and in 1844 it broke out in regard to the
ownership of slaves by the wife of Bishop Andrew of Alabama. The
hostile sections agreed to separate into a northern and a southern
church, and a Plan of Separation was adopted. This was disre-
garded by the northern body and the question of the division of prop-
erty went to the courts. The United States Supreme Court finally
decided in favor of the southern church. From these troubles
angry feelings on both sides resulted. The southern church took
the name of the Methodist Episcopal Church South; the northern
church retained the old name.^
In 1858, the northern conferences of the Methodist Protestant
1 Carroll, " Religious Forces of the United States," p. 306 ; Thompson, " History
of the Presbyterian Churches in the United States," pp. 41, 135.
2 Statistics of Churches, Census of 1890, p. 146; Riley, "History of the Baptists
in the Southern States East of the Mississippi," p. 205 et seq. ; Newman, "History of
the Baptists of the United States," pp. 443-454.
^ See Smith, " Life of James Osgood Andrew " ; Buckley, " History of Metho-
dism"; McTyeire, "History of Methodism"; Alexander, "History of the Methodist
Episcopal Church South" ; Statistics of Churches, p. 581.
SEPARATION OF THE CHURCHES
23
Church, having failed to change the constitution of the church in
regard to slavery, withdrew, and uniting with a number of Wesley an
Methodists, formed the Methodist Church/
The Southern Aid Society was formed in New York in 1854 for
mission work in the South because it was generally beheved that the
American Home Mission Society was allied with the abohtionists,
and because the latter society refused to aid any minister or mis-
sionary who was a slaveholder. In Alabama the Southern Aid
Society worked principally among the Presbyterians of north
Alabama.^
The Presbyterians (N.S.) separated in 1858 ''on account of
politics," and the southern branch formed the United Synod South.^
The East Alabama Presbytery (O.S.) in 1861 supported the Presby-
tery of Memphis in a protest against the action of the General Assem-
bly of the church in entering politics. The Presbytery of South
Alabama (O.S.) met at Selma in July, 1861, severed its connection
with the General Assembly, and recommended a meeting of a Con-
federate States Assembly. This Assembly was held at Augusta
and formed the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of
America. A long address was pubhshed, setting forth the causes of
the separation, the future policy of the church, and its attitude towards
slavery. It declared that the northern section of the church with
its radical policy was playing into the hands of both slaveholders
and abolitionists and thus weakening its influence with both. "We, "
the address stated; "in our ecclesiastical capacity are neither the
friends nor foes of slavery." As long as they were connected with
the radical northern church the southern Presbyterians felt that they
would be excluded from useful work among the slaves by the suspi-
cions of the southern people concerning their real intentions.^
The Christian church was divided in 1854. During the war
the southern synods of the Evangelical Lutherans withdrew and
^ Statistics of Churches, p. 566.
2 Southern Aid Society Reports, 1854-1861.
3 Statistics of Churches, p. 684; Carroll, "Religious Forces," pp. 281, 306;
Thompson, "History of the Presbyterian Churches," p. 135.
4 Thompson, "History of the Presbyterian Churches," p. 155 ; Johnson, "History
of the Southern Presbyterian Church," pp. ;i;i;i, 339 ; McPherson, " History of the
Rebellion," p. 508; "Annual Cyclopaedia" (1862), p. 707; Statistics of Churches,
p. 683.
24 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
formed the General Synod South. There were few members of
these churches in Alabama.^
The Cumberland Presbyterians, though separated by the war,
seem not to have formally established an independent organization
in the Confederate States. A convention was called to meet at Selma
in 1864, but nothing resulted.^
In May, 1861, the Protestant Episcopal Convention of Alabama
declared null and void that part of the constitution of the diocese
relating to its -connection with the church in the United States. In-
stead of the President of the United States, the Governor of Alabama,
and later, the President of the Confederate States, was prayed for
in the formal prayer. Bishop Cobbs, a strong opponent of secession,
died one hour before the secession of the state was announced. Rev.
R. H. Wilmer, a Confederate sympathizer, was elected to succeed
him.^ In July the bishops of the southern states met in Montgomery
to draft a new constitution and canons. A resolution was passed
stating that the secession of the southern states from the Union and
the formation of a new government rendered it expedient that the
dioceses within those states should form an independent organiza-
tion. The new constitution was adopted in November, 1861, by a
general convention, and the Protestant Episcopal Church in the
Confederate States was formed.* And thus the religious ties were
broken.
Business had also become sectionalized by 1861. The southern
states felt keenly their dependence upon the states of the North for
manufactures, water transportation, etc. For two decades before
the war the southern newspapers agitated the question and advocated
measures that would tend to secure economic independence of the
North. As an instance of the feeling, many of the educators of the
state were in favor of using only those text-books written by southern
men and printed in the South. Professor A. P. Barnard ^ of the
University of Alabama was strenuously in favor of such action. He
^ Carroll, " Religious Forces," pp. 93, 178.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1864), p. 683.
3 Wilmer, " Recent Past," p. 248.
* Perry, " History of the Anmerican Episcopal Church," Vol. II, p. 328 et seq. ;
McPherson, " History of the Rebellion," p. 515 ; Whitaker, " Church in Alabama."
^ President of Columbia College (N.Y.) during and after the war.
SPEECH OF SENATOR CLAY
25
declared that nothing ought to be bought from the North. From
1845 to 1 86 1, fifteen "Commercial Conventions" were held in the
South, largely attended by the most prominent business men and
poHticians. The object of these conventions was to discuss means
of attaining economic independence.
When Alabama withdrew from the Union in 1 861, no bonds were
broken. Practically the only bond of Union for most of the people
had been in the churches; to the Wasjiington government and to
the North they had never become attached. The feehngs of the
great majority of the people of the state are expressed in the last
speech of Senator C. C. Clay of north Alabama in the United States
Senate. It had been forty-two years, he said, since Alabama had
entered the Union amidst scenes of excitement and violence caused
by the hostihty of the North against the institution of slavery in the
South (referring to the conflict over Missouri). In the churches,
southern Christians were denied communion because of what the
North styled the "leprosy of slavery." In violation of Constitution
and laws southern people were refused permission to pass through
the North with their property. The South was refused a share in the
lands acquired mainly by her diplomacy, blood, and treasure. The
South was robbed of her property and restoration was refused. Crim-
inals who fled North were protected, and southern men who sought
to recover their slaves were murdered. Southern homes were burned
and southern famihes murdered. This had been endured for years,
and there was no hope of better. The Republican platform was a
declaration of war against the South. It was hostile to domestic
peace, reproached the South as unchristian and heathenish, and
imputed sin and crime to that section. It was a strong incitement
to insurrection, arson, and murder among the negroes. The southern
whites were denied equality with northern whites or even with free
negroes, and were branded as an inferior race. The man nominated
for President disregarded the judgment of courts, the obligations of
the Constitution, and of his oath by declaring his approval of any
measure to prohibit slavery in the territories of the United States.
The people of the North branded the people of the South as outlaws,
insulted them, consigned them to the execration of posterity and to
ultimate destruction. "Is it to be expected that we will or can exer-
cise that Godlike virtue that bearcth all things, believeth all things,
26 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
hopeth all things, endureth all things ; which tells us to love our ene-
mies, and bless them that curse us? Are we expected to be denied
the sensibilities, the sentiments, the passions, the reason, the instincts
of men?" Have we no pride, no honor, no sense of shame, no rever-
ence for ancestors and care for posterity, no love of home, of family,
of friends? Are we to confess baseness, discredit the fame of our
sires, dishonor ourselves and degrade posterity, abandon our homes
and flee the country — all -5- all — for the sake of the Union ? Shall
we live under a government administered by those who deny us
justice and brand us as inferiors ? whose avowed principles and poHcy
must destroy domestic tranquillity, imperil the lives of our wives and
children, and ultimately destroy the state? The freemen of Ala-
bama have proclaimed to the world that they will not/
1 Smith, pp. 448-450, condensed.
CHAPTER II
SECESSION FROM THE UNION
On November 12, i860, a committee of prominent citizens, ap-
pointed by a convention of the people of several counties, asked the
governor whether he intended to call the state convention immedi-
ately after the choice of presidential electors or to wait until the elec-
tors should have chosen the President. They also asked to be
informed of the time he intended to order an election of delegates to
the convention/ Governor Moore replied that a candidate for the
presidency was not elected until the electors cast their votes, and until
that time he would not call a convention. The electors would vote
on December 5, and as he had no doubt that Lincoln would be elected,
he would then order an election for December 24, and the convention
would assemble in Montgomery on January 7, 1861. The date, he
said, was placed far ahead in order that the people might have time
to consider the subject. He summed up the situation as follows:
Lincoln was the head of a sectional party pledged to the destruction
of slavery; the non-slaveholding states had repeatedly resisted the
execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, even nuUifying the statutes of
the United States by their laws intended to prevent the execution
of the Fugitive Slave Law ; Virginia had been invaded by abolitionists
and her citizens murdered; emissaries had burned towns in Texas;
and in some instances poison had been given to slaves with which to
destroy the whites. With Lincoln as President the abohtionists
would soon control the Supreme Court and then slavery would be
abolished in the Federal district and in the territories. There would
1 Smith, "History and Debates of the Convention of Alabama," i86i, p. 12. My
account of the convention is condensed almost entirely from Smith's " Debates." Smith
was a coiiperationist member from Tuscaloosa County. He kept full notes of the pro-
ceedings and is impartial in his reports of speeches. Almost the entire edition of the
" Debates " was destroyed by fire in 1861. Hodgson, '• Cradle of the Confederacy," and
DuBose, " Life and Times of William L. Yancey," both give short accounts of the
convention.
27
28 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
soon be a majority of free states large enough to alter the Constitution
and to destroy slavery in the states. The state of society, with four
million negroes turned loose, would be too horrible to contemplate,
and the only safety for Alabama lay in secession, which was within
her right as a sovereign state. The Federal government was estab-
lished for the protection and not the destruction of rights ; it had
only the powers delegated by the states and hence had not the power
of coercion. Alabama was devoted to the Union, but could not con-
sent to become a degraded member of it. The state in seceding ought
to consult the other southern states; but first she must decide for
herself, and cooperate afterwards. The convention, the governor
said, would not be a place for the timid or the rash. Men of wisdom
and experience were needed, men who could determine what the honor
of the state and the security of the people demanded, and who had
the moral courage to carry out the dictates of their honest judgment.
The proclamation, ordering an election on Christmas Eve and the
assembly of the convention at Montgomery, on January 7, 1861,
was issued on December 6, the day after the choice of Lincoln by
the electors. On January 7, every one of the one hundred delegates
was present. It was a splendid body of men, the best the people
could send.
There were the "secessionists," who wanted immediate and sepa-
rate secession of the state without regard to the action of the other
southern states; the ''cooperationists," who were divided among
themselves, some wanting the cooperation of the southern states
within the Union in order to force their rights from the central gov-
ernment, and others wanting the southern states to come to an agree-
ment within the Union and then secede and form a confederacy,
while a third class wanted a clear understanding among the cotton
states before secession. It was said that there were a few "sub-
missionists," but the votes and speeches fail to show any.
At first both parties claimed a majority, but before the convention
opened it was known that the larger number were secessionists. A
test vote on the election of a presiding officer showed the relative
strength of the parties. WiUiam M. Brooks of Perry was elected
over Robert Jemison of Tuscaloosa by a vote of 54 to 46, north
Alabama voting for Jemison, central and south Alabama for Brooks.
And thus the parties voted throughout the convention.
SECESSION FROM THE UNION
29
It is probable that the majority of the delegates were formerly
Whigs, and a majority of them was still hostile to Yancey, who was
the only prominent agitator elected. His colleague, from Mont-
gomery County, was Thomas H. Watts, formerly a Whig. Other
prominent secessionists were J. T. Dowdell, John T. Morgan,
Thomas H. Herndon, E.
S. Dargan, WiUiam M.
Brooks, and Frankhn K.
Beck. The opposition
leaders were Wilham R.
Smith, Robert Jemison,
M. J. Bulger, Nicholas
Davis, Jeremiah Clem-
ens, Thomas J. McClel-
lan, and David P. Lewis.
Yancey, Morgan, and
Watts excepted, the oppo-
sition had the more able
speakers and debaters
and the more political
experience. The advan-
tage of representation was
with the white counties,
which sent 70 of the
100 delegates.
When the convention
settled down to work,
the grievances of the
South had no important
place in the discussions.
The little that was said on the subject came from the cooperationists
and that only incidentally. There was a genuine fear of social revo-
lution brought about by the Republican programme, but the seces-
sionists had been stating their grievances for twenty years and were
now silent.^ All seemed to agree that the present state of affairs was
1 Except Yancey, who declared that the disease preying on the vitals of the Federal
Union was not due to any defect in the Constitution, but to the heads, hearts, and con-
sciences of the northern j)eople ; that no guarantees, no amenchnents, could reeducate
PARTIES IN SECESSION CONVENTION
Secession at once.
Cooperation.
+ Majority of population (I860) Negroes.
Contesting delegation from Slielby County.
Delegates from Coosa and Talladega, and
Clemens from Madison voted for Secession
though elected and acted untlLlUialvote as
cooperationists.
30 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
unbearable, and that secession was the only remedy. The only ques-
tion was, How to secede ? To decide that question the leaders of each
party were placed on the Committee on Secession. A majority of the
convention was in favor of immediate, separate secession. They
held the logical state sovereignty view that the state, while a member
of the Union, should not combine with another against the government
or the party controlling it. Such a course would be contrary to the
Constitution and would be equivalent to breaking up the Union while
planning to save it. As a sovereign state, Alabama could withdraw
from the Union, and hence immediate, separate secession was the
proper method. Then would follow consultation and codperation with
the other seceded southern states in forming a southern confederacy.
From the first it was known that the secessionists were strong enough
to pass at once a simple ordinance of withdrawal. They said but
little because their position was already well understood. The people
were now more united than they would be after long debates and
outside influence. Yet, for pohcy's sake, and in deference to the
feelings of the minority, the latter were allowed to debate for four
days before the question at issue was brought to a vote. In that
time they had about argued themselves over to the other side. With
the exception of Yancey, the secessionists were silent until the ordi-
nance was passed. The first resolution declared that the people of
Alabama would not submit to the administration of Lincoln and
Hamlin. Both parties voted unanimously for this resolution.^
The cooperationists were determined to resist Repubhcan rule,
but did not consider delay dangerous. Some doubtless thought that
in some way Lincoln could be held in check and the Union still be
preserved, and a number of them w^re doubtless wiUing to wait and
make another trial. It was known that an ordinance of secession
would be passed as soon as the secessionists cared to bring the ques-
tion to a vote, but for four days the Committee on Secession con-
the northern people on the slavery question, so as to induce a northern majority to with-
hold the exercise of its power in aid of abolition. Governor Moore, in the commissions
given to the ambassadors to the other states, declared that the peace, honor, and
security of the southern states were endangered by the election of Lincoln, the candi-
date of a purely sectional party, whose avowed principles demanded the destruction of
slavery.
1 It would seem that after this vote no one would say that nearly half of the mem-
bers were " Unionists," yet nearly all accounts make this statement.
SECESSION FROM THE UNION
31
sidered the matter while the cooperationists made speeches/ On
January lo the committees made two reports. The majority report,
presented by Yancey, simply provided for the immediate withdrawal of
the state from the Union. The minority report, presented by Clemens,
was in substance as follows : We are unable to see in separate state se-
cession the most effectual mode of guarding our honor and securing our
rights. This great object can best be attained by concurrent and
concentrated action of all the states interested, and such an effort
should be made before deciding finally upon our own policy. All
the southern states should be requested to meet in convention at
Nashville, February 22, 1861, to consider wrongs and appropriate
remedies. As a basis of settlement such a convention should con-
sider: (i) the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law and the
repeal of all state laws nullifying it; (2) more stringent and expHcit
provisions for the surrender of criminals escaping into another state ;
(3) guarantees that slavery should not be aboHshed in the Federal
district or in any other place under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Congress; (4) non-interference with the interstate slave trade;
(5) protection of slavery in the territories which, when admitted
as states, should decide for themselves the question of slavery;
(6) right of transit through free states with slave property; (7) the
foregoing to be irrepealable amendments to the Constitution. This
basis of settlement was not to be regarded as absolute, but simply
as the opinion of the Alabama convention, to which its delegates
to the proposed convention were expected to conform as nearly as
possible. Secession should not be attempted except after the most
thorough investigation and discussion.^
The secessionists were of one mind in regard to secession and did
not debate the subject; the cooperationists — all from north Ala-
bama — were careful to explain their views at length in their speeches
of opposition. Bulger (c.) ^ of Tallapoosa thought that separate
secession was unwise and impoHtic, but that an effort should be made
1 There were many indications that the opposition was more sectional and personal
than political. It is safe to state for north Alabama that had the Black Belt declared
for the Union, that section would have voted for secession,
^ This minority report was signed by Clemens of Madison, Lewis of Lawrence,
Winston of De Kalb, Kimball of Tallapoosa, Watkins of Franklin, and Jemison of Tusca-
loosa, all from north Alabama.
^ c, = cooperationist ; s. = secessionist ; cs. = cooperationist who voted for secession.
32 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to secure the cooperation of the other southern states before seceding]
To this end he proposed a convention of the southern states to con-
sider the grievances of the South and to determine the mode of rehef
for the present and security for the future, and, should its demands
not be compUed with, to determine upon a remedy.
Clark (c.) of Lawrence denied the right of separate secession,
which would not be a remedy for existing evils. The slavery question
would not be settled but would still be a vital and ever present issue.
Separate secession would revolutionize the government but not the
northern feeling, would not hush the pulpits, nor calm the northern
mind, nor purify Black Republicanism. The states would be in a
worse condition politically than the colonies were before the Con-
stitution was adopted. The border states would sell their slaves
south and become free states ; separate secession would be the decree
of universal emancipation. A large majority of the people were
opposed to separate secession, and besides, the state alone would be
weak and at the mercy of foreign powers. The proper policy for Ala-
bama was to remain in a southern union, at least, with the border
states for aUies. Would secession repeal ''personal Hberty" laws,
return a single fugitive slave, prevent abolition in the Federal dis-
trict and territories, or the suppression of interstate slave trade?
By secession Alabama would reHnquish her interest in the Union
and leave it in the control of Black Repubhcans. It would be almost
impossible to unite the southern states after separate secession —
as difficult as it was to form the original Union. The only hope for
peaceable secession was in a united South, and now was the time for
it, for southern sentiment, though opposed to separate secession,
was ripe for southern union. The "United South" would possess
all the requirements of a great nation — territory, resources, wealth,
population, and community of interests. Separate secession would
result in the deplorable disasters of civil war. He hoped that even
yet some poHcy of reconciliation might succeed, but if the contrary
happened, there should be no scruples about state sovereignty; the
United South would assert the God-given right of every community
to freedom and happiness. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale declared that
it was a great mistake to call his constituents submissionists, since
time after time they had declared that they would not submit to
Black RepubHcan rule. They differed as to the time and man-
SECESSION FROM THE UNION 33
ner of secession, believing that hasty secession was not a proper
remedy, that it was unwise, impoHtic, and discourteous to the
border states.
Smith of Tuscaloosa, the leader of the cooperationists,^ read
the platform upon which he was elected to the convention ; which,
in substance, was to use all honorable exertions to secure rights
in the Union, and faihng, to maintain them out of the Union.
Allegiance, he went on to say, was due first to the state, and support
was due her in any course she might adopt. If an ordinance of
secession should be passed, it would be the supreme law of the land.
Kimball (c.) of Tallapoosa said that his constituents were opposed to
secession, but were more opposed to Black RepubHcanism. Before
taking action he desired a soHd or united South. He agreed with
General Scott that with a certain unanimity of the southern states
it would be impohtic and improper to attempt coercion. To secure
the cooperation of the southern states and to justify themselves to
the world a southern convention should be called. However, rights
should be maintained even if Alabama had to withdraw from the
Union.
Watkins (c.) of Franklin stated that he would vote against the
ordinance of secession in obedience to the will of the people he repre-
sented. He believed that separate secession was wrong. Edwards
(c.) of Blount said that secession was unwise on the part of Alabama,
while Beard (c.) of Marshall thought the best, safest, and wisest
course would be to consult and cooperate with the other slave states.
He favored resistance to Black Republican rule, and his constituents,
though desiring cooperation, would abide by the action of the state.
Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa stated that he had voted against every
proposition leading to immediate and separate secession. Yet he
would give to the state, when the ordinance was passed, his whole alle-
giance ; and, if any attempt were made to coerce the state, would join
the army.^ Winston (c.) of Dc Kalb stated that his constituents were
opposed to immediate secession, yet they would, no doubt, acquiesce.
He had written to his son, a cadet at West Point, to resign and come
home. A convention of the slave states should be called to make an
attempt to settle difficulties. Davis (c.) of Madison, who had stoutly
1 It was he who compiled the debates of the convention.
2 He was the oldest general officer in the Confederate service.
D
34 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
opposed separate secession, now declared that since the meeting of
the convention serious changes had occurred. Several states had
already seceded and others would follow. Consequently Alabama
would not be alone. Clemens (cs.) of Madison said he would
vote for secession, but would not do so if the result depended upon
his vote. He strongly preferred the plan proposed by the minority
of the committee on secession.
During the debates there was not a single strong appeal for the
Union. There was simply no Union feehng, but an intense dishke
for the North as represented by the Repubhcan party. The coop-
erationists contemplated ultimate secession. They wished to make
an attempt at compromise, but they felt sure that it would fail. Their
plan of effecting a united South within the Union was clearly uncon-
stitutional and could only be regarded as a proposition to break up
the old Union and reconstruct a new one.^
Political Theories of the Members
The secessionists held clear, logical views on the question before
them. They clearly distinguished the "state" or "people" from
"government." No secessionist ever claimed that the right of se-
cession was one derived from or preserved by the Constitution; it
was a sovereign right. Granted the sovereignty of the state, the
right to secede in any way at any time was, of course, not to be
questioned. Consequently, they said but Httle on that point.
The cooperationists were vague-minded. Most of them were
stanch beHevers in state sovereignty and opposed secession merely
on the ground of expediency. A few held a confused theory that
while the state was sovereign it had no right to secede unless
with the whole South. This view was most strongly advocated by
Clark of Lawrence. Separate secession was not a right, he said,
though he admitted the sovereignty of the state. To secede alone
would be rebelHon ; not so, if in company with other southern states.
Earnest (c.) of Jefferson said that the state was sovereign, and that
after secession any acts of the state or of its citizens to protect their
rights would not be treason. But unless the state acted in its sover-
eign capacity, it could not withdraw from the Union, and her citizens
1 Constitution, Article I, Section X : "No state shall without the consent of Con-
gress enter into any agreement or compact with another state," etc.
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MEMBERS
35
would be subject to the penalties of treason/ Sheffield (c.) of Mar-
shall believed in the right of ''secession or revolution." Clemens
of Madison, elected as a cooperationist, said that in voting for seces-
sion he did it with the full knowledge that in secession they were all
about to commit treason, and, if not successful, would suffer the pains
and penalties pronounced against the highest pohtical crime. Acting
''upon the convictions of a Hfetime" he "calmly and deliberately
walked into revolution." ^
The cooperationists were generally disposed to deny the sover-
eignty of the convention. Most of them were former Whigs, who had
never worked out a theory of government. Davis (c.) of Madison
repeatedly denied that the convention had sovereign powers; sover-
eignty, he said, was held by the people. Clark (c.) of Lawrence
complained that the convention was encroaching upon the rights
of the people whom it should protect, and asserted it did not possess
unhmited power, but that its power was conferred by act of the legis-
lature, which created only a general agency for a special purpose;
that the convention had no power to do more than pass the ordinance
of secession and acts necessary thereto. Smith (c.) said that the con-
vention was the creature of the legislature, not of the people, and that
the southern Congress was the creature of the convention. Buford
(s.) of Barbour ^ doubted whether the convention possessed legisla-
tive powers. According to his views, pohtical or sovereign power
was vested in the people ; the convention was not above the consti-
tution which created the legislature. Watts (s.) of Montgomery
beheved that the power of the convention to interfere with the con-
stitution was confined to such changes as were necessary to the perfect
accompHshment of secession. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee summed up
the theory of the majority : the convention had full power and control
over the legislative, executive, and judiciary ; the people were present
in convention in the persons of their representatives and in them was
the sovereignty, the power, and the will of the state. This was the
theory upon which the convention acted.
1 He was here referring indirectly to the action of the state authorities in seizing the
forts at Pensacola and Mobile before secession.
2 Clemens was accused of voting for secession in order to obtain the command of
the militia. He had formerly been an army officer, and was now made major-general
of militia. It was not long before he deserted and went North.
8 Who succeeded Yancey in the convention after the latter was sent to Europe.
36 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Passage of the Ordinance of Secession
I
On January ii, 1861, Yancey spoke at length, closing the debate
on the question of secession. Referring to the spirit of fraternity
that prevailed, he stated that irritation and suspicion had, in great
degree, subsided. The majority had yielded to the minority all the
time wanted for dehberation, and every one liad been given an oppor-
tunity to record his sentiments. The question had not been pressed
to a vote before all were ready. Though preferring a simple ordi-
nance of secession, the majority had, for the sake of harmony and
fraternal feehng, yielded to amendment by the minority. All, he
said, were for resistance to Repubhcan rule, and differed only as
to the manner of resistance. Some believed in secession, others in
revolution. The ordinance might mean disunion, secession, or
revolution, as the members preferred. The mode was organized
cooperation, not of states, but of the people of Alabama, in resistance
to wrong. Yet the ordinance provided for cooperation with other
states upon the basis of the Federal Constitution. Every effort, he
said, had been made to find common ground upon which the advo-
cates of resistance might meet, and all parties had been satisfied.
This was not a movement of the pohticians, but a great popular move-
ment, based upon the widespread, deep-seated conviction that the gov-
ernment had fallen into the hands of a sectional majority who were
determined to use it for the destruction of the rights of the South.
All were driven by an irresistible tide ; the minority had been unable
to repress the movement, the majority had not been able to add one
particle to its momentum; in northern, not in southern, hands was
held the rod that smote the rock from which flowed this flood.
Some, he said, concluded that by dissolving the Union the rich
inheritance bequeathed by the fathers was hazarded. But Hberties
were one thing, the power of government delegated to secure them
was another. Liberties were inalienable, and the state governments
were formed to secure them ; the Federal government was the common
agent, and its powers should be withdrawn when it abused them to
destroy the rights of the people. This movement was not hostile
to Hberty nor to the Federal Constitution, but was merely a dismissal
of an unfaithful agent. The state now resumed the duties formerly
delegated to that agent. The ordinance of secession was a declaration
General L. P. Walker, First Confederate Secretary of War.
President of Convention of 1875,
William R. Smith, leader of
Cooperationists in 1861.
CIVIL WAR LEADERS.
JERE. Clemens.
PASSAGE OF THE ORDINANCE OF SECESSION 37
of this fact and also a proposition to form a new government similar
to the old. All were urged to sign the ordinance, not to express
approval, but to give notice to their enemies that the people were not
divided. "I now ask that the vote may be taken," he said.
The ordinance was called up. It was styled "An Ordinance to
dissolve the Union between Alabama and other States united under the
Compact styled 'The Constitution of the United States of America.'"
The preamble stated that the election of Lincoln and Hamhn by a
sectional party avowedly hostile to the domestic institutions, peace,
and security of Alabama, preceded by many dangerous infractions
of the Constitution by the states and people of the North, was a politi-
cal wrong of so insulting and menacing a character as to justify the
people af Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided measures
for their future peace and security. The ordinance simply stated
that Alabama withdrew from the Union and that her people resumed
the powers delegated by the Constitution to the Federal government.
A cooperationist amendment expressed the desire of the people to
form with the other southern states a permanent government, and
invited a convention of the states to meet in Montgomery on February
4, 1 86 1, for consultation in regard to the common safety. The ordi-
nance was passed by a vote of 69 to 31, every delegate voting. Fif-
teen cooperationists voted for secession and 22 signed the ordinance.
In the convention opinions varied as to whether peace or war
would follow secession. The great majority of the members, and of
the people also, beheved that peaceful relations would continue. All
truly wished for peace. A number of the cooperationists expressed
themselves as fearing war, but this was when opposing secession,
and they probably said more than they really beheved. Yet in
nearly all the speeches made in the convention there seemed to be
distinguishable a feeling of fear and dread lest war should follow.
However, had war been a certainty, secession would not have been
delayed or checked.
There was warm discussion on the question of submitting the
ordinance to the people for ratification or rejection. The coopera-
tionists, both before and after the passage of the ordinance, favored
its reference to the people in the hope that the measure would be
delayed or defeated. No one expected that it would be referred to
the people, but this was a good question for obstructive purposes.
38 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ABABAMA
The minority report on secession declared that, in a matter of such
vital importance, involving the Hves and liberties of a whole people,
the ordinance should be submitted to them for their discussion,
and that secession should be attempted only after ratification by a
direct vote of the people on that single issue.
Posey (c.) of Lauderdale said that his constituents expected the
question of secession to be referred to the people, and that they would
submit more wilHngly to a decision made by popular vote; that the
ordinance was objectionable to them unless they were allowed to
vote on it. He further stated that when the convention had refused
to submit the ordinance to the popular vote, the first impulse of some
of the cooperationists had been to "bolt the convention." However,
not being responsible, they preferred to remain and aid in providing
for the emergencies of the future. Kimbal (c.) of Tallapoosa said
that the people were the interested parties, that sovereignty was in
the people, and that they ought to decide the question. Edwards
(c.) of Blount said that his constituents expected the ordinance to
be referred to them and had instructed him to use his best exer-
tions to secure reference to the people. Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa
voted against all propositions looking toward secession without
reference to the people. Davis (c.) of Madison denied the sover-
eignty of the convention. He said that the vote of the people
might be one way and that of the convention another. He beheved
that the majority in convention represented a minority of the
people.
In closing the debate on this subject, Yancey (s.) of Montgomery
said that, as a measure of poHcy, to submit the ordinance to a vote
of the people was wrong. The convention was clothed with all the
powers of the people; it was the people acting in their sovereign
capacity; the government was not a pure democracy, but a govern-
ment of the people, though not by the people. Historically the con-
vention was the supreme power in American poHtical theory, and
submission to the people was a new doctrine. If the ordinance should
be submitted to the people, the friends of secession would triumph,
but irritation and prejudice would be aroused. Yancey's views
prevailed.
ESTABLISHING THE CONFEDERACY
Establishing the Confederacy
39
A number of the cooperationists prefessed to believe that secession
would result in disintegration and anarchy in the South. The seces-
sionists were accused of desiring to tear down, not to build up. These
assertions were, in fact, unfounded, since, during the entire debate,
those favoring immediate secession stated plainly that they expected
to reunite with the other southern states after secession. Wilhamson
(s.) of I^owndes said that to declare to the world that they were not
ready to unite with the other slave states in a permanent government
would be to act in bad faith and subject themselves to contempt
and scorn; united action was necessary; financial and commercial
affairs were in a deplorable condition ; confidence was lost, and in
the business world all was gloom and despair — this could be reme-
died only by a permanent government. Whatley (s.) of Calhoun
w^as unwilHng for it to be said by posterity that they tore down the
old government and failed to reconstruct a new; the cotton states
should estabhsh a government modelled on the Federal Union.
In accordance with these views the ordinance of secession pro-
posed a convention of southern states, and a few days later a resolu-
tion was passed approving the suggestion of South Carolina to form
a provisional government upon the plan of the old Union and to pre-
pare for a permanent government. Each state was to send as many
delegates to the convention on February 4 as it had had senators and
representatives in Congress. The Alabama convention (January 16)
elected one deputy from each congressional district and two from the
state at large, most of them being cooperationists or moderate seces-
sionists.
Yancey, on January 16, read a unanimous report from the Com-
mittee on Secession in favor of forming a provisional confederate
government at once. The report also stated that the people of Ala-
bama had never been dissatisfied with the Constitution of the United
States; that their dissatisfaction had been with the conduct of the
northern people in violating the Constitution and in dangerous mis-
interpretation of it, causing the belief that, while acting through the
forms of government, they intended to destroy the rights of the South.
The Federal Constitution, the report declared, represented a com-
plete scheme of government, capable of being put into speedy opera-
40 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
.tion, and was so familiar to the people that when properly interpreted
they would feel safe under it. A speedy confederation of the seceded
states was desirable, and there was no better basis than the United
States Constitution. The report recommended the formation, first,
of a provisional, and later, of a permanent, government. The seces-
sionists warmly advocated the speedy formation of a new confederacy.
The cooperationists renewed their pohcy of obstruction. Jemison
(c.) of Tuscaloosa proposed to strike out the part of the resolution
relating to the formation of a permanent government. Another
cooperationist wanted delay in order that the border states might
have time to take part in forming the proposed government. Others
wanted the people to elect a new convention to act on the question.
Yancey replied that delay was dangerous, if coercion was intended
by the North ; that the issue had been before the people and that
they had invested their delegates with full power; that the conven-
tion then in session had ample authority to settle all questions con-
cerning a provisional or a permanent government; that another
election would only cause irritation; that delay, waiting for the se-
cession of the border states, would be suicidal. The proposition for
a new convention was lost by a vote of 53 to 36.
The convention decided to continue the work until the end.
After choosing delegates (January 16) to the southern convention,
which was to meet in Montgomery on February 4, the state conven-
tion adjourned until the Confederate provisional government was
planned and the permanent constitution written. Then the state
convention met again on March 4 to ratify them. The cooperation-
ists now proposed that the new plan of government be submitted to
the people. It was right and expedient, they said, to let the people
decide. Morgan ^ (s.) of Dallas said that the proposition for rati-
fication by direct vote of the people was absurd. The people would
never ratify, for too many unrelated questions would be brought in.
Dargan (s.) of Mobile said that the people had conferred upon the
convention full powers to act, and that a new election would harass
the candidates with new issues such as the slave trade, reconstruction,
etc., introduced by the opponents of secession. Stone (s.) of Pickens
thought that a new election would cause angry and bitter discussions,
wrangling, distrust, and division among the people ; that the proposed
1 The present (1905) senior U. S. senator from Alabama.
ESTABLISHING THE CONFEDERACY
41
constitution was very like the United States Constitution, to which
the people were so devoted that they had given up the Union rather
than the Constitution; that Lincoln's inaugural address was a dec-
laration of war, and a permanent government was necessary to raise
money for armies and fleets. Still the cooperationists obstructed,
saying that not to refer to the people was unfair and ilKberal; that
the convention was usurping the powers of the people, who desired
to be heard in the matter ; that government by a few was hke a house
built on the sand ; that there was no danger in waiting, for the people
would be sure to ratify and then would be better satisfied, etc. Finally
most of the cooperationists agreed that it would be better not to refer
the question to the people and the permanent Confederate constitu-
tion was ratified on March 12 by the vote of 87 to 5.^
For the first time Yancey stood at the head of the people of the
state. They were ready to give him any office. But the coopera-
tionists and a few secessionist pohticians in the convention were
jealous of his rising strength and desired to stay his progress. So
Earnest (c.) of Jefferson introduced a self-denying resolution making
inehgible to election to Congress the members of the state legislature
and of the convention. It was a direct attack by the dissatisfied
politicians upon the prominent men in the convention, and especially
upon Yancey. The measure was supported by Jemison (c.) who
said that it was a practice never to elect a member of a legislative
body to an office created by the legislature. Clemens (cs.) thought
such a measure unnecessary, as the majority necessary to pass it could
defeat any undesirable candidate. Stone (s.) said that such a resolu-
tion would cost the state the services of some of her best men when
most needed ; that the best men were in the convention ; and that the
southern Confederacy should be intrusted to the friends, not to the
enemies, of secession. Morgan (s.) of Dallas thought that, as a matter
of policy, the congressmen would be chosen from outside of the con-
vention. Bragg (s.) of Mobile wanted the best men regardless of
place; this was no ordinary work and the best men were needed;
the people had already made a choice of the members once and would
approve them again. Yancey said that in principle he was opposed
to such a measure. He declared that he would not be a candidate.
1 Bulger of Tallapoosa, Jones and Wilson of Fayette, and Sheets of Winston voted
in the negative.
42 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
But he believed that the people had a right to a choice from their
entire number, and that the convention had no right to violate the
equality of citizenship by disfranchising the 223 members of the con-
vention and the legislature. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee at first favored
the resolution, but upon discovering that it was aimed at a few leaders
and especially at Yancey, he opposed it. He did not wish the leaders
of secession to be proscribed.
The resolution was lost by a vote of 46 to 50, but the delegates
sent to the Provisional Congress were, with one exception, taken from
outside the convention. A few politicians among the secessionists
united with the cooperationists and, passing by the most experienced
and able leaders, chose an inexperienced Whiggish delegation.^
The African Slave Trade
The Committee on Foreign Relations reported that the power of
regulating the slave trade would properly be conferred upon the Con-
federate government, but, meanwhile, believing that the slave trade
should be prohibited until the Confederacy was formed, the, com-
mittee reported an ordinance forbidding it. Morgan (s.) of Dallas
opposed the ordinance because it was silent as to the cause of the pro-
hibition. He was opposed to the slave trade on the ground of pubHc
policy. If at liberty to carry out Christian convictions, he would have
Africans brought over to be made Christian slaves, the highest con-
dition attainable by the negro. In holding slaves, the South was
charged with sin and crime, but the southern people were unable to
perceive the wrong and unwilling to cease to do what the North con-
sidered evil. The present movement rested, in great measure, upon
their assertion of the right to hold the African in slavery. The laws
of Congress denouncing the slave trade as piracy had been a shelter
to those who assailed the South, and had affected the standing of the
South among nations. If the slave trade were wrong, then it was
much worse to bring Christian and enlightened negroes from Vir-
ginia to Alabama than a heathen savage from Africa to Alabama.
Slavery was the only force which had ever been able to elevate the
negro. He beheved that on grounds of public pohcy the traffic should
be condemned, but it was a question better left to the Confederate
1 See below, Ch. Ill, sec. 5.
THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 43
government, because the various states would not make uniform laws.
There were slaves enough for twenty years and, when needed, more
could be had. Reopening of the African slave trade should be for-
bidden by the Confederate government expressly for reasons of public
policy.
Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the question of morahty did
not arise ; the slave trade was not wrong. The heathen African was
greatly benefited by the change to Christian Alabama. But no more
negroes were needed ; they were already increasing too fast and there
was no territory for extension. Crowded together, the white and
black might degenerate hke the Spaniards and natives in Mexico.
He supported the ordinance as a measure to disarm foes who charged
that one of the reasons for secession was a desire to reopen the African
slave trade, which should be denied to the world. The slave trade
would lead to war, and ''If Cotton is King, his throne is peace,"
war would destroy him. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale did not want
another negro on the soil of Alabama. The people of the border
states were afraid that the cotton states would reopen the slave trade,
but for the sake of uniformity the question should be left to the Con-
federate government. Posey (c.) of Lauderdale also thought the
border states should be reassured, and said that on the grounds of
expediency alone he would vote against the slave trade. There were
already too many negroes; already more land was needed, and that
for whites. The slave trade should be prohibited as a great evil to
the South. Potter (c.) of Cherokee was astonished that the slave
trade and slavery were treated as if identical in point of morality.
It was a duty to support and perpetuate slavery ; the slave trade was
immoral in its tendency and effects; the question, however, should
be settled on the grounds of pohcy alone.
Yelverton (s.) of Coffee ^ said that the slave trade should not now
be reopened nor forever closed, but that the regulation of it should be
left to the legislature. It was said that the world was against the
South on the slavery question ; then the South should either own all
the slaves, or set them all free in deference to unholy prejudice. As
the southern people were not ready to surrender the negroes, they
should be at liberty to buy them in any market, subject simply to the
laws of trade. Slavery was the cause of secession and should not be
1 Coffee was a white county and had very few slaves.
44 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
left in doubt. A slave in Alabama cost eight times as much as one
imported from Africa. If the border states entered the Confederacy,
they could furnish slaves; if they remained in the Union and thus
became foreign country, the South should not be forced to buy from
them alone. Slavery was a social, moral, and political blessing.
The Bible sanctioned it, and had nothing to say in favor of it in one
country and against it in another. To restrict the slave market to
the United States would be a blow at states rights and free trade, and
with slavery stricken, King Cotton would become a petty tyrant. Sla-
very had built up the Yankees, socially, poHtically, and commercially.
The English were a calculating people and would not hesitate, on
account of slavery, to recognize southern independence, and other
nations would do likewise. Expansion of territory would come and
would cause an increased demand for slaves. The arguments against
the slave trade, he said, were that fanaticism might be angered, that
there were too many negroes already, and that those who had slaves
to sell might suffer from reduced prices. But the larger part of the
people would prefer to purchase in a cheaper market, and non-slave-
holders, as they grew wealthier, could become slave owners. The
argument against the slave trade, he added, was usually the one of
dollars and cents. The great moral effect was lost sight of, and it
seemed from some arguments that Christianity did not require the
Bible to be taught to the poor slave unless profit followed. The time
was not far distant when the reopening of the slave trade would be
considered essential to the industrial prosperity of the cotton states.
Stone (s.).of Pickens said that he would not hesitate, from moral
reasons, to purchase a slave anywhere. Slavery was sanctioned by
the divine law ; it was a blessing to the negro. But on grounds of
policy he would insist upon the prohibition of the slave trade. Too
many slaves would make too much cotton; prices would then fall
and weaken the institution. Keep the prices high, and the institu-
tion would be strengthened; reduce the value of the slaves, and the
interest of the owners in the institution would be reduced, and the
border states would listen to plans for general emancipation. There
was no territory in which slavery could expand.
Yancey (s.) explained his course in the Southern Commercial
Conventions in preceding years when he had advocated the repeal of
the laws against the slave trade. He thought that the laws of Con-
THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 45
gross defining the slave trade as piracy placed a stigma on the insti-
tution, condemned it from the point of view of the government, and
thus violated the spirit of the Constitution by discriminating against
the South. He did not then advocate the reopening of the slave trade,
nor would he do so at this time. For two reasons he insisted that the
Confederate Congress should prohibit the slave trade: (i) already
there were as many slaves as were needed; (2) to induce the border
states to enter the Confederacy.
Dowdell (s.) of Chambers proposed an amendment to the ordi-
nance of prohibition, declaring that slavery was a moral, social, and
political blessing, and that any attempt to hinder its expansion should
be opposed. He opposed reopening the slave trade, though he con-
sidered that there was no moral distinction between slavery and the
slave trade. The border states, he said, need not be encouraged by
declarations of poHcy; they would join the Confederacy anyway.
Slavery might be regulated by Congress, but should not be prohibited
by organic law. He expressed a wish that he might never see the
day when white immigration would drive out slave labor and take its
place, nor did he want social or pohtical inequality among white
people whom he believed should be kept free, independent, and equal,
recognizing no subordinate except those made as such by God. The
legislature, he thought, should be left to deal with the evil of white
immigration from the North, so that the southern people might be
kept a slaveholding people. But, he asked, can that be done with
slaves at $1000 a head? And must the hands of the people be tied
because a fantastical outside world says that slavery and the slave
trade are morally wrong?
Watts (s.) of Montgomery proposed that the Confederacy be given
power to prohibit the importation of slaves from any place. Smith (c.)
of Tuscaloosa said that the proposal of Watts was a threat against
the border states, which would lose their slave market unless they
joined the Confederacy ; that the border states must be kept friendly,
a bulwark against the North.
A resolution was finally passed to the effect that the people of
Alabama were opposed, for reasons of public policy, to reopening the
slave trade, and the state's delegates in Congress were instructed to
insist on the prohibition.
The debates show clearly the feeling of the delegates that, on the
46 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
i
slavery question, the rest of the world was against them, and hence,
as a measure of expediency, they were in favor of prohibiting the trade.
Some wished to have all the whites finally become slaveholders ; others
believed that the negroes were the economic and social enemies of
the whites, and they wanted no more of them. But all agreed that
slavery was a good thing for the negro.
Yancey (s.) introduced a resolution favoring the free navigation of
the Mississippi. The North, he said, was uncertain as to the policy
of the South and must be assured that the South wished no restric-
tions upon trade. '' Free trade " was its motto. Dowdell (s.) proposed
that the navigation should be free only to those states and territories
lying on the river and its tributaries, while Smith (c.) thought that
all navigation should remain as unrestricted and open to all as
before secession. Yancey thought that absolutely unrestricted navi-
gation would tend to undermine secession, for it would tend to recon-
struct the late political union into a commercial union. Such a poHcy
would discriminate against European friends in favor of New England
enemies. As passed, the resolution expressed the sense of the con-
vention that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to all the
people of those states and territories which were situated on that river
or its tributaries.
Commissioners to Other States
As soon as the governor issued writs of election for a convention,
fearing that the legislatures of other states then in session might ad-
journ before caUing conventions, he sent a commissioner to each
southern state to consult and advise with the governor and legisla-
ture in regard to the question of secession and later confederation.
These commissioners made frequent reports to the governor and con-
vention and did much to secure the prompt organization of a per-
manent government.*
1 The commissioners sent to the various states were as follows : Virginia, A. F.
Hopkins and F. M. Gilmer ; Sou^k Carolina, John A. Elmore ; North Carolina, I. W.
Garrott and Robert H. Smith ; Maryland, J. L. M. Curry ; Delaware, David Clopton ;
Kentucky, S. F. Hale ; Missouri, William Cooper ; Tennessee, L. Pope Walker ;
Arkansas, David Hubbard ; Louisiana, John A. Winston ; Texas, J. M. Calhoun ;
Florida, E. C. Bullock ; Georgia, John G. Shorter ; Mississippi, E. W. Pettus. Only
one state, South Carolina, sent a delegate to Alabama.
COMMISSIONERS TO OTHER STATES 47
After the ordinance of secession was passed a resolution was
adopted to the effect that Alabama, being no longer a member of the
Union, was not entitled to representation at Washington and that her
representatives there should be instructed to withdraw. A second
resolution, authorizing the governor to send two commissioners to
Washington to treat with that government, caused some dabate.
Clemens (cs.) said that there was no need of sending commission-
ers to Washington, because they would not be received. Let Wash-
ington send commissioners to Alabama; South CaroHna was
differently situated; Alabama held her own forts, South CaroUna
did not. Smith (c.) proposed that only one commissioner be sent.
One would do more, efficient work and the expense would be less.
Watts (s.) said that Alabama as a former member of the Union
should inform the old government of her withdrawal and of her
policy for the future; that there were many grave and delicate mat-
ters to be settled between the two governments; and that commis-
sioners should be sent to propose terms of adjustment and to demand
a recognition of the new order.
Webb (s.) of Greene said that Alabama stood in the same atti-
tude toward the United States as toward France. And the fact that
the commissioners of South Carohna had been treated with contempt
should not influence Alabama. If one was to be in the wrong, let it
be the Washington government. To send commissioners would not
detract from the dignity of the state, but would show a desire for ami-
cable relations. Whatley (s.) took the same ground, and added that,
having seized the forts to prevent their being used against Alabama,
the state, as retiring partner, would hold them as assets until a final
settlement, especially as its share had not been received. Some
members urged that only one commissioner be sent in order to save
expenses. All were getting to be very economical. And practically
all agreed that it was the duty of the state to show her desire for
amicable relations by making advances.
Yancey thought the matter should be left to the Provisional Con-
gress; the United States had made agreements with South Carolina
about the military status of the forts and had violated the agreement ;
the other states also had claims of public property, and negotiations
should be carried on by the common agent. Separate action by the
state would only complicate matters.
48 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Finally, it was decided to send one commissioner, and the gov-
ernor appointed Thomas J. Judge, who proceeded to Washington,
with authority to negotiate regarding the forts, arsenals, and custom-
houses in the state, the state's share of the United States debt, and the
future relations between the United States and Alabama, and through
C. C. Clay, late United States senator from Alabama, applied for an
interview with the President. Buchanan refused to receive him in
his official capacity, but wrote that he would be glad to see him as a
private gentleman. Judge decHned to be received except in his official
capacity, and said that future negotiations must begin at Washington.
Foreseeing war. Watts (s.) proposed that the general assembly be
given power to confiscate the property of alien enemies, and also to
suspend the collection of debts due to ahen enemies. Shortridge (s.)
thought that the measure was not sufficiently emphatic, since war had
practically been declared. He said the courts should be closed against
the collection of debts due persons in the northern states which had
passed personal Hberty laws. He stated that Alabama owed New
York several milhon dollars, and that to pay this debt would drain
from the country the currency, which should be held to relieve the
strain.
Jones (c.) was opposed to every description of robbery. The
course proposed, he said, would be a flagrant outrage upon just cred-
itors, as the greater wrong would be done the friends of the South,
for nineteen-twentieths of the debt was due to political friends —
merchants who had always defended the rights of the South. Those
debts should be paid and honor sustained. The legislature, he added,
would pass a stay-law, which he regretted, and that would suffice.
Smith (c.) said that confiscation was an act of war, and would pro-
voke retaliation. Every action should look toward the preservation
of peace.
Clarke (s.) of Marengo saw nothing wrong in the measure. There
was no wish or intention of evading payment of the debt; payment
would only be suspended or delayed. It was a peace measure.
Lewis (cs.) said that only the war-making power would have author-
ity to pass such a measure, and that this power would be lodged in the
Confederate Congress. Meanwhile, he proposed to give the power
temporarily to the legislature.
LEGISLATION BY THE CONVENTION 49
Early in the session the secessionists introduced a resolution pledg-
ing the state to resist any attempt by the United States to coerce any
of the seceded states. Alabama could not stand aside, they said, and
see the seceded states coerced by the United States government,
which had no authority to use force. All southern states recognized
secession as the essence and test of state sovereignty, and would sup-
port each other.
Earnest (c.) of Jefferson was of the opinion that this resolution
was intended to cover acts of hostility already committed by indi-
viduals, such as Governor Moore and other officials, before the state
seceded, and to vote for the resolution subjected the voter to the pen-
alties of treason. When a state acted in its sovereign capacity and
withdrew from the Union, then those individuals were relieved. But
to vote for such a measure before secession was treason.
Morgan (s.) of Dallas said that, whether Alabama were in or out
of the Union, she could see no state coerced ; the question was not
debatable. To attack South Carohna was to attack Alabama. "We
are one united people and can never be dissevered." The North
was pledging men and money to coerce the southern states, and its
action must be answered. Jemison (c.) thought the war alarms were
false and that there was no necessity for immediate action, while
Smith (c), his colleague, heartily indorsed the measure. Jones (c.)
declared that before the state seceded he would not break the laws
of the United States ; that he had sworn to support the Constitution,
and only the state could absolve him from that oath; that such a
measure was not lawful while the state was in the Union.
After secession the resolution was again called up, and all speakers
agreed that aid should be extended to seceded states in case of coer-
cion. Some wanted to promise aid to any one of the United States
which might take a stand against the other states in behalf of the
South. Events moved so rapidly that the measure did not come to
a vote before the organization of the Provisional Congress.
Legislation by the Convention
Not only was the old political structure to be torn down, but a
new one had to be erected. In organizing the new order the conven-
tion performed many duties pertaining usually to the legislature.
50 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
This was done in order to save time and to prevent confusion in the
administration.
Citizenship was defined to include free whites only, except such
as were citizens of the United States before January ii, 1861. A per-
son born in a northern state or in a foreign country before January 1 1 ,
1 86 1, must take the oath of allegiance to the state of Alabama, and
the oath of abjuration, renouncing allegiance to all other sovereign-
ties. The state constitution was amended by omitting all references
to the United States ; the state officers were absolved from their oath
to support the United States Constitution ; jurisdiction of the United
States over waste and unappropriated lands and navigable waters
was rescinded ; and navigation was opened to all citizens of Alabama
and other states that "may unite with Alabama in a Southern Slave-
holding Confederacy." A registration of lands was ordered to be
made ; the United States land system was adopted, a homestead law
was provided for, and a new land office was estabhshed at Greenville,
in Butler County. The governor was authorized to revoke contracts
made under United States laws with commissioners appointed to
locate swamps and overflowed lands. The general assembly was
authorized to cede to the Confederacy exclusive jurisdiction over a
district ten miles square for a seat of government for the Confederate
States of America.
Provision was m.ade for the miHtary defence of Alabama, and the
United States army regulations were adopted almost in their entirety.
The militia was reorganized ; all commissions were vacated, and new
elections ordered. The governor was placed in charge of all meas-
ures for defence. He was authorized to purchase supplies for the
use of the state army, to borrow money for the same, and to issue
bonds to cover expenses. Later, the convention decreed that all
arms and munitions of war taken from the United States should be
turned over to the Confederacy; only the small arms belonging to
the state were retained. The governor was authorized to transfer
to the Confederate States, upon terms to be agreed upon between the
governor and the president, all troops raised for state defence. Thus
all volunteer companies could be transferred to the Confederate ser-
vice if the men were willing, otherwise they were discharged. A
number of ordinances were passed organizing the state military sys-
tem, and cooperating with the Confederate government. Jurisdic-
LEGISLATION BY THE CONVENTION
51
tion over forts, arsenals, and navy yards was conferred upon the Con-
federate States. This ordinance could only be revoked by a con-
vention of the people.
The port of Mobile was resumed by the state. The collector of
the port and his assistants were continued in office as state officials
who were to act in the name of the state of Alabama. With a view
to future settlement the collector was ordered to retain all funds in
his hands belonging to the United States, and the state of Alabama
guaranteed his safety, as to oath, bond, etc. As far as possible, the
United States customs and port regulations were adopted. Vessels
built anywhere, provided that one-third was owned by citizens of
the southern states and commanded by southern captains, were enti-
tled to registry as vessels of Alabama. The collector was authorized
to take possession in the name of the state of all government custom-
houses, lighthouses, etc., and to reappoint the officers in charge if
they would accept office from the state. The weights and measures
of the United States were adopted as the standard; discriminating
duties imposed by the United States, and regulations on foreign ves-
sels and merchandise were abolished; Selma and Mobile were con-
tinued as ports of entry, and all ordinances relating to Mobile were
extended to Selma.
Thaddeus Sanford, the collector of Mobile, reported to the con-
vention that the United States Treasury Department had drawn on
him for $26,000 on January 7, 1861, and asked for instructions in
regard to paying it. The Committee on Imports reported that the
draft was dated before secession and before the ordinance directing
the collector to retain all United States funds, that it was drawn to
pay parties for services rendered while Alabama was a member of
the Union. So it was ordered to be paid.
After the Confederacy was formed, the convention ordered that
the custom-houses, marine hospital, lighthouses, buoys, and the reve-
nue cutter, Lewis Cass, be turned over to the Confederate authori-
ties; and the collector was directed to transfer all money collected
by him to the Confederate authorities, who were to account for all
moneys and settle with the United States authorities. The collector
was then released from his bond to the state.
Postal contracts and regulations in force prior to January 11,
1 86 1, were permitted to remain for the present. The general assem-
52 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
bly was empowered to make postal arrangements until the Confed-
erate government should be estabhshed. Meanwhile, the old
arrangements with the United States were unchanged/ Other ordi-
nances adopted the laws of the United States relating to the value of
foreign coins, and directed the division of the state into nine congres-
sional districts.
The judicial powers were resumed by the state and were hence-
forth to be exercised by the state courts. The circuit and chancery
courts and the city court of Mobile were given original jurisdiction
in cases formerly arising within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.
Jurisdiction over admiralty cases was vested in the circuit courts and
the city court of Mobile. The chancery courts had jurisdiction in
all cases of equity. The state supreme court was given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning ambassadors and pubhc
ministers. All admiralty cases, except where the United States was
plaintiff, pending in the Federal courts in Alabama were transferred
with all records to the state circuit courts ; cases in equity in like man-
ner to the state chancery courts ; the United States laws relating to
admiralty and maritime cases, and to the postal service were adopted
temporarily; the forms of proceedings in state courts were to be the
same as in former Federal courts ; the clerks of the circuit courts were
given the custody of all records transferred from Federal courts and
were empowered to issue process running into any part of the state
and to be executed by any sheriff; United States marshals in whose
hands processes were running were ordered to execute them and to
make returns to the state courts under penalty of being prosecuted as
if defaulting sheriffs; the right was asserted to prosecute marshals
who were guilty of misconduct before secession. The United States
laws of May 26, 1796, and March 27, 1804, prescribing the method
of authentication of pubhc acts, records, or judicial proceedings for
use in other courts, were adopted for Alabama. In cases appealed
to the United States Supreme Court from the Alabama supreme court,
the latter was to act as if no appeal had been taken and execute judg-
ment ; cases appealed from inferior Federal courts to the United States
1 It was not until the end of June, 1861, that the United States postal service was
withdrawn and final reports made to the United States. The Confederate postal service
succeeded. At first, the Confederate Postmaster-General directed the postmasters to
continue to report to the United States.
NORTH ALABAMA IN THE CONVENTION 53
Supreme Court, were to be considered as appealed to the state su-
preme court which was to proceed as if the cases had been appealed
to it from its own lower courts. The United States were not to be
allowed to be a party to any suit in the state courts against a citizen
of Alabama unless ordered by the convention or by the general assem-
bly. Federal jurisdiction in general was to be resumed by state
courts until the Confederate government should act in the matter.
No law of Alabama in force January 11, 1861, consistent with the
Constitution and not inconsistent with the ordinances of the conven-
tion, was to be affected by secession ; no official of the state was to be
affected by secession; no offence against the state, and no penalty,
no obligation, and no duty to or of state, no process or proceeding in
court, no right, title, privilege, or obligation under the state or United
States Constitution and laws, was to be affected by the ordinance of
secession unless inconsistent with it. No change made by the con-
vention in the constitution of Alabama should have the effect to divest
of any right, title, or legal trust existing at the time of making the
change. All changes were to have a prospective, not a retrospective,
effect unless expressly declared in the change itself.
The general assembly was to have no power to repeal, alter, or
amend any ordinance of the convention incorporated in the revised
constitution. Other ordinances were to be considered as ordinary
legislation and might be amended or repealed by the legislature.^
North Alabama in the Convention
All the counties of north Alabama sent cooperation delegates to
the convention, and these spoke continually of a pecuHar state of feel-
ing on the part of their constituents which required conciliation by
the convention. The people of that section, in regard to their griev-
ances, thought as the people of central and south Alabama, but they
were not so ready to act in resistance. Moreover, it would seem that
they desired all the important measures framed by the convention to
be referred to them for approval or disapproval. The cooperation-
ists made much of this state of feeling for purposes of obstruction.
There was, and had always been, a slight lack of sympathy between
the people of the two sections ; but on the present question they were
^ This account of the work of the convention is compiled from the pamphlet ordi-
nances in the Supreme Court Library in Montgomery.
54 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
very nearly agreed, though still opposing from habit. Had the co-
operationists been in the majority, secession would have been hardly
delayed. Of course, among the mountains and sand-hills of north
Alabama was a small element of the population not concerned in any
way with the questions before the people, and who would oppose any
measure supported by southern Alabama. Sheets of Winston was
probably the only representative of this class in the convention. The
members of the convention referred to the fact of the local nature of
the dissatisfaction. Yancey, angered at the obstructive tactics of the
cooperationists, who had no definite poHcy and nothing to gain by
obstruction, made a speech in which he said it was useless to disguise
the fact that in some parts of the state there was dissatisfaction in
regard to the action of the convention, and warned the members
from north Alabama, whom he probably considered responsible for
the dissatisfaction, that as soon as passed the ordinance of secession
became the supreme law of the land, and it was the duty of all citi-
zens to yield obedience. Those who refused, he said, were traitors
and pubHc enemies, and the sovereign state would deal with them as
such. Opposition after secession was unlawful and to even speak
of it was wrong, and he predicted that the name "tory" would be
revived and applied to such people. Jemison of Tuscaloosa, a lead-
ing cooperationist, made an angry reply, and said that Yancey would
inaugurate a second Reign of Terror and hang people by famihes,
by towns, counties, and districts.
Davis (c.) of Madison declared that the people of north Alabama
would stand by the expressed will of the people of the state, and inti-
mated that the action of the convention did not represent the will of
the people. If, he added, resistance to revolution gave the name of
^'tories," it was possible that the people of north Alabama might yet
bear the designation ; that any invasion of their rights or any attempt
to force them to obedience would result in armed resistance ; that the
invader would be met at the foot of the mountains, and in armed con-
flict the question of the sovereignty of the people would be settled.
Clark (c.) of Lawrence said that north Alabama was more closely
connected with Tennessee, and that many of the citizens were talk-
ing of secession from Alabama and annexation to Tennessee. He
begged for some concession to north Alabama, but did not seem to
know exactly what he wanted. He intimated that there would be
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
NORTH ALABAMA IN THE CONVENTION 55
civil war in north Alabama. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale said that his
people were not ''submissionists" and would share every toil and
danger in support of the state to which was their supreme allegiance.
Edwards (c.) of Blount was not prepared to say whether his people
would acquiesce or not. He promised to do nothing to excite them
to rebellion ! Davis of Madison, who a few days before was ready
to rebel, now said that he, and perhaps all north Alabama, would
cheerfully stand by the state in the coming conflict.
A majority of the cooperationists voted against the ordinance of
secession, at the same time stating that they intended to support it
when it became law. The ordinance was lithographed, and the
delegates were given an opportunity to sign their names to the offi-
cial copy. Thirty-three of the delegates from north Alabama, two
of whom had voted for the ordinance, refused to sign, because, as
they said, it might appear as if they approved all that had been done
by the secessionists. Their opposition to the pohcy of the majority
was based on the following principles: (i) the fundamental princi-
ple that representative bodies should submit their acts for approval
to the people; (2) the interests of all demanded that all the southern
states be consulted in regard to a plan for united action. The mem-
bers who refused to sign repeatedly acknowledged the binding force
of the ordinance and promised a cheerful obedience, but, at the same
time, published far and wide an address to the people, justifying their
opposition and refusal to sign, causing the impression that they con-
sidered the action of the convention illegal. There was no reason
whatever why these men should pursue the poHcy of obstruction to
the very last, yet it was done. Nine of the thirty-three finally signed
the ordinance, but twenty- four never signed it, though they promised
to support it.
The majority of the members and of the people contemplated
secession as a finahty; reconstruction was not to be considered. A
few of the cooperationists, however, were in favor of secession as a
means of bringing the North to terms. Messrs. Pugh and Clay
(members of Congress) in a letter to the convention suggested that
the border states considered the secession of the cotton states as an
indispensable basis for a reconstruction of the Union. Smith of Tus-
caloosa, the leading cooperationist, stated his belief that the revolu-
56 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
tion would teach the North her dependence upon the South, how mucl
she owed that section, bring her to a sense of her duty, and cause hei
to yield to the sensible demands of the South. He looked forward
with fondest hopes to the near future when there would be a recon-
struction of the Union with redress of grievances, indemnity for the
past, complete and unequivocal guarantees for the future.
Incidents of the Session
The proceedings were dignified, solemn, and at times even sad.
During the whole session, good feehng prevailed to a remarkable
degree among the individual members, and toward the last the ut-
most harmony existed between the parties.* For this the credit is
due the secessionists. At times the cooperationists were suspicious,
and pursued a pohcy of obstruction when nothing was to be gained ;
but they were given every privilege and shown every courtesy. Dur-
ing the early part of the session an enthusiastic crowd filled the halls
and galleries and manifested approval of the course of the secession-
ist leaders by frequent applause. In order to secure perfect freedom
of debate to the minority, it was ordered that no applause be per-
mitted ; and this order failing to keep the spectators silent, the galler-
ies were cleared, and thereafter secret sessions were the rule.
Affecting and exciting scenes followed the passage of the ordi-
nance of secession. One by one the strong members of the minority
arose and, for the sake of unity at home, surrendered the opinions of
a lifetime and forgot the prejudices of years. This was done with no
feeling of humiliation. To the last, they were treated with distin-
guished consideration by their opponents. There was really no
difference in the principles of the two parties; the only differences
were on local, personal, sectional, and social questions. On the
common ground of resistance to a common enemy they were united.
On January ii, 1861, after seven days' debate, it became known
that the vote on secession would be taken, and an eager multitude
crowded Capitol Hill to hear the announcement of the result. The
senate chamber, opposite the convention hall, was crowded with the
waiting people, who were addressed by distinguished orators on the
topics of the day. As many women as men were present, and, if
1 So Smith, the cooperationist historian, reported.
INCIDENTS OF THE SESSION
57
possible, were more eager for secession. Their minds had long ago
been made up. "With them," says the grave historian of the con-
vention, "the love songs of yesterday had swelled into the political
hosannas of to-day."
The momentous vote was taken, the doors were flung open, the
result announced, and in a moment the tumultuous crowd filled the
galleries, lobbies, and aisles of the convention hall. The ladies of
Montgomery had made a large state flag, and when the doors were
opened this flag was unfurled in the hall so that its folds extended
almost across the chamber. Members jumped on desks, chairs, and
tables to shake out the floating folds and display the design. There
was a perfect frenzy of enthusiasm. Yancey, the secessionist leader
and splendid orator, in behalf of the ladies presented the flag to the
convention. Smith, the leader of the cooperationists, replied in a
speech of acceptance, paying an affecting tribute to the flag that they
were leaving — "the Star-Spangled Banner, sacred to memory, bap-
tized in the nation's best blood, consecrated in song and history, and
the herald of liberty's grandest victories on land and on sea." In
memory of the illustrious men who brought fame to the flag, he
said, "Let him who has tears prepare to shed them now as we lower
this glorious ensign of our once vaunted victories." Alpheus Baker
of Barbour in glowing words expressed to the ladies the thanks of
the convention.
Amidst wild enthusiasm in hall and street the convention ad-
journed. One hundred and one cannon shots announced the result.
The flag of the RepubHc of Alabama floated from windows, steeples,
and towers. Party Hnes were forgotten, and until late in the night
every man who would speak was surrounded by eager listeners. The
people were united in common sentiment in the face of common
danger.
One hour before the signal cannon shot announced that the fate-
ful step had been taken and that Alabama was no longer one of the
United States, there died, within sight of the capitol. Bishop Cobb of
the Episcopal Church, the one man of character and influence who
in all Alabama had opposed secession in any way, at any time, or for
1 See Smith's "Debates"; Hodgson's "Cradle of the Confederacy"; DuBose's
" Yancey " ; Wilmer's " Recent Past."
PART II
WAR TIMES IN ALABAMA
CHAPTER III
MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS
Sec. I. Military Operations
On January 4, 1861, the Alabama troops, ordered by Governor
Andrew B. Moore, seized the forts which commanded the entrance
to the harbor at Mobile, and also the United States arsenal at Mount
Vernon, thirty miles distant. A few days later the governor, in a
communication addressed to President Buchanan, explained the
reason for this step. He was convinced, he said, that the conven-
tion would withdraw the state from the Union, and he deemed it
his duty to take every precaution to render the secession peaceable.
Information had been received which led him to believe that the
United States government would attempt to maintain its authority
in Alabama by force, even to bloodshed. The President must surely
see, the governor wrote, that coercion could not be effectual until
capacity for resistance had been exhausted, and it would have been
unwise to have permitted the United States government to make
preparations which would be resisted to the uttermost by the people.
The purpose in taking possession of the forts and arsenal was to
avoid, not to provoke, hostilities. Amicable relations with the
United States were ardently desired by Alabama ; and every patriotic
man in the state was praying for peaceful secession. He had ordered
an inventory to be taken of public property in the forts and arsenal,
which were held subject to the control of the convention.^ A month
later. Governor Moore, in a communication addressed to the Vir-
ginia commissioners for mediation, stated that Alabama, in seceding,
had no hostile intentions against the United States; that the sole
object was to protect her rights, interests, and honor, without dis-
turbing peaceful relations. This would continue to be the policy
1 Gov. A. B. Moore to President Buchanan, Jan. 4, 186 r, in O. R. Ser. I, Vol. I,
pp. 327, 328.
61
62 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of the state unless the Federal government authorized hostile acts.
Yet any attempt at coercion would be resisted. In conclusion, he
stated that he had no power to appoint delegates to the proposed
convention, but promised to refer the matter to the legislature. How-
ever, he did not beheve that there was the least hope that concessions
would be made affording such guarantees as the seceding states
could accept.^
The War in North Alabama
For a year Alabama soil was free from invasion, though the coast
was blockaded in the summer of 1861. In February, 1862, Fort
Henry, on the Tennessee River, fell, and on the same day Commodore
Phelps with four gunboats sailed up the river to Florence. Several
steamboats with supphes for Johnston's army were destroyed to
prevent capture by the Federals. Phelps destroyed a partly finished
gunboat, burned the Confederate supplies in Florence, and then
returned to Fort Henry .^ The fall of Fort Donelson (February 16)
and the retreat of Johnston to Corinth left the Tennessee valley open
to the Federals. A few days after the battle of Shiloh, General O. M.
Mitchell entered Hunts ville (April 11, 1862) and captured nearly
all the rolling stock belonging to the railroads running into Hunts-
ville. Decatur, Athens, Tuscumbia, and the other towns of the
Tennessee valley were occupied within a few days. To oppose
this invasion the Confederates had small bodies of troops widely
scattered across north Alabama. The fighting was almost entirely
in the nature of skirmishes and was continual. Philip D. Roddy,
later known as the ** Defender of North Alabama," first appears
during this summer as commander of a small body of irregular troops,
which served as the nucleus of a regiment and later a brigade. Hos-
tilities in north Alabama at an early date assumed the worst aspects
of guerilla warfare. The Federals were never opposed by large
commands of Confederates, and were disposed to regard the detach-
ments who fought them as guerillas and to treat them accordingly.
In spite of the strenuous efforts of General Buell to have his subor-
dinates wage war in civilized manner,^ they were guilty of infamous
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 89.
2 Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 158.
8 See D. C. Buell, " Operations in North Alabama," in " Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War," Vol. II, pp. 701-708.
THE WAR IN NORTH ALABAMA 63
conduct. General Mitchell was charged by the people with brutal
conduct toward non-combatants and with being interested in the
stealing of cotton and shipping it North. He was finally removed
by BuelL'
One of Mitchell's subordinates — John Basil Turchin, the Rus-
sian colonel of the Nineteenth Illinois regiment — was too brutal
even for Mitchell, and the latter tried to keep him within bounds.
His worst offence was at Athens, in Limestone County, in May, 1862.
Athens was a wealthy place, intensely southern in feehng, and on
that account was most heartily disUked by the Federals. Here, for
two hours, Turchin retired to his tent and gave over the town to the
soldiers to be sacked after the old European custom. Revolting
outrages were committed. Robberies were common where Turchin
commanded. His Russian ideas of the rules of war were probably
responsible for his conduct. Buell characterized it as "a case of
undisputed atrocity." For this Athens affair Turchin was court-
martialled and sentenced to be dismissed from the service. The
facts were notorious and well known at Washington, but the day
before Buell ordered his discharge, Turchin was made a brigadier-
general.^
General Mitchell himself reported (May, 1862) that "the most
terrible outrages — robberies, rapes, arson, and plundering — are
being committed by lawless brigands and vagabonds connected
with the army." He asked for authority to hang them and wrote,
"I hear the most deplorable accounts of excesses committed by
1 Miller, p. 160 ; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 65 ; Mrs. Clay-Clopton, "A Belle of the
Fifties," Chs. 18-22; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Ft. II, pp. 204, 294, 295, et passim. Buell stated
that " habitual lawlessness prevailed in a portion of General Mitchell's command," and
that though authority was granted to punish with death there were no punishments.
Discipline was lost. The officers were engaged in cotton speculation, and Mitchell's
wagon trains were used to haul the cotton for the speculators. Flagrant crimes, Buell
stated, were " condoned or neglected " by Mitchell. " Battles and Leaders," Vol. II,
pp. 705, 706. North Alabama was not important to the Federals from a strategic point
of view, and only the worst disciplined troops were stationed in that section.
2 His real name was Ivan Vasilivitch Turchinoff. Several other officers were court-
martialled at the same time for similar conduct. Keifer, " Slavery and Four Years of
War," Vol. I, p. 277; Miller, p. 160; "Battles and Leaders," II, p. 706. A former
" Union " man declared after the war that the barbarities of Turchin crushed out the
remaining " Union " sentiment in north Alabama. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Testimony, p.
850 (Richardson) ; O. R., Ser. I, Vols. X cand XN\, passim; Brewer, "Alabama," pp.
319, 348. Accounts of eye-witnesses.
64 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
soldiers."^ About fifty of the citizens of Athens, at the suggestion
of Mitchell, filed claims for damages. Thereupon Mitchell informed
them that they were laboring under a very serious misapprehension
if they expected pay from the United States government unless they
had proper vouchers.^ Buell condemned his action in this matter
also. Mitchell asked the War Department for permission to send
prominent Confederate sympathizers at Huntsville to northern
prisons. He said that General Clemens and Judge Lane advised
such a measure. He reported that he held under arrest a few active
rebels "who refused to condemn the guerilla warfare." The War
Department seems to have been annoyed by the request, but after
Mitchell had repeated it, permission was given to send them to the
fort in Boston Harbor.^
Mitchell was charged at Washington with having failed in his
duty of repressing plundering and pillaging. He replied that he
had no great sympathy with the citizens of Athens who hated the
Union soldiers so intensely."*
As the war continued the character of the warfare grew steadily
worse. Ex- Governor Chapman's family were turned out of their
home to make room for a negro regiment. A four- year- old child
of the family wandered back to the house and was cursed and abused
by the soldiers. The house was finally burned and the property
laid waste. Governor Chapman was imprisoned and at last expelled
from the country. Mrs. Robert Patton they threatened to strip in
search of money and actually began to do so in the presence of her
husband, but she saved herself by giving up the money.^ Such
experiences were common.
The provost marshal at Huntsville — Colonel Harmer — selected
a number of men to answer certain political questions, who, if their
answers were not satisfactory, were to be expelled from the country.
Among these were, George W. Hustoun, Luke Pryor, and Malone
of Athens, Dr. Fearn of Huntsville, and two ministers — Ross and
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 204, 294, 295.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, p. 212.
3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 167, 168, 174 (May, 1862) ; for Clemens and
Lane, see Ch. Ill, sec. 4.
4 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 290-293.
6 Brewer, p. 485, et passim ; Miller, p. 125 j O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill,
PP- 750-751-
THE WAR IN NORTH ALABAMA 65
Banister. General Stanley condemned the policy, but General
Granger wanted the preachers expelled anyway, although Stanley
said they had never taken part in pohtics.^ The harsh treatment
of non-combatants and Confederate soldiers by Federal soldiers
and by the tories resulted in the retaliation of the former when
opportunity occurred. Toward the end of the war prisoners were
seldom taken by either side. When a man was caught, he was often
strung up to a limb of the nearest tree, his captors waiting a few
minutes for their halters, and then passing on. The Confederate
irregular cavalry became a terror even to the loyal southern people.
Steahng, robbery, and murder were common in the debatable land
of north Alabama.^
Naturally the "tory" element of the population suffered much
from the same class of Confederate troops. The Union element,
it was said, suffered more from the operation of the impressment
law. The Confederate and state governments strictly repressed the
tendency of Confederate troops to pillage the "Union" communities
in north Alabama.^
General Mitchell and his subordinates were accustomed to hold
the people of a community responsible for damages in their vicinity
to bridges, trestles, and trains caused by the Confederate forces. In
August, 1862, General J. D. Morgan, in command at Tuscumbia,
reported that he "sent out fifty wagons this afternoon to the planta-
tions near where the track was torn up yesterday, for cotton. I want
it to pay damages." ^ When Turchin had to abandon Athens, on
the advance of Bragg into Tennessee, he set fire to and burned much
of the town, but his conduct was denounced by his fellow-officers.^
Near Gunterville (1862) a Federal force was fired upon by scouts,
and the Federals, in retaliation, shelled the town. This was done a
second time during the war, and finally the town was burned. In
Jackson County four citizens were arrested (1862) because the pickets
at Woodville, several miles away, had been fired upon.®
In a skirmish in north Alabama, General R. L. McCook was
1 Gen. D. S. Stanley to Gen. William D. Whipple, Feb., 1865 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol.
XLIX, Pt. I, p. 718.
■^ Clanton's report, March, 1864 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, p. 718.
3 Miller, "Alabama." < Miller, p. 165.
^ Miller, "Alabama" ; Brewer, pp. 318, 348. « Brewer, pp. 284, 383.
F
^ CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
shot by Captain Gurley of Russell's Fourth Alabama Cavalry. The
Federals spread the report among the soldiers that he had been mur-
dered, and as the Federal commander reported, "Many of the sol-
diers spread themselves over the country and burned all the property
of the rebels in the vicinity, and shot a rebel lieutenant who was
on furlough." Even the house of the family who had ministered to
General McCook in his last moments was burned to the ground.
The old men and boys for miles around were arrested. The officer
who was shot was at home on furlough and sick. General Dodge's
command committed many depredations in retahation for the death
of McCook. A year later Captain Gurley was captured and sen-
tenced to be hanged. The Confederate authorities threatened re-
taliation, and he was then treated as a prisoner of war. After the
close of the war he was again arrested and kept in jail and in irons
for many months at Nashville and Huntsville. At last he was
Hberated.^
Later in the war (1864), General M. L. Smith ordered the arrest
of "five of the best rebels" in the vicinity of a Confederate attack
on one of his companies, and again five were arrested near the place
where a Union man had been attacked.^ These are examples of
what often happened. It became a rule to hold a community re-
sponsible for all attacks made by the Confederate soldiers.
The people suffered fearfully. Many of them had to leave the
country in order to live. John E. Moore wrote to the Confederate
Secretary of War from Florence, in December, 1862, that the people
of north Alabama "have been ground into the dust by the tyrants
and thieves." ^ The citizens of Florence (January, 1863) petitioned
the Secretary of War for protection. They said that they had been
greatly oppressed by the Federal army in 1862. Property had been
destroyed most wantonly and vindictively, the privacy of the homes
invaded, citizens carried off and ill treated, and slaves carried off
and refused the liberty of returning when they desired to do so. The
harshness of the Federals had made many people submissive for fear
of worse things. No men, except the aged and infirm, were left in
the country; the population was composed chiefly of women and
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, pp. 841, 839 ; Wyeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 1 1 i-i 13.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 394.
8 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XX, Pt. II, p. 442.
THE STREIGHT RAID
67
children.^ It was in response to this appeal that Roddy's command
was raised to a brigade. But the retreat of Bragg left north Alabama
to the Federals until the close of the war, except for a short period
during Hood's invasion of Tennessee.
The Streight Raid
April 19, 1863, Colonel A. D. Streight of the Federal army, with
2000 picked troops, disembarked at Eastport and started on a daring
raid through the mountain region of north Alabama. The object
of the raid was to cut the railroads from Chattanooga to Atlanta
and to Knoxville, which supphed Bragg and to destroy the Confeder-
ate stores at Rome. To cover Streight's movements General Dodge
was making demonstrations in the Tennessee valley and Forrest
was sent to meet him. Hearing by accident of Streight's move-
ments, Forrest left a small force under Roddy to hold Dodge in check
and set out after the raider. The chase began on April 29. Streight
had sixteen miles the start with a force reduced to 1 500 men, mounted
on mules. As his mounts were worn out, he seized fresh horses on
the route. The chase led through the counties of Morgan, Blount,
St. Clair, De Kalb, and Cherokee — counties in which there was a
strong tory element, and the Federals were guided by two companies
of Union cavalry raised in north Alabama. Streight had asked for
permission to dress some of his men "after the promiscuous southern
style," but, fortunately for them, was not allowed to do so.^
On May i occurred the famous crossing of Black Creek, where
Miss Emma Sansom guided the Confederates across in the face of
a heavy fire. Forrest now had less than 600 men, the others having
been left behind exhausted or with broken-down horses. The best
men and horses were kept in front, and Streight was not allowed a
moment's rest. At last, tired out, the Federals halted on the morn-
ing of May 3. Soon the men were asleep on their arms, and when
Forrest appeared, some of them could not be awakened. Men were
asleep in Hne of battle, under fire. Forrest placed his small force
so as to magnify his numbers, and Streight was persuaded by his
officers to surrender — 1466 men to less than 600. The running
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XX, Pt. II, p. 443.
2 The Andrews raiders in Georgia were hanged as spies for being dressed " in the
promiscuous southern style."
68 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
fight had lasted four days, over a distance of 150 miles, through
rough and broken country filled with unfriendly natives. Forrest
could not get fresh mounts, the Federals could; the Federals had
been preparing for the raid a month ; Forrest had a few hours to
prepare for the pursuit, and his whole force with Roddy's did not
equal half of the entire Federal force of 9500/
During the summer and fall there were many small fights between
the cavalry scouts of Roddy and Wheeler and the Federal foraging
parties. In October General S. D. Lee from Mississippi entered
the northwestern part of the state, and for two or three weeks fought
the Federals and tore up the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.
The First Alabama Union Cavalry started on a raid for Selma, but
was routed by the Second Alabama Cavalry. The Tennessee
valley was the highway along which passed and repassed the Federa
armies during the remainder of the war.
During the months of January, February, March, and April,
1864, scouting, skirmishing, and fighting in north Alabama by For-
rest, Roddy, Wheeler, Johnson, Patterson, and Mead were almost
continuous; and Federal raids were frequent. The Federals called
all Confederate soldiers in north Alabama "guerillas," and treated
prisoners as such. The Tennessee valley had been stripped of
troops to send to Johnston's army. In May, 1864, the Federal Gen-
eral Blair marched through northeast Alabama to Rome, Georgia,
with 10,500 men. Federal gunboats patrolled the river, landing
companies for short raids and shelling the towns. In August there
were many raids and skirmishes in the Tennessee valley. On Sep-
tember 23, Forrest with 4000 men, on a raid to Pulaski, persuaded
the Federal commander at Athens that he had 10,000 men, and the
latter surrendered, though in a strong fort with a thousand men.
Rousseau^s Raid
July 10, 1864, General Rousseau started from Decatur, Morgan
County,. with 2300 men on a raid toward southeast Alabama to
destroy the Montgomery and West Point Railway below OpeUka,
and thus cut off the supphes coming from the Black Belt for John-
ston's army. General Clanton, who opposed him with a small force,
1 Wyeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 185-222 ; Mathes, " General Forrest," pp. 109-127;
Miller, Ch. 32.
THE WAR IN SOUTH ALABAMA 69
was defeated at the crossing of the Coosa on July 14; the iron works
in Calhoun County were burned, and the Confederate stores at
Talladega were destroyed. The railroad was reached near Loacha-
poka in what is now Lee County, and miles of the track there and
above OpeHka were destroyed, and the depots at Opchka, Auburn,
Loachapoka, and Notasulga, all with quantities of supphcs, were
burned. This was the first time that central Alabama had suffered
from invasion.^
In October General Hood marched via Cedartown, Georgia,
into Alabama to Gadsden, thence to Somerville and Decatur, cross-
ing the river near Tuscumbia on his way to the fatal fields of Frankhn
and Nashville. "Most of the fields they passed were covered with
briers and weeds, the fences burned or broken down. The chimneys
in every direction stood hke quiet sentinels and marked the site of
once prosperous and happy homes, long since reduced to heaps of
ashes. No cattle, hogs, horses, mules, or domestic fowls were in
sight. Only the birds seemed unconscious of the ruin and desola-
tion which reigned supreme. No wonder that Hood pointed to the
devastation wrought by the invader to nerve his heroes for one more
desperate struggle against immense odds for southern independence." ^
A few weeks later the wreck of Hood's army was stragghng back
into north Alabama, which now swarmed with Federals. Bush-
whackers, guerillas, tories, deserters, ''mossbacks," harried the
defenceless people of north Alabama until the end of the war and
even after. A few scattered bands of Confederates made a weak
resistance.
The War in South Alabama
To return to south Alabama. During the years 1861 and 1862
the defences of Mobile were made almost impregnable. They were
commanded in turn by Generals Withers, Bragg, Forney, Buckner,
and Maury. The port was blockaded in 1861, but no attacks were
made on the defences until August, 1864, when 15,000 men were
landed to besiege Fort Gaines. Eighteen war vessels under Farragut
passed the forts into the bay and there fought the fiercest naval battle
of the war. Admiral Buchanan commanded the Confederate fleet
of four vessels — the Morgan, the Selma, the Gaines y and the Ten-
1 Brewer, p. 339. * Miller, p. 213.
70 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
nessee} The Tecumseh was sunk by a torpedo in the bay, and
Farragut had left 17 vessels, 199 guns, and 700 men against the
Confederates' 22 guns and 450 men. The three smaller Confederate
vessels, after desperate fighting, were riddled with shot ; one was cap-
tured, one beached, and one withdrew to the shelter of the forts.
The Tennessee was left, i against 17, 6 guns against 200. After
four hours' cannonade from nearly 200 guns, her smoke-stack and
steering gear shot away, her commander (Admiral Buchanan)
wounded, one hour after her last gun had been disabled, the
Tennessee surrendered. The Federals lost 52 killed, and 17
wounded, besides 120 lost on the Tecumseh. The Tennessee lost
only 2 killed and 9 wounded, the Selma 8 killed and 17 wounded,
the Gaines about the same.^ The fleet now turned its attention to
the forts. Fort Gaines surrendered at once; Fort Morgan held out.
A siege train of 41 guns was placed in position and on August 22
these and the 200 guns of the fleet opened fire. The fort was unable
to return the fire of the fleet, and the sharpshooters of the enemy
soon prevented the use of guns against the shore batteries of the
Federals. The firing was furious ; every shell seemed to take effect ;
fire broke out, and the garrison threw 90,000 pounds of powder
into cisterns to prevent explosion; the defending force was deci-
mated; the interior of the fort was a mass of smouldering ruins;
there was not a place five feet square not struck by shells; many
of the guns were dismounted. For twenty-four hours the bombard-
ment continued, the garrison not being able to return the fire of the
besiegers, yet the enemy reported that the garrison was not "moved
by any weak fears." On the morning of August 23, 1864, the fort
was surrendered.^ Though the outer defences had fallen, the city
could not be taken. The inner defences were strengthened, and
were manned with "reserves," — boys and old men, fourteen to
sixteen, and forty-five to sixty years of age.
1 After completion at Selma the Tennessee was taken down the river to defend
Mobile. It was found, even after removing her armament, that the vessel could not pass
the Dog River bar, and timber was cut from the forests up the river and " camels " made
with which to buoy up the heavy vessel. By accident these camels were burned and
more had to be made. At last the heavy ram was floated over the bar. Of course the
newspapers harshly criticised those in charge of the Tennessee. Maclay, " History of
the United States Navy," Vol. II, p. 448.
2 Brewer, p. 389 ; Scharf, " Confederate Navy," Ch. 18 ; Miller, pp. 205-206.
3 Brewer, p. 120; Miller, p. 207.
WILSON'S RAID AND THE END OF THE WAR 71
In March, 1865, General Steele advanced from Pensacola to
Pollard with 15,000 men, while General Canby with 32,000 moved
up the east side of Mobile Bay and invested Spanish Fort. He sent
12,000 men to Steele, who began the siege of Blakely on April 2.
Spanish Fort was defended by 3400 men, later reduced to 2321,
against Canby's 20,000. The Confederate lines were two miles long.
After a twelve days' siege a part of the Confederate works was cap-
tured, and during the next night (April 8), the greater part of the
garrison escaped in boats or by wading through the marshes.
Blakely was defended by 3500 men against Steele's 25,000. After
a siege of eight days the Federal works were pushed near the Con-
federate lines, and a charge along the whole three miles of line cap-
tured the works with the garrison (April 9). Three days later
batteries Huger and Tracy, defending the river entrance, were
evacuated, and on April 12 the city surrendered.^ The state was
then overrun from all sides. ^
Wilson's Raid and the End of the War
During the winter of 1 864-1 865, General J. H. Wilson gathered
a picked force of 13,500 cavalry, at Gravelly Springs in northwestern
Alabama, in preparation for a raid through central Alabama, the
purpose of which was to destroy the Confederate stores, the factories,
mines, and iron works in that section, and also to create a diversion
in favor of Canby at Mobile.^ On March 22 he left for the South.
There was not a Confederate soldier within 120 miles; the country
was stripped of its defenders. The Federal army under Wilson
foraged for provisions in north Alabama when they themselves
reported people to be starving.^ To confuse the Confederates,
Wilson moved his corps in three divisions along different routes.
On March 29, near Elyton, the divisions united, and General Croxton
1 Some of the Confederate gunboats were sunk {Huntsville and Tuscaloosa), and
Commander Farrand surrendered twelve gunboats in the Tombigbee. All of these had
been built at Mobile, Selma, and in the Tombigbee.
2 Miller, pp. 208, 217-221.
3 It was intended that Wilson should raid to and fro all through central Alabama.
His men were armed with repeating carbines ; his train of 250 wagons was escorted by
1500 unmounted men who secured mounts as they went farther into the interior.
Greeley, Vol. IT, p. 716.
* N. V. Herald, April 6, 1865.
72 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was again detached and sent to burn the University and public build-
ings at Tuscaloosa. Driving Roddy before him, Wilson, on March
31, burned five iron v^orks near Elyton. Forrest collected a motley
force to oppose Wilson. The latter sent a brigade which decoyed
one of Forrest's brigades away into the country toward Mississippi,^
so that this force was not present to assist in the defence when, on
April 2, Wilson arrived before Selma with 9000 men. This place, with
works three miles long, was defended by Forrest with 3000 men, half
of whom were reserves who had never been under fire. They made
a gallant fight, but the Federals rushed over the thinly defended
works. Forrest and two or three hundred men escaped; the re-
mainder surrendered. When the Federals entered the city, night
had fallen, and the soldiers plundered without restraint until morn-
ing. Forrest had ordered that all the government whiskey in the
city be destroyed, but after the barrels were rolled into the street
the Confederates had no time to knock in the heads before the city
was captured. The Federals were soon drunk. All the houses in
the city were entered and plundered. A newspaper correspondent
who was with Wilson's army said that Selma was the worst-sacked
town of the war. One woman saved her house from the plunderers
by pulling out all the drawers, tearing up the beds, throwing clothes
all over the floor along with dishes and overturned tables, chairs,
and other things. When the soldiers came to the house, they concluded
that others had been there before them and departed. The out-
rages, robberies, and murders committed by Wilson's men, not-
withstanding his stringent order against plundering,^ are almost
incredible. The half cannot be told. The destruction was fearful.
The city was wholly given up to the soldiers, the houses sacked,
the women robbed of their watches, earrings, rings, and other
jewellery.^ The negroes were pressed into the work of destruction,
and when they refused to burn and destroy, they were threatened
with death by the soldiers. Every one was robbed who had any-
thing worth taking about his person. Even negro men on the streets
1 April 5 Cahaba was captured by a part of Wilson's force and twenty Federal pris-
oners released from the military prison at that place. They reported that they had been
well treated. — N. Y. Herald, April 29, 1865.
2 Wyeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 606, 607.
8 Parsons's Cooper Institute Speech in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1865 ; Trowbridge,
"The South," pp. 435, 440. Accounts of eye-witnesses.
WILSON'S RAID AND THE END OF THE WAR 73
and negro women in the houses were searched and their Httle money
and trinkets taken/
The next day the pubHc buildings and storehouses with three-
fourths of the business part of the town and 150 residences were
burned. Three roUing mills, a large naval foundry, and the navy
yard, — where the Tennessee had been built, — the best arsenal in
the Confederacy, powder works, magazines, army stores, 35,000
bales of cotton, a large number of cars, and the railroad bridges were
destroyed. Before leaving, Wilson sent men about the town to kill
all the horses and mules in Selma, and had 800 of his own worn-out
horses shot. The carcasses were left lying in the roads, streets,
and dooryards where they were shot. In a few days the stench
was fearful, and the citizens had to send to all the country around
for teams to drag away the dead animals, which were strewn along
the roads for miles. ^
Nearly every man of Wilson's command had a canteen filled
with jewellery gathered on the long raid through the richest section of
the state. The valuables of the rich Cane Brake and Black Belt
country had been deposited in Selma for safe-keeping, and from
Selma the soldiers took everything valuable and profitable. Pianos
wxre made into feeding troughs for horses. The officers were sup-
plied with silver plate stolen while on the raid. In Russell County
a general officer stopped at a house for dinner, and had the table
set with a splendid service of silver plate taken from Selma. His
escort broke open the smoke-house and, taking hams, cut a small
piece from each of them and threw the remainder away. Everything
that could be was destroyed. Soft soap and syrup were poured
together in the cellars. They took everything they could carry and
destroyed the rest.
On April 10 Wilson's command started for Montgomery. A
negro regiment of 800 men^ was organized at Selma and accompanied
1 Trowbridge, " The South," p. 435.
2 Hardy, " History of Selma," p. 51 ; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 221-226; Parsons,
speeches in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1865, Apr. 20, 1866; N. Y. Herald, May 4, and
Apr. 6, 1865 ; Montgomery Advertiser, July 14, 1867 ; Wilson's Report, June 29, 1865 ;
Selma Times, Feb. 13, 1866; "Our Women in War Times," p. 277 ; Greeley, Vol. II,
p. 719 ; Wyeth, " Life of Forrest," pp. 604-607 ; "Northern Alabama," p. 6155.
8 Hardy, " History of Selma," p. 52, says four regiments were organized, and the
others were driven away.
74 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the army, subsisting on the country. Before reaching Georgia
there were several such regiments. On April 12 Montgomery was
surrendered by the mayor. The Confederates had burned 97,000^
bales of cotton to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy.
The captors burned five steamboats, two rolling mills, a small- arms
factory, two magazines of stores, all the roUing stock of the railways,
and the nitre works, the fire spreading also to the business part of
the town.^ Here, as at Selma, horses, mules, and valuables were
taken by the raiders.
The force was then divided into two columns, one destined for
West Point and the other for Columbus. The last fights on Alabama
soil occurred near West Point on April 16, and at Girard, opposite
Columbus, on the same day. At the latter place immense quantities
of stores, that had been carried across the river from Alabama, were
destroyed.^
Croxton's force reached Tuscaloosa April 3, and burned the
University buildings, the nitre works, a foundry, a shoe factory,
and the Sipsey cotton mills. After burning these he moved eastward
across the state, destroying iron works, nitre factories, depots, and
cotton factories. Before he reached Georgia, Croxton had destroyed
nearly all the iron works and cotton factories that had been missed
by Rousseau and Wilson.^
Destruction by the Armies
For three years north Alabama was traversed by the contending
armies. Each burned and destroyed from military necessity and
from malice. General Wilson said that after two years of warfare
the valley of the Tennessee was absolutely destitute.^ From the
spring of 1862 to the close of the war the Federals marched to and
fro in the valley. There were few Confederate troops for its defence,
and the Federals held each community responsible for all attacks
made within its vicinity. It became the custom to destroy property
1 125,000 bales, according to Greeley, Vol. II, p. 719.
2 The Advertiser of April 18, 1865.
8 N. V. World, May I and July 18, 1865 ; N. V. Herald, May 4 and 15, and
June 17, 1865 ; Brewer, p. 512 ; Greeley, Vol. II, p. 720.
'^ N. V. Daily News, May 29, 1865; Century Magazine, ^ov., 1889 ; Transactions
Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, p. 449.
s Report, June 29, 1865.
DESTRUCTION BY THE ARMIES
75
as a punishment of the people. Much of the destruction was unneces-
sary from a miHtary point of view/ Athens and smaller towns were
sacked and burned, Guntersville was shelled and burned; but the
worst destruction was in the country, by raiding parties of Federals
and "tories," or ''bushwhackers" dressed as Union soldiers. Hunts-
ville, Florence, Decatur, Athens, Guntersville, and Courtland, all
suffered depredation, robbery, murder, arson, and rapine.^ The
tories destroyed the railways, telegraph lines, and bridges, and as
long as the Confederates were in north Alabama they had to guard
all of these. ^
Along the Tennessee River the gunboats landed parties to ravage
the country in retahation for Confederate attacks. In the counties
of Lauderdale, Frankhn, Morgan, Lawrence, Limestone, Madison,
and Jackson nearly all property was destroyed.^
In 1863, a member of Congress from north Alabama tried to get
arms from Bragg for the old men to defend the county against Federal
raiders, but failed, and wrote to Davis that all civilized usages were
being disregarded, women and children turned out and the houses
burned, grain and provisions destroyed, women insulted and out-
raged, their money, jewellery, and clothing being stolen.
In December, 1863, General Sherman ordered that all the forage
and provisions in the country around Bridgeport and Bellefont "be
collected and stored, and no compensation be allowed rebel owners."
In April, 1864, General Clanton wrote to Governor Watts that the
"Yankees spared neither age, sex, nor condition." Tories and desert-
ers from the hills made frequent raids on the defenceless population.
General Dodge reported, May, 1863, that his army had destroyed
or carried off in one raid near Town Creek, "fifteen milUon bushels
of corn, five hundred thousand pounds of bacon, quantities of wheat,
rye, oats, and fodder, one thousand horses and mules, and an equal
number of cattle, sheep, and hogs, besides thousands that the army
consumed in three weeks; we also brought out fifteen hundred
negroes, destroyed five tanyards and six flouring mills, and we left
the country in such a devastated condition that no crop can be raised
1 Somers, "The South Since the War," pp. 134, 135.
2 Truman in N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1865.
« O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, pp. 230-233.
* See Brewer, " County Notes."
76 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
during the year;" and nothing was left that would in the least aid
the Confederates. On the night of his retreat Dodge ht up the
Tennessee valley from Town Creek to Tuscumbia with the flames
of burning dwellings, granaries, stables, and fences. In June Colonel
Cornyn reports that in a raid from Corinth to Florence he had de-
stroyed cotton factories, tanyards, all the corn- cribs in sight, searched
every house in Florence, burned several residences, and carried off
200 mules and horses.^ A few days later General Stanley raided
from Tennessee to Huntsville and carried off cattle and supplies,
but did not lay waste the country. General Buell did all that
he could to restrain his subordinates, but often to no avail. After
Sherman took charge affairs grew steadily worse. In a remarkable
letter giving his views in the matter he says: "The government of
the United States has in north Alabama any and all rights which
they choose to enforce in war, to take their Hves, their houses, their
lands, their everything, because they cannot deny that war exists
there, and war is simply power unrestrained by constitution or com-
pact. If they want eternal warfare, well and good. We will accept
the issue and dispossess them and put our friends in possession.
To those who submit to the rightful law and authority all gentleness
and forbearance, but to the petulant and persistent secessionists,
why, death is mercy and the quicker he or she is disposed of the better.
Satan and the rebellious saint of heaven were allowed a continuance
of existence in hell merely to swell their just punishment." He
referred to the fact that in Europe, whence the principles of war were
derived, wars were between the armies, the people remaining practi-
cally neutral, so that their property remained unmolested. However,
this present war was, he said, between peoples, and the invading
army was entitled to all it could get from the people. He cited as a
like instance the dispossessing of the people of north Ireland during
the reign qf William and Mary.^ After this no restraint on the
plundering and persecution of Confederate non-combatants was
even attempted, and hundreds of families from north Alabama
*'refugeed" to south Alabama.
General Sherman wrote to one of his generals, ''You may send
1 Brewer, p. 188 et passim ; Miller, p. 179 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXIII, Pt. I, pp. 245-
249.
2 Miller, p. 183 ; Garrett, " Public Men."
,
DESTRUCTION BY THE ARMIES
77
notice to Florence that if Forrest invades Tennessee from that direc-
tion, the town will be burned ; and if it occurs, you will remove the
inhabitants north of the Ohio River and burn the town and Tuscumbia
also/" All through this section fences were gone, fields grew up
in bushes, and weeds, residences were destroyed, farm stock had
disappeared. People who lived in the Black Belt report that Wilson's
raiders ate up all the cooked provisions wherever they went, taking
all the meat, meal, and flour to their next camping-place, where they
would often throw away wagon loads of provisions. Frequently
the meal and flour that could not be taken was strewn along the
road. The mills were burned, and some families for three months
after the close of the war Hved on corn cracked in a mortar. All
the horses and mules were taken; and only a few oxen were left to
work the crops.
Governor Parsons said that Wilson's men were a week in destroy-
ing the property around Selma. Three weeks after, as Parsons
himself was a witness, it was with difficulty that one could travel
from Planterville to Selma on account of the dead horses and mules.
The night marches of the enemy in the Black Belt were lighted by
the flames of burning houses. Until this raid only the counties of
north Alabama had suffered.^
Wilson had destroyed during this raid 2 gunboats; 99,000 small
arms and much artillery; 10 iron works; 7 foundries; 8 machine
shops ; 5 rolling mills ; the University buildings ; many county court-
houses and pubhc buildings; 3 arsenals; a naval foundry and
navy yard; 5 steamboats; a powder magazine and mills; 35 loco-
motives and 565 cars; 3 large railroad bridges and many smaller
ones; 275,000 bales of cotton; much private property along the line
of march, many magazines of stores; and had subsisted his army
on the country.^ Trowbridge, who passed through Alabama in
the fall of 1865, said that Wilson's route could be traced by burnt
gin-houses dotting the way.'' Three other armies marched through
the state in 1865, burning and destroying.
1 Miller, p. 301.
2 Speech at Cooper Institute, Nov. 13, 1865, in N. Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1895.
^ N. V. Herald, May 4 and 15, 1865; the World, May i, 1865; the Times,
April 20, and Nov. 2, 1865 ; Montgomery Advertiser, July 14, 1867 ; Selma Times,
V&h. 13, 1866 ; Wilson's Report, June 29, 1865 : Hardy, " History of Selma," pp. 46, 51.
* "The Suuth," p. 440.
78 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Federals took horses and mules, cattle and hogs, corn and meat,
gold and silver plate, jewellery, and other valuables. Aged citizens
were tortured by "bummers" to force them to tell of hidden treasure.
Some were swung up by the neck until nearly dead. Stragghng
bands of Federals committed depredations over the country. Houses
were searched, mattresses were cut to pieces, trunks, bureaus, ward-
robes, and chests were broken open and their contents turned out.
Much furniture was broken and ruined. Famihes of women and
children were left without a meal, and many homes were burned.
Cattle and stock were wantonly killed. What could not be carried
away was burned and destroyed.^
Though two-thirds of the state was untouched by the enemy
two months before the close of hostilities, yet when the surrender
came Alabama was as thoroughly destroyed as Georgia or South
Carolina in Sherman's track.
Sec. 2. Military Organization
Alabama Soldiers : Numbers and Character
The exact number of Confederate soldiers enlisted in Alabama
cannot be ascertained. The original records were lost or destroyed,
and duplicates were never completed. There were on the rolls
infantry regiments numbered from i to 65, but the 5 2d and 64th
were never organized. Of the 14 cavalry regiments, numbered
from I to 12, two organizations were numbered 9. There was one
battalion of artillery, afterwards transferred to the regular service,
and 18 batteries.
In Alabama, as in the other southern states, local pride has placed
the number of troops furnished at a very high figure. Colonel W.
H. Fowler, superintendent of army records, who worked mainly in
the Army of Northern Virginia, estimated the total number of men
from Alabama at about 120,000. Governor Parsons, in his inaugural
proclamation, evidently following Fowler's statistics, placed the
number at 122,000,^ while Colonel M. V. Moore placed the number
1 Hague, " Blockaded Family," passim ; Riley, "Baptists in Alabama," pp. 304, 305 ;
*' Our Women in the War," p. 275 et seq. ; Riley, " History of Conecuh County," p. 173.
2 Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 359 ; Brewer, " History of Alabama," pp. 68, 69 ;
Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. II, p. 188.
ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 79
at 60,000 to 65,000/ General Samuel Cooper, adjutant and inspec-
tor-general of the Confederate States Army, estimated that not more
than 600,000 men in the Confederacy actually bore arms.^ This
estimate would make the share of Alabama even less than Colonel
Moore estimated. The highest estimates have placed the number at
128,000 and 135,000, but the correct figures are evidently somewhere
between these extremes.^
The Superintendent of the Confederate Bureau of Conscription
estimated that according to the census of i860 there were in Alabama,
from 1 86 1 to 1864, 106,000 men between the ages of eighteen and
forty-five, and of these, more than 8000 had been regularly exempted
during the year 1864, all former exemptions having been revoked by
act of Congress, February 17, 1864/ Livermore's estimate,^ based
on the census of i860, was: There were in Alabama (1861) between
the ages of eighteen and forty-five, 99,967 men, and in the entire
Confederacy there were 265,000 between the ages of thirteen and
sixteen. Of the latter, a rough estimate would place Alabama's pro-
portion about one-tenth of the whole, that is, about 26,500. Those
men over forty-five who later became liable to mihtary duty he esti-
mates at 20,000, that is, about 2000 in Alabama. Thus there were in
Alabama, in 1861, not allowing for deaths, 127,467 persons who would
become subject to military service unless exempted. Livermore places
the number of boys from ten to twelve years of age and of men from
forty-seven to fifty, in the Confederacy in 1861, at 300,000, or about
30,000 in Alabama. These would become liable to service in the
state militia before 1865.^ In 1861 the governor stated that by
October 7 there had been 27,000 enhstments in the various organiza-
tions. Several of these comiriands were enrolled for short terms of
three months, six months, or one year. Before November, 1862, there
had been 60,000 enlistments. Included in this number were several
thousand reenlistments and transfers. At the end of 1863, when
1 Miller, "History of Alabama," p. 360; Colonel Moore's article in the Louisville
Post, May 30, 1900.
2 Miller, p. 359.
8 For other estimates, see Livermore, " Numbers and Losses," and Curry, '* Civil
History of the Confederate States," pp. 152, 153.
* O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. HI, pp. 102, 103.
^Livermore, "Numbers and Losses," pp. 20, 21.
* Alabama did not succeed in organizing the militia.
8o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
enlistment and reorganization had practically ceased, there had
been 90,857 enlistments of all kinds from Alabama/ For two years
troops were organized in Alabama much faster than they could be
supplied with arms. For months some of the new regiments waited
for equipment. Four thousand men at Huntsville were in service
several months before arms could be procured, and several infantry
regiments were drilled as artillery for a year before muskets were to
be had.^
Before the close of 1863, Alabama had placed in the Confederate
service about all the men that could be sent. The organization of
new regiments by original enlistment practically ceased with the
fall of 1862. In 1863, only three regiments were thus organized,
and two of these were composed of conscripts and men attracted by
the special privileges offered.^ The other regiments, formed after
the summer of 1862, were made by consohdating smaller commands
that were already in service. The few small regiments of reserves
called out in 1864 and 1865 and given regular designations saw little
or no service. Those few who were made liable to service by the
conscript law and who entered the army at all, as a rule went as
volunteers and avoided the conscript camps. The strength of the
Alabama regiments came from central and south Alabama, for the
full military strength of north Alabama could not be utiHzed on
account of invasion by the enemy. At first there were many small
commands — companies and battalions — which were raised in a
short time and sent at once to the front before a regimental organiza-
tion could be effected. Later these were united to form regiments.
Nearly all the higher numbered infantry regiments and more than
half of the cavalry regiments were formed in this way. The first
regiments raised and the strongest in numbers were sent to Virginia.
To these went also the largest number of the recruits secured by the
1 Miller, "Alabama," Appendix; Report of Col. E. D. Blake, Supt. of Special
Registration, in O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 102, 103 ; Brewer, "Alabama," see " Regi-
mental Histories."
2 O. R., Ser. i, Vol. Ill, pp. 440, 445 ; Brewer, "Alabama." Several commands
were equipped at the expense of the commanders ; others were equipped by the com-
munities in which they were raised ; one old gentleman, Joel E. Matthews of Selma,
gave his check for ;^i 5,000 to the ^tate, besides paying for the outfitting of several com-
panies of soldiers. "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 661.
8 These regiments were the 57th and 6ist Infantry, and 7th Cavalry.
ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 8 1
recruiting officers sent out by the regiments. On an average, about
350 recruits or transfers were secured by each Alabama regiment
in Virginia, though some had almost none. There were numbers
of persons who obtained authority to raise new commands for service
near their homes, and in order to fill the ranks of their regiments
and companies they would offer special inducements of furloughs
and home stations. The cavalry and artillery branches of the service
were popular and secured many men needed in the infantry regiments.^
Each commander of a separate company or battahon desired to raise
his force to a regiment, and it was to the interest of the state to have
as many organizations as possible in the field as its quota. A better
show was thus made on paper. Such conditions prevented the re-
cruitment of old regiments, especially those in the armies that sur-
rendered under Johnston and Taylor. Consequently the regiments
in the Western Army were, as a rule, much smaller than the ones in
the Army of Northern Virginia, to which recruits were sent instead
of new regiments.
In each infantry and cavalry regiment there were ten companies.^
The original strength of each .company was from 64 to 100. Later
the number was fixed at 104 to the company for infantry, 72 for cav-
alry, and 70 in the artillery. After the formation of new commands
had practically ceased, the number for each company of infantry
was raised to 125 men, 150 in the artillery, and 80 in the cavalry.^
The original strength of each infantry regiment was, therefore, from
640 to 1000, not including officers; of cavalry, 600 to 720. A bat-
tery of artillery seems to have had any number from 70 to 1 50, though
usually the smaller number. The size of the regiments varied greatly.
Colonel Fowler reported that to February i, 1865, 27,022 men had
joined the 20 Alabama regiments in Virginia, an average of 1351 men
to the regiment. Brewer gives the total enrolment of 15 regiments
in the Army of Northern Virginia as 21,694, an average of 1446 to the
regiment.'' Four of these regiments had an enrolment of less than
1 General Lee protested against this practice as preventing the proper recruitment
of the armies. Livermore, "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War," p. 12.
2 The infantry regiments in Lee's army had 12 companies.
8 See summary of Confederate legislation on the subject. Livermore, p. 30. The
purpose of these laws was to discourage the formation of new commands. It was not
effective in Alabama.
* These were the infantry regiments numbered 3,4, 5, 6, 8, 9, lo, il, 12, 13, 14, I5»
41, 44, 48.
G
82 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
1200; ^ SO it is evident that the other 5, not given by Brewer, must
have averaged about 1265 to the regiment.^ These numbers in-
clude transfers, details, and reenhstments, the exact number of
which it is impossible to ascertain. Brewer lists the transfers and
discharges from 15 regiments at 4398, an average of 293 each, of
which about one-third seem to have been transfers.^ There were also
many reenhstments from disbanded organizations.^ Both Brewer and
Fowler count each enlistment as a different man and arrive at about
the same results.^
The enrolment of 8 Alabama regiments in Johnston's army,
as given by Brewer, amounted to 8300, an average to the regiment
of 1037.® It was the practice, in 1864 and 1865, to unite two or more
weaker regiments into one. No Alabama regiments in Virginia
were so united, and of the 8 in the Western Army, whose enrolment
is given by Brewer, only i was afterward united with another."^
It would then seem that the enrolment of the strongest regiments
is known.* The total number of enlistments in the Alabama com-
mands in Virginia was, according to Fowler, about 30,000, and these
were in 20 infantry regiments, and a f^w smaller commands. In the
armies surrendered by Johnston and Taylor there were 38 Alabama
infantry regiments, and 13 of these had been consoHdated on account
of their small numbers. Eight of them which remained separate
and which must have been stronger than the ones united had enrolled
^The infantry regiments numbered 9, ii, 44, 48.
2 The infantry regiments numbered 43, 47, 49, 61. Brewer, "Regimental His-
tories."
8 These were the infantry regiments numbered 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, ii, 12, 13, 14, 15,
41, 44, 48.
* When the regiments enlisted for a short time were retained in the service, the men
were allowed to change to other regiments if they desired, and many did so. These
transfers and reenhstments swelled the total enrolment of popular regiments. '
5 This has since been the method of estimating the number of soldiers furnished by
Alabama, — each enlistment counting as one man.
6 The infantry regiments numbered 20, 23, 28, 31, 34, 37, 42, 55.
' The 23d Infantry.
8 The regiments that were united were : 24, 34, and 28 ; 33 and 38 ; 32 and 58 ;
23 and 46 ; 7, 39, 22, and 26-50. All were in Johnston's army except the 32d and 58th,
which were in Taylor's command. Some of these regiments were consolidated after
only one year's service ; the others after less than two years. This indicates a low
enrolment. Many companies were never recruited to the minimum. Three infantry
regiments were disbanded after short service, — i, 2 and 7, — and the men reenlisted in
other organizations.
ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 83
an average of 1037 (according to Brewer). Thirty-eight regiments
of this strength (which is probably too large an estimate) would give
a total enrolment of 39,406. This number, added to Fowler's esti-
mate of 27,022 in the Army of Northern Virginia, will give 66,428
enhstments of all kinds, for the infantry arm of the service. Add to
this 3000 for the 3 regiments of reserves called out in 1864/ and
the total is 69,428 enhstments in the infantry.
There were 14 cavalry regiments, 7 of which, and possibly more,
were formed by the consolidation of smaller commands already in
service. The cavalry regiments did not enter the service as early
as the infantry, only i regiment being organized in 1861. The
original strength of each regiment, as has been said, was from 600 to
720. All these regiments served in the commands surrendered by
Johnston and Taylor, where recruits were scarce, so 1000 to the regi-
ment is a very large estimate of total enrolment. However, this
would give 14,000 in the cavalry regiments.
Of artillery, there were 19 batteries and i battalion of 6 batteries,
making 25 batteries in all, with an enrolment ranging from 70 to
150 in each. A total enrolment of 3750, or 150 to each battery,
would be a large estimate.
Fowler reported about 3000 enlistments in the various smaller
commands from Alabama in the Army of Northern Virginia.^ An
additional 2000 would more than account for all similar scattering
commands in the other armies.^
The total enrolment may then be estimated : —
Army of Northern Virginia (Fowler report) .... 27,022
Army of Northern Virginia, scattering (Fowler report) . . 3,000
Armies of the West — infantry (estimate) 39>4o6
Armies of the West — cavalry 14,000
Scattering 2,500
Artillery 3,750
89^678
This total includes many transfers and reenhstments, which can be
only roughly estimated. In the Army of Northern Virginia 464 re-
iThe 62d, 63d, 65th. A thousand to the regiment is a very liberal estimate; 500 is
probal)ly more nearly correct, I am told by old soldiers.
2 Jeff Davis Artillery, Hadaway's Battery, Jeff Davis Legion, 4th Battalion Infantry,
23d Battalion Infantry.
8 The 1st, 3d, 8th, ioth,and 15th Confederate regiments of cavalry had some compa-
nies from Alabama.
84 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
signed, 245 were retired, 3639 were discharged, 181 5 were trans-
ferred to other commands, and 1666 deserted or were unaccounted
for. Those who resigned — as a rule to accept higher positions —
reentered the service. Almost all of those who retired or were dis-
charged had to enter the reserves, and many of them again becams
Hable to service. Numbers of soldiers were accustomed to leave one
command and go to another without any formality of transfer. De-
serters who were driven back to the army nearly always chose to enter
other regiments than their own. There were numbers of transfers
from the cavalry to the infantry, for each cavalryman had to furnish
his own horse, and, should it be killed or die and the soldier be
unable to secure another, he was sent to an infantry regiment. There
were also smaller infantry organizations, which were mounted and
merged into the cavalry regiments. Half of the enhstments in the
artillery came from the infantry. One regiment^ at one time lost
100 men in this way, and it has been estimated that one-fifth of the
Alabama soldiers served in more than one command.^ Counting
each name on the rolls as one man, as Brewer and Fowler do,^ it is
difficult to see how more than 90,000 enlistments can be counted, and
from this total must be deducted several thousand for transfers and
reenhstments. Miller's estimate of a deduction of one-fifth for names
counted twice would make the total number of different men about
75,000, which is probably about the correct number. Not only were
the same names counted twice, and even oftener in different com-
mands, but sometimes in the same companies and regiments they
were counted more than once. It was to the interest of local and
state authorities to have each enlistment counted as a different man,
and this was invariably done."* Five of the early regiments were
reorganized and reenhsted, and thus 5000 at least were added to
the total enrolment without securing a single recruit. The three-
year regiments reenlisted in 1864,^ and here again were extra thou-
1 The 6th Infantry. 2 Miller, p. 374.
3 Brewer evidently follows Fowler, as to the Army of Northern Virginia.
* Not that this deceived the Confederate administration, but the large estimates
sounded well in the governor's messages, and when there was a dispute with Richmond
about the quota of the state.
^ In 1861 and 1862 some regiments enlisted for short terms, some for three years,
some for the war. I have been unable, in more than two or three cases, to find out the
exact term, but there could hardly have been more than one reenlistment of an organization.
ALABAMA SOLDIERS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTER 85
sands of enlistments to be added to the former total. There were
also 19 infantry regiments^ which were formed by the reorganiza-
tion of former commands that had already been counted, and upon
reenlistment for the war they were again counted. In this same
way 7 regiments at least of cavalry were formed.^ In this way it is
possible to count up a total enlistment from Alabama of about
120,000.^ There is no method which will even approximate correct-
ness by which the total number of enHstments may be reduced to
enhstments for a certain term, as three years or four years. The
history of every enlistment must first be known.
There were three Heutenant-generals who entered the service in
command of Alabama troops — John B. Gordon, Joseph Wheeler,*
James Longstreet * ; seven major-generals — H. D. Clayton, Jones
M. Withers,' E. M. Law, C. M. Wilcox, John H. Forney,'' W. W.
Allen, R. E. Rodes ^ ; and thirty-six brigadier generals — Tennent
Lomax,^ P. D. Bowles,' S. A. M. Wood, E. A. O'Neal, William H.
Forney, J. C. C. Sanders,''' I. W. Garrott,' Archibald Gracie,''' B. D.
Fry, James Cantey, J. T. Holtzclaw, E. D. Tracy,' E. W. Pettus,
Z. C. Deas, G. D. Johnston, C. M. Shelly, Y. M. Moody, Wm. F.
Perry, John T. Morgan, M. H. Hannon, Alpheus Baker, J. H. Clan-
ton, James Hagan, P. D. Roddy, John Gregg,' L. P. Walker, D.
Leadbetter,''' J. H.Kelley,''' J. Gorgas, C. A. Battle, John W. Frazer,
x\lex. W. Campbell, Thomas M. Jones, M. J. Bulger, John C. Reid,
James Deshler.' Other Alabamians exercised commands in the
troops of other states, and several were staff officers of general rank.
The naval commanders were Semmes, Randolph, and Glassell, and
a few subordinate officers.^
iThe 1st, 2d, 7th, nth, 21st, 25th, 26th-50th, 27th, 29th, 42d, 46th, 54th, 55th,
56th, 58th, 59th, 60th, 62d, 65th.
2 The 3d, Russell's 4th, 8th, 9th, 10th, nth, 12th.
3 (a) There had been to the end of 1863, 90,857 enlistments in Alabama, Included
in these figures were all reenlistments and transfers.
{d) In the summer of 1863 the state took a census of all males from sixteen to sixty
years of age, a total of 40,500 names. These included 8835, and later 10,000, exempts,
and all the cripples and deadheads in the state. Since this was six months previous to
the report of the 90,857 enlistments, there must have been in the latter number many
that were on the former list. See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 101-103, iioi.
* West Point graduates, nine. ^ Killed in battle, ten.
« Derry, " Story of the Confederate States" ; Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. VI ;
P>rewer, "Alabama," " Regimental Histories" ; Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 375 ;
Brown, '* History of Alabama," pp. 238-254.
S6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
During the early months of 1865 a movement was started to
enroll negroes as Confederate soldiers, and a number of officers,
among whom was John T. Morgan, received permission to raise
negro troops. The conference of governors at Augusta in 1864
recommended the arming of slaves, but Governor Watts asked the
Alabama legislature to disapprove such a movement/ An enthusi-
astic meeting of citizens, held in Mobile, February 19, 1865, declared
that the war must be prosecuted "to victory or death," and that
100,000 negroes should be placed in the field.^ It was too late, how-
ever, for success. Wilson, on his raid, picked up the Confederate
negro troops at Selma, and took them with him.^ In 1862, the
"Creoles" of Mobile apphed for permission to enlist in a body.
They were mulattoes, but were free by the treaties with France in
1803 and with Spain in 1819, were property holders, often owning
slaves, and were an orderly, respectable class, true to the South and
anxious to fight for the Confederacy. The Secretary of War was not
friendly to the proposal, but in November, 1862, the legislature of
Alabama authorized their enlistment for the defence of Mobile. A
year later, at the urgent request of General Maury, they were re-
ceived into the Confederate service as heavy artillery."*
The Alabama troops in the Confederate service made a notably
good record. The flower of the Alabama army served with Lee in
Virginia, but nearly as good were the Alabama troops in the western
armies. Brewer says they moved "high and haughty in the face of
death." The regiments of reserves raised late in the war and
stationed within the state were not very good. Yet there were
instances of regiments, with bad reputation when stationed near home,
making splendid records when sent to the front. The spirit of the
troops at the front was high to the last. In 1864 an Alabama regi-
ment reenhsted for the war, with the oath that they would "live on
bread and go barefoot before they would leave the flag under which
they had fought for three years." ^ On the morning of April 9, 1865,
the Sixtieth Alabama (HiUiard's Legion), then about 165 strong,
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1864), p. 7.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 10.
8 Riley, "Baptists of Alabama," p. 305 ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 1193.
* O. R., Ser. IV, Vol I, p. 1088 ; Vol. II, pp. 94, 197.
6 iV. V. World, March 12, 1864; "The Land We Love," Vol. II, p. 296.
UNION TROOPS FROM ALABAMA 87
captured a Federal battery.^ Fowler, in his report in 1865, asserts
that Alabama sent more troops into the service than any other state;
also that she sent more troops in proportion to her population than
any other state. ''I am certain too," he says, "that when General
Lee surrendered his army, the representation from Alabama on the
field that day was inferior to no other southern state in numbers,
and surely not in gallantry."^
Union Troops from Alabama
To the Union army Alabama furnished about 3000 regular enhst-
ments. Of these 2000 were white men. It is not Hkely that there were
many more, since in 1900 there were in Alabama only 3649 persons,
northerners, negroes, and all, drawing pensions, and some of these
on account of the Indian and Mexican wars.^ The white Union
troops served in the First Alabama Union Cavalry, in the First Ala-
bama and Tennessee Cavalry (the First Vedette), Kennamer's
Scouts (Cavalry), and in northern regiments — principally those
from Indiana. The report of the Secretary of War for 1864- 186 5
says that no white regiments were regularly enlisted in Alabama
for the Union army. But this is evidently not correct, since the report
for 1866 says that there were 2576 enlistments in Alabama for various
periods of service.^
Of negro regiments in the Union army, there were the First
Alabama Volunteers, afterward known as the Fifth United States
Colored Infantry, the Second Alabama Volunteers (negroes), and the
First Alabama Colored Artillery, afterward known as the Sixth
United States Heavy Artillery, which served at Fort Pillow. Late
in 1864 General Lorenzo Thomas reported that he had recently
organized three regiments of colored infantry in Alabama, and Wilson
organized several other negro regiments in the state in 1865. Many
1 Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. II, p. 61 ; Shaver, "History of the Sixtieth
Alabama," p. 106; Miller, "History of Alabama," pp. 359, 374; Brewer, "Ala-
bama," pp. 586-705; "Confederate Military History" — Alabama; Longstreet,
" Manassas to Appomattox " ; " Memorial Record of Alabama " (Wheeler's " Military
History ") ; McMorries, " History of the First Alabama Regiment."
2 Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. II, p. 188; also John S. Wise, "End of an
Era" ; Longstreet, " Manassas to Appomattox."
3 Montgomery Advertiser Almanac (1901), p. 220.
■* Report of 1866, Appendix, Pt. I, p. 166.
88 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
negroes from north Alabama went into various negro organizations,
and were credited to the northern states, the official records showing
only 4969 negro enlistments credited directly to Alabama. A con-
servative estimate would be from 2000 to 2500 whites and 10,000
negroes enlisted in Alabama, not counting those who were enrolled
in the spring of 1865/ The white Union soldiers from Alabama
were mostly poor men from the mountain counties of north Alabama.
The Union troops from Alabama received no bounty.^
The Militia System
The mihtia system of Alabama in 1861 existed only in the statute
books, and in the persons of a few brigadiers and a major-general,
whose entire duty had consisted in wearing uniforms at the inaugura-
tion of a governor and ever thereafter bearing miHtary titles. A
series of Arabic numbers, something more than a hundred, was
assigned to the militia regiments that were unorganized, but which,
under favorable circumstances, might be enrolled and called out.
The county was the unit. To each county was assigned one regiment
or more according to the white population. Several counties formed
a mihtia district under a brigadier-general, and over all was a major-
general. Bodies of trained volunteers were not connected with the
militia system at all, but these went at once, on the outbreak of war,
into the state army, which was soon merged into the Confederate
army.
In theory the mihtia consisted of all the male citizens of Alabama
of military age. The enlistments for war service soon reduced the
material from which militia regiments could be formed, and the
system broke down before it was tried. A few regiments may have
been enrolled in 1861 and 1862, but if so, they at once entered the
Confederate service. The Forty-eighth Alabama Mihtia regiment
was ordered out to defend Mobile in 186 1, and $6000 was appropriated
to provide pikes and knives with which to arm them, as it was impos-
1 Report of the Secretary of War, 1866, Appendix, Pt. I, p. 69; Report of the
Secretary of War (1864-1865), p. 28; Moore, "Rebellion Record," Vol. VII, p. 45 ;
Miller, p. 360 ; O. R., Ser. Ill, Vol. Ill, pp. 1115, 1190, and Vol. IV, pp. 16, 921, 925,
1269, 1270 ; O. R., Ser. II, Vol. V, pp. 589, 570, 626, 627, 716, 946, 947 ; " Confederate
Military History " — Alabama.
2 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 592.
THE MILITIA SYSTEM 89
sible to get firearms. On March i, 1862, Governor Shorter appealed
to the people to give their shotguns, rifles, bowie-knives, pikes, powder,
and lead to state agents, probate judges, sheriffs, and other state
officials for the use of the state miHtia/ A few days later he ordered
out, for the defence of Mobile and the coast, the mihtia from the river
counties and the southwestern counties — eighteen counties in all.
But the militia failed to appear. It seems that the governor expected
a hearty response from the people. He asked for too much, and got
nothing. On March 12, 1862, he again ordered out the mihtia,
this time specifying the regiments by number.^ But again the mihtia
failed to respond. The fact was, there was no longer any militia;
the officers and men had gone, or were preparing to go, into the Con-
federate service. Many of the militia regiments could not have
mustered a dozen men, and it is doubtful if there was a muster-roll
of a militia regiment in all Alabama.^ In May, 1862, the governor,
recognizing that the militia system was worthless as a means of rais-
ing troops for home defence, issued a proclamation asking the people
to form volunteer organizations. The response, as he said, "was not
prompt." The legislature of that year, not seeing the necessity,
refused to reorganize the militia so as to give the governor any effective
control. The people seem not to have been worried by any fear
of invasion, and many thought that organization into militia com-
panies was merely preliminary to entering the Confederate service.
Some did not wish to go until they had to do so, others preferred
to go at once to the Confederate army. It appears that all persons,
for various reasons, disliked mihtia service.
December 22, 1862, the governor issued a proclamation, in which,
after mentioning the tardy response to his May proclamation and the
failure of the legislature to reorganize the system, he again asked
the people to volunteer in companies for home defence.'' He begged
the people to drive those who were shirking service to their duty
by the force of public scorn. He requested that business houses
be closed early in order to give time for drill. The response to this
1 Moore, " Rebellion Record," Supplement.
2 The 89th, 94th, 95th, etc. See Moore, " Rebellion Record," Supplement. The
highest number of a militia regiment to be found on the records was the I02d, in Sumter
County.
3 See O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II (Shorter to Johnston).
4 Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VI ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 253-256-
90 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was the same as to his previous proclamation. There was no longer
any material for a militia organization. Early in 1863, and in some
sections even before, the need began to be felt for a militia force
to execute the laws. Under the direction of the governor, small
commands were organized here and there of those who were not
Hkely to become subject to service in the Confederate army. These
were state and Confederate officials, young boys, and sometimes old
men. These organizations were later a source of constant conflict
between the state authorities and the Confederate enrolling officers,
who wanted to take such commands bodily into the Confederate
service, and who usually did so with the full consent of most of the
men and to the great indignation of the governor.^ In August,
1863, the legislature finally passed a law to reorganize the mihtia
system, or rather to establish a new system. By the law an official
in each county, appointed by the governor, was to enroll as first-
class militia all males under seventeen and over forty-five years of
age, including all state and Confederate civil officials, and those
physically disquahfied for service in the Confederate army. The
second class was to consist of those not in the first class, that is, of
men between seventeen and forty-five years of age. But men of
the second class were subject to enrolment by Confederate conscript
officers, and consisted of the few thousand who were specially ex-
empted by the Confederate authorities. Those of the first class
who wished to do so might enroll in the second class. The governor
was given the usual power over the militia, but it was ordered that
the first-class militia was not to go beyond the limits of the county
to which it belonged.^ Presumably the second class might be ordered
beyond the county limits, but there were so few in their class that they
were not organized. The first-class mihtia in each county was under
a commandant of reserves, militia now being called reserves. He
had the power to call it out to repel invasion and execute the laws.
Jealousy of Confederate authority had caused the legislature to take
legal means of making the militia worthless to the Confederacy, and
useful only for local defence and for executing the state laws in par-
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pts. II and III, pp. 780, 855 ; Ser. IV, Vol. Ill,
pp. I75» 323-
2 Act of General Assembly, Aug. 29, 1863, which seems to have followed an act of
Congress of similar nature.
THE MILITIA SYSTEM 9I
ticular localities.^ Still, the system seems to have been practically
useless, and the governor continued to organize small irregular com-
mands to execute the laws and to furnish mihtary escorts to civil
officials. As has been stated, such commands were highly approved
of by the Confederate enrolling officers, who eagerly persuaded them
to join the Confederate army, and thus called forth strong remon-
strances from Governor Watts. The War Department reasoned that
a state could keep troops of war which were not subject to absorption
in the Confederate service, but that the mihtia were subject to the
superior claims of the Confederacy.^ February 6, 1864, Governor
Watts, in an address to the people, declared that a raid into the state
was threatened and called upon young and old to volunteer for the
defence of the state.^ The reserve system was now worthless. Few
of the regiments had more than fifty men, many had none, and the
governor was powerless to use them beyond the limits of their respec-
tive counties. The state was at the mercy of any invading force,
and Rousseau's Raid, through the heart of the state, showed the
woful condition of affairs. On October 7, 1864, the legislature
passed an act which prohibited Confederate army officers from com-
manding the reserves. It was again ordered that the first-class
reserves should not serve beyond the limits of the county to which
they belonged. At the same time, permission was granted to the
harassed citizens of Dale and Henry counties to organize themselves
to protect their homes, provided they did so under the direction of
the commandant of the first-class militia. Perhaps the legislature
was afraid that, if left to themselves, they might cross the county
line, or choose a Confederate officer to lead them. In December,
1864, when north Alabama was almost entirely overrun by tories,
deserters, and Federals, the citizens of Marion CounJ:y were authorized
to organize into squads and protect themselves." Still the legislature
refused to make an effective reorganization of the militia. When
the spring campaign in 1865 began. Governor Watts appealed to the
people to do what the legislature had failed to do. The first-class
mihtia could not, he said, be ordered beyond the Kmits of their coun-
10. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 1133.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 172-174, 256, 376. The state supreme court held the
same view. ^ Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VIII, p. 378.
* Acts of General Assembly, Dec. 12, 1864.
92 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAiMA
ties, and in three congressional districts in north Alabama it had not
been and, by law, could not be, organized. He estimated that
30,000 men were enrolled in the first-class militia, of whom 4000
were boys, and to the latter he made the appeal to defend the state.
Evidently the remaining 26,000 men were, in his estimation, not worth
much as soldiers. However, he called upon all first-class militia to
volunteer as second class. ^ A few hundred responded to this appeal,
and all of them who saw active service were with Forrest in front
of Wilson.
The various organizations mentioned in the War Records, the
Junior Reserves, Senior Reserves, Mobile Regiment, Home Guards,
Local Defence Corps,^ and others, were, except the reserves, volunteer
organizations for local defence, and all that saw active service before
1865, except the Home Guards, were absorbed into the Confederate
organization.^ The stupid conduct of the legislature during the
last two years of the war in failing to provide for the defence of the
state cannot be too strongly condemned. The final result would have
been the same, but a strong force of militia would have enabled
Governor Watts to execute the laws in all parts of the state, and
to protect the families of loyal citizens from outrage by tories and
deserters.
Sec. 3. Conscription and Exemption
Confederate Enrolment Laws
In the spring of 1862, the Confederate Congress passed the Enrol-
ment Act, by which all white men between the ages of eighteen and
thirty-five were made liable to military service at the call of the Presi-
dent, and those already in service were retained. The President was
authorized to employ state officials to enroll the men made subject
to duty, provided the governor of the state gave his consent; other-
wise he was to employ Confederate officials. The conscripts thus
secured were to be assigned to the state commands already in the
field until these organizations were recruited to their full strength.
Substitutes were allowed under such regulations as the Secretary of
1 N. V. Times, April i6, 1865 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 10.
2 See O. R., General Index.
* The 6ist, 62d, and 65th regiments were thus formed, the men becoming subject to
duty under the conscript act, or by volunteering.
CONFEDERATE ENROLMENT LAWS 93
War might prescribe.^ Five days later, a law was passed exempt-
ing certain classes of persons from the operations of the Enrolment
Act. These were: Confederate and state officials, mail- carriers,
ferrymen on post-office routes, pilots, telegraph operators, miners,
printers, ministers, college professors, teachers with twenty pupils
or more, teachers of the deaf, dumb, and bhnd, hospital attendants,
one druggist to each drug store, and superintendents and operatives
in cotton and wool factories.^ In the fall of 1862, the Enrolment
law was extended to include all white men from thirty-five to forty-
five years of age and all who lacked a few months of being eighteen
years of age. They were to be enrolled for three years, the oldest,
if not needed, being left until the last.^
At this time was begun the practice, which virtually amounted
to exemption, of making special details from the army to perform
certain kinds of skilled labor. The first details thus made were to
manufacture shoes for the army.^ The list of those who might claim
exemption, in addition to those named in the act of April 21, 1862,
was extended to include the following : state militia officers, state and
Confederate clerks in the civil service, railway employees who were
not common laborers, steamboat employees, one editor and the neces-
sary printers for each newspaper, those morally opposed to war, pro-
vided they furnished a substitute or paid $500 into the treasury, physi-
cians, professors, and teachers who had been engaged in the profession
for two years or more, government artisans, mechanics, and other
employees, contractors and their employees furnishing arms and sup-
plies to the state or to the Confederacy, factory owners, shoemakers,
tanners, blacksmiths, wagon makers, millers, and engineers. The
artisans and manufacturers were granted exemption from military
service provided the products of their labor were sold at not more
than seventy-five per cent profit above the cost of production. On
every plantation where there were twenty or more negroes one white
man was entitled to exemption as overseer.^
1 Act, April 16, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess.
2 Act, April 21, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess.
3 Act, Sept. 27, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 2d Sess.
* Act, Oct. 9, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 2d Sess. These details were
still carried on the rolls of the company.
6 Act, Oct. II, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.SA., ist Cong., 2d Sess. The exemption of one
white for twenty negroes was called the " twenty-nigger law." One peaceable Black Belt
94 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
In the spring of 1863 mail contractors and drivers of post-coaches
were exempted ; ^ and it was ordered that those exempted under the
so-called '' twenty-negro" law should pay $500 into the Confederate
treasury ; also, that such state officials as were exempted by the gov-
ernor might be also exempted by the Confederate authorities. The
law permitting the hiring of substitutes by men liable to service was
repealed on December 28, 1863, and a few days later even those who
had furnished substitutes were made subject to mihtary duty.^
A law of February 17, 1864,^ provided that all soldiers between
the ages of eighteen and forty-five should be retained in service dur-
ing the war. Those between the ages of seventeen and eighteen,
and forty-five and fifty were called into service as a reserve force for
the defence of the state. All exemptions were repealed except the
following: (i) the members of Congress and of the state legislature,
and such Confederate and state officers as the President or the gov-
ernors might certify to be necessary for the proper administration of
government; (2) ministers regularly employed, superintendents,
attendants, and physicians of asylums for the deaf, dumb, and blind,
insane, and other public hospitals, one editor for each newspaper,
public printers, one druggist for each drug store which had been two
years in existence, all physicians who had practised seven years,
teachers in colleges of at least two years' standing and in schools
which had twenty pupils to each teacher; (3) one overseer or agri-
culturist to each farm upon which were fifteen or more negroes, in
case there was no other exempt on the plantation. The object was
to leave one white man, and no more, on each plantation, and the
owner or overseer was preferred. In return for such exemption,
the exempt was bound by bond to deliver to the Confederate authori-
ties, for each slave on the plantation between the ages of sixteen and
fifty, one hundred pounds of bacon or its equivalent in produce, which
citizen wished to stay at home, but he possessed only nineteen negroes. His neighbors
thought that he ought to go to war, and no one would give, lend, or sell him a slave.
Unable to purchase even the smallest negro, he was sadly making preparations to depart,
when one morning he was rejoiced by the welcome news that one of the negro women
had presented her husband with a fine boy. The tale of twenty negroes was complete,
and the master remained at home.
1 Act of April 14, 1863, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 3d Sess.
2 Acts, Dec. 28, 1863, and Jan. 5, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 4th Sess.
3 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 4th Sess.
POLICY OF THE STATE IN REGARD TO CONSCRIPTION
95
was paid for by the government at prices fixed by the impressment
commissioners. In addition, the exempt was to sell his surplus
produce at prices fixed by the commissioners. The Secretary of
War was authorized to make special details, under the above condi-
tions, of overseers, farmers, or planters, if the pubhc good demanded
it; also (4) to exempt the higher officials of railroads and not more
than one employee for each mile of road ; and (5) mail carriers and
drivers. The President was authorized to make details of old men
for special service.^ By an act passed the same day free negroes
from eighteen to fifty years of age were made liable to service with
the army as teamsters. These acts of February 17, 1864, were the
last Confederate legislation of importance in regard to conscription
and exemption. During the year 1864 the Confederate authorities
devoted their energies to construing away all exemptions possible,
and to absorbing the state reserve forces into the Confederate army.
Policy of the State in Regard to Conscription
To return to 1861. The state legislature, when providing for
the state army, authorized the governor to exempt from mihtia duty
all railway, express, steamboat, and telegraph employees, but even
the fire companies had to serve as militia.^ The operation of the
enrolment law stripped the land of men of militia age, and on Novem-
ber 17, 1862, the legislature ordered to duty on the public roads men
from sixteen to eighteen years of age, and forty-five to fifty-five, and
later all from sixteen to fifty as well as all male slaves and free negroes
from fourteen to sixty years of age.^ Militia officers between the
ages of eighteen and forty-five were declared subject to the enrolment
acts of Congress,^ as were also justices of the peace, notaries pubhc,
and constables.^
Yet, instead of making an effective organization of the militia,
the legislature in 1863 proceeded to frame a law of exemptions pat-
terned after that of the Confederacy. It released from militia duty
all persons over forty-five years of age, county treasurers, physicians
of seven years' practice or who were in the public service, ministers,
teachers of three years' standing, one blacksmith in each beat, the
1 Act, Feb. 17, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S.A,, 1st Cong., 4th Sess.
2 Acts, Jan. 31, 1861, ist Called Session.
3 Act, Aug. 29, 1863. * Nov. 25, 1862. » Dec. 6, 1862.
•96 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
city police and fire companies, penitentiary guards, general adminis-
trators who had been in service five years. Confederate agents, millers,
railroad employees, steamboat officials, overseers, managers of foun-
dries, salt makers who made as much as ten bushels a day and who
sold it for not more than $15 per bushel. Besides, the governor could
make special exemptions/ In 1864 millers who charged not more
than one-eighth for toll were exempted.^ It will be seen that in some
respects the state laws go farther in exemption than the Confederate
laws, and thus were in conflict with them. But it must be remem-
bered that the Confederacy had already stripped the country of
nearly all the able-bodied men who did not evade duty. To this
time, however, there was no conflict between the state and Confed-
erate authorities in regard to conscription. An act was also passed
providing for the reorganization of the penitentiary guards, and only
those not subject to conscription were retained.^ A joint resolution
of August 29, 1863, called upon Congress to decrease the hst of ex-
emptions, as many clerks and laborers were doing work that could
be done by negroes. At the end of the year 1863 the legislature
asked that the conscript law be strictly enforced by Congress.^
On the part of the state rights people, there was much opposition
to the enrolment or conscription laws on the ground that they were
unconstitutional. Several cases were brought before the state su-
preme court, and all were decided in favor of the constitutionality
of the laws ; furthermore, it was decided that the courts and judicial
officers of the state had no jurisdiction on habeas corpus to discharge
from the custody of a Confederate enrolHng officer persons who had
been conscripted under the law of Congress.^ A test case was car-
ried to the state supreme court, which decided that a person who had
conscientious scruples against bearing arms might pay for a substi-
tute in the state militia and claim exemption from state service, but
1 Act, Aug. 29, 1863.
2 Dec. 13, 1864. This was a measure of obstruction, since the Confederate laws did
not exempt millers. The legislature elected in 1863 contained many obstructionists.
3 Act, Auj^. 29, 1863. * Resolution, Dec. 4, 1863.
^ Ex parte Hill, In re Willis et al. t/j. Confederate States — 38 Alabama Reports
(1863), 429. All over the state at various times men sought to avoid conscription or
some certain service under every pretext, sometimes '* even resorting to a habeas corpus
before an ignorant justice of the peace, who had no jurisdiction over such cases." See
O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 139; also Governor Shorter to General Johnston.
Aug., 1863.
^
r"%
The First Confederate Capitol.
The State Capitol, Montgomery.
monhiomery residence of
President Davis.
Confederate Monument, Montgomery.
The Inauc.uration of Jeffekson Davis.
(From an old negative.)
POLICY OF THE STATE IN REGARD TO CONSCRIPTION
97
if conscripted he was not exempted from the Confederate service
unless he belonged to the rehgious denominations specially exempted
by the act of Congress.^ The court also declared constitutional the
Confederate law which provided that when a substitute became sub-
ject to military duty his principal was thereby rendered liable to
service.^ In 1864 the supreme court held that the state had a right
to subject to mihtia service persons exempted by the Confederate
authorities as bonded agriculturists under the acts of February 17,
1864, and that only those overseers were granted exemption from
mihtia service under the act of Congress in 1863 who at the time were
not subject to mihtia duty, and not those exempted from Confederate
service by the later laws,^ and that the clause in the act of Congress
passed February 17, 1864, repealing and revoking all exemptions,
was constitutional/ In other cases the court held that a person
regularly enrolled and sworn into the Confederate service could not
raise any question, on habeas corpus^ of his assignment to any par-
ticular command or duty,^ but that the state courts could discharge
on habeas corpus from Confederate enrolling officers persons held as
conscripts, who were exempted under Confederate laws;® that the
Confederacy might reassert its rights to the military service of a
citizen who was enrolled as a conscript and, after producing a dis-
charge for physical disabihty, had enlisted in the state militia service ; ^
and finally, that the right of the Confederacy to the mihtary service
of a citizen was paramount to the right of the state. ^
During the year 1864 Governor Watts had much trouble with
the Confederate enrolling officers who insisted upon conscripting his
volunteer and militia organizations, whether they were subject to
duty under the laws or not. The authorities at Richmond held that
while a state might keep "troops of war" over which the Confederacy
could have no control, yet the state militia was subject to all the laws
of Congress. ''Troops of war," as the Secretary of War explained,
would be troops in active and permanent service,® and hence virtually
Confederate troops. A state with troops of that description would
be very willing to give them up to the Confederacy to save expense.
1 Dunkards, Quakers, Nazarenes. In re Stringer — 38 Alabama (1863), 457.
2 38 Alabama, 458. 8 39 Alabama, 367. ■* 39 Alabama, 254.
^ 39 Alabama, 457. « ^9 Alabama, 440, "^ 39 Alabama, 611.
8 39 Alabama, 609. ^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 256, 463, et passim.
H
98 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Thus we find the legislature of Alabama asking the President to re-
ceive and pay certain irregular organizations which had been used
to support the Conscript Bureau/ The legislature, now somewhat
disaffected, showed its interest in the operations of the enrolling officers
by an act providing that conscript officials who forced exempts into
the Confederate service should be hable to indictment and punish-
ment by a fine of $1000 to $6000 and imprisonment of from six
months to two years.^ It went a step further and nulhfied the laws
of Congress by declaring that state officials, civil and military, were
not subject to conscription by the Confederate authorities.^
Effect of the Enrolment Laws
Few good soldiers were obtained by conscription,^ and the sys-
tem, as it was organized in Alabama,^ did more harm than good to
the Confederacy. The passage of the first law, however, had one
good effect. During the winter of 1861-1862, there had been a
reaction from the enthusiastic war feeling of the previous summer.
Those who thought it would be only a matter of weeks to overrun
the North now saw their mistake." Many of the people still had no
doubt that the North would be glad to make peace and end the war
if the government at Richmond were willing. Numbers, therefore,
saw no need of more fighting, and hence did not volunteer. Thou-
sands left the army and went home. A measure like the enrolment
act was necessary to make the people reahze the actual situation.
Upon the passage of the law all the loyal population liable to ser-
vice made preparations to go to the front before being conscripted,
which was deemed a disgrace, and the close of the year 1862 saw
practically all of them in the army. Those who entered after
1862 were boys and old men.'' Many not subject to service
1 Memorial, Oct. 7, 1864. 2 Acts, Dec. 12, 1864. ^ Dec. 13, 1864.
* Curry, "Civil History of the Confederate States," p. 151.
^ The Conscript Bureau had posts at the following places : Decatur, Courtland, Som-
erville, Guntersville, Tuscumbia, Fayetteville, Pikeville, Camden, Montgomery, Selma,
Lebanon, Pollard, Troy, Mobile, West Point (Ga.), Marion, Greensborough, Blountsville,
Livingston, Gadsden, Cedar Bluff, JacksonviHe, Ashville, CarroUton, Tuscaloosa, Eutaw,
Eufaula, Jasper, Newton, Clarksville, Talladega, Elyton. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp.
819-821.
^ See De Leon, ** Four Years in Rebel Capitals."
■^ President Davis visited Mobile in October, 1863, and upon reviewing the Alabama
troops recently raised, was much moved at seeing the young boys and the old gray-haired
EFFECT OF THE ENROLMENT LAWS
99
volunteered, so that when the age Hmit was extended but few more
were secured.
Great dissatisfaction was expressed among the people at the enrol-
ment law. Some thought that it was an attack upon the rights of
the states, and the irritating manner in which it was enforced aroused,
in some localities, intense popular indignation. Conscription being
considered disgraceful, many who would have been glad for various
good reasons to remain at home a few months longer went at once
into service to escape conscription. Yet some loyal and honest citi-
zens found it disastrous to leave their homes and business without
definite arrangements for the safety and support of their families.
Such men suffered much annoyance from the enrolling officers, in
spite of the fact that the law was intended for their protection. The
conscript officials, often men of bad character, persecuted those who
were easy to find, while neglecting the disloyal and refractory who
might make trouble for them. In some sections such weak con-
duct came near resulting in local insurrections; this was especially
the case in Randolph County in 1862.^ The effect of the law was
rather to stop volunteering in the state organizations and reporting
to camps of instructions, since all who did either were classed as
conscripts. Not wishing to bear the odium of being conscripted,
many thousands in 1862 and 1863 went directly into the regular service.^
While the conscript law secured few, if any, good soldiers who
would not have joined the army without it, it certainly served as a
reminder to the people that all were needed, and as a stimulus to
volunteering. Three classes of people suffered from its operations:
(i) those rightfully exempted, who were constantly annoyed by the
enrolHng officers ; (2) those soon to become liable to service, who were
not allowed to volunteer in organizations of their own choice; and
(3) '^ deadheads" and malcontents who did not intend to fight at all
if they could keep from it. It was this last class that made nearly
all the complaints about conscription, and it was they whom the
enrolling officers left alone because they were so troublesome.
men in the ranks before him. See Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 8. The A. and L
General of Alabama reported, July 29, 1862, that not more than io,ocx) conscripts could
be secured from Alabama unless the enemy could be expelled from the Tennessee valley.
In that case, 30CX) more men might be secured. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 21.
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 1 149 ; Vol. II, pp. 87, 207, 208, 790.
2 See Curry, "Civil History," p. 151.
lOO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The defects in the working of conscription are well set forth in a
letter from a correspondent of President Davis in December, 1862.
In this letter it was asserted that the conscript law had proven a fail-
ure in Mississippi and Alabama, since it had stopped the volunteering.
Governor Shorter was reported to have said that the enforcement of
it had been ^'a humbug and a farce." The writer declared that the
enrolling officers chosen were frequently of bad character ; that ineffi-
cient men were making attempts to secure '' bomb-proof" offices in
order to avoid service in the army; and that the exemption of slave
owners by the "twenty-negro law" had a bad influence upon the
poorer classes. He also declared that the system of substitutes was
bad, for many men were on the hunt for substitutes, and others liable
to duty were working to secure exemptions in order to serve as sub-
stitutes, while large numbers of men connected with the army man-
aged in this way to keep away from the fighting. He was sure, he
said, that there were too many hangers-on about the officers of high
rank, and that it was believed that social position, wealth, and influ-
ence served to get young men good staff positions.^ Another evil
complained of was that "paroled" men scattered to their homes and
never heard of their exchange. To a conscript officer whose duty
it was to look after them they said that they were "paroled," and he
passed them by. The officers were said to be entirely too lenient
with the worthless people and too rigorous with the better classes.^
Exemption from Service
After the passage of the enrolment laws, every man with excessive
regard for the integrity of his person and for his comfort began to
secure exemption from service. In north Alabama men of little
courage and patriotism lost confidence after the invasions of the Fed-
erals, and resorted to every expedient to escape conscription. Strange
and terrible diseases were developed, and in all sections of the state
health began to break down.^ It was the day of certificates, — for
old age, rheumatism, fits, bhndness, and various physical disabili-
ties.'* Various other pretexts were given for staying away from the
1 James Phelan to President Davis, O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 790.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVII, Pt. II, p. 790.
8 C. C. Clay, Jr., to Secretary of War, O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 141, 142.
* I know of one man who for two years carried his arm in a sling to deceive the
EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE ' lOi
army, while some men hid out in the woods. The governor asked
the people to drive such persons to their duty.^ There was never so
much skilled labor in the South as now. Harness making, shoe
making, charcoal burning, carpentering — all these and numerous
other occupations supposed to be in support of the cause secured
exemption. Running a tanyard was a favorite way of escaping ser-
vice. A pit was dug in the corner of the back yard, a few hides
secured, carefully preserved, and never finished, — for more hides
might not be available ; then the tanner would be no longer exempt.
There were purchasing agents, sub-purchasing agents, and sub-sub-
agents, cattle drivers, tithe gatherers, agents of the Nitre Bureau, agents
to examine political prisoners,^ and many other Confederate and state
agents of various kinds. ^ The class left at home for the enrolling
officers to contend with, especially after 1862, was a source of weak-
ness, not of strength, to the Confederate cause. The best men had
gone to the army, and these people formed the public. Their opin-
ion was public opinion, and with few exceptions the home stayers
were a sorry lot. From them came the complaint about the favor-
itism toward the rich. The talk of a "rich man's war and a poor
enrolling officers. It was sound when he put it into the sling. After the war ended he
could never regain the use of it.
A draft from the Home Guards of Selma was ordered to go to Mobile. The roll
was made out, and opposite his name each man was allowed to write his excuse for not
wishing to go. One cripple, John Smith, wrote, "One leg too short," and was at once
excused by the Board. The next man had no excuse whatever, but he had seen how
Smith's excuse worked, so he wrote, " Both legs too short," but he had to go to Mobile.
"The Land V^e Love," Vol. Ill, p. 430.
1 Shorter's Proclamation, Dec. 22, 1862.
2 M. J. Saffold, afterward a prominent " scalawag," escaped service as an " agent
to examine political prisoners." O. R., Ser. II, Vol. VI, p. 432.
^ The list of pardons given by President Johnson will show a number of the titles
assumed by the exempts. The chronic exempts were skilled in all the arts of beating
out. If a new way of securing exemption were discovered, the whole fraternity of
"deadheads" soon knew of it. In 1864 nearly all the exemptions and details made in
order to supply the Quartermaster's Department were revoked, and agents sent through
the country to notify the former exempts that they were again subject to duty. Before
the enrolling officers reached them nearly all of them had secured a fresh exemption,
and from a large district in middle Alabama, I have been informed by the agent who
revoked the contracts, not one recruit for the armies was secured. Often the exemption
was only a detail, and large numbers of men were carried on the rolls of companies who
never saw their commands. Often a man when conscripted would have sufficient influ-
ence to be at once detailed, and would never join his company. Little attention was
paid to the laws regarding exemption.
102 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
man's fight" originated with them, as well as the criticism of the
''twenty-negro law." In the minds of the soldiers at the front there
was no doubt that the slaveholder and the rich man were doing their
full share/
Very few of the slaveholders and wealthy men tried to escape
service; but when one did, he attracted more attention and called
forth sterner denunciation than ten poor men in similar cases would
have done. In fact, few able-bodied men tried to secure exemption
under the "twenty-negro law." It would have been better for the
Confederacy if more planters had stayed at home to direct the pro-
duction of suppHes, and the fact was recognized in 1864,^ when a
''fifteen- negro law" was passed by the Congress, and other exemp-
tions of planters and overseers were encouraged.^
There is no doubt that those who desired to remain quietly at
home — to be neutral, so to speak — found it hard to evade the
conscript officers. One of these declared that the enrolHng officers
"burned the woods and sifted the ashes for conscripts." Another
who had been caught in the sifting process deserted to the enemy at
Huntsville. He was asked, " Do they conscript close over the river ? "
"Hell, stranger, I should think they do ; they take every man who has
not been dead more than two days." ^ But the "hill-billy" and
"sand- mountain" conscripts were of no service when captured;
there were not enough soldiers in the state to keep them in their regi-
ments. The Third Alabama Regiment of Reserves ran away almost
in a body. There were fifteen or twenty old men in each county as
a supporting force to the Conscript Bureau, and they had old guns,
some of which would not shoot, and ammunition that did not fit.^
Thus the best men went into the army, many of them never to return,
and a class of people the country could well have spared survived to
assist a second time in the ruin of their country in the darker days of
Reconstruction. Often the " fire-eating, die-in- the-last-ditch " radical of
1861 who remained at home "to take care of the ladies" became an
exempt, a "bomb-proof" or a conscript officer, and later a "scalawag."
' Curry, "Civil History," pp. 142-148. The wealthy young men volunteered, at
first as privates or as officers; the older men of wealth nearly all became officers, chosen
by their men. One company from Tuskegee owned property worth over ^2,000,000.
Opelika Post, Dec. 4, 1903.
2 Act of Feb. 17, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S. A. 3 Curry, " Civil History," pp. 142-148,151.
* N. y. World, March 28, 1864. ^ q. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 881.
EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE
103
Some escaped war service by joining the various small indepen-
dent and irregular commands formed for frontier service by those
officers who found field duty too irksome. Though these irregular
bodies were, as we have seen, gradually absorbed by the regular or-
ganizations, yet during their day of strength they were most unpleasant
defenders. The men sometimes joined in order to have more oppor-
tunity for Hcense and plunder, and such were hated alike by friend
and foe.
Another kind of irregular organization caused some trouble in
another way. Before the extension of the age limits to seventeen
and fifty, the governor raised small commands of young boys to assist
in the execution of the state laws, no other forces being available.
Later, when the Confederate Congress extended its laws to include
these, the conscript officers tried to enroll them, but the governor
objected. The officers complained that, in order to escape the odium
of conscription, the young boys who were subject by law to duty in
the reserves evaded that law by going at once into the army, or by
joining some command for special duty. They were of the opinion
that these boys should be sent to camps of instruction. The gov-
ernor had ten companies of young men under eighteen years of age
raised near Talladega, and really mustered into the Confederate
service as irregular troops, before the law of February 17, 1864, was
passed. After the passage of the law, the enrolhng officers wished to
disband these companies and send the men to the reserves. Watts
was angered and sharply criticised the whole policy of conscription.
He said that much harm was done by the method of the conscript
officers; that it was nonsense to take men from the fields and put
them in camps of instruction when there were no arms for them,
and no active service was intended; they had better stay at home,
drill once a week with volunteer organizations, and work the rest of
the time; to assemble the farmers in camps for useless drill while
the crops were being destroyed was "most egregious folly." The
governor also attacked the policy of the Bureau in refusing to allow
the enrolment in the same companies of boys under eighteen and
men over forty-five.^ In regard to the attempts to disband his small
1 The law of P'eb. 17, 1864, provided for the separate enrohnent of these two
classes, and the enrolling officers interpreted it as requiring separate service. Such an
interpretation would practically prohibit the formation of volunteer commands and
would leave the reserves to the enrolling officers to be organized in camp.
I04 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
force of militia in active service, the governor used strong language.
To Seddon, the Secretary of War, he wrote in May, 1864: "It must
not be forgotten that the states have some rights left, and that the
right to troops in the time of war is guaranteed by the Constitution.
These rights, on the part of Alabama, I am determined shall be re-
spected. Unless you order the Commandant of Conscripts to stop
interfering with [certain volunteer companies] there will be a con-
flict between the Confederate general [Withers] and the state authori-
ties."^ Watts carried the day and the Confederate authorities
yielded.
The enrolment law provided that state officials should be exempt
from enrolment upon presenting a certificate from the governor stat-
ing that they were necessary to the proper administration of the
government. In November, 1864, Governor Watts complained to
General Withers, who commanded the Confederate reserve forces in
Alabama, that the conscript officers had been enrolling by force state
officials who held certificates from the governor and also from the
commandant of conscripts, and, he added: ''This state of things
cannot long last without a conflict between the Confederate and state
authorities. I shall be compelled to protect my state officers with
all the forces of the state at my command." The enroUing officers
referred him to a decision of the Secretary of War in the case of a
state official in Lowndes County, — that by the act of February 17,
1864, all men between the ages of seventeen and fifty were taken at
once into the Confederate service, and that state officials elected
later could not claim exemption. Governor Watts then wrote to
Seddon, "Unless you interfere, there will be a conflict between the
Confederate and the state authorities." He denied the right of Con-
federate officers to conscript state officials elected after February 17,
1864: "I deny such right, and will resist it with all the forces of the
state." ^ The Secretary of War repHed by commending the Con-
federate officers for the way in which they had done their duty, insist-
ing that it was not a political nor a constitutional question, but one
involving private rights, and that it should be left to the courts. This
was receding from the confident ruling made in the case of the
Lowndes County man. There was no more dispute and it is to be
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 322, 323, 463, 466, 1059, 1060.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 817, 819, 920.
EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE 105
presumed that the governor retained his officials.^ No wonder that
Colonel Preston, the chief of the Bureau of Conscription, wrote to
the Secretary of War that, "from one end of the Confederacy to the
other every constituted authority, every officer, every man, and
woman was engaged in opposing the enrolhng officer in the execu-
tion of his duties." ^
But these officers had only themselves to blame. They pursued
a short-sighted, nagging poHcy, worrying those who were exempt —
the state officials and the militia — because they were easy to reach,
and neglecting the real conscript material.^ The work was known
to be useless, and the whole system was irritating to the last degree
to all who came in contact with it. It was useless because there was
Httle good material for conscription, except in the frontier country
where no authority could be exerted. During 1862 and 1863 prac-
tically nothing was done by the Bureau in Alabama, and at the end
of the latter year, Colonel E. D. Blake, the Superintendent of Special
Registration, reported that there were 13,000 men in the state between
the ages of seventeen and forty- five, and of these he estimated 4000
were under eighteen years of age, and hence, at that time, beyond
the reach of the enrolling officers. More than 8000 '' were exempt
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 821, 848. At this time there were in the state 1223
officials who had the governor's certificate of exemption. There were 1012 in Georgia,
1422 in Virginia, 14,675 in North Carolina, and much smaller numbers in the other
states. See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 851.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 224 (March 18, 1864).
3 An ex-Confederate related to me his experiences with the conscript officers. In
1864 he was at home on furlough and was taken by the "buttermilk " cavalry, carried
to Camp Watts, at Notasulga, and enrolled as a conscript, no attention being paid to his
furlough. To Camp Watts were brought daily squads of conscripts, rounded up by
the " buttermilk " cavalry. They were guarded by conscripts. When rested, the new
recruits would leave, the guards often going with them. Then another squad would
be brought in, who in a day or two would desert. This soldier came home again with
a discharge for disability. The conscript officials again took him to Camp Watts. He
presented his discharge papers ; the commandant tore them up before his face, and a
few days later this soldier with a friend boarded the cowcatcher of a passing train and
rode to Chehaw. The commandant sent guards after the fugitives, who captured the
guards and then went to Tuskegee, where they swore out, as he said, a habeas corpus
before the justice of the peace and started for their homes with their papers. They
found the swamps filled with the deserters, who did not molest them after finding that
they too were " deserters."
^ 8835 to January, 1864. See report of Colonel Preston, April, 1864, in O. R., Ser.
IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 355, 363. The estimate was based on the census of i860.
I06 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
under laws and orders. This left, he said, looo subject to enrolment.
Nowhere, in any of the estimates, are found allowances for those
physically and mentally disqualified. The number then exempted
in Alabama by medical boards is unknown. In other states this
number was sometimes more and sometimes less than the number
exempted by law and by order.
A year later, after all exemptions had been revoked, the number
disqualified for physical disability by the examining boards amounted
to 3933. Besides these there were the lame, the halt, the blind, and
the insane, who were so clearly unfit for service that no enrolling
officer ever brought them before the medical board. The 4000
between the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and also the 4600
between sixteen and seventeen, came under the enrolment law of
February 17, 1864, as also several thousand who were over forty-
five. But it is certain that many of these, especially the younger
ones, were already in the general service as volunteers. It is also
certain that many hundreds of all ages who were hable to service
escaped conscription, especially in north Alabama. In a way,
their places in the ranks were filled by those who did not become
liable to enrolment until 1864, or even not at all, but who volun-
teered nevertheless.
From April, 1862, to February, 1865, there had been enrolled at
the camps in Alabama 14,875 men who had been classed in the re-
ports as conscripts. This included all men who volunteered at the
camps, all of military age that the officers could find or catch before
they went into the volunteer service, details made as soon as enrolled,
irregular commands formed before the men were liable to duty, and
a few hundred genuine conscripts who had to be guarded to keep
them from running away. It was reported that for two years not a
recruit was sent by the Bureau from Alabama to the army of Ten-
nessee or to the Army of Northern Virginia, but that the men were en-
rolled in the organizations of the state. This means that much of the
enrolment of 14,875 was only nominal, and that this number included
the regiments sent to the front from Alabama in 1862, after the pas-
sage of the Enrolment Act in April. Eighteen regiments were organ-
ized in Alabama after that date, in violation of the Enrolment Act,
many of the men evading conscription, as the Bureau reported, by
going at once into the general service. The number who left in
EXEMPTION FROM SERVICE
107
these regiments was estimated at more than 10,000.^ There was
not a single conscript regiment.
It is possible to ascertain the number exempted by law and by-
order before 1865. A report by Colonel Preston, dated April, 1864,
gives the number of exempts in Alabama as 8835 to January, 1864.^
A month later, all exemptions were revoked.^ In February, 1865, a
complete report places the total number exempted by law and order
in Alabama at 10,218, of whom 3933 were exempted by medical
boards. The state officials exempted numbered 1333,'' and Confed-
erate officials, 21; ministers, 726; editors, 7,7,, and their employees,
155; pubhc printers, 3; druggists, 81; physicians, 796; teachers,
352 ; overseers and agriculturists, 1447 ; railway officials and em-
ployees, 1090; mail carriers and contractors, 60; foreigners, 167;
agriculture details, 38; pilots, telegraphers, shoemakers, tanners,
and blacksmiths, 86 ; government contractors, 44 ; details of artisans
and mechanics, 570; details for government service (not specified),
218. There were 1046 men incapable of field service who
were assigned to duty in the above details, chiefly in the Conscript
Bureau, Quartermaster's Department, and Commissariat.^ It
is certain that many others were exempted by being detailed from
service in the army. The list of those pardoned in 1865 and 1866 by
President Johnson shows many occupations not mentioned above.
It is interesting to notice the fate of the conscript officers when
captured by the Federals. Bradford Hambrick was tried by a mili-
tary commission in Nashville, Tennessee, in January, 1864, charged
with being a Confederate conscript officer and with forcing ''peace-
able citizens of the United States" in Madison County, Alabama, to
enter the Confederate army. He was convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment at hard labor for one year, and to pay a fine of $2000 or
serve an additional imprisonment of 1000 days.^
To sum up: The early enrolment laws served to stimulate en-
listment; the later ones probably had no effect at all except to give
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. loi, 103, e^ passim.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 355, 363. » Feb. 17, 1864.
4 There were 1223 to Nov. 30, 1864. ^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. i, 103-109.
6 G. O., No. 144, Dept. of the Cumberland, Atlanta, Ga., Oct. 4, 1864, War
Department Archives. There were other similar cases, but I found record of no other
conviction. The " tories " were sometimes in league with the conscript officers, and
sometimes they shot them at sight.
I08 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the Bureau something to do, and the law officers something on
which to exercise their wits. The conscript service also served as
an exemption board. It secured few, if any, enHstments that the
state could not have secured, and certainly lost more than it gained
by harassing the people. The laws were constantly violated by the
state; this is proved by the enhstment of eighteen new regiments
contrary to the law. It finally drove the state authorities into
an attitude of nulHfication by its construction of the enrolment
laws.
Neither the state nor the Confederate government had an efficient
machinery for securing enHstments. If there ever were laws regarded
only in the breaking, the Enrolment Acts were such laws. The con-
scripts and exempts, like the deserters, tories, and Peace Society men,
are important, not only because they so weakened the Confederacy,
but also because they formed the party that would have carried out,
or at least begun. Reconstruction according to the plans of Lincoln
and Johnson as first proclaimed. Many of these people became
"scalawags" later, probably influenced to some extent by the scorn
of their neighbors.
Sec. 4. Tories and Deserters
In Alabama opposition to the Confederate government took
two forms.' One was the rebellious opposition of the so-called
"unionists" or "tories," who later joined with the deserters from
the army; the other was the legal or constitutional opposition of the
old cooperation or anti-secession party, which maintained an unfriendly
attitude toward the Confederate administration, though the great
majority of its members were loyal to the southern cause. From
this second class arose a so-called "Peace Party," which desired to
end the war on terms favorable to the South; and from this, in turn,
when later it was known that such terms could not be secured, sprang
the semi-treasonable secret order — the "Peace Society." In 1864,
the "tories" and the Peace Society began to work together. Pecul-
iar social and poHtical conditions will in part account for the strength
and growth of the opposition in two sections of the state far removed
from each other — in north Alabama and in southeast Alabama.
1
CONDITIONS IN NORTH ALABAMA
Conditions in North Alabama
109
To the convention of 1861 forty-four members from north
Alabama were elected as cooperationists, that is, in favor of a union
of the southern states, within the old Union, for the purpose of secur-
ing their rights under the Constitution or of securing safe secession.
They professed to be afraid of separate state secession as Hkely to
lead to disintegration and war. Thirty-one of these cooperationists
voted against the ordinance of secession, and twenty-four of them
(mostly members from the northern hill counties) refused to sign
the ordinance, though all expressed the intention to submit to the
will of the majority, and to give the state their heartiest support.
When war came all espoused the Confederate cause. ^ The coopera-
tionist party as a whole supported the Confederacy faithfully, though
nearly always in a more or less disapproving spirit toward the ad-
ministration, both state and Confederate.
North Alabama differed from other portions of the state in many
ways. There was no railroad connecting the country north of the
mountains with the southern part of the state, and from the northern
counties it was a journey of several days to reach the towns in cen-
tral and south Alabama. Hence there was little intercourse between
the people of the two sections, though the seat of government was
in the central part of the state ; even to-day the intimacy is not close.
For years it had been a favorite scheme of Alabama statesmen to
build railroads and highways to connect more closely the two sec-
tions.^ Geographically, this northern section of the state belonged
to Tennessee. The people were felt to be shghtly different in char-
acter and sympathies from those of central and south Alabama,
and whatever one section favored in public matters was usually
opposed by the other. Even in the northern section the popula-
tion was more or less divided. The people of the valley more closely
resembled the west Tennesseeans, the great majority of them being
planters, having little in common with the small farmers of the hill
and mountain country, who were like the east Tennesseeans. Of
1 D. P. Lewis of Lawrence, Jeremiah (or Jere) Clemens of Madison, and C. C.
Sheets of Winston deserted later.
2 T. H. Clark, " Railroads and Highways," in the " Memorial Record of Alabama,"
Vol. I, pp. 322-323.
no CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the latter the extreme element was the class commonly known as
''mountain whites" or "sand-mountain" people. These were the
people who gave so much trouble during the war, as "tories," and
from whom the loyal southerners of north Alabama suffered greatly
when the country was stripped of its men for the armies. Yet it
can hardly be said that
they exercised much in-
fluence on politics before
the war. Their only repre-
sentative in the conven-
tion of 1 86 1 was Charles
Christopher Sheets, who
did not speak on the floor
of the convention during
the entire session.
On the part of all in
the northern counties there
was a strong desire for
delay in secession, and
they were angered at the
action of the convention
in not submitting the ordi-
nance to a popular vote for
ratification or rejection.
Many thought the course
taken indicated a suspicion
of them or fear of their
action, and this they re-
sented. Their leaders in the convention expressed the behef that the
ordinance would have easily obtained a majority if submitted to the
popular vote.^ Much of the opposition to the ordinance of secession
was due to the vague sectional dislike between the two parts of the
state. It was felt that the ordinance was a south Alabama measure,
and this was sufficient reason for opposition by the northern section.
Throughout the entire session a local sectional spirit dictated their
1 Smith, Clemens, Jemison, and Bulger, in Smith's " History and Debates of the
Convention of i86i " ; Hodgson, " Cradle of the Confederacy " ; Garrett, " Public Meu
of Alabama."
^^ Tories, 186M8a&
Jt:>y<^ Deserters, 1862-1865.
"Reconstruction" sentiment 1861-5
in same localities.
CONDITIONS IN NORTH ALABAMA III
course of obstruction/ In January and February of 1861, there
was spme talk among the discontented people of seceding from
secession, of withdrawing the northern counties of Alabama and
uniting with the counties of east Tennessee to form a new state,
which should be called Nick-a-Jack, an Indian name common in
East Tennessee.^ Geographically, this proceeding would have been
correct, since these two parts of the country are closely connected,
the people were alike in character and sentiment, and the means of
intercourse were better. The people of the valley and many others,
however, had no sympathy with this scheme. Lacking the .sup-
port of the politicians and no leaders appearing, the plan was aban-
doned after the proclamation of Lincoln, April 10, 1861. Had
the war been deferred a few months, it is almost certain that the
discontented element of the population would have taken positive
steps to embarrass the administration ; many bcheved that recon-
struction would take place. Only after four years of war was there
after this any appreciable number of the people willing to listen again
to such a proposition. In February, 1861, Jeremiah Clemens wrote
that Yancey had been burned in effigy in Limestone County (some-
thing that might have happened at any time between 1845 ^^^ 1861) ;
that some discontent still existed among the people, but that this
was daily growing weaker, and unless something were done to excite
it afresh, it would soon die out.^ Mr. John W. DuBose, a keen
observer from the Cotton Belt, travelled on horseback through the
northern hill counties during the winter of 1861 and 1862 as a Con-
federate recruiting officer. Thus he came into close contact with all
classes of people, eating at their tables, sleeping in their beds, and
in conversation learning their opinions and sentiments on public
1 See Smith's " History and Debates of the Convention of 1861 " ; Nicolay and
Hay, " Lincoln," Vol. Ill, p. 1 86.
2 A. B. Hendren, mayor of Athens and editor of the Union Banner, wrote in i86l
to Secretary Walker, stating that he had strongly opposed secession, but was now con-
vinced that it was right ; as mayor, he was committed to reconstruction, which he no
longer favored ; he did not proclaim his new sentiments through his paper for fear of
pecuniary loss, but people were becoming suspicious of his lukewarm reconstruction
spirit. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. i8i, 182.
8 "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 47; Ku Klux Rept. Ala. Test., pp. 592, 824 ;
Saunders, "Early Settlers"; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 65; Garrett, "Public Men";
Miller, "Alabama " ; Nicolay and Hay, Vol. HI, p. 186 ; DuBose, "Life of Yancey,"
pp. 562, 563.
112 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
matters. He saw no man, he says, who was not devoted to the Con-
federacy. Several of the first and best vohmteer regiments came
from this section of the state, and in these regiments there were
whole companies of men none of whom owned a slave. In order
to preserve this spirit of loyalty in those who had been opposed to
the pohcy of secession, Yancey and others, after the outbreak of the
war, recommended a prompt invasion of the North. ^
Unionists, Tories, and Mossbacks
Before secession, the term "unionist" was applied to those who
were opposed to secession and who wished to give the Union a longer
trial. They were mostly the old Whigs, but many Democrats were
among them. Then again the cooperationists, who wanted delay
and cooperation among the states before secession, were called
"unionists." In short, the term was apphed to any one opposed
to immediate secession. This fact deceived the people of the North,
who believed that the opposition party in the South was uncondi-
tionally for the Union, and that it would remain in allegiance to the
Union if secession were attempted. But after secession this "union"
party disappeared.
1 See DuBose, " Life of Yancey," p. 563.
The non-slaveholders in the Black Belt appear to have been more dissatisfied than
those of the white counties at the outbreak of the war. May 13, 1861, William M.
Brooks, who had presided over the secession convention, wrote from Perry County to
President Davis in regard to the bad effect of the refusal to accept short -time volunteers.
He said that though there were 20,000 slaves in Perry County, most of the whites were
non-slaveholders. Some of the latter had been made to believe that the war was solely
to get more slaves for the rich, and many who had no love for slaveholders were declar-
ing that they would " fight for no rich man's slave." The men who had enlisted were
largely of the hill class, poor folks who left their work to go to camp and drill. Here,
while their crops wasted, they lost their ardor, and when they heard that their one-year
enlistment was not to be accepted, they began to murmur. They were made to believe by
traitors that a rich man could enter the army for a year and then quit, while they had
to enlist for the war. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. VIII, pp. 318-319.
Horace Greeley in the Tribune was reported to have said : Large slaveholders
were not secessionists, they resisted disunion ; those who had much at stake hesitated a
long while ; it was not a " slaveholders' rebellion " ; it was really a rebellion of the non-
slaveholders resident in the strongholds of slavery, springing from no love of slavery,
but from the antagonism of race and the hatred of the idea of equality with the blacks
involved in simple emancipation. — Ku Klux Rept., p. 519. There is a basis of truth
in this.
UNIONISTS, TORIES, AND MOSSBACKS 113
The ''tories" were those who rebelled against the authority of
the Confederate States. Some of them were true "unionists" or
"loyalists," as they were called at the North. Most of them were
not. The "mossback," who according to popular behef hid him-
self in the woods until moss grew on his back, might or might not
be a " tory. " If he were hostile to the Confederacy, he was a " tory " ;
if he was simply keeping out of the way of the enrolHng officers,
he was not a "tory," but a plain "mossback" or "conscript." When
too closely pressed he would either become a "tory" or enter the
Confederate army, though he did not usually remain in it. The
"deserter" was such from various reasons, and often became a
"tory" as well; that is, he became hostile to the Confederacy. Often
he was not hostile to the government, but was only hiding from
service, and doing no other harm.. The true "unionists" always
claimed great numbers, even after the end of the war.- The North
Hstened to them and believed that old Whigs, Know-nothings,
Anti-secessionists, Douglas Democrats, Bell and Everett men, co-
operationists — all were at heart "Union" men. It was also claimed
that the only real disunion element was the Breckenridge Democ-
racy. Such, however, was not the case. Probably fewer of the
old Whig party than of any other were disloyal to the Confederacy.
So far as the "tory" or "loyalist" had any politics, he was proba-
bly a Democrat, and the more prominent of them had been Douglas
Democrats. The others were Douglas and Breckenridge Demo-
crats from the Democratic stronghold — north Alabama.^ Very
few, if any, Bell and Everett men were among them. The small
lower class had no party affiliations worth mentioning. During
the war, the terms "unionist" and "tories" were very elastic and
covered a multitude of sins against the Union, against the Confeder-
ate States, and against local communities. With the exception of
those who entered the Federal army the "tories" were, in a way,
traitors to both sides. North Alabama was not so strongly opposed
1 North Alabama before the war was overwhelmingly Democratic and was called
"The Avalanche" from the way it overran the Whiggish counties of the southern and
central sections. This wds shown in the convention, where representation was based on
the white vote. Since the war representation in the conventions is based on population,
and the Black Belt has controlled the white counties. " Northern Alabama Illustrated,"
pp. 251, 756. See also DuBose, "Yancey," p. 562.
I
114 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to secession as was east Tennessee/ nor were the Alabama "union-
ists" or "loyalists," as they called themselves, "tories" as other
people called them, of as good character as the "loyahsts" of Ten-
nessee.
The Alabama tory was, as a rule, of the lowest class of the popu-
lation, chiefly the "mountain whites" and the "sand-mountain"
people, who were shut off from the world, a century behind the
times, and who knew scarcely anything of the Union or of the ques-
tions at issue. There was a certain social antipathy felt by them
toward the lowland and valley people, whether in south or in north
Alabama, and a bhnd antagonism to the "nigger lord," as they called
the slaveholder, wherever he was found. In this feeling the women
were more bitter than the men. Secluded and ignorant, they did
not feel it their duty to support a cause in which they were not directly
concerned, and most of them would have preferred to remain neutral
during the entire war, as there was little for them to gain either way.
As long as they did not have to leave their hills, they were quiet, but
when the enrolling officers went after them, they became dangerous.
To-day those people are represented by the makers of " moonshine "
whiskey and those who shoot revenue officers. They were "moon-
shiners" then. Colonel S. A. M. Wood, who caught a band of
thirty of these "tories," reported to General Bragg, "They are
the most miserable, ignorant, poor, ragged devils I ever saw." ^
Many of the "tories" became bushwhackers, preying impartially
on friend and foe, and especially on the people of the rich Tennessee
valley.^
Growth of Disaffection
The invasion of the Tennessee valley had discouraging effects
on the weaker element of the population, and caused many to take
a rather degrading position in order to secure Federal protection
1 Professor George W. Duncan of Auburn, Ala., and many others have given
me information in regard to the people in that section. See also H. Mis. Doc. No. 42,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. ; N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 14, 1862.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 249. For much information concerning the conditions
in north Alabama during the war, I am indebted to Professor O. D. Smith of the
Alabama Polytechnic Institute, a native of Vermont who was then a Confederate
Bonded Treasury Agent and travelled extensively over that part of the country.
8 Reid, " After the War," pp. 348-350 ; Saunders, "Early Settlers," pp. 115, 164;
Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I, pp. 182, 208.
GROWTH OF DISAFFECTION I15
for themselves and their property. To call the tories and those
who submitted and took the oath "unionists" would be honoring
them too highly. Little true ''Union" sentiment or true devotion
to the United States existed except on the part of those who enKsted
in the Federal armies. In October, 1862, C. C. Clay, Jr., wrote to
the Secretary of War at Richmond that the Federal invasion had
resulted in open defiance of Confederate authority on the part of
some who beheved that the Confederacy was too weak to protect
or punish. Even loyal southerners were afraid to be active for fear
of a return of the Union troops. Some had sold cotton to the Federals
during their occupation, bought it for them, acted as agents, spies,
and informers; and now these men openly declared for the Union
and signed calls for Union meetings. Huntsville, Mr. Clay stated,
was the centre of disaffection.^ But in April, 1863, a northern cotton
speculator reported that there were but few ''true Union men" at
Huntsville or in the vicinity."
Though not fully in sympathy with the secession movement, the
majority of the people in the northern counties acquiesced in the
action of the state, and many volunteers entered the army. Until
late in the war this district sent as many men in proportion to popu-
lation as any other section, and the men made good soldiers. But
with the opening of the Tennessee and the passage of the conscrip-
tion laws the mountaineers and the hill people became troublesome.
To avoid conception they hid themselves. Their families, with
their slender resources, were soon in want of the necessaries of life,
which they began to obtain by raids on their more fortunate neigh-
bors in the river valleys. A few entered the Federal army. In July,
1862, small parties came to Decatur, in Morgan County, from the
mountains and joined the Federal forces under the command of
Colonel Streight. They told him of others who wished to enlist, so
Streight made an expedition to Davis Gap, in the mountains south of
Decatur, and secured 150 recruits.
These formed the nucleus of the First Alabama Union Cavalry,
of which George E. Spencer of Ohio, afterward notorious in Alabama
politics, was colonel. At this time C. C. Sheets, who said that he
had been in hiding, appeared and made a speech encouraging all
to enlist. Streight said that the "unionists" were poor people,
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 141, 142. ^ O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, p. 638.
Il6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
often destitute. There were, he reported, about three "unionists"
to one "secessionist" in parts of Morgan, Blount, St. Clair, Winston,
Walker, Marion, Taylor, and Jefferson counties, and he thought
two full regiments could be raised near Decatur. Though so few
in numbers, the "secessionists" seem to have made it lively for the
"unionists," for Streight reported that the "unionists" were much
persecuted by them and often had to hide themselves,^ The Con-
federate commander at Newberne, in Greene County, reported (Jan-
uary, 1862) that in an adjoining county the "Union" men were
secretly organizing, that 300 had met, elected officers, and gone into
camp.^ A month later. Lieutenant- Commander Phelps of the United
States navy, after his river raid to Florence (1862), reported that
along the Tennessee the "Union" sentiment was strong, and that
men, women, and children in crowds welcomed the boats. How-
ever, he adds that they were very guarded in their conversation.
It may be that he mistook curiosity for "Union" sentiment. Another
naval officer reported that the fall of Fort Donelson was beneficial
to the Union cause in north Alabama. Neither of these observers
landed, and their observations were limited to the river banks.^ In
June, 1862, Governor Shorter said that much dissatisfaction existed
in several of the northern counties,^ and in December, 1862, that
Randolph County was defying the enforcement of the conscript law,
and armed forces were releasing deserters from jail. Colonel Hannon
was at length sent with a regiment and suppressed for a time the
disloyal element.^ September 21, 1862, General Pillow reported
to Seddon that there were 8000 to 10,000 deserters and tory con-
scripts in the mountains of north Alabama, as "vicious as copper-
heads." ° In April, 1863, a civiHan of influence and position wrote
to General Beauregard that the counties of north Alabama were
full of tories. During 1862, he stated, a convention had been held
in the corner of Winston, Fayette, and Marion counties, in which
the people had resolved to remain neutral. He believed that this
meant that when the enemy appeared the so-called neutrals would
1 Moore, "Anecdotes, Poetry, and Incidents of the War," p. 215 (Letters from the
chaplain of Streight's regiment) ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XVI, Pt. I, pp. 124, 785
(Streight's Report); Miller, " Alabama " ; Jones, " Diary," Vol. I, pp. 182-208.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, p. 840. 3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. VII, pp. 153-156, 424-
4 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 1 149. ^ q. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 258.
6 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 819-821.
GROWTH OF DISAFFECTION
117
join them, for they openly carried United States flags.^ A simi-
lar convention was held in north Alabama (apparently in Winston
County) in the spring of 1863. A staff officer reported to General
Beauregard (May, 1864) that in the counties of Lawrence, Blount,
and Winston, Federal recruiting agents for mounted regiments car-
ried on open correspondence with the disaffected citizens,^ appar-
ently with little success, for although disaffection and hostility to
the Confederacy among the people of north Alabama had continued
for three years, and there was every opportunity for entering the
Federal army, yet the official statistics give the total number of enhst-
ments and reenlistments of whites from Alabama at 2576.^
In 1862 deserters from the army began to gather in the more remote
districts of the state. Many of them had been enrolled under the
conscript law, and had become dissatisfied. As the war went on
the number of these deserters increased, until their presence in the
state became a menace to government. After the Confederate
reverses in the summer of 1863, great numbers of deserters and
stragglers from all of the Confederate armies east of the Mississippi
River and from the Union armies collected among the hills, moun-
tains, and ravines of north Alabama. A large portion of them
became outlaws of the worst character. In August, 1863, the general
assembly passed a law directing the state officials and the militia
officers to assist the Confederate enrolHng officers in enforcing the
conscript law, and in returning deserters to their commands. The
state and county jails were offered as places to confine the deserters
until they could be sent back to the army. To give food and shelter
to deserters was declared a felony, and civiHans were authorized
to arrest them.'*
The deserters and stragglers of north Alabama were well armed
and somewhat organized, and kept the people in terror. General
Pillow thought that the temporary suspension of the conscript law
had made them bolder. Eleven counties were infested with them.
No man was safe in travelling along the roads, for murders, robberies,
and burnings were common, and peaceable citizens were shot while
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, p. 431. 2 q. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIX, Pt. II, p. 57.
8 The official statement of the War Department. See also " Confederate Military
History," Vol. XII, p. 502.
* Act of General Assembly, Aug. 29, 1863.
Il8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
at work in the fields. It was estimated that in July, 1863, there
were 8000 to 10,000 tories and deserters in the mountains of north
Alabama, and these banded themselves together to kill the officers
sent to arrest them. It was impossible to keep a certain class of
men in the army when they were encamped near their homes/ Even
good soldiers, when so stationed, sometimes deserted. Had these
same men been in the Army of Northern Virginia, they would have
done their duty well. But here, near their home, many influences
led them to desert. There was Httle fighting, and they could see
no reason why they should be kept away from their suffering famihes.
General Pillow, in the fall of 1863, forced several thousand deserters
and stragglers from Alabama, Mississippi, and Texas, who were
in hiding in north Alabama, to return to their commands. The
legislature commended his work and asked that his jurisdiction
be extended over a larger area, even over the whole Confederacy.^
In April, 1864, the Ninth Texas Cavalry was sent against the ''union-
ists" in Marion County. The colonel reported that the number
of tories had been greatly exaggerated, though the woods seemed to
be swarming with deserters, and he learned that they had a secret
organization.^ The deserters always infested the wildest and most
remote parts of the country, and were found wherever disaffection
toward the Confederacy had appeared. The Texans, who had no
local attachments to interfere with their duty, drove back into the
army several thousand "stragglers," as the better class of deserters
were called.'' General Polk reported (April, 1864) that in north
Alabama formidable bands were being organized for resistance to
the government, and that hostility to the Confederacy was openly
proclaimed by them. He sent out detachments which forced more
than a thousand men to leave the woods and hills and return to the
army.^ When Alabama soldiers were captured or deserted to the en-
emy, it was the custom of the Federals to send them north of the
Ohio River, and to offer to enlist as many as possible in regiments
to fight the Indians in the West. Some took advantage of the offer
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 680. 2 joint Resolution, Dec. 4, 1863.
8 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 671.
4 O. R, Ser. I, Vol. XXXII, Pt. I, p. 671, and Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 570,
683, 856.
6 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 825, 826, 856.
OUTRAGES BY TORIES AND DESERTERS 119
and thus avoided prison life. Such men were called "galvanized
Yankees" and were hated by the loyal soldiers. Early in 1865,
J. J. Giers, a prominent tory, wrote General Grant that if Alabama
deserters were permitted to remain near home their numbers would
Outrages by Tories and Deserters
The tory and the deserter often led squads of Federal sol-
diers on expeditions of destruction and pillage. When possible,
they would burn the county court-houses, jails, and other pubHc
buildings, with the books and records of the counties. Sometimes
disguised as Union troops, they committed the worst outrages. On
one occasion four men, dressed as soldiers, went to the house of an
old man named Wilson, three miles from Florence, and searched
it for money supposed to be hidden there. As the old man would
tell them nothing, they stripped him to the waist, tied him face
downward upon a table, tore leaves from a large Bible, and, piling
them on him, burned him to death. His nephew, unable to tell about
the money, was shot and killed. A grandson was shot and wounded,
and left for dead. The overseer, coming up, was shot and killed in
spite of the appeals of his wife. Senator R. M. Patton had the
wounded boy taken to Florence, where the same band came the
next night and demanded him. Upon being refused, they fired
repeatedly into the house until they were driven away. They then
went to the house of a druggist, and, faihng to find money, burned
him as they had Wilson. Though fearfully burned, he survived.
Two of the band, natives of Florence, were captured, court-mar-
tialled by the Federal authorities, and hanged.^
Twenty Federals, or disguised tories, led by a tory from Madison
County, killed an old man, his son, a nephew and his son, and wounded
a fifth person, who was then thrown into the Tennessee River. When
he caught the bush on the bank, he was beaten and shot until he
turned loose. An enrolling officer was made to wade out into the
river, and then was shot from the bank. An overseer who had
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 659.
2 Somers, "The Southern States since the War," p. 135 ; Montgomery Advertiser y
Aug. 17, 1902; N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 10, 1865; Freemantle, "Three Months in the
Southern States."
120 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
hidden some stock was hanged. A Confederate officer was robbed
of several thousand dollars and driven from the country/
The tories, who were often deserters from the armies, gathered
in the hill country and watched for an opportunity to descend into
the valley to rob, burn, and murder. One family had the following
experience with Federal troops or "unionists": On the first raid
six mules, five horses, a wagon, and fifty-two negroes were taken;
on the second, the remainder of the mules, a cart, the milch cows,
some meat, and the cooking utensils. On the third the wagons were
loaded with the last of the meat, and all of the sugar, coffee, molasses,
flour, meal, and potatoes. The mother of the family told the officer
in charge that they were taking away their only means of subsist-
ence, and that the family would starve. "Starve and be d — d,"
was the reply. Then the buggy and the carriage harness and
cushions were taken, and the carriage cut to pieces. The house
was searched for money. Closets and trunks were broken open,
the offer of keys being refused. Clothing and bedding, dishes,
knives and forks were taken, and whatever could not be carried was
broken. The "Destroying Angels," as they called themselves,
then burned the gin-house and cotton press with one hundred and
twenty-five bales of cotton, seven cribs of corn, stables, and
stacks of fodder, a wagon, four negro cabins, the lumber room, $500
worth of thread, axes, hoes, scythe-blades, and other plantation
implements. They started to burn the dweUing house, but the
woman pleaded that it was the only shelter for her children and
herself. "You may thank your good fortune, madam, that we have
left you and your d — d brats with your heads to be sheltered,"
answered one of the "Destroying Angels." Then an officer galloped
up, claimed to be much astonished, and ordered away the men.^
The tories or "unionists" of the mountains, instead of join-
ing the Federal army, formed bands of "Destroying Angels,"
"Prowling Brigades," etc., to prey upon their lowland neighbors.
All the able-bodied loyal men were in the army, and there were no
defenders. During the Federal occupation these marauders har-
assed the country. When the Confederates temporarily occupied
1 Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VII, p. 45; Freemantle, p. 141.
2 Freemantle, "Three Months in the Southern States," p. 141, quoted from a local
newspaper; accounts of eye-witnesses.
OUTRAGES BY TORIES AND DESERTERS 121
, the country, they tried to drive out the brigands, whence arose the
I "persecution of unionists" that we read about. Thousands of
Confederate sympathizers were driven from their homes during the
Federal occupation in 1862. When the Union army retreated in
1862, attempts at retahation were made by those who had suffered,
but this was strictly suppressed by the state and Confederate authori-
ties. An officer was dismissed for cruelty to "unionists," and the
state troops destroyed a band of deserters and guerillas who were
preying upon the "union" people in the mountain districts. Marion,
Walker, and Winston counties were especially infested with tories.^
In 1864, when there were few Confederate troops in north
Alabama, the tories were very troublesome in De Kalb, Marshall,
Marion, Winston, Walker, Lawrence, and Fayette counties, and
the poor people were largely under their control. Among the hills
were deserters from both armies, and these, banded with the tory
element, reduced the helpless poor whites to submission. These
men were few in comparison with the total population, but -most
of the able-bodied loyal men were in the army, and the tories and
deserters were almost unchecked.^ Sometimes the. Confederate
soldiers from north Alabama would get furloughs, come home, and
clear the country of tories, who had been terrorizing the people.
Short work was made of them when the soldiers found them. Some
were shot, others were hanged, and the remainder driven out of the
country for a timc.^
After their occupation of north Alabama, the Federal commanders
were embarrassed by the violent clamorings of the "unionists" for
revenge, and for superior privileges over the non-unionist popula-
tion. Material advantage and personal disHkes were too often the
basic principles of their unionism. They were extremely vindictive,
demanding that all Confederate sympathizers be driven from the
country. Thus they made themselves a nuisance to the Federal
officers, and especially was this true of the small lowland tory ele-
ment. Subjugation, banishment, hanging, confiscation, — was the
programme planned by the " loyalists." They wanted the country
"pacified" and then turned over to themselves. Though they
1 Miller, passim ; Somers, " Southern States," p. 135.
2 Miller, p. 193 ; Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. VII, p. 357.
* Saunders, "Early Settlers," pp. 115, 164.
122 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
claimed to be numerous, no instance is found where they proposed
to do anything for themselves; they seemed to think that the sole
duty of the United States army in Alabama was to look after their
interests. The northerners who had deahngs with the '' loyahst "
did not like him, as he was a most unpleasant person, with a griev-
ance which could not be righted to his satisfaction without giving
rise to numerous other grievances.
Some qualifications of loyalty seem to have been: a certain mild
disapproval of secession, a refusal to enlist in the Confederate army
or desertion after enlisting, hiding in the woods to avoid conscript
officers. These qualifications, or any of them, the '' loyahst" thought
entitled him to the everlasting gratitude and protection of the United
States. But a newspaper correspondent, who was on a sliarp look-
out for all signs of weakness in the Confederacy, said: "You can
tell the southern loyalists as far as you can see them. They all have
black or yellow skins and kinky hair." Sometimes, he added, there
was a white ''unionist," but this was rare, and the exceptions in
any town in north Alabama could be counted on the fingers of one
hand.^ As long as the war lasted the lawless element fared well,
and when peace should come they hoped for a division of the
spoils.^
Disaffection in South Alabama
So much for toryism in the northern part of the state. There were
also manifestations of a disloyal spirit in the extreme inaccessible
corner of the state next to Florida and Georgia, where the popu-
lation of the sparsely settled country was almost entirely non-slave-
holding. Though most of the people were Democrats, they were
somewhat opposed to secession. Delegates were elected, however,
to the convention of 1861, who voted for secession, and after the war
began nearly or quite all of those who had opposed secession heartily
supported the Confederacy. If there were any ''union" men, they
1 This correspondent defined a " unionist " or " loyalist " as one truly devoted to the
Union and who had never wavered, thus excluding from consideration those who had
gone with the Confederacy and later become disappointed. Boston Journal, Nov. 15,
1864; N. y. Herald, April 7, 1864; The Tribune, Nov. 14, 1862; N. Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1862 ; Tharin, "The Alabama Refugee."
2 The World, Feb. 15, 1865.
DISAFFECTION IN SOUTH ALABAMA 123
kept very quiet, and for two years there was no trouble.^ But during
the winter of 1 862-1 863, numerous outrages were committed by
outlaws who were called, indiscriminately, tories and deserters.
Much trouble was given by an organization called the First Florida
Union Cavalry, which for two years committed various outrages
while on bushwhacking expeditions under the leadership of one
Joseph Sanders. After being soundly beaten one night by the
citizens of Newton; in Dale County, these marauders were less trouble-
some.^ The country near the Gulf coast was infested with tories,
deserters, and runaway slaves, concealed in caves, ''tight-eyes,"^
canebrakes, -swamps, and the thick woods of the sparsely settled
country. In January, 1863, Governor Shorter wrote to President
Davis that nearly all the loyal population of southeast Alabama
was in the army, and that the country was suffering from the out-
rages of tories and deserters. About the same time, Colonel
Price "suppressed unionism and treason in Henry County," though
only one prisoner was reported as being taken.''
In August of the same year (1863) conditions had grown worse.
General Howell Cobb reported that there was a disloyal feehng in
southeast Alabama, but that there was no way to reach the offenders,
as they were guilty of no overt act, and therefore the military courts
could not try them. To turn them over to the civil authorities in that
district would secure only a farcical trial, and the justices of the
peace, though assuming the highest jurisdiction, were ignorant, and
there was little chance of conviction. At this time. Governor Shorter
said that affairs in lower Henry County were in bad condition; that
the deserter element was strong and threatened the security of loyal
people; and that the soldiers were afraid to leave their families.®
A judge could not hold court unless he had a military escort.
During the next year matters grew worse in this section as well
as in north Alabama. Some of the best soldiers felt compelled to
go home, even without permission, to protect or to support their
1 Information in regard to affairs in southeast Alabama during the war I have ob-
tained from relatives (all of whom were " Union " men before the war) and from neigh-
bors who were acquainted with the conditions in that section of the country.
2 Miller, " Alabama." Sanders had been a Confederate officer.
* Thickets which the eye could not penetrate.
* O. R., Ser. I, Vol. LI I, p. 403.
6 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVIII, Pt. II, p. 273 ; Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 1043.
124 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
families; and in October, 1864, the legislature recognized this con-
dition of affairs, and asked the Alabama soldiers, then absent without
leave, to return to their duty under promise of lenient treatment/
The worst depredations were committed during the winter of
1 864-1 865, in the counties of Dale, Henry, and Coffee. The loyal
people in the thinly settled country were terrorized. The legislature,
unable to protect them, authorized them to band themselves together
in mihtary form for protection against the outlaws. These bands of
self-constituted ''Home Guards," composed of boys and old men,
captured numbers of the outlaws and straightway hanged them.
Desertions from the regiments raised in the white counties were
often caused by denying to recruits or conscripts the privilege of
choosing the command in which they should serve. Others deserted
because their families were exposed to tory depredations and Federal
raids, or were in want of the necessaries of Hfe. These would have
returned to the army after providing for their famihes had they been
permitted to join other organizations and not subjected to punish-
ment. Assigned arbitrarily to commands in need of recruits, some
became dissatisfied, and deserted. A deserter was an outlaw and
found it impossible to remain neutral. Hence many joined the
bands of outlaws to pillage, and burn, and steal horses and cattle.
Others of better character joined the Federals or became tories,
that is, aUied themselves with the , original tories in order to work
against the Confederacy. Numbers of these disaffected people had
once been secessionists.^
Prominent Tories and Deserters
In view of the fact that the "unionists" were to play an important
part in Reconstruction, it will be of interest to examine the records
of the most prominent tories and deserters. A few prominent men
joined the Federals during the course of the war, though none did
so before the Union army occupied the Tennessee valley. Only
one of these tried to assume any leadership over the so-called union-
1 Joint Resolution, Oct. 7, 1864. J. J. Seibels proposed to raise a regiment for state
defence of men under and over military age. He wanted, also, to get the skulkers who
could not otherwise be obtained. O. R., Ser, IV, Vol. IT, p. 604.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 1042, 1043 (Solicitor James N. Arrington and Attorney-
General M. A. Baldwin).
I
PROMINENT TORIES AND DESERTERS 12$
ists. This was William H. Smith, who had come within a few votes
of being elected to the Confederate Congress, and was later the first
Reconstruction governor. He went over to the enemy in 1862, and
did much toward securing the enlistment of the 2576 Union soldiers
from Alabama.
At the same time, a more important character. General Jeremiah
Clemens,^ who had been in command of the mihtia of Alabama
with the rank of major-general, became disgruntled and went over
to the enemy. In the secession convention, Clemens had declared
that he "walked dehberately into rebellion" and was prepared for
all its consequences.^ He first opposed, then voted for, the ordinance
of secession, and afterwards accepted the office of commander of
the mihtia under the "RepubKc of Alabama." For a year Clemens
was loyal to the ''rebelKon," but in 1862 he had seen the fight and
wished to go to Washington as the representative of north Alabama
to learn from President Lincoln in what way the controversy might
be ended. The Washington administration, by that time, had fittle
faith in any following he might have, and when Clemens with John
Bell started to Washington, Stanton advised them to stay at home and
use their influence for the Union.^
George W. Lane, also of Madison County, was a prominent man
who cast his lot with the Federals. Lane never recognized secession,
and was an outspoken Unionist from the beginning. He was ap-
pointed Federal judge by Lincoln and died in 1864.'' In April,
1 86 1, Clemens wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War that the
acceptance of a United States judgeship by Lane was treason, and
that the "north Alabama men would gladly hang him." ^ General
O. M. Mitchell seemed to think that the negroes were the only "truly
loyal," but he recommended in May, 1862, that, when a military
government should be estabhshed in Alabama, George W. Lane,
1 Clemens was a cousin of *' Mark Twain." He was fond of drink, and once when
William L. Yancey asked him not to drink so much, he answered that he was obliged to
drink his genius down to a level with Yancey's.
2 JV. V. Tribune, May 23, 1865. See Smith, "Debates," Index.
3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 167, 168, 174, 178. Clemens had been captain,
major, and colonel of the Thirteenth United States Infantry. From 1849 to 1853 he
was United States Senator. lie died in Philadelphia a few years after the war. Gar-
rett, " Public Men of Alabama," pp. 176-179.
* Brewer, "Alabama," p. 364. ^ O. R., Ser. T, Vol. LII, Pt. II, p. 35.
126 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the United States district judge appointed by Lincoln, be appointed
military governor. Lane's faded United States flag still flew from
the staff to which he had nailed it at the beginning of the war, and
his appointment as governor, Mitchell thought, would give the greatest
satisfaction to Hunts ville and to all north Alabama/
Two members of the convention of 1861, besides Clemens, de-
serted to the Federals. These were C. C. Sheets and D. P. Lewis.
Like Clemens, they were elected as cooperationists and opposed
immediate secession, though all three voted for the resolution declar-
ing that Alabama would not submit to the rule of Lincoln. Sheets
voted against secession and would not sign the ordinance. For a
while he remained quietly at home and refused to enter the Con-
federate army. At length he reappeared from his place of hiding
and assisted in recruiting soldiers for the First Alabama Union
Cavalry. He was elected to the state legislature, but in 1862 was
expelled for disloyalty. After some time in hiding, he was arrested,
and imprisoned for treason. General Thomas retaliated by arrest-
ing and holding as a hostage General McDowell. Sheets remained
in prison until the end of the war.^
David P. Lewis of Madison County voted against secession but
signed the ordinance, and was elected to the Provisional Congress
by the convention, and in 1863 was appointed circuit judge by the
governor. This position he held for a few months, and then deserted
to the Federals. During the remainder of the war he lived quietly
at Nashville.^
Another prominent citizen of Madison County, Judge D. C.
Humphreys, joined the Federals late in the war. Humphreys had
been in the Confederate army and had resigned. He was arrested
by General Roddy on the charge of disloyalty. It is not known
that he was ever tried or put into prison, but in January, 1865, Hon.
C. C. Clay, Sr., and other prominent citizens of Huntsville, of southern
sympathies, all old men, were arrested and carried to prison in Nash-
ville as hostages for the safety of Humphreys, who had been released
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol, X, Pt. II, pp. 1 61-163.
2 "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 327; Acts of Alabama, 1862, p. 225; Moore,
"Anecdotes, Poetry, and Incidents of the War," p. 215.
3 Lewis became the second " Radical " or scalawag governor of Alabama, serving
from 1872 to 1874. Miller, "Alabama," pp. 260, 261 ; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 368.
NUMBERS OF THE DISAFFECTED 12/
by order of the Confederate War Department as soon as the rumor
of his arrest reached Richmond/ In April, 1864, General Clanton,
commanding in north Alabama, sent Governor Watts a Nashville
paper in which Jeremiah Clemens, ''the arch traitor," and that
"crazy man," Humphreys, figured as advisers to their fellow- citizens
of Alabama in recommending submission.^ There are indications
that several such addresses were issued by Clemens, Humphreys,
Lane, and others from the safety of the Federal lines, but the text
of none of them has been found except those written and pubHshed
when the war was nearly ended.
Of the men of position and influence who were found in the
ranks of opposition to the Confederate government after 1861, Judge
Lane is the only one whose course can command respect. He was
faithful to the Union from first to last, while the others were erratic
persons who changed sides because of personal spites and disap-
pointments. They had Httle or no influence over, and nothing in
common with, the dissatisfied mountain people and the tories and
deserters.^
Numbers of the Disaffected
At the surrender the deserters came in in large numbers to be
paroled. The reports of the Federal generals who received the
surrender of the Confederate armies in the southwest show a sur-
prisingly large number of Confederates paroled. A large proportion
of them were deserters, "mossbacks," and tories, who, hated by the
Confederate soldiers and fearing that the latter would seek revenge
for their misdeeds during the war, felt that it would be some protec-
tion to take the oath, be paroled, and secure the certificate. Then,
they thought, the United States government would see to their safety.
At the surrender of a Confederate command in their vicinity, they
flocked in from their retreats and were paroled as Confederate sol-
1 O. R., Ser. 11, Vol. VIII, p. 86.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXX, Pt. Ill, pp. 750-751.
3 It is a notable fact that among the disafifected persons of prominence there were
none of the old Whigs, or Bell and Everett men. Nearly all were Douglas Democrats.
The Bell and Everett people so conducted themselves during the war that afterwards
they were as completely disfranchised and out of politics as were the Breckenridge
Democrats, The work of reconstruction under the Johnson plan fell mainly to the
former Douglas Democrats and the lesser Whigs.
128 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
diers. To show how large this element in Mississippi and Alabama
was, when General Dick Taylor surrendered, May 4, 1865, at Merid-
ian, Mississippi, he had not more than 8000 real soldiers, or men
under arms. It is possible, though not probable, that many were
absent with leave. Yet of the 42,293 soldiers paroled in the armies
of the Southwest ^ about 30,000 of them were at Meridian. Many
of these had never been in the army; some had served in both
armies; none had been in either for a long time. For weeks they
kept coming in at all points where a United States officer was sta-
tioned in order to be paroled. The soldiers were furious. The
statistics show^ that strong Confederate armies were surrendered in
this section of the country, when, as a matter of fact, the governor
of Alabama had for two years been unable to secure sufficient military
support to enforce the laws over more than half of the state.^
It is difficult to estimate the number of disaffected persons within
the limits of the state. Probably in southeast Alabama there were
in all, of tories and deserters, 1000 who at times were actively hostile
to the Confederate authorities, and who committed depredations
on the loyal people, and 1000 or 1500 more would include the ''moss-
backs" and obstructionists, who were without the courage to do
more than keep out of the army and talk sedition. In addition to
the 2576 enhstments in the Federal army credited to Alabama, it
is probable that several hundred more were enlisted in northern
regiments. Some of these were the Confederate prisoners captured
late in the war and enlisted as ''Galvanized Yankees" in the United
States regiments sent West to fight the Indians.
Of deserters, tories, and "mossbacks" there could not have been
less than 8000 or 10,000 in north Alabama. Of these, at least half
were in active depredation all over the section. There were several
thousand deserters from the Alabama troops, most of them from
north Alabama and from commands stationed near their homes.
At the beginning of the war there were probably no more than 2000
1 Report of the Secretary of War, 1865, Vol. I, p. 45 ; "Confederate Military His-
tory," Vol. XII, p. 501.
2 Report of the Secretary of War, Vol. I, p. 45 ; " Confederate Military History,"
Vol. XII, p. 501.
^ I am indebted to old soldiers for descriptions of conditions in north and west
Alabama before and following Taylor's surrender. All agree in their accounts of the
conditions in Alabama and Mississippi at that time.
NUMBERS OF THE DISAFFECTED
129
I
men who were wholly disaffected/ and these only to the extent of
desiring neutrality for themselves.
On November 30, 1864, the Confederate "Deserter Book" showed
that since April, 1864, 7994 Alabama soldiers had deserted or been
absent without leave from the armies of the West and of Northern
Virginia. Of these 4323 were again in the ranks, leaving still to
be accounted for 3671 men. There were many deserters in the
hills of Alabama from the commands from other states. After the
fall of Atlanta, the number of stragglers and deserters greatly in-
creased, and late in 1864 it was estimated that 6000 of them were
in the state, some in every county; there being no longer a force to
drive them back to the army. For a year or more the force for this
purpose had been very weak.^
Much of the toryism and of the trouble resulting from it was
due to the weak poHcy of the Confederate authorities in deahng
with discontent and in protecting the loyal people in exposed dis-
tricts. Many a man had to desert in order to protect his family from
outlaws, and was then easily driven into toryism.
There was a mild annoyance of the more peaceable tories by
the Confederate officials in the spasmodic attempts to enforce the
conscription laws, but it amounted to very little. The loyal southern
people suffered more from the depredations of the disaffected
"union" people of north and southeast Alabama than the latter
suffered from all causes combined. The state and Confederate
authorities were very lenient — too much so — in their treatment
of these people. There was no great need of a strong Confederate
force in north Alabama, since only raids, not invasions in force, were
to be feared ; yet the governments — both state and Confederate —
were guilty of neglect in leaving so many of the people at the mercy
of the outlaws when, as shown in several instances, two or three
thousand good soldiers could march through the country and scatter
the bands that infested it. Assuming that the state had a right to
demand obedience and support from its citizens, it was weak and
1 These estimates are based on half a hundred other estimates made during the war
by state, Confederate, and Federal officials, and by other observers, and from estimates
made by persons familiar with conditions at that time. They are rather too small than
too large. O. R., Ser. IV, Vols. I to IV passim.
20. R., Ser. IV, pp. 880, 881.
K
I30 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
reprehensible conduct on the part of the authorities to allow thn
or four thousand malcontents and outlaws to demorahze a third
of the state. Often the famihes of tories and "mossbacks" were
suppHed from the state and county stores for the destitute families
of soldiers, while the men of such famihes were in the Federal service
or were hiding in the woods, caves, and ravines, or were plundering
the families of loyal soldiers. Not enough arrests were made, and
too many were released. The majority of the troublesome class
was of the kind who preferred to take no stand that incurred the
fulfilment of obHgations. In an emergency they would incline toward
the stronger side. Prompt and rigorous measures, similar to the
pohcy of the United States in the Middle West, stringently maintained,
would have converted this source of weakness into a source of strength,
or at least would have rendered it harmless. The mihtary resources
of that section of the state could then have been better developed,
the helpless people protected, outlaws crushed, and there would have
been peace after the war was ended. ^ As it was, the animosities
then aroused smouldered on until they flamed again in one phase of
the Ku Klux movement.^
Sec. 5. Party Politics and the Peace Movement
Political Conditions, 1861-1865
When, by the passage of the ordinance of January 11, 1861,
the advocates of immediate secession had gained their end, the strong
men of the victorious party, for the sake of harmony, stood aside,
and intrusted much of the important work of organizing the new
government to the defeated cooperationist party, who, to say the
least, disapproved of the whole pohcy of the victors. The delegates
chosen to the Provisional Congress were: R. H. Walker of Hunts-
ville, a Union Whig, who had supported Bell and Everett and opposed
secession ; Robert H. Smith, a pronounced Whig, who had supported
Bell and Everett and opposed secession ; Colin J. McRae of Mobile,
a commission merchant, a Whig; John Gill Shorter of Eufaula,
who had held judicial office for nine years; William P. Chilton of
Montgomery, for several years chief justice and before that an active
Whig; Stephen F. Hale of Eutaw, a Whig who supported Bell and
1 See also Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 563 ; Schwab, p. 190. 2 ggg below, Ch. XXI.
Governor Thomas H. Watts. Governor John Gill Shorter.
Governor Andrew B. Moore, Bishop R. H. Wilmer.
CIVIL WAR LEADERS.
.L.. : A.:^A iiL\: JiVi j
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1861-1865 131
Everett; David P. Levels of Lawrence, an "unconditional Unionist"
who had opposed secession in the convention of 1861, and who, in
1862, deserted to the Federals; Dr. Thomas Fearn of Huntsville,
an old man, a Union Whig; and J. L. M. Curry of Talladega, the
only consistent Democrat of the delegation, the only one who had
voted for Breckenridge, and the only one with practical experience
in public affairs. The delegation was strong in character, but weak
in political abiHty and not energetic.^ The delegation elected to the
first regular Congress was more representative and more able.
In August, 1 86 1, John Gill Shorter, a State Rights Democrat,
was elected governor by a vote of 57,849 to 28,127 over Thomas Hill
Watts, also a State Rights Democrat, who had voted for secession, but
who had formerly been a Whig. Watts was not a regular candidate
since he had forbidden the use of his name in the canvass.^ For a
time the people enthusiastically supported the administration. Gov-
ernor Shorter's message of October 28, 1861, to the legislature closed
with the words: "We may well congratulate ourselves and return
thanks that a timely action on our part has saved our liberties, pre-
served our independence, and given us, it is hoped, a perpetual sepa-
ration from such a government. May we in all coming time stand
separate from it, as if a wall of fire intervened." ^ The legislature
in 1 86 1 declared that it was the imperative duty as well as the patri-
otic privilege of every citizen, forgetting past differences, to support
the poHcy adopted and to maintain the- independence assumed.
To this cause the members of the general assembly pledged their
lives, fortunes, and sacred honor.'^ A year later the same body
declared that Mobile, then threatened by the enemy, must never be
desecrated by the polluting tread of the abohtionist foe. It must
never be surrendered, but must be defended from street to street,
from house to house, and at last burned to the ground rather than
surrendered.^ The same legislature, elected in 1861 when the war
feeling was strong, stated in August, 1863, that the war was unpro-
voked and unjust on the part of the United States government, which
1 See DuBose, " Yancey," pp. 566, 567, and Brewer and Garrett under the names
of the above.
2 Brewer, p. 126 ; Garrett, p. 723. » O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 709.
* Joint Resolution, Acts of 1st Called Sess., 1861, p, 142.
^ Joint Resolution, Acts of Called Sess. and 2d Regular Sess., 1862, p. 202.
132 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was conducting it in utter disregard of the principles which shouk
control and regulate civilized warfare. They renewed the pledge
never to submit to abolitionist rule. The people were urged not to
be discouraged by the late reverses, nor to attribute their defeats
to any want of courage or heroic self-sacrifice on the part of the
armies. All the resources of the state were pledged to the cause of
independence and perpetual separation from the United States. It
was the paramount duty, the assembly declared, of every citizen to
sustain and make effective the armies by encouraging enlistments,
by furnishing supplies at low prices to the families of soldiers, and
by upholding the credit of the Confederate government. To enfeeble
the springs of action by disheartening the people and the soldiers
was to strike the most fatal blow at the very life of the Confederacy.^
This resolution was called forth partly by the constant criticism
that the "cross-roads" poHticians and a few individuals of more im-
portance were directing against the civil and military policy of the
administration. The doughty warriors of the office and counter
were sure that the ■'* Yankees" should have been whipped in ninety
days. That the war was still going on was proof to them that those
at the head of affairs were incompetent. These people had never
before had so good an opportunity to talk and to be Hstened to.
Those to whom the people had been accustomed to look for guid-
ance were no longer present to advise. They had marched away
with the armies, and there were left at home as voters the old men, the
exempts, the lame, the halt, and the blind, teachers, preachers, offi-
cials, ''bomb-proofs," ''feather beds" ^ — all, in short, who were most
unlikely to favor a vigorous war policy and who, if subject to service,
wanted to keep out of the army. Consequently, among the voting
population at home, the war spirit was not as high in 1863 as it had
been before so many of the best men enHsted in the army.^ The occu-
pation of north Alabama by the enemy, short crops in 1862, and
reverses in the field such as Vicksburg and Gettysburg, had a chilHng
1 Acts of Called Sess. and 3d Regular Sess., 1863, p, 52.
2 A " bomb-proof" was a person who secured a safe position in order to keep out of
service in the field. A " feather bed " was one who stayed at home with good excuse,
— a teacher, agriculturist, preacher, etc., who had only recently been called to such
profession.
^ By act of the legislature soldiers in the field were to vote, but no instance is found
of their having done so.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1861-1865 133
effect on the spirit of those who had suffered or were hkely to suffer.
The conscription law was unpopular among those forced into the
service; it was much more disliked by those who succeeded for a
time in escaping conscription. These lived in constant fear that the
time would come when they would be forced to their duty.^
Further, the official class and the lawmakers were not up to the
old standard of force and ability. The men who had the success of
the cause most at heart usually felt it to be their duty to fight for it,
if possible, leaving lawmaking and administration to others of more
peaceable disposition. Some of the latter were able men, but few
were filled with the spirit that animated the soldier class. Many of
these unwarhke statesmen in the legislature and in Congress thought
it to be their especial duty to guard the liberties of the people against
the encroachments of the military power. They would talk by the
hour about state rights, but would allow a few thousand of the sover-
eign state's disloyal citizens to demoralize a dozen counties rather
than consent to infringe the liberties of the people by making the
militia system more effective to repress disorder. They succeeded
in weakening the efforts of both state and Confederate governments,
and their well-meant arguments drawn from the works of Jefferson
were never remembered to their credit. One of the best of these
men — Judge Dargan, a member of Congress from Mobile — seems
to have had a very unhappy disposition, and he spent much of his
time writing to the governor and to the President in regard to the
critical state of the country and suggesting numberless plans for its
salvation. Among many things that were visionary he advanced
some original schemes. In 1863 he proposed a plan for the gradual
emancipation of slaves, later a plan for arming them, and suggested
that blockade running be prohibited, as it was ruining the country.^
Even while the tide of war feeling was at the flood there occurred
instances of friction between the state and the Confederate govern-
ments. In December, 1862, the legislature complained of the con-
tinued use of the railroads by the Confederate government, to the
exclusion of private transportation. The railroads were built, it
1 See Hannis Taylor, " Political History of Alabama," in " Memorial Record of
Alabama," Vol. I, p. 82.
2 Jones, " A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I, pp. 250, 335, 391 ; Schwab, " Con-
federate States," p. 210; Garrett, p. 385; Brewer, p. 411.
134 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was stated, for free intercourse between the states, and, since the
blockade had become effective, were more important than ever in
the transportation of the necessaries of Hfe.^ The legislature com-
plained about the conduct of the Confederate officers in the state,
about impressment, taxation, and redemption of state bonds, the
state's quota of troops for the Confederate service, about arms and
supphes purchased by the state, and about trade through the lines.
Suits were brought again and again in the state courts by the strict
constructionists to test the constitutionality of the conscript laws
and the law forbidding the hiring of substitutes. But the courts
declared both laws constitutional.^ The lawmakers of the state
were much more afraid of militarism than of the Federal invasion
or domestic disorder, and refused to organize the militia effectively.^
The military reverses in the summer of 1863 darkened the hopes
of the people and chilled their waning enthusiasm, and the effect
was shown in the elections of August. Thomas H. Watts, who had
been defeated in 1861, was elected governor by a vote of 22,223 ^^
6342 over John G. Shorter, who had been governor for two years.
Watts had a strong personal following, which partly accounted for
the large majority; but several thousand, at least, were dissatisfied
in some way with the state or the Confederate administration. Jemi-
son, a former cooperationist, took Yancey's place in the Confederate
Senate. J. L. M. Curry was defeated for Congress because he had
strongly supported the administration. The delegation elected to
the second Congress was of a decidedly different temper from the
delegation to the first Congress. A large number of hitherto un-
known men were elected to the legislature.*
At the close of the term of Governor Shorter, the new legislature
passed resolutions indorsing his policy in regard to the conduct of
the war and commending his wise and energetic administration.^
Other resolutions were passed which would seem to indicate that the
1 Acts of 2d Regular Sess., 1862, p. 200,
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1862), p. 9; Schwab, "Confederate States," pp. 195, 196;
Brewer, 127; Garrett, pp. 722, 724. See infra, p. 97.*
^Shorter's Proclamation, Dec. 22, 1862, in Moore, "Rebellion Record," Vol. IV,
and above, p. 88.
* Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 6; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 126; Brewer, pp. 66,
126, 460; Garrett, p. 722; Hannis Taylor, in "Memorial Record of Alabama," p. 82.
^ Acts, 3d Regular Sess., 1864, p. 217.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1861-1865 1 35
war feeling ran as high and strong as ever. In fact, it was only the
voice of the majority, not of all, as before. There was a strong
minority of malcontents who pursued a poHcy of obstruction and
opposition to the measures of the administration and thereby weak-
ened the power of the government. It was believed by many that
Watts, who had been a Whig and a Bell and Everett elector, would
be more conservative in regard to the prosecution of the war than
was his predecessor. There were numbers of people in the state
who believed or professed to believe that it was possible to end the
war whenever President Davis might choose to make peace with the
enemy. Others, who saw that peace with independence was impos-
sible, were in favor of reconstruction, that is, of ending the war at
once and returning to the old Union, with no questions asked. They
beheved that the North would be ready to make peace and welcome
the southern states back into the Union on the old terms. These
constituted only a small part of the population, but they had some
influence in an obstructive way and were great talkers. Any one
who voted for Watts from the belief that he would try to bring about
peace was much mistaken in the man. It was reported that he was
in favor of reconstruction. This he emphatically denied in a message
to the legislature: "He who is now ... in favor of reconstruction
with the states under Lincoln's dominion, is a traitor in his heart
to the state . . . and deserves a traitor's doom. . . . Rather than
unite with such a people I would see the Confederate states desolated
with fire and sword. . . . Let us prefer death to a life of cowardly
shame." ^ Though Watts was elected somewhat as a protest against
the war party, he was in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war.
However, at times, he had trouble with the Confederate government,
and we find him writing about "the tyranny of Confederate offi-
cials," that "the state had some rights left," that "there will be a con-
flict between the Confederate and state authorities unless the conscript
officials cease to interfere with state volunteers and state officials."^
^Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 7. Francis Wayland, Jr., in a "Letter to a
Peace Democrat" in the Atlantic Monthly, Dec, 1863, quotes Governor Watts as
saying immediately after he had been elected : " If I had the power I would build
up a wall of fire between Yankeedom and the Confederate States, there to burn for
ages." See also O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 120; McMorries, " History of the First Alabama
Regiment of Infantry."
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 37, 463, 466, 817, 820. See also above, pp. 97, 103, 104.
136 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The governor was in favor of supporting the war, and recoi
mended the repeal of some of the state laws obstructing Confederate
enHstments; he was wilHng for any state troops that were available
to go to the aid of another state, and he desired to aid in returning
deserters to the army; but he opposed the manner of execution of
laws by the Confederate government. He demanded for the state
the right to engage in the blockade trade in order to secure neces-
saries. He also protested against the proposed poHcy of arming
the slaves.^
During the year 1864 the legislature protested against the action
of Confederate conscript officers who insisted on enrolhng certain
state officials. It was ordered that the reserves, when called out for
service, should not be put under the command of a Confederate
officer. The first-class reserves were not to leave their own coun-
ties. An act was passed to protect the people from "oppression by
the illegal execution of the Confederate impressment laws." ^ Con-
federate enrolhng officers who forced exempt men into the army
were made Hable to punishment by heavy fine.^
An Alabama newspaper, in the fall of 1864, advocated a conven-
tion of the states in order to settle the questions at issue, to bring
about peace, and to restore the Union. Such a proposition found
supporters in the legislature. A resolution was introduced favoring
reconstruction on the basis of the recent platform of the Democratic
party and McClellan's letter of acceptance.'' The resolution was to
this effect: if the Democratic party is successful in 1864, we are will-
ing to open negotiations for peace on the basis indicated in the plat-
form adopted by the convention; provided that our sister states of
the Confederacy are willing. A lengthy and heated discussion fol-
lowed. The governor sent in a message asking "who would desire
a poHtical union with those who have murdered our sons, outraged
our women, with demoniac mahce wantonly destroyed our property,
and now seek to make slaves of us!" It would cause civil war,
he said, if the people at home attempted such a course. After the
reading of the m'essage and some further debate, both houses united
in a declaration that extermination was preferable to reconstruction
according to the Lincoln plan. The proposed resolution, the extended
10. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 683, 685, 735, 736. 2 Act, Oct. 7, 1864.
8 Act, Dec. 12, 1864. ■* See McPherson, "Rebellion," pp. 419-421.
THE PEACE SOCIETY
137
debate, the governor's message, all clearly indicate a strong desire
on the part of some to end the war and return to the Union/
With the opening of 1865 conditions in Alabama were not favor-
able to the war party : the old cooperationists, with other malcontents,
were charging the Davis administration with every poHtical crime;
the state administration was disorganized in half the counties; de-
serters and stragglers were scattered throughout the state ; and many
of the state and county officials were disaffected. Those who were
in favor of war were in the armies. Had the war continued until
the August election, there is no doubt that an administration would
have been elected which would have refused further support to the
Confederacy. Had it not been for fear of the soldier element, the
malcontents at home could have controlled affairs in the fall of 1864.
For a year there had been indications that the discontented were
thinking of a coup (Tetat and an immediate close of the war. The
formation of secret societies pledged to bring about peace was a sign
of formidable discontent.
The Peace Society-
It was after the reverses of 1863 that the enthusiasm of the people
for the war very perceptibly decHned. For the first time, many
felt that perhaps after all their cause would not win, and that the
horrors of war might be brought home to them by hostile invasion
of their country. Pubhc opinion was more or less despondent.
There was a searching for scapegoats and a more pronounced hos-
tility to the administration. The ^'cross-roads" statesmen were
sure that a different policy under another leader would have been
crowned with success, though what this pohcy should have been,
perhaps no two would have agreed. This feehng was largely confined
to the less well informed, but it was also found in a number of the
old-time conservatives who would never believe that extreme measures
were justifiable in any event, and who could never get over a feeling
iThe "Confederate Military History" states that in 1864 the people hoped for terms
of peace, believing that Democratic successes in the northern elections would result in
an armistice, and later reconstruction ; that the people were always ready to go back to
the principles of 1787, and it was believed that Davis was willing, but that the unfavor-
able elections of 1864 and the military interference by the Federal administration in the
border states killed this constitutional peace party. See Vol. I, pp. 505, 537.
138 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of horror at all that the Democrats might do. If left alone, they
thought, time would have brought all things right in the end. It
was as painful to them to think that Lincoln was marching armies
over the fragments of the United States Constitution, as that the
Davis administration was stranghng state sovereignty in the Con-
federate States. Their minds never rose above the narrow legalism
of their books. But they were few in numbers as compared with the
more ignorant people (who were conscious only of dissatisfaction
and suffering) who had wilhngly plunged into the war ''to whip
the Yankees in ninety days," and who now thought that all that had
to be done to bring peace was to signify to the North a wilHngness
to stop fighting. This course, many thought, need not result in a
loss of their independence. Later they were minded to come back
into the Union on the old terms, and later still they were ready to
make peace without conditions and return to the Union. It seems
never to have occurred to them that northern opinion had changed
since 1861, and that severe terms of readmission would be exacted.
The hardest condition Hkely to be imposed, they thought, would be
the gradual emancipation of the slaves. As a rule, they owned few
slaves, but such a condition would probably have been considered
harder by them than by the larger slaveholders who felt that slavery
had come to an end, no matter how the struggle might result.
This dissatisfaction culminated in the formation of numerous
secret or semi-secret political organizations which sprang up over
the state, and which together became generally known as the "Peace
Society," though there were other designations. Often these organ-
izations were formed for purposes bordering on treason; often
not so, but only for constitutional opposition to the administration.
The extremes grew farther apart as the war progressed, until the
constitutional wing withdrew or ceased to exist, and the other became,
from the point of view of the government, wholly treasonable in its
purposes. These organizations had several thousand members,
at least half the active males left in the state.
The work of the peace party was first felt in the August elections
of 1863. The governor, though a true and loyal man, was elected
with the help of a disaffected party, and a disaffected element was
elected to the legislature and to Congress. Six members of Congress
from Alabama were said to be "unionists," that is, in favor of end-
THE PEACE SOCIETY
139
ing the war at once and returning to the Union/ A Confederate
official who had wide opportunities for observation reported that
the district (Talladega) in which he was stationed had been carried
by the peace party under circumstances that indicated treasonable
influence. Unknown men were elected to the legislature and to other
offices by a secret order which, he stated, had for its object the en-
couragement of desertion, the protection of deserters, and resistance
to the conscription laws. Some men of influence and position be-
longed to it, and the leaders were believed to be in communication
with the enemy. The entire organization was not disloyal, but he
feared that the controlKng element was faithless. The election had
been determined largely by the votes of stragglers and deserters
and of paroled Vicksburg soldiers who, it was found later, had been
''contaminated" by contact with the western soldiers of Grant's army.^
By this he evidently meant that the soldiers had been initiated into
the "Peace Society."
A few months later the "Peace Society" appeared among the
soldiers of General Clanton's brigade stationed at Pollard, in Conecuh
County. Some of the soldiers had served in the army of Tennessee,
and had there been initiated into this secret society. Clanton, who
was strongly disliked by General Bragg and not loved by General
Polk, had much trouble with them because he asserted that the
order appeared first in Bragg's army and spread from thence. Later
1 Williamson R. W. Cobb of Jackson County, a very popular politician, a member
of the 36th Congress, met his first defeat in 1861, when a candidate for the Confederate
Congress. In 1863 he was successful over the man who had beaten him in 1861. After
the election, if not before, he was in constant communication with the enemy and went
into their lines several times. The Congress expelled him by a unanimous vote. It
was rumored that President Lincoln intended to appoint him military governor, but he
killed himself accidentally in 1864. Cobb was a "down east Yankee" who had come
into the state as a clock pedler. He had no education and little real ability, but was
a smooth talker and was master of the arts of the demagogue. In political life he was
famed for shaking hands with the men, kissing the women, and playing with the babies.
At a Hardshell foot-washing he won favor by carrying around the towels, in striking
contrast with his Episcopalian rival, who sat on the back bench. Cobb was for the Con-
federacy as long as he thought it would win ; when luck changed, he proceeded to make
himself safe. After his desertion he lost influence among the people of his district.
See Brewer, pp. 286, 287 ; McPherson, pp. 49, 400, 402, 411.
2 O. R., Vol. II, p. 726 (W. T. Walthall, commandant of conscripts for Alabama,
Talladega, Aug. 6, 1863). In the fall of 1864 a secret peace society was discovered in
southwest Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 802-
&ao.
140 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
developments showed that he was correct/ It was in December,
1863, that the operations of the order among the soldiers were ex-
posed. A number of soldiers at Pollard determined to lay down their
arms on Christmas Day, as the only means of ending the war. These
troops, for the most part, were lately recruited from the poorer classes
of southwest Alabama by a popular leader and had never seen active
service. They were stationed near their homes and were exposec
to home influences. Upon them and their famiHes the pressure of
the war had been heavy.^ Many of them were exempt from service
but had joined because of Clanton's personal popularity, because they
feared that later they might become Hable to service, and because
they were promised special privileges in the way of furloughs and
stations near their homes. To this unpromising material had been
added conscripts and substitutes in whom the fires of patriotism
burned low, and who entered the service very reluctantly. With
them were a few veteran soldiers, and in command were veteran
officers. A secret society was formed among the discontented, with
all the usual accompaniment of signs, passwords, grips, oaths,
and obligations. Some bound themselves by solemn oaths never
to fight the enemy, to desert, and to encourage desertion — all this
in order to break down the Confederacy. General Maury, in com-
mand at Mobile, concluded after investigation that the society had
originated with the enemy and had entered the southern army at
Cumberland Gap.^
In regard to the discontent among the soldiers. Colonel Swanson
of the Fifty-ninth and Sixty-first Alabama'' regiments (consoHdated)
stated that there was a general disposition on the part of the poorer
classes, substitutes, and foreigners to accept terms and stop the war.
They had nothing anyway, so there was nothing to fight for, they
said. There was no general matured plan, and no leader. Colonel
Swanson thought.^ Major Cunningham of the Fifty-seventh Alabama
Regiment ® reported that there had been considerable manifestation
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. IT, pp. 555-557.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 548.
3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, pp. 551, 552.
* The 6 1 St Alabama Regiment was composed largely of conscripts under veteran
officers. It was evidently at first called the 59th. Brewer, p. 673.
6 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 550.
* The 57th Alabama Regiment was recruited in the counties of Pike, Coffee, Dale,
Henry, and Barbour. See Brewer, p. 669.
THE PEACE SOCIETY
141
of revolutionary spirit on account of the tax-in-kind law and the im-
pressment system, and that there was much reckless talk, even
among good men, of protecting their famihes from the injustice of
the government, even if they had to lay down their arms and go home.^
General Clanton said that the society had existed in HiUiard's
Legion and Gracie's brigade, and that few men, he was sure, joined
it for treasonable purposes.^ Before the appointed time — Christmas
Day — sixty or seventy members of the order mutinied and the whole
design was exposed. Seventy members were arrested and sent to
Mobile for trial by court-martial.^ There is no record of the action
of the court. The purged regiments were then ordered to the front
and obeyed without a single desertion. Boiling Hall's battahon,
which was sent to the Western army for having in it such a society,
made a splendid record at Chickamauga and in other battles, and
came out of the Chickamauga fight with eighty-two bullet-holes in
its colors.^
During the summer and fall of 1863 and in 1864 the Confederate
officials in north Alabama often reported that they had found certain
traces of secret organizations which were hostile to the Confederate
government. The Provost-Marshal's Department in 1863 obtained
information of the existence of a secret society between the lines in
Alabama and Tennessee, the object of which was to encourage
desertion.
Confederate soldiers at home on furlough joined the organization
and made known its object to the Confederate authorities. The
members were pledged not to assist the Confederacy in any way,
to encourage desertion of the north Alabama soldiers, and to work
for a revolution in the state government. Stringent oaths were taken
by the members, a code of signals and passwords was used, and a
well-organized society was formed. The bulk of the membership con-
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 550.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 556. The 59th Alabama Regiment was formed
from a part of HiUiard's Legion. Brewer, p. 671.
3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, pp. 552, 556.
*0. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXVI, Pt. II, p. 556; Brewer, "Alabama," p. 671. It may
be that the 59th Regiment here spoken of as consolidated was not the 59th under the
command of Boiling Hall, but M'as merely the first number given to the regiment, which
later became the 6ist. See Brewer, pp. 671, 673. However, the society existed in
Boiling Hall's regiment.
142 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
sisted of tories and deserters, with a few discontented Confederates.
Their society gave information to the Federals in north Alabama
and Tennessee and had agents far within the Confederate lines,
organizing discontent. General Clanton early in 1864 endeavored
to break up the organization in north Alabama and made a number
of arrests, but failed to crush the order.
In middle Alabama, about the same time (the spring of 1864),
the workings of a treasonable secret society were brought to Hght.
Colonel Jefferson Falkner of the Eighth Confederate Infantry over-
heard a conversation between two malcontents and began to investi-
gate. He found that in the central counties a secret society was
working to break down the Confederate government and bring about
peace. The plans were not perfected, but some were in favor of
returning to the Union on the Arkansas or Sebastian platform,^
others wanted to send to Washington and make terms, and still
others were in favor of unconditional submission. As to methods,
the malcontents meant to secure control of the state administration,
either by revolution or by elections in the summer of 1865, then they
would negotiate with the United States and end the war. The society
had agents in both the Western army and the Army of Northern Vir-
ginia, tampering with the soldiers and endeavoring to carry the or-
ganization into the Federal army. The leaders in the movement
hoped to organize into one party all who were discontented with the
administration. If successful in this, they would be strong enough
either to overthrow the state government, which was supported only
by home guards, or by obstruction to force the state government
to make peace. The oaths, passwords, and signals of this society
were similar to those of the north Alabama organization, with which
it was in communication. Conscript officers, county officials, medi-
cal boards, and members of the legislature were members of the order.
If a deserter were arrested, some member released him ; the members
claimed that the society caused the loss of the battle of Missionary
Ridge and the surrender at Vicksburg.
The strength of the so-called Peace Society lay in Alabama,
Georgia, Tennessee, and North CaroHna. The organizers were
called Eminents. They gave the ''degree" to (that is, initiated)
1 See Nicolay and Hay, " Lincoln," Vol. VIII, pp. 410-415 ; McPherson, " Rebel-
lion," pp. 320-322.
RECONSTRUCTION SENTIMENT I43
those whom they considered proper persons. No records were kept;
the members did not know one another except by recognition through
signals. They received directions from the Eminents, who accom-
modated their instructions to the person initiated. An ignorant but
loyal person was told that the object of the order was to secure a
change of administration; the disloyal were told that the purpose
was to encourage desertion and mutiny in the army, to injure loyal
citizens, and to overthrow the state and Confederate governments.
Owing to the non-intercourse between members there were many in
the order who never knew the real objects of the leaders or Eminents,
who intended to use the organization to further their designs in 1865.
The swift collapse of the Confederacy in the spring of 1865 anticipated
the work of the secret societies. The anti- Confederate element was,
however, left somewhat organized through the work of the order.^
Reconstruction Sentiment
Besides the open obstruction of pohticians, officials, and legisla-
ture, and the secret opposition of the peace societies, there was a third
movement for reconstruction. This movement took place in that
part of Alabama held by the Federal armies, and the reconstruction
meetings were encouraged by the Union army officers. The leaders
were D. C. Humphreys and Jeremiah Clemens, whose defection
has been noted before. A more substantial element than the tories
and deserters supported this movement — the dissatisfied property
1 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, pp. 682, 683, and Vol. XXII, Pt. I, p. 671 ;
Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 393-397. A fuller account of the Peace Society will be found in
the South Atlantic Quarterly, July, 1903. Some of the prominent leaders in the Peace
Society were said to be : Lewis E. Parsons, later provisional governor, said to be the
head of it ; Col. J. J. Seibels of Montgomery ; R. S. Heflin, state senator from Ran-
dolph County ; W. W. Dodson, William Kent, David A. Perryman, Lieut.-Col. E. B.
Smith, W. Armstrong, and A. A. V^est, of Randolph County ; Capt. W. S. Smith,
Demopolis; L. McKee and Lieut. N. B. DeArmon.
General James H. Clanton testified in 1871 that while in the Alabama legislature
during the war L. E. Parsons, afterwards governor, introduced resolutions invoking the
blessings of heaven on the head of Jefferson Davis and praying that God would spare
him to consummate his holy purposes. Jahez M. Curry charged Parsons with being a
" reconstructionist " during the war, that is, with being disloyal to the government. Par-
sons had two young sons in the Confederate army, and one of them was so indignant at
the charge against his father that he shot and wounded Curry. Dr. Ware of Mont-
gomery afterwards made the same charge. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test, p. 234.
144
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
holders who were afraid of confiscation. Several Confederate offi-
cers were drawn into the movement later/
Early in 1864, Humphreys ^ issued an elaborate address renounc-
ing his errors. There was no hope, he told his fellow-citizens, that
foreign powers would intervene. Slavery as a permanent institution
must be given up. Law and order must be enforced and constitu-
tional authority reestablished. Slavery was the cause of revolution,
and as an institution was at an end. With slavery abolished, there
was, therefore, no reason why the war should not end. The right
to regulate the labor question would be secured to the state by the
United States government. At present labor was destroyed, and in
order to regulate labor, there must be peace. The address was
printed and distributed throughout the state with the assistance of
the Federal officials. A number of the packages of these addresses
was seized by some women and thrown into the Tennessee River.^
Jeremiah Clemens, who had deserted in 1862, issued an address to
the people of the South advocating the election of Lincoln as Presi-
dent.'* March 5, 1864, a reconstruction meeting, thinly attended,
was held in Huntsville under the protection of the Union troops.
Clemens presided. Resolutions were passed denying the legality
of secession because the ordinance had not been submitted to the
people for their ratification or rejection. Professions of devotion
and loyalty to the United States were made by Clemens, the late major-
general of Alabama militia and secessionist of 1861.^ A week later
the same party met again. No young men were present, for they were
in the army. All were men over forty-five, concerned for their prop-
erty. Clemens spoke, denouncing the "twenty-negro" law. The
Gilchrist story was here originated by Clemens and told for the
first time. The story was that J. G. Gilchrist of Montgomery
County went to the Secretary of War, Mr. Walker, and urged him
to begin hostihties by firing on Fort Sumter, saying, ''You must
sprinkle blood in the face of the people of Alabama or the state will
iSee O, R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 718. "Confederate Military History,"
Vol. I, pp. 505, 509, 51 1, 512, 537.
2 A Douglas Democrat, a Douglas elector, and a strong secessionist, who had de-
serted to the enemy. Brewer, p. 364.
^ N. V. Times, Feb. 14, 1864; Annual Cyclopsedia (1864), pp. 10, ii; A^. K
Daily News, April 16, 1864, from Columbus (Ga.) Sun.
4 N. V. Tribune, May 23, 1865. ^ N. Y. World, March 28, 1864.
RECONSTRUCTION SENTIMENT
145
be back into the Union within ten days." In closing, Clemens said,
"Thank God, there is now no prospect of the Confederacy succeeding."
D. C. Humphreys then proposed his plan: slavery was dead,
but by submitting to Federal authority gradual emancipation could
be secured, and also such guarantees as to the future status of the
negro as would reheve the people from social, economic, and politi-
cal dangers. He expressed entire confidence in the conservatism
of the northern people, and asserted that if only the ordinance of seces-
sion were revoked, the southern people would have as long a time
as they pleased to get rid of the institution of slavery. In case of
return to the Union the people would have political co5peration to
enable them to secure control of negro labor. "There is really no
difference, in my opinion," he said, "whether we hold them as slaves
or obtain their labor by some other method. Of course, we prefer
the old method. But that is not the question." He announced the
defection from the Confederacy of Vice-President Stephens, and
bitterly denounced Ben Butler, Davis, and Slidell, to whose intrigues
he attributed the present troubles. Resolutions were proposed
by him and adopted, acknowledging the hopelessness of secession
and advising a return to the Union. Longer war, it was declared,
would be dangerous to the liberties of the people, and the restoration
of civil government was necessary. The governor was asked to call
a convention for the purpose of reuniting Alabama to the Union.
It was not expected, it was stated, that the governor would do this;
but his refusal would be an excuse for the independent action of
north Alabama and a movement toward setting up a new state gov-
ernment. Busteed could then come down and hold a "bloody
assize, trying traitors and bushwhackers." ^
In the early winter of 1864- 1865, the northern newspaper cor-
respondents in the South ^ began to write of the organization of a
strong peace party called the "State Rights party," in Georgia,
Alabama, and Mississippi. The leaders were in communication
with the Washington authorities. They claimed that each state
1 N. V. Times, March 24, 1864; JV. Y. World, March 2Z, 1864. Busteed was a
newly appointed Federal judge who afterward became notorious in " carpet-bag " days.
He succeeded George W. Lane in the judgeship.
2 There were several regular, reliable correspondents in north Alabama, for the
New York, Boston, and Chicago papers. Their accounts are corroborated by the re-
ports made later by Confederate and Federal officials.
L
146 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
had the right to negotiate for itself terms of reconstruction. The
plan was to secure control of the state administration and then apply
for readmission to the Union. The destruction of Hood's army
removed the fear of the soldier element. Several thousand of Hood'
suffering and dispirited soldiers took the oath of allegiance to th^
United States, or dispersed to their homes. Early in 1865 peace
meetings were held in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, within
the Confederate lines; commissioners were sent to Washington;
and the tories and deserters organized. A delegation waited on
Governor Watts to ask him to negotiate for the return of the state
to the Union, but did not get, nor did they expect, a favorable answer
from him. The peace party expected to gain the August elections
and elect as governor J. C. Bradley of Huntsville, or M. J. Bulge
of Tallapoosa.^ The plan, then, was not to wait for the inauguration
in November, but to have the newly elected administration take
charge at once. It was continually reported that General P. D.
Roddy was to head the movement.^
There is no doubt that during the winter of 1864- 186 5 some
kind of negotiation was going on with the Federal authorities. J. J.
Giers, who was a brother-in-law of State Senator Patton,^ was in con-
stant communication with General Grant. In one of his reports
to Grant he stated that Roddy and another Confederate general
had sent Major McGaughey, Roddy's brother-in-law, to meet Giers
near Moulton, in Lawrence County, to learn what terms could be
obtained for the readmission of Alabama. Major McGaughey said
that the people considered that affairs were hopeless and wanted
peace. If the terms were favorable, steps would be taken to induce
Governor Watts to accept them. If Watts should refuse, a civil
and mihtary movement would be begun to organize a state govern-
ment for Alabama which would include three-fourths of the state.
The plan, it was stated, was indorsed by the leading pubhc men.
1 At this time Bulger was in active service. See Brewer, "Alabama," pp. 548, 660;,
"Confederate Military History" — Alabama, see Index. Bradley was a north Alabama
man who had gone over to the enemy to save his property. This was his chief claim to
notoriety. He became a prominent "scalawag" later.
2 N. Y. Herald, Nov. 29, 1864 ; N'. V. Times, Feb. 10, 1865 ; Boston Journal,
Nov. 15, 1864; The World, March 28, 1864, Feb. ii, 1865; O. R., Ser. I, Vol.
XLIX, Ft. I, pp. 590, 659.
^ Later governor, succeeding Parsons.
RECONSTRUCTION SENTIMENT I47
The peace leaders wanted Grant, or the Washington administration,
to announce at once a policy of gradual emancipation in order to
reassure those afraid of outright abolition, and to '^ disintegrate the
rebel soldiery" of north Alabama, which they said was never strongly
devoted to the Confederacy. It was asserted that all the counties
north of the cotton belt and those in the southeast were ready for a
movement toward reconstruction. Giers stated that approaches
were then being made to Governor Watts. Andrew Johnson, the newly
elected Vice-President, vouched for the good character of Giers.^
Ten days later Giers wrote Grant that on account of the rumors of
the submission of various Confederate generals he had caused to be
published a contradiction of the report of the agreement with the
Confederate leaders. He further stated that one of Roddy's officers.
Lieutenant W. Alexander, had released a number of Federal prisoners
without parole or exchange, according to agreement.^ In several
instances, in the spring of 1865, subordinate Confederate commanders
proposed a truce, and after Lee's surrender and Wilson's raid this
was a general practice. During the months of April and May, there
was a combined movement of citizens and soldiers in a number of
counties in north Alabama to reorganize civil government accord-
ing to a plan furnished by General Thomas, Giers being the inter-
mediary.^ On May i General Steele of the second army of invasion
was informed at Montgomery by J. J. Seibels, L. E. Parsons, and
J. C. Bradley — all well-known obstructionists — that two-thirds of
the people of Alabama would take up arms to put down the ''rebels." *
Colonel Seibels alone of that gallant company had ever taken up arms
for any cause. The other two and their kind may have been, and
doubtless often were, warhke in their conversation, but they never
drew steel to support their convictions.
It is quite hkely that the strength of the disaffection, especially
in north and east Alabama, was exaggerated by the reports of both
Union and Confederate authorities. There never had been during
the war much loyalty, in the proper sense of the word, to the United
1 Letter from Giers at Decatur, Jan. 26, 1865 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, R. I,
pp.590, 718. See also Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, pp. 13-
15, 60, 64.
2 Giers, from Nashville, to Grant ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 659.
* Judging from the correspondence of Giers, the plan had the approval of General
Grant. ^ q. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, p. 560.
148 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
States. There was much pure indifference on the part of some people
who desired the strongest side to win as soon as possible and leave
them in safety. There was much discontent on the part of others
who had supported the Confederacy for a while, but who, for various
reasons, had fallen away from the cause and now wanted peace and
reunion. There was a very large element of outright lawlessness
in the opposition to the Confederate government. The lowest class
of men on both sides or of no side united to plunder that defenceless
land between the two armies. This class wanted no peace, for on
disorder they thrived. For years after the war ended they gave
trouble to Federal and state authorities. The discontent was actively
manifested by civihans, deserters, "mossbacks," ''bomb-proofs,"
and "feather beds." These had never strongly supported the Con-
federacy. It was largely a timid, stay-at-home crowd, with a few
able but erratic leaders. The soldiers may have been dissatisfied,
— many of them were, — and many of them left the army in the
spring of 1865 to go home and plant crops for the rehef of their suf-
fering families. Many of them in the dark days after Nashville
and Franklin took the oath of allegiance and went home, sure that
the war was ended and the cause was lost. Yet these were not the
ones found in such organizations as the Peace Society. That was
largely made up of people whom the true soldier despised as worth-
less. There were few soldiers in the peace movement and these only
at the last.
The peace party, however, was strong in one way. All were
voters and, being at home, could vote. The soldiers in the army
had no voice in the elections. The malcontents, had they possessed
courage and good leaders, could have controlled the state after the
summer of 1864. The able men in the movement were not those
who inspired confidence in their followers. There were no troops
in the state to keep them down, and the only check seems to have
been their fear of the soldiers, who were fighting at the front, in the
armies of Lee and Johnston, of Wheeler and Hood and Taylor.
They were certainly afraid of the vengeance of these soldiers.^' It
was much better that the war resulted in the complete destruction
of the southern cause, leaving no questions for future controversy,
such as would have arisen had the peace party succeeded in its plans.
1 This fear is expressed in all their correspondence.
CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS
Sec. I. Industrial Development during the War
Early in the war the blockade of the southern ports became so
effective that the southern states were shut off from their usual sources
of supply by sea. Trade through the Hnes between the United States
and the Confederate States was forbidden, and Alabama, owing to
its central location, suffered more from the blockade than any other
state. For three years the Federal lines touched the northern part
of the state only, and, as no railroads connected north and south
Alabama, contraband trade was difficult in that direction. Mobile,
the only port of the state, was closely blockaded by a strong Federal
fleet. The railroad communications with other states were poor, and
the Confederate government usually kept the railroads busy in the
public service. Consequently, the people of Alabama were forced
to develop certain industries in order to secure the necessaries of life.
But outside these the industrial development was naturally in the
direction of the production of materials of war.
Military Industries
During the first two years of the war volunteers were much more
plentiful than equipment. The arms seized at Mount Vernon and
other arsenals in Alabama were old flint-locks altered for the use of
percussion caps and were almost worthless, being valued at $2 apiece.
These were afterwards transferred to the Confederate States, which
returned but few of them to arm the Alabama troops.^ Late in i860
a few thousand old muskets were purchased by the state from the
arsenal at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, for $2.50 each. A few Mis-
sissippi rifles were also secured, and with these the Second Alabama
1 Davis, " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," Vol. I, p. 471 ; O. R.,
Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p, 440.
149
I50 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Infantry was armed. These rifles, however, required a special kind
of ammunition, and this made them almost worthless. Other arms
were found to be useless for the same reason. Both cavalry and
infantry regiments went
~~7X to the front armed with
oCtsbor. g-j^gjg ^^^ double bar-
relled shot-guns, squirrel
rifles, muskets, flint-locks,
and old pistols. No
ammunition could be sup-
phed for such a miscel-
laneous collection. Many
regiments had to wait
for months before arms
could be obtained. Be-
fore October, 1861, sev-
eral thousand men had
left Alabama unarmed,
and several thousand
more, also unarmed, were
left waiting in the state
camps.^ In 1861 the
state legislature bought
a thousand pikes and a
hundred bowie-knives to
arm the Forty- eighth
Militia Regiment, which
was defending Mobile.
The sum of $250,000 was appropriated to lend to those who would
manufacture firearms for the government.^ In 1863 the Confederate
Congress authorized the enhstment of companies armed with pikes
who should take the places of men armed with firearms when the
latter were dead or absent.^ Private arms — muskets, rifles, pistols,
shot-guns, carbines — were called for and purchased from the owners
Wooleu Factorle*-
Salt Works ,-9
Medical Labontoriesl 0
Shoe factories n
Flour Mllli 18
Car 8hop» 1»
Machine Shops _.
Small Arms Factories 1
Harness Factnria
Sulphur Works.
Nail Kac-torj
Distilleries
Collieries 20
Iron Works 21
Steel Furnaces 22
Naval Foundry 23
Arsenal «♦
Powder MiUs 2S
1 Miller, "History of Alabama," p. 158
I, p. 476 ; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, p. 440.
Davis, " Confederate Government," Vol.
2 Acts of 2d Called and 1st Regular Sess. (1861), pp. 75, 21 1.
* April 10, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., ist Sess.
MILITARY INDUSTRIES I5I
when not donated.^ An offer was made to advance fifty per cent of
the amount necessary to set up machinery for the manufacture of
small arms.^ Old Spanish flint-lock muskets were brought in from Cuba
through the blockade, altered, and placed in the hands of the troops.^
In 1862 a small- arms factory was established at Tallassee which
employed 150 men and turned out about 150 carbines a week. At
the end of 1864 it had produced only 6000/ At Montgomery the
Alabama Arms Manufacturing Company had the best machinery
in the Confederacy for making Enfield rifles. At Selma were the
state and Confederate arsenals, a navy-yard, and naval foundry with
machinery of EngUsh make, of the newest and most complete pattern.
It had been brought through the blockade from Europe and set up
at Selma because that seemed to be a place safe from invasion and
from the raids of the enemy. Here the vessels for the defence of
Mobile were built, heavy ordnance was cast, with shot and shell,
and plating for men-of-war. The armored ram Tennessee, famous
in the fight in Mobile Bay, the gunboats Morgan, Selma, and Gaines
were all built at the Selma navy-yard — guns, armor, and everything
being manufactured on the spot. When the Tennessee surrendered,
after a terrible batde, its armor had not been penetrated by a single
shot or shell. The best cannon in America were cast at the works
in Selma. The naval foundry employed 3000 men, the other works
as many more. Half the cannon and two-thirds of the fixed ammu-
nition used during the last two years of the war were made at these
foundries and factories. The foundry destroyed by Wilson was pro-
nounced by experts to be the best in existence. It could turn out at
short notice a fifteen-inch Brooks or a mountain howitzer. Swords,
rifles, muskets, pistols, caps, were manufactured in great quantities.
There were more than a hundred buildings, which covered fifty acres ;
and after Wilson's destructive work, Truman, the war correspondent,
said that they presented the greatest mass of ruins he had ever seen.^
1 April 16, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess. ; Governor's Proclamation,
March i, 1862.
2 April 17, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.SA., ist Cong., 1st Sess.
3 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. Ill, pp. 870, 875.
4 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 986, 987 ; Davis, Vol. I, p. 480 ; "Southern Hist.
Soc. Papers," Vol. II, p. 61.
5 Miller, " History of Alabama," pp. 180, 181 ; Davis, Vol. I, pp. 480, 481; Hardy,
"History of Selma," pp. 46, 47; N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1865 (Truman); O. R.,
152 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
There was a navy-yard on the Tombigbee, in Clarke County, near
the Sunflower Bend. Several small vessels had been completed and
several war vessels, probably gunboats, were in process of construc-
tion here when the war ended; both vessels and machinery were
destroyed by order of the Confederate authorities/
Gunpowder was scarce throughout the war, and nitre or saltpetre,
its principal ingredient, was not to be purchased from abroad. A
powder mill was established at Cahaba,^ but the ingredients were
lacking. Charcoal for gunpowder was made from willow, dogwood,
and similar woods. The nitre on hand was soon exhausted, and it
was sought for in the caves of the limestone region of Alabama and
Tennessee. In north Alabama there were many of these large caves.
The earth in them was dug up and put in hoppers and water poured
over it to leach out the nitre. The lye was caught (just as for making
soft soap from lye ashes), boiled down, and then dried in the sun-
shine.^ The earth in cellars and under old houses was scraped up
and leached for the nitre in it. In 1862 a corps of officers under the
title of the Nitre and Mining Bureau ^ was organized by the War
Department to work the nitre caves of north Alabama which lay in
the doubtful region between the Union and the Confederate lines,
and which were often raided by the enemy. The men were sub-
jected to military discipline and were under the absolute command
of the superintendent, who often called them out to repulse Federal
raiders. As much as possible in this department, as in the others,
exempts and negroes were used for laborers. For clerical work those
disabled for active service were appointed, and instructions were
Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 986, 987. The arsenal was commanded by Col. J. L. White;
the naval foundries and the rolling mills were under the direction of Capt. Catesby ap
Roger Jones, the designer of the Virginia; Commodore Ebenezer Farrand superin-
tended the construction of war vessels at the Selma navy-yard. Captain Jones cast the
heavy ordnance for the forts at Mobile, Charleston, and Wilmington. Five gunboats
were built at Selma in 1863 and two or three others in 1 864-1 865. The ram Tennessee,
built in 1 863-1 864, was constructed like the Virginia, but was an improvement except
for the weak engines. When the keel of the Tennessee was laid, in the fall of 1863, some
of the timbers to be used in her were still standing in the forest, and the iron for her
plates^ was ore in the mines. Scharf, "Confederate Navy," pp. 50, 534, 550, 555;
"Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 654; Maclay, "History of United States Navy,"
Vol. II, pp. 446, 447; Wilson, " Ironclads in Action," Vol. I, p. 116.
1 Ball, "Clarke County," p. 765. 2 q. R,, Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 29, 102.
8 Miller, pp. 201, 230 ; Davis, Vol. I, p. 473; Porcher, p. 378.
* April II, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess.
MILITARY INDUSTRIES 1 53
I -sued that employment should be given to needy refugee women/
riicse important nitre works were repeatedly destroyed by the Fed-
^ r;Lls, who killed or captured many of the employees.^ In the dis-
iiict of upper Alabama, under the command of Captain William
( labbitt, whose headquarters were at Blue Mountain (now Anniston),
p.iost of the work was done in the limestone caves of the mountain
11 gion.^ Several hundred men — whites and negroes — were em-
loyed in extracting the nitre from the cave earth. To the end of
i)tember, 1864, this district had produced 222,665 pounds of nitre
at a cost of $237,977.17, war prices.''
The supply from the caves proved insufficient, and artificial nitre
Ixds or nitraries were prepared in the cities of south and central Ala-
bama. It was necessary to have them near large towns, in order to
obtain a plentiful supply of animal matter and potash, and the neces-
sary labor. Efforts were also made to induce planters in marl or
limestone counties to work plantation earth.^ Under the supervision
of Professor W. H. C. Price, nitraries were established at Sclma,
Mobile, Talladega, Tuscaloosa, and Montgomery. Negro labor was
used almost entirely, each negro having charge of one small nitre bed.
To October, 1864, the nitraries of south Alabama produced 34,716
])ounds at a cost of $26,171.14, which was somewhat cheaper than the
nitre from the caves. From these nitraries better results were ob-
tained than from the French, Swedish, and Russian nitraries which
\'ed as models. The Confederate nitre beds were from sixteen
to twenty-seven months old in October, 1864, and hence not at their
best producing stage. Yet, allowing for the difference in age, they
L^ave better results, as they produced from 2.57 to 3.3 ounces of nitre
• cubic foot, while the average European nitraries at four years of
ij;e gave 4 ounces per cubic foot. Earth from under old houses
and from cellars produced from 2 to 4 ounces to the cubic foot.
Xitre caves produced from 6 to 12 ounces per cubic foot. Most
of the nitre thus obtained was made into powder at the mills in Selma.
There were some private manufacturers of nitre, and to encourage
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 195, 697.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 695.
^ One of the most valuable of these caves was the '* Santa Cave." See O. R., Ser.
IV, Vol. II, pp. 29, 102.
* O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 695, 698.
^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 29, 102.
4
154 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
these the Confederate Congress authorized the advance to maki
of fifty per cent of the cost of the necessary machinery/ i
The state legislature appropriated $30,000 to encourage the man J
facture and preparation of powder, saltpetre (nitre), sulphur, and lead
Little of the last article was found in Alabama.^ Some of the powd<
works were in operation as early as 1861, and in that year the Wi
Department gave Dr. Ullman of Tallapoosa a contract to supp^
1000 to 1500 pounds of sulphur a day.^
The Confederate Nitre and Mining Bureau had charge of
production of iron in Alabama for the use of the Confederacy. TH
mines were principally in the hilly region south, of the Tennessej
River, where several furnaces and iron works were already estaq
lished before the war. Two or three new companies, with capital
$1,000,000 each, had bought mineral lands and had commenc
operations when the war broke out. The Confederate governme
bought the property or gave the companies financial assistance. T
iron district was often raided by the Federals, who blew up the fu
naces and wrecked the iron works.* The Irondale works, near El
ton, were begun in 1862, and made much iron, but they also wero
destroyed in 1864 by the Federals.^ Other large iron furnaces, wid
their forges, foundries, and rolling-mills, were destroyed by Rousseau!
raid in 1864. The government employed several hundred conscripj
and several thousand negroes in the mines and rolling-mills. It als<
offered fifty per cent of the cost^of equipment to encourage the opening
of new mines by private owners.^ There is record of only aboui:
15,000 tons of Alabama iron being mined by the Confederacy, but
probably there was much more.' The iron was sent to Selma, Mont-
gomery, and other places for manufacture. The ordnance cast i^
1 In 1 861 the War Department gave Leonard and Riddle of Montgomery an ordej-
for 60,000 pounds of nitre, and a company near Larkinsville in north Alabama was makf
ing 700 pounds a day, which it sold to the government at 22 to 35 cents a poundt
O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 556.
2 April 17, 1862. Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess.; Acts of Ala., Dec. 7,
i86r, and Dec. 2, 1862; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 195, 698, 702, 987; Davis, Vol. I,
pp. 316, 473, 477; Miller, pp. 201, 230; Schwab, "Confederate States," p. 270; Annual
Cyclopaedia (1862), p. 9; Le Conte's "Autobiography," p. 184.
3 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 556.
* Somers, "Southern States," p. 162. ^ Somers, p. 175. "|
^ April 9, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S. A., 1st Cong., ist Sess.
' O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 695, 700, 702, 990.
MILITARY INDUSTRIES 155
Selma was of Alabama iron ; and after the war, when the United States
sold the ruins of the arsenal, the big guns were cut up and sent to
Philadelphia. Here the fine quality of the iron attracted the atten-
tion of experts and led to the development by northern capital of the
iron industry in north Alabama.
The Confederate government encouraged the building and exten-
sion of railroads, and paid large sums to them for the transportation
of troops, munitions of war, and military supplies.^ Several lines
of road within the state were made military roads, and the govern-
ment extended their lines, built bridges and cars, and kept the Hnes
in repair.^ In 1862 $150,000 was advanced to the Alabama and
Mississippi Railway Company, to complete the line between Selma
and Meridian,^ and the duty on iron needed for the road was remitted.*
On June 25 of this year this road was seized by the mihtary authorities
in order to finish it,'^ and because of the lack of iron D. H. Kenny was
directed (July 21, 1863) to impress the iron and roUing stock belong-
ing to the Alabama and Florida Railway, the Gainesville Branch of
1 Freight rates in Alabama were as follows in December, 1862 : —
1. Ammunition $0.60 per roo lbs., per 100 miles.
2. (Second class) 0.30 per 100 lbs., per 100 miles.
3. Live stock 30.00 per car, per 100 miles.
4. Hay, fodder, wagons, ambulances, etc. . . 20.00 per car, per 100 miles.
Troops were to be carried for 2^ to 3I cents a mile per man. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II,
p. 276.
'■^ Charles T . Pollard, president of the Montgomery and West Point R.R., who ran
his road under direction of the government, reported, April 4, 1862, that he had placed the
whole line between Montgomery and Selma under contract, and that it would be com-
pleted within the year if iron could be obtained. He thought the road between Selma
and Meridian ought to be completed at once. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 10, 48. On
Sept. 14, 1864, it \vas reported that the grading was finished on the road between Mont-
gomery and Union Springs, but that no iron could be obtained. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol.
Ill, p. 576.
8 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 941 ; Pub. Laws, C.S.A., Feb. 15, 1862.
* On April 4, 1862, the Secretary of War wrote to A. S. Gaines that the road from
Selma to Uemopolis had been completed ; from Demopolls to Reagan, a distance of 24
miles, a part of the grading had been done ; while the road from Reagan to Meridian,
a distance of 27 miles, had been graded, bridged, and some iron had been laid. O. R.,
Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 1048-1049, 1061. Gaines stated, April 24, 1852, that on the Missis-
sippi end of the road the road was completed to within 8 miles of Uemopolis, Ala., and
was being built at the rate of 3 miles a week. Connection was made by boat to Gainesville,
within 2 miles of which a spur of the Mobile and Ohio, 21 miles long, had been com-
pleted. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 1089.
^O. R.,.Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 11 71.
156 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the Mobile and Ohio, the Cahaba, Marion, and Greensborough Rail-
road, and the Uniontown and Newberne Railroad. The Alabama
and Mississippi road was a very important Kne, since it tapped the
supply districts of Mississippi and the Black Belt of Alabama. There
were many difficulties in the way of the builders. In 1862 the loco-
motives were wearing out and no iron was to be obtained. In the
fall of the same year the planters withdrew their negroes who were
working on the road, and left the bridges half finished. But finally,
in December, 1862, the road was completed.^ In the fall of 1862 a
road between Blue Mountain, Alabama, and Rome, Georgia, was
planned, and $1,122,480.92 was appropriated by the Confederate
Congress, a mortgage being taken as security.^ This road was graded
and some bridges built and iron laid, but was not in running order
before the end of the war.
Telegraph lines, which had been few before the war, were now
placed along each railroad, and several cross-country Hnes were put
up. The first important new fine was along the Mobile and Ohio_
Railroad, from Mobile to Meridian.^
Private Manufacturing Enterprises
Both the state and the Confederate government encouraged mani
factures by favorable legislation. The Confederate government was
always ready to advance half of the cost of the machinery and to
take goods in payment. A law of Alabama in 1861 secured the rights
of inventors and authors. All patents under the United States laws
prior to January 11, 1861, were to hold good under the state laws,
and the United States patent and copyright laws were adopted for
Alabama.'* Later, jurisdiction over patents, inventions, and copy-
rights was transferred to the Confederate government. A bonus of
five and ten cents apiece on all cotton and wool cards made in Ala-
bama was offered by the legislature in December, 1861.^ All em-
ployees in iron mills, in foundries, and in factories supplying the state
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 1089, 1145; Vol. II, pp. io6, 148, 149, 655.
2 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 144-145; Vol. Ill, p. 312; Stats.-at -Large, Prov.
Cong., C.S.A., Feb. 15, 1862 ; Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., ist Sess., April 7 and Oct.
2, 1862.
8 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 783.
* Acts, Feb. 8, 1 86 1. ^ Acts, 2d Called and ist Regular Sess., p. 70.
PRIVATE MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES 157
or Confederate governments with arms, clothing, cloth, and the like
were declared by the state exempt from mihtary duty.
Factories were soon in operation all over the state, especially in
central Alabama. In all places where there were government facto-
ries there also were found factories conducted by private individuals.
In 1 86 1 there were factories at Tallassee, Autauga ville, and Pratt-
ville, with 23,000 spindles and 800 employees, which could make
5000 yards of good tent cloth a day.^ And other cotton mills were
estabHshed in north Alabama as early as 1861.^ The Federals burned
these buildings and destroyed the machinery in 1862 and 1863. There
was the most "unsparing hostiHty displayed by the northern armies
to this branch of industry. They destroyed instantly every cotton
factory within their reach." ^
At Tuscaloosa were cotton and shoe factories, tanneries, and an
iron foundry. A large cotton factory was estabHshed in Bibb County,
and at Gainesville there were workshops and machine-shops. In
addition to the government works, Selma had machine-shops, car
shops, iron mills, and foundries, cotton, wool, and harness factories,
conducted by private individuals. There were cotton and woollen
factories at Prattville and Autaugaville, and at Montgomery were
car shops, harness shops, iron mills, foundries, and machine-shops.
The best tent cloth and uniform cloth was made at the factories of
Tallassee. The state itself began the manufacture of shoes, salt,
clothing, whiskey, alcohol, army suppHes, and supplies for the des-
titute.^ Extensive manufacturing establishments of various kinds in
Madison, Lauderdale, Tuscumbia, Bibb, Autauga, Coosa, and Talla-
poosa counties were destroyed during the war by the Federals.
There were iron works in Bibb, Shelby, Calhoun, and Jefferson coun-
ties, and in 1864 there were a dozen large furnaces with rolling-mills
and foundries in the state.^ However, in that year the governor com-
plained that though Alabama had immense quantities of iron ore,
even the planters in the iron country were unable to get sufficient
1 Governor Moore to Sec. L. P. Walker, July 2, 1861, O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 493;
Somers, p. 136.
2 Schwal), "Confederate States," p. 271. ^ Somers, p. 136.
* Acts, Dec. 13, 1864, Acts of Ala., 2d Called and 1st Regular Sess. passim.
^ Le Conte states that in 1863 he found the only Bessemer furnace in the Confeder-
acy at Shelbyville; it was the first that he had ever seen. "Autobiography," pp. 184-
185. It was probably the first in America.
158 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
iron to make and mend agricultural implements, since all iron that
was mined was used for purposes of the Confederacy.^ The best and
strongest cast iron used by the Confederacy was made at Selma and
at Briarfield. The cotton factories and tanneries in the Tennessee
valley were destroyed in 1862 by the Federal troops.^
Salt Making
Salt was, one of the first necessaries of life which became scarce
on account of the blockade. The Adjutant and Inspector-General
of Alabama stated, March 20, 1862, that the Confederacy needed
6,000,000 bushels of salt, and that only an enormous price would
force the people to make it. In Montgomery salt was then very scarce,
bringing $20 per sack, and speculators were using every trick and
fraud in order to control the supply.^ The poor people especially soon
felt the want of it, and in November, 1861, the legislature passed an
act to encourage the manufacture of salt at the state reservation in
Clarke County."* The state government even began to make salt at
these salt springs. At the Upper Works, near Old St. Stephens,
600 men and 120 teams were employed at 30 furnaces, which were
kept going all the time, the production amounting to 600 bushels a
day. These works were in operation from 1862 to 1865. The
Lower Works, near Sunflower Bend on the Tombigbee River, for
four years employed 400 men with 80 teams at 20 furnaces. The
production here was about 400 bushels a day. The Central Works,
near Salt Mountain, were under private management, and, it is said,
were much more successful than the works under state management.^
The price of salt at the works ranged from $2.50 to $7 a bushel
in gold, or from $3 to $40 in currency. From 1861 to 1865, 500,000
bushels of good salt were produced each year.
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 3.
2 Miller, pp. 179, 180, i8r, 193; Davis, Vol. I, p. 481; Alonigomery Advertiser,
July 14, 1867 ; N. Y. Herald, May 15, 1865.
8 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. loio.
* This act authorized the governor to lease the salt springs belonging to the state
and to require the lessee to sell salt at 75 cents a bushel at the salt works. The state
paid 10 cents a bushel bounty and advanced ^10,000 to the salt maker. Acts, Nov. ii
and Nov. 19, 1861.
^ One private maker w^ith one furnace and from 15 to 20 hands made 60 bushels a
day. Another, with 15 hands, burning 5 cords of wood, made 36 bushels a day. There
were also many other private salt makers.
SALT MAKING
159
To obtain the salt water, wells were bored to depths ranging from
60 to 100 feet, — one well, however, was 600 feet deep, — while in
the bottom or swamp lands brine was sometimes found at a depth of
8 feet. The water at first rose to the surface and overflowed about
30 gallons a minute in some wells, but as more wells were sunk the
brine ceased to flow out and had to be pumped about 16 feet by
steam or horse power. It was boiled in large iron kettles like those
then used in syrup making and which are still seen in remote dis-
tricts in the South. Seven or eight kettles of water would make one
kettle of salt. This was about the same percentage that was ob-
tained at the Onondaga (New York) salt springs. About the same
boiling was required as in making syrup from sugar-cane juice.
The wells were scattered for miles over the country and thousands of
men were employed. For three years more than 6000 men, white
and black, were employed at the salt works of Clarke County, from
2000 to 3000 working at the Upper Works alone. All were not at
work at the furnaces, but hundreds were engaged in cutting and haul-
ing wood for fuel, and in sacking and barrelHng salt. It is said that
in the woods the blows of no single axe nor the sound of any single
faUing tree could be distinguished; the sound was simply continu-
ous. Nine or ten square miles of pine timber were cleared for fuel.
The salt was sent down the Tombigbee to Mobile or conveyed in
wagons into the interior of Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia.
These wagons were so numerous that for miles from the various
works it was difficult to cross the road. The whole place had the
appearance of a manufacturing city. These works had been in
operation to some extent since 1809. The wells were exhausted from
1865 to 1870, when they began flowing again.
Besides the smaller works and large private works there were
hundreds of smaller estabhshments. When salt was needed on a
plantation in the Black Belt, the overseer would take hands, with pots
and kettles, and go to the salt wells, camp out for several weeks, and
make enough salt for the year's supply. All private makers had to
give a certain amount to the state.^ People from the interior of the
state and from southeast Alabama went to the Florida coast and
made salt by boiling the sea water. The state had salt works at
Saltville, Virginia, but found it difficult to get transportation for
1 Ball, " Clarke County," pp. 645-649, 765 ; " Our Women in War," p. 275 et seq.
l6o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the product. Salt was given to the poor people by the state, or sole
to them at a moderate price. The legislature authorized the governoi
to take possession of all salt when necessary for public use, paying
the owners a just compensation; $150,000 was appropriated for this
purpose in 1861, and in 1862 it was made a penal offence to send
salt out of the state. ^ A Salt Commission was appointed to look
after the salt works owned by the state in Louisiana. A private salt
maker in Clarke County made a contract to deliver two-fifths of his
product to the state at the cost of manufacture, and the state pur-
chased some salt from the Louisiana saltbeds.^ As salt became
scarcer the people took the brine in old pork and beef barrels and
boiled it down. The soil under old smoke-houses was dug up, put
in hoppers, and bleached Hke ashes, and the brine boiled down and
dried in the sunshine.^
At Bon Secour Bay, near Mobile, there were salt works consisting
of fifteen houses, capable of making seventy- five bushels per day
from the sea- water. In 1864 these were burned by the Federals,
who often destroyed the salt works along the Florida coast. "* At
Saltmarsh, ten miles west of Selma, there were works which furnished
much of the salt used in Mississippi, central Alabama, and east
Georgia during the years 1862, 1863, and 1864. Wells were dug to
the depth of twelve or fifteen feet, when salt water was struck. The
wells were then curbed, furnaces of Hme rock were built, and upon
them large kettles were placed. The water was pumped from the
wells and run into the kettles through troughs, then boiled down,
and the moisture evaporated by the sun. The fires were kept up
day and night. A large number of blacks and whites were employed
at these wells, and, as salt makers were exempt from military duty,
the work was quite popular.^
Besides the industries above mentioned there were many minor
enterprises. Household manufactures were universal. The more
1 Acts, Nov. 9, 1861, and Dec. 9, 1862.
2 Acts, Dec. 9, 1862, Oct. 11, 1864, and Dec. 13, 1864.
3 Miller, "Alabama," pp. 156, 167, 230; Hague, "Blockaded Family"; "Our Women
in War," pp. 267, 268.
4 N. V. Herald, Sept. 20, 1864 ; Miller, p. 167.
° American Cyclop(edia (1864), p. 10; N. V. Times, April 15, 1864. To show the
character of the white laborers employed in the salt works : in reconstruction days,
prominent negro politician told how, when a slave, he had to keep accounts, and read
and write letters for the whites at the salt works, who were very ignorant people.
SALT MAKING l6l
important companies were chartered by the legislature. The acts
of the war period show that in 1861 there were incorporated six
insurance companies and the charters of others were amended to
suit the changed conditions; three railroad companies were incor-
porated, and aid was granted to others for building purposes. Roads
carrying troops and munitions free were exempted from taxation.
Two mining and manufacturing companies were incorporated,
four iron and coal companies, one ore foundry, an express com-
pany,^ a salt manufacturing company, a chemical manufacturing
company, a coal and leather company, and a wine and fruit company.
In 1862 the legislature incorporated four iron and foundry companies,
a railroad company, the Southern Express Company, a gas-Hght
company, six coal and iron companies, a roUing-mill, and an oil
company, and amended the charters of four railroad companies and
two insurance companies. In 1864 two railroad companies were
given permission to manufacture alcohol and lubricating oil, and the
Citronelle Wine, Fruit, and Nursery Company was incorporated.
Various other manufacturing companies — of drugs, barrels, and
pottery — were estabHshed.
Besides salt the state made alcohol and whiskey for the poor.
Every man who had a more than usual regard for his comfort and
wanted to keep out of the army had a tannery in his back yard, and
made a few shoes or some harness for the Confederacy, thus securing
exemption.
Governor Moore, in his message to the legislature on October
28, 1861, said: ^'Mechanical arts and industrial pursuits, hitherto
practically unknown to our people, are already in operation. The
clink of the hammer and the busy hum of the workshop are beginning
to be heard throughout our land. Our manufactories are rapidly
increasing and the inconvenience which would result from the con-
tinuance of the war and the closing of our ports for years would be
more than compensated by forcing us to the development of our
abundant resources, and the tone and the temper it would give to
our national character. Under such circumstances the return of
peace would find us a self-reliant and truly independent people.
n 2
1 Later the Southern Express Company, which is still in existence. It was the
southern division of the Adams Express Company.
2 0. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 711.
M
1 62 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
And had the war ended early in 1864, the state would have been
well provided with manufactures.
The raids through the state in 1864 and 1865 destroyed most of
the manufacturing estabHshments. The rest, whether owned by
the government or private persons, were seized by the Federal troops
at the surrender and were dismantled/
Sec. 2. Confederate Finance in Alabama
Banks and Banking
In a. circular letter dated December 4, i860, and addressed to
the banks, Governor Moore announced that should the state secede
from the Union, as seemed probable, $1,000,000 in specie, or its
equivalent, would be needed by the administration. The state bonds
could not be sold in the North nor in Europe, except at a ruinous
discount, and a tax on the people at this time would be inexpedient.
Therefore he recommended that the banks hold their specie. Other-
wise there would be a run on the banks, and should an extra session
of the legislature be called to authorize the banks to suspend specie
payments, such action would produce a run and thus defeat the object.
He requested the banks to suspend specie payments, trusting to the
convention to legaHze this action.^ The governor then issued an
address to the people stating his reasons for such a step. It was done,
he said, at the request and by the advice of many citizens whose
opinions were entitled to respect and consideration. Such a course,
they thought, would relieve the banks from a run during the cotton
season, would enable them to aid the state, would do away with the
expense of a special session of the legislature, would prevent the sale
of state bonds at a great sacrifice, and would prevent extra taxation
of the people in time of financial crisis.^
Three banks — the Central, Eastern, and Commercial — sus-
pended at the governor's request and made a loan to the state of
$200,000 in coin. Their suspension was legaHzcd later by an ordi-
1 Miller, pp. 179, 1 80, 181, 193; Davis, Vol. II, p. 481 ; Montgojjiery Advertiser ^
July 14, 1867 ; N. V. Herald, May 15, 1865 ; Acts of the General Assembly of Alabama,
i86i-i864,/«jjm. The Freedman's Bureau was largely supported by sales of the rem-
nants of iron works, etc.
2 Smith, " Debates," pp. 38, 39. ^ Smith, " Debates," pp. 37, 39.
BANKS AND BANKING 163
nance of the convention. The Bank of Mobile, the Northern Bank,
and the Southern Bank refused to suspend, though they announced
that the state should have their full support. The legislature passed
an act in February, 1861, authorizing the suspension on condition
that the banks subscribe for ten year state bonds at their par value.
The bonds were to stand as capital, and the bills issued by the banks
upon these bonds were to be receivable in payment of taxes. The
amount which each bank was to pay into the treasury for the bonds
was fixed^ and no interest was to be paid by the state on these bonds
until specie payments were resumed. All the banks suspended
under these acts, and thus the government secured most of the coin
in the state.^ In October, 1861, before all the banks had suspended,
state bonds at par to the amount of $975,066.68 had been sold —
all but $28,500 to the banks. By early acts specie payments were to
be resumed in May, 1862, but in December, 1861, the suspension
was continued until one year after the conclusion of peace with the
United States. By this law the banks were to receive at par the Con-
federate treasury notes in payment of debts, their notes being good
for public dues. The banks were further required to make a loan
to the state of $200,000 to pay its quota of the Confederate war tax of
August 16, 1861. So the privilege of suspension was worth paying for.^
The banking law was revised by the convention so that a bank
might deposit with the state comptroller stocks of the Confederate
States or of Alabama, receiving in return notes countersigned by the
comptroller amounting to twice the market value of the bonds de-
posited. If a bank had in deposit with the comptroller under the old
law any stocks of the United States, they could be withdrawn upon
the deposit of an equal amount of Confederate stocks or bonds of
the state. The same ordinance provided that none except citizens
of Alabama and members of state corporations might engage in the
banking business under this law. But no rights under the old law
1 In his message of Oct, 25, 1861, Governor Shorter made a report showing that the
finances of the state for 1861 were in good condition, and advised against levying a tax
on the people to pay the state's quota of the Confederate tax. He stated that the
banks had done good service to the state ; that, though in time of peace they were a
necessary evil, now they were a public necessity ; that all the money used to date by
the state in carrying on the war had come from the banks. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp.
. 697-700.
'^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, pp. 697-699 ; Acts of Gen. Assembly, Feb. 2, Nov. 27 and
30, and Dec. 7 and 9, 1861 ; Patton's Message, Jan. 16, 1866.
l64 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
were to be affected. It was further provided that subsequent legis-
lation might require any "free" bank to reduce its circulation to an
amount not exceeding the market value of the bonds deposited with
the comptroller. The notes thus retired were to be cancelled by the
comptroller.^ The suspension of specie payments was followed by
an increase of banking business; note issues were enlarged; eleven
new banks were chartered,^ and none wound up affairs. They paid
dividends regularly of from 6 to lo per cent in coin, in Confederate
notes, or in both. Speculation in government funds was quite profit-
able to the banks.
Issues of Bonds and Notes
The convention authorized the general assembly of the state
to issue bonds to such amounts and in such sums as seemed best,
thus giving the assembly practically unhmited discretion. But it
was provided that money must not be borrowed except for pur-
poses of mihtary defence, unless by a two-thirds vote of the members
elected to each house; and the faith and credit of the state was
pledged for the punctual payment of the principal and interest.^
The legislature hastened to avail itself of this permission. In
1 86 1 a bond issue of $2,000,000 for defence, and not Hable to taxation,
was authorized at one time; at another, $385,000 for defence, besides
an issue of $1,000,000 in treasury notes receivable for taxes. Of the
first issue authorized, only $1,759,500 were ever issued. Opposition
to taxation caused the state to take up the war tax of $2,000,000
(August 19, 1861), and for this purpose $1,700,000 in bonds was
issued, the banks supplying the remainder. There was a relaxation
in taxation during the war; paper money was easily printed, and
the people were opposed to heavy taxes.''
In 1862 bonds to the amount of $2,000,000 were issued for the
benefit of the indigent. The governor was given unlimited authority
to issue bonds and notes, receivable for taxes, to "repair the treasury,"
and $2,085,000 in bonds were issued under this permit. These bonds
1 Ordinance No. ;^;^, amending sections 1373, 1375, ^393* o^ the Code, March 16, 1861.
2 In 1 86 1 two banks were chartered, two in 1862, five in 1863, and two in 1864.
Several of these were savings-banks.
3 Ordinance No. 18, Jan. 19, 1861 ; Nos. 35 and 36, March 18, 1861.
* Schwab, p. 302 ; Davis, Vol. I, p. 495 ; Journal of the Convention of 1865, p. 61 ;
Acts of Ala , Jan. 29, Feb. 6 and 8, Dec. 10, 1861 ; Stats. -at- Large, Prov. Cong., C. S. A.,
Feb. 8, 1861 ; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 152, 157. ]
ISSUES OF BONDS AND NOTES 165
drew interest at 6 per cent, ran for twenty years, and sold at a pre-
mium of from 50 per cent to 100 per cent. Bonds were used both for
civil and for military purposes, but chiefly for the support of the
destitute. Treasury notes to the amount of $3,500,000 were issued,
drawing interest at 5 per cent, and receivable for taxes. The Confed-
erate Congress came to the aid of Alabama with a grant of $1,200,000
for the defence of Mobile.^ In 1863 notes and bonds for $4,000,000
were issued for the benefit of indigent famihes of soldiers, and $1,500,-
000 for defence ; $90,000 in bonds was paid for the steamer Florida^
which was later turned over to the Confederate government.^ In
1864 $7,000,000 was appropriated for the support of indigent fami-
lies of soldiers, and an unlimited issue of bonds and notes was author-
ized.^ In 1862 the Alabama legislature proposed that, each state
should guarantee the debt of the Confederate States in proportion
to its representation in Congress. This measure was opposed by
the other states and failed.^ A year later a resolution of the legisla-
ture declared that the people of Alabama would cheerfully submit to
any tax, not too oppressive in amount or unequal in operation, laid
by the Confederate government for the purpose of reducing the volume
of currency and appreciating its value. The assembly also signified
its disapproval of the scheme put forth at the bankers' meeting at
Augusta, Georgia — to issue Confederate bonds with interest payable
in coin and to levy. a heavy tax of $60,000,000 to be pai'd in coin or
in coupons of the proposed new issue.^
The Alabama treasury had many Confederate notes received for
taxes. Before April i, 1864 (when such notes were to be taxed one-
third of their face value), these could be exchanged at par for twenty-
year, 6 per cent Confederate bonds. After that date the Confederate
notes were fundable at 33!- per cent of their face value only.® After
June 14, 1864, the state treasury could exchange Confederate notes
for 4 per cent non-taxable Confederate bonds, or one-half for 6 per
cent bonds and one-half for new notes. The Alabama legislature
1 Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 61 ; Acts of Ala., Nov. 8, Dec. 4, 8, and 9,
1862 ; Miller, p. 168.
2 Jour, of the Convention of 1865, p. 61 ; Acts of Ala., Aug. 29, Dec. 8, 1863 ;
Miller, pp. 186, 189.
' Miller, p. 215 ; Acts of Ala., Oct. 7 and Dec. 13, 1864.
* Resolutions of Gen. Assembly, Dec. i, 1862 ; vSchwab, p. 50.
^ Resolutions, Dec. 8, 1863. ^ Confederate Funding Act, Feb. 17, 1864.
1 66 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of 1864 arranged for funding the notes according to the latter method.
The Alabama legislature of 1861 had made it lawful for debts con--
tracted after that year to be payable in Confederate notes.^ Later
a meeting of the citizens of Mobile proposed to ostracize those who
refused to accept Confederate notes. Cheap money caused- a clamor
for more, and the heads of the people were filled with fiat money
notions. The rise in prices stimulated more issues of notes. On
February 9, 1861, $1,000,000 in state treasury notes was issued,
and in 1862 there was a similar issue of $2,000,000 more. These
state notes were at a premium in Confederate notes, which were dis-
credited by the Confederate Funding Act of February 17, 1864.
Confederate notes were eagerly offered for state notes, but the state
stopped the exchange.^ December 13, 1864, a law was passed pro-
viding for an unlimited issue of state notes redeemable in Confederate
notes and receivable for taxes.
Private individuals often issued notes on their own account,
and an enormous number was put into circulation. The legislature,
by a law of December 9, 1862, prohibited the issue of "shinplaster"
or other private money under penalty of $20 to $500 fine, and any
person circulating such money was to be deemed the maker. It
was not successful, however, in reducing the flood of private tokens;
the credit of individuals was better than the credit of the government.
Executors, administrators, guardians, and trustees were author-
ized to make loans to the Confederacy and to purchase and receive
for debts due them bonds and treasury notes of the Confederacy
and of Alabama and the interest coupons of the same. One-tenth
of the Confederate $15,000,000 loan of February 28, 1861, was sub-
scribed in Alabama.'' In December, 1863, the legislature laid a
tax of 37J per cent on bonds of the state and of the Confederacy
unless the bonds had been bought directly from the Confederate
government or from the state.^ This was to punish speculators.
After October 7, 1864, the state treasury was directed to refuse Con-
1 Acts of Ala., Oct. 7, 1864 ; Schwab, pp. 73, 74. 2 Acts of Ala., Dec. 10, 1861.
^ Acts of Ala., passim. Notes of the state and of state banks were hoarded, while
Confederate notes were distrusted. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 421.
4 Acts of Ala., Nov. 9, 1861 ; Schwab, p. 8. It was considered a matter of patriot-
ism to invest funds in Confederate securities. Not many other investments offered ;
there was little trade in negroes. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 424.
5 Acts of Ala., Dec. 8, 1863.
ISSUES OF BONDS AND NOTES 167
federate notes issued before February 17, 1864 (the date of the Fund-
ing Act) in payment of taxes except at a discount of ;^7,^ per cent.
Later, Confederate notes were taken for taxes at their full market value.^
Gold was shipped through the blockade at Mobile to pay the
interest on the state bonded debt held in London. It has been charged
that this money was borrowed from the Central, Commercial, and
Eastern banks and was never repaid, recovery being denied on the
ground that the state could not be sued.^ But the banks received
state and Confederate bonds under the new banking law in return
for their coin. The exchange was willingly made, for otherwise
the banks would have had to continue specie payments or forfeit
their charters. And to continue specie payments meant immediate
bankruptcy.^ After the war, the state was forbidden to pay any
debt incurred in aid of the war, nor could the bonds issued in aid of
the war be redeemed. The banks suffered just as all others suffered,
and it is difficult to see why the state should make good the losses
of the banks in Confederate bonds and not make good the losses of
private individuals. To do either would be contrary to the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The last statement of the condition of the Alabama treasury
was as follows : —
Balance in treasury, September 30, 1864 .... J^3>7 13,959
Receipts, September 30, 1864, to May 24, 1865 . . . 3,776,188
Total $7,490,147
Disbursements, September 30, 1864, to May 24, 1865 . . 6,698,853
Balance in treasury, September 30, 1864, to May 24, 1865 $791,294
The balance was in funds as follows : —
Checks on Bank of Mobile, payable in Confederate notes . $11,440
Certificate of deposit. Bank of Mobile, payable in Confeder-
ate notes ... ...... i>330
Confederate and state notes in treasury .... 517,889
State notes, change bills (legal shinplasters) . . . 250,004
Notes of state banks and branches 358
Bank-notes 424
Silver ' 337
Gold on hand 497
Gold on deposit in northern banks 35
Balance $791,294
^ Acts of Ala., Dec. 13, 1864.
2 Clark, " Finance and Banking," in the " Memorial Record of Alabama," Vol. I,
p. 341. Statement of J. II. Fitts. ^ Patton's Message, Jan. 16, 1866.
1 68 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
To dispose of nearly $7,000,000 in small notes must have kept
the treasury very busy during the last seven months of its existence.
It is interesting to note that the treasury kept at work until May 24,
1865, six v^eeks after the surrender of General Lee.
Special Appropriations and Salaries
Besides the regular appropriations for the usual expenses of the
government, there were many extraordinary appropriations. These,
of course, were for the war expenses which were far greater than the
ordinary expenses. The chief item of these- extraordinary appropria-
tions was for the support of the indigent famihes of soldiers, and for
this purpose about $11,000,000 was provided. For the mihtary
defence of the state several million dollars were appropriated, much
of this being spent for arms and clothing for the Alabama troops,
both in the Confederate and the state service. Money was granted
to the University of Alabama and other mihtary schools on condition
that they furnish drill-masters for the state troops without charge.
Hospitals were furnished in Virginia and in Alabama for the Alabama
soldiers. The gunboat Florida was bought for the defence of Mobile,
and $150,000 was appropriated for an iron-clad ram for the same
purpose. Loans were made to commanders of regiments to buy
clothing for their soldiers, and the state began to furnish clothing,
$50,000 being appropriated at one time for clothing for the Alabama
soldiers in northern prisons. By March 12, 1862, Alabama had con-
tributed $317,600 to the support of the Army of Northern Virginia.^
Much was expended in the manufacture of salt in Alabama and in
Virginia, which was sold at cost or given away to the poor ; in the pur-
chase of salt from Louisiana to be sold at a low price, and in bounties
paid to salt makers in the state who sold salt at reasonable prices.
The state also paid for medical attendance for the indigent families
of soldiers. When the records and rolls of the Alabama troops in
the Confederate service were lost, money was appropriated to have
new ones made. Frequent grants were made to the various benevo-
lent societies of the state whose object was to care for the maimed
and sick soldiers, the widows and the orphans. Cotton and wool
cards and agricultural implements were purchased and distributed
1 Jones, "Diary," Vol. I, p. 114. North Carolina alone had* contributed more —
;g 325,000.
TAXATION 169
among the poor. Slaves and supplies were taken for the public
service and the owners compensated.
The appropriations for the usual expenses of the government were
light, seldom more than twice the appropriations in times of peace,
notwithstanding the depreciated currency. The salaries of pubhc
officers who received stated amounts ranged from $1500 to $4000 a
year in state money. In 1862 the salaries of the professors in the
State University were doubled on account of the depreciated currency,
the president receiving $5000 and each professor $4000.^ The
members of the general assembly were more fortunate. In 1864
they received $15 a day for the time in session, and the clerks of the
legislature, who were disabled soldiers or exempt from service, or
were women, were paid the same amount. The salt commissioners
drew salaries of $3000 a year in 1864 and 1865, though this amount
was not sufficient to pay their board for more than six months. Sala-
ries were never increased in proportion to expenses. The compen-
sation, in December, 1864, for capturing a runaway slave was $25,
worth probably 50 cents in coin. For the inaugural expenses of
Governor Watts, $500 in paper was appropriated.^ Many laws were
passed, regulating and changing the fees and salaries of public offi-
cials. In October, 1884, for example, the salaries of the state offi-
cials, tax assessors and collectors, and judges were increased 50 per
cent. Besides -the general depreciation of the currency, the varia-
tions of values in the different sections of the state rendered such
changes necessary. In the central part, which was safe for a long
time from Federal raids, the currency was to the last worth more,
and the prices of the necessaries of hfe were lower than in the more
exposed regions. This fact was taken into consideration by the
legislature when fixing the fees of the state and county officers in the
various sections of the state.
Taxation
As a result of the poHcy adopted at the outset of meeting the
extraordinary expenses by bond issues,^ the people continued to pay
1 Clark, " Education in Alabama," p. 90. 2 Acts of Ala., Dec. 7, 1863.
^ The state authorities coBsidered it inexpedient to levy heavier state taxes. The
people had always been opposed to heavy state taxes, but paid county taxes more will-
I/O CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the light taxes levied before the war, and paid them in paper money.
Though faUing heavily on the salaried and wage- earning classes,
it was never a burden upon the agricultural classes except in the poor-
est white counties. The poll tax brought in httle revenue. Soldiers
were exempt from its payment and from taxation on property to the
amount of $500. The widows and orphans of soldiers had similar
privileges. A special tax of 25 per cent on the former rate was im-
posed on all taxable property in November, 1861, and a year later,
by acts of December 9, 1862, a far-reaching scheme of taxation was
introduced. Under this poll taxes were levied as follows : —
White men, 21 to 60 years
Free negro men, 21 to 50 years
Free negro women, 2i to 45 years .
Slaves (children to laborers in prime)
More valuable slaves
5.00
3.00
50 to 2.00
2.00 and up
And other taxes as follows : —
Crop liens . . . 33^ %
Hoarded money I %
Jewellery, plate, furniture | %
Goods sold at auction 10%
Imports 2%
Insurance premiums (companies not chartered by state) . 2 %
Playing cards, per pack ^^i.oo
Gold watches, each i.oo
Gold chains, silver watches, clocks 0.50
Articles raffled off 10%
Legacies, profits and sales, incomes 5 %
Profits of Confederate contractors . 10 %
Wages of Confederate officials 10%
Racetracks 10%
Billiard tables, each ^150.00
Bagatelle 20.CX)
Tenpin alleys, each 40.00
Readings and lectures, each 4.00
Pedler 100.00
Spirit rapper, per day 500.00
Saloon-keeper ;^40.oo to 150.00
Daguerreotypist ....... 10.00 to 100.00
Slave trader, for each slave offered for sale .... 20.00
ingly. So the gift of ^500,000 to the Confederate government in 1861 and the
$2,000,000 war tax of the same year were assumed by the state, and bonds were issued.
Stats.-at-Large, Prov. Cong., C.S.A., Feb. 8, 1861; Acts of Ala., Nov. 27, 1861.
TAXATION 171
In 1863 a tax of 37^ per cent was laid on Confederate and state
bonds not in the hands of the original purchaser ; ^ 7 J per cent was
levied on profits of banking, railroad companies, and on evidence
of debt ; 5 per cent on other profits not included in the act of the year
before. The tax on gold and silver was to be paid in gold and silver ;
on bank-notes, in notes; on bonds, in coupons.^ In December,
1864, the taxes levied by the laws of 1862 and 1863 were increased
by 33J per cent. Taxes on gold and silver were to be paid in kind
or in currency at its market value.^ This was the last tax levied by
the state under Confederate rule. From these taxes the state govern-
ment was largely ♦supplied.
A number of special laws were passed to enable the county authori-
ties to levy taxes-in-kind or to levy a certain amount in addition to
the state tax, for the use of the county. The taxes levied by the state
did not bear heavily upon the majority of the people, as nearly all,
except the well-to-do and especially the slave owners, were exempt.
The constant depreciation of the currency acted, of course, as a tax
on the wage-earners and salaried classes and on those whose income
was derived from government securities.
While the state taxes were felt chiefly by the wealthier agricul-
tural classes and the slave owners, this was not the case with the
Confederate taxes. The loans and gifts from the state, the war tax
of August 19, 1861, the $15,000,000 loan, the Produce Loan, and the
proceeds of sequestration — all had not availed to secure sufficient
supphes. The Produce Loan of 1862 was subscribed to largely
in Alabama, the Secretary of the Treasury issuing stocks and bonds
in return for supphes,'' and $1,500,000 of the $15,000,000 loan was
raised in the state. Still the Confederate government was in desperate
need. The farmers would not willingly sell their produce for cur-
rency which was constantly decreasing in value, and, when selHng
at all, they were forced to charge exorbitant prices because of the
high prices charged them for everything by the speculators.^ The
speculator also ran up the prices of supplies beyond the reach of
the government purchasing agents who had to buy according to the
list of prices issued by impressment commissioners. So in the spring
1 Another measure aimed at the speculator. 2 Acts of Ala., Dec. 8,^1863.
3 Acts of Ala., Dec. 13, 1864. * Pub. Laws, 1st Cong., ist Sess., April 21, 1862.
^ Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 427.
1/2 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of 1863 all other expedients were cast aside and the Confederate
government levied a genuine "Morton's Fork" tax. No more loans
of paper money from the state, no more assumption of war taxes
by the state governments because the people were opposed to any
form of direct taxation, no more holding back of suppHes by pro-
ducers and speculators who refused to sell to the Confederate govern-
ment except for coin; the new law stopped all that/
First there was a tax of 8 per cent on all agricultural products
in hand on July i, 1863, on salt, wine, and Hquors, and i per cent
on all moneys and credits. Second, an occupation tax ranging from
$50 to $200 and from 2 J per cent to 20 per cent of their gross sales
was levied on bankers, auctioneers, brokers, druggists, butchers,
fakirs, hquor dealers, merchants, pawnbrokers, lawyers, physicians,
photographers, brewers, and distillers ; hotels paid from $30 to $500,
and theatres, $500. Third, there was an income tax of i per cent
on salaries from $1000 to $1500 and 2 per cent on all over $1500.
Fourth, 10 per cent on all trade in flour, bacon, corn, oats, and dry
goods during 1863. Fifth, a tax-in-kind, by which each farmer,
after reserving 50 bushels of sweet and 50 bushels of Irish potatoes,
20 bushels of peas or beans, 100 bushels of corn or 50 bushels of wheat
out of his crop of 1863, had to dehver (at a depot within 8 miles)
out of the remainder of his produce for that year, 10 per cent of all
wheat, corn, oats, rye, buckwheat, rice, sweet and Irish potatoes,
hay, fodder, sugar, molasses, cotton, wool, 'tobacco, peas, beans,
and peanuts; 10 per cent of all meat killed between April 24, 1863,
and March i, 1863.^
By this act $9,500,000 in currency was raised in Alabama. Ala-
bama, with Georgia and North Carolina, furnished two-thirds of
the tax-in-kind. Though at first there was some objection to the tax-
in-kind because it bore entirely on the agricultural classes, yet it was a
just tax so far as the large planters were concerned, since the depre-
ciated money had acted as a tax on the wage-earners and salaried
classes, who had also some state tax to pay. The tax-in-kind fell
heavily upon the famihes of small farmers in the white counties,
who had no negro labor and who produced no more than the barest
necessaries of Hfe. To collect the tax-in-kind required an army of
1 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 3d Sess., April 24, 1863.
2 See also Curry, "Confederate States," p. no.
TAXATION 173
tithe gatherers and afforded fine opportunities of escape from military
service. The state was divided into districts for the collection of
all Confederate taxes, with a state collector at the head. The col-
lection districts were usually counties, following the state division
into taxing districts. In 1864 the tobacco tithe was collected by
treasury agents and not by the quartermaster's department, which had
formerly collected it.^ The tax of April 24, 1863, was renewed on
February 17, 1864, and some additional taxes laid as follows: —
Real estate and personal property e 0/
Gold and silver ware, jewellery .• 10%
Coin 50/^
Credits 50/^
Profits on liquors, produce, groceries, and dry goods . . . .10%
On June 10, 1864, an additional tax of 20 per cent of the tax for 1864
was laid, payable only in Confederate treasury notes of the new issue.
Four days later an additional tax ^ was levied as follows : —
Real estate and personal property and coin . , . . . . 5 %
Gold and silver ware . . . . . . . . . .10%
Profits on liquors, produce, groceries, and dry goods . . . • 3° %
Treasury notes of old issue (after January, 1865) 100%
The taxes during the war, state and Confederate, were in all
five to ten times those levied before the war. Never were taxes paid
more willingly by most of the people,^ though at first there was oppo-
sition to them. It is probable that the authorities did not, in 1861
and 1862, give sufficient consideration to the fact that conditions
were much changed, and that in view of the war the people would
wiUingly have paid taxes that they would have rebelled against in
times of peace.
Of the tax-in-kind for 1863, $100,000 was collected in Pickens
county alone, one of the poorest counties in the state. The produce
was sent in too freely to be taken care of by the government quarter-
masters, and, as there was enough on hand for a year or two, much
of it was ruined for lack of storage room.'' An Enghsh traveller
in east Alabama, in 1864, reported that there was abundance. The
tax-in-kind was working well, and enough provisions had already
been collected for the western armies of the Confederacy to last until
^ Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 4th Sess., Jan. 30, 1864.
2 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 2d Cong., ist Sess., June 10 and 14, 1864.
8 Miller, "Alabama," p. 190. * JV. Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1864.
1/4 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the harvest of 1865/ There were few railroads in the state and the
roUing stock on these was scarce and soon worn out. So the suppHes
gathered by the tax-in-kind law could not be moved. Hundreds of
thousands of pounds of beef and bacon and bushels of corn were
piled up in the government warehouses and at the depots, while star-
vation threatened the armies and the people also in districts remote
from the railroads or rivers. At the supply centres of Alabama
and along the railroads in the Black Belt there were immense stores
of provisions. When the war ended, notwithstanding the destruc-
tion by raids, great quantities of cofn and bacon were seized or de-
stroyed by the Federal troops.^
Impressment
The state quite early began to secure supplies by impressment.
Salt was probably the first article to which the state laid claim. Later
the officials were authorized to impress and pay for supplies necessary
for the public service. In 1862 the governor was authorized to im-
press shoes, leather, and other shoemakers' materials for the use of
the. army. The legislature appropriated $250,000 to pay for impress-
ments under this law.' In case of a refusal to comply with an order
of impressment the sheriff was authorized to summon a posse comi-
talus of not less than 20 men and seize double the quantity first im-
pressed. In such cases no compensation was given.'' The people
resisted the impressment of their property. By a law of October 31,
1862, the governor was empowered to impress slaves, and tools and
teams for them to work with, in the public service against the enemy,
and $1,000,000 was appropriated to pay the owners.^ Slaves were
regularly impressed by the Confederate officials acting in cooperation
with the state authorities, for work on fortifications and for other
pubhc service. Several thousand were at work at Mobile at various
times. They were secured usually by requisition on the state gov-
ernment, which then impressed them. In December, 1864, Alabama
was asked for 2500 negroes for the Confederate service.® The people
1 Fitzgerald Ross, " Cities and Camps of the Confederate States," pp. 237, 238.
2 Miller, p. 230. 3 Acts of Ala., Nov. 19, 1862.
* Acts of Ala., Nov. 17, 1862. ^ Acts of Ala., Oct. 31, 1862.
« O. R., Ser. II, Vol. Ill, p. 933; G. O., 86, A. and I. G. Office, Richmond, Dec. 12,
1864; Miller, pp. 198, 199 ; Beverly, " History of Alabama,"; A. C. Gordon, in Century
Magazine, Sept., 1888; David Dodge, in Atlantic Monthly, Aug., 1886.
IMPRESSMENT
175
were morbidly sensitive about their slave property, and there was
much discontent at the impressment of slaves, even though they were
paid for. As the war drew to a close, the people were less and less
willing to have their servants impressed.
In the spring of 1863, the Confederate Congress authorized the
impressment of private property for pubhc use.^ The President
and the governor each appointed an agent, and these together fixed
the prices to be paid for the property taken.^ Every two months
they published schedules of prices, which were always below the
market prices.^ Evidently impressment had been going on for some
time, for, in November, 1862, Judge Dargan, member of Congress
from Alabama, wrote to the President that the people from the coun-
try were afraid to bring produce to Mobile for fear of seizure by the
government. In November, 1863, the Secretary of War issued an
order that no supplies should be impressed when held by a person
for his own consumption or that of his employees or slaves, or while
being carried to market for sale, except in urgent cases and by order
of a commanding general. Consequently the land was filled with
agents buying a year's supply for railroad companies, individuals,
manufactories, and corporations, relief associations, towns, and
counties — all these to be protected from impressment. Most specu-
lators always had their goods on the way to market for sale. The
great demand caused prices to rise suddenly, and the government,
which had to buy by scheduled prices, could not compete with private
purchasers ; yet it could not legally impress. There was much abuse
of the impressment law, especially by unauthorized persons. It
was the source of much lawless conduct on the part of many who
claimed to be Confederate officials, with authority to impress.^ The
legislature frequently protested against the manner of execution of
the law. In 1863 a state law was passed which indicates that the
people had been suffering from the depredations of thieves who pre-
1 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., 3d Sess., March 26, 1863.
2 A conference of impressment commissioners met in Augusta, Ga., Oct. 26, 1863.
Among those present were Wylie W. Mason, of Tuskegee, Ala., and Robert C. Farris, of
Montgomery, Ala. See O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, pp. 898-906.
3 Schwab, p. 202 ; Saunders, " Early Settlers," Schedules were printed in all the
newspapers, and many have been reprinted in the Official Records.
4 Jones, "Diary," Vol. I, p. 1^4; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 198, 199; Pollard, " Lost
Cause," pp. 487-488.
1/6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
tended to be Confederate officials in order to get supplies. It was
made a penal offence in 1862 and again in 1863, with from one to five
years' imprisonment and $500 to $5000 fine, to falsely represent one's
self as a Confederate agent, contractor, or official/ The merchants
of Mobile protested against the impressment of sugar and molasses,
as it would cause prices to double, they said.^ There was much com-
plaint from sufferers who were never paid by the Confederate authori-
ties for the supplies impressed. Quartermasters of an army would
sometimes seize the necessary supplies and would leave with the army
before settHng accounts with the citizens of the community, the latter
often being left without any proof of their claim. In north Alabama,
especially, where the armies never tarried long at a place, the com-
plaint was greatest. To do away with this abuse resulting from care-
lessness, the Secretary of War appointed agents in each congressional
district to receive proof of claims for forage and supplies impressed.^
The state wanted a Confederate law passed to authorize receipts
for supplies to be given as part of the tax-in-kind.'* The unequal
operation of the impressment system may be seen in the case of Clarke
and Monroe counties. In the former, from 16 persons, property
amounting to $1700 was impressed. In Monroe, from 37 persons
$60,000 worth was taken. The delay in payment was so long that
the money was practically worthless when received.^
Debts, Stay Laws, Sequestration
In the secession convention the question of indebtedness to north-
em creditors came up, and Watts of Montgomery proposed con-
fiscation, in case of war, of the property of alien enemies and of debts
due northern creditors. The proposal was supported by several
members, who declared that the threat of confiscation would do much
to promote peace. But the majority of the convention were opposed
to any measure looking toward confiscation, and the matter was
carried over for the Confederate government to settle.®
Stay laws were enacted in Alabama on February 8, 1861, and on
1 Acts of Ala., Nov. 25, 1863. ^ Jones, "Diary," Vol. I, p. 301.
* Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 2d Cong., ist Sess., June 14, 1864; Saunders, "Early Set-
tlers."
* Resolutions of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 26, 1864.
fi Ball, " Clarke County," p. 501. ^ Smith, "Debates," pp. 174-183.
DEBTS, STAY LAWS, SEQUESTRATION 1 77
December 10, 1861. The Confederate Provisional Congress enacted
a law (May 21, 1861) that debtors to persons in the North (except
in Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, and the District of Columbia)
be prohibited from paying their debts during the war/ They should
pay the amount of the debt into the Confederate treasury and receive
a certificate reheving them from their debts, transferring it to the
Confederate treasury. A Confederate law of November 17, 1862,
provided that when payment of the interest on a debt was proffered
in Confederate treasury notes and refused, it should be unlawful
for the plaintiff to secure more than J of i per cent interest. On
August 30, 1 86 1, Congress, in retaliation for the confiscation and
destruction of the property of Confederate citizens, passed the Se-
questration Act, which held all property of ahen enemies (except citi-
zens of the border states) as indemnity for such destruction and
devastation.^ Under the Sequestration Act receivers were appointed
in each county to take possession of all property belonging to alien
enemies. They were empowered to interrogate all lawyers, bank
officials, officials of corporations engaged in foreign trade, and all
persons and agents engaged for persons engaged in foreign trade, for
the purpose of discovering such property. The proceeds were to be
held for the indemnity of loyal citizens suffering under the confiscation
laws of the United States.^ Later the property thus seized was sold
and the money paid into the Confederate treasury."* In the last days
of the war (February 15, 1865), the Sequestration Act was extended
to include the property of disloyal citizens who had gone within the
Federal lines to escape military service, or who had entered the Union
service to fight against the Confederacy.^
In December, 1861, a law was passed by the legislature which
1 Stats. -at-Large, Prov. Cong., C.S.A.
2 Stat.-at-Large, Prov. Cong., 2d Sess. ; McPherson, " Rebellion," pp. 203, 204.
European merchants and capitalists also had a large trade with the South when the war
broke out, and thus sustained great losses. They had made large advances to southern
planters and merchants, and were also interested in property in the South. Proceeds
were remitted to foreign creditors or owners in Confederate or state currency or bonds
for there was no other form of remittance. Robertson, " The Confederate Debt and
Private Southern Debts" (English pamphlet).
^McPherson, "Rebellion," pp. 203, 204; Acts of Prov. Cong., Aug. 30, 1861 ;
Benjamin's "Instructions to Receivers," Sept. 12, 1861.
* Stats.-at- Large, Prov. Cong., 3d Sess., Feb. 15, 1862.
^ McPherson, "Rebellion," p. 613.
N
1/8 CIVIL WAR AND RECOxNSTRUCTION IN ALABAiMA
provided that no suit by or for an alien enemy for debt or money
should be prosecuted in any court in Alabama. No execution was
to be issued to an alien enemy, and suits already brought could be
dismissed on the motion of the defendant/ In Alabama much of
the time of the Confederate district courts was taken up by seques-
tration cases. In fact, they did little else. However, but little money
was ever turned into the Confederate treasury from this source.^
Just as the state sent nearly all its coin through the blockade
to pay the interest of its London debt, so the Mobile, Montgomery,
or Selma merchant cancelled his indebtedness and sent money, as
he was able, during the early years of the war, to his northern and
European creditors. Most debts due to northerners were con-
cealed from the government. The stringent laws passed against it
were of no avail. As a source of revenue the sequestration of the
property of ahen enemies hardly paid expenses.* After all, however,
the northern creditor probably lost nearly all his accounts in the
South in the general wreck of property in 1865.
Trade, Barter, Prices
After the outbreak of war, business was soon almost at a stand-
still. The government monopolized all means of transportation
for military purposes. There were few good railroads in the state
and few good wagon roads. In one section there would be plenty,
while seventy-five or a hundred miles away there would be great
suffering from want. Depreciated currency and the impressment
laws made the producer wary of going to market at all. He pre-
ferred to keep what he had and live upon it, effecting changes in the
old way of barter. Cows, hogs, chickens, mules, farm implements,
cotton, corn, peas — all were exchanged and reexchanged for one
another. The farmer tended more and more to become indepen-
dent of the merchant and of money. Consequently the townspeople
suffered. Confederate money, at first received at par, soon began
to depreciate, though the most patriotic people considered it their
duty to accept it at its par value.^
1 Acts of Ala., Dec. lo, 1861.
2 Two years after the passage of the Sequestration I^aw its entire proceeds in the
Confederacy amounted to less than ^2,000,000. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 220.
* Suspension of specie payments had been made in order to prevent a drain on the
banks. The Confederate government took possession of some of the coin, while much
Alabama Money.
Confederate Postacje
Stamps.
Private Money. Printed in large sheets on one
side only and never used. The other side is a
state bill similar to the one above. Paper was
scarce, and the state money was printed so that
when cut apart the private money was destroyed.
TRADE, BARTER, PRICES 1 79
At the end of 1861, Confederate money was worth as much*
as Federal, but it had depreciated. Often private credit was better
than pubHc, and individuals in need of a more stable circulating
medium issued notes or promises to pay which in the immediate
neighborhood passed current at their face value. Great quantities
of this ''card money" or shinplasters were issued, and in some
communities it almost supplanted the legal money. as a more reliable
medium of exchange. The Alabama legislature passed severe laws
against the practice of issuing "card money," but with httle effect.
The effect of depreciation of paper money was the same as a
tax so far as the people were concerned. Forced into circulation,
it supported the government, but it gradually depreciated and each
holder lost a little. Finally, when almost worthless, it was practically
repudiated by the state and by the Confederacy, and funding laws
were passed, providing for the redemption of old notes at a low rate
in new issues. Depreciation of the currency caused extravagance
and other more evil results. A person who handled much money
felt that he must at once get rid of all that came into his possession
in order to avoid loss by depreciation. Consequently there was
speculation, reckless spending, and extravagance. Money would
be spent for anything offered for sale. If useful things were not
to be had, then luxuries would be bought, such as silks, fancy
articles, liquors, etc., from blockade- runners. This was especially
the case in Selma, Mobile, and Montgomery, and in northern Ala-
bama. Persons formerly of good character frequently drifted into
extravagant and dissipated habits, because they tried to spend their
money and there were not enough legitimate ways in which to do so.
was used in the contraband and blockade trade. All this contributed to discredit Con-
federate paper currency. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 421. In May, 1862, General Beau-
regard seized ^500,000 in coin from a bank in Jackson, Ala. The coin belonged to a
New Orleans bank and had been sent out to prevent confiscation by Butler. Confeder-
ate money was almost worthless at Mobile in 1864, while in the interior of the state it
still had a fair value.
1 Confederate paper held up well in 1861 and 1862, though prices were very high.
The people were opposed to fixing a depreciated value to Confederate money, but they
were forced to do so by speculators. The money was worth more the farther away from
Richmond, though comparison with gold should not be made, as gold was scarce, and
prices in gold fell. Board, which formerly cost $2 a day, could now be had for fifty
cents in gold. Gold was not a standard of value, but an article of commerce with a
fictitious value. Pollard, " Lost Cause," p. 425.
l80 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Depreciation, speculation, and scarcity caused prices to rise,
especially the prices of the necessaries of life. These varied in the
different sections of the state. In Mobile, in 1862, prices were as
follows : —
Shoes, per pair ;5525.oo
Boots, per pair ........... 40.00
Overcoats, each ........... 25.00
Hats, each . . . . . . . . . . . 15.00
Flour, per barrel j^40.oo to 60.00
Corn, per bushel 3.25
Butter, per pound 1.75
Bacon, per pound lo.oo
Soap, per pound (cheap) i.oo
Candles, per pound 2.50
Sugar, per pound $ 0.50 to .75
Coffee, per pound 1. 75 to 3.25
Tea, per pound 10.00 to 20.00
Cotton and wool cards, per pair 2.00
Board per week at the Battle House, in 1862 . . ^3.50 ; in 1863, 8.00 1
In May, 1862, at Huntsville, then in the hands of the Federals,
some prices were, in Federal currency : —
Green tea (poor quality), per pound $4.00
13.00
25.00
^5.00 to 12.00 2
in Confederate currency : —
^4.00
6.00
^80.00 to 95.00
10.00
Common rough trousers, per pair
Boots, per pair ....
Shoes, per pair ....
In 1863, in south Alabama,
Meat, per pound
Lard, per pound
Salt, per sack at the works
"Wheat, per bushel
Corn, per bushel
A cow (worth ^15 in i860)
In March, 1864, prices in Sclma were as follows
Salt, per bushel
Calico, per yard
Women'fe common shoes, per pair
Men's rough boots, per pair
Cotton cards (worth ^1.75 in Connecticut)
3.00
27.00'
$30.00
10.00
60.00
[25.00
85.00 4
1 Clark, " Finance and Banking Memorial Record," Vol. I, p. 341 ; "Two Months
in the Confederate States by an English Merchant," pp. in, 115; DeBow's Review
for 1866.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. X, Pt. 11, p. 639.
3 Ball, " Clarke County," pp. 294, 295 ; Miller, p. 230 ; oral accounts.
* JV. y. Times, April 5, 1864 (from Mobile papers).
TRADE, BARTER, PRICES l8i
In August, 1864, the prices in Mobile were: —
Flour, per barrel ^250.00 to ^300.00
Bacon, per pound 3.00 to 5.00
Cotton thread, per spool 6,00 to 12.00
Calico, per yard . 12.50 to 15.00
Common shoes, per pair 150.00 to 175.00
Boots, per pair 250.00 to 300.00
Nails, per pound ^00
Cotton shirts (each worth 50 to 60 c. in Massachusetts) . 50.00 to 60.00 1
In November, 1864, Colonel Dabney paid the following prices
in Montgomery : —
Bacon, per pound ^3.50
Beef, per pound ^2.00 to 2.50
Potatoes, per bushel 6.00
Wood, per cord .......... 50.00
Board, per day 30.00 2
In Russell County and east Alabama the following prices were
paid in 1863 -1864: —
A calico dress (9 yards) j^ioS.oo
A plain straw hat 100.00
Half a quire of note paper 40.00
Morocco shoes 375.00
Coffee, per pound ^30.00 to 70.00
Corn, per bushel I2.00 to 13.00
Wax candles, each .10
Wages, per day 30.00
Soldier's pay, per month (which he seldom received) . . . ii.oo^
In southwest Alabama, in December, 1864, prices were: —
A mule (worth before the war ^75.00 to ^120.00) . ^800.00 to ^1200.00
A horse (worth before the war ^120.00 to $250.00) . 1200.00 to 2500.00
A wagon and team cost ......... 2940.00
Beef cattle, each 930.00^
At the close of 1864, in Mobile, Alabama, $1 in gold was worth
$25 in state currency, and prices were as follows: —
Wheat, per bushel $30.00 to $40.00
Corn, per bushel 10.00
Coffee, per pound 20.00
Fresh beef, per pound 150.00
1 JV. Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1864. 2 Smedes, "A Southern Planter," p. 226.
3 Hague, " Blockaded Family," passim ; " Our Women in the War," passim; Jacobs,
" Drug Conditions."
* Ball, "Clarke County," p. 501.
l82 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Bacon, per pound .......... ^4.00
Domestics, per yard 5.00
Calico, per yard 15.00
Ahorse ^i5CX).oo to 2000.00
Salt, per sack 150.00 to 200.00
Quinine, per ounce 150.00 ^
The War Department published, on September 26, 1864, the
following prices ^ as agreed upon by the commissioners of February
17, 1864, for the states east of the Mississippi: —
Bacon, per pound . . . $2.50
Fresh beef, per pound . .70
Flour, per barrel 40.00
Meal, per bushel 4.00
Rice, per pound .30
Peas, per bushel . . . . > 6.50
Sugar, per pound .......... 3.00
Coffee, per pound .......... 6.00
Candles, per pound 3.75
Soap, per pound 1. 00
Vinegar, per gallon 2.50
Molasses, per gallon 10.00
Salt, per pound .30
The commissioners' prices were always lower than the prevailing
market price.
A little property or labor would pay a large debt. Merchants
did not want to be paid in money, and were sorry to see a debtor
come in with great rolls of almost worthless currency. Barter was
increasingly resorted to. There were so many different series and
issues of money and so many regulations concerning it that no one
could know them all, and this operated to discredit the currency.
Besides, it was known that much of it was counterfeited at the North
and quantities sent South. Prices advanced rapidly in 1865; state
money was worth more than Confederate money, though it was much
depreciated. Board was worth $600 a month; meals, $10 to $25
each ; a boiled egg, $2 ; a cup of imitation coffee, $5. After the news
of Lee's surrender, few would accept the paper money, though for
i Miller, p. 232. A negro went to a conscript camp in 1864 with a fifty-cent jug of
whiskey. He gave his master a bottleful from the jug, replacing what he had taken out
by water. The resulting mixture he sold for ^5 a drink, a drink being a cap-box full.
Each drink poured out of the jug was replaced by the same measure of water. In this
way he made ^300 before the mixture was so diluted that the thirsty soldiers would not
buy. Related by the negro's master.
2 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 686.
BLOCKADE-RUNNING 1 83
two or three months longer, in remote districts, state money remained
in circulation.
When Wilson's army was marching into Montgomery, a young
man asked an old negro woman who stood gazing at the soldiers
if she could give him a piece of paper to light his pipe. She fumbled
in her pocket and handed him a one-dollar state bill. "Why, auntie,
that is money!" remarked the young man. "Haw, haw!" the old
crone chuckled, "light it, massa; don't you see de state done gone
up?"^
Sec. 3. Blockade-running and Trade through the Lines
Blockade-running
For several months after the secession of the state, its one im-
portant seaport — Mobile — was open, and export and import trade
went on as usual. The proclamation of Lincoln, April 19, 1861,
practically declared a blockade of the ports of the southern states.
A vessel attempting to enter or to leave was to be warned, and if a
second attempt was made, the vessel was to be seized as a prize.^
By proclamations of April 27 and August 16, 1861, the blockade was
extended and made more stringent. All vessels and cargoes belong-
ing to citizens of the southern states found at sea or in a port of the
United States were to be confiscated.^ As the summer advanced,
the blockade was made more and more effective, until finally, at the
end of 1 86 1, the port of Mobile was closed to all but the professional
blockade-runners.^ The fact that the legislature in the fall of 1861
was fostering various new industries and purchasing certain articles
of common use shows that the effects of the blockade were beginning
to be felt.^
1 Montgomery Daily Advertiser, April 18, 1865. But for another month state
money circulated in Montgomery,
2 See Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 14.
3 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, pp. 15, 37.
^ In i860 the South exported ^150,000,000 worth of cotton, and Mobile was the
second cotton port of America. Scharf, " History of the Confederate Navy," pp. 439,
533, Besides the regular ship channel there were two shallow entrances to Mobile
Bay, through which blockade-runners passed. Soley, " The Blockade and the Cruisers,"
p. 134. Regular water communication with New Orleans was kept up until 1862
through Mississippi Sound, Scharf, p. 535 ; Maclay, " A History of the United States
Navy," Vol. II, p. 445.
5 Miller, "Alabama," p. 167 ; Acts of the Called Sess. (1861), p. 123 ; Acts of 2d
Called and 1st Regular Sess. (1861), pp. 151, 168, 214, 278.
l84 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
ade 1
At first the general confidence in the power of King Cotton made
most southern people desire to let the blockade assist the work of
war, and, by creating a scarcity of cotton abroad, cause foreign gov-
ernments to recognize the Confederate government and raise the
blockade/ The pinch of want soon made many forget their faith
in the power of cotton; there was a general desire to get supplies
through the blockade and to send cotton in exchange. The state
administration was distinctly in favor of blockade-running and for-
eign trade.^ In 1861 the legislature incorporated two '' Direct Trad-
ing Companies," giving them permission to own and sail ships
between the ports of the state and the ports of foreign countries for
the purpose of carrying on trade.^ The general regulation of for-
eign commerce, however, fell to the Confederate government, which
was distinctly opposed to all blockade- running not under its imme-
diate control and supervision. The state authorities complained
that the course of the Confederate administration was harsh and
unnecessary. The state was wilHng to prohibit blockade- running
on private account, but insisted that its public vessels be allowed to
import supplies needed by the state. The complaint about restric-
tions on trade was general throughout the southern states and, in
October, 1864, the southern governors, in a meeting in Augusta,
Georgia, Governor Watts of Alabama taking a leading part, declared
that each state had the right to export its productions and import
such supphes as might be necessary for state use or for the use of
1 The blockading force before Mobile in 186 1 often consisted of only one vessel
(Soley, p. 134), and the people of Mobile believed that foreign nations would not
recognize the blockade as effective. There was an English squadron under Admiral
Milne in the Gulf, and on Aug. 4, 1861, the Mobile Register and Advertiser said that
a conflict between the English and United States forces was expected ; the English
were then to raise the blockade. Scharf, p. 442.
2 This, however, was not the plan favored by Ex-Gov. A. B. Moore, who, on
Feb. 3, 1862, wrote to President Davis stating his belief that the permission given
by the Federal fleet to export cotton was a " Yankee trick " to get cotton to leave port
in order to seize it. He thought that the Confederate government should forbid all
exportation of cotton until the close of the war. "This leaky blockade system should
be deprecated as one [in which the parties] are either dupes or knaves and [is] not in
the least calculated to demonstrate the fact that our cotton crops are a necessity to the
commerce of the world." If cotton was not a necessity to Europe, then the sooner the
South knew it the better ; if it was a necessity, the sooner Europe knew it the better.
O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 905.
8 Acts of Feb. 6 and Dec. 10, 1861.
BLOCKADE-RUNNING 185
the state troops in the army, state vessels being used for this purpose.
The governors united in a request to Congress to remove the restric-
tions on such trade/ But the Confederate administration to the last
retained control of foreign trade. Agents were sent abroad by the
Treasury and War Departments ^ who were instructed to send on
vessels attempting to run the blockade, first, arms and ammunition;
second, clothing, boots, shoes, and hats; third, drugs and chemicals
that were most needed, such as quinine, chloroform, ether, opium,
morphine, and rhubarb. These agents were instructed to see that
all vessels leaving for southern ports were laden with the articles
named. Such part of the cargoes as was not taken by the govern-
ment was sold at auction to the highest bidder. These blockade
auction sales were attended by merchants from the inland towns,
whose shelves were almost bare of goods during three years of the
war.^ For two years mihtary and naval suppHes were the most im-
portant articles brought into the southern ports. The Alabama
troops were in great need of all kinds of war equipment, and the state
administration made every effort to obtain military supplies from
abroad. Shipments of arms from Europe were made to the West
Indies, generally to Cuba, and thence smuggled into Mobile and other
Gulf ports. The shipments were always long delayed while wait-
ing for a favorable opportunity to attempt a run. A large propor-
tion of the blockade-runners making for Mobile were captured by
the United States vessels.'' Dark nights, and rainy, stormy weather
furnished the opportunity to the runners to shp into or out of a port.
Once at sea, nothing could catch them, since they were built for fast
saiHng rather than for capacity to carry freight.^
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 735; Ser. I, Vol. XXXIII, Pt. Ill, p. 805.
2 The Confederate War and Treasury Departments required that each steamship
coming and going should reserve one-half its tonnage for government use. The owners
of an outgoing vessel had to make bond to return with one-half the cargo for the govern-
ment and the other half in articles the importation of which was not prohibited by the
Confederate government. The Confederate government paid five pence sterling a pound
on outgoing freight, payable in a British port. On return freight /^2^ a ton was paid in
cotton at a Confederate port. The expenses of one blockade-runner for one trip
amounted to ^80,265; while the gross profits were $172,000, leaving a net gain of
^9^735 on the trip. Scharf, pp. 481, 485.
8 Joseph Jacobs, " Drug Conditions." * Soley, pp. 44, 156.
^ See Taylor, "Running the Blockade." A typical blockade-runner of 1862- 1864
was a long, low, slender, rakish sidewheel steamer, of 400 to 600 tons, about nine times
as long as broad, with powerful engines, twin screws, and feathering paddles. The
1 86 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Most of the arms secured by Alabama came by way of Cuba, as
did nearly all the suppHes that entered the port of Mobile or were
smuggled in on boats along the coast. Havanna was 590 miles from
Mobile, and between these ports most of the blockade trade of the
Gulf Coast was carried on. One shipment, welcomed by the state
authorities, was a lot of condemned Spanish flint-lock muskets, which
were remodelled and repaired and placed in the hands of the state
troops. Machinery for the naval foundry and arsenal at Selma and
for the navy-yard on the Tombigbee was brought through the block-
ade from England via the West Indies. The Confederate govern-
ment, besides taking its own half of each cargo, had the first choice of
all other goods brought through the blockade and usually chose shoes,
clothing, and medicine. The state could only make contracts for
the importation of supplies; it could not import them on its own
vessels. The Confederate government paid high prices for goods,
but, on the whole, paid much less than did the private individual
for the remainder of the cargo when sold at auction. The mer-
chants made large profits on the few articles of merchandise secured
by them. Speculators bought up lots of merchandise at Mobile and
carried them far inland, to the small towns and villages of the Black
Belt and farther north, and secured fabulous prices in Confederate
money for ordinary cahco, shoes, women's apparel, etc. The cen-
tral part of the state was more completely shut from the outside world
than any other section of the South. The Federal lines touched the
northern part of the state, but the traffic carried on through the lines
seldom reached the central counties. Consequently, the arrival of
a merchant in the Black Belt village with a small lot of blockade
calicoes, shoes, hats, scented soap, etc., was a great event, and people
came from far and near to gaze upon the fine things exhibited in
the usually empty show windows. Few had sufficient Confederate
money to buy the commonest articles, but some one could always be
found to purchase the latest useless trifle that came from abroad.^
funnels were short and could be lowered to the deck. It was painted a dull gray or
lead color, and the masts being very short, it could not be seen more than two hundred
yards away. When possible to obtain it, anthracite coal was burned, and when running
into port all lights were turned out and the steam blown off under water. Scharf, p. 480;
Soley, p. 156 ; Spears, Vol. IV, p. 55.
1 " Two Months in the Confederate States by English Merchant," p. 1 1 1 ; Taylor,
"Running the Blockade"; Hague, " A Blockaded Family"; "Our Women in War,"
passim ; Jacobs, " Drug Conditions."
BLOCKADE-RUNNING 1 87
In exchange for goods thus imported, the blockade- runners car-
ried out cargoes of cotton. As has been stated, the Confederate ad-
ministration was in charge of cotton exportation. The Confederate
Treasury Department purchased in Alabama 134,252 bales of cotton
for $13,633,621.90 — that is, $101.55 a bale. This cotton was to be
sold abroad for the benefit of the Confederate government. Nearly
all the cotton purchased by the government was in the great produc-
ing states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Alabama fur-
nished more than any other state. In 1864 3226 bales of cotton were
shipped from Mobile by the Treasury Department, and the proceeds
applied to the support of the Erlanger Loan. To avoid competition
between the departments of the government, it was agreed, June i,
1864, that all stores for shipment should be turned over to the Treas-
ury, transported to the vessels by the War Department, and consigned
to Treasury agents in the West Indies or in Europe. It was to be
sold finally by the Treasury agent at Liverpool and the proceeds
placed to the credit of the Treasury. The export business was under
the direction of the Produce Loan Office, which had charge of all
government cotton and tobacco. Contracts were usually made with
companies, to whom the government turned over the cotton for ship-
ment. In November, 1864, there were 115,450 bales of government
cotton in Alabama, 18,802 bales having been sold. It is hardly pos-
sible that it was all exported; some of it was sold through the lines. ^
It was found very difficult to secure bagging and ties sufficient to bale
the cotton for shipping.
The state lost much as well as gained by trade through the
blockade. The risks were great and the exporters had to have a
large share of the profit; but arms, medicine, and blankets were
valuable and very necessary. In spite of regulations, the blockade-
runners brought in more luxuries than necessaries, causing much
extravagance, and there were people who objected to the practice alto-
gether. In March, 1863, the Mobile Committee of Safety reported
that there were several vessels then in the harbor fitting out to carry
cotton to Cuba. They were of the opinion that the government ought
not to allow them to depart, since the country could not afford to lose
1 Report of A. Roane, Chief of the Produce Loan Office ; Richmond, to Secretary
of Treasury Trenholm, Oct. 30, 1864, in H. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong., 1st Sess.;
"Two Months in the Confederate States," p. in.
l88 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the vessels with their machinery, which could not be replaced. Gov-
ernor Shorter agreed with them, and a protest was made to the Rich-
mond authorities; but the vessels went out/ Judge Dargan, whom
many things troubled, wrote to the Richmond authorities that the
blockade-runners were ruining the country by supplying the enemy
with cotton and bringing in return useless gewgaws.^
From March i, 1864, to the end of the war, the Confederate gov-
ernment succeeded better in regulating the imports by blockade-run-
ners. But after August, when Farragut captured the forts defending
the harbor entrance, the port of Mobile received little from the out-
side world. Before the stringent regulations of the Confederacy
went into force, blockade- running was demorahzing. The import-
ers refused to accept paper money for their goods, and thus discredited
currency while draining specie from the country. High prices and
extortion followed. Cotton, instead of being exchanged for British
gold, brought in trinkets, silks, satins, laces, broadcloths, brandy,
rum, whiskey, fancy shppers, and ladies' goods generally. Curiously
enough, there was great demand for these, in spite of the wants of the
necessaries of life, medicine, and munitions of war. Delicate women,
old persons, and children suffered most from the effects of the block-
ade. As Spears says, there were many tiny graves made in the South
because the blockade kept out necessary medicines.^
The blockade reduced the Confederacy; the Union navy rather
than the Union army was the prime factor in crushing the South ; it
made possible the victories of the army. As it was, the blockade-
runners probably postponed the end for a year or more.^ Though
the number of blockade-runners increased in the latter part of 1864
and in 1865, Alabama profited but Httle; her one good seaport was
closed in August, 1864, by Farragut's fleet, and with the fleet came
the last regular blockade-runner. As the warships were moving up
to engage the forts, a blockade-runner passed in with them unnoticed.^
Small boats still brought in supplies.
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. IT, p. 462.
2 Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I, p. 350.
* Scharf, pp. 484, 486 ; Spears, Vol. IV, p. 56.
* Bancroft, " Seward," Vol. II, p. 209 ; Wilson, " Ironclads in Action," Vol. I,
pp. 196-197.
^ Scharf, p. 487 ; Wilson, pp. 187, 192,
TRADE THROUGH THE LINES 1 89
Trade through the Lines
The early policy of the Confederate administration was to bring
the North to terms by shutting off the cotton supply and by ceasing
to purchase supplies which had heretofore been a source of great
profit to northern merchants, and was, on the whole, consistently
adhered to during the war. The state administration held the same
theory until one-fourth of its people were destitute ; then it was ready
to relax restrictions on trade/ Individuals who had plenty of cotton
and little to eat and wear soon came to the conclusion that traffic with
the North would do no harm, but much good. The United States
wanted the products of the South, and made stronger efforts to get
them than the blockaded South made to get suppHes by the exchange.
Until the very last, the North was more active in commercial inter-
course than the South, notwithstanding the fearful want all over the
southern country. The policy of the North was to have all trade in
southern products pass through the hands of its own Treasury agents,
who were to strip such products of all extraordinary profits for the
benefit of the United States Treasury, and to see that the Confederacy
profited as little as possible.^ The Confederate States government,
when forced to allow some kind of trade through the lines, sought to
sell only government cotton or to force traders to traffic under its
license. The state administration, at times, worked in its agents
under Confederate license in order to get supphes for the destitute
in the counties near the fines of the enemy. Few regulations of com-
1 Scharf, p. 446, says that the press and public sentiment were against allowing
shipment of cotton to districts or through ports held by the United States. When in
danger of capture the cotton was burned. Pollard states that the Richmond authorities
were opposed to allowing any extensive cotton trade through the lines or through block-
aded ports, because it was believed that the Union finances were in bad condition and
would not stand the loss of cotton manufacturing. Moreover, the Confederate authori-
ties were afraid of the demoralization caused by contraband trade, and also feared that
Europe might consider that licensed trade through ports in possession of the enemy, like
New Orleans, was a confession of the weakness of King Cotton, and would refuse to
recognize the Confederacy. " Lost Cause," pp. 484-485.
2 The North was determined to show that cotton was not king, and to do this it
must get all the cotton possible from the South by allowing a contraband trade in which
nearly or quite all the profits on the cotton should be stripped off, leaving only the bare
cost to the Confederate government or cotton planter. The North was willing that the
South should sell all its cotton, but the North was to be middleman. Scharf, p. 443 ;
" Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," Vol. I, p. 331.
I90 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
mercial intercourse were made by the Confederate States, but many
were made by the United States. The Confederate States had the
problem almost under control; the United States did not, and had
to try to regulate what it could not prohibit.
Trade along the Tennessee and Mississippi frontier was subject
to the following regulations on the side of the United States : Trade
was carried on under the control of the Treasury Department; all
trade had to be licensed; there were numerous officials to regulate
the trade and the army was directed to assist traders; no coin, no for-
eign money, and no supplies were to be allowed to get to the Confed-
erates; the trader must not go within Confederate territory; until
1864 the southern seller, whither Confederate or Union, when he
went beyond the Hnes could get only 25 per cent of the New York
value of his produce; from 1864 to 1865 he could get 75 per cent of
the value if the cotton were not produced by slave labor ; in all cases
the seller had to take the oath of allegiance to the United States.
These regulations were gradually repealed during the latter part of
1865 and early in 1866.^
The legislation of the Confederate States was not so full, but the
policy was about the same and more consistently enforced. In 1862
the Confederate Congress made it unlawful to sell in any part of the
Confederate States in the possession of the enemy any cotton, tobacco,
rice, sugar, molasses, or naval stores.^ Licenses, however, for the
sale of certain merchandise could be obtained from the Secretary of
War. Trade through the lines was not under the supervision of
Treasury officials but was looked after by the generals commanding
the frontier. In 1864 a law of Congress prohibited the export of
1 The various proclamations, orders, regulations, and laws affecting commercial inter-
course between the United States and the Confederate States will be found in a compila-
tion of the United States Treasury Department entitled " Acts of Congress and Rules and
Regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in pursuance thereto, with the
approval of the President, concerning Commercial Intercourse with and in States and
parts of States declared in insurrection. Captured, Abandoned, and Confiscable Property,
the care of freedmen, and the purchase of products of insurrectionary districts on gov-
ernment account." The proclamations of the President will be found in the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents. See also Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 56, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.,
and No. 23, 43d Cong., 3d Sess., p. 58 ; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. , 45th Cong., 2d Sess.,
p. 36 ; Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong., ist Sess., p. 39. A fuller account of the
trade regulations is in the Sotith Atlantic Qtiarterly, July, 1905.
2 Act, April 19, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., ist Sess.
TRADE THROUGH THE LINES 191
military and naval stores, and agricultural production, such as cotton
and tobacco, except under regulations prescribed by the President.'
But the restrictions were not strictly enforced. It was not pos-
sible to do so ; commerce would find a way in spite of the war. The
people of Alabama were, on the whole, disposed to approve the policy
of the Confederate authorities, but, when want and destitution came,
the owners of cotton proceeded to find a way to sell a few bales.
Early in 1863 north Alabama was occupied by the Federals, and trade
began along the line of the Tennessee River. Later, there were
trade lines to the northwest through Mississippi, and to the north-
east through Georgia and Tennessee.^ After the capture of New
Orleans, cotton was sent through Mississippi to New Orleans, or to
the banks of the Mississippi River, and always found purchasers.
There was a thriving trade between Mobile and New Orleans during
the Butler regime in the latter city.
By the trade through the lines, the people of Alabama secured
more of the scarcer commodities than by the blockade-running.
Much of the trade was carried on by firms in Mobile that had agents
or branch houses in New Orleans. Three pounds of cotton were
exchanged for one of bacon; army supphes, clothing, blankets, and
medical stores were secured in exchange for cotton; salt was also a
commodity much in demand. For three years, from 1862 to 1864,
trade was quite brisk between the two cities, some of it under license
by the Confederate Secretary of War, and some of it purely contra-
band. As long as Butler controlled New Orleans there was no trouble.^
When General Canby went to New Orleans, he reported that English
houses in Mobile were making contracts to export 200,000 bales of
1 Act, Feb. 6, 1864, Pub. Laws, C.S.A,, 1st Cong., 4th Sess.
2 The state officials in 1 862-1 863 planned to exchange cotton from Mississippi and
Alabama with the cotton speculators in Tennessee for bacon. Davis opposed (Pol-
lard, p. 481), but, nevertheless, the change was made. Along the Tennessee River
there was much trading with the enemy. In order to conform with the United States
regulations forbidding the payment of coin for Confederate staples, the northern specu-
lator bought Confederate and state money, often at a high price (^100 gold for ^225
in Confederate currency or ^120 to ^125 in Alabama, Georgia, or South Carolina bank-
notes), with which to carry on the cotton trade. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 10.
^ Shorter, who was opposed to contraband trade, complained in July, 1862, that
the cotton speculators in Mobile had an understanding with Butler and Farragut by
which salt was allowed to come in and cotton, in unlimited quantities, allowed to go out.
O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II, p. 21.
192
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
cotton via New Orleans, and expected to realize $10,000,000 net
profits. Canby was of the opinion that the cotton trade aided the
Confederates. The character of the Treasury agents in charge of the
cotton trade was bad; they were Kkely to do anything for gain. He
stated on the authority of a New Orleans banker, who was the agent
of a cotton speculator, that Confederate agents would come to New
Orleans with United States legal tender notes and invest in sterling
with him, drawing against cotton which was ostensibly purchased
from "loyal" or foreign citizens.^ The speculators would give in-
formation to the Confederates with regard to the movements of the
Federals, in order that the Confederates might preserve cotton that
would in an emergency be destroyed. The speculators would buy
the cotton later.
In 1864 a New York manufacturer testified that he had made
contracts with firms in Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile to take pay
for debts due him in cotton delivered through the lines at New Orleans.
The price was $1.24 to $1.30 a pound in New York. Treasury agents
made similar contracts for Alabama cotton to be dehvered through
New Orleans, Pensacola, or through the lines in Mississippi, Ten-
nessee, and Georgia. One agent, H. A. Risley, made contracts with
half a dozen persons for more than 350,000 bales of cotton, the bulk
of which was to come from Alabama. Most of this, it is needless to
say, was not dehvered.^
The Confederate officials tried to manage that only government
cotton went out under the licenses from the War Department and
that only necessary suppHes were imported in exchange. But there
was much abuse of the privilege and much private smuggling of cotton
in 1864, through the Mississippi to New Orleans and the river; and
on September 22, 1864, General Dick Taylor (at Selma) annulled
all cotton export contracts in the Department of Alabama, Missis-
sippi, and East Louisiana. However, he said, the Confederate author-
ities would purchase necessaries imported and would pay for them
in cotton at 50 cents a pound. This cotton could then be carried
beyond the lines. No luxuries were to be imported, under penalty
of confiscation.^
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 16, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Ho. Kept., No. 24, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 16, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
TRADE THROUGH THE LINES I93
Surgeon Potts, of the Confederate army, stationed at Montgomery,
secured medical supplies from the Federal lines in Louisiana and
Mississippi, both by water and by land, sending cotton in exchange.
One of the last reports made to President Davis was by Lieutenant-
Colonel Brand, of Miles's Louisiana Legion, who stated (April 9,
1865, at Danville, Virginia) that on March 21, 1865, a Mr. McKnight
of the Alabama Reserves had presented a permit to General Hodges
in Louisiana for indorsement and orders for a grant to escort
i,666,666| pounds of cotton (about 4000 bales) through south-
western Mississippi and eastern Louisiana to exchange for medical
suppHes for Surgeon Potts. Brand was of the opinion that this was
merely a scheme to sell cotton and not to get medicines, as he had
known of only one wagon-load of medical supplies that had gone
through his territory to Dr. Potts. McKnight had no government
cotton to carry, for there was none in that section of the country, but
he expected to buy it as a speculation. This practice, Brand stated,
was common. Even government cotton would be sold for coffee,
soap, flour, etc., under the name of medical suppHes, and these
would be sold by the speculators.^
In north Alabama a brisk trade was carried on for three years
with the connivance of the Federal officers, many of whom were in-
terested in the fleecy staple in spite of orders forbidding such conduct.^
Negroes were given "free papers" in order that they might go in and
out of the lines of the armies on contraband trade. The Confederate
officials on the border were also often impHcated in the traffic or con-
nived at it through a desire to see poor people get supplies.^
One of the mildest charges against the Federal General O. M.
Mitchel was that he had profited by speculation in the contraband
^ O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 1180, 1181. Davis probably made his last official
indorsement on this report, Apr. 10, 1865. He forwarded it to the Adjutant and In-
spector-General with instructions to look into the matter.
'■^ Somers, "The Southern States since the War," p. 134. General Grant, July 21,
1863, stated that this trade through west Tennessee was injurious to the United States
forces. " Restriction, if lived up to," he said, " makes trade unprofitable and hence
none but dishonest men go into it. I will venture to say, that no honest man has made
money in west Tennessee in the last year, while many fortunes have been made there
during the time." So vexed was General Grant with the speculators that, early in 1865,
he suspended all permits, but within a month he had to remove the suspensions.
Scharf, pp. 443, 446, 447.
'■^ Taylor, " Destruction and Reconstruction," pp. 227, 235.
o
194 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
^
trade in cotton while he was in command in north Alabama. It was
alleged that he used United States transportation to haul cotton when
the transportation was needed for other purposes. Mitchel claimed
that personally he had received no profit from his trade ; it appeared,
however, that he had used his official position to advance the inter-
ests of his brother-in-law and his son-in-law. The discussion over
his case brought out the fact that the northern cotton speculator or
agent would go into the Confederate fines and buy cotton at ten
and eleven cents a pound. Confederate currency, and take the cotton
North and realize immense profits.^ Mitchel and other Federal offi-
cers, it was shown, approved and assisted the trade beyond the lines.^
Individual permits were sometimes given by President Lincoln,
authorizing the bearers to go within the Confederacy, without re-
striction, and get cotton and other southern produce. Sometimes,
after bringing it out, these people lost their cotton to United States
Treasury agents, because the permission given by the President was
not in accordance with the Treasury regulations. In north Alabama
several agents got into trouble in this way. Lincoln, it seems, under-
stood that the laws gave him authority to issue permits to trade within
the Confederate lines.^
In 1864, when cotton was selling at forty to fifty cents a pound in
coin, numbers of Federal officers resigned in order to speculate in
cotton. A former beef contractor who had grown rich in the cotton
trade was said to have controlled almost the whole of Huntsville.
Both hotels, the waterworks, and the gas works belonged to him, and
there was complaint of his extortions."*
Small packages, especially of quinine, were sent South through
the Adams Express Company, which would guarantee to deliver
them within the Confederacy.^ This caused speculation, and it was
finally stopped. Women passed through the fines and brought back
quinine and other medicines concealed in their clothing. A druggist
in middle Alabama determined to carry on a contraband trade in
1 Confederate currency was plentiful in the North, where it was made even more
cheaply than in the South, and the southerners did not notice the difference.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, Pt. II, pp. 291-293, 638-640.
8 Ho. Rept., No. 83, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. ; No. 618, 46th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 AT. V. Herald, April 7, 1864.
^ Jacobs, " Drug Conditions," p. 7. The Southern Express Company worked in
connection with the Adams, of which it had been a part before 1861.
TRADE THROUGH THE LINES I95
cotton and drugs. The South had prohibited private trade in cotton ;
the North forbade the sale of medical supphes to the Confederates.
But following the example of many others, he went into north Mis-
sissippi, loaded a wagon with cotton, and carried it to Memphis, then
held by the Federals, and sold it for a high price in United States
money. He then exchanged his wagon for an ambulance with a
white canvas cover, on which was painted the word "smallpox"
in large letters, and over which fluttered a yellow flag. He loaded
the ambulance with quinine, ether, morphine, and other valuable
drugs, and other articles of merchandise scarce in Alabama. The
yellow flag and the magic word "smallpox" kept people away, and,
after many adventures, he finally reached home.^ Only by such
methods could the beleaguered people obtain the precious medicines.
One of the last contracts on record in respect to trade through the
lines was a deal made on January 6, 1865, by Samuel Noble and
George W. Quintard, his agent, both of Alabama, to deliver several
thousand bales of cotton to an agent of the United States Treasury.^
There is evidence that some of the cotton was delivered.
The ilHcit trade in cotton by private parties became so flagrant
that in the winter of 1864-1865, a fresh Confederate regiment, which
had not yet been touched by the fever of speculation, was sent from
the interior of Georgia to guard part of the frontier in Alabama and
Mississippi. One of the first persons captured smugghng a cotton
train through the lines was the wife of the Confederate commanding
general, who, of course, released her.^ Much of the trade was car-
ried on by poor people who had a few bales of cotton and who were
obliged to sell it or suffer from want. This fact caused the Confed-
erate officers to be lax in the enforcement of the regulations.^
1 Jacobs, " Prug Conditions," pp. 7-10.
2 Ho. Repts., 38th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 174. Before this, Samuel Noble of Rome,
Georgia, representing himself as a " loyal " man (he was introduced and vouched for by
George W. Quintard), made a contract with a United States Treasury agent to deliver
250,000 bales of cotton from Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. In
Alabama at that time he owned 800 bales at Selma, 1256 at Mobile, and had much
more contracted for. The cotton was to be delivered at Huntsville, Mobile, and places
in the adjoining states. Noble was to get three-fourths of the proceeds, according to
the regulations. Ho. Rept., No. 24, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
^ Statement of Professor O. I). Smith of Auburn, Ala., who was then a Confederate
l><)nded agent operating in north Alabama.
* Taylor, " Destruction and Reconstruction," p. 232.
196 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The extraordinary prices of cotton in the outside world brought
little gain to the blockaded Confederacy. Before the cotton could be
brought into the Union Hnes or beyond the blockade, all the profits
had been absorbed by the Confederate speculator, or, most often, by
the Union speculators and Treasury agents. Theoretically, the regu-
lations of the United States should have brought much profit to the
Federal government. In fact, as Secretary Chase reported, the United
States did not realize a great deal from Confederate staples brought
into the Union lines. These frauds and the demoralizing effects of
the system were evidenced by many reports from officers from the
army and navy.^
But in spite of the demorahzing effects of the contraband trade
within the Confederacy and in spite of the extremely low prices ob-
tained for Confederate staples, much-needed supplies were sent in
in such quantities as to enable the contest to be maintained much
longer than otherwise it would have lasted. Owing to its interior
location, it is probable that Alabama profited less by this trade than
the other states.
Sec. 4. Scarcity and Destitution
When the men went away to the army, many poor families began
to sufi^er for the necessaries of fife. The suffering was greater in
the white counties, where slaves were relatively few, many famiHes
feeling the touch of want as soon at the breadwinners left. The
Black Belt had plenty, such as it was, until the end of the war.
The first legislature, after the secession of the state, levied a
special tax of 25 per cent of the regular tax for the next year
to provide for the destitute famiHes of absent volunteers.^ A month
later a law was passed permitting counties to assume the tax and
to pay the amount into the state treasury, and thus secure exemption
from the state tax.^ The county commissioners were directed to
appropriate money from the county treasury for the support of the
1 Letter of Secretary Chase to Hon. E. B. Washburne, in Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 78,
38th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Nov. ii, 1861. As early as Jan. 14, 1 861, Governor
Moore reported that the poorest classes were in want and that much suffering, perhaps
starvation, would result unless aid were given. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 51. The
soldiers' families were reported to be almost destitute in April, 1 861. Idem^ p. 220.
2 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 31, 1861.
SCARCITY AND DESTITUTION
197
indigent families of soldiers.^ This was to secure immediate relief,
which was imperatively necessary, since the special tax for their
benefit would not be collected until the next year.
Early in 1862 portions of north Alabama were so devastated by
the Federals that many people, to escape starvation, had to ''refugee"
to other parts of the country, usually to middle Alabama, there to
be supported by the state. At this time all crops were short, owing
to a drought, and the poorer people suffered greatly.^ Speculators
had advanced the prices on food, and wage- earners were unable to
buy. Impressment by the government made farmers afraid to
bring produce to town.^
The county commissioners were authorized in 1862 to levy for
the next year a tax equal to the regular state tax and to use it for
the benefit of the destitute.^ The state also made an appropriation
of $2,000,000 for the same purpose. This appropriation was to
be distributed by the county commissioners in the form of supplies
or money. The famihes of substitutes were not made beneficiaries
of this fund.^ The sum of $60,000 was appropriated for cotton
and wool spinning cards, which were to be purchased abroad and
distributed among the counties in proportion to the white popula-
tion. They were sold at cost to those able to buy,'' and several dis-
tributions were made to the needy famihes of soldiers.^ Salt was
the scarcest of all the necessaries of hfe. The state took entire
charge of the whole supply that was for sale and sold it at a moderate
price, sometimes at cost, and to those in great need it was furnished
free.^ The county commissioners were authorized to hire and
rehire slaves and take in return provisions, which were distributed
among the poor famihes of soldiers.^ The commissioners of Sumter
and Walker counties were permitted to borrow $10,000 in each county
for the poor, and to levy a tax of 50 per cent of the state tax with
which to repay the borrowed money. ^^
Judge Dargan, member of Congress, wrote to President Davis
1 Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 29, 1861. 2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1862), p. 9.
3 Jones, " Diary," Vol. I, pp. 194, 198. * Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 8, 1862.
^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. ii, 1862. ^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 8, 1862.
■^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Oct. 16, 1864.
8 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Oct. 9 and Dec. 9, 1862, and Aug. 29, 1863. Miller,
"Alabama," p. 167.
» Acts of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 26, 1862. 10 Act of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 28, 1862.
198 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
in the winter of 1862 that many people of Mobile were destitute.^
Mobile was farther away from country supplies, and the people
suffered greatly. In the spring of 1863 there was suffering in the
southern white counties. A party of women, the wives and daugh-
ters of soldiers, raided a provision shop in Mobile, when there were
instances of dire distress in the famihes of soldiers.^ The richer
citizens of the city gave $130,000 to support a free market, where
for a while 4000 needy persons were furnished daily. Another contri-
bution of $70,000 was raised to clothe a thousand destitute famihes.^
In 1863 the non-combatants of north Alabama suffered m.ore
than in the previous year. Houses had been burned, grain -and
provisions destroyed, and many were homeless and destitute. Num-
bers were driven from the country by the persecutions of the Federals
and tories. The Confederate war tax and the state tax were sus-
pended in districts invaded by the enemy,'* and in August, 1863, the
legislature appropriated $1,000,000 for the support of the destitute
famihes of soldiers during the next three months. Twenty-five
pounds of salt were also given to each member of a soldier's family
as a year's supply.^ Probate judges impressed provisions and paid
for them out of this million-dollar fund. In November, 1863, an
appropriation of $3,000,000 was made for the support of soldiers'
famihes during the coming year. In counties held by the enemy
where there were no commissioners' courts, the probate judges paid
to soldiers' famihes their share of the appropriation. The county
commissioners were authorized to impress provisions for the poor
if they were unable to buy them.® Washington County was per-
mitted to borrow $10,000 for the rehef of soldiers' famihes.' The
pohcy of giving a county permission to raise money for its own
poor was much opposed on the ground that the counties which had
furnished most soldiers and where the destitution was greatest were
the least able to pay. The legislature declared then that the poor
soldiers' famihes should be the charge of the state. ^ The sum of
1 Jones, " Diary," Vol. I, p. 194. 2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 6.
8 N. Y. Herald, Dec. 26, 1863.
4 Act, April 19, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., i8th Sess ; Act of Gen.
Assembly, Dec. 5, 1863.
^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Aug. 29, 1863. ^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Aug. 27, 1863.
' Act of Gen. Assembly, Aug. 27, 1863.
^ Resolutions of Gen. Assembly, Aug. 27, 1863.
SCARCITY AND DESTITUTION 1 99
$500,000 was appropriated for the destitute of north Alabama, who
had lost everything from the seizure and destruction by the enemy.
Disloyal persons and their famihes were not entitled to aid/ Macon
County was authorized to levy a tax-in-kind for the poor, and Pike
County a tax-in- kind and a property and income tax, practically
a duplicate of the Confederate tax.^
The legislature of 1864 appropriated $5,000,000 for soldiers'
famihes,^ and made a special appropriation of $180,000 for the poor
in the counties of Cherokee, De Kalb, Morgan, St. Clair, Marshall, and
Blount, which were overrun by the enemy. '^ The probate judge
of Cherokee County was authorized to act for De Kalb because the
probate judge of that county had been carried off by the Federals.^
In Lawrence County the Federals raided the probate judge's office,
and took $3000 belonging to the destitute, and the agent was robbed
of $3887.50 while trying to carry it to Moulton. Both losses were
made good by the state.^
Statutes were repeatedly passed, prohibiting the distiUing of
grain for the purpose of making alcoholic liquors. The state placed
this industry under the supervision of the governor, and alcohol
and whiskey were distributed among the counties where most needed,
to be sold at a moderate price for medicinal purposes, and the profit
given to the poor, or to be given away upon physicians' prescriptions.
Later the prohibition was extended to include potatoes, peas, and
even molasses and sugar. This prohibition was not a temperance
measure, but was designed to preserve as foodstuffs the grain,
molasses, peas, and potatoes. '^
The county commissioners usually had charge of the destitute,
and looked after the collection of the special taxes which were
levied for the benefit of the poor. They also distributed the sup-
plies, purchased or collected by the tax-in-kind, among the needy
people after investigating the merits of each case. In those por-
tions of the state overrun by the enemy or liable to repeated invasion,
the probate judge of the county was authorized to take charge of
^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 8, 1863.
2 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 4 and Dec. 7, 1863.
8 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Oct. 7, 1864, and Dec. 13, 1864.
* Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 9, 1864. ^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 13, 1864.
^ Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 4, 1864.
' Acts of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 8, 1862, Aug. 27 and 29, 1863, and Dec. 13, 1864.
200 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
all matters relating to the relief of the destitute. Many thousand
dollars' worth of suppHes were furnished the northern counties when
they were within the Federal Hnes or between the hostile Hnes. Many
of the supphes sent there fell into the hands of tories or Federals,
and many undeserving persons obtained assistance. Confederate
sympathizers within the Federal Hnes had a struggle to live, and
numbers, completely ruined by the ravages of the Federals and
tories, had to flee to the central and southern counties.
The quartermaster-general of the state had charge of the state
distribution among the counties, and among the Confederate sol-
diers. There was an agent of the state whose business it was to look
after claims for pay and bounty due the families of deceased soldiers.
It is safe to say that httle was ever collected on this account.^ The
Confederate soldiers, as plentiful as paper money was, were rarely
paid. Much of their supphes came from home. The Confederate
government could not supply them even with blankets and shoes.
This the state undertook to do and with some degree of success.
And at one time, however (1862), after impressing all the leather and
shoes in the state, only one thousand pairs could be secured.^ Agents
were sent with the armies going north into Kentucky and Maryland
to buy supphes of blankets, shoes, woollen clothing, and salt, for
the state. Blankets could not be obtained except by capture, running
the blockade, or purchase through the Hnes, as there was not a blanket
factory in the Confederacy in 1862. In the following year the carpets
in the state capitol were torn up and sent to the Alabama soldiers
to be used as blankets.^ In 1863 the legislature asked Congress
to exempt from payment of the tax-in-kind the people of that part
1 Acts of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 8, 1863. There were Confederate soldiers who were
paid only twice in two years' service, and then not enough to buy a new uniform. The
following incident is related of the 9th Alabama Infantry: at Chancellorsville some
Federals had been captured by the regiment, and as they were being sent back over the
field covered with dead Federals, one of the prisoners remarked : " You rebs are sharper
than you used to be. You used to shoot us anywhere ; now you shoot us in the head
so as not to bloody our clothes." The 9th was a regiment of sharpshooters from north
Alabama. The narrator says that the prisoner was alluding to " the practice of strip-
ping the dead of their clothing to cover our nakedness." — "The Land We Love," Vol.
II, pp. 216.
2 The legislature had offered ^200,000 for 50,000 pairs of shoes, but received none.
3 Miller, p. 167 ; Acts of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 8, 1863 ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. II,
pp. 32, 196.
SCARCITY AND DESTITUTION 20I
of north Alabama which was subject to the invasions of the enemy.
This was done. Congress was also asked to exempt from the pay-
ment of this tax those families of soldiers whose support was derived
from white labor. ^ As a result of economic conditions the taxation
fell upon the slave owners of central and south Alabama. But the
suffering was much greater among the people whose supphes came
from white labor. These were the people assisted by the state and
county appropriations. Yet when they were able to pay the tax-
in-kind, they, at times, almost rebelled against it.
It has been estimated that from the latter part of 1862 to the
close of the war at least one-fourth of the white population of the
state was supported by the state and counties. This estimate does
not include the soldiers.^ A letter written in April, 1864, to the
governor, from Talladega County discloses the following facts in regard
to that county: With a white population of 14,634, it had furnished
up to April, 1864, 27 companies of volunteers, not counting those
who volunteered in other regiments or who furnished substitutes or
were enrolled in the reserves or mihtia. The citizens of the county
pledged the soldiers that they would raise $20,000 annually, if neces-
sary, for the support of the soldiers' famihes. In May, 1861, 30
persons received aid from the county; in April, 1864, 3799. In 1863,
the county received about $80,000 from the state for the poor, and
25 pounds of salt for each member of needy families of soldiers. In
addition to this the people of the county raised in that year, for the
poor, $7276 in cash, 2570 bushels of corn, 102 bushels of wheat, and
16 sacks of salt. The county bought 21,755 bushels of corn at $3 a
bushel, and sold it at 50 cents a bushel to the poor; 920 bushels of
wheat at $10 a bushel and sold it at $2 a bushel; 233 sacks of salt
at $80 per sack, and sold it at $20 per sack. The destitute families
were those of laborers who had joined the army. They Hved mostly
in the hill country, where they suffered much from the tories. Many
were refugees from north Alabama.^ In May, 1864, 1600 soldiers'
families in Randolph County were supported by the state and county.
Many thousand bushels of corn brought from middle Alabama had
to be hauled 40 miles from the railway. Eight thousand people,
or one-third of the population, were destitute. The same condition
1 Resolutions of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 28, 1863.
2 Miller, " Alabama," p. 229. ^ Miller, p. 198.
202 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
existed in other white counties/ Colonel Gibson, probate judge of
Lawrence County, relates an experience of his in caring for the des-
titute. He went in person to Gadsden for loo sacks of salt. He
found the sacks in a very bad condition, and repaired the whole lot
with his own hands so as to preserve the precious contents. This
judge, with his own money, bought cotton cards for the poor people
of his county as well as salt, which at that time cost $ioo a barrel.^
The people who had supplies gave to those who had none, and thus
supplemented the work of the state. They felt it a duty to divide to
the last with the deserving families of the poorer soldiers.^
Early in the war, in order to provide against famine, the authori-
ties, state and Confederate, began to urge the people to plant food
crops only. They were asked to plant no cotton, except for home
needs. Corn, wheat, beans, peas, potatoes, and other farm prod-
uce and live stock were essential.^ During the winter of 1862- 1863
there was much distress among the poor people in the cities and
towns, and the next spring the senators and representatives of Alabama
united in an address to the people, asking them to stop raising cotton
and raise more foodstuffs and live stock. Governor Shorter begged
the people to raise food crops to keep the soldiers from starving.
The planters were asked as a patriotic duty to raise the largest pos-
sible quantities of supplies. The Confederate Congress also urged
the people to raise provision crops instead of cotton.^ Though hard
to convince that cotton was not king, the people in 1863 and 1864
turned their attention more to food crops, and had transportation
faciHties been good in 1864 and 1865, there need not have been
any suffering in the state, and the armies could have been fed better.^
Because of the few railways, and the bad roads, often people
in one section of the state would be starving when there was an
1 Miller, "Alabama," pp. 198, 199, 229. 2 Saunders, " Early Settlers," p. 68.
* Saunders, *' Early Settlers," p. 206 ; Hague, " Blockaded Family " ; Clayton,
"White and Black under the Old Regime"; "Our Women in the War."
* Governor Shorter's Proclamation, March I, 1862 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1862), p. 9.
^Annual Cyclopaedia (1863), p. 6; Resolution, April 4, 1863, Pub. Laws, 15th
Cong., 3d Sess.
6 A report to Davis in October, 1864, stated that Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi
had been supplying the Confederate armies. Georgia was exhausted, and Alabama,
having sent 125,000 pounds of bacon, could do no more. Pollard, "Lost Cause," pp.
648-649. But in remote counties were large stores of supplies that could not be moved
for want of transportation facilities.
SCARCITY AND DESTITUTION 203
abundance a hundred miles away. In the upper counties, when the
soldiers' families failed to make a crop, and when suppHes were hard
to get, the probate judges would give the women certificates, and send
them down into the lower country for corn. Women whose husbands
were at home hiding to escape the conscript officer or the squad
searching for deserters, young girls, and old women came in droves
into the central counties both by railway and by boat, for free passage
was given them, getting off at every landing and station. With
large sacks, these "corn women," as they were called, scoured the
country for corn and other provisions. Something was always given
them, and these suppHes were sent to the station or landing for them.
Money was sometimes given to them, and a crowd of "corn women"
on their way home would have several hundred dollars and quantities
of provisions. These women were usually opposed to the war,
and hated the army and every one in it; the negro they especially
disHked. The "corn women" became a nuisance to the overseers
and planters' wives on the plantations.^
When there was plenty in the country, the towns and the armies
were often in want. Speculators controlled the prices on whatever
found its way to the market. In 1861 Governor Moore issued a
proclamation condemning the extortion of tradesmen, who were
buying up the necessaries of life for the purposes of speculation.
Such, he declared, was unpatriotic and wicked.^ The legislature
made such an action a penal offence, and to buy up provisions and
clothing on the false pretence of being a Confederate agent was
"felony."^ In 1862 some officers of the Quartermaster's Depart-
ment were found guilty of speculation in food suppHes.'* To prevent
extortion the legislature afterwards enacted that on all goods for sale
or speculation, except medicine and drugs, a profit of 15 per cent
only could be made. All over that amount was to be paid into the
state treasury.^ Millers were not to take more than one-eighth for
U)\V
At times it was unlawful to buy corn or other grain for shipment
1 " Our Women in the War," p. 275 <?/ se^.
2 Moore, " Rebellion Records," p. 3; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p, 701.
^ Acts of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 11, 1862.
* Jones, " Diary," Vol, I, p. 198 ; Schwab, p. 180.
^ Acts of Gen. Assembly, Nov. 8, 1862. *' Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 13, 1864.
204 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and sale in another part of the state or in other states. The mihtary
authorities in charge of the railroads sometimes prohibited the
shipment of grain or suppHes away from the regions where the armies
were Hkely to camp or to march. In December, 1862, it was enacted
that no one except the producer or miller should sell corn without a
Hcense from the judge of probate, which hcense limited the sale to
one county for one year at a profit of not more than 20 per cent.^
However, in 1863 the legislature authorized T. B. Bethea of Mont-
gomery to sell corn bought in Marengo County in any market in the
state.^
Distress was produced in south Alabama by General Pember-
ton's order prohibiting shipment by private individuals from Mis-
sissippi to Alabama on the railways.^
In each state and later in each congressional district there were
price commissioners appointed, whose duty it was to fix schedules
of prices at which the articles of common use and necessity were to
be sold by the owners or paid for by the government when impressed.
These prices were fixed for the whole state, were usually for a term
of three months, and were often below the real market value. Con-
sequently this had no effect except to make the people hide their
suppHes from the government.'' Prices necessarily varied greatly
in the different sections of the state, and what was a reasonable
value in central Alabama was unreasonably low in north Alabama
or at Mobile. In 1863 a Confederate quartermaster in north Ala-
bama insisted that the price commissioners must raise their prices
or he would be unable to buy for the army. He wrote that wool
and woollen and leather goods sold at Mobile in December, 1863,
for from three to five times as much as the scheduled prices of No-
vember I, 1863. Prices in north Alabama, he added, must be made
higher than in south Alabama because there was barely enough in
that section for the people themselves ito live on.^
For months after the end of the war the inhabitants of the hill
and mountain districts of north Alabama and of the pine barrens
1 Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 8, 1862.
2 Act of Gen. Assembly, Dec. 8, 1863. ^ q. R., Ser. I, Vol. X, p. 971.
* In September, 1864, Surgeon Richard Potts was instructed to buy all the apple
brandy to be had, at not more than ^35 a gallon, but to purchase as a private individual
in order not to have to pay too much. O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 682.
s Saunders, " Early Settlers of Alabama," p. 29 ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. I, p. 608.
MILITARY USES OF NEGROES
205
of south Alabama were on the verge of starvation, and a number
of deaths actually occurred. The Black Belt fared better, and re-
covered more quickly from the devastation of the armies.
Sec. 5. The Negro during the War
Military Uses of Negroes
The large non-combatant negro population v^as not v^holly a
source of military and economic weakness to the state. In many
respects it was a source of strength to the mihtary authorities, who
employed negroes in various capacities, thus relieving whites for
military service. They were employed as teamsters, cooks, nurses,
and attendants in the hospitals, laborers on the fortifications at
Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, around the ordnance factories at
Selma, in the salt works of Clarke County, and at the nitre works of
central and southern Alabama. Half as many whites could be re-
leased for war as there were negroes employed in mihtary industries.
The negroes employed by the authorities were usually chosen because
trustworthy, and they were as devoted Confederates as the whites,
all in all, perhaps, more so. They were efficient and faithful, and
rarely deserted to the enemy or allowed themselves to be captured,
though many opportunities were offered in north Alabama.^
After the secession of the state and before the formation of the
Confederacy numerous offers of the services of negro men were made
by their masters. The legislature passed an act to regulate the
use of men so proffered.^ Where the negroes were employed in
great numbers by the government they worked under the supervision,
not of a government overseer, but of one appointed by the master
who supported the negroes, and who was paid or promised pay for
their work. In the early part of the war the white soldiers wanted
to fight, but not to dig trenches, cook, drive teams, or play in the
band. Congress authorized, in 1862, the employment of negroes
as musicians in the army, and the enhstment of four cooks, who
might be colored, for each company.^ In the same year the state
^ See also article by C. C. Jones, Jr., in Magazine of American History, Vol. XVI,
pp. 168-175 ; J. W. Beverly (colored), " History of Alabama," p. 22.
'■^ Act, Jan. 31, 1861 ; Beverly, "Alabama," p. 200.
8 April 15 and 21, 1862, Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., 2d Sess.
206 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
legislature authorized the governor to impress negroes to work on
the fortifications/ The state government impressed numbers of
negroes as laborers in the various state industries, such as nitre and
salt working, building railroads, and hauling the tax-in-kind. The
legislature, in August, 1863, declared that negroes ought to be placed
in all possible positions in the workshops and as laborers, and the
white men thus released should be sent to the army.^
Most of the impressment of blacks was done by the Confederate
government. The Confederate Impressment Act of March 26, 1863,
provided that no farm slave should be impressed before December i.
On February 17, 1864, free negroes were made liable to service in
the army as laborers and teamsters. Before the passage of this act
free negroes had often been hired as substitutes, and sent to the army
as soldiers in place of those who preferred the comforts of home.^
Bishop- General Polk made a general impressment of negroes in
north Alabama to work on the defences in his department, and many
protests were made by the owners. A public meeting was held in
April, 1864, in Talladega County to protest against further impress-
ment of negroes. This county, in December, 1862, sent 90 negroes
to the fortifications; in January, 1863, 120 more were sent; in
February, 1863, 160; in March, 1863, 160; and so on. Talladega
was one of the counties that had to furnish supplies to the destitute
mountain counties, and the loss of labor was severely felt. Randolph
and other north Alabama counties made similar protests. From
north Alabama 2500 negroes were taken at one time to work on the
fortifications in the Tennessee valley; this frequently occurred.
Central and south Alabama and southeast Mississippi furnished
many negroes to work on the fortifications at Selma, Montgomery,
and Mobile. After Farragut passed the forts at Mobile, 4500
negroes were at once set to throwing up earthworks and soon had
the city in safety.^ The lines of earthworks then made by the negroes
still stretch for miles around the city, through the pine woods, almost
as well defined as when thrown up.
When the' crack regiments of young men from the black counties
1 Acts, Oct. 31 and Nov. 20, 1862. 2 Resolutions, Aug. 29, 1863.
^ I have known two men who hired negro substitutes to go to the army, and the
negroes having been killed in battle, the whites were forced to go.
* Beverly, "Alabama," p. 200; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 198, 199, 207; Curry,
" Civil History," p. no ; O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, p. 933.
MILITARY USES OF NEGROES
207
went to Virginia, early in 1861, nearly every soldier had with him a
negro servant who faithfully took care of his ''young master" and
performed the rough tasks that fell to the soldier — splitting wood,
digging ditches about the camp, hauHng, and building. The Third
Alabama regiment of infantry, one of the best, left Alabama a thousand
strong in rank and file and several hundred strong in negro servants.
Two years later there were no negro servants; they had been sent
home when their masters were killed, or because they were needed
at home, or they had been sold and "eaten up" by the youngsters,
who now had to do their own work.^ Only the officers kept body-
servants after the first year or two. These servants were always
faithful, even unto death. The old Confederate soldiers have pleasant
recollections of the devotion of the faithful black who "fought, bled,
and died" with him for four years in dreary camp and on bloody
battle-field. The old soldier-servants who survive tell with pride
of the times when with "young master" and "Mass Bob Lee" they
"fowt the Yankees in Virginny" or at "Ilun 10." Many a bullet
was sent into the northern fines by the slaves secretly using the white
soldiers' guns. When capture was imminent, the negro servant
would take watches, papers, and other valuables of the master, and,
making his way through the enemy's fines, return to the old home
with messages and directions from his master, then in prison. In
battle the slave was close at hand to aid his master when wounded
or exhausted. With a pine torch at night he searched among the
wounded and dead for his master. Finding him wounded, he cared
for him faithfully, bore him to hospital or friendly house, or carried
him a long journey home. Finding him dead, the devoted slave
performed the last duties and alone often buried his master, and
then went sadly home to break the news. Sometimes he managed
to carry home his master's body, that it might fie among kindred in
the family burying-ground. If he could not do that, he carried to his
mistress his master's sword, horse, trinkets, and often his last message.^
The negroes were more wifiing to serve as soldiers than the whites
were for them to serve. The slave owner did not fike the idea of
1 John S. Wise, " End of an Era," pp. 161, 212, speaks of the impression made by
the 3d Alabama before and after the two years' service. The privates in one company
in this regiment paid tax on J?3,ooo,ocx5.
2 See also Beverly, " Alabama," p. 200. Several of these old body-servants have
related their experiences to me.
208 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
haying the negro fight, because it was felt that fundamentally the
black was the cause of strife. Others were sensitive about using
slave property to fight the quarrels of free men. As the years went
on opinion was more and more favorable to negro enhstment, but
it was too late before the Confederate government took up the matter.^
The average white person and the private soldiers generally
were opposed to the enlistment of the negroes. The white soldier
thought it was a white man's duty and privilege to serve as a soldier
and that the fight was a white man's fight. To make a negro a
soldier was to grant him military equality at least. To enlist negroes
meant to aboHsh slavery, sooner or later: negro soldiers would be
emancipated at once; the rest would be freed gradually. The non-
slaveholders were more opposed to such a scheme than the slave-
holders. The negro would have made a good soldier under his
master, but he was worth almost as much to the Confederacy to raise
suppHes and perform labor.^
The free negro population, though less than 3000 in number, were
devoted supporters of the Confederacy, and nearly all free black men
were engaged in some way in the Confederate service. Some entered
the service as substitutes, others as cooks, teamsters, and musicians.
In Mobile they asked to be enlisted as soldiers under white officers.
The skilful artisans usually stayed at home at the urgent request
of the whites, who needed their work, but, nevertheless, they con-
tributed. All accounts agree that they never avoided payment of
the tax-in-kind, and other contributions. One of the best-known
of the free negroes was Horace Godwin (or King) ' of Russell County.
He was a constant and liberal contributor to the support of the Con-
federacy. He also furnished clothes and money to the sons of his
former master who were in the army, and erected a monument over
the grave of their father.
1 Sewanee Review, Vol. II, pp. 94-95 ; Acts of Ala., Nov. 20, 1863, and Resolution
of Aug. 29, 1863 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 10.
2 See also C. C. Jones, Jr., in the Magazine of American History, Vol. XVI, pp.
168-175. When the war ended General (now Senator) Morgan was recruiting near
Selma for a Confederate negro brigade.
^ His master was named Godwin. Horace learned to make bridges, and became
so skilful and was so much in demand that he was set free. By special act of the
Alabama legislature he was given civil rights and at once he became a slave owner.
After the war he was in Republican politics for a while, but soon went back to bridge-
building.
NEGROES 01^ THE FARMS 209
Negroes on the Farms
During the war the greater part of the farm labor in the white
counties was done by old men, women, and children, and in the Black
Belt by the negroes. Usually the owner, who was perhaps entitled
to exemption under the "twenty- negro" law, went to war and left his
family and plantation to the care of the blacks. In no known in-
stance was the trust misplaced. There was no insubordination among
the negroes, no threat of violence. The negroes worked contentedly,
though they were soon aware that if the war went against their mas-
ters their freedom would result.^ Under the direction of the mistress,
advised once in a while by letter from the master in the army, the
black overseer controlled his fellow- slaves, planted, gathered, and
sold the crops, paid the tax-in-kind (under protest), and cared for
the white family.^ In a day's ride in the Black Belt no able-bodied
white man was to be found.^ When raiders came, the negroes saved
the family valuables and concealed the farm cattle in the swamps,
and though often mistreated by the plundering soldiers because they
had hidden the property, they were faithful. Women and children
felt safer then, when nearly all the white men were away, than
they have ever felt since among free negroes.'' The Black Belt
could never again send out one-half as many whites to war, in pro-
portion, as in 1861-1865.
1 Some masters, like General John B. Gordon, informed their slaves that the victory
of the North meant the freedom of the negroes. See Ku Klux Kept., Ga. Test., and
Sewanee Re^iiew, Vol. II, p. 95. I have been told by ex-slaves that the negroes in the
quarters believed from the first that their freedom would follow the defeat of the masters,
but that few slaves believed that their masters could be defeated.
'^ The following are some of the various occupations in which slaves relieved whites :
spinners, weavers, dyers, cutters and dressmakers, body-servants, butlers, coachmen, gar-
deners, carpenters, planters, brick masons, painters, tanners, shoemakers, harness makers,
barrel makers, wheelwrights, blacksmiths, machinists, engineers, millers, seine and sail
makers, and ship carpenters, besides farm occupations. Nearly all of the skilled laborers
were negroes. Their industrial capacity was even greater during the war than in time
of peace. President Winston in Proceedings of Fourth Conference for Education in
the South, pp. 40, 41. See also the books of Miss Hague, Mrs. Clayton, and Booker T.
Washington,
^ Harrison, " Gospel Among the Slaves," p. 299.
* See Mallard, pp. 209, 210 ; Hague, "Blockaded Family"; Clayton, "White and
Black " ; " Our Women in War" ; Sewanee Review^ Vol. II, p. 95.
2IO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Fidelity to Masters
The negroes had every opportunity to desert to the Federals,
except in the interior of the state, but desertions were infrequent
until near the close of the war. In the Tennessee valley many were
captured and carried off to work in the Federal camps. Numbers
of these captives escaped and gladly returned home. As the Federal
armies invaded the neighboring states, negroes from Georgia, Ten-
nessee, Florida, and Mississippi were sent into the state to escape
capture. In many instances the refugee slaves were in charge of
one of their own number — the overseer or driver. The invading
armies in 1865 found numbers of negro refugees doing their best
to keep out of the way of the Federals. As a rule only the negroes
of bad character or young boys deserted to the enemy or gave infor-
mation to their armies. The young negroes who followed the Fed-
eral raiders did not meet with the treatment expected, and were glad
enough to get back home. Most of the negroes disHked and feared
the invaders until they came as intensely as the whites did.^
The devotion and faithfulness of the house-servants and of many
of the field hands where they came in contact with the white people
at "the big house" cannot be questioned.^ On the part of these
there was a desire to acquit themselves faithfully of the trust imposed
in them.^ It is one of the beautiful aspects of slavery. Yet this will
not account for the good behavior of the blacks on the large planta-
tions where a white person was seldom seen. They were as faithful
almost as the house-servants. It was the faithfulness of trained
obedience rather than of love or gratitude, for these were fleeting
emotions in the soul of the average African.^ On the other hand,
the negro did not harbor mahce or hatred. Constitutionally good-
1 See Mallard, p. 210 ; Sewanee Review^ Vol. II, pp. 94-95 ; Southern Magazine,
Jan., 1874.
2 It has been estimated that one-fourth of the total number of negroes was not en-
gaged in field labor, but in some kind of service which brought them into close relations
with the whites. Tillinghast, "Negro in Africa and America," p. 126. And on the farms
and smaller plantations also the blacks knew their " white folks."
^ See W. H. Thomas, "American Negro," p. 41.
* The experiences of Reconstruction showed that the negro had only to feel the
touch of a stronger hand, and, with most of them, the attachments of a lifetime were of
no force. The negro was as wax in the hands of a stronger race. Hence the influence
of the carpet-baggers, who were for a time the stronger power.
FIDELITY TO MASTERS 211
natured, the negroes were as faithful to a harsh and strict master as
to one who treated them as men and brothers. Where one would
expect a desire and an effort for revenge, there was nothing of the
sort. Not so much love and fideHty, but training and discipHne,
made insurrection impossible among the blacks. Moreover, the negro
lacked the capacity for organization under his own leaders. Had
there been strong leaders and agitators, especially white ones, it is
likely that there would have been insurrection, and a negro rising
in Marengo County would have disbanded the Alabama troops.
But the system of discipHne prevented that.
The good church people maintain that one of the strongest in-
fluences to hold the negro to his duty was his religion. He had
often been carefully instructed by preachers, black and white, and
by his white master, and his religion was a real and living thing to
him. Invariably the influence of the sturdy old black plantation
preacher was exerted for good. This influence was strongly felt
on the large plantations, where the negroes seldom held converse
with white men.^
The negroes were frightened, during the last months of the war,
at possible capture by the Federals and forced enhstment or deporta-
tion to freedom and work in camps. They had somewhat the small
white child's idea of a ''Yankee" as some kind of a thing with horns.
When the end was at hand and the bonds of the social order were
loosening, the negro heard more of the freedom beyond the blue
armies, and some of them hoped for and welcomed the invaders.
When the armies came at last, most of the negroes helped, as before,
to save all that could be saved from the plunderers. At the worst,
the negro celebrated freedom by quitting work and following the
armies. Much steahng was done by them with the encouragement of
their dehverers, but the behavior of the blacks was always better than
that of the invaders. Many rode off the plantation stock in order to be
^ Harrison, " Gospel among the Slaves," pp. 299, 300 ; McTyeire, " A History of
Methodism" ; Riley, " Baptists in Alabama"; Mallard, " Plantation Life," p. 74 et seq.
W. H. Thomas (colored), "American Negro," pp. 41, 149, gives as reasons why the
slaves did not revolt during the war : (i) genuine affection for the whites ; (2) the de-
sire on the part of the negro to do the duty intrusted to him ; (3) and most important
— the supreme and all-pervading influence of religion. The mission work among the
negroes was kept up all during the war. Harrison, pp. 292-300 ; Tichenor, " Work of
Southern Baptists among the Negroes" (pamphlet).
212 CIVIL WAR AND RFXONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
able to follow the army to freedom and no work. Some burned
buildings, etc., because the army did. Most of the former house-
servants remained faithful to the whites until it was no longer safe
for a black man to be the friend of a native white.
On the whole the behavior of the slaves during the war, whatever
may be the causes, was most excellent. To the last day of bondage
the great majority were true against all temptations. With their
white people they wept for the Confederate slain, were sad at defeat,
and rejoiced in victory.^
Sec. 6. Schools and Colleges ; Newspapers and Publishing
Houses
Schools and Colleges
During the first year of the war the higher institutions of learning
kept their doors open and the common schools went on as usual.
The strongest educational institution was the University of Alabama,
which was supported by state appropriations. In i860 a military
department was established at the university under Captain. Caleb
Huse, U.S.A., who afterwards became a Confederate purchasing
agent in Europe. This step was not taken in anticipation of future
trouble with the United States, but had been contemplated for years.
The student body had been rather turbulent and hard to control, and
for the sake of order they were put under a strict mihtary dis-
cipHne similar to the West Point system. Many students resigned
early in 1861 and went into the Confederate service. Others, pro-
ficient in drill, were ordered by the governor to the state camps of
instruction to drill the new regiments. There were no commence-
ment exercises in 1861 ; but the trustees met and conferred degrees
upon a graduating class of fifty-two, the most of whom were in the
army.
The fall session of 1861 opened with a slight increase of students,
1 Harrison, pp. 299, 300. For general information in regard to the negroes during
the war, consult Beverly (colored), "Alabama," pp. 201, 202; Miller, "Alabama," pp.
142-157; Mallard, " Plantation Life"; Washington, " Up from Slavery"; Washington,
"Future of the American Negro"; Thomas, "The American Negro"; Tillinghast,
"Negro in Africa and America"; Hague, " A Blockaded Family"; Clayton, " White
and Black under the Old Regime"; Smedes, "Southern Planter"; "Our Women in
War."
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES
^13
but they were younger than usual, — from fourteen to seventeen
years, and not as well prepared as before the war. Parents sent
young boys to school to keep them out of the army; many went to
get the mihtary training in order that they might become officers
later; the state needed officers and encouraged military education.
The university was required to furnish drill-masters to the instruc-
tion camps without expense to the state. As soon as the boys were
well drilled they usually deserted school and entered the Confederate
service. This custom threatened to break up the school, and in 1862
all students were required to enlist as cadets for twelve months, and
were not permitted to resign. Yet they still deserted in squads
of two, three, and four, and went to the army. Recruiting officers
would offer them positions as officers, and they would accept and
leave the university. The students refused to study seriously any-
thing except military science and tactics. Numbers refused to take
the examinations in order that they might be suspended or expelled,
and thus be free to enlist.
In 1862-1863, 256 students were enrolled, — more than ever
before, — but mostly boys of fourteen and fifteen. The majority
of them were badly prepared in their studies, and it was necessary
to establish a preparatory department for them. In 1 863-1 864
there were 341 boys enrolled — younger than ever. At the end of
this session the first commencement since i860 was held, and degrees
were conferred on a few who had enlisted and on one or two who
had not. The enrolment during the session of 1864-1865 was be-
tween 300 and 400 — all young boys of twelve to fifteen. The cadets
were called out several times during this session to check Federal
raids. Little studying was done; all were spoiling for a fight.
When Croxton came, one night in 1865, the long roll was beaten,
and every cadet responded. Under the command of the president
and the commandant they marched against Croxton, whose force
outnumbered theirs six to one. There was a sharp fight, in which
a number of cadets were wounded, and then the president with-
drew the corps to Marion in Perry County, where it was disbanded
a few days later. It was now the end of the war. Croxton had
imperative orders to burn the university buildings, and they were
destroyed. There was a fine library, and the librarian, a French-
man, begged in vain that it might be spared. The officers who
214 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
fired the library saved one volume — the Koran — as a souvenir of
the occasion/
The Hospital for the Deaf and Dumb at Talladega and the
Insane Asylum were continued throughout the war by means of
state aid, and after the collapse of the Confederacy were not destroyed
by the Federals.^ La Grange College, a Methodist institution at
Florence, in north Alabama, lost its endowment during the war, and
after the occupation of that section by the Federals was closed. After
the war it was given to the state, and is now one of the State Normal
Colleges. In 1861, Howard College, the Baptist institution at Marion,
sent three professors and more than forty students to the army.
Soon there was only one professor left to look after the buildings ;
the rest of the faculty and all of the students had joined the army.
The endowments and equipment of the college were totally destroyed.
Nothing was left except the buildings.
The Southern University at Greensboro kept its doors open for
three years, but had to close in 1864 for want of students and faculty.
Most of its endowment was lost in Confederate securities. After
two years of war the East Alabama College at Auburn suspended
exercises. The buildings were then used as a Confederate hospital.
The endowment was totally lost in Confederate bonds, and after
the war the property was given to the state for the Agricultural and
Mechanical College, now the Alabama Polytechnic Institute. The
Catholic College at Spring Hill near Mobile, the Judson Institute
at Marion, a well-known Baptist College for women, and the Metho-
dist Woman's College at Tuskegee managed to keep going during
the war.^ The student body at both male and female colleges was
composed of younger and younger students each successive year.
In 1865 only children were found in any of them.
In i860 there were many private schools throughout the state.
Every town and village had its high school or academy. For several
1 W. G. Clark, " Education in Alabama," pp. 87-92; W. G. Clark, "The Progress of
Education," in " Memorial Record," Vol. I, p. 160; Acts, 1st Called Sess. (1861), p. 56;
N. Y. Daily Neivs, May 29, 1865; Century Magazine, Nov., 1889. In recent years
Congress has made a grant of lands in north Alabama to replace the burned buildings.
Kept. Comr. of Ed., 1899-1900, Vol. I, p. 484.
2 Clark, "Education in Alabama," pp. 149, 152, 153, 156; "Northern Alabama
Illustrated," p. 453.
8 Clark, " Education in Alabama," pp. 164, 174, 179, 180.
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 21$
years before the war military schools had been springing up over
the state. State aid was often given these in the form of supphes
of arms. Several were incorporated in i860 and 1861. Private
academies were incorporated in 1861 in Coffee, Randolph, and
Russell counties, with the usual provision that intoxicating Hquors
should not be sold within a mile of the school. Charters of several
schools were amended to suit the changed conditions. These schools
were all destroyed, with the exception of Professor Tutwiler's Green
Springs School, which survived the war, though all its property was
lost,^ and two schools in Tuscaloosa. One of these, known as ''The
Home School," was conducted by Mrs. Tuomey, wife of the well-
known geologist, and the other by Professor Saunders in the building
later known as the ''Athenaeum. " ^
The only independent city pubHc school system was that of Mobile,
organized in 1852, after northern models. The Boys' High School in
this city was kept open during the war, though seriously thinned
in numbers. The lower departments and the girls' schools were
always full.^ The state system of schools was organized in 1855
on the basis of the Mobile system. It was not in full operation
before the war came, though much had been done.
During the first part of the war pubhc and private schools went
on as usual, though there was a constantly lessening number of boys
who attended. Some went to war, while others, especially in the
white counties, had to stop school to look after farm affairs as soon
as the older men enhsted. Teachers of schools having over twenty
pupils were exempt,'* but as a matter of fact the teachers who were
physically able enlisted in the army along with their older pupils.
The teaching was left to old men and women, to the preachers and
disabled soldiers; most of the pupils were small girls and smaller
boys. The older girls, as the war went on, remained at home to
weave and spin or to work in the fields. In sparsely settled com-
1 Clark, " Education in Alabama," pp. 204, 208, 259; Acts, 1st Called Sess. (1861),
pp. 67, 70, 82, 113; Acts, 2d Called Sess. and ist Regular Sess., pp. 92, 93, 94; Brewer,
"Alabama," p. 347.
2 " Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 513.
3 Clark, " Education in Alabama," pp. 6, 7, 224, 226, 229, 239, 259; Ingle,
"Southern Side-Lights," p. 172.
* Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong., ist Sess., April 21, 1862; ist Cong., 2d Sess., Oct.
11,1862.
2l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAxMA
munities it became dangerous, on account of deserters and outlaws
for the children to make long journeys through the woods, and the
schools were suspended. The schools in Baldwin County were sus-
pended as early as i86i.^
Legislation for the schools went on much as usual. After the
first year few new schools were estabhshed, public or private. Ap-
propriations were made by the legislature and distributed by the
county superintendents. When the Federals occupied north Alabama,
the legislature ordered that school money should be paid to the county
superintendents in that section on the basis of the estimates for i86i.^
The sixteenth section lands were sold when it was possible and the
proceeds devoted to school purposes.^ A Confederate military
academy was established in Mobile and conducted by army officers.
The purpose of this institute was to give practical training to future
officers and to young and inexperienced officers.
Few, if any, of the schools were entirely supported by public
money. The small state appropriation was eked out by contributions
from the patrons in the form of tuition fees. These fees were paid
sometimes in Confederate money, but oftener in meat, meal, corn,
cloth, yarn, salt, and other necessaries of life. The school terms
were shortened to two or three months in the summer and as many
in the winter. The stronger pupils did not attend school when there
was work for them on the farm; consequently the summer session
was the more fully attended. The school system as thus conducted
did not break down, except in north Alabama, until the surrender,
though many schools were discontinued in particular locahties for
want of teachers or pupils.
The quaHty of the instruction given was not of the best; only
those taught who could do little else. The girls are said to have
been much better scholars than the boys, whose minds ran rather
upon miHtary matters. Often their play was military drill, and
listening to war stories their chief intellectual exercise.'*
Some rare and marvellous text-books again saw the light during
the war. Old books that had been stored away for two generations
1 Acts, 1st Called Sess. (1861), p. 82. 2 Acts (1862), p. 97.
3 Acts, 2d Called and ist Regular Sess. (1861), pp. 65, 182, 183, 223, 253, 255;
Acts of 1863 and i^6/\, passim.
* My chief source of information in regard to the common schools during the war
has been the accounts of persons who were teachers and pupils in the schools.
SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES 217
were brought out for use. Webster's "blue back" Speller was the
chief reliance, and when the old copies wore out, a revised southern
edition of the book was issued. Smith's Grammar was expurgated
of its. New Englandism and made a patriotic impression by its exer-
cises. Davies's old Arithmetics were used, and several new mathe-
matical works appeared. Very large editions of Confederate
text-books were pubhshed in Mobile, and especially in Richmond;
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia also furnished Con-
federate text-books to Alabama. Mobile furnished Mississippi.^
I have seen a small geography which had crude maps of all the coun-
tries, including the Confederate States, but omitting the United States.
A few lines of text recognized the existence of the latter country.
Another geography was evidently intended to teach patriotism and
pugnacity, to judge from its contents. Here are some extracts from
W. B. Moore's Primary Geography: "In a few years the
northern states, finding their climate too cold for the negroes to be
profitable, sold them to the people living farther south. Then the
northern states passed laws to forbid any person owning slaves in
their borders. Then the northern people began to preach, to lec-
ture, and to write about the sin of slavery. The money for which
they had sold their slaves was now partly spent in trying to persuade
the southern states to send their slaves back to Africa. . . . The
people [of the North] are ingenious and enterprising, and are noted
for their tact in 'driving a bargain.' They are refined and intelligent
on all subjects but that of negro slavery ; on this they are mad. . . .
1 From 1863 to 1865 W, G. Clark and Co. of Mobile, the chief educational publishers
of the state, brought out a series of five readers, "The Chaudron Series," — by Adelaide
de V. Chaudron, a well-known writer of Mobile. Large numbers were sold. S. H.
Goetzel of Mobile published Madame Chaudron's spelling-book, of which 40,000 copies
were sold in 1864 and 1865. W. G. Clark and Co. printed a revision of Colburn's
Mental Arithmetic in 1864. A Mental Arithmetic by G. Y. Browne of Tuscaloosa is
dated Atlanta, 1865, but was probably published in North Carolina. In 1864 W. G.
Clark and Co. announced " A Book of Geographical Questions." Before the close of the
war Confederate text-books were quite common in the state. The series were usually
named "Confederate," "Dixie," "Texas," "Virginia," etc. Stephen B. Weeks, in "A
Preliminary Bibliography of Confederate Text-books " (Rept. of Comr. of Ed., 1898-
1S99, Vol. I, p. 1139), lists 16 primers, 14 spellers, 29 readers, 4 geographies, I diction-
ary, 12 arithmetics, 12 grammars, 8 books in foreign languages, 20 Sunday-school and
religious works, and 10 miscellaneous educational publications. Those published in
Georgia, North and South Carolina, and Virginia sold largely in Alabama. Few came
from the West. See also Yates Snowden, " Confederate Books."
2l8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
This [the Confederacy] is a great country! The Yankees thought
to starve us out when they sent their ships to guard our seaport towns.
But we have learned to make many things; to do without others.
" Q. Has the Confederacy any commerce ?
" A. A fine inland commerce, and bids fair, sometime, to have a
grand commerce on the high seas.
" Q. What is the present drawback to our trade ?
" A. An unlawful blockade by the miserable and helHsh Yankee
nation." ^
In some families the children were taught at home by a governess
or by some member of the family. This was the case especially in
the Black Belt, where there were not enough white children to make
up a school. Many mistresses of plantations were, however, too
busy to look after the education of their children, and the latter, when
old enough, would be sent to a friend or relative who hved in town,
in order to attend school.^ Sometimes a planter had a school on his
plantation for the benefit of his own children. To this school would
be admitted the children of all the whites on the plantation, and of
the neighbors who were near enough to come.^
Newspapers
In i860 there were ninety-six periodicals of various kinds pub-
lished in Alabama. About twenty-five of these suspended pubhca-
tion during the war and were not revived afterwards. Numbers
of others suspended for a short time when paper could not be secured
or when being moved from the enemy. The monthly pubhcations
— usually agricultural — all suspended. The so-called ''unionist"
newspapers of i860 went to the wall early in the war or were sold to
editors of different political principles.'' In spite of the existence
of war, the circulation decreased. Most of the reading men were
in the army; the people at home became less and less able to pay
for a newspaper as the war progressed, and many persons read a
1 See Weeks, "Bibliography of Confederate Text-books."
2 See Mrs. Clayton, "White and Black," p. 115, and Hague, "Blockaded Family."
^ See Hague, " A Blockaded Family." Miss Hague was a teacher in a plantation
school during the war.
* W. W. Screws, "Alabama Journalism," in "Memorial Record," Vol. II, pp. 195,
234-
NEWSPAPERS
219
single copy, which was handed around the community. People who
could not read would subscribe for newspapers and get some one
to read for them. An eager crowd surrounded the reader. Papers
left for a short time in the post-office were read by the post-office
loiterers as a right. Few war papers are now in existence, there
were so many uses for them after they were read.
It is said that the newspaper men did more service in the field
in proportion to numbers than any other class. At the first sound of
war many of them left the office and did not return until the struggle
was ended. Often every man connected with a paper would volun-
teer, and the paper would then cease to be issued. There were
instances when both father and son left the newspaper office,
and one or both were killed in the war. Colonel E. C. Bullock
of the Alabama troops was a fine type of the Alabama editor. The
law exempted from service one editor and the necessary printers for
each paper. But little advantage was taken of this ; few able-bodied
newspaper men failed to do service in the field. ^
Sometimes in north Alabama publication had to cease because of
the occupation of the country by the Federal forces, which con-
fiscated or destroyed the printing outfits. It was difficult to get
supplies of paper, ink, and other newspaper necessaries. No new
lots of type were to be had at all during the whole war. Some papers
were printed for weeks at a time on blue, brown, or yellow wrapping-
paper. The regular printing-paper was often of bad quality and
the ink was also bad, so that to-day it is almost impossible to read
some of the papers. Others are as white and clean as if printed a
year ago. A bound volume presents a variegated appearance —
some issues clear and white and strong, others stained and greasy
from the bad ink. The type was often so worn as to be almost
illegible. In some instances, when the sense could be made out,
letters were omitted from words, and even words were omitted, in
order to save the type for use elsewhere.
The reading matter in the papers was not as a rule very exciting.
Brief summaries were given of rnilitary operations, in which the
Confederates were usually victorious, and of political events, North
and South. One of the latest war papers that I have seen chronicles
^ Screws, pp. 194, 195, 205, 212, 218, 233, 234 ; Pub. Laws, C.S.A., 1st Cong.,
1st Sess., April 21, 1862; 2d Sess., Oct. ii» 1862; Yates Snowden, " Confederate Books."
220 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the defeat of Grant by Lee about April lo, 1865. Letters were
printed from the editor in the field; former employees also wrote
letters for the paper, and items of interest from the soldiers' letters
were pubhshed. New legislation, state and Confederate, was sum-
marized. The governor's proclamations were made pubHc through
the medium of the county newspapers. It was about the only way
in which the governor could reach his people. The orders and
advertisements of the army commissaries and quartermasters and
conscript officers were printed each week; there were advertise-
ments for substitutes, a few for runaway negroes, and a very few
trade advertisements. If a merchant had a stock of goods, he was
sure to be found without giving notice., Notices of land sales were
frequent, but very few negroes were offered for sale. The price
of slaves was high to the last, a sentimental price. Many papers
devoted columns and pages to the printing of directions for making
at home various articles of food and clothing that formerly had been
purchased from the North — how to make soap, salt, stockings,
boxes without nails, coarse and fine cloth, substitutes for tea, coffee,
drugs, etc.
Mobile, Montgomery, Selma, and Tuscaloosa were the head-
quarters of the strongest newspapers. The Mobile Tribune and
the Register and Advertiser were suppressed when the city fell ; the
material of the latter was confiscated. Both had been strong war
papers. In April, 1865, the Montgomery Advertiser sent its material
to Columbus, Georgia, to escape destruction by the raiders, but
Wilson's men burned it there. In Montgomery the newspaper
files were piled in the street by Wilson and burned ; and when Steele
came, with the second army of invasion, the Advertiser, which was
coming out on a makeshift press, was suppressed, and not until July
was it permitted to appear again. The Montgomery Mail, edited
by Colonel J. J. Seibels, who had leanings toward peace, began early
in 1865 to prepare the people for the inevitable. Its attitude was
bitterly condemned by the Advertiser and by many people, but it
was saved from destruction by this course.^
1 Screws, pp. 161, 166, 188, 192, 231.
PUBLISHING HOUSES 221
Publishing Houses
Most of the people of Alabama had but little time for reading,
and those who had the time and incHnation were usually obHged to
content themselves with old books. The family Bible was in a great
number of homes almost the only book read. Most of the new
books read were pubhshed in Atlanta, Richmond, or Charleston,
though during the last two years of the war Mobile pubhshers sent
out many thousand volumes. W. G. Clark and Co., of Mobile,
confined their attention principally to text-books, but S. H. Goetzel
was more ambitious. His Hst includes text-books, works on miHtary
science and tactics, fiction, translations, music, etc. The best-selHng
southern novel pubhshed during the war was "Macaria," by Augusta
J. Evans of Mobile. It was printed by Goetzel, who also pubhshed
Mrs. Ford's " Exploits of Morgan and his Men," which was pirated
or reprinted by Richardson of New York. Evans and Cogswell of
Charleston pubhshed Miss Evans's "Beulah." Both "Macaria " and
''Beulah" were reprinted in the North. Goetzel bound his books in
rotten pasteboard and in wall-paper. Goetzel was also an enter-
prising pubhsher of translations. In 1864 he pubhshed (on wrap-
ping-paper) a four-volume translation, by Adelaide de V. Chaudron,
of Muhlbach's "Joseph II and His Court." He pubhshed other
translations of Miss Muhlbach's historical novels, — her first American
pubhsher. Owen Meredith's poem, " Tanhauser," was first printed
in America in Mobile. An opera of the same name was also pubhshed.
Hardee's " Rifle and Infantry Tactics,"- in two volumes, and
Wheeler's " Cavalry Tactics " were printed in large editions by
Goetzel for the use of Alabama troops.
Lieutenant-Colonel Freemantle's book, "Three Months in the
Southern States," was published in Mobile in 1864, and. in the same
year the works of Dickens and George Eliot were reprinted by
Goetzel. An interesting book published by Clark of Mobile was
entitled "The Confederate States Almanac and Repository of Useful
Knowledge." It appeared annually to 1864 in Mobile and Augusta,
and resembled the annual cyclopaedias and year-books of to-day.
Small devotional books and tracts were printed in nearly every town
that had a printing-press. It is said that the church societies pub-
lished no doctrinal or controversial tracts. Hundred of different
222 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
tracts, such as Cromwell's "Soldier's Pocket Bible," were printed for
distribution among the soldiers. But not enough Bibles and Testa-
ments could be made. The northern Bible societies "with one ex-
ception " refused to supply the Confederate sinners. The American
Bible Society of New York gave hundreds of thousands of Bibles,
Testaments, etc., principally for the Confederate troops. At one
time 150,000 were given, at another 50,000, and the work was con-
tinued after the war. In 1862 the British and Foreign Bible Society
gave 310,000 Bibles, etc., for the soldiers, and gave unlimited credit
to the Confederate Bible Society.^
After the surrender the material of the newspapers and publish-
ing houses was confiscated or destroyed.
Sec. 7. The Churches during the War
Attitude of the Churches toward Public Questions
The reHgious organizations represented in the state strongly
supported the Confederacy, and even before the beginning of hostili-
ties several of them had placed themselves on record in regard to
political questions. As a rule, there was no political preaching, but
at conferences and conventions the sentiment of the clergy would be
pubhcly declared.
The Alabama Baptist Convention, in i860, declared, in a series
of resolutions on the state of the country, that though standing aloof
for the most part from pohtical parties and contests, yet their retired
position did not exclude the profound conviction, based on unques-
tioned facts, that the Union had failed in important particulars to
answer the purpose for which it was created. From the Federal gov-
ernment the southern people could no longer hope for justice, protec-
tion, or safety, especially with reference to their peculiar property,
recognized by the Constitution. They thought themselves entitled
to equality of rights as citizens of the republic, and they meant to
maintain their rights, even at the risk of life and all things held dear.
They felt constrained "to declare to our brethren and fellow-citizens,
before mankind and before our God, that we hold ourselves subject
to the call of proper authority in defence of the sovereignty and
1 See also Yates Snowden, " Confederate Books." I have examined copies of most
of the books mentioned.
ATTITUDE OF CHURCHES TOWARD PUBLIC QUESTIONS 223
independence of the state of Alabama and of her sacred right as a
sovereignty to withdraw from this Union, and to make any arrange-
ment which her people in constituent assembUes may deem best
for securing their rights. And in this declaration we are heartily,
deliberately, unanimously, and solemnly united." ^ Bravely did
they stand by this declaration in the stormy years that followed.
A year later (1861) the Southern Baptist Convention adopted reso-
lutions sustaining the principles for which the South was fighting,
condemning the course of the North, and pledging hearty support
to the Confederate government.^ Like action was taken by the
Southern Methodist Church, but little can now be found on the sub-
ject. One authority states that in i860 the poHticians were anxious
that the Alabama Conference should declare its sentiment in regard
to the state of the country. This was strongly opposed and frus-
trated by Bishops Soule and Andrew, who wanted to keep the
church out of politics.^ From another account we learn that in
December, i860, a meeting of Methodist ministers in Montgomery
declared in favor of secession from the Union.''
In 1862 a committee report to the East Liberty Baptist Associa-
tion urged "one consideration upon the minds of our membership :
the present civil war which has been inaugurated by our enemies
must be regarded as a providential visitation upon us on account
of our sins." This called forth warm discussion and was at once
modified by the insertion of the words, "though entirely just on
our part. " ^
In 1863 the Alabama ministers — Baptist, Methodist Episcopal
South, Methodist Protestant, United Synod South, Episcopal, and
Presbyterian — united with the clergy of the other southern states
in "The Address of the Confederate Clergy to Christians through-
out the World." The address declared that the war was being
waged to achieve that which it was impossible to accomplish by
violence, viz. to restore the Union. It protested against the action
of the North in forcing the war upon the South and condemned the
aboHtionist policy of Lincoln as indicated in the Emancipation Proc-
1 Riley, " History of the Baptists of Alabama," p. 279.
2 McPherson, " Rebellion," p. 514.
8 Smith, " Life and Letters of James Osgood Andrew," p. 473.
4 N. V. World, Dec. 26, i860. ° Riley, "Baptists of Alabama," p. 291.
224 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
lamation. It made a lengthy defence of the principles for which
the South was fighting/
By law ministers were exempt from mihtary service.^ But nearly
all of the able-bodied ministers went to the war as chaplains, or as
officers, leading the men of their congregations. It was considered
rather disgraceful for a man in good physical condition to take up
the profession of preaching or teaching after the war began. Young
men ''called to preach" after 1861 received scant respect from their
neighbors, and the government refused to recognize the validity of
these "calls to preach." The preachers at home were nearly all
old or physically disabled men. Gray-haired old men made up the
conferences, associations, conventions, councils, synods, and presby-
teries. But to the last their spirit was high, and all the churches
faithfully supported the Confederate cause. They cheered and
kept up the spirits of the people, held society together against
the demoralizing influences of civil strife, and were a strong support
to the state when it had exhausted itself in the struggle. They gave
thanks for victory, consolation for defeat; they cared for the needy
families of the soldiers and the widows and orphans made by war.
The church societies incorporated during the last year of the war
show that the state rehef administration had broken down. Some
of them were, "The Methodist Orphans' Home of East Alabama,"
"The Orphans' Home of the Synod of Alabama," "The Samaritan
Society of the Methodist Protestant Church," "The Preachers'
Aid Society of the Montgomery Conference of the Methodist Epis-
copal Church South." The Episcopal Church was incorporated in
order that it might make provision for the widows and orphans of
soldiers.^
In 1 86 1 the Presbyterian, Cumberland Presbyterian, Episcopal,
and Methodist churches in Huntsville sent their bells to Holly Springs,
Mississippi, and had them cast into cannon for a battery to be called
the "Bell Battery of Huntsville." Before they were used the cannon
were captured by the Federals when they invaded north Alabama
in 1862.''
Each command of volunteers attended church in a body before
1 McPherson, " Rebellion," p. 591.
2 Pub. Laws, C.S.A., ist Cong., ist Sess., April 21, 1862, and 2d Sess., Oct. ii,
1862.
3 Acts of Ala., Dec. 9, 12, and 13, 1864. * N, Y. TimeSy Aug. 30, 1865.
THE CHURCHES AND THE NEGROES 225
departing for the front. On such occasions there were special ser-
vices in which divine favor was invoked upon the Confederate
cause and its defenders. Rehgion exercised a strong influence over
the southern people. The strongest demominations were the Meth-
odists and the Baptists. Nearly all the soldiers belonged to some
church, the great majority to the two just named. The good influence
of the chaplains over the undisciphned men of the southern armies
was incalculable. To the religious training of the men is largely
due the fact that the great majority of the soldiers returned but little
demorahzed by the four years of war.^
Not only was the southern soldier not demoralized by his army
life, but many passed through the baptism of fire and came out better
men in all respects. The ''poor whites," so-called, arrived at true
manhood, they fought their way into the front of affairs, and learned
their true worth. The reckless, slashing temper of the young bloods
disappeared. All were steadied and sobered and imbued with greater
self-respect and respect for others. And the work of the church
at home and in the army aided this tendency; its democratic
influences were strong.
The white congregations at home were composed of women, old
men, cripples, and children. Among the women the religious spirit
was strongest ; it accounts in some degree for their marvellous cour-
age and constancy during the war. They were often called to church
to sanctify a fast. The favorite readings in the Bible were the first
and second chapters of Joel. They worked and fasted and prayed
for protection and for victory.^ The Bible was the most commonly
read book in the entire land. The people, naturally religious before
the war, became intensely so during the struggle.^
The Churches and the Negroes
After the separation of the southern churches from the northern
organizations the religious instruction of the negroes was conducted
1 Rev. J. William Jones, " The Great Revival in the Southern Armies " ; Rev. J.
William Jones, "Confederate Military History," Vol. XII, p. 119 et seq. ; Bennett, "The
Great Revival in the Southern Armies" ; Alexander, " History of the Methodist Church
South," p. 74.
2 Hague, " Blockaded Family," pp. iii, 112, 142 ; Ball, "Clarke County," p. 283.
3 For one instance, see Hague, " Blockaded Family," p. 141 ; and for others, Jones
on the " Morale of the Confederate Armies," in Vol. XII, " Confederate Military History."
Q
226 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
under less difficulties, and greater progress was made. There was
no longer danger of interference by hostile mission boards controlled
by antislavery officials/ The mission work among the negroes
was prospering in 1861, and while the white congregations were often
without pastors during the war, the negro missions were always sup-
plied.^ Many negro congregations were united to white ones and
were thus served by the same preacher; others were served by regu-
lar circuit riders. Some of the best ministers were preachers to
the blacks, and were most devoted pastors. One winter a preacher
in the Tennessee valley, when the Federals had burned the bridges,
swam the river in order to reach his negro charge. The faithful
1 By the Alabama Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, there was
appropriated for slave missions in the state
From 1829 to 1844 • ^I7>366.36
From 1845 t° ^^^4 340,166.67
Before the separation the planters were not favorably inclined toward Methodist
missionaries on account of the attitude of the northern section of the church. They
preferred the Baptists and Presbyterians, who did most of their work with the blacks in
connection with the white congregations. After the separation, in 1845, there was a
greater demand for Methodist missionaries. Many planters of the Episcopal Church
paid the salaries of Baptist and Methodist missionaries to their slaves, and erected
chapels for their use. Harrison, "Gospel among the Slaves," pp. 302, 312, 313, 326.
In i860 there were 20,577 negro southern Methodists in Alabama, about half of whom
were attached to the white churches and the rest to plantation missions. The number
was rapidly increasing. The number of negro Baptists was much greater, but there are
no exact statistics of membership. There were smaller numbers in all the other churches.
2 The following statistics relate to colored mission work by the Methodists : —
Year
Number of Missions
Members
Missionaries
Appropriations
1859
38
8381
39
^25,849.10
i860
40
9208
40
27,091.66
1 861
40
40
27,091.66
1862
36
8962
35
10,800.00
1863
37
9020
37
3i»3ii.59
1864
22
(Montgomery Conference)
5153
22
24,508.00
1864
1865
23
(Mobile Conference)
5684
33
26,938.16
Some money was raised
in 1864 for 1865.
The General Conference raised, in 1862, 1^593,509.87 for negro missions; in
1^158,421.96; and, for 1865, ^80,000.
THE FEDERAL ARMIES AND SOUTHERN CHURCHES 22/
blacks were waiting for him and built him a fire of pine knots. He
preached and dried his clothes at the same time/
The fidehty of the slave during these trying times called forth
expressions of gratitude from the churches, and all of them did what
they could to better his social and religious condition.^ Often when
there was no white preacher, the old negro plantation preacher took
his place in the pulpit and preached to the white and black congre-
gation.^ The good conduct of the slaves during the war was due
in large degree to the religious training given them by white and
black preachers and by the families of the slaveholders. The old
black plantation preacher was a tower of strength to the whites of
the Black Belt.'' The missions were destroyed by the victorious
Unionists, and the negro members of the southern churches were
encouraged to separate themselves from the "rebel" churches; and
never since have the southern religious organizations been able to
enter successfully upon work among the blacks.
The Federal Armies and the Southern Churches
With the advance of the Federal armies came the northern
churches. Territory gained by northern arms was considered ter-
ritory gained for the northern churches. Ministers came, or were
sent down, to take the place of southern ministers, who were prohibited
from preaching. The mihtary authorities were especially hostile
to the Methodist Episcopal Church South,^ and to the Protestant
Episcopal Church, annoying the ministers and congregations of these
bodies in every way. They were told that upon them lay the blame
for the war ; they had done so much to bring it on. There were very
few "loyal" ministers and no "loyal" bishops, but the Secretary of
War at Washington, in an order dated November 30, 1863, placed
at the disposal of Bishop Ames of the northern Methodist Church,
all houses of worship belonging to the southern Methodist Church
in which a "loyal" minister, appointed by a "loyal" bishop, was
1 Harrison, p. 314. 2 Riley, " Baptists of Alabama." * Hague, pp. lo, ii.
* Riley, "Baptists of Alabama," pp. 286, 300; McTyeire, "A History of Method-
ism," p. 671; Tichenor, "The Work of the Baptists among the Negroes." The war
records of the churches show that sometimes the slaves gave more money for church
purposes than the whites ; for example, in the Methodist church of Auburn, Ala.
^ Smith, " Methodists in Georgia and Florida."
228 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
not officiating. It was a matter of the greatest importance to the
government, the order stated, that Christian ministers should by
example and precept support and foster the " loyal " sentiment of the
people. Bishop Ames, the order recited, enjoyed the entire confi-
dence of the War Department, and no doubt was entertained by the
government but that the ministers appointed by him would be
"loyal." The mihtary authorities were directed to support Bishop
Ames in the execution of his important mission.^ A second order,
dated January 14, 1864, directed the military authorities to turn
over to the American Baptist Home Mission Society all churches
belonging to the southern Baptists. Confidence was expressed in
the "loyalty" of this society and its ministers.^ Other orders placed
the Board of Home Missions of the United Presbyterian Church
in charge of the churches of the Associate Reformed Church, and
authorized the northern branches of the (O. S. and N. S.) Presby-
terians to appoint "loyal" ministers for the churches of these de-
nominations in the South.
Lincoln seems to have been displeased with the action taken by
the War Department, but nothing more was done than to modify
the orders so as to concern only the "churches in the rebellious
states." ^
Under these orders churches in north Alabama were seized and
turned over to the northern branches of the same denomination.
In some of the mountain districts this was not opposed by the so-called
"union" element of the population. But in most places bitter
feelings were aroused, and controversies began which lasted for
several years after the war ended. The northern churches in
some cases attempted to hold permanently the property turned over
to them during the war. In central and south Alabama, where thf
Federal forces did not appear until 1865, these orders were no I
enforced.
In the section of the country occupied by the enemy, the military
authorities attempted to regulate the services in the various churches.
Prayer had to be offered for the President of the United States and
for the Federal government. It was a criminal offence to pray for
the Confederate leaders. Preachers who refused to pray "loyal"
1 McPherson, p. 521. 2 McPherson, p. 521.
8 McPherson, pp. 521, 522 ; Nicolay and Hay, Vol. V, p. 337.
THE FEDERAL ARMIES AND SOUTHERN CHURCHES 229
prayers and preach ''loyal" sermons were forbidden to hold services.
In Huntsville, in 1862, the Rev. Frederick A. Ross, a celebrated
Presbyterian clergyman, was arrested by General Rousseau, and
sent North for praying a "disloyal" prayer in which he said, "We
pray Thee, O Lord, to bless our enemies and to remove them from
our midst as soon as seemeth good in Thy sight." He seems to have
been released, for in February, 1865, General R. S. Stanley wrote
to General Thomas's adjutant-general protesting against the poHcy
of the provost- marshal in Huntsville, who had selected a number
of prominent men to answer certain test questions as to "loyalty."
If not answered to his satisfaction, the person catechized was to be
sent beyond the hnes. Among other prominent citizens two min-
isters — Ross and Bannister — were selected for expulsion. These,
General Stanley said, had never taken part in politics, and he thought
it was a bad pohcy. However, he stated that General Granger
wanted the preachers expelled.^
Throughout the war there was a disposition on the part of some
army officers to compel ministers of southern sympathies to con-
duct "loyal" services — that is, to preach and pray for the success
of the Federal government. It was especially easy to annoy the
Episcopal clergy, on account of the formal prayer used, but other
denominations also suffered. In one instance, a Methodist minister
was told that he must take the oath (this was soon after the surrender)
and pray for the President of the United States, or he must stop
preaching. For a time he refused, but finally he took the oath,
and, as he said, "I prayed for the President; that the Lord would
take out of him and his allies the hearts of beasts and put into them
the hearts of men, or remove the cusses from office. The little cap-
tain never asked me any more to pray for the President and the
United States." ^
In the churches the situation at the close of the war was not
promising for peace. Some congregations were divided; church
property was held by aliens supported by the army; "loyal" services
were still demanded; the northern churches were sending agents
1 See Gulf States Hist. Mag., Sept., 1902, on "The Churches in Alabama during
Civil War and Reconstruction"; O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, p. 718; Southern
Reviezv, April, 1872, p. 414; Boston Journal, Nov. 15, 1864; McTyeire, "A History
of Methodism," p. 673.
2 Richardson, " Lights and Shadows of Itinerant Life," p. 183.
230 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to occupy the southern field; the negroes were being forcibly sepa-
rated from southern supervision ; the poHcy of "disintegration and
absorption" was beginning. Consequently the church question
during Reconstruction was one of the most irritating/
Sec. 8. Domestic Life
Society in 1861
During the early months of 1861 society was at its brightest and
best. For several years social life had been characterized by a vague
feeling of unrest. Political questions became social questions, so-
ciety and politics went hand in hand, and the social leaders were the
political leaders. The women were well informed on all questions
of the day and especially on the burning sectional issues that affected
them so closely. After the John Brown episode at Harper's Ferry,
the women felt that for them there could be no safety until the ques-
tion was settled. They were strongly in favor of secession after that
event if not before; they were even more unanimous than the men,
feeling that they were more directly concerned in questions of inter-
ference with social institutions in the South. There was to them a
great danger in social changes made, as all expected, by John Brown
methods.^
Brilliant social events celebrated the great political actions of the
day. The secession of Alabama, the sessions of the convention, the
1 See Whitaker's paper in Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, p. 21 1 et seq.
2 Col. Higginson seems to understand the influence of the women, but not the
reason for their interest in public questions. He says : " But for the women of the seced-
ing states, the War of the Rebellion would have been waged more feebly, been sooner
ended, and far more easily forgotten. . . . Had the voters of the South been all women,
it would have plunged earlier into the gulf of secession, dived deeper, and come up even
more reluctantly." Higginson, " Common Sense about Women," pp. 54, 209. Professor
Burgess, with a better understanding, explains the reason for the interest of the women
in sectional questions. He says that, after the attempt of John Brown to incite the slaves
to insurrection, " especially did terror and bitterness take possession of the hearts of the
women of the South, who saw in slave insurrection not only destruction and death, but
that which to feminine virtue is a thousand times worse than the most terrible death.
For those who would excite such a movement or sympathize with anybody who would
excite such a movement, the women of the South felt a hatred as undying as virtue itself.
Men might still hesitate . . . but the women were united and resolute, and their unani-
mous exhortation was : * Men of the South, defend the honor of your mothers, your
wives, your sisters, and your daughters. It is your highest and most sacred duty.' "
Burgess, " Civil War and the Constitution," Vol. I, p. 42.
SOCIETY IN 1861
231
meeting of the legislature, the meeting of the Provisional Congress,
the inauguration of President Davis — all were occasions for splendid
gatherings of beauty and talent and strength. There were balls,
receptions, and other social events in country and in town. There
was no city Ufe, and country and town were socially one. Enthu-
siasm for the new government of the southern nation was at fever
heat for months. At heart many feared and dreaded that war might
follow, but had war been certain, the knowledge would have turned
no one from his course. When war was seen to be imminent, enthu-
siasm rose higher. Fear and dread were in the hearts of the women,
but no one hesitated. From social gayety they turned to the task of
making ready for war their fathers, brothers, husbands, and sweet-
hearts. They hurriedly made the first gray uniforms and prepared
supplies for the campaign. When the companies were fitted out and
ready to depart, there were farewell balls and sermons, and presenta-
tions of colors by young women. These ceremonies took place in
the churches, town halls, and court-houses. Speeches of presenta-
tion were made by young women, and of acceptance by the officers.
The men always spoke well. The women showed a thorough ac-
quaintance with the questions at issue, but most of their addresses
were charges to the soldiers, encouragement to duty. "Go, my sons,
and return victorious or fall in the cause of the South," or a similar
paraphrase, was often heard. One lady said, "We confide [to you]
this emblem of our zeal for liberty, trusting that it will nerve your
hearts and strengthen your hands in the hour of trial, and that its
presence will forbid the thought of seeking any other retreat than in
death." Another maiden told her soldiers that "we who present
this banner expect it to be returned brightened by your chivalry or
to become the shroud of the slain." "The terrors of war are far less
to be feared than the degradation of ignoble submission," the soldiers
were assured by another bright-eyed girl. The legends embroidered
or woven into the colors were such as these: "To the Brave," "Vic-
tory or Death," "Never Surrender." ^
There were dress parades, exhibition drills, picnics, barbecues;
and then the soldiers marched away. After a short season of fever-
ish social gayety, the seriousness of war was brought home to the peo-
i"Our Women in V^^ar," passim; Ball, *' Clarke County," pp. 261-274; oral
accounts, scrap-books, letters.
232 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
pie, and those left behind settled down to watch and wait and work
and pray for the loved ones and for the cause. It was soon a very
quiet life, industrious, strained with waiting and Hstening for news.
For a long time the interior country was not disturbed by fear of inva-
sion. Life was monotonous ; sorrow came afresh daily ; and it was
a blessing to the women that they had to work so hard during the war,
as constant employment was their greatest comfort.
Life on the Farm
The great majority of the people of Alabama lived in the country
on farms and plantations. They had been dependent upon the North
for all the finer and many of the commoner manufactured articles.
The staple crop was cotton, which was sold in exchange for many of
the ordinary necessaries of life. Now all was changed. The block-
ade shut off supplies from abroad, and the plantations had to raise
all that was needed for feeding and clothing the people at home and
the soldiers in the field. This necessitated a change in plantation
economy. After the first year of war less and less cotton was planted,
and food crops became the staple agricultural productions. The
state and Confederate authorities encouraged this tendency by advice
and by law. The farms produced many things which were seldom
planted before the war, when cotton was the staple crop. Cereals
were cultivated in the northern counties and to some extent in central
Alabama, though wheat was never successful in central and south
Alabama. Rice, oats, corn, peas, pumpkins, ground-peas, and chufas
were grown more and more as the war went on. Ground-peas (called
also peanuts, goobers, or pindars, according to locality) and chufas
were raised to feed hogs and poultry. The common field pea, or
"speckled Jack," was one of the mainstays of the Confederacy. It
is said that General Lee called it "the Confederacy's best friend."
At "laying by" the farmers planted peas between the hills of corn, and
the vines grew and the crop matured with little further trouble. Sweet
potatoes were everywhere raised, and became a staple article of
food.
Rice was stripped of its husk by being beaten with a wooden pestle
in a mortar cut out of a section of a tree. The threshing of the wheat
was a cause of much trouble. Rude home-made flails were used, for
LIFE ON THE FARM
233
there were no regular threshers. No one raised much of it, for it was
a great task to clean it. One poor woman who had a small patch
of wheat threshed it by beating the sheaves over a barrel, while bed
quilts and sheets were spread around to catch the scattering grains.
Another placed the sheaves in a large wooden trough, then she and
her small children beat the sheaves with wooden clubs. After being
threshed in some such manner, the chaff was fanned out by pour-
ing the grain from a measure in a breeze and catching it on a
sheet.
Field labor was performed in the Black Belt by the negroes, but
in the white counties the burden fell heavily upon the women, children,
and old men. In the Black Belt the mistress of the plantation
managed affairs with the assistance of the trusty negroes. She super-
intended the planting of the proper crops, the cultivation and gather-
ing of the same, and sent to the government stores the large share
called for by the tax-in-kind. The old men of the community, if
near enough, assisted the women managers by advice and direction.
Often one old gentleman would have half a dozen feminine planters
as his wards. Life was very busy in the Black Belt, but there was
never the suffering in this rich section that prevailed in the less fer-
tile white counties from which the white laborers had gone to war.
In the latter section the mistress of slaves managed much as did her
Black Belt sister, but there were fewer slaves and life was harder for
all, and hardest of all for the poor white people who owned no slaves.
When few slaves were owned by a family, the young white boys
worked in the field with them, while the girls of the family did the
light tasks about the house, though at times they too went to the field.
Where there were no slaves, the old men, cripples, women, and chil-
dren worked on the little farms. All over the country the young boys
worked like heroes. All had been taught that labor was honorable,
and all knew how work should be done. So when war made it neces-
sary, all went to work only the harder ; there was no holding of hands
in idleness. The mistress of the plantation was already accustomed
to the management of large affairs, and war brought additional duties
rather than new and strange problems; but the wife of the poor
farmer or renter, left alone with small children, had a hard time mak-
ing both ends meet.
234 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Home Industries; Makeshifts and Substitutes
Many articles in common use had now to be made at home, and
the plantation developed many small industries. There was much
joy when a substitute was found, because it made the people inde-
pendent of the outside world. Farm implements were made and
repaired. Ropes were made at home of various materials, such as
bear-grass, sunflower stalks, and cotton ; baskets, of willow branches
and of oak splints; rough earthenware, of clay and then glazed;
cooking soda from seaweed and from corn-cob ashes ; ink from nut-
galls or ink balls, from the skin of blue fig, from green persimmons,
pokeberries, rusty nails, pomegranate rind, and indigo. Cement
was made from wild potatoes and flour ; starch from nearly ripe corn,
sweet potatoes, and flour. Bottles or gourds, with small rolls of cotton
for wicks, served as lamps, and in place of oil, cotton-seed oil, ground-
pea or peanut oil, and lard were used. Candles made of wax or tallow
were used, while in the "piney woods" pine knots furnished all the
necessary illumination. Mattresses were stuffed with moss, leaves,
and "cat-tails." No paper could be wasted for envelopes. The sheet
was written on except just enough for the address when folded. In
other instances wall-paper and sheets of paper with pictures on one side
and the other side blank were folded and used for envelopes. Muci-
lage for the envelopes was made from peach-tree gum. Corn-cob
pipes with a joint of reed or fig twig for a stem were fashionable.
The leaves of the China tree kept insects away from dried fruit ; the
China berries were made into whiskey and were used as a basis for
''Poor Man's" soap. Wax myrtle and rosin were also used in mak-
ing soap. Beer was made from corn, persimmons, potatoes, and
sassafras; "lemonade" from may-pops and pomegranates. Dog-
wood and willow bark were mixed with smoking tobacco "to make it
go a long way." Shoes had to be made for white and black, and back-
yard tanneries were established. The hides were first soaked in a
barrel filled with a solution of lye until the hair would come off, when
they were placed in a pit between alternate layers of red oak bark
and water poured in. In this "ooze" they soaked for several months
and were then ready for use. The hides of horses, dogs, mules, hogs,
cows, and goats were utiHzed, and shoes, harness, and saddles were
made on the farm.
HOME INDUSTRIES; MAKESHIFTS AND SUBSTITUTES 235
All the domestic animals were now raised in larger numbers,
especially beef cattle, sheep, goats, and hogs. Sheep were raised
principally for their wool. The work of all was directed toward
supplying the army, and the best of everything was sent to the soldiers.
Home life was very quiet, busy, and monotonous, with its daily
routine of duty in which all had a part. There were few even of the
wealthiest who did not work with their hands if physically able.
Life was hard, but people soon became accustomed to makeshifts and
privation, and most of them had plenty to eat, though the food was
usually coarse. Corn bread was nearly always to be had; in some
places often nothing else. After the first year few people ever had
flour to cook; especially was this the case in the southern counties.
When a family was so fortunate as to obtain a sack or barrel of flour,
all the neighbors were invited in to get biscuits, though sometimes
all of it was kept to make starch. Bolted meal was used as a sub-
stitute for flour in cakes and bread. Most of the meat produced
was sent to the army, and the average family could afford it only once
a day, many only once a week. When an epidemic of cholera killed
the hogs, the people became vegetarians and lived on corn bread,
milk, and syrup; many had only the first.^ Tea and coffee were
very scarce in the interior of Alabama, and sniall suppHes of the
genuine were saved for emergencies. For tea there were various
substitutes, among them holly leaves, rose leaves, blackberry and
raspberry leaves; while for coffee, rye, okra seed, corn, bran, meal,
hominy, peanuts, and bits of parched or roasted sweet potatoes were
used. Syrup was made from the juice of the watermelon, and pre-
serves from its rind. The juice of corn-stalks was also made into
syrup. In south Alabama sugar-cane and in north Alabama sorghum
furnished "long sweetening." The sorghum was boiled in old iron
kettles, and often made the teeth black. In south Alabama syrup
was used instead of sugar in cooking. In grinding sugar-cane and
sorghum, wooden rollers often had to be made, as iron ones were
scarce. However, when they could be obtained, they were passed
from family to family around the community.
1 One of my acquaintances says that quite often she had only bread, milk, and syrup
twice a day. Sometimes she was unable to eat any breakfast, but after spinning an hour
or two she was hungry enough to eat. To many the diet was very healthful, but the sick
and the delicate often died for want of proper food.
236 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Clothes and Fashions
Before the war most articles of clothing were purchased in the
North or imported from abroad. Now that the blockade shut Ala-
bama off from all sources of supply, the people had to make their
cloth and clothing at home. The factories in the South could not
even supply the needs of the army, and there was a universal return
to primitive and frontier conditions. Old wheels and looms were
brought out, and others were made Hke them. The state government
bought large quantities of cotton and wool cards for the use of poor
people. The women worked incessantly. Every household was a
small factory, and in an incredibly short time the women mastered
the intricacies of looms, spinning-wheels, warping frames, swifts,
etc. Negro women sometimes learned to spin and weave. The
whites, however, did most of it ; weaving was too difficult for the aver-
age negro to learn. The area devoted to the cultivation of cotton
was restricted by law, but more than enough was raised to supply
the few factories then operating, principally for the government, and
to supply the spinning-wheels and hand looms of the people.
As a rule, each member of the family had a regularly allotted task
for each day in spinning or weaving. The young girls could not
weave, but could spin;* while the women became expert at weaving
and spinning and made beautiful cloth. All kinds of cotton goods
were woven, coarse osnaburgs, sheetings, coverlets, counterpanes, a
kind of muslin, and various kinds of light cloth for women's dresses.
Wool was grown on a large scale as the war went on, and the women
wove flannels, plaids, balmorals, blankets, and carpets.^ Gray jeans
was woven to make clothing for the soldiers, who had almost no clothes
except those sent them by their home people. A soldier's pay would
not buy a shirt, even when he was paid, which was seldom the case.
Nearly every one wove homespun, dyed with home-made dyes, and
it was often very pretty. The women took more pride in their neat
homespun dresses than they did before the war in the possession
of silks and satins. And there was friendly rivalry between them in
1 At the close of the war my mother was twelve years old ; for more than two years
she had been doing a woman's task at spinning. Her sister had been spinning for a
year, though she was only six years old.
2 Many of the heavier articles woven during the war, such as coverlets, counterpanes,
rugs, etc., are still, after forty years, almost as good as new.
CLOTHES AND FASHIONS
237
spinning and weaving the prettiest homespun as there was in making
the whitest sugar, the cleanest rice, and the best wheat and corn.
But they could not make enough cloth to supply both army and people,
and old clothes stored away were brought out and used to the last
scrap. When worn out the rags were unravelled and the short threads
spun together and woven again into coarse goods. Pillow-cases
and sheets were cut up for clothes and were replaced by homespun
substitutes, and window curtains were made into women's clothes.
Carpets were made into blankets. There were no blanket factories,
and the legislature appropriated the carpets in the capitol for blankets
for the soldiers.^ Some people went to the tanyards and got hair
from horse and cow hides and mixed it with cotton to make heavy
cloth for winter use, which is said to have made a good-looking gar-
ment. Once in a long while the father or brother in the army would
send home a bolt of calico, or even just enough to make one dress.
Then there would be a very proud woman in the land. Scraps of
these rare dresses and also of the homespun dresses are found in the
old scrap-books of the time. The homespun is the better-looking.
No one saw a fashion plate, and each one set the style. Hoop-skirts
were made from the remains of old ones found in the garrets and
plunder rooms. It is said that the southern w^omen affected dresses
that were slightly longer in front than behind, and held them aside
in their hands. Sometimes fortunate persons succeeded in buying
for a few hundred dollars some dress material that had been brought
through the blockade. A calico dress cost in central Alabama from
$100 to $600, other material in proportion. Sewing thread was
made by the home spinners with infinite trouble, but it was never sat-
isfactory. Buttons were made of pasteboard, pine bark, cloth, thread,
persimmon seed, gourds, and wood covered with cloth. Pasteboard,
for buttons and other uses, was made by pasting several layers of old
papers together with flour paste.^.
Sewing societies were formed for pleasure and to aid soldiers and
the poor. At stated intervals great quantities of clothing and . sup-
plies were sent to the soldiers in the field and to the hospitals. All
1 Acts, Dec, 1861, 2cl Called and ist Regular Sess., p. 70.
2 Hague, "Blockaded Family," /^/jjzw ,• Miller, pp. 223-232; "Our Women in the
War," p, 275 et seq. ; Clayton, " White and Black under the Old Regime," pp. 1 12-149;
Porcher, "Resources of the Southern Fields and Forests," pp. 70, 107, 284-295, 351,
372,657.
238 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
women became expert in crocheting and knitting — the occupations
for leisure moments. Even when resting, one was expected to be
doing something. Many formed the habit of knitting in those days
and keep it up until to-day, as it became second nature to have some-
thing in the hands to work with. Many women who learned then
can now knit a pair of socks from beginning to end without looking
at them. After dark, when one could not see to sew, spin, or weave,
was usually the time devoted to knitting and crocheting, which some-
times lasted until midnight. Capes, sacks, Vandykes, gloves, socks
and stockings, shawls, underclothes, and men's suspenders were
knitted. The makers ornamented them in various ways, and the
ornamentation served a useful purpose, as the thread was usually
coarse and uneven, and the ornamentation concealed the irregulari-
ties that would have shown in plain work. The smoothest thread that
could be made was used for knitting. To make this thread the finest
bolls of cotton were picked before rain had fallen on them and stained
the fibre.
The homespun cloth had to be dyed to make it look well, and, as
the ordinary dye materials could not be obtained, substitutes were
made at home from barks, leaves, roots, and berries. Much experi-
mentation proved the following results : Maple and sweet gum bark
with copperas produced purple ; maple and red oak bark with cop-
peras, a dove color ; maple and red walnut bark with copperas, brown ;
sweet gum with copperas, a nearly black color; peach leaves with
alum, yellow; sassafras root with copperas, drab; smooth sumac
root, bark, and berries, black; black oak bark with alum, yellow;
artichoke and black oak, yellow; black oak bark with oxide of tin,
pale yellow to bright orange; black oak bark with oxide of iron,
drab ; black oak balls in a solution of vitriol, purple to black ; alder
with alum, yellow ; hickory bark with copperas, oHve ; hickory bark
with alum, green ; white oak bark with alum, brown ; walnut roots,
leaves, and hulls, black. Copperas was used to "set" the dye, but
when copperas was not to be had blacksmith's dust was used instead.
Pine tree roots and tops, and dogwood, willow bark, and indigo were
also used in dyes.^
1 Clayton, " White and Black under the Old Regime " ; Hague, " Blockaded
Family," /«w/"/« ,• Miller, p. 229; Jacobs, "Drug Conditions," p. 16 ; oral accounts;
Porcher, passim.
DRUGS AND MEDICINES 239
Shoes for women and children were made of cloth or knitted uppers
or of the skins of squirrels or other small animals, fastened to leather
or wooden soles. A girl considered herself very fortunate if she could
get a pair of " Sunday" shoes of calf or goat skin. There were shoe-
makers in each community, all old men or cripples, who helped the
people with their makeshifts. Shoes for men were made of horse
and cow hides, and often the soles were of wood. A wooden shoe
was one of the first things patented at Richmond. Carriage cur-
tains, buggy tops, and saddle skirts furnished leather for uppers, and
metal protections were placed on leather soles. Little children went
barefooted and stayed indoors in winter; many grown people went
barefooted except in winter. Shoe blacking was made from soot mixed
with lard or oil of ground-peas or of cotton-seed. This was applied
to the shoe and over it a paste of flour or starch gave a good poHsh.
Old bonnets and hats were turned, trimmed, and worn again.
Pretty hats were made of cloth or woven from dyed straw, bulrushes,
corn-shucks, palmetto, oat and wheat straw, bean-grass, jeans, and
bonnet squash, and sometimes of feathers. The rushes, shucks,
palmetto, and bean-grass were bleached by boihng and sunning. Bits
of old finery served to trim hats as well as feathers from turkeys,
ducks, and peafowls, with occasional wheat heads for plumes. Fans
were made of the palmetto and of the wing feathers and wing tips of
turkeys and geese. Old parasols and umbrellas were re-covered, but
the majority of the people could not afford cloth for such a purpose.
Hair-oil was made from roses and lard. Thin-haired unfortunates
made braids and switches from prepared bark.
The ingenious makeshifts and substitutes of the women were
innumerable. They were more original than the men in making use
of what material lay ready to hand or in discovering new uses for vari-
ous things. The few men at home, however, were not always of
the class that make discoveries or do original things. In an account
of life on the farms and plantations in the South during the war, the
white men may almost be left out of the story.
Drugs and Medicines
After the blockade became effective, drugs became very scarce
and home-made preparations were substituted. All doctors became
botanical practitioners. The druggist made his preparations from
240 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
herbs, roots, and barks gathered in the woods and fields. Manufac-
turing laboratories were early established at Mobile and Montgomery
to make medical preparations which were formerly procured abroad.
Much attention was given to the manufacture of native preparations,
which were administered by practitioners in the place of foreign drugs
with favorable results. Surgeon Richard Potts, of Montgomery,
Alabama, had exclusive charge of the exchange of cotton for medical
supphes, and when allowed by the government to make the exchange,
it was very easy for him to get drugs through the lines into Alabama
and Mississippi. But this permission was too seldom given. ^
Quinine was probably the scarcest drug. Instead of this were
used dogwood berries, cotton-seed tea, chestnut and chinquapin roots
and bark, willow bark, Spanish oak bark, and poplar bark. Red oak
bark in cold water was used as a disinfectant and astringent for
wounds. Boneset tea, butterfly or pleurisy root tea, mandrake tea,
white ash or prickly ash root, and Sampson's snakeroot were used in
fever cases. Local apphcations of mustard seed or leaves, hickory
leaves, and pepper were used in cases of pneumonia and pleurisy,
while sumac, poke root and berry, sassafras, alder, and prickly ash
were remedies for rheumatism, neuralgia, and scrofula. Black haw
root and partridge berry were used for hemorrhage; peach leaves
and Sampson's snakeroot for dyspepsia and sassafras tea in the
spring and fall served as a blood medicine. The balsam cucumber
was used for a tonic, as also was dogwood, poplar, and rolled cherry
bark in whiskey. Turpentine was useful as an adjunct in many cases.
Hops were used for laudanum; may-apple root or peach tree leaf
tea for senna; dandelion, pleurisy root, and butterfly weed for calo-
mel. Corks were made from black gum roots, corn-cobs, and old
life preservers. Barks were gathered when the sap was running, the
roots after the leaves were dead, and medicinal plants when they were
in bloom.^ Opium was made from the poppy, cordials from the
blackberry, huckleberry, and persimmon, brandy from watermelons
and fruits, and wine from the elderberry.^ Whiskey made in the
hills of north Alabama, in gum log stills, formed the basis of nearly
all medicinal preparations. The state had agents who looked after
the proper distribution of the whiskey among the counties. The
1 O. R., Ser. IV, Vol. Ill, pp. 1073-1075 ; Jacobs, "Drug Conditions."
2 Jacobs, pp. 4-6, 12-14, 16-21 ; Porcher, p. 65. ^ Hague, " Blockaded Family."
SOCIAL LIFE DURING THE WAR
241
castor beans raised in the garden were crushed and boiled and the
oil skimmed off/
Social Life during the War
Life in the towns was not so monotonous as in the country. In the
larger ones, especially in Mobile, there was a forced gayety through-
out the war. Many marriages took place, and each wedding was
usually the occasion of social festivities. In the country ''homespun"
weddings were the fashion — all parties at the wedding being clad
in homespun. Colonel Thomas Dabney dined in Montgomery in
November, 1864, with Mr. Woodleaf, a refugee from New Orleans.
"They gave me," he said, "sl fine dinner, good for any time, and some
extra fine music afterwards, according to the Italian, Spanish, and
French books, for we had some of each sort done up in true opera
fashion, I suppose. It was a leetle too foreign for my ear, but that
was my fault, and not the fault of the music." ^ The people were
too busy for much amusement, yet on the surface life was not gloomy.
Work was made as pleasant as possible, though it could never be
made play. The women were never idle, and they often met together
to work. There were sewing societies which met once a week for
work and exchange of news. " Quiltings" were held at irregular inter-
vals, to which every woman came armed with needle and thimble.
At other times there would be spinning "bees," to which the women
would come from long distances and stay all day, bringing with them
in wagons their wheels, cards, and cotton. When a soldier came
home on furlough or sick leave, every woman in the community went
to see him, carrying her work with her, and knitted, sewed, or spun
while listening to news from the army. The holiday soldier, the
"bomb-proof," and the "feather bed" received Httle mercy from the
women ; a thorough contempt was the portion of such people. "Fur-
lough" wounds came to receive slight sympathy.^ The soldiers
1 Jacobs, "Drug Conditions," pp. 4-6, 12-14, 16-21 ; Hague, "Blockaded P'amily,"
passim; " Our Women in the War " ; Ball, "Clarke County " ; Miller, "Alabama";
Porcher ; Pub. So. Hist. Ass'n, March, 1903. '
2 Smedes, "A Southern Planter," p. 226.
3 In the early part of the war when a soldier received a slight wound he was given
a furlough for a few weeks until he was well again. Slight wounds came to be called
" furloughs," and some soldiers when particularly homesick are said to have exposed
themselves unnecessarily in order to get a " furlough."
R
242 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
always brought messages from their comrades to their relatives in
the community, which was often the only way of hearing from those
in the army. Letters were uncertain, the postal system never being
good in the country districts. Postage was ten to twenty cents on- a
letter, and one to five cents on small newspapers. Letters from the
army gave news of the men of the settlement who were in the writer's
company or regiment, and when received were read to the neighbors
or sent around the community. Often when a young man came
home on furlough or passed through the country, there would be
many social gatherings or "parties" in his honor, and here the
young people gathered. There were parties for the older men,
too, and dinners and suppers.' Here the soldier met again his
neighbors, or rather the feminine half of them, anxious to hear
his experiences and to inquire about friends and relatives in the
army. The young people also met at night at ''corn shuckings"
and ''candy puUings," from which they managed to extract a good
deal of pleasure. At the social gatherings, especially of the older
people, some kind of work was always going on. Parching pindars
to eat and making peanut candy were amusements for children after
supper.
The intense devotion of the women to the Confederate cause was
most irritating to a certain class of Federal officers in the army that
invaded north Alabama. They seemed to think that they had con-
quered entrance into society, but the women were determined to show
their colors on all occasions and often had trouble when boorish officers
were in command. A society woman would lose her social position
if seen in the company of Federal officers. When passing them, the
women averted their faces and swept aside their skirts to prevent
any contact with the hated Yankee. They played and sang Con-
federate airs on all occasions, and when ordered by the miHtary
authorities to discontinue, it usually took a guard of soldiers to enforce
the order. The Federal officers who acted in a gentlemanly manner
toward the non-combatants were accused by their rude fellows and
by ruder newspaper correspondents of being "wound round the fingers
of the rebel women," who had some object to gain. When the people
of a community were especially contemptuous of the Federals, they
were sometimes punished by having a negro regiment stationed as
a garrison. Athens, in Limestone county, one of the most intensely
SOCIAL LIFE DURING THE WAR 243
southern towns, was garrisoned by a regiment of negroes recruited in
the immediate vicinity/
For the negroes in the Black Belt life went on much as before the
war. More responsibihty was placed upon the trusty ones, and they
proved themselves worthy of the trust. They were acquainted with
the questions at issue and knew that their freedom would probably
follow victory by the North. Yet the black overseer and the black
preacher, with their fellow-slaves, went on with their work. The
master's family Hved on the large plantation with no other whites
within miles and never felt fear of harm from their black guardians.
The negroes had their dances and, 'possum hunts on Saturday nights
after the week's work was done. There was preaching and singing
on Sunday, the whites often attending the negro services and vice
versa. Negro weddings took place in the "big house." The young
mistresses would adorn the bride, and the ceremony would be per-
formed by the old white clergyman, after which the wedding supper
would be served in the family dining room or out under the trees.
These were great occasions for the negroes and for the young people
of the master's family. The sound of fiddle and banjo, songs,
and laughter were always heard in the "quarters" after work was
done, though Saturday night was the great time .for merrymaking.
In July and August, after the crops were "laid by," the negroes had
barbecues and picnics. To these the whites were invited and they
always attended. The materials for these feasts were furnished by
the mistress and by the negroes themselves, who had garden patches,
pigs, and poultry. The slaves were, on the whole, happy and content.
The clothes for the slaves were made under the superintendence
of the mistress, who, after the war began, often cut out the clothes
for every negro on the place, and sometimes assisted in making them.
Some of the negro women had spinning-wheels and looms, and
clothed their own families, while others spun, wove, and made their
clothes under the direction of the mistress. But most of them could
not be trusted with the materials, because they were so unskilful. It
took a month or two twice a year to get the negroes into their new
outfits. The rule was that each negro should have two suits of heavy
material for winter wear and two of light goods for summer. To
1 See Boston Journal, Sept. 29 and Nov. 15, 1864.
244 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
clothe the negroes during the war time was a heavy burden upon the
mistress.
To those negroes who did their own cooking rations were issued
on Saturday afternoon. Bacon and corn meal formed the basis of
the ration, besides which there would be some kind of "sweetening"
and a substitute for coffee.^ Special goodies were issued for Sunday.
The negroes in the Black Belt fared better during the war than either
the whites or the negroes in the white counties. When there were
few slaves or in the time of great scarcity, the cooking for whites and
blacks was often done in the house kitchen by the same cooks. This
was done in order to leave more time for the negroes to work and to
prevent waste. Where there were many slaves, there was often some
arrangement made by which cooking was done in common, though
there were numbers of families that did their own cooking at home all
the time. When meat was scarce, it was given to the negro laborers
who needed the strength, while the white family and the negro women
and children denied themselves.
As the Confederate government did not provide well for the sol-
diers, their wives and mothers had to supply them. The sewing
societies undertook to clothe the soldiers who went from their respec-
tive neighborhoods. Once a week or once a month, a box was sent
from each society. One box sent to the Grove Hill Guards contained
sixty pairs of socks, twenty-five blankets, thirteen pairs of gloves,
fourteen flannel shirts, sixteen towels, two handkerchiefs, five pairs
of trousers, and one bushel of dried apples. Other boxes contained
about the same. Hams and any other edibles that would keep were
frequently sent and also simple medicine chests. When blankets
could not be had, quilts were sent, or heavy curtains and pieces of
carpet. With the progress of the war, there was much suffering
among the soldiers and their destitute families that the state could do
but little to relieve, and the women took up the task. Besides the
various church aid societies, we hear of the "Grove Hill Military Aid
Society " and the "Suggsville Soldiers' Aid Society," both of Clarke
County; the "Aid Society of Mobile"; the "Montgomery Home
Society" and the "Soldiers' Wayside Home," in Montgomery; the
"Wayside Hospital" and the "Ladies' Military Aid Society" of
Selma; the "Talladega Hospital"; the "Ladies' Humane Society"
^ See Mrs. Clayton's " White and Black " in regard to rations for negroes.
SOCIAL LIFE DURING THE WAR 245
of Huntsville/ and many others. The legislature gave financial aid
to some of them. Societies were formed in every town, village, and
country settlement to send clothing, medicines, and provisions to the
soldiers in the army and to the hospitals. The members went to
hospitals and parole camps for sick and wounded soldiers, took them
to their homes, and nursed them back to health. "Wayside Homes"
were estabhshed in the towns for the accommodation of soldiers trav-
eUing to and from the army. Soldiers on sick leave and furlough
who were cut off from their homes beyond the Mississippi came to
the homes of their comrades, sure of a warm welcome and kind atten-
tions. Poor soldiers sick at home were looked after and supplies sent
to their needy families.
The last year of the war a bushel of corn cost $13, while a soldier's
pay was $11 a month, paid once in a while. So the poor people be-
came destitute. But the state furnished meal and salt to alP and the
more fortunate people gave liberally of their suppHes. Many of the
poorer white women did work for others — weaving, sewing, and
spinning — for which they were well paid, frequently in provisions,
which they were in great need of. Some made hats, bonnets, and
baskets for sale. The cotton counties supported many refugees from
the northern counties, and numerous poor people from that section
imposed upon the generosity of the planting section. The overseers,
white or black, had a disHke for those to whom suppHes were given ;
they also objected to the regular payment of the tax-in-kind, and to
impressment which took their corn, meat, horses, cows, mules, and
negroes, and crippled their operations. The mistresses had to
interfere and see that the poor and the government had their
share.
In the cities the women engaged in various patriotic occupations,
— sewing for the soldiers, nursing, raising money for hospitals, etc.
The women of Tuskegee raised money to be spent on a gunboat for
the defence of Mobile Bay. They wanted it called The Women's
Gunboat.^ "A niece of James Madison" wrote to a Mobile paper,
1 See Acts of Ala., Nov. 28 and 30, 1861, Dec. 9, 1862, and Dec. 8, 1863 ;
Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, pp. 219 ei seq.
'^ It was estimated that one-fourth of the people of the state were furnished for
three years with meal and salt,
3 Moore, " Rebellion Record," Vol. IV (1862).
246 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
proposing that 200,000 women in the South sell their hair in Europe
to raise funds for the Confederacy. The movement failed because
of the blockade.^ There were other similar propositions, but they
could not be carried out, and year after year the legislatures of the
state thanked the women for their patriotic devotion, their labors,
sacrifices, constancy, and courage.
The music and songs that were popular during the war show the
changing temper of the people. At first were heard joyous airs, later
contemptuous and defiant as war came on ; then jolly war songs and
strong hymns of encouragement. But as sorrow followed sorrow
until all were stricken ; as wounds, sickness, imprisonment, and death
of friends and relatives cast shadow over the spirits of the people;
as hopes were dashed by defeat, and the consciousness came that
perhaps after all the cause was losing, — the iron entered into the
souls of the people. The songs were sadder now. The church hymns
heard were the soul-comforting ones and the militant songs of the
older churchmen. The first year were heard ''Farewell to Brother
Jonathan," "We Conquer or We Die;" then "Riding a Raid,"
"Stonewall Jackson's Way," "All Quiet Along the Potomac," "Lo-
rena," "Beechen Brook," "Somebody's Darling," "When the Cruel
War is O'er," "Guide Me, O Thou Great Jehovah." "Dixie" was
sung and played during the entire time, whites and blacks singing it
with equal pleasure. The older hymns were sung and the doctrines
of faith and good works earnestly preached. The promises were,
perhaps, more emphasized. A deeply religious feeling prevailed
among the home workers for the cause.
The women had the harder task. The men were in the field in
active service, . their families were safe at home, there was no fear for
themselves. The women lived in constant dread of news from the
front ; they had to sit still and wait, and their greatest comfort was
the hard work they had to do. It gave them some relief from the
burden of sorrow that weighed down the souls of all. To the very
last the women hoped and prayed for success, and failure, to many
of them, was more bitter than death. The loss of their cause
1 N. Y. News, March 29, 1864, from the Richmond Whig, from the Mobile Evening
News ; oral accounts. There were numbers of women who actually cut off their hair,
thinking that it could be sold through the blockade. For a while they were hopeful
and enthusiastic in regard to the plan of selling their hair.
SOCIAL LIFE DURING THE WAR 247
hurt them more deeply than it did the men who had the satis-
faction of fighting out the quarrel, even though the other side was
victorious.^
1 p. A. Hague's " Blockaded Family " is the best account of life in Alabama during
the war. Mrs. Clayton's " White and Black under the Old Regime " is very good, but
brief. " Our Women in the War " is a valuable collection of articles by a number of
women. Nearly all the incidents mentioned I have heard related by relatives and
friends. " John Holden, Unionist," by T. C. De Leon, gives a good account of Ufe in
the hill country. Mary A. H. Gay's " Life in Dixie during the War " and Miller's
"History of Alabama" give information based on personal experiences. Porcher's
" Resources of the Southern Fields and Forests," published in 1863, is a mine of infor-
mation in regard to economic conditions in the South. Porcher quotes much from the
newspapers and from correspondence. The second edition, published in 1867, omits
much of the more interesting material.
I
PART III
THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
CHAPTER V
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DISORDER
Sec. I. Loss of Life and Property
The Loss of Life
The surviving soldiers came straggling home, worn out, broken
in health, crippled, in rags, half starved, little better off, they thought,
than the comrades they had left under the sod of the battle-fields
on the border. In the election of i860 about 90,000 votes were cast,
nearly the entire voting population, and about this number of Alabama
men enlisted in the Confederate and Union armies. Various esti-
mates were made of Alabama's losses during the war, most of which
are doubtless too large. Among these Governor Parsons, in his
inaugural address, gives the number as 35,000 killed or died of wounds
and disease, and as many more disabled.^ Colonel W. H. Fowler,
for two years the state agent for setthng the claims of deceased sol-
diers and also superintendent of army records, states that he had the
names of nearly 20,000 dead on his lists and believed this to be only
about half of the entire number; that the Alabama troops lost more
heavily than any other troops. He asserted that of the 30,000 Ala-
bama troops in the Army of Northern Virginia over 9000 had died in
1 In his inaugural proclamation of July 20 (or 21), 1865, Governor Parsons gives
the foUoveing figures : —
Alabama male population (i860), 15 to 60 years .... 126,587
Connecticut male population (i860), 15 to 60 years . -. . 120,249
Alabama soldiers enlisted 122,000
Connecticut soldiers enlisted 40,000
Alabama soldiers died in service 35»ooo
Alabama soldiers disabled 35>ooo
N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1865 ; N. Y. Herald, Aug. II, 1865 ; Parsons's Message, Nov.
22, 1865 ; Parsons's Speech at Cooper Institute, Nov. 13, 1865.
251
252 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
service, and of those who were retired, discharged, or who resigned,
about one-half were either dead or permanently disabled.^ These
estimates are evidently too large, and they probably form the basis
of the statements of Governors Parsons and Patton. Governor
Patton estimated that 40,000 had died in service, while 20,000 were
disabled for life, and that there were 20,000 widows and 60,000
orphans.^ A Times correspondent places the loss in war at 34,000.^
The strongest regiments were worn out by 1865. At Appomattox,
when three times as many men surrendered as were in a condition
to bear arms, the Alabama commands paroled hardly enough men
in each regiment to form a good company. Though the average
enlistment had been 1350 to the regiment, one of the best regiments —
the Third Alabama Infantry — paroled: from Company B, 8 men;
from Company D, 7 men; Company G, 4; Company E, 7; while the
Fifth Alabama paroled : from Company A, 2 ; B, 7 ; C, 2 ; E, 2 ;
F, I ; K, 3. The Twelfth Alabama : Company A, 4 ; C, 6 ; D, 6 ;
E, 4 ; G, 3 ; I, 5 ; M, 4. Sixth Alabama (over 2000 enlistments) :
D, 2 ; F, 2 ; I, 5; M, 4. Sixty-first Alabama: B, 2 ; C, 4; E, i ;
G, 5 ; 1,4; K, 3. Fifteenth Alabama : C, 8, Forty- eighth Alabama:
C, 6; K, 7. Ninth Alabama: 70 men in all — an average of 7 to a
company. Thirteenth Alabama: 85 men in all. Forty-first Ala-
bama: 74 men in all. Forty-first, Forty-third, Fifty- ninth, Sixtieth,
and Twenty-third: 220 men in all. Some companies were entirely
annihilated, having neither officer nor private at the surrender. A
company from DemopoHs is said to have lost all except 7 men, that
is, 125 by death in the service.^ The census of 1866 contains the
names of 8957 soldiers killed in battle, 13,534 ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ disease or
wounds, and 2629 disabled for life.^ These are the only facts obtain-
able on which to base calculations, yet the census was very imperfect,
as hundreds of families were broken up, thousands of men forgotten,
and there was no one to give information regarding them to the
census taker.
1 Fowler's Report, Transactions Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. II, p. i88.
2 Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 114, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
8 7V Y. Times, Oct. 2,1, 1865.
* Southern Hist. Soc. Papers, Vol. XV (Paroles at Appomattox); Miller, "His-
tory of Alabama," p. 233 ; Brewer, " Regimental Histories."
* Census of 1866, Selvta Times and Messenger, March 24, 1868.
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
253
The white population decreased 3632 from i860 to 1866, accord-
ing to the census of the latter year. But for the war, according to
rate of increase from 1850 to i860, there should have been an increase
of 50,000. In 1870 the census showed a further decrease of 141 5,
due, perhaps, to the great mortahty just after the war. In other
words, the white population was about 100,000 less in 1870 than it
would have been under normal conditions, without immigration. Con-
temporary accounts state that the negro suffered much more than the
whites in the two years immediately following the war, from starvation,
exposure, and pestilence, and the census of 1866 showed a decrease
of 14,325 in the colored population, when there should have been
an increase of nearly 70,000 according to the rate of 1850 to i860,
besides the 20,000 that it has been estimated were sent into the inte-
rior of the state from other states to escape capture by the raiding
Federals. The census of 1866 was not accurate, for the negroes at
that time were in a very unsettled condition, wandering from place
to place. However, in 1870, the number of negroes had increased
37,740 over the numbers for i860, while the number of whites had
decreased several thousand, which would seem to indicate that the
census of 1866 was defective. But there is no doubt that the negroes
suffered terribly during this time.^
Destruction of Property-
Governor Patton, in a communication to Congress dated May 11,
1866, gives the property losses in Alabama as $500,000,000,^ which
sum doubtless includes the value of the slaves, estimated in i860
at $200,000,000, or about $500 each.^ The value of other property
in i860 has been estimated at $640,000,000, the assessed value,
$256,428,893, being 40 per cent of the real value.*
1 Whites Blacks
i860 526,271 i860 437.770
1866 522,799 1866 423.445
1870 521.384 1870 475.5'o
Censuses of i860, 1866, 1870.
2 Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 114, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
^ Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 141.
* Miller, "Alabama," p. 141 (Auditor's Report).
254 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ' ALABAMA
A comparison of the census statistics of i860 and of 1870 after
five years of Reconstruction will be suggestive : —
i860 1870
Value of farms ^175,824,032 $54,191,229
Value of live stock 43,411,711 21,325,076
Value of farm implements .... 7,433,178 5*946,543
Number of horses 127,000 80,000
Number of mules 111,000 76,000
Number of oxen 88,000 59,ooo
Number of cows 230,000 170,000
Number of other cattle .... 454,000 257,000
Number of sheep 370,000 241,000
Number of swine 1,748,000 719,000
Improved land in farms, acres . . . 6,385,724 5,062,204
Corn crop, bushels 33,226,000 16,977,000
(35.053.047 in 1899)
Cotton crop, bales 989,955 429,482
(1,106,840 in 1899)
Not until 1880 was the acreage of improved lands as 'great as
in 1860.^ Live stock, valued at $43,000,000 in i860, is still to-day
$7,000,000 behind. Farm implements and machinery in 1900 were
worth $1,000,000 more than in i860, having doubled in value in the
last ten years.^ Land improvements and buildings, worth $175,000,-
000 in i860, were in 1900 still more than $30,000,000 below that
mark. The total value of farm property in i860 was $226,669,511;
in 1870, $97,716,055 ;^ and in 1900, $179,339,882. Though the popu-
lation has increased twofold since i860 ^ and the white counties
have developed and the industries have become more varied, agricul-
ture has not yet reached the standard of i860, the Black Belt farmer
is much less prosperous, and the agricultural system of the old cotton
belt has never recovered from the effects of the war. From the theo-
retical point of view the abolition of slavery should have resulted
in loss only during the readjustment of industrial conditions. Yet
$200,000,000 capital had been lost; and, as a matter of fact, the
statistics of agriculture show that, while in the white counties in
1900 there was a greater yield of the staple crops, — cotton and corn,
1 i860, 6,385,724 acres ; 1880, 6,375,706 acres.
2 i860, $7,433,178; 1890, $4,511,645 ; 1900, $8,675,900.
3 Which must be reduced by one-fifth for depreciated currency.
* See Census Bulletin, No. 155, 12th Census.
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY 255
— in the black counties the free negroes of double the number do
not yet produce as much as the slaves of 1860/
The manufacturing estabhshments that had existed before the
war or were developed during that time were destroyed by Federal
raids, or were seized, sold, and dismantled after the surrender because
they had furnished suppUes to the Confederacy. The pubHc build-
ings used by the Confederate authorities in all the towns and all over
the country were burned or were turned over to the Freedmen's
Bureau. The state and county public buildings in the track of the
raiders were destroyed. The stocks of goods in the stores were
exhausted long before the close of the war. All banking capital,
and all securities, railroad bonds and stocks, state and Confederate
bonds, and currency were worth nothing. All the accumulated
capital of the state was swept away ; only the soil and some buildings
remained. People owning hundreds of acres of land often were as
destitute as the poorest negro. The majority of people who had
money to invest had bought Confederate securities as a patriotic
duty, and all the coin had been drawn from the country. The most
of the bonded debt was held in Mobile, and that city lost all its capi-
tal when the debt was declared null and void.^ This city suffered
severely, also, from a terrible explosion soon after the surrender.
Twenty squares in the business part were destroyed.^
Thousands of private residences were destroyed, especially in
north Alabama, where the country was even more thoroughly devas-
tated than in the path of Sherman through Georgia. The third year
of the war had seen the destruction of everything destructible in
north Alabama outside of the large towns, where the devastation
was usually not so great. In Decatur, however, nearly all the build-
ings were burned ; only three of the principal ones were left standing.''
Tuscumbia was practically destroyed, and many houses were con-
demned for army use.^ The beautiful buildings of the Black Belt
1 Census, i860 and 1900; Miller, "Alabama," p. 235.
2 A^. V. Times, Nov. 2, 1865 (Truman).
3 The explosion was caused by fire reaching the ordnance stores left by the Confed-
erate troops. One of the cotton agents claimed that 9000 bales of cotton were destroyed
for him in the explosion. But the government held otherwise. It was charged, with-
out satisfactory proof, that the cotton agents caused the explosion to cover their shortage.
* "Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 321.
^ " Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 427.
256
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
were out of repair and fast going to ruin. Many of the fine houses
in the cities — especially in Mobile — had fallen into the hands of
the Jews. One place, which was bought for $45,000 before the war,
was sold with difficulty in 1876 for $10,000. Before the war there
were sixteen French business houses in Mobile; none survived the
war. The port of Mo-
bile never again reached
its former importance.
In i860, 900,000 bales
of cotton had been
shipped from the port ;
in 1 865-1 866, 400,000
bales; in 1866-1867,
250,000 bales; in 1876,
400,000 bales. There
was no disposition on
the part of the Wash-
ington administration to
remove the obstructions
in Mobile harbor. They
were left for years and
furnished an excuse to
the reconstructionists
for the expenditure of
state money. ^ Nearly
all the grist-mills and
cotton-gins had been
destroyed, mill-dams
cut, and ponds drained.
The raiders never spared
a cotton-gin. The cot-
ton, in which the government was interested, was either burned or
seized and sold, and private cotton, when found, fared in the same way.
Cotton had been the cause of much trouble to the commanders on
both sides during the war ; it was considered the mainstay of the South
before the war and the root of all evil. So of all property it received
1 M. G. Molinari, " Lettres sur les Etats-Unis et le Canada," p. 233 ; Somers,
"Southern States," pp. 181, 183.
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
257
the least consideration from the Federal troops, and was very easily
turned into cash. AU farm animals near the track of the armies had
been carried away or killed by the soldiers (as at Selma), or seized
after the occupation by the troops. Horses, mules, cows, and other
domestic animals had almost disappeared except in the secluded
districts. Many a farmer had to plough with oxen. Farm and
plantation buildings had been dismantled or burned, houses ruined,
fences destroyed, corn, meat, and syrup taken. The plantations
in the Tennessee valley were in a ruined condition. The gin-houses
were burned, the bridges ruined, mills and factories gone, and the
roads impassable.^ In the homes that were left, carpets and cur-
tains were gone, for they had been used as blankets and clothes,
window glass was out, furniture injured or destroyed, and crockery
broken. In the larger towns, where something had been saved from
the wreck of war, the looting by the Federal soldiers was shameful.
Pianos, furniture, pictures, curtains, sofas, and other household
goods were shipped North by the Federal officers during the early
days of the occupation. Gold and silver plate and jewellery were
confiscated by the bummers who were with every command. Abuses
of this kind became so flagrant that the northern papers condemned
the conduct of the soldiers, and several ministers, among them
Henry Ward Beecher, rebuked the practice from the pulpit.^
Land was almost worthless, because the owners had no capital,
no farm animals, no farm implements, in many cases not even seed.
Labor was disorganized, and the product of labor was most likely
to be stolen by roving negroes and other marauders. Seldom was
more than one-third of a plantation under cultivation, the remainder
growing up in broom sedge because laborers could not be gotten.
When the Federal armies passed, many negroes followed them and
never returned. Numbers of them died in the camps. When the
war ended, many others left their old homes, some of whom several
isomers, "Southern States," p. 114; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 114, 39th Cong., ist
Sess.
2 John Hardy, " History of Selma," pp. 51, 52; Reid, "After the War," pp. 211,
214, 222, 371; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 233-235; Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 114, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Patton to Congress) ; N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, Oct. 31, and Aug. 17,
1865; Riley, "History of Conecuh County"; Riley, " Baptists of Alabama," pp. 304,
305; Brewer, "Alabama," pp. 65, 69; Brown, "Alabama," pp. 254, 256; DuBose,
"Alabama," pp. 114, 115 ; "Our Women in the War," p. 277 ei seq.
s
258 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
years later came straggling back/ Land that would produce a bale
of cotton to the acre, worth $125, and seUing in i860 for $50 per
acre at the lowest, was now seUing for from $3 to $5 per acre. Among
the negroes, especially after the occupation, there was a general behef,
which was carefully fostered by a certain class of Federal officials
and by some leaders in Congress, that the lands would be confiscated
and divided among the ''unionists" and the negroes. When the state
seceded, it took charge of the pubHc lands within its boundaries
and opened them to settlement. After the fall of the Confederacy
those who had purchased lands were required to rebuy them from
the United States or to give up their claims. Some lands were
abandoned, as the owners were able neither to cultivate nor to sell
them, for there was no capital. In Cumberland, a village, at one
time there were ninety advertisements of sales posted in the hotel.
The planters often found themselves amid a wilderness of land, with-
out laborers, and often rented land free to some white man or to a
negro who would pay the taxes. ^ Many hundreds of the people
could see no hope whatever for the future of the state, and certainly
the North was not acting so as to encourage them. Hence there
was heavy emigration to Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, the northern and
western states, and much property was offered at a tenth of its value
and even less.
The heaviest losses fell upon the old wealthy families, who, by
the loss of wealth and by poHtical proscription, were ruined. In
middle life and in old age they were unable to begin again, and for
a generation their names disappear from sight. Losses, debts,
taxes, and proscriptions bore down many, and few rose to take their
places.^ The poorer people, though they had but Httle to lose, lost
all, and suffered extreme poverty during the latter years of the war
and the early years of Reconstruction. No wonder they were in de-
spair and seemed for a while a menace to public order. To the power
and influence of the leaders succeeded in part a second-rate class —
the rank and file of 1861 — upon whom the losses of the war fell
with less weight, and who were thrown to the front by the war which
ruined those above and those below them. They were the sound,
hard-working men — the lawyers, farmers, merchants, who had for-
1 Somers, "Southern States," p. 115. ^ Somers, "Southern States," p. 115.
3 Somers, "Southern States," p. 114.
THE WRECK OF THE RAILWAYS 259
merly been content to allow brilliant statesmen to direct the public
affairs. Now those leaders were dead or proscribed, for poverty,
war, reconstruction, and political persecution rapidly destroyed
the old ruling element, and deaths among them after the war were
very common. The men who rescued the state in 1874 were the men
of lesser ability of i860, farmer subordinates in the pohtical ranks/
The Wreck of the Railways
The steamboats on the rivers were destroyed. At that time
the steamers probably carried as much freight and as many passen-
gers as did the -milroads, and served to connect the railway systems.
The railroads also were in a ruined condition ; depots had been burned,
bridges and trestles destroyed, tracks torn up, cross-ties burned or
were rotten, rails worn out or ruined by burning, cars and locomotives
worn out or destroyed or captured. The boards of directors and
the presidents of the roads, because of the aid they had given the
Confederacy, were not considered safe persons to trust with the reor-
ganization of the system, and, in August, 1865, Stanton, the Secretary
of War, directed that each southern railway be reorganized with a
''loyal" board of directors.
In i860 there were about 800 miles of railways in Alabama.
Nearly all of the roads were unfinished in 1861, and, except on the
most important mihtary roads, httle progress was made in their
construction during the war — only about 20 or 30 miles being
completed. During this time all roads were practically under the
control of the Confederate government, which operated them through
their own boards of directors and other officials. The various roads
suffered in different degrees. At the close of the war, the Tennessee
and Alabama Railroad had only two or three cars that could be used,
the rails also were worn out, the locomotives out of order and useless,
nearly all the depots, bridges, and trestles destroyed, as well as all
of its shops, water tanks, machinery, books, and papers. The Mem-
phis and Charleston, extending across the entire northern part of
the state, fell into the hands of the Federals in 1862, who captured
at Huntsville nearly all of the rolling stock and destroyed the shops
1 Reid, "After the War," pp. 222, 371 ; Ball, "Clarke County," p. 294; Riley,
"Baptists of Alabama," pp. 304-305; N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1865; N. Y. Herald,
July 23, 1865.
260 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and the papers. The roUing stock had been collected at Huntsville,
ready to be shipped to a place of less danger; but because of the
treachery of a telegraph operator who kept the knowledge of the
approaching raid from the officials, all was lost, for to prevent its
faUing into the hands of the enemy much more was destroyed than
was captured. When the Federals were driven from a section of
the road, they destroyed it in order to prevent the Confederates
from using it. The length of this road in the state was 155 miles,
and 140 miles of the track were torn up, the rails heated in the middle
over fires of burning cross-ties, and the iron then twisted around trees
and stumps so as to make it absolutely useless. In 1865 very
little machinery of any kind was left. Besides this the company
lost heavily in Confederate securities, and the other losses (funds,
etc.) amounted to $1,195,166.79.
The Mobile and Ohio lost in Confederate currency $5,228,562.23.
Thirty-seven miles of rails were worn out, 21 miles were burned and
twisted, 184 miles of road cleared of bridges, trestles, and stations,
the cross-ties burned, and the shops near Mobile destroyed. There
were 18 of 59 locomotives in working order, 11 of 26 passenger cars,
3 of II baggage cars, 231 of 721 freight cars. The Selma and Me-
ridian lost its shops and depots in Selma and Meridian, and its bridges
over the Cahaba and Valley creeks. It sustained a heavy loss in
Confederate bonds and currency. The Alabama and Tennessee
Rivers Railroad lost a million dollars in Confederate funds, its shops,
tools, and machinery at Selma, 6 bridges, its trestles, some track
and many depots, its locomotives and cars. The Wills Valley Road
suffered but little from destruction or from loss in Confederate secu-
rities. The Mobile and Great Northern escaped with a loss of only
$401,190.37 in Confederate money, and $164,800 by destruction,
besides the wear and tear on its track and rolHng stock in the four
years without repairs. The Alabama and Florida Road lost in Con-
federate currency $755,343,21. It had at the end of the war only
4 locomotives and 40 cars of all descriptions. The people were so
poor that in the summer of 1865 this road, on a trip from Mobile to
Montgomery and return, a distance of 360 miles, collected in fares
only $13. The Montgomery and West Point, 161 miles in length,
and one of the best roads in the state, probably suffered the heaviest
loss from raids. It lost in currency $1,618,243, besides all of its
I
THE WRECK OF THE RAILWAYS 261
rolling stock that was in running order; much of the track was torn
up and rails twisted, all bridges and tanks and depots were destroyed.
Both Rousseau and Wilson tore up the track and destroyed the shops
and rolling stock at Montgomery and along the road to West Point
and also the rolhng stock that had been sent to Columbus, Georgia.
After the surrender an old locomotive that had been thrown aside
at Opelika and 14 condemned cars were patched up, and for a while
this old engine and a couple of flat cars were run up and down the
road as a passenger train. The worn strap rails used in repairing
gave much trouble. The fare was 10 cents a mile in coin or 20
cents in greenbacks.^ Every road in the South lost rolhng stock on
the border. The few cars and locomotives left to any road were
often scattered over several states, and some of them were never
returned.
As the Federal armies occupied the country, they took charge of
the railways, which were then run either under the direction of the
War Department or the railroad division of the army. After the
war they were returned to the stockholders as soon as "loyal" boards
of directors were appointed or the "disloyal" ones made "loyal"
by the pardon of the President. Contractors who undertook to re-
open the roads in the summer of 1865 were unable to do so because
the negroes refused to work. The companies were bankrupt, for all
money due them was Confederate currency, and all they had in their
possession was Confederate currency. Many debts that had been
paid by the roads during the war to the states and counties now had
to be paid again. All of the nine roads in the state attempted reor-
ganization, but only three were able to accomplish it, and these then
absorbed the others. None, it appears, were abandoned.^
1 An indignant northern newspaper correspondent appealed to the military authori-
ties to check this "rebellious discrimination," but nothing was done. The railroad offi-
cials, as well as all other southern people, were now suspicious of paper money.
2 Ho. Repts., Vol. IV, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., on "Affairs of Southern Railroads" ;
Trowbridge, "The South," p. 451 ; Reid, "After the War," p. 212; Brewer, "Ala-
bama," pp. 78, 79; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 141, 234; N. V. World, July 18, 1865;
Selma Times, Jan. 25 and Feb. 2, 1866 ; N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1865 ; April 25 and
July 2, 1866; Berney, "Handbook of Alabama"; Hodgson, "Alabama Manual and
Statistical Register."
262 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Sec. 2. The Interregnum ; Lawlessness and Disorder
Immediately after the surrender of the armies a general demand
arose from the people throughout the lower South that the governors
convene the state legislatures for the purpose of calhng conventions
which, by repeahng the ordinance of secession and abolishing slavery,
could prepare the way for reunion. This, it was thought, was all
that the North wanted, and it seemed to be in harmony with Lincoln's
plan of restoration. General Richard Taylor, when he surrendered
at Meridian, Mississippi, advised the governors of Tennessee, Ala-
bama, and Mississippi to take steps to carry out such measures;
and General Canby, to whom Taylor surrendered the department,
indorsed the plan, as did also the various general officers of the armies
of occupation. But these generals were not in touch with politics
at Washington. The Federal government outlawed the existing
southern state governments, leaving them with no government at
all. Governor Watts and ex-Governors Shorter and Moore were
arrested and sent to northern prisons. A number of prominent
leaders, among them John Gayle of Selma and ex-Senators Clay
and Fitzpatrick, were also arrested. The state government went to
pieces. General Canby was instructed by President Johnson to
arrest any member of the Alabama legislature who might attempt
to hold a meeting of the general assembly. Consequently, from the
first of May until the last of the summer the state of Alabama was
without any state government ; ^ and it was only after several months
of service as provisional governor that Parsons was able to reorganize
the state administration.
For six months after the surrender there was practically no gov-
ernment of any kind in Alabama except in the immediate vicinity
of the military posts, where the commander exercised a certain
authority over the people of the community. A good commander
could do little more than let affairs take their course, for the great mass
of the people only wanted to be left alone for a while. They were
tired of war and strife and wanted rest and an opportunity to work
their crops and make bread for their suffering families. The strong-
1 A^. Y. Herald, June 17 and Aug. 30, 1865; Taylor, "Destruction and Recon-
struction," pp. 227, 228 ; Miller, *' History of Alabama," p. 237 ; McCuUoch, " Men
and Measures," p. 235.
THE INTERREGNUM; LAWLESSNESS AND DISORDER 263
est influence of the respectable people was exerted in favor of peace
and order. While much lawlessness appeared in the state, it was not
as much as might have been expected under the existing circumstances
at the close of the great Civil War. Much of the disorder was caused
by the presence of the troops, some of whom were even more trouble-
some than the robbers and outlaws from whom they were supposed
to protect the people. Tlte best soldiers of the Federal army had
demanded their discharge as soon as fighting was over, and had gone
home. Those who remained in the service in the state were, witH
few exceptions, very disorderly, and kept the people in terror by their
robberies and outrages. Especially troublesome among the negro
population, and a constant cause of irritation to the whites, were
the negro troops, who were sent into the state, the people believed,
in order to humiliate the whites. They were commanded by officers
who had been insulted and threatened all during the war because of
their connection with these troops, and this treatment had embittered
them against the southern people. The negro troops were stationed
in towns where Confederate spirit had been very strong, as a disci-
phne to the people. For months and even years after the surrender
the Federal troops in small detachments were accustomed to march
through the country, searching for cotton and other public property
and arresting citizens on charges preferred by the tories or by the
negroes, many of whom spent their time confessing the sins of their
white neighbors. The garrison towns suffered from the unruly
behavior of the soldiers. The officers, who were only waiting to be
mustered out of service, devoted themselves to drinking, women,
and gambling. The men followed their example. The traffic in
whiskey was enormous, and most of the sales were to the soldiers,
to the lowest class of whites, and to the negroes. The streets of the
towns and cities such as Montgomery, Mobile, Selma, Huntsville,
Athens, and Tuscaloosa, were crowded with drunken and violent
soldiers. Lewd women had followed the army and had established
disreputable houses near every military post, which were the centre
and cause of many lawless outbreaks. Quarrels were frequent, and
at a disorderly ball in Montgomery, in the fall of 1865, a Federal
officer was killed. The peaceable citizens were plundered by the
camp followers, discharged soldiers, and the deserters who now
crawled out of their retreats. Sometimes these marauders dressed in
264 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the Federal uniforms when on their expeditions, in order to cast sus-
picion on the soldiers, who were often wrongfully charged with these
crimes.^
As one instance of the many outrages committed at this time
the following may be cited: in the summer of 1865, when all was in
disorder and no government existed in the state, a certain "Major"
Perry, as his followers called him, went- on a private raid through
the country to get a part of anything that might be left. He was one
of the many who thought that they deserved some share of the spoils
and who were afraid that the time of their harvest would be short.
So it was necessary to make the best of the disordered condition
of affairs. Perry was followed by a few white soldiers, or men who
dressed as soldiers, and by a crowd of negroes. At his saddle-bow
was tied a bag containing his most valuable plunder. From house
to house in Dallas and adjoining counties he and his men went,
demanding valuables, pulling open trunks and bureau and wardrobe
drawers, scattering their contents, and choosing what they wanted,
tearing pictures in pieces, and scattering the contents of boxes of
papers and books in a spirit of pure destructiveness. At one house
they found some old shirts which the mistress had carefully mended
for her husband, who had not yet returned from the army. One of
the marauders suggested that they be added to their collection.
"Major" Perry looked at them carefully, but, as he was rather choice
in his tastes, rejected them as "damned patched things," spat tobacco
on them, and trampled them with his muddy boots. Incidents
similar to this were not infrequent, nor were they calculated to soften
the feelings of the women toward the victorious enemy. Their cor-
dial hatred of Federal officers was strongly resented by the latter,
who were often able to retaliate in unpleasant ways.^
In southeast Alabama deserters from both armies and members
of the so-called First Florida Union Cavalry continued for a year
after the close of the war their practice of plundering all classes of
people and sometimes committing other acts of violence. Some
1 N. V. Herald, July 17 and 20, 1865 ; N. Y. World, July 20, 1865 ; N. Y. Times,
Aug. 17 and Dec. 27, 1865; Miller, "History of Alabama," pp.235, ^37 '^ Herbert,
" The Solid South," pp. 18, 19 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 451 ; oral accounts.
2 " Our Women in the War," p. 279 ; Riley, " Baptists of Alabama," pp. 304, 305.
See also Elizabeth McCracken, "The Southern Woman and Reconstruction," in the
Outlook, Nov., 1903.
I
THE INTERREGNUM; LAWLESSNESS AND DISORDER 265
persons were robbed of nearly all that they possessed/ Joseph
Saunders, a millwright of Dale County, served as a Confederate
lieutenant in the first part of the war. Later he resigned, and being
worried by the conscript officers, alhed himself with a band of desert-
ers near the Florida Hne, who drew their supphes from the Federal
troops on the coast. Saunders was made leader of the band and made
frequent forays into Dale County, where on one occasion a company
of mihtia on parade was captured. The band raided the town of
Newton, but was defeated. After the war, Saunders with his gang
returned and continued horse-stealing. Finally he killed a man and
went to Georgia, where, in 1866, he himself was killed.^ He was a
type of the native white outlaw.
The burning of cotton was common. Some was probably
burned because the United States cotton agents had seized it, but
the heaviest loss fell on private owners. A large quantity of private
cotton worth about $2,000,000, that had escaped confiscation and
had been collected near Montgomery, was destroyed by the cotton
burners.^ Horse and cattle thieves infested the whole state, especially
the western part. Washington and Choctaw counties especially
suffered from their depredations.'' The rivers were infested with
cotton thieves, who floated down the streams in flats, landed near
cotton fields, established videttes, went into the fields, stole the cotton,
and carried it down the river to market.^ A band of outlaws took
passage on a steamboat on the Alabama River, overcame the crew
and the honest passengers, and took possession of the boat.®
A secret incendiary organization composed of negroes and some
discharged Federal soldiers plotted to burn Selma. The members of
the band wore red ribbon badges. One of the negroes informed the
authorities of the plot and of the place of meeting, and forty of the
band were arrested. The others were informed and escaped. The
miHtary authorities released the prisoners, who denied the charge,
though some of their society testified against them."^ There were
1 Miller, " History of Alabama," p. 238 ; Patton's Message, Jan. 16, 1866.
2 Brewer, " Alabama," pp. 205, 206.
^ N. Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1865 (Truman).
4 N. Y. Herald, Oct. 5, 1895 ; Report of Carl Schurz.
5 Chicago Tribune, (fall of) 1865, Montgomery correspondence.
^ Governor Patton's Message, Jan. 16, 1866.
7 Oral accounts ; Daily News, Sept. 3, 1865 (Selma correspondence).
266 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
incendiary fires in every town in the state, it is said, and several were]
almost destroyed.
The bitter feeling between the tories and the Confederates ofi
north Alabama resulted in some places in guerilla warfare. The|
Confederate soldiers, whose families had suffered from the depreda-
tions of the tories during the war, wanted to punish the outlaws for
their misdeeds, and in many cases attempted to do so. The tories
wanted revenge for having been driven from the country or into
hiding by the Confederate authorities, so they raided the Confederate
soldiers as they had raided their families during the war. Some of
the tories were caught and hanged. In revenge, the Confederates
were shot down in their houses, and in the fields while at work, or
while travelling along the roads. The convention called by Gov-
ernor Parsons declared that lawlessness existed in many counties
of the state and authorized Parsons to call out the militia in each
county to repress the disorder. They also asked the President to
withdraw the Federal troops, which were only a source of disorder,^
and gave to the mayors of Florence, Athens, and Huntsville special
police powers within their respective counties in order to check
the lawless element, which was especially strong in Lauderdale,
Limestone, and Madison counties.^ These counties lay north of the
Tennessee River, along the Tennessee border. There was a dispo-
sition on the part of the civil and military authorities in Alabama to
attribute the lawlessness in north and northwest Alabama to bands
of desperadoes from Tennessee and Mississippi, but north Alabama
had numbers of marauders of her own, and it is probable that Ten-
nessee and Mississippi had Httle to do with it. Half a dozen men,
where there was no authority to check them, could make a whole
county uncomfortable for the peaceable citizens.^
The Federal infantry commands scattered throughout the country
were of little service in capturing the marauders. General Swayne
repeatedly asked for cavalry, for, as he said, the infantry was the
source of as much disorder as it suppressed. The worst outrages, he
added, were committed by small bands of lawless men organized
1 Ordinj^nces, No. 4, Sept. 20, 1865, and No. 54, Sept. 30, 1865.
2 Reid, " After the War," pp. 351, 352 ; Ordinance, No. 43, Sept. 30, 1865.
8 Daily Times, Aug. 17, Nov. 2, and Dec. 27, 1865 ; Report of Carl Schurz ; oral
accounts.
THE INTERREGNUM; LAWLESSNESS AND DISORDER 267
under various names, and whose chief object was robbery and plun-
der/ After the estabhshment of the provisional government an
attempt was made to bring to trial some of the outlaws who had in-
fested the country during and after the war, and who richly deserved
hanging. They were of no party, being deserters from both armies,
or tories who had managed to keep out of either army. However,
when arrested they raised a strong cry of being "unionists" and
appealed to the military authorities for protection from ''rebel'"
persecution, though the officials of the Johnson government in Ala-
bama were never charged by any one else with an excess of zeal
in the Confederate cause. The Federal officials released all pris-
oners who claimed to be "unionists." Sheriff Snodgrass of Jackson
County arrested fifteen bushwhackers charged with murder. They
claimed to be "loyalists," and General Kryzyanowski, commanding
the district of north Alabama, ordered the court to stop proceedings
and to discharge the prisoners. This was not done, and Kryzy-
anowski sent a body of negro soldiers who closed the court, released
the prisoners, and sent the sheriff to jail at Nashville.^ The military
authorities allowed no one who asserted that he was a "unionist"
to be tried for offences committed during the war, and any effort
to bring the outlaws to trial resulted in an outcry against the "perse-
cution of loyalists."
In August, 1865, Sheriff John M. Daniel of Cherokee County
arrested and imprisoned a band of marauders dressed in the Federal
uniform, though they had no connection with the army. A short
time afterwards the citizens asked him to raise a posse and arrest
a similar band which was engaged in robbing the people, plunder-
ing houses, assaulting respectable citizens, and threatening to kill
them. And as such occurrences were frequent, Sheriff Daniel, after
consulting with the citizens, summoned a posse comitatus and went
in pursuit of the marauders. One squad was encountered which
surrendered without resistance. A second, belonging to the same
band, approached, and, refusing to surrender, opened fire on the sher-
iff's party. In the fight the sheriff killed one man. Upon learning
that his prisoners were soldiers and were on detail duty, he desisted
1 Report of the Freedmen's Bureau, Oct. 24, 1865 ; Patton's Message, Jan. 16,
1866; Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, p. 140.
^ N. V. Times, Oct. 10, 1865. See also Resolutions of Legislature, 1865-1866.
268 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
from further pursuit, released the citizens who were held as prisoners
by the soldiers, and turned his prisoners over to the mihtary authori-
ties. This was on August 24. Daniel was at once arrested by the
military authorities and confined in prison at Talladega in irons.
Six months later he had had no trial, and the general assembly peti-
tioned the President for his release, claiming that he had acted in the
faithful discharge of his duty.^ The memorial asserts that such out-
rages were of frequent occurrence. Another petition to the President
asked for the withdrawal of the troops, whose presence caused dis-
order, and who at various times provoked unpleasant collisions.
Many of the troops, remote from the hne of transportation, subsisted
their stock upon the country. This was a hardship to the people,
who had barely enough to support hfe.^
For several years the arbitrary conduct of some of the soldiers
was a cause of bad feeling on the part of the citizens.^ But the soldiers
were very often blamed for deeds done by outlaws disguised as Federal
troops. In northern Alabama a party of northern men bought prop-
erty, and complained to Governor Parsons of the depredations of the
Federal troops stationed near and asked for protection. Parsons
could only refer their request to General Davis at Montgomery,
and in the meantime the troops complained of drove out of the com-
munity the signers of the request for protection. One of them,
an ex-captain in the United States army, was ordered to leave within
three hours or he would be shot.'' The soldiers, except at the impor-
tant posts, were under slack discipline, and their officers had little
control over them. At Bladen Springs some negro troops shot a
Mr. Bass while he was in bed and beat his wife and children with
ramrods. They drove the wife and daughters of a Mr. Rhodes
from home and set fire to the house. The citizens fled from their
homes, which were pillaged by the negro soldiers in order to get the
clothing, furniture, books, etc. The trouble originated in the refusal
of the white people to associate with the white officers of the colored
troops.^ These negroes had Httle respect for their officers and
1 Joint Memorial and Resolutions of the General Assembly, in Acts of Ala. (1865-
1866), pp. 598-600.
2 Memorial and Joint Resolutions, Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), pp. 601-603.
* Miller, " Alabama," p. 242.
* N. Y. Herald, Dec. 15, 1865.
^ The wife of one of these officers was a notorious prostitute.
THE NEGRO TESTING HIS FREEDOM 269
threatened to shoot their commanding officers/ At Decatur the
negro troops plundered and shot into the houses of the whites. In
Greensboro a white youth struck a negro who had insulted him, and
was in turn slapped in the face by a Federal officer, whom he at once
shot and then made his escape. The negro population, led by negro
soldiers, went into every house in the town, seized all the arms, and
secured as a hostage the brother of the man who had escaped. A
gallows was erected and the boy was about to be hanged when his
relatives received an intimation that money would secure his release.
With difficulty about $10,000 was secured from the people of the town
and sent to the officer in command of the district. No one knows
what he did with the money, but the young man was released.^
Before the close of 1865, the commanding officers were reducing
the troops to much better discipline and many were withdrawn.
The provisional government also grew stronger, and there was con-
siderably less disorder among the whites, though the blacks were
still demoralized.
Sec. 3. The Negro testing his Freedom
The conduct of the negro during the war and after gaining his
freedom seemed to convince those who had feared that insurrection
would follow emancipation that no danger was to be feared from this
source. Most of the former slaveholders, who were better acquainted
with the negro character and who knew that the old masters could
easily control them, at no time feared a revolt of the blacks unless
under exceptional circumstances. It was only when the wretched
characters who followed the northern armies gained control of the
negro by playing upon his fears and exciting his worst passions that
the fear of the negro was felt by many who had never felt it before,
and who have never since been entirely free from this fear.
When the Federal armies passed through the state, the negroes
along the line of march followed them in numbers, though many
returned to the old home after a day or two. Yet all were restless
and expectant, as was natural. During the war they had understood
1 Selma Times, Feb. 22, 1 866.
2 From Ms. account by a citizen of Greensboro. The young man who came so
near hanging was some years later a hotel proprietor in Birmingham and created much
newspaper discussion by ordering General Sherman to leave his hotel.
270 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the questions at issue so far as they themselves were concerned,
and now that the struggle was decided against their masters they
looked for stranger and more wonderful things, not so much at first,
however, as later when the negro soldiers and the white emissaries
had filled their minds with false impressions of the new and glorious
condition that was before them. For several weeks before the master
came home from the army the negroes knew that, as a result of the
war, they were free. They, however, worked on, somewhat restless,
of course, until he arrived and called them up and informed them that
they were free. This was the usual way in which the negro was in-
formed of his freedom. The great majority of the blacks, except in
the track of the armies, waited to hear from their masters the con-
firmation of the reports of freedom. And the first thing the returning
slaveholder did was to assemble his negroes and make known to them
their condition with its privileges and responsibihties. It did not
enter the minds of the masters that any laws or constitutional amend-
ments were necessary to abolish slavery. They were quite sure that
the war had decided the question. Some of the legal-minded men,
those who were not in the army and who read their law books, were
disposed to cling to their claims until the law settled the question.
But they were few in number.^
How to prove Freedom
The negro believed, when he became free, that he had entered
Paradise, that he never again would be cold or hungry, that he never
would have to work unless he chose to, and that he never would have
to obey a master, but would live the remainder of his life under the
tender care of the government that had freed him. It was necessary,
he thought, to test this wonderful freedom. As Booker Washington
says, there were two things which all the negroes in the South agreed
must be done before they were really free: they must change their
names and leave the old plantation for a few days or weeks. Many
of them returned to the old homes and made contracts with their
masters for work, but at the same time they felt that it was not proper
to retain their old master's name, and accordingly took new ones.^
1 See Mrs. Clayton, "White and Black Under the Old Regime," pp. 152-153.
2 Washington, " Up From Slavery," pp. 23, 24.
HOW TO PROVE FREEDOM 27 1
Upon leaving their homes the blacks collected in gangs at the
cross-roads, in the villages and towns, and especially near the mihtary
posts. To the negro these ordinary men in blue v^ere beings from
another sphere who had brought him freedom, which was something
that he did not exactly understand, but which he was assured was a
delightful state. The towns were filled with crowds of blacks who
left their homes with absolutely nothing, thinking that the govern-
ment would care for them, or, more probably, not thinking at all.
Later, after some experience, they were disposed to bring with them
their household goods and the teams and wagons of their former
masters. This was the effect that freedom had upon thousands;
yet, after all, most of the negroes either stayed at their old homes,
or, that they might feel really free, moved to some place near by.
But among the quietest of them there was much restlessness and neg-
lect of work. Hunting and fishing and frolics were the duties of the
day. Every man acquired in some way a dog and a gun as badges
of freedom. It was quite natural that the negroes should want a
prolonged holiday to enjoy their new-found freedom ; and it is rather
strange that any of them worked, for there was a universal impres-
sion, vague of course in the remote districts — the result of the teach-
ings of the negro soldiers and of the Freedmen's Bureau officials —
that the government would support them. Still some communities
were almost undisturbed. The advice of the old plantation preachers
held many to their work, and these did not suffer as did their brothers
who flocked to the cities. Many negro men seized the opportunity
to desert their wives and children and get new wives. It was con-
sidered a rehc of slavery to remain tied to an ugly old wife, married
in slavery. Much suffering resulted from the desertion, though,
as a rule, the negro mother alone supported the children much better
than did the father who stayed.^
In many districts the negro steadily refused to work, but persisted
in supporting himself at the expense of the would-be employer.
Thousands of hogs and cattle that had escaped the raiding armies
or the Confederate tithe gatherer went to feed the hungry African
1 Columbus (Ga.) Sun, Nov. 22, 1865 5 '^^^ World, July 20, 1865 ; N. Y. Herald,
July 23, 1865 ; Parsons's Speech, Cooper Institute, Nov. 13, 1865 ; Riley, " Baptists of
Alabama," pp. 305, 307 ; Ball, " Clarke County," p. 294 ; Herbert, " Solid South," pp.
19, 20 ; Miller, " History of Alabama," Ch. CXLI ; oral accounts.
2/2 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
whom the Bureau did not supply. The Bureau issued rations only
three times a week, and as the homeless negro had nowhere to keep
provisions for two or three days, there would be a season of plenty
and then a season of fasting. The Bureau reached only a small
proportion of the negroes ; and, of those it could reach, many, in spite
of the regulations, neglected to apply for relief. By causing the
negroes to crowd into the towns and cities the Bureau brought on
much of the want that it did not relieve. The complaint was made
that in the worst period of distress the soldiers in charge of the issue
of supplies made no effort to see that the negroes were cared for.
It was easier also for the average negro to pick up pigs and chickens
than to make trips to the Bureau. During the summer the roving
negro lived upon green corn from the nearest fields and blackberries
from the fence corners and pine orchards. With the approach of
winter suffering was sure to come to those who were now doing well
in a vagrant way, but winter was to them too far in the future to
trouble them.
The negroes soon found that freedom was not all they had been
led to expect. A meeting of 900 blacks held near Mobile decided
by a vote of 700 to 200 to return to their former masters and go to
work to make a living, since their northern deHverers had failed to
provide for them in any way.*
The negro preacher, especially those lately called to preach,
and the northern missionaries had, during the summer and fall, a
flourishing time and a rich harvest. A favorite dissipation among
the negroes was going to church services as often as possible, especially
to camp-meetings where he or she could shout. It was another mark
of freedom to change one's church, or to secede from the white churches.
All through the summer of 1865 the revival meetings went on, con-
ducted by new self-" called" colored preachers and the missionaries.
The old plantation preachers, to their credit be it remembered,
frowned upon this religious frenzy. The people living near the
places of meetings complained of the disappearance of poultry and
pigs, fruit and vegetables after the late sessions of the African con-
gregations. The various missionaries filled the late slave's head with
false notions of many things besides religion, and gathered thou-
sands into their folds from the southern religious organizations.
1 N. Y. Herald, Aug. 27, 1865 ; Mobile Register, Aug. 16, 1 865.
SUFFERING AMONG THE NEGROES 2/3
Baptizings were as popular as the opera among the whites to-day.
That ceremony took place at the river or creek side. Thousands were
sometimes assembled, and the air was electric with emotion. The
negro was then as near Paradise as he ever came in his Hfe. The
Baptist ceremony of immersion was preferred, because, as one of
them remarked, "It looks more Hke business." Shouting they went
into the water and shouting they came out. One old negro woman
was immersed in the river and came out screaming: ''Freed from
slavery! freed from sin! Bless God and General Grant!" ^
Suffering among the Negroes
The negroes massed in the towns lived in deserted and ruined
houses, in huts built by themselves of refuse lumber, under sheds
and under bridges over creeks, ravines, and gutters, and in caves
in the banks of rivers and ravines. Many a one had only the sky
for a roof and the ground in a fence corner for a bed. They were
very scantily clothed. Food was obtained by begging, stealing, or from
the Bureau. Taking from the whites was not considered steaHng,
but was "spihn de Gypshuns." The food supply was insufficient,
and was badly cooked when cooked at all. It was not possible for
the army and the Freedmen's Bureau, which came later, to do half
enough by issuing rations to relieve the suffering they caused by
attracting the negroes to the cities. While in slavery the negro
had been forced to keep regular hours, and to take care of himself;
he had plenty to eat and to wear, and, for reasons of dollars and cents,
if for no other, his health was looked after by his master. Now all
was changed. The negroes were like young children left to care for
themselves, and even those who remained at home suffered from
personal neglect, since they no longer could be governed in such mat-
ters by the directions of the whites. Among the negroes in the cities
and in the "contraband" camps the sanitary conditions were very
bad. To make matters infinitely worse disease in its most loathsome
forms broke out in these crowded quarters. Smallpox, peculiarly
fatal to negroes, raged among them for two years and carried off
great numbers. The Freedmen's Bureau had established hospitals
1 Iluntsville Advocate, July 26 and Nov. 9, 1865 ; McTyeire, " History of Methodism ";
Riley, " Baptists of Alabama"; conversations with various negroes and whites.
T
2/4 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
for the negroes, but it could not or would not care for the smallpox
patients as carefully as for other sickness. In Selma, for instance,
the city authorities had been sending the negroes who were ill to one
of the city hospitals. But the military authorities interfered, took
the negroes away, and informed the city authorities that the negroes
were the especial wards of the government, which-would care for them
at all times. When smallpox broke out, the mihtary authorities
in charge of the Bureau refused to have anything to do with the sick
negroes, and left them to the care of the town.^ Consumption and
venereal diseases now made their appearance. The relations of the
soldiers of the invading army and the negro women were the cause
of social demorahzation and physical deterioration. An eminent
authority states that from various causes the efficient negro popula-
tion was reduced by one-fourth.^ Though this estimate must be
too large, still the negro population decreased between i860 and 1866,
as the census of the latter year shows,^ in spite of the fact that thou-
sands of negroes ^ were sent into Alabama during the war from
Georgia, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Florida to escape capture by
the Federal armies. The greatest mortahty was among the negroes
in the outskirts of the cities and towns. Some of the loss of popula-
tion must be ascribed to the enrolment of negroes as soldiers and to
the capture of slaves by the Federal armies.^ For several years
after the war young negro children were scarce in certain districts.
They had died by hundreds and thousands through neglect.®
^ Hardy, " History of Selma," p. 85. ^ DeBoiv's Review, March, 1866.
^ Negro population in i860 ....... 437,770
Negro population in 1866 . . . . . . . 423,325
Decrease I4>445
* Estimated 20,000 — Census of 1866.
^Southern Mag., Jan., 1874. Authorities as already noted and DeBoiv's Review,
March, 1866; Montgomery Advertiser, March 21, 1866; Hardy, "History of Selma,"
p. 85 ; A^. F. Times, Oct. 31, 1865 ; Huntsville Advocate, Nov. 9, 1865 ; N, Y. Herald,
. July 17, 1865 ; N. Y, News, Sept. 7 and Dec. 4, 1865 ; Census of 1866 in Selma Times
and Messenger, March 24, 1868 ; Mrs. Clayton, " White and Black," pp. 152, 153.; " Our
Women in the War"; Thomas, "The American Negro," p. 190; Report of the Joint
Committee, Pt. Ill, p. 140; B. C. Truman, Report to the President, April 9, 1866; Carl
Schurz, Report to the President, see Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 2, 39th Cong., istSess.; General
Grant, Report to the President, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 2, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
^ Southern Mag,, Jan., 1874.
RELATIONS BETWEEN WHITES AND BLACKS 275
Relations between Whites and Blacks
For a year or two the relations between the blacks and whites
were, on the whole, friendly, in spite of the constant effort of individual
northerners and negro soldiers to foment trouble between the races.
As a result of the work of outsiders, there was a growing tendency
to insolent conduct on the part of the younger negro men, who were
convinced that civil behavior and freedom were incompatible. On
the part of some there was a disposition not to submit to the direction
of the white men in their work, and the negro's advisers warned him
against the efforts of the white man to enslave him. Consequently
he refused to make contracts that called for any responsibihty on his
part, and if he made a contract the Bureau must ratify it, and, as he
had no knowledge of the obligation of contracts, he was likely to
break it. In an address of the white ministers of Selma to the negroes,
they said that papers had been circulated among the negroes telling
them that they were hated and detested by the whites, and that such
papers caused bad feeling, which was unfortunate, as the races must
live together, and the better the feeling, the better it would be for
both. At first, the address added, there was some bad feehng when
certain negroes, in order to test their freedom, became impudent
and insulting, but on the part of the white man this feeHng was soon
changed. Later the negroes were poisoned against their former
masters by listening to lying whites, and then they refused to work.
The ministers warned the negroes against their continual idleness
and their immoral hves, and told them that those of them who pre-
tended to work were not making one bushel of corn where they might
make ten, and that the whites wanted workers. The self-respecting
negroes were asked to use their influence for the bettering of the
worthless members of their race.^
When the negroes became convinced that the government would
not support them entirely, they then took up the notion that the lands
of the whites were to be divided among them. In the fall of 1865
there was a general behef that at Christmas or New Year's Day a
division of property would be made, and that each negro would get
his share — ''forty acres of land and an old gray mule " or the equiva-
lent in other property. The soldiers and the officials of the Freed-
^ Protestant Episcopal Freedmen's Commission, Occasional Papers, Jan., 1866.
2/6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
men's Bureau were responsible for putting these notions into the heads
of the negroes, though General Swayne endeavored to correct such
impressions. The effect of the belief in the division of property
was to prevent steady work or the making of contracts. Many ceased
work altogether, waiting for the division. In many cases northern
speculators and sharpers deceived the negroes about the division of
land, and, in this way, secured what little money the latter had.
The trust that the negro placed in every man who came from the
North was absolute. They manifested a great desire to work for
those who bought or leased plantations in the South, and nearly all
observers coming from the North in 1865 spoke of the alacrity with
which the blacks entered into agreements to work for northern men.
At the same time there was no ill feeling toward the southern whites ;
only, for the moment, they were eclipsed by these brighter beings
who had brought freedom with them. Two years' experience at
the most resulted in a thorough mutual distrust. The northern
man could make no allowances for the difference between white and
negro labor, he expected too much; the negro would not work for
so hard a taskmaster.
The northern newspaper correspondents who travelled through
the South in 1865 agreed that the old masters were treating the
negroes well, and that the relations between the races were much
more friendly than they had expected to find. When cotton was
worth fifty cents a pound, it was to the interest of the planter to treat
the negro well, especially as the negro would leave and go to another
employer on the slightest provocation or offer of better wages. The
demand for labor was much greater than the supply. The lower
class of whites, the "mean" or ''poor whites," as the northern man
called them, were hostile to the negro and disposed to hold him
responsible for the state of affairs, and, in some cases, mistreated
him. The negro, in turn, made many complaints against the vicious
whites, and against the policemen in the towns, who were not of the
highest type, and who made it hard for Sambo when he desired to
hang around town and sleep on the sidewalks. One correspondent
said that the Irish were especially cruel to the negroes.
The negro freedman undoubtedly suffered much more from mis-
treatment by low characters than the negro slave had suffered. In
slavery times his master saw that he was protected. Now he had
DESTITUTION AND WANT IN 1865 AND 1866 277
no one to look to for protection. The strongest influence of the
great majority of the whites was used against any mistreatment of
the negro, and the meaner element of the whites was suppressed as
much as it was possible to do when there was no authority except
public opinion. All in all the negro had less ill treatment than was
to be expected, and suffered much more from his own ignorance and
the mistaken kindness of his friends.^
Sec. 4. Destitution and Want in 1865 and 1866
When the war ended, there was little good money in the state,
and industry was paralyzed. The gold and silver that remained
was carefully hoarded, and for months there was none in circulation
except in the towns. A Confederate officer relates that on his way
home, in 1865, he gave $500 in Confederate currency to a Federal
soldier for a silver dime, and that this was the only money he saw
for several weeks. The people had no faith in paper money of any
kind, and thought that greenbacks would become worthless in the
same way as Confederate currency. All sense of values had been
lost, which may account for the fabulous and fictitious prices in the
South for several years after the war, and the liberality of appropria-
tions of the first legislature after the surrender, which in small matters
was severely economical. The legislators had been accustomed
to making appropriations of thousands and even millions of dollars,
with no question as to where the money was to come from, for the
state had three pubhc printers to print money. Now it was hard
to realize that business must be brought to a cash basis.
Here and there could be found a person who had a bale or two
of cotton which he had succeeded in hiding from the raiders and
the Treasury agents. This was sold for a good price and relieved
the wants of the owner ; but those who had cotton to sell often spent
the money foolishly for gewgaws and fancy articles to eat and wear,
such as they had not seen for several years. There was an almost
maddening desire for the things which they had once been accustomed
1 N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1865, Jan. 25, Feb. 12, and July 2, 1866; N. Y. Herald,
June 24, 1866; The Nation, Feb. 15 and April 19, 1866; Reid, "After the War," pp.
369-371 ; Reports of Grant, Truman, and Schurz ; Report of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction (Fisk); Herbert, "Solid South," p. 20; Paper by Petrie in Transactions
Ala. Hist. Soc, Vol. IV, p. 465.
2/8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to, and which the traders and speculators now placed in temptii
array in the long-empty store windows. But the majority of the"
people had no cotton to sell, and in many cases a pig or a cow was
driven ten or fifteen miles to sell for a little money to buy necessaries,
or frequently trinkets.
In certain parts of the state the crops planted by the negroes
were in good condition in April, 1865, but after the invasions they
were neglected, and in thousands of cases the negroes went away
and left them. In the white counties conditions were as bad as it
was possible to be. Half of the people in them had been supported
by state and county aid which now failed. Nearly all the men were
injured or killed, and there were no negroes to work the farms. The
women and the children did everything they could to plant their
Httle crops in the spring of 1865, but often not even seed corn was
to be had. All over the state, where it was possible, the returning
soldiers planted late crops of corn, and in the Black Belt they were
able to save some of the crops planted by the negroes. But in the
white counties, especially in the northern part of the state, nothing
could be done. Often the breadwinner had been killed in the war,
and the widow and orphans were left to provide for themselves.
The late crops were almost total failures because of the drought,
not one-tenth of the crop of i860 being made. In this section every-
thing that would support life had been stripped from the country
by the contending armies and the raiding bands of desperadoes.
A double warfare had devastated the country, ''tories" raiding their
neighbors and vice versa; and the bitter state of feeling prevented
neighbor from reheving neighbor. But the '^ Unionists," who were
sure that their turn had come, wanted the destitute cared for, even
if some were fed "who curse us as traitors." This part of the
country had been supported by the central Black Belt counties,
but in 1865 the supply was exhausted. In the cotton counties there
was enough to support Hfe, and had the negroes remained at home
and worked, they would not have suffered. As it was, those who
left the plantation were decimated by disease and want. Soon after
the occupation, the army officers distributed the supplies captured
from the Confederates among the needy whites and blacks who
apphed for aid. But many out of reach of aid starved, and espe-
cially did this happen among the aged and helpless who made no
DESTITUTION AND WANT IN 1865 AND 1866 279
appeal for aid, but who died in silence from want of shelter and
food.
After several months the Freedmen's Bureau, under the charge
of General Swayne, who was a man of discretion and common sense,
and who understood the real state of affairs, extended its assistance
to the destitute whites. Among the negroes the Bureau created
much of the misery it reHeved, for in the cotton belt there was enough
to support life; and had the negroes not flocked to the Bureau, they
would have Hved in plenty. Besides, the aged and infirm negroes
were not assisted by the Bureau, but remained with their master's
people, who took care of them. But the generous assistance extended
by that much-abused institution saved many a poor white from
starvation. In the fall of 1865 139,000 destitute whites were reported
to the provisional government. They were mostly in the mountain
counties of north and northeast Alabama, though in southeast Alabama
there was also much want. And in Governor Parsons's last message
to the legislature (December, 1865), he stated that those in need of
food numbered 250,000.^ A state commissioner for the destitute
was appointed to cooperate with General Swayne and the Freed-
men's Bureau. The legislature appropriated $500,000 in bonds
to buy suppHes for the poor, but the attitude of Congress toward
the Johnson state governments prevented the sale of state securities.
However, the governor went to the West and succeeded in getting
some supphes. In December, 1865, it was believed that there were
200,000 people who needed assistance in some degree.
The failure of the crops in 1865 left affairs in even a worse con-
dition than before. Small farmers could not subsist while making
a new crop, and many widows and children were in great need.
Some of the latter walked thirty or forty miles for food for them-
selves and for those at home.^
In January, 1866, the state commissioner, M. H. Cruikshank,
reported to Governor Patton that 52,921 whites were entirely destitute.
1 Brown, " Alabama," p. 259.
2 Montgomery Advertiser, Dec, 1865, and Jan. 31, 1866; N. Y. Tunes, Oct. 31 and
Dec. 27, 1865 ; N. Y. News, Dec. 4, 1865 ; JV. Y. Herald, Dec, 1865, and Jan. 31, 1866;
Ho. Ex, Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess. ; Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 42, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
(W. H. Smith); Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. (Swayne's Report); Riley,
-* Baptists of Alabama," p. 305 ; Trowbridge, "The South," p. 445 ; Miller, "Alabama,"
pp. 228, 229 ; Somers, " South since the War," p. 134 ; Iluntsville Advocate, Nov. 23, 1865.
280 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
These were mostly in the counties of Bibb, Shelby, Jefferson, Tal-
ladega, St. Clair, Cherokee, Blount, Jackson, Marshall, all white
counties; nine other counties had not been heard from.^ During
the same month, a Freedmen's Bureau official who travelled through
the counties of Talladega, Bibb, Shelby, Jefferson, and Calhoun
reported that the suffering among the whites was appalling, espe-
cially in Talladega County. The Freedmen's Bureau had neglected
the poor whites, though there was little suffering in the richer sec-
tions where the negroes Hved. He stated that near Talladega many
white famihes were Hving in the woods with no shelter except the
pine boughs, and this in the middle of winter.^
In Randolph County, in January, 1866, the probate judge said
that 5000 persons were in need of aid. Most of these had been
opposed to the Confederacy. The " unionists " complained that the
Confederate foragers had discriminated against them, which, while
very Hkely true, was more than offset by the depredations of the
tories and Federals on the Confederate sympathizers. All ac-
counts agree that the Confederate sympathizers were in the worse
condition; many of them had not tasted meat for months. But
charges were brought that the probate judges of the provisional gov-
ernment, who certainly were not strong Confederates, did not fairly
distribute provisions among the ''damned tories," as the latter
complained that they were called.^ The state commissioner could
relieve only about one-tenth of the destitute whites. In January,
1866, he gave assistance in the form of meal, corn (and sometimes
a little meat) to 5245 whites and 2426 blacks; in February, to
13,083 whites and to 4107 blacks; and in March, to 17,204 whites
and to 5877 blacks, most of whom were women and children, the
men receiving assistance being old, infirm, or crippled. General
Swayne of the Freedmen's Bureau helped Cruikshank in every way
he could, and took charge of some of the negroes. But owing to
the failure of the crops in 1865, the situation was growing worse,
^ Montgomery Advertiser, Jan. 31, 1866.
2 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess. ; Buckley's Report, Jan, 16, 1865;
Report of John H. Hurst and A. B. Strickland, Oct. 4, 1865.
3 Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866 ; R. T. Smith to Swayne, Jan. 6, 1866 (in Ho. Ex.
Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess.); W. H. Smith, D. C. Humphreys, and J. J. Giers,
Memorial to Congress, Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 42, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. ; Patton's Message,
Jan. 16, 1866.
DESTITUTION AND WANT IN 1865 AND 1866 28 1
and there was no hope for any rehef until the summer of 1866 when
vegetables and corn would ripen/
In May, 1866, Governor Patton said that of 20,000 widows and
60,000 orphans, three-fourths were in need of the necessaries of life,
that they had been able to do very Httle for themselves, even those
who had land being unable to work it to any advantage, and that
their corn crop of the previous year had failed.^ There is little doubt
that many died from lack of food and shelter during 1865 and 1866,
but in the disordered times incomplete records were kept. Many
cases of starvation were reported, especially in north Alabama, but
few names can now be obtained. Near Guntersville there were
three cases of starvation, while hundreds were in an almost perish-
ing condition. From Marshall County, where, it was said, there were
2180 helpless and destitute persons and 2000 who were able to work,
but could get nothing to do, it was reported that not more than
twenty people had more than enough to supply their own needs.
The people of Cherokee County, when on the verge of starvation,
appealed to south Alabama for aid. They asked for corn, and said
that if they could not get it they must leave the country. Hundreds,
they said, had not tasted meat for months, and farm stock was in a
wretched condition. Nashville sent $15,000 and Montgomery
$T 0,000 to buy provisions for them.^ From Coosa County much
distress was reported among the old people, widows, children, refu-
gees, and the families whose heads had returned from the army too
late to make a crop. However, the negroes in this section who had
remained on their farms had made good crops and were doing well.'*
In the valley of the Coosa, in northeast Alabama, several cases of
starvation were reported. One woman went seventeen miles for a
peck of meal, but died before she could reach home with it. Another,
after fasting three days, walked sixteen miles to obtain supplies,
and failing, died. One family lived on boiled greens, with no salt
nor pepper, no meat nor bread. An old woman, Hving eighteen
miles from Guntersville, walked to that village to get meal for her
grandchildren. It has been estimated that there were 20,000 people
1 Report of M. H. Cruikshank, March, 1866.
2 IIo. Mis. Doc, No. 114, 39th Cong., ist Sess ; National Intelligencer, Oct. 2, 1866.
^ //untsville Independent, A\:>x\\ :^ 2.v\d 19,1866; Selma Times, June g, 1866; oral
accounts.
* W. Garrett to Swayne, Jan. 15, 1866, in Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 38th G)ng., 1st Sess.
282 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
in the five counties south of the Tennessee river — Franklin, Lawrence,
Morgan, Marshall, De Kalb — in a state of want bordering on
starvation/
The majority of the destitute whites never appealed for aid, but
managed, though half starved, to live until better times. Numbers
left the land of famine and went where there was plenty, and where
they could get work. Others who could not emigrate and those
broken in spirit received assistance. From January to September,
1866, 15,000 to 20,000 whites, and 4000 to 14,000 negroes were aided
each month by the Freedmen's Bureau and by the state. Most of
these were women and children, the rule being not to assist able-
bodied whites except in extreme cases.
In 1866 the state succeeded in selhng some of its bonds, and
raised money in other ways. Much was spent for suppHes for the
poor, for in 1866 the crops almost failed again. From November,
1865, to September, 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau and the state com-
missioner issued, to black and white, 3,789,788 rations. There were
also large donations from the West and from Tennessee and Ken-
tucky. After this the Freedmen's Bureau gave less, though during
the year from September, 1866, to September, 1867, it issued 214,305
rations to whites and 274,399 to blacks. To the whites, and partly
to the blacks, the issue of provisions was made under the general
supervision of General Swayne, and through state agents in each
county who were acceptable to Swayne.^
In November, 1867, the Freedmen's Bureau reported that there
were 10,000 whites and 50,000 blacks without means of support, and
450,000 rations per month were asked for. It would have been much
better to have put an end to relief work, since by this time the offi-
cials of the Freedmen's Bureau were very active in politics and showed
a disposition to report their pohtical henchmen as destitute and in
need of support. And in another way there was much abuse of the
^ Chicago Tribune, June 2, 1866 (Correspondent at Bellefonte, Jackson County);
Tluntsville hidependent, April 3 and 19, 1866 ; Reports of General Swayne, 1 865-1 866.
2 March 8, 1867, General Howard of the Freedmen's Bureau reported that in Ala-
bama there were 10,000 whites and 5000 blacks in a destitute condition, and that during
the next five months, owing to the failure of the crops in 1866, there would be needed
2,250,000 rations valued at ^562,500, or 25 cents per ration. Sen. Ex. Docs., No. i,
40th Cong., 1st Sess. Report of Swayne, Oct. 31, 1866 ; Report of Com. Bureau, Nov.
I, 1867 ; G. O., No. 4, Hq. Dist. of Ala., Montgomery, Oct. 10, 1866.
DESTITUTION AND WANT IN 1865 AND 1866 283
charity of the government, for some broken-down, spiritless people
would never work for themselves as long as they could draw rations
for nothing. The negroes, especially, were demorahzed by the issue
of rations. Fear of the contempt of their neighbors would drive
all but the meaner class of whites back to work, but the negro came
to beheve that he would be supported the rest of his Hfe by the gov-
ernment.
As late as October, 1868, it was reported that there was great
want in middle and south Alabama, and soup houses were estab-
Hshed by the state and the Bureau in Mobile, Huntsville, Selma,
Montgomery, and other central Alabama towns.^ The location of
the soup kitchens, and the date, lead one to suspect that poHtics,
perhaps, had something to do with the matter. These towns were
the very places where there was less want than anywhere else in the
state, but Grant was to be elected, and there were many negro votes.
For more than two years after the war in all the small towns were
seen emaciated persons who had come long distances to get food.
General Swayne thought the condition of the poor white much worse
than that of the negro. The latter, he said, was hindered by no
wounds nor by a helpless family, for his aged and helpless kin were
cared for at the old master's. The "refugees," as the poor whites
were called who had but little and lost all by the war, hved in a dif-
ferent part of the country, — in the mountains and in the pine woods,
— beyond the reach of work or help, clinging to the old home places
in utter hopeless desolation. For the negro, Swayne thought, there
was hope, but for the "refugee" there was none; he existed only.^
It was years before a large number of the people again attained
a comfortable standard of Hving. Some gave up altogether. Many
died in the struggle. Numbers left the country; others, in reach of
assistance, became trifling and worthless from too much aid. In
later years the opening of mines and the building of railroads in
north Alabama, the lumber industry and the rapid development of
south Alabama, saved the "refugee" from the fate that General
Swayne thought was in store for him.
1 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Oct. 24, 1868.
2 Swayne's Report, Nov., 1866 ; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. ; Reid,
"After the War," p. 221 ; Freedmen's Bureau Report, Nov. 1, 1866, Nov. I, 1867, Oct
2, 1868 ; and other authorities noted above.
CHAPTER VI
CONFISCATION AND THE COTTON TAX
Sec. I. Confiscation Frauds
Restrictions on Trade in 1865
At the time of the collapse of the Confederacy trade within the
state of Alabama was subject to the following regulations: gold
and silver was in no case to be paid for southern produce ; all trade
was to be done through officers appointed by the United States
Treasury Department ; ^ the state was divided into districts and
sub-districts called agencies, under the superintendence of these
Treasury agents, whose business it was to regulate trade, and collect
captured, abandoned, and confiscable property; in making pur-
chases of cotton, and other produce the agents were to pay only three-
fourths of the value, or to purchase the produce at three-fourths its
value, and then at once resell it to the former owner at full value,
with permission to export or ship to the North ; in order to get per-
mission to sell, the owner must take the Lincoln amnesty oath of
December 8, 1863; there was, besides, an internal revenue tax of
two cents a pound, and a shipping fee of four cents a pound.^ So
for a month after the surrender the person who owned cotton near
any port or place of sale had to sell to United States Treasury agents,
or pretended agents, and have twenty-five per cent to fifty per cent
of the value of his cotton deducted before it could be sent North.
On May 9, 1865, a regulation provided that ''all cotton not produced
by persons with their own labor or with the labor of jreedmen or others
employed and paid by them, must, before shipment to any port or
1 These were general agents, supervising special agents, assistant special agents,
local special agents, agency aids, aids to the revenue, customs officers, and superinten-
dents of freedmen. Rules and Regulations, July 29, 1864. Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 190,
44th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 Amended regulations, Sec. IV, March 30, 1865.
284
FEDERAL CLAIMS TO CONFEDERATE PROPERTY 285
place in a loyal state, be sold to and resold by an officer of the govern-
ment . . . and before allowing any cotton or other product to be
shipped ... the proper officer must require a certificate from the
purchasing agent or the internal revenue officer that the cotton pro-
posed to be shipped had been resold by him or that 25 per cent of
the value thereof has been paid to such purchasing agent in money." *
This was in accord with the general poHcy of Johnson, at first,
viz. to punish the slaveholding class and to favor the non- slaveholders.
Cotton was then worth $250 or more a bale, arid cotton raised by
slave labor had to pay the 25 per cent tax — $60 to $75. However,
the regulations ordered that no other fees were to be exacted after
the fourth was taken. Nearly all the cotton not yet destroyed was
in the Black Belt, and was raised by slave labor. The few people
who had cotton raised by their own labor might sell it after paying
the tax of three cents a pound, or $12 to $15 a bale.
May 22, 1865, the proclamation of the President removed restric-
tions on commercial intercourse except as to the right of the United
States to property purchased by agents in southern states, and except
as to the 25 per cent tax on purchases of cotton. No exceptions
were made to the 25 per cent tax. The ports were to be opened to
foreign commerce after July i, 1865.^ After June 30, 1865, restric-
tions as to trade were removed except as to arms, gray cloth, etc.^
And after August 29, 1865, even contraband goods might be admitted
on license.'*
Federal Claims to Confederate Property
The confiscation laws relating to private property under which
the army and Treasury agents were acting in Alabama in 1865 were:
(i) the act of July 17, 1862, which authorized the confiscation and
sale of property as a punishment for "rebels" ; (2) the act of March
12, 1863, which authorized Treasury agents to collect and sell "cap-
tured and abandoned" property, — but a "loyal" owner might
within two years after the close of the war prove his claim, and " that
1 Rules and Regulations, Sec. IX, Treasury Department, May 9, 1865. Renewed
by Circular Instructions, May 16, 1865, and in force to June 30, 1865. In Alabama the
regulation was enforced during the entire summer. Ho. Rapt., No. 83, 45th Cong.,
3d Sess.
2 McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 9.
8 Proclamations, June 13 and 23, 1865. * Proclamation, Aug. 29, 1865.
286 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
he has never given any aid or comfort" to the Confederacy, and
then receive the proceeds of the sales, less expenses; (3) the act of
July 2, 1864, authorizing Treasury agents to lease or work abandoned:
property by employing refugee negroes. ''Abandoned" property
was defined by the Treasury Department as property the owner of
which was engaged in war or otherwise against the United States,
or was voluntarily absent. According to this ruling all the property
of Confederate soldiers was "abandoned" and might be seized by
Treasury agents. North Alabama suffered from the operation of
these laws from their passage until late in 1865, the rest of Alabama
only in 1865.
The blockade prevented the people from disposing of most of
the cotton raised during the war; there were heavy crops in i860,
1 86 1, 1862, and small ones in 1863 and 1864. The number of bales
produced in 1859 was 989,955; in i860, about the same; and less
in 1861 and 1862.
Comparatively little cotton was sent out on blockade- runners, and
not very much was sent through the lines from the cotton belt
proper, so that at the close of the war there were many thousands of
bales of cotton in the central counties of the state. Cotton was
selhng for high prices — 30 cents to $1.20 a pound, or $200 to
$500 a bale. It was almost the sole dependence of the people to
prevent the severest suffering. The state and Confederate govern-
ments had some kind of a claim on much of the cotton early in 1865.
No one knew how much nor exactly where all of the Confederate
cotton was stored, and it bore no marks that would distinguish it
from private cotton. But the records surrendered by General Taylor
and others showed who had subscribed to the Cotton or Produce Loan.
Many thousand bales had been destroyed by the raiders in 1864
and 1865, and many thousand more had been burned by Confederate
authorities to prevent its falHng into the hands of the Federals.^
1 Wilson burned at Selma 32,000 bales, and at Columbus, Ga., 150,000 bales, much
of which came from Alabama. During the raid he destroyed 275,000 bales, 125,000 of
which were burned in Alabama. The Confederates destroyed at Montgomery 80,000
bales (other accounts say 97,000 and 125,000; see Greeley, Vol. II, p. 19). Government
cotton was, of course, the first destroyed, and there is no doubt but that nearly all of
it was burned either by the raiders or by the Confederates to prevent its falling into the
hands of the enemy. Cotton was also destroyed at Mobile and by the Federal armies
that came up from the South,
FEDERAL CLAIMS TO CONFEDERATE PROPERTY 287
On October 30, 1864, a report was made to Secretary of the
Treasury^ Trenholm which showed the amount of Confederate cotton
in the southern states. By far the greater part that was still on hand
was in Alabama. In this state the Confederacy had received as
subscriptions to the Produce Loan, 134,252 bales, at an average
cost of $101.55, in all, $13,633,621.90. Other sales or subscriptions
on other products to this Produce or Cotton Loan raised the amount
in Alabama to $16,691,500. Alabama, as one of the producing
states, and the one least affected by the ravages of war, furnished
to all of these loans more produce than any other state.^ The people,
unable to sell their cotton abroad, exchanged some of it for Con-
federate bonds. Several thousand bales (6000 in 1864) were gath-
ered by the cotton tithe. After shipping several thousand bales
through the blockade, and smuggHng some through the lines, and
after some destruction by the enemy, or to prevent seizure by the
enemy, there remained in the state, in the fall of 1864, 115,450 bales
of Confederate cotton. Nearly all of this was destroyed in 1865,
before the surrender, by Federals and Confederates, and very Httle
remained which the Federal government could rightfully claim as
Confederate property. This claim was based on the theory that
cotton subscribed to the Produce Loan was devoted to the aid of
the Confederacy, in intention at least, and therefore was forfeited
to the United States, even though the owner had never dehvered the
cotton or other produce, and though the United States held that the
Confederacy could not legally acquire property.^ There were three
classes of property claimed by the United States: (i) ''captured"
property or anything seized by the army and navy; (2) ''abandoned"
property, the owner being in the Confederate service, no matter
whether his family were present or not; (3) "confiscable" property,
or that liable to seizure and sale under the Confiscation Act of July
1 Report of A. Roane, Chief of the Produce Loan, C.S.A. OfiBce, in Ho. Mis. Doc,
No. 190, 44th Cong., 1st Sess.
2 Roane then estimated that by April i, 1865, the Confederacy owned in all no more
than 150,000 bales. Dr. Curry, a member of the Confederate Congress, stated that
only 250,000 bales were ever owned by the Confederate government. "Civil History,"
pp. 115, 128. F. S. Lyon, when a member of the Confederate Congress in 1864, found
that the Confederacy had a claim on about 150,000 bales scattered over ten states.
Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., 1426.
8 J. Barr Robertson, " The Confederate Debt and Private Southern Debts," p. 25.
288 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
17, 1862. Until 1865, all sorts of property were seized and used
by the Federal forces, or, if portable, sent North for sale. Live
stock, planting implements and machinery, wagons, etc., were in
some cases sent North and sold;^ but most was used on the
spot.
After the surrender the Secretary of Treasury ordered household
furniture, family relics, books, etc., to be restored to all ''loyal"
owners or to those who had taken the amnesty oath.^ In no case
had a person who could not prove his or her ''loyalty" any remedy
against seizure of property. Until the surrender the people of north
Alabama were despoiled of all property that could be moved, and
after the surrender the same policy was pursued all over the state,
especially in regard to cotton. No right of property in cotton was
there recognized, but by a previous law a "loyal" owner had until
two years after the war to prove his claim and his "loyalty."^
The Attorney- General delivered an opinon, July 5, 1865, that cot-
ton and other property seized by the agents or the army was de facto
and de jure, captured property, and that neither the President nor
the Secretary of the Treasury had the power to restore such property
to the former owners. They must go through the courts, and under
the laws only "loyal" claimants had any basis for claims, and
"loyalty" must first be determined by the courts.* After the opinion
of the Attorney- General, Secretary McCulloch followed it so far as
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 78, 38th Cong., ist Sess. (Chase).
2 Circular, Sept. 9, 1865. ^ Act, March 12, 1863.
* Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 114, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.; Treasury Department Doc, No.
2261. According to a decision of the Supreme Court in case of Klein vs. United States
(13 Wallace, 128), "disloyal" owners might become "loyal" by pardon and thus have
all rights of property restored. This was the effect of proclamations of the President.
"The restoration of the proceeds [then] became the absolute right of persons par-
doned." See. Ho. Repts., No. 784, 51st Cong., ist Sess., and No. 1377 ; 52d Cong., ist
Sess. The Attorney-General stated that " Congress took notice of the fact that cap-
tures of private property on land had been made and would continue to be made by
the armies as a necessary and proper means of diminishing the wealth and thus reduc-
ing the powers of the insurgent rulers," and that after a seizure had been made there
could be no question of whether the usages of war were observed or violated, except
through the courts ; the President and the Secretary of the Treasury had no discretion
in the matter. Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 114, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. According to the opinion
of the United States law officers, " No one who submitted to the Confederate States,
obeyed their laws, and contributed to support their government ought to recover under
the statute " of March 12, 1863. See Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 22, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
FEDERAL CLAIMS TO CONFEDERATE PROPERTY 289
captures by the army were concerned, but still continued to ''revise
the mistakes" of the cotton agents who "frequently seized the prop-
erty of private individuals." Proof of "loyalty" was, however,
required in all cases before restoration, and the fourteen classes
excepted by the amnesty proclamation of May 29, 1865, could
get no restoration. In all cases the expenses charged against the
property had to be paid before the owner could get it. After April 4,
1867, by request of the Joint Sub-Committee on Retrenchment,
no further releases of any kind were made.^ On March 30, 1868,
a joint resolution of Congress covered into the Treasury all money
received from sales of property in the South. After this only an
act of Congress could restore the proceeds to the owner.^
The result was in the long run that the "disloyal" owners never
received restoration of their property seized by the army, and by the
Treasury agents during and after the war, but claim agents and per-
jurers have pursued a thriving business in proving "loyal" claims
against the Treasury. " Disloyal" persons, whose property was liable
to confiscation, and who could not recover in the Court of Claims, were,
as decided by that body: those who served in the military, naval,
or civil service of the state or the Confederacy; those who voted for
secession or for secession candidates; those who furnished supplies
to the Confederacy, engaged in business that aided the Confederacy,
subscribed to its loans, resided or removed voluntarily within the
Confederate lines, or sold produce to the Confederacy. Women who
had sons or husbands in the Confederate army, or who belonged to
"sewing societies," or made flags and clothing for, or furnished
delicacies to. Confederate soldiers were "disloyal" and could not
recover property. "Loyalty" had to be proven, not only for the
original owner, but also for the heirs and claimants. The claims
of deserters were allowed. In order to test the "loyalty" of claim-
ants, they were asked to answer in writing Hsts of questions (num-
bering at various times 49, 62, 79, and 80 questions) regarding their
conduct during the war. The questions covered several hundred
points, and embraced every possible activity from 1861 to 1865.
No man and few women who lived within the state until 1865 could,
1 Secretary McCulloch to President of the Senate, Jan. 16, 1869. Sen. Ex. Doc,
Xo. 22, 40th ('ong., 2d Sess., No. 37, 39th Cong., 25th .Sess.
■^ Department Circular, No. 4, Jan. 9, 1900; 15 Stats.-at-Large, p. 251.
u
290 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
without perjury, pass the examination and prove a claim. Yet
numbers have proved claims/
Cotton Frauds and Stealing
The minority report of the Ku Klux Committee in 1872 asserted
that, of the 5,000,000 bales of cotton in the South at the close of the
war, 3,000,000 had been seized by United States Treasury agents
or pretended agents.^ The Gulf states, and especially Alabama,
were for a year or more filled with agents and "cotton spies," seek-
ing Confederate cotton and other property. They were paid a per-
centage of what they seized — 25 to 50 per cent. Native scoundrels
united with these, and all reaped a rich harvest.^
On much of the cotton subscribed to the Confederate Produce
Loan the government had advanced a small amount to the owner
and allowed him to keep it. In many cases no payment had been
made. The farmer considered that the cotton still belonged to him,
but that the Confederacy had a claim on a part of it. The records
kept were imperfect, and few persons knew just what was Confederate
cotton and what was not. Much of the cotton subscribed had been
destroyed or sent to government warehouses in Selma, Mobile,
Montgomery, and Columbus, where it was burned in April and
May, 1865. Of course each man considered that the cotton destroyed
was Confederate cotton, and that all left was private cotton. In
most cases the claim of the government was very shadowy. Where
cotton was still in the hands of the planter, private and government
cotton could not be distinguished. The records did not show whether
a man had kept or dehvered the cotton he had subscribed to the
Produce Loan. The agents proceeded upon the assumption that he
had kept it, and that all he had kept was government cotton.'' No
proof to the contrary would convince the average agent. Secretary
1 See Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 16, 426. Cong., 2d Sess.; No. 12, 42d Cong., 3d
Sess. ; No. 23, 43d Cong., ist Sess. ; No. 18, 43d Cong., 2d Sess. ; No. 30, 44th
Cong., 1st Sess. ; No. 4, 45th Cong., 2d Sess. ; Nos. 10 and 30, 46th Cong., 2d Sess.;
also Treasury Department Doc, No. 2261 (1901); Department Circular, No. 4. Jan. 9,
1900.
2 Sen. Kept., No. 41, Pt. I, pp. 442, 445, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 1941.
* Curry. "Civil History Confederate States," pp. 115, 126, 128. See testimony of
Lieut.-Col. Hunter Brooke in Kept. Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, p. 115.
COTTON FRAUDS AND STEALING 291
McCuUoch said, "I am sure I sent some honest cotton agents South;
but it sometimes seems very doubtful whether any of them remained
honest very long."^ It was said that Secretary Chase had foreseen
the trouble that would result if the cotton were confiscated, and
had proposed to leave all cotton in the hands of the former owners
who then held it. When the records were certain, the cotton might
be confiscated ; but in most cases there were no correct records. Such
a poHcy would have been generous and magnanimous, and would
have had a good effect.^ The plan of Chase was not accepted, and
a carnival of corruption followed. In August, 1865, President John-
son wrote to General Thomas, "I have been advised that innumer-
able frauds are being practised by persons assuming to be Treasury
agents, in various portions of Alabama, in the collection of cotton
pretended to belong to the Confederate States government."^ The
thefts of the Treasury agents and the worst characters of the army
did much to arouse bitter feehngs among the people who lost their
only possession that could be turned into ready money. It was
assumed, as a general rule, that all cotton belonged to the government
until the real owner could prove his claim and his "loyalty," and of
course he could seldom do this to the satisfaction of the agent or of
the army officer who was bent on supplementing his pay. Cotton
had been all along an object of the special hostility of Federals. The
old southern beUef that cotton was king and the hopes that Con-
federates had founded on this belief were well known. "Cotton
is the root of all evil" was a common declaration of the invading
army and of the cotton agents. When no other private property
was taken or destroyed, cotton was sure to be. Every cotton-gin and
press in reach of the armies was burned from 1863 to 1865. There
seemed to be an intense desire to destroy the royal power of King
Cotton. As opportunity offered, officers in the army, contrary to
orders, began to interest themselves in ' speculations in cotton —
captured, purchased, or stolen. The small garrisons were not officered
by the best men of the army, and many who would never have touched
money from any other kind of plunder thought it perfectly legiti-
mate to fill their pockets by the seizure and sale of cotton. They
1 Whitelaw Reid, " After the War," p. 204.
2 Reid, "After the War," pp. 208, 209.
8 Miller, " Alabama," p. 236.
292 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
did not consider it defrauding the government, for the latter, they
knew, had no more title to it than they had/
The disposition of the cotton collectors to regard the people as
without rights resulted in the growth of a feeling on the part of the
latter that it was perfectly legitimate to keep the government and
its rascally agents from profiting by the use of Confederate property.
In every way people began to hinder the agents and the army in
its work of collecting cotton. Colonel Hunter Brooke stated, in 1866,
that most of the people who had subscribed cotton to the Confederate
government or on whose cotton the Confederates had some claim
utterly refused to recognize the title of the United States to that prop-
erty and refused to give any assistance to the authorities in tracing
the cotton. At times the citizens rose in rebellion against the inva-
sion of Treasury agents and the military escorts sent with them.
A cotton spy was sent into Choctaw County to collect information
about cotton steahng. He had an escort of twenty soldiers, but
the people drove them out. A battalion of cavalry was then sent.
Steamers sent up the rivers to get the cotton seized by the agents
were sometimes fired upon.^
Not only cotton but stores collected on private plantations for
the army, no matter whether private property or not, were seized.
Horses and mules used in the Confederate service were taken, not-
withstanding the terms of surrender and the fact that the Confeder-
ate soldiers owned the cavalry horses.^ The counties of Cherokee,
1 One who suffered writes from Selma : " Our cotton, the only thing left us with
which to buy the necessaries of life, was seized at the point of the bayonet under the
plea that it was Confederate cotton and that it was being seized by the government for
its own use, whereas it was taken by the officers and sold, and the money put into their
own pockets. It was then worth ^255 a bale. Gen. commanded at this place, and
he and his staff coined money faster than a mint could turn it out." Judge B. H. Craig.
In July, 1865, a train of wagons at Talladega was sent to the ginnery of Ross Green,
at Alexandria, and 59 bales of cotton, Green's own property, worth ^100 a bale in gold,
were carried off. Miller, p. 236.
2 Testimony in Rept. of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, p. 115; Ku
Klux Rept., Ala. Test,, p. 1426. F. S. Lyon said that the people would have been
better reconciled to the confiscation had the cotton been sold for the benefit of the
United States, but it was plainly stolen by the agents and the army, and they began to
resist in every way. Some of them concealed Confederate cotton ; some stole from the
government, some from the agents what the latter had stolen from them ; some went
into partnership with the agents. No one believed that any one except the original
owner had a right to the cotton, and they did anything to get even.
8 Miller, p. 236 ; N. Y. Times, March 2 and Aug. 30, 1865. In the Black
COTTON FRAUDS AND STEALING 293
Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Lauderdale, Limestone, Madison, Mor-
gan, St. Clair, Walker, and Winston ~ all white counties — lost prin-
cipally corn, fodder, provisions, harness, mules, horses, and wagons.^
As to cotton, much pure stealing was done by the followers
of the army and thieving soldiers and some natives, but sooner or
later the officials became implicated in it, since only by their permis-
sion could the commodity be shipped. A thieving southerner would
find where a lot of cotton was stored and inform a soldier, usually
an officer, who would make arrangements to ship the cotton, and the
two would divide the profits. Planters who were afraid that their
cotton would be seized by Treasury agents went into partnership
with Federal officers and shipped their cotton to New Orleans or to
New York. No one outside the ring could ship cotton until five
or ten dollars a bale was paid the military officers who controlled
affairs. Along the fine of the Mobile and Ohio Railway 10,000 bales
of cotton were said to have been stolen from the owners and sold
in Mobile and New Orleans. The thieves often paid $75 a bale to
have the cotton passed through to New Orleans.^
But all petty thievery went unnoticed when the Treasury agents
began operations. They harried the land worse than an army of
bummers. There was no protection against one; he claimed all
cotton, and, unless bribed, seized it. Thousands of bales were taken
to which the government had not a shadow of claim. In November,
1865, the Times correspondent (Truman) stated that nearly all the
Treasury agents in Alabama had been filhng their pockets with cotton
money, and that $2,000,000 were unaccounted for. One agent took
2000 bales on a vessel and went to France. Their method of pro-
ceeding was to find a lot of cotton. Confederate or otherwise, and
give some man S50 a bale to swear the cotton belonged to him, and
that it had never been turned over to the Confederate States. Then
the agent shipped the cotton and cleared $100 a bale.^
Belt the United States military authorities collected the tax-in-kind which had been levied
by the Confederate authorities but not collected. One planter had to pay one thousand
bushels of corn, two barrels of syrup, and smaller quantities of other produce. P>om those
who refused to pay the tax was taken forcibly. See Ku Klux Kept,, p. 446 (F. S. Lyon).
1 Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 30, 46th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Trowbridge, "The South," p. 447; Reid, "After the War," pp. 208, 209, 375 ;
N. V. Times, Aug. 30, 1865 ; N. V. Herald, ]\xr\Q 23, 1865.
8 N. Y. Times, Aug. 30 and Nov. 2, 1865 ; De Bow's Review, 1866 ; oral accounts.
I
294 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Secretary McCuUoch said that the most troublesome and dii
agreeable duty that he was called upon to perform was the executi
of the law in regard to Confederate property. The cotton agents!
being paid by a commission on the property collected, were disposed
so seize private property also. There was no authority at hand
to check them. And people were disposed, he thought, to lay clai
to Confederate cotton and "spirited away" much of it, while on thi
other hand much private property was taken by the agents.^
Five years later the testimony taken in Alabama at the instance
of the minority members of the Ku Klux Committee exposed the
methods of the cotton agents.^ The country swarmed with agents
or pretended agents and their spies or informers; the commission
given was from one-fourth to one-half of all cotton collected ; every-
body's cotton was seized, but for fear of future trouble a proposition
from the owner to divide was usually Hstened to and a peaceable
settlement made ; when private or pubhc cotton was shipped it was
consigned by bales and not by pounds; the various agents through
whose hands it passed were in the habit of "tolling" or "plucking"
it, often two or three times, about one-fifth at a time; in this way
a bale weighing 500 pounds would be reduced to 200 or 300 pounds ;
even after the private cotton arrived at Mobile or New Orleans,
paying "toll" all the way, it was liable to seizure by order of some
Treasury agent ; as a rule, terms could be arranged by which a planter
might keep one-fourth to three-fourths of his cotton, whether Con-
federate or not ; it was safer for the agent to take a part of the cotton
with the consent and silence of the owner than to steal both from
the owner and from the government for which he pretended to work,
and in this way the owners saved some for themselves ; much private
cotton was seized on the plantations near the rivers before the owners
came home from the war; cotton seized in the Black Belt was shipped
to Simeon Draper, United States cotton agent, New York, while
that from north Alabama was sent to William P. Mellen, Cincinnati;^
complaint was made by those few owners who succeeded in tracing
^ McCulloch, " Men and Measures," pp. 234, 235.
2 Sen. Kept., No, 41, Pt. I, 420! Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 442-445.
8 The minority Ku Klux Report asserted that it was a well-known fact that Draper
when appointed cotton agent was a bankrupt, and that when he died he was a million-
COTTON FRAUDS AND STEALING
295
their cotton that, after being reduced by "toUing" or "plucking," *
it was sold by the agent in the North, by samples which were much
inferior to the cotton in the bales, and in this way the purchaser,
who was in partnership with the agents, would pay ten or fifteen
cents a pound for a lot of cotton certainly not worth more than that
if the samples were honest, but which was really good cotton, worth
35 cents to $1.20 a pound in New York.
So in case the Secretary of the Treasury could be brought to
"revise the mistakes" of his agents, the owner would get only the
small sum paid in for inferior cotton, and even this was reduced by
excessive charges and fees.^ There was also complaint that when
a lot of private cotton was seized and traced to Draper, the latter
would inform the owners that only a small proportion of what had
been seized was received,^ and that had been sold at a low price.
It w^as afterwards shown that Draper never gave receipts for cotton
received. There was nothing businesslike about the cotton admin-
istration. Cotton was consigned to Draper or Mellen by the bale
and not by the pound. A bale might weigh 200 or 500 pounds. As
soon as cotton was seized the bagging was stripped off, and it was then
repacked in order to prevent identification. "* Many persons who
knew nothing of the law and who saw that their property was unsafe
were induced by the Treasury agents to surrender their cotton to the
United States government, even though there might be no claim
against it, the agents promising that the United States would pay
to the owners the proceeds upon apphcation to the Treasury De-
partment. When the Secretary of the Treasury discovered this,
and when the agent would certify that such was the case, his "mistake
was revised" and the money received from the sale of cotton was
refunded.^ The owner had no remedy if the agent declined to cer-
1 The cotton secured in this way was, it was claimed, sold as " waste," " trash," or
" dog tail " to some friend of the agent, who would divide with the latter.
2 All freight, agency, auctioneer, insurance, storage, etc., charges, and fees for legal
advice, were charged against the cotton, and had to be paid before it was restored.
8 Probably Draper was correct here. The agents would consign to him all cotton that
they felt sure the government had record of, and the rest they sold for their own benefit.
* Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong, ist Sess.
^ Secretary McCulloch to President of the Senate, March 2, 1867, in Sen. Ex.
Doc. No. 37, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. In this way, during the summer of 1865, 5616,844.34
was restored to owners, and to the end of 1866 $1,018,459.83 was restored. Most of the
owners lived in Alabama and Louisiana.
296 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
tify, and he usually declined, since the cotton had probably neve
been turned over to the United States by him.
The experience of Hon. F. S. Lyon ^ is typical of many
the Black Belt. He stated^ that after the surrender of Taylor^
General Canby issued an order that all who had sold cotton to the
Confederate government must now surrender it to United States
authorities under penalty of confiscation of other property to make
good the failure to dehver Confederate cotton. Under this order
some cotton was seized to replace Confederate cotton that had dis-
appeared. United States army wagons, guarded by soldiers, went
over the country day and night, gathering cotton for persons who
pretended to be Treasury agents. Lyon had 384 bales of Confed-
erate cotton which were claimed by General Dustin, a cotton agent
(later a carpet-bag politician), and Lyon agreed to haul it to the
railroad, under an ''agreement" with Dustin. But one night a
train of army wagons, guarded by soldiers, came and carried off 26
bales, and the next day, 70 bales. (They had asked the manager
"if he would accept $2000 and sleep soundly all night.") The
wagons were traced to Uniontown, and the commanding officer there
was induced to hold the cotton until the question was settled.
General Hubbard, commanding the district, arrested one Ruter,
who, with the soldiers, had taken the cotton. Ruter claimed to be
acting under the authority of a cotton agent in Mississippi, but could
show no evidence of his authority, and his name was not on the list
of authorized agents. However, General Hubbard was ordered by
superior authority to regard Ruter as a cotton agent and to discharge
him. The 70 bales were lost.
The Mobile agent, Dustin,^ would not make a decision in disputed
cases because he was afraid of appeal to Washington. A proposition
to divide the profits, however, would always secure from him a
declaration that the cotton had no claims against it. Lyon reported
that not one-tenth of the cotton seized was consigned to govern-
1 See Brewer, p. 375, and Garrett, p. 587. Lyon was one of the most useful, reli-
able, and respected public men of Alal:)ama and his account is entitled to confidence.
He had been a lawyer, clerk of the senate, senator, member of Congress, state bank
commissioner, presidential elector, member Confederate Congress, etc.
2 Letter to F.P.Blair, in Sen. Kept., No. 41, Pt. I, p. 445, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 Under the reconstruction government Dustin held the office of major-general of
militia.
DISHONEST AGENTS PROSECUTED 297
ment agents, but that the agents usually sold it on the spot to cotton
buyers. The planter was held responsible for cotton sold or sub-
scribed to Confederate government. Cotton stolen from the agent
had to be made good by the person from whom the agent had
seized it. Seed cotton was often hauled away at night by pretended
agents. In every part of the cotton belt the looting of cotton went on.
There were frequent changes of agents. As soon as a man became
rich his place would be taken by another. The chief cotton agents
sold for high prices appointments as collecting agents. The new
agents often seized the cotton that through bribery had escaped
former agents ; and in this way the same lot would be seized two or
three times. One cotton agent, a mere youth, at Demopolis received
as his commission for one month 400 bales of cotton which netted
him $80,000. The Treasury Department made a regulation allow-
ing one-fourth to a person who had kept the Confederate cotton
and delivered it safely to the United States authorities, but the
agents did not make known the regulation, and the one-fourth
went to them.^
There were complaints of the seizure of cotton grown after the
war. The Planters' Factory of Mobile lost 240 bales of cotton grown
in 1865. This company was made up of ''Union" and northern
men who were able to obtain an order for the release of the cotton.
There was of course no way to tell what cotton was seized, and 240
bales of ''dog tail," worth six cents a pound, were turned over to
the factory instead of the good cotton, worth sixty cents a pound. ^
Dishonest Agents Prosecuted
The Federal grand jury reported that at the end of the war there
were 150,000 bales of cotton in Alabama to which the government
1 See Ku Klux Rept., pp. 444-446. Letter of F. S. Lyon to General Blair. Also Ku
Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 1410-1426, 1661.
Lyon had been agent for the Confederate Produce Loan, and consequently knew
what was government cotton and what was not. After the war he acted as attorney for
those whose cotton was unlawfully seized. The general officers commanding in his dis-
trict approved his conduct, but he was hated by the cotton agents, who frequently com-
plained of his " rebellious conduct." Lyon tried to save even the cotton pledged to the
Confederacy, on the ground that the promise or sale had not been completed and that
the transaction was void from the beginning, and that the right of capture did not exist
after the close of the war.
2 Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong., ist Sess., p. 146.
298 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
had clear title ; ^ the records showed the history and location of each
bale, and these records were placed in the hands of the cotton agents ;
the papers of two agents, in south Alabama, Dexter and Tomeny,
showed that while a large part of this cotton had been shipped but
little of it had been consigned to the government, the bulk of it having
become a source of private profit to the agents; the 20,000 bales
turned over to the government by these agents had been much re-
duced in weight, in some cases as much as one- third, and exorbitant
expenses had been charged against them; large quantities of cotton
had been fraudulently released to parties who presented fictitious
claims; cotton belonging to private individuals had often been
seized, and release refused unless the owner sold at a ruinous sacri-
fice to S. E. Ogden and Company, who seemed to be on the inside at
New York; cotton thus seized was not released except through the
influence of Ogden and Company, and it was said that Tomeny
openly advised some parties to make arrangements with Ogden and
Company, who paid less than half-price for cotton under such
circumstances.^ The grand jury declared that in Alabama 125,000
bales had been stolen by agents. Tomeny, who seems to have
secured a much smaller share of the spoils than Dexter, stated that
when he began business in November, 1865, nearly all cotton had
been collected or stolen, and that not a hundred bales had been
received by himself except from other agents who had collected it.
He consigned all his cotton to Simeon Draper, in New York City.
None was released to Ogden and Company, and they bought only
one lot of cotton that had been seized — 505 bales seized from Ellis
and Alley, themselves cotton agents under the First Agency. This
lot, Tomeny claimed, was bought by Ogden and Company without
his knowledge or consent.^
Two cotton agents, T. C. A. Dexter and T. J. Carver, were finally
arraigned, in the fall and winter of 1865, in the Federal courts, and
Judge Busteed proceeded to try them; but they denied the jurisdic-
tion of the court, and the army interfered and stopped the pro-
ceedings, whereupon Busteed closed the court. Then a mihtary
1 Calculation based on subscriptions to Produce Loan. Most of it had been
destroyed.
2 N. Y. Times, June 2, 1865 ; HuntsvilU Advocate, May 26, 1866. Report of
Grand Jury.
8 N. V. Times, June 2, 1866.
STATISTICS OF THE FRAUDS 299
commission was convened, and before it the cases were tried. Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Hunter Brooke presided over the commission. The
culprits denied the legahty of this trial by a mihtary commission in
time of peace and ultimately were pardoned on this account. Carver
was convicted of fraud in the collection of cotton, and was fined $90,000
and sentenced to imprisonment for one year and until the fine should
be paid. Carver had paid Dexter $25,000 for his commission as
cotton agent. So it seems the office must have carried with it certain
opportunities. Dexter was convicted of fraud in the cotton business
and for selHng the appointment to Carver. Only 3321 bales of gov-
ernment cotton could be traced directly to his steahng.^ He was
fined $250,000 and imprisoned for one year and until the fine should
be paid.^
Statistics of the Frauds
The minority report of the Ku Klux Committee asserted, as has
been said, that in 1865 there were 5,000,000 bales of cotton in the
South, and that the agents seized 3,000,000 bales for themselves
and for the government;^ Dr. Curry said that there were about
250,000 bales of Confederate cotton; * another expert estimate placed
the total number of bales of Confederate cotton at 150,000 on April i,
1865 ; after April i, many thousand bales were destroyed in Alabama,
where most of the Confederate cotton was gathered ; the report of
A. Roane, in 1864, showed 115,000 bales in Alabama. It is not
probable, after all the burnings which later took place in Alabama,
1 Worth ^500,<X)0, at the lowest price.
2 G. O., No, 55, Department of Ala., Oct. 30, 1865 ; G. O., No. 8, Department of
Ala., Feb. 14, 1866; Ms. records in War Department archives. For years these men
were in prison while their friends were working to secure their release. The principal
arguments for Dexter's release were the virtue of his wife's relations in New England
and the illegality of the trial before the military commission in time of peace. Judging
from the tone of the indorsements he was probably released, though there is no record
of the fact in the archives. The manuscript proceedings of the trial show that thousands
of bales of cotton had'been "spirited away," but everything was in such a state of con-
fusion that little could be plainly proven against the agents. Only one thing was certain,
" that much more cotton was seized for the government than was received .by the gov-
ernment." The investigation was hushed up as soon as possible ; too many were
implicated,
^ Sen, Rept., No. 41, Pt, I, pp. 442, 445, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. This estimate is
probably too large for both numbers,
* "Civil History, Confederate States," pp, 115, 128.
300
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
that there was much government cotton left in AJabama, 20,000 bales
at the most.
Secretary McCulloch, on March 2, 1867, reported that the total
receipts from captured and abandoned property amounted to
$34,052,809.54, netting $24,742,322.55.^ The cotton sold for
$29,518,041.17.^ The records show that only 115,000 bales were
turned over to the United States, and of these Draper received
95,840^ bales which he sold for about $15,000,000 when cotton was
worth ^^ cents to $1.22 a pound, and a bale weighed 400 to 450
pounds. This cotton was worth in New York $500,000,000.^ The
records of the agencies were badly kept or not kept at all, and many
agents made no reports. The government never knew how many
bales had been collected in its name.
The First Special Agency reported that in Alabama it had seized
cotton (after June i, 1865) in the counties of Greene, Marengo, Perry,
Dallas, Pickens, Montgomery, Sumter, and Tuscaloosa, during
October, November, and December, 1865, and January, 1866. This
agency had, before June i, 1866,'' shipped 5697 bales to the govern-
ment agent in New York, who sold them for $750,702.68, and had
made charges of $209,338.58 for freight, fees, etc., $35 a bale.
The Ninth Agency, under the notorious T. C. A. Dexter and J. M.
Tomeny, gathered cotton from the counties of Dallas, Marengo,
Sumter, Montgomery, Wilcox, Lowndes, Barbour, Butler, Tuscaloosa,
Macon, and Mobile. This agency had thirty-six collecting agents,
and turned over to the government only 9,712 bales, which sold for
$1,412,335.68, with fees and charges amounting to $540,962.38.^
1 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 37, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 56, 40th Cong., 2d Sess,
2 Sen. Kept., No. 41, Pt. I, p. 444, 42d Cong., 2d Sess,
■* After which date confiscation was forbidden by Treasury regulation.
5 An example of the way charges were piled up : A lot of 448 bales of cotton was
seized in Eufaula, Alabama, and shipped to New York, via Appalachicola. The
expenses were : —
Expenses to and at Appalachicola $24,264.85
Freight ....
Expenses at New York
Information and collecting
Total expenses .
Gross proceeds of sale
Net proceeds of sale .
Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 23, 43d Cong., 2d Sess
4,164.69
2,5CXD,05
30>893-3i
61,822.90
78,352.56
16,529.66
I
STATISTICS OF THE FRAUDS
30I
Most of the government cotton was consigned to New York
agents and sold there/
The army quartermasters at Mobile received 19,396 bales of
cotton, of which 6149 were deHvered to Dexter and 9741 were, it was
claimed, destroyed by the great explosion. Dexter turned over to
the government only 7469 bales and Tomeny 7732, other agents
accounted for enough to bring the total up to about 30,000 bales.
Dexter sold $823,947 worth of other property.^
The Freedmen's Bureau in Alabama was supported for two
years by the sale of confiscated property, of which no accounts were
kept. The army also sold cotton and other confiscated property
and used the proceeds. "Abandoned" cotton netted to the Treasury
$2,682,271.69. After June 30, according to Treasury records, 33,638
bales (worth $7,650,675.93, but netting only $4,886,671) were illegally
seized. It is this money which is still held because the former
owners once subscribed to the Confederate Produce Loan. "Loyal"
claimants, 22,298 in number in 1871, were asking damages to the
amount of $60,258,150.44. When Congress, on March 30, 1868,
called into the Treasury all proceeds of captured and abandoned
property, it was found that Jay Cooke and Company had $20,000,000,
which they had been using in their business for years. The cotton
agents and others interested lobbied persistently in Washington
The following cotton statistics show how the Mobile agents ran
J. R. Dillon, 1st Agency : Cotton sales
Total proceeds of all sales
Expenses, total .
S. B. Eaton, 1st Agency: Cotton sold
Total receipts
Total expenses .
T. C. A. Dexter, 9th Agency : Cotton sold
Total receipts
Expenses . . •
J. M. Tomeny, 9th Agency : Cotton sold
Total receipts
Expenses
Total expenses of every kind amounted to .
On receipts of
Of which cotton sold for
1 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 56, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 97, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
up expenses : —
^57>033.66
129,076.33
64,350.01
15,963.01
27,799.48
27,799.48
39,945-39
783,152.62
485»i37-77
14,159-51
208,185.63
208,185.63
6,546,000.95
34,396,189.95
29,518,041.17
302 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
against legislation in behalf of claimants, fearing investigation an(^
exposure.
The statistics given in the public documents are often those foF
the whole South, but usually only for Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana. Seldom can the figures for Alabama be separated from
the others. Alabama lost more from the invasion of Treasury agents
than any other state, since in 1865 she had more cotton and other
property, and many more agents visited her soil. The United States
Treasury received only a small fraction of the confiscated property,
and most of the proceeds of that have been released to people who
were willing to commit perjury in order to get it.^
Under the act of March 12, 1863, '^oyal" owners had until two
years after the war to file claims, and by February, 1888, $9,864,300.75
had been paid out to satisfy these people. Since 1888, $520,700.18
has been paid out. Under the act of May 18, 1872, providing for
return of proceeds of cotton seized illegally after June 30, 1865, 1337
claims were filed, 339 of which were from Alabama. These Ala-
bama claims called for 23,529 bales. Only a very small amount
($195,896.21) was returned to the claimants, because the records
showed that most of them had once sold cotton to the Confederate
government. Therefore, they now say, all cotton seized after June
30, 1865, was Confederate cotton, and the proceeds will be held.
Only about four and a half milhons now (1904) remain in the
Treasury, as the proceeds of all the cotton seized. This is the
amount for which the cotton seized after June 30, 1865, was sold.
All other proceeds have either been returned to "loyal" claimants or
have been absorbed by expenses. Very few, if any, claimants not
able to prove ''loyalty" have been able to secure restoration, since
''loyalty" was in most cases a prerequisite to consideration.^
1 See Ku Klux Kept., pp. 443-446 ; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 37, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. ;
Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 97, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 113, 41st Cong., 2d
Sess.; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 23, 43d Cong., 2d Sess.; Department Circular, No. 4, Jan. 9,
1900.
2 Department Circular, No. 4, Jan. 9, 1900 ; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 23, 43d Cong.,
2d Sess. There are imperfect records of only two Alabama agencies, which reported a
certain number of bales seized. The other agencies did not report their operations in
Alabama. The agents not reporting were : J. R. Dillon, H. M. Buckley, S. B. Eaton,
E. P. Hotchkiss, L. Ellis, A. D. Banks, James and Ellis Carver, and perhaps others.
None of the numerous collecting agents made reports or kept records. In 1876, thirty-
three cotton agents were defaulters to the United States, one man owing the United
THE COTTON TAX
303
The confiscation policy, it may be concluded, profited the gov-
ernment nothing; the Treasury agents and pretended agents were
enriched by their stealings and but few were punished; nearly all
private cotton was lost; the people were reduced to more desperate
want and exasperated against the government which, it seemed,
had acted upon the assumption that the ex- Confederates had no
rights whatever.
Sec. 2. The Cotton Tax
Another heavy burden imposed on the prostrate South was the tax
levied by the United States government on each pound of cotton raised.
An act of July, 1862, imposed a tax of one- half cent a pound on cotton,
but this tax could be collected only on that part of the crop that was
brought through the hnes by speculators. January 30, 1864, the tax
was increased to two cents a pound, collectible on all cotton coming
from the Confederate States. This was raised to two and a half cents
a pound on March 3, 1865, and to three cents a pound, or $15 a bale,
on July 13, 1866.^ After the war the tax bore with crushing weight
on the impoverished farmers.^ On March 2, 1867, in anticipation of
Reconstruction, the tax was reduced to two and a half cents a pound,
or $12.50 a bale, to take effect after September i, 1867. A year later,
partly because of the decided objections of those carpet-baggers,
scalawags, and negroes who had small farms and whose remon-
strances had more influence than those of the planters, the tax was
discontinued on all cotton raised after the crop of 1867. The tax was
a Hen on the cotton from the time it was baled until the tax was paid,
and was often collected in the states to which the cotton was shipped.
States $337,460.44. Of these, sixteen were not to be found anywhere. Four of the
defaulters had operated in Alabama. These men were by their own records defaulters
— having failed to turn over to the government the proceeds of sales they had reported.
Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 190, 44th Cong., ist Sess.
1 In addition to the tax of twenty-five per cent on purchases of cotton levied by a
Treasury regulation during the war and in force during 1865. Treasury regulations,
May 9, 1865. See also President's proclamation, in McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 9.
2 Governor Patton, in his message of Nov. 12, 1866, stated that the cotton tax of
three cents a pound was oppressive and unjust, a burden on the farmers and on- the
laborers also ; that the tax went into the United States Treasury and then passed into
the hands of the manufacturers as a gratuity of three cents per pound ; that there was no
way of getting the ruinous tax raised or lightened unless by an appeal in the form of a
petition ; that the people of Alabama had no voice in the government ; that this " law
paralyzes our energies and represses the development of our resources and is injurious
to the whole country." Governor's Message, House Journal, 1866-1867, p. 21.
304
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The collections in the South amounted to the following sums:
^351,311.48
1,268,412.56
1,772,983.48
1 8,409,654.90
23^769,078.80
22,500,947.77
^68,072,388.991
For the year ending June 30, 1863
For the year ending June 30, 1864
For the year ending June 30, 1865
For the year ending June 30, 1866
For the year ending June 30, 1867
For the year ending June 30, 1 868
Total,
Of this tax Alabama paid with
n her borders $10,388,072.10/ and
since she was one of the three great cotton states, her share of the tax
paid in northern ports must have been several miUion dollars more.
Of the other cotton states, — Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas,
Tennessee, and Arkansas, — all except Georgia, which paid about
a million dollars more than Alabama, suffered in less degree.
From April i, 1865, to February i, 1866, Alabama paid in other
taxes, into the United States Treasury, $1,747,563.51, of which $1,655,-
218.31 was internal revenue, and from September i, 1862, to January
30, 1872, $14,200,982 internal revenue.^ The former sum was much
more than the Federal government spent in Alabama during that
year for the relief of the destitute, both black and white. The cotton
spirited away by thieves and confiscated by the government would
have paid several times over all the expenses of the army and the
Freedmen's Bureau during the entire time of the occupation. Many
times as much money was taken from the negro tenant in the form of
this cotton tax as was spent in aiding him. The most crushing weight
of the tax came in 1866 and 1867, and it was much heavier than the
taxation imposed by the Confederate and state governments even in
the darkest days of the war. Had the price of cotton remained high,
the tax would not have borne so heavily on the people ; but with the
decline of the price the tax finally amounted to a third of the net value
of the cotton, while the amount raised in these years was about one-
fifth of the value of the farming lands."* The tax absorbed all the
profits of cotton planting and left the farmer nothing.
1 Twenty states and territories are not included in these sums, as no reports were
received from them. Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 181, 42d Cong., 3d Sess., and Sen. Ex. Doc,
No. 2, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 181, 42d Cong., 3d Sess.
3 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 47, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 181, 42d Cong.,
3d Sess.
4 ^54,191,229 in 1870.
THE COTTON TAX
305
A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury in reference to the
propriety of refunding the money received from the cotton tax stated
some of the arguments of the opponents of the tax. It was claimed
(i) that the tax was unconstitutional because it was not uniform
and because it was virtually a tax upon exports; (2) that the tax was
unequal and oppressive in its operations because it fell entirely upon
cotton producers; (3) that it was levied without the consent of the
people and when they were not represented in Congress ; and (4) that
in addition to the cotton tax the producers of the cotton were subject
to all taxes paid by citizens of other states/ These objections were
answered by the Secretary, who said that the tax was added to the
price of cotton and was borne by the consumer, not the producer,
and that it was the fault of the cotton states that they were not rep-
resented. He asserted that the tax on cotton was an excise Hke that
on tobacco and whiskey.^
In 1866 an effort was made in Congress to raise the tax to five
cents a pound. Such a tax, they said, would raise $66,000,000, or,
at the least, $50,000,000 a year, of which Alabama's share would be
about $12,000,000 to $15,000,000. The Committee on the Revenue
reported that such a tax "will not prove detrimental to any national
interest." The testimony of experts was quoted to prove that the
tax would fall upon the consumer, though most of the experts, who
were manufacturers from New England, said that on account of the
great demand and excessive prices of cotton goods the tax would fall
upon the manufacturer for the present time. Nevertheless, they
were all in favor of the proposed tax, except one manufacturer and
one planter from Georgia, who objected on the ground that the pro-
ducer would have the burden to bear.^
The business men of New York and other northern cities opposed
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 181, 42d Cong., 3d Sess.
2 The cotton tax was justified on the ground that while Alabania had paid
$14,200,982 from 1862 to 1872, New Jersey had paid a total tax of $48,528,298, the two
states having very nearly the same population. But no account was taken of the fact
that for four years no tax was collected from Alabama by the United States, while nearly
all of the movable wealth was destroyed during the war, and that in 18&5 property was
almost non-existent in Alabama. New Jersey, however, was a rich state. Alabama had
besides paid an enormous war tax and had been looted of millions of dollars' worth of
cotton. And in Alabama there were 500,cxx) negroes who paid no tax, while most of
the population of New Jersey were taxpayers. Ho. Ex. Doc, No. iSi, 42d Cong., 3d Sess.
' Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 34, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
X
306 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
\
the tax and defeated the extra levy. The New York Chamber of
Commerce, when the measure to raise the cotton tax to five cents a
pound was proposed, memoriahzed Congress against the injustice of
the tax. The memorial stated that the North and the West must not
take advantage of the South in the days of her weakness; that the
cultivation of cotton should not be thus discouraged. It was shown
that the manufacturer would be protected by the drawback of five
cents a pound allowed on cotton goods exported, while the cotton
farmer would pay a five- cent tax. By the operation of such a tax,
they stated, the rich would be made richer, and the poor made
poorer. That in the proposed law "there is a want of impartiaHty
which is calculated to provoke hostility at the South, and to excite
in all honest minds at the North the hope that such a purpose will
not prevail."^
By the people who had to pay the tax it was considered an unjust
and purely vindictive measure, which was the more exasperating
because they had no voice in the matter and because no attention was
paid to their remonstrances. They complained that it was levied as
a penalty, that it was confiscation under color of law. They felt
that it was a blow of revenge aimed at them when there was no fear
of resistance or hope of protection, as no other part of the country
had its exports taxed.^ The fact that the tax was removed because
of the objections of the carpet-baggers, scalawags, and negroes, in-
stead of pleasing the whites, was a source of irritation to them. The
respectable people had asked for justice and it was refused them, but
was granted to those who were of opposing pohtics. Those who paid
the tax never believed that the mass of the people at the North were
in favor of such a measure, and they hoped that favorable elections
would reverse the pohcy of Congress, which, then recognizing the
unconstitutionaHty of the tax, would refund it, if not to individuals,
at least to the states in proportion to the amount raised in each,
or, that Congress would give it to the states as a long-time loan.^
1 Sen. Mis. Doc, No. loo, 39th Cong., ist Sess. (A. A. Low, Chairman of Com-
mittee of the N. Y. Chamber of Commerce).
2 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 383, 403 (General Pettus) ; Journal of the Con-
vention of 1867.
8 See Saunders, "Early Settlers," p. 31 (Reverdy Johnson to Saunders). Jan.
18, 1872, the Alabama legislature (Republican Senate and Democratic House) memori-
alized Congress, asking to have the cotton tax refunded to the impoverished people, and
THE COTTON TAX 307
For years there was a belief among the farmers that the unjust tax
would be refunded, and the cotton tax receipts were carefully pre-
served against a day of reimbursement, but, Hke the negroes' "forty
acres and a mule," the money never came/
stating that the tax was "most unjust and oppressive, a direct tax upon industry" ; that
to refund the tax would be "evenhanded but tardy justice." Acts of Ala., 1871-1872,
pp. 445-446. A similar petition was made on Feb. 23, 1875. ^^ts of Ala., 1 874-1 875,
p. 674.
1 In December, 1903, Representative J. S. Williams of Mississippi introduced a
measure in Congress to refund the amount of the cotton tax to the southern states.
CHAPTER VII
THE TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE, 1865-1866
After the Surrender
The paroled Confederate soldier returned to his ruined farm and
went to work to keep his family from extreme want. For him the
war had decided two questions, the abolition of slavery, and the de-
struction of state sovereignty. Further than that he did not expect
the effects of the war to extend, while punishment, as such, for the
part he had taken in the war^ was not thought of. He knew that
there would be a temporary delay in restoring former relations with
the central government, but pohtical proscription and humiliation
were not expected. That after a fair fight, which had resulted in
their defeat, they should be struck when down, was something that
did not occur to the soldiers at all. No one thought of further oppo-
sition to the United States; the results of the war were accepted in
good faith, and the people meant to abide by the decision of arms.
Naturally, there were no profuse expressions of love for the United
States, — which was the North, — but there was an earnest desire
to leave the past behind them and to take their place and do their
duty as citizens of the new Union.^
1 It is difficult to understand now how thoroughly the Confederate soldier realized
that the questions at issue were decided against him. But that it was a crime to have
been a Confederate soldier, he did not understand. See also testimony of John B. Gor-
don and of Edmund W. Pettus in the Ku Klux Testimony.
2 A neglected point of view is the attitude of the Confederate soldier. He had sur-
rendered with arms in hand, and certain terms had been made with him, as he thought,
a contract, embodied in the parole. This he believed secured his rights in return for
laying down arms, and that as long as he was law-abiding his rights were to be inviolate.
He was well pleased with the " spirit of Appomattox," but nearly all that happened after
Appomattox was in violation, he felt, of the terms of surrender. The whole radical
programme was contrary to the contract made with men who had arms in their hands.
Lee had decided that there should be no guerilla warfare, and in return certain moral
obHgations rested on the North. See the statements of General (now Senator) Edmund
W. Pettus, in Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 377, 383, and of General John B. Gordon,
in Ga. Test., pp. 314, 332, 333, 343.
308
AFTER THE SURRENDER 309
The women and the children, who heard with a shock of the sur-
render, felt a terrible fear of the incoming armies. The raids of the
latter part of the war had made them fear the northern soldiers, from
whom they expected harsh treatment. The women had been enthu-
siastic for the Confederate cause; their sacrifices for it had been
incalculable, and to many the disappointment and sorrow were more
bitter than death. The soldier had the satisfaction of having fought
in the field for his opinions, and it was easier for him to accept the
results of war. A certain class of people who had served during the
war at duties which kept them at home professed to be afraid of
hanging, of confiscation, of negro suffrage and negro equahty, and
many other horrible things ; they were loud in their denunciation of
the surrender; they would have '^fought and died in the last ditch,"
they declared. It is hard to see how they could so flatter themselves
as to think the conqueror would hold them responsible for anything,
unless for their violent talk on political questions before and during
the war.
Such was the state of feeling in the first stage, before there was any
general understanding of the nature of the questions to be solved or
of the conflicting policies. News from the outside world came in
slowly; each country community was completely cut off from the
world; the whole state lay prostrate, breathless, exhausted, resting.
Little interest was shown in pubhc questions; the long strain had
been removed, and the people were dazed about the future. There
was no information from abroad except through the army officials,
who reported the news to suit themselves. The railroads and steam-
boats were not running ; for months there was no post-office system,
and for years the service was poor. The people settled down into a
lethargy, seemingly indifferent to what was going on, and exhibiting
little interest in the government and in pohtics. Some persons
dumbly awaited the worst, but the soldiers feared nothing ; at present
they took no interest in pohtics ; they were working, when they were
able, to provide for their famihes.
With many people there was a disposition to see in the defeat the
work of God. There was a belief that fate, destiny, or Providence
had been against the South, and this state of mind made them the
more ready to accept as final the results of war. The fear expressed
by northern politicians that in case of foreign war the South would
310 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
side with the enemy was without cause. The South had had enough
and too much of war. It disliked England and France more than it
hated the North, because they had withheld their aid after seeming to'
promise it.
From the general gloom and seeming despair the young people
soon recovered to some degree, and among them there was much
social gayety of a quiet sort. For four years the young men and
young women had seen Httle of each other, and there had been com-
paratively few marriages. Now they were glad to be together again,
and all the surviving young men proceeded to get married at once.
This revival of spirits did not extend to the older people. Nearly
all were grieving over the loss of sons, brothers, husbands, or rela-
tives. Much that made life worth living was lost to them forever,
and unable to adapt themselves to changed conditions or to recover
from the shock of grief and the strain of war, they died one after the
other, until soon but few were left.^
One of the first things to awaken the people of Alabama from
the blank lethargy into which they had fallen was the question of
what was to be done by the United States government with the Con-
federate leaders who had been arrested. President Davis and Vice-
President Stephens, Senator Clay, the war governors, — Moore,
Shorter, and Watts, — Admiral Semmes, several judicial officers of
the state, and many minor officials were arrested and imprisoned in
the North. Davis, Moore, and Clay were known to be in feeble
health, and from them came -accounts of harsh treatment. The
arrests of lesser personages were purely arbitrary, and in most cases
were probably done by the military without any higher authority.
It was announced unofficially that all who had held office before the
war and who had supported the Confederacy, even those who had
never taken an oath to support the Constitution and laws of the
United States, would be arrested and tried for treason.^ During the
spring and summer of 1865 rumor was busy. Thus, fear of arrest
and imprisonment, the sympathy of the people for their leaders who
1 See " Our Women in the War," p. 280 ; Ball, " Clarke County," p. 463; Le Conte,
" Autobiography," p. 236.
2 N. Y. Herald, June 17 and Aug. 30, 1865 ; N. V. Times, Aug. 17 and Oct. 31,
1865; Mrs. Clay, "A Belle of the Fifties"; Nation, Feb. 15, 1865; oral accounts;
Clayton, " White and Black under the Old Regime."
"THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH" 311
were being made to suffer as scapegoats, the irritating methods of
the Freedmen's Bureau, the work of various pohtical and rehgious
emissaries among the negroes, and the confiscation of property
served progressively to awaken the people from the stupor into which
they had fallen, and they began to take an interest in affairs of such
vital importance to them. The newspapers began to discuss the
problems of Reconstruction and to condemn the treatment of the
pohtical prisoners from the South. This renewed interest was char-
acterized by a section of the northern press and by prominent poli-
ticians as "disloyalty," — a proof of a ''rebellious" spirit which ought
to be chastised.
"The Condition of Affairs in the South"
The President, who began with a vindictive policy, gradually
modified it until it was as fair as the South could expect from him.
To support his policy, he sent agents to the South to ascertain the state
of feehng here and the exact condition of affairs. These agents were
General Grant, the head of the army, Carl Schurz, a sentimental for-
eign revolutionist and politician with an imphcit belief in the Rights
of Man, and Benjamin C. Truman, a well-known and able journahst.
General Grant reported: ''I am satisfied that the thinking men
of the South accept the present condition of affairs in good faith.
The questions that have heretofore divided the sentiment of the people
of the two sections, slavery and state rights, or the right of a state to
secede from the Union, they regard as having been settled by the
highest tribunal — arms — that man can resort to." He beheved
that acquiescence in the authority of the general government was uni-
versal, but that the demoralization following four years of civil war
made it necessary to post small garrisons throughout the South until
civil authority was fully estabhshed.^
The report of Carl Schurz was distinctly unfavorable to the south-
1 Letter concerning affairs at the South, Dec. 18, 1865, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 2,
39th Cong., 2d Sess. ; McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 67. General Grant's conclu-
sions were undoubtedly correct, but they evidently could not be based on the informa-
tion gathered in a week's journeying through the South. This gave the Radicals an
opportunity to attack his report as being based on insufficient information. But General
Grant knew the men against whom he had fought, he had talked with many of the rep-
resentative men of the South, and through military channels was well informed as to
actual conditions at the South.
312 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
erners. He made a classification of the people into four divisions
(i) The business and professional men and men of wealth who wei
forced into secession. These, though prejudiced, were open to conj
viction, and accepted the results of the war. However, as a clas
they were neither bold nor energetic. (2) The professional poli-"
ticians who supported the poHcy of the President and wanted the
state readmitted at once, as they hoped then to be able to arrange
things to suit themselves. (3) A strong lawless element, idlers and
loiterers, who persecuted negroes and "union" men, and in poli-
tics would support the second class. They appealed to the passions
and prejudices of the masses and commanded the admiration of the
women. (4) The mass of the people, who were of weak intellect,
with no definite ideas about anything; who were ruled by those who
appealed to their impulses and prejudices. He stated, however, that
all were agreed that further resistance to the government was useless
and that all submitted to its authority. The people, he said, were
hostile toward the soldiers, northern men, unionists, and negroes;
their loyalty was only submission to necessity ; and they still honored
their old political leaders.^
B. C. Truman, the journalist, after a long stay in the South, of
which about two months were spent in Alabama, reported to the Presi-
dent that the southerners were loyal to the government and were
cheerfully submissive and obedient to the law. The fates were against
them, the people thought, and it was the will of God that they should
lose ; the dream of independence was over, and secession would never
be thought of again ; the war had decided this question, and the deci-
sion was accepted. The Confederate soldier, the backbone and sinew
of the South, who must be the real basis of reconstruction and worthy
citizenship, was exerting his influence for peace and reconciliation;
1 Report of Carl Schurz, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. Schurz made a
journey of more than two months through the southern states. Judging from the testi-
mony which he submits, his confidence must have been confined to the officers of the
Freedmen's Bureau. As a foreigner (a German), he would not be able, even if so
inclined, to ascertain anything of the sentiments of the representative people. How-
ever, his report was evidently not based entirely on the evidence submitted with it ; if
it had been, it would have been even more unfavorable. In AfcClure's Magazine, Janu-
ary, 1904, Schurz has an article which is practically a rewriting of this report made
nearly forty years before. He repeats some of the same stories told him then, and
endeavors to reconcile his attitude in 1865-1866 with his course as a Liberal Republican
in 1871-1872.
"THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH" 313
there were few more potent influences at work in promoting real and
lasting reconciliation and reconstruction than that of the Confederate
soldier. The fear that in case of foreign war the South would fight
against the United States he knew to be unfounded; the soldiers
hated England, and would fight for the United States ; this, Hardee,
McLaws, and Forrest had told him ; but, he added, the soldiers pre-
ferred to have no war at all, they had had all^that they wanted. At
the collapse of the Confederacy, there had been a general feehng of
despair. The people at home, especially, had expected the worst;
and the reaction was wrongly called "disloyal." The people were
gradually returning to old attachments, but that they would repudiate
their old leaders was not to be expected ; neither would they acknowl-
edge any wrong in their former belief in slavery and the right of seces-
sion, though ready to grant that those no longer existed. They were
better friends to the negro than the northern men who came South;
and the courts, magistrates, and lawyers would see that justice was
done the negro.^
In order to produce a report which would justify the action of
Congress in opposing the President's plan,^ a committee of Congress
for several months held an inquest at Washington and examined se-
lected witnesses who gave the desired testimony relative to the condi-
tion of affairs in the South. The committee consisted of six senators
and nine representatives. Only three Democrats were on this com-
mittee, and not one of them was on the sub-committee that took
testimony relating to affairs in Alabama.^ All sessions of the sub-
committees were held in Washington, far removed from the state
under inquisition. Care was exercised in calHng as witnesses only
RepubHcans, and these usually were not citizens of the state. No
citizens of Alabama testified except two deserters,'' one tory,^ and one
1 Report of Benjamin C. Truman to the President, April 9, 1866, Sen. Ex. Doc,
No. 43, 39th Cong., 1st Bess.; N. V. Times, March 2, 1865. Truman spent two months
in Alabama, and saw many prominent men whom Schurz did not see, and came in con-
tact with thousands of other citizens. His aim was to picture conditions as they were.
The newspaper correspondents, regardless of politics, gave better accounts than the volun-
teer officers, who had little training or education and much prejudice.
2 See Blaine, Vol. II, p. 127.
8 The sub-committee : Senator Harris (New York) and Senator Boutwell (Massa-
chusetts) and Morrill (Vermont) from the House.
* Smith and Humphreys,
s J. J. Giers.
314
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
man who, during the war, had been an agent of the Confederate
government ''to examine poHtical prisoners," ^ but who told the com-
mittee that during the war he had been a ''union" man. A witness
from Ohio claimed to be a citizen of Alabama.^ Another witness
was a cotton speculator from Massachusetts, and still another, a land
office man from the North. Three hailed from Illinois, three from
Iowa, one each from California and Minnesota, and the remainder
were from the North, with the exception of General George H.
Thomas, who had been a Virginian and who had not been allowed
to remain in ignorance of what the Virginians called his " treason-
able " conduct toward his native state. Three were connected with
the Freedmen's Bureau, already fiercely criticised in all sections of
the country, and twelve were, or had been, connected with the army,
and for short periods had served in some part of Alabama.^
Of the five men who resided in the state,' each was bitter in denun-
ciation of existing conditions and tendencies in Alabama. The course
they had taken during the war made it impossible for them to attain
to any position of honor or profit so long as the Confederate sympa-
1 M. J. Saffold. He was pardoned by President Johnson for that offence.
2 George E. Spencer, Colonel 1st Alabama Union Cavalry.
8 The witnesses who furnished testimony to the Congressional committee were : —
Name
Nativity
Remarks
I. Warren Kelsey
Massachusetts
Cotton speculator
2. General Edward Hatch
Iowa
Volunteer army
3. General George E. Spencer
Iowa
Volunteer army
4. William H. Smith
Alabama
Deserter
5. J. J. Giers ....
Alabama
Tory
6. Mordecai Mobley
Iowa
7. General George H. Thomas
Virginia
U. S. Army
8. General Clinton B. Fisk
North
Freedmen's Bureau
9. M. J. Saffold ....
Alabama
" Union " man
10. D. C. Humphreys
Alabama
Deserter
II. Colonel Milton M. Bane
Illinois
Volunteer army
12. General Joseph R.West
California
Volunteer army
13. Colonel Hunter Brooke
North
Volunteer army
14. General Grierson
Illinois
Volunteer army
15. General Swayne .
North
Freedmen's Bureau
16. General C. C. Andrews
Minnesota
Volunteer army
17. General Chetlain
Illinois
Volunteer army
18. General Tarbell .
North
Volunteer army
"THE" CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTH" 315
thizers were not proscribed. Existing institutions must be over-
thrown before they could hope for political preferment/
The conflicting stories of most of the witnesses neutralized one
another, and the remainder corroborated the testimony of General
Wager Swayne, the head in Alabama of that much-hated institution,
the Freedmen's Bureau. General Swayne stated that he had been
agreeably disappointed in the temper of the people. In most of his
conclusions he agreed with Truman. He said that he had observed
a gradual cessation of disorder, the opening of courts to the negro,
and favorable legislation for him ; but a marked increase of political
animosity. He thought the northerner was well treated except so-
cially. He thought the people were determined to make it honorable
to have been engaged in " rebellion " and dishonorable to have been
a "unionist" among them during the war.^ The statements of Gen-
eral Swayne were probably as near to the truth as the average human
being could attain to.^ His account was from the northern stand-
point, but was as impartial as any one could make at that time.* A
few weeks later he said that the bluster of a few irreconcilables should
not be exaggerated into the threatening voice of a whole people.^
This he repeatedly asserted.
1 One of these men (W. H. Smith) became the first scalawag governor of Alabama,
another (George E. Spencer) became a United States senator by negro votes, the third
(Giers) was provided for in the departments at Washington, the fourth (Saffold) became
a circuit judge in Alabama, and the fifth (Humphreys) a judge of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia. See Herbert, "The Solid South," pp. 19, 20.
'^ Testimony of General Swayne, Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
1866, Pt. Ill, pp. 138-141.
3 Other witnesses gave, in some respects, more favorable testimony, though most of
them were very much more bitter. General Swayne showed no bias except the natural
bias of one who did not understand the people, and who had no sympathy with any of
the southern social or political principles. Of the northern men he was the best quali-
fied by experience and observation to testify as to conditions in the South. He was an
intelligent, educated man, trained in the law, and had a good military record. Most of
the others were distinctly below his standard, — ignorant, prejudiced officers of volunteers
from the West.
^ General Swayne was in Alabama nearly three years as the head of the unpopular
Freedmen's Bureau, and his accounts, from first to last, of conditions in Alabama were
marked by a fairness which can be found in but little of the official correspondence from
the South. He believed in the Freedmen's Bureau, in negro suffrage, and in the politi-
cal proscription of white leaders; but his feelings influenced his judgment but little, and,
unlike other Bureau officials, he never made misrepresentations.
5 The Nation, Feb. 15, 1866.
3l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Ex-Governor Andrew B. Moore spoke for the people when he said:
"Slavery and the right of secession are settled forever. The people
will stand by it." Rev. Thomas O. Summers, who lived in the heart
of the Black Belt, said, "I have not found a planter who does not
think the abolition of slavery a great misfortune to both races; but
all recognize aboHtion to be an accompHshed fact." ^
The people had Httle faith in the free negro as a laborer, but were
disposed to make the best of a bad situation and to give the negro a
fair chance. The old soldiers took a hopeful view, and the great
wrong of Reconstruction was not so much in the enfranchising of the
ignorant slave as in the proscription and humiliation of the better
whites with the alienated negro as an instrument.
There was no indication at this time that the people could ever
be united into one political party. Before the war party hnes had
sharply divided the people, and the divisions were deep and politi-
cal prejudices strong, though not based to any great extent on differ-
ences of principles. The war had served to unite the people only
temporarily, and the last years of the struggle showed that this tem-
porary union would fall to pieces when the pressure from without was
removed. When normal conditions should be restored, local poHtical
strife was sure to be warm and probably bitter, and parties would
separate along the old Whig and Democratic lines. At this time
there was a disposition on the part of Whig and Democrat, secessionist
and cooperationist, each to charge the responsibility for present evils
upon the other, and by the "bomb-proof" people there was much
talk of the " twenty- nigger law," of "the rich man's war and the poor
man's fight," etc., in order to discredit the former leaders.^
The "Loyalists"
An unpleasant and violent part of the population was the Union
"loyal" or tory party, consisting of a few thousand persons who
had now returned from the North or had crept out of their hiding-
places and were demanding the punishment of the "traitors" who
had carried the state into war. Hanging, imprisonment, disfranchise-
ment, confiscation, banishment, was the programme demanded by
1 Huntsville Advocate, July 26, 1865.
2 Herbert, " Solid South," pp. 29, 30 ; Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1901.
I
THE "LOYALISTS"
317
them. From the Johnson regime in the state they could hope only
for toleration, never for official preferment, nor even for respect.
They demanded the assistance of the Federal government to place
them in power and maintain them there.^
About this time it became difficult to distinguish the various species
of "loyal" men or "loyalists." There were: (i) Those who had
taken the side of the United States in the war. These numbered
two or three thousand and they were "truly loyal," as they were called.
(2) Those who had escaped service in the Confederate army by hid-
ing out or by desertion, or who engaged in secret movements intended
to overthrow the Confederate government. These claimed and were
accorded the title of " loyalists " or " union" men. (3) All who during
the war became in any way disaffected toward the Confederate or
state government and gave but weak support to the cause asked to be
called "loyalists" or "unionists." (4) All negroes were, in the minds
of the northern radical politician, "loyalists" by virtue of their color,
and had all the time been "devoted to the Union" ; the fact, of course,
was that the negroes had been about as faithful as their masters to
the Confederate cause. (5) All who took the oath in 1865 or were
pardoned by the President and who promised to support the govern-
ment thereby acquired the designation of "loyal" men. These
included practically all the population except negroes and the first
class. (6) A small number included in the fifth class who were con-
servative people, and who now used their influence to bring about
peace and reconstruction. This was the best class of the citizens,
and the majority of them were old soldiers, — men like Clanton,
Longstreet, Gordon, and Hardee. (7) Later, only those who ap-
proved the policy of Congress were "loyal," while those who disap-
proved were "disloyal." The first and second classes coalesced at
once, and finally they admitted the right of the third class to bear the
designation "loyal." They, for a long time, would not admit the
claims of the negro to "loyalty," but at last poHtical necessity drove
them to it; they denied always that the sixth class had any right
to share the rewards of "loyalty." These various definitions of loy-
1 See Memorial of William H. Smith, J. J. Giers, and D. C. Humphreys to Congress,
Feb., 1866, in Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 42, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. Testimony of the same an«l
of M. J. Safifold in Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1866; letter of D. II.
Bingham from VS^est Point, New York; Reid, " After the War,"/awiw.
3l8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
alty were made by the men themselves, by the various poHtical par-
ties, and by the party newspapers. Every man in the South was]
some kind of a "loyaHst," and most of them were also ''disloyal,"!
according to the various points of view.
Treatment of Northern Men
There was no question more irritating to both sides than that of
social relations between the southern people and the northerners.
After the first weeks of occupation the relations between the enlisted
men of the Union army and the native whites became somewhat
friendly and in most cases remained so, while, with few exceptions,
the regular officers and the people maintained friendly relations,
in public matters, at least. The volunteers, however, were much
more disagreeable, especially the volunteer officers, who lacked the
social training of the regulars. Too often the northerners seemed to
feel that they had conquered in war the right to enter the most exclu-
sive southern society, and individuals made themselves disliked more
than ever by striving to obtain social recognition where they were not
known and were not desired. They had a newspaper knowledge of
social conditions before the war, and, while professing to scorn the
pretensions of the "southern chivalry and beauty," yet were very de-
sirous of closer acquaintance with both, and especially the latter.
Soon after the armies of occupation came, matters were pretty bad for
the southern people. The less refined subordinate volunteer officers
almost demanded entrance, and even welcome, into southern social
circles. They found that while the southern men would meet them
courteously in business relations and in public places, they were never
invited to the homes. On all occasions the women avoided meeting
the northern men ; this was their own wish, as well as that of their
male relatives. They felt the losses of war more keenly than did
the men because they had lost more. All of them had lost some
loved one in the war, and quite naturally had no desire to meet in
social relations the men who had overcome their country and possi-
bly killed their fathers, brothers, husbands, lovers. They must have
time to bury their dead, and it was long before the sight of a Federal
soldier caused other than bitter feelings of sorrow and loss. Yet
most of the northerners overlooked this fact. The southern women
TREATMENT OF NORTHERN MEN
319
reigned supreme over society; the death in the war of so large a
number of young men had only strengthened the influence of the
women ; as a rule, they were better educated than the men, espe-
cially the young men, whose education had been interrupted by the
war/
When the famihes of the northern people came South, the doors
of the southern homes were not opened to them. The northerners
resented this ostracism by the southerners, and the coldness of so-
ciety toward them caused many a sarcastic and sneering letter to be
written home or to the newspapers.^ There was constant interference
in semi-social relations : the mistress of the house was told how she
must treat her colored cook ; the employer was warned that his con-
duct must be more respectful toward the negroes in his employ; ex-
Confederates were forbidden to wear their uniforms, or even to use
their buttons; nor could southern airs be sung or played.^ The
soldiers would crowd a woman off the sidewalk in order to make her
look at them. Women would go far out of the way to avoid meeting
1 See Le Conte, "Autobiography," p. 236; Montgomery correspondent in A^. V.
Daily N'ews, May 7, 1866.
■■2 A newspaper correspondent, the guest of ex-Governor C. C. Clay, wrote : " While
the Yankee boldly marched in at the front door into his [Clay's] parlors and best cham-
bers to dream loyal dreams and rest now that the warfare's o'er, the quondam aristocrat
[a son of ex-Governor Clay, editor of a paper in Huntsville, had been outlawed for his
sentiments during the occupation of north Alabama by the Federal troops and was in
hiding] must plod around to the rear and there eat the (corn) bread of mad passion
weighed down with mad remorse." Letter from a travelling correspondent of the N. Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 1865. The Times usually had very little of such correspondence. The
Times, the Hei'ald, and the World had good correspondents in the South, especially
during Reconstruction.
3 An old Alabama river steamboat captain had had his boat burned by Wilson, but
had secured another. The Federal army regarded him as a most unmitigated " rebel."
He would play " Dixie " in spite of all prohibitions. He was finally arrested on a more
serious charge.
*' What do you answer to the charge against you?"
"Faith, an' which one?"
" That you refuse to take the bodies of dead Federal soldiers on your boat to Mont-
gomery."
" No, no, that's not true. God knows it would be the pleasure of my life to take
the whole Yankee nation up the river in that same fixT " Our Women in the War,"
p. 281.
Colonel Robert McFarland returned to Florence in the only suit he possessed —
a gray uniform. He was peremptorily ordered by the Federal officers not to wear it.
He was in a quandary until a friend secured a long linen duster for him to wear.
"Northern Alabama," p. 291.
320 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
a Federal officer, and when forced to pass one, would sweep theif
skirts aside as if to avoid contagion. Forthwith the man insulted
indited an epistle in which such incidents were related and the size
of the ladies' feet and ankles and the poverty-stricken appearance of
their dress commented upon. This naturally found its way into the
newspapers, as home letters from soldiers usually do. Soldiers,
white and black, would sit on the back fence and jeer at the former
mistress of slaves as she worked at the family washing. United
States flags were hung over the sidewalks to force the women to walk
under them, and in some instances, when they refused to do so and
went out into the street, efforts were made to force them to pass under
the flag. For refusal and for exceedingly "disloyal" remarks made
under the excitement of such treatment, several were arrested and
lectured by coarse officials. Drunken soldiers terrorized women in
the garrison towns. A lot of drunken officers in a launch in Mobile
Bay habitually terrified pleasure parties of women who were on the
bay in small boats. The officers invited the women to balls and*
entertainments, but the latter paid no attention to what they consid-
ered impertinence. This angered the officers. The northern news-
papers of 1865, 1866, and 1867 have many letters from correspondents
in the South complaining of social neglect or ostracism. Letters
were written about the coarseness, unlovely tempers, and character
of the southern men and women who, it was insisted, were of the best
families. ^
These letters the violent southern press afterward made a practice
of copying for poHtical reasons.^ The more incorrigible officers were
accustomed to express their most offensive sentiments in regard to
1 Gen. T. Kilby Smith, on Sept. 14, 1865, in Mobile, made a statement for Carl
Schurz in which he asserted that one of the most intelligent, well-bred, pious ladies of
Mobile wanted the military authorities to whip or torture into a confession of theft two
negroes whom she suspected of stealing. She considered it a hardship, he said, that a
negro might not be whipped or tortured in order to force a confession, when there was
no evidence against him. "I offer this," he wrote, " as an instance of the feeling that
exists in all classes against the negro." See Doc. No. 9, accompanying the report of
Schurz.
2 I have seen a coarse article reflecting on the character of southern women origi-
nally published in the Tribune and copied in a small Alabama paper each issue for
several weeks. It asserted in thinly veiled terms that many of the young southern
women were too intimate with negro men ; the solution of the race question by amal-
gamation was asserted as sure to come ; details of such a solution were suggested, and
examples of what was taking place were cited.
IMMIGRATION TO ALABAMA
321
negro inequality, the position of the negro, the slavery question, and
the treatment of the negro by the whites. The Bureau officials were
cordially disliked for their tendency to such conduct. Though only
a small portion of the northerners and Federal officials were guilty
of offensive actions, the relations in many places being kindly and
the conduct of most of the officers considerate and courteous, yet
the insolent behavior of some caused all to be blamed.^
The question of the social standing of the tory element may be
summed up in a few words. They were mercilessly ostracized and
thoroughly despised by the Confederate element of the population
at that time, and the same feehng of social contempt had descended
to their children's children. It is rather a feehng of indifference now,
but the result is even more deadly. The true Unionist was dishked
but respected.
All the witnesses called before the sub-committee at Washington
complained of the dishke exhibited toward "unionists" and north-
erners. It was a burning question and had much influence on the
later course of reconstruction.^
Immigration to Alabama
As soon as the war was ended, there was an influx of northern
men and northern capital into Alabama. Cotton was selling at a
1 General Terry attempted to explain the condition of affairs by saying that the
results of the war were but the legitimate consequence of a conflict between an inferior
and a superior race. " Land We Love," Vol. IV, p. 243. Gen. T. Kilby Smith, in Sep-
tember, 1865, complained that Federal officers were not received in society in Mobile.
General Wood, he said, had been six weeks in Mobile, "ignored socially and damned
politically"; and this, he said, in a community which before the war was considered one
of the most refined and hospitable of all the southern maritime cities, the favorite home
of army and naval officers. Doc. No. 9, accompanying the report of Schurz.
2 In addition to references cited above, see also Huntsville Advocate, March 9 and
23, July 26, 1865 ; Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 42, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.; Sen. Mis. Doc, No. 43,
39th Cong, 1st Sess. (Truman); Reid, "After the War," pp. 211, 212, 218, 219; "The
Land We Love," passim; "Our Women in the War," p. 279 et passim ; Abbott, "The
Rights of Man," pp. 224-226; Clayton, "White and Black," pp. 150-152; Clay, "A
Belle of the Fifties" ; Straker, "The New South Investigated," pp. 24, 57 ; Report of
the Joint Committee, 1866, Ft. Ill; N. Y. Daily Neivs, April 16, 1864, and Dec. 4,
1865; Reports of Schurz, Truman, and Grant; Reports of the Freedmen's Bureau;
Southern Magazine, 1874 (DeLeon) ; N. Y. Junes, Oct. 31, 1865; N. Y. Herald,
July 23, 1865 ; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 233-251 ; Columbus (Ga.) Sun, March 22 and
April 19, 1865; The Nation, Feb. 15, 1866; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., passim;
Reconstruction articles in Atlantic Monthly, 1901.
V
322
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
fabulous price, — 40 to 50 cents a pound, $200 to $250 a bale, — and
the newcomers expected to make fortunes in a few years. They were
welcomed by the planters who wanted to sell or to lease their plan-
tations, which, for want of funds, they were unable to cultivate.
General Swayne said that in 1866 there were 5000 northern men^ in
Alabama engaged in trading and planting. They were sought for
as partners or as overseers by those who hoped that northern men
could control free negro labor. Lands were sold or leased at low
prices, and many soldiers, especially officers, decided to buy land
and raise cotton. Numbers of large plantations in the Black Belt
were bought or leased by officers of the army, all of whom had lofty
ideas as to what they were going to do. The soil was fertile, cotton
was selling for high prices, and the free blacks, they were sure, would
work for them out of gratitude and trust. They wanted to help
reconstruct southern industry, and to show what could be done toward
developing the great natural resources of the state. They embarked
in large enterprises, and as long as their money lasted bought every-
thing that was offered for sale. Their success or failure was depend-
ent largely upon the negro laborer, who was to make the cotton, and
the new planters made extraordinarily liberal terms with him. They
dealt with the negro as if he were a New Englander with a black skin,
and they purchased expensive machinery for him to use. They
would not listen to southern advice, but went as far as possible to
the opposite extreme from southern methods of farming. All sug-
gestions were met with the assurance that the southern man was used
only to slaves, and could not know how free men would work.
Reports, generally false and made mainly for political purposes,
were continually published by the northern press in regard to the
ill treatment of northern men who wished to make their homes in
the South.^ But not a single authenticated case of violence to such
persons can be found to have taken place in Alabama.
In some locahties, on account of bands of outlaws, for several
1 Trowbridge, " The South," p. 448.
2 Thomas W. Conway, of the Freedmen's Bureau, who passed through the state in
1866, stated that there were men in Alabama who, rather than sell their lands to northern
men or borrow money in the North, would see their plantations lie waste, and before
they would hire their former slaves as free laborers they would starve. The spirit of
hatred toward northern men was universal, he said. Report to Chamber of Commerce,
New York, June 7, 1866.
IMMIGRATION TO ALABAMA 323
months after the war it was not safe for any stranger to settle. The
ignorant whites had no Hking for the northern men (and may not have
to this day). The better class of people was in favor of much immi-
gration from the North, and Governor Parsons made a tour through
the North to induce northern men and capital to come to Alabama.^
The people had no capital, and wanted to induce those who possessed
it to come and live in the state. The testimony of travellers was that
the accounts of cruelty and intolerance toward northerners were al-
most entirely false ; that they were welcomed if they did not attempt
to stir up trouble between the races.^ The refusal of Congress to
recognize the state government and the rejection of the members
elected to Congress caused a fresh outburst of bitter feeling against
the North; but General Swayne, who had the best opportunities for
observation, said that rudeness and insult and the occasional atten-
tions of a horse-thief were the worst things that had happened to
the northern settlers.^
These northern men meant well but, as a rule, were incompetent
as farmers and business men. Consequently they failed, and most
of them never quite understood the reasons for their failure. They
knew next to nothing of plantation economy, and the negroes were
their only teachers. Most of them were from the West, and had never
seen cotton growing before. It was almost pathetic to see these 5000
northerners risking all they possessed upon their faith in the negro,
and losing. The northern merchant gave the negro unhmited credit
and lost; the planter gave his tenant all he asked for, whenever it
pleased him to ask. The farm stock was driven to camp-meetings
1 Jan. 17, 1867, the state legislature declared that the reports published in the north-
ern papers that it was unsafe for northern men to reside in Alabama were" false. The
lower house declared that "we, in the name of the people of Alabama, most cor-
dially invite skilled labor and capital from the world, and particularly from all parts of
the United States, and pledge the hearty cooperation and support of the state." Annual
Cyclopcedia (1867), p. 15. For several years every inducement was offered by the
planters to encourage immigration to the Black Belt. As late as 1869 immigration con-
ventions were held. Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), p. 10. During 1865 the north Ala-
bama " unionists " hoped to see northern white men come in and take the place of the
negroes. The Nation, Aug. 17, 1865.
2 Report of Truman, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 43, 39th Cong., ist Sess.; Reid "After the
War," passim; Trowbridge, "The South," p. 448; N. V. Times, Nov. lo, 1865, July 2
and Oct. 31, 1866; General Swayne's testimony, Report Joint Committee, Pt. Ill, p. 141 ;
General Tarbell's testimony, Report Joint Committee, Pt. Ill, pp. 155, 156.
3 Report Joint Committee, 1866, Pt. Ill, pp. 139-141.
324 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and frolics while the grass was killing the cotton. Mills and fac-
tories were built and negro laborers employed, but the negroes, be-
cause of a lack of quickness and sensitiveness of touch, proved to be
unfit for factory work. Besides, the noise of the machinery made
them sleepy, and it was beyond their power to report for work at a
regular hour each morning. At first, the negroes showed great con-
fidence in the northern man and were glad to work for him, but too
much was required of them, and after a year or two the disgust was
mutual. The revulsion of feehng following failure and disappoint-
ment and ostracism injured the South by creating hostile opinion in
the North. Nearly all the northern men went home, but the less
desirable ones remained to assist in the political reconstruction of
the state, when many of them became state officials.^
Troubles in the Church
At the close of the war, the churches were in a disturbed condition,
owing to the attitude of the Washington government. Most of the
southern churches held by the northern organizations were restored
to their former owners. The northern Methodist Church caused
irritation by retaining southern church property that had been
placed under its control by the military authorities. But the most
aggravated ill feehng was aroused in the Protestant Episcopal Church.
After the collapse of the Confederate government. Bishop Wilmer
of Alabama directed the Episcopal clergy to omit that portion of the
prayer mentioning the President of the Confederate States. Further,
he ordered that when civil authority should be restored, the prayer
for the President of the United States should be used.^ Bishop Wil-
mer, consecrated in 1862, had never made a declaration of conform-
ity to the constitution and canons of the church in the United States,
and, consequently, even by the northern Episcopal Church, was not
considered amenable to its constitution.^
1 In addition to the above references, see The Worlds Nov. 13, 1865 ; N. Y. Times,
July 2 and Sept. 9, 1866 ; N. Y. Herald, July 23 and Aug. 28, 1865 (Swayne) ; Truman's
Report, April 9, 1866; Swayne's Report, Jan., 1866; Harper's Monthly Magazine,
Jan., 1874.
2 Pastoral Letters, May 30 and June 20, 1865.
3 Perry, " History of the American Episcopal Church," Vol. II, p. 328 et seq. ;
Whitaker, "The Church in Alabama," pp. 172-175; N. Y. Herald, Sept. 4, 1865; Wil-
TROUBLES IN THE CHURCH 325
For several months his directions were not noticed by the Federal
authorities, and services were held in conformity to the bishop's
orders. In September, "Parson" WilHam G. Brownlow of Ten-
nessee, it is said, brought the matter of the Wilmer pastoral letters
to the attention of General George H. Thomas, who commanded the
Mihtary Division of the Tennessee, to which belonged the Depart-
ment of Alabama. Thomas, like Wilmer, was a Virginian, and was
regarded by the latter and other southerners as a traitor to his native
state. Thomas was peculiarly sensitive to such a charge, and dis-
liked Wilmer, who had expressed his opinion in regard to the matter.
So it was easy to secure his interference. General Woods, at Mobile,
was directed to investigate the matter. An officer was sent to ask
Wilmer when he intended to order the clergy to pray for the President
of the United States. The bishop refused to direct its use at the dic-
tation of the military authority, or while the state was under military
domination, since no one desired ''length of hfe," nor the least pros-
perity to such a government.^ The result was the argumentative
order which follows : ^ —
Headquarters Department of Alabama,
Mobile, Ala., Sept. 20, 1865.
General Order No. j8 :
The Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States has established a form
of prayer to be used for " the President of the United States and all in civil
authority." During the continuance of the late wicked and groundless rebellion
the prayer was changed to one for the President of the Confederate States, and
so altered, was used in the Protestant Episcopal churches of the Diocese of
Alabama.
Since the " lapse " of the Confederate government, and the restoration of the
authority of the United States over the late rebellious states, the prayer for the
President has been altogether omitted in the Episcopal churches of Alabama.
This'omission was recommended by the Rt. Rev. Richard Wilmer, Bishop of
Alabama, in a letter to the clergy and laity, dated June 20, 1865. The only
reason given by Bishop Wilmer for the omission of a prayer, which, to use his
own language, " was established by the highest ecclesiastical authorities, and has
mer, " The Recent Past from a Southern Standpoint," p. 143. Gen. T. Kilby Smith
said that Wilmer had great influence among the better class of people, especially the
women. Doc. No. 9, accompanying the report of Carl Schurz.
1 Perry, " History of the American Episcopal Church," Vol. II, p. 328 ei seq. ;
^ Whitaker, pp. 175, 176; Wilmer, pp. 143-145.
2 Whitaker, p. 177; Wilmer, " Recent Past," p. 145. A copy of the order was also
found in the War Department archives.
326 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
^
for many years constituted a part of the liturgy of the church," is stated by him
in the following words : — ^H
" Now the church in this country has established a form of prayer for th^H
President and all in civil authority. The language of the prayer was selected
with careful reference to the subject of the prayer — all in civil authority — and
she desires for that authority prosperity and long continuance. No one can I
reasonably be expected to desire a long continuance of military rule. Therefore,
the prayer is altogether inappropriate and inapplicable to the present condition
of things, when no civil authority exists in the exercise of its functions. Hence,
as I remarked in the circular, we may yield a true allegiance to, and sincerely
pray for grace, wisdom, and understanding in behalf of a government founded on |
force, while at the same time we could not in good conscience ask for its continu-
ance, prosperity, etc."
It will be observed from this extract, first, that the bishop, because he cannot
pray for the continuance of " military rule," therefore declines to pray for those in
authority ; second, he declares the prayer inappropriate and inapplicable, because
no civil authority exists in the exercise of its functions. On the 20th of June,
the date of his letter, there was a President of the United States, a Cabinet,
Judges of the Supreme Court, and thousands of other civil officers of the United
States, all in the exercise of their functions. It was for them specially that this
form of prayer was established ; yet the bishop cannot, among all these, find any
subject worthy of his prayers.
Since the publication of this letter a civil governor has been appointed for the
state of Alabama, and in every county judges and sheriffs have been appointed,
and all these are, and for weeks have been, in the exercise of their fiinctions ; yet
the prayer has not been restored.
The prayer which the bishop advised to be omitted is not a prayer for the
continuance of military rule, or the continuance of any particular form of govern-
ment or any particular person in power. It is simply a prayer for the temporal
and spiritual weal of the persons in whose behalf it is offered — it is a prayer to
the High and Mighty Ruler of the Universe that He would with His power behold
and bless His servant, the President of the United States, and all others in
authority ; that He would replenish them with grace of His holy spirit that they
might always incline to His will and walk in His ways ; that He would endow
them plenteously with heavenly gifts, grant them in health and prosperity long to
live, and finally, after this life, to attain everlasting joy and felicity. It is a prayer
at once applicable and appropriate, and which any heart not filled with hatred,
malice, and all uncharitableness, could conscientiously offer.
The advice of the bishop to omit this prayer, and its omission by the clergy,
is not only a violation of the canons of the church, but shows a factious and dis-
loyal spirit, and is a marked insult to every loyal citizen within the department.
Such men are unsafe public teachers, and not to be trusted in places of power
and influence over public opinion.
It is therefore ordered, pursuant to the directions of Major-General Thomas,
commanding the military division of Tennessee, that said Richard Wilmer, Bishop
of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Alabama, and the Protes-
tant Episcopal clergy of said diocese be, and they are hereby suspended from
TROUBLES IN THE CHURCH 327
their functions, and forbidden to preach, or perform divine service; and that
their places of worship be closed until such time as said bishop and clergy show
a sincere return to their allegiance to the government of the United States, and
give evidence of a loyal and patriotic spirit by offering to resume the use of the
prayer for the President of the United States and all in civil authority, and by
taking the amnesty oath prescribed by the President.
This prohibition shall continue in each individual case until special applica-
tion is made through the military channels to these headquarters for permission
to preach and perform divine service, and until such application is approved at
these or superior headquarters.
District commanders are required to see that this order is carried into effect.
By order of
Major-General Charles R. Woods,
Frederick H. Wilson, A. A.-G.
Wilmer denied the right of civil or mihtary ofBcials to interfere in
such matters. Prayer, he said, was rehgious, not pohtical, and was
not to be prescribed by secular authority.^ Woods threatened to use
force, and had the churches closed by soldiers. St. John's Church
in Montgomery having been closed by the military authorities, the
congregation attempted to meet in Hamner Hall, a school building,
but was dispersed by soldiers at the point of the bayonet. Much to
the indignation of Generals Woods and Thomas, services were held
in private houses.^ The House of Bishops of the northern church
protested against this edict to the President. Wilmer appealed to
Governor Parsons and found that the "civil governor" of G. O. No. 38
was only a subordinate mihtary ofhcial with no power. President
Johnson at first refused to interfere, but was finally induced to direct
Thomas to revoke the suspension of the clergy. This was done in
the following remarkable order : ^ —
Headquarters
Military Division of the Tennessee,
Nashville, Tenn., Dec. 22, 1865.
General Orders No. 40 :
Armed resistance to the authority of the United States having been put down,
the President, on the 29th of May last, issued his Proclamation of Amnesty,
declaring that armed resistance having ceased in all quarters, he invited those
lately in rebellion to reconstruct and restore civil authority, thus proclaiming the
magnanimity of our government towards all, no matter how criminal or how
deserving of punishment.
1 Pastoral Letter, Sept. 28, 1865.
2 Whitaker, pp. 180, 181 ; Wilmer, pp. 145, 146; Montgomery Mail, Oct. 2, 1865.
3 Whitaker, p. 182; Wilmer, p. 146 ; Copy of order in War Department archives.
Republished on G. O. 2, Jan. 10, 1866, Hq. Dept. Ala., Mobile.
328 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Alarmed at this imminent and impending peril to the cause in which he hac
embarked with all his heart and mind, and desiring to check, if possible, the
spread of popular approbation and grateful appreciation of the magnanimous
policy of the President in his efforts to bring the people of the United States back
to their former friendly and national relations one with another, an individual,
styling himself Bishop of Alabama, forgetting his mission to preach peace on
earth and good will towards man, and being animated with the same spirit which
through temptation beguiled the mother of men to the commission of the first
sin — thereby entaihng eternal toil and trouble on earth — issued, from behind
the shield of his office, his manifesto of the 20th of June last to the clergy of the
Episcopal Church of Alabama, directing them to omit the usual and customary
prayer for the President of the United States and all others in authority, until the
troops of the United States had been removed from the limits of Alabama ; cun-
ningly justifying this treasonable course, by plausibly presenting to the minds of
the people that, civil authority not yet having been restored in Alabama, there
was no occasion for the use of said prayer, as such prayer was intended for the
civil authority alone, and as the military was the only authority in Alabama it
was manifestly improper to pray for the continuance of military rule.
This man in his position of a teacher of religion, charity, and good fellowship
with his brothers, whose paramount duty as such should have been characterized
by frankness and freedom from all cunning, thus took advantage of the sanctity
of his position to mislead the minds of those who naturally regarded him as a
teacher in whom they could trust, and attempted to lead them back into the
labyrinths of treason.
For this covert and cunning act he was deprived of the privileges of citizen-
ship, in so far as the right to officiate as a minister of the Gospel, because it was
evident he could not be trusted to officiate and confine his teachings to matters
of religion alone — in fact, that religious matters were but a secondary considera-
tion in his mind, he having taken an early opportunity to subvert the church to
the justification and dissemination of his treasonable sentiments.
As it is, however, manifest that so far from entertaining the same political
views as Bishop Wilmer, the people of Alabama are honestly endeavoring to
restore the civil authority in that state in conformity with the requirements of
the Constitution of the United States, and to repudiate their acts of hostility
during the past four years, and have accepted with a loyal and becoming spirit
the magnanimous terms offered them by the President ; therefore, the restrictions
heretofore imposed upon the Episcopal clergy of Alabama are removed, and
Bishop Wilmer is left to that remorse of conscience consequent to the exposure
and failure of the diabolical schemes of designing and corrupt minds.
By command of
Major-General Thomas.
William D. Whipple,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
Wilmer had won, and three days after the order was promulgated
in Alabama he directed the use of the prayer for the President of the
United States. Two months earlier, the General Council of the Con-
TROUBLES IN THE CHURCH
329
federate States had provided for such a prayer, but this provision was
not to have the force of law in any diocese until approved by the
bishop. This was to enable Wilmer to win the fight and then to
resume the use of the prayer/
The General Council of the Confederate Church, in November,
1865, decided that each diocese should decide for itself whether to
remain in union with the General Council (of the Confederate States)
or to withdraw and unite with the General Convention (of the United
States). A small party in the northern church wanted "to keep the
southern churchman out for a while in the cold," and ''to put the
rebels upon stools of repentance," but better feehng and better pol-
icy prevailed. The southern church was met halfway by the northern
church, and the only important reunion of churches separated by sec-
tional strife was accomphshed. The diocese of Alabama was the
last to join, Bishop Wilmer making the declaration of conformity
January 31, 1866.^
1 Whitaker, p. i86 ; Mobile Register^ Jan, 9, 1866 ; Montgomery Mail, Jan. 19, 1866.
'^ Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 25; Wilmer, pp. 147-152 ; Whitaker, pp. 189-194;
Perry, Vol. II, p. 328 et seq. The northern conferences of the Methodist Protestant
Church returned in 187710 the southern organization. See " Statistics of Churches,"
p. 566.
PART IV
PRESIDENTIAL RESTORATION
/
CHAPTER VIII
FIRST PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Sec. I. Theories of Reconstruction
Owing to the important bearing upon the problem of Reconstruc-
tion of the disputes between the President and Congress in regard
to the status of the seceded states, it will be of interest to examine
the various plans and theories for restoring the Union. From the
beginning of the war the question of the status of the seceded states
was discussed both in Congress and out, and with the close of the war
it became of the gravest importance. There was nothing in the
Constitution to guide the President or Congress, though each sought
to base a pohcy on that ancient instrument. Many questions con-
fronted them. Were the states in the Union or out ? If in the Union,
what rights had they? If out of the Union, were they conquered
territories subject to no law but the will of the United States govern-
ment, or were they United States territory with rights under the
Constitution ? Must they be reconstructed or restored, and who was
to begin the movement — the people of the states. Congress, or the
President ? Were the states in their corporate capacity, or the people
as individuals, responsible for secession ? What punishment was to
be inflicted, and on whom or what must it fall — the people or the
states? Who or what decides who are the political people of the
state ? Exactly what was a state ? Was the Union the old Union of
Washington, or a new one? Congress and the President could
never agree in their answers to these questions.^
Conservative Theories
As to the status of the seceded states and the proper method of
Reconstruction, all interested persons had theories, but the only one
which was logical and consistent with regard to the ** Constitution
^ See Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. X, p. 562.
333
334 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
as it was" was the so-called Southern theory. This theory was that
secession having failed, state sovereignty was at an end ; the doctrine
was worthless; secession was a nuUity, and therefore the states
were not out of the Union; the state was indestructible. The war
was prosecuted against individuals and not against states, and the
consequences must fall upon individuals ; the states had all the rights
they ever possessed, but, being out of their proper relation to the
Union, its officers must take the oath of allegiance to the United
States government, representatives must be sent to Congress, and the
people must submit to the authority of the government. Then the
Union would be restored as it was.* At the fall of the Confederacy
the general behef was that restoration would proceed along these
lines. Many of the higher officials of the United States army were
of the same opinion, and on this theory the celebrated Johnston-
Sherman convention was drawn up by General Sherman, which
promised amnesty to the people and recognition of the state govern-
ments as soon as the officials should have taken the oath of allegiance.^
Likewise, in the Southwest, General Dick Taylor, with the approval
of General Canby, advised the governors of the states in his depart-
ment to take steps toward restoring their states to their former rela-
tions to the Union. General Thomas, and perhaps General Grant,
had hkewise advised the people of north Alabama, and the subordi-
nate Federal commanders in the Southwest favored such reconstruc-
tion and were incHned to help along the movement. But orders
from Washington put an end to any such course by directing the
arrest of all state officials who endeavored to act. Among those who
had taken steps to restore the former relations with the Union were
the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida.^
The Presidential and Democratic theories, hke the Southern
theory, were based on the doctrine of the indestructibility of the state.
In the beginning the Democratic theory would have recognized the
state governments of the seceded states and thus practically coin-
cided with the later Southern theory. The Presidential theory, as
formulated later, would not have recognized the state governments,
1 See Dunning, " Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction," pp. 100-103.
2 McPherson, "Reconstruction," pp. 121, 122, 504, 505.
' Taylor, " Destruction and Reconstruction " ; Report of Joint Committee on Recon-
struction, Pt. Ill, pp. 15, 60.
CONSERVATIVE THEORIES
335
and to this view the Democrats came after the war. The Union was
indestructible and was composed of indestructible states. To assert
that the states as states were not in the Union was to admit the success
of secession and the dissolution of the Union. But the people as
insurgents were incapable of political recognition by the United States
government. So the state after the war was in a condition of sus-
pended animation: the so-called state governments were not gov-
ernments in a constitutional sense; the President could have the
citizens tried for treason and punished, or he could pardon them and
thus restore to them all their former rights, which, of course, included
the right to reestabhsh their governments and to resume their former
relations with the Union. Congress had no power to interfere or to
disfranchise any man, nor to regulate the suffrage in any way. Its
only part in Reconstruction was to admit to Congress the represen-
tatives of the states as soon as constitutional government was re-
stored by the people with the assistance of the President.^
The earhest legislative declaration touching this subject was in
the Crittenden Resolutions passed by the House of Representatives
on July 22, i86i.^ Two days later practically the same resolutions
were introduced in the Senate by Andrew Johnson of Tennessee and
passed with only five dissenting voices.^ They declared that "war
is not waged upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any
purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor for the purpose of over-
throwing or interfering with the rights or estabhshed institutions
of these states, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution with all the dignity, equahty, and rights of the several
states unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accom-
plished, the war ought to cease." * To this declaration of principles
the Democratic party adhered throughout the war and after. The
Union as it was must be restored and maintained, one and indivisible.*
President Lincoln had no such regard for the ''sacred rights
of a state" as had the Democrats and his successor, Andrew Johnson.
In his inaugural address he asserted that the Union existed before
the states and was perpetual; that no state could withdraw from the
Union; that secession was null and void; and that the Union was
1 See Dunning, " Essays," pp. 103-104. ^ with only two dissenting votes.
* Some of these were southerners who were about to withdraw.
* Cong. Globe, July 22, 24, 25, 1861. ^ Cong. Globe, Dec. 5, 1862.
336 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
unbroken/ In the formation of the provisional governments by th(
aid of the military authorities in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Louisiana,
Lincoln showed that he expected the pohtical institutions of 1861 to
be restored. In December, 1863, be brought forth this plan for
restoration: When one-tenth of the voting population of a state in
1 86 1 should take an oath to support the Constitution and should
establish a government on the basis of the state constitution and laws
in 1 86 1, such a government would be recognized as the government
of the state.^ In July, 1864, he announced by proclamation that he
was unwilling to commit himself formally to any fixed plan of resto-
ration. This was in answer to the Wade- Davis bill passed by Con-
gress, which, if approved, would set aside the governments he had
erected in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, and it showed that
he considered it the prerogative of the executive to bring about and
recognize the restored government.^ These restored states he ex-
pected to take their places in the Union on the old terms, ^ for as soon
as the people submitted and civil governments were estabhshed,
constitutional relations would be resumed, and Congress would be
obliged to admit their representatives.^ Early in the war, he said
nothing about abolition, but rather to the contrary. Later he ad-
vocated gradual and compensated emancipation by state action.
At the close of the war, after the practical, if not the theoretical,
abolition of slavery, he suggested that the newly established govern-
ments might, as a measure of expediency, confer the privilege of voting
upon the best negroes.® He considered the matter of the suffrage
beyond the control of the central government. The enfranchise-
ment of the negro as a measure of revenge, and as a means of keeping
the southern whites down and the Republican party in power, never
entered his thoughts.
President Johnson succeeded to the policy of Lincoln, or, at
least, to Lincoln's belief that restoration was a matter for the execu-
tive attention, not for the legislative. He asserted that secession
1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, pp. 5-12.
2 Proclamation, Dec. 8, 1863, in Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI,
p. 213.
3 Proclamation, July 8, 1864, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 223.
* Lincoln to Reverdy Johnson, Nicolay and Hay, p. 349.
^ Nicolay and Hay, Vol. IX, p. 457; Vol. X, p. 123.
6 Nicolay and Hay, Vol. VIII, p. 434.
Andrew Johnson.
Charles Sumner.
THADDEUS Stevens.
RECONSTRUCTION LEADERS.
CONSERVATIVE THEORIES 337
was null and void from the beginning; that a state could not commit
treason; that by the attempted revolution the vitaHty of the state
was impaired and its functions suspended but not destroyed; that
it was the duty of the executive to breathe into the inanimate state
the hfe-giving breath of the Constitution. He recognized no power
in Congress to pass laws preHminary to or restricting the admission
of duly quahfied representatives of the states/
The plan of Lincoln was, in theory and at first in practice, objec-
tionable. It would recognize as the poHtical people of a state the
loyal minority, which would be an oligarchy, and the principle of
the rule of majorities would thus be repudiated. Those who claimed
to be loyal were not promising material for a new poHtical people,
and the "10 per cent" governments were treated with just contempt.
But the plan was based, not on any narrow principle of legahty, but
on the broader grounds of justice and expediency, and was capable
of expansion into a very different plan from what it was in the begin-
ning. As applied to Louisiana and Arkansas, it was severely, and in
theory justly, criticised on the ground that the President was assuming
absolute authority in dealing with the seceded states, and that by this
plan the entire political power would be given to a small class not
capable of using it. As later modified, his plan would have admitted
to participation in Reconstruction nearly or quite all the citizens
of the southern states.
President Johnson, a war Democrat, gave promise of being more
harsh than Lincoln in the work of restoration. Lincoln's poHcy was
based on expediency; Johnson's, on the narrow legal principles of a
State Rights Democrat. He had a strong regard for the "sacred
rights of a state." He proposed to reestablish the state governments
by means of a pohtical people of the lower classes, and the old political
leaders were to be disfranchised. Lincoln imposed certain condi-
tions on individuals as a prerequisite to participation in reconstruc-
tion. Having created by the pardoning power a political people,
he expected the initiative to come from them. The executive then
retired into the background and waited the impulse of the people.
He shrank from interfering with the states, not from any great respect
for their rights, but from motives of policy. As Johnson applied
his theory, there was little initiative left to the people. The exccu-
1 Message, Dec. 4, 1865, in Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 379.
338 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
tive authority as the source of power set the machinery of restoration
in motion, and the people were obhged to do as he ordered, many of
them being at first excluded from participation. The whole pro-
gramme was prescribed by him, and he watched every step of the prog-^
ress made. For a firm behever in the rights of states he took strange'
liberties with them while restoring their suspended animation. Lin-
coln advised a limited suffrage for the blacks ; but negroes could have
no part in the Johnson scheme. Like Lincoln, however, Johnson
so modified his plan that practically all the white people were to take
part in the reestabhshment of the government. The conservative
theories contemplated restoration, not reconstruction.
Radical Theories
The Republican majority in Congress soon advanced from the
position taken in the Crittenden- Johnson resolutions. Most of the
Republican party had no fixed opinions in regard to Reconstruction,
but formed a kind of a centre or swamp between the Democrats
and the President on the one extreme, and the Radicals on the other.
The plan of Lincoln, as first announced and appHed, was offensive
to all parties, and some leaders never seem to have recognized that the
President had, to any appreciable degree, modified his poHcy. The
extreme Radicals were not sorry to have the matter of reconstruction
fall from the hands of the wise and kind Lincoln into those of the
narrow and vindictive Johnson. But the seeming defection of the
latter soon disappointed those who were in favor of harsh measures
in deahng with the defeated southerners. The best-known of the
Radical theories advanced in opposition to the presidential policy
were (i) the State Suicide theory of Charles Sumner, (2) the Con-
quered Province theory of Thaddeus Stevens, and (3) the Forfeited
Rights theory, practically the same as the Conquered Province theory,
but expressed in less definite language for the benefit of the more
timid members of the RepubHcan party.
Charles Sumner, the Radical leader of the Senate, set forth
the Suicide theory in a series of resolutions to the effect that the ordi-
nances of secession were void, and, when sustained by force, amounted
to abdication by the state of all constitutional rights ; that the treason
involved worked instant destruction of the body politic, and the state
1
RADICAL THEORIES 339
became territory under the exclusive control of Congress. Con-
sequently, there were no state governments in the South, and all
pecuHar institutions had ceased to exist — among them slavery.
Sumner constantly asserted that Congress now had exclusive juris-
diction over the southern territory.^ He made strong objection to
the despotic power of the President as apphed in dealing with the
seceded states, and declared that the executive was encroachin<y
upon the sphere of Congress, which was the proper authority to
organize the new governments. The seceded states, he affirmed, by
breaking the constitutional compact had committed suicide, and no
longer had corporate existence, and that the "loyaHsts," who were
few in number, should not have the power formerly possessed by
all. The whole South was a ''tabular rasa," "a clean slate," upon
which Congress might write the laws.^ The existence of slavery
was declared to be incompatible with a republican form of govern-
ment, which it was the duty of Congress to establish. For it is
necessary to such a form of government that there be absolute
equality before the law, suffrage for all, education for all, the choice
of ''loyal" citizens for office, and the exclusion of "rebels." The
negro must take part in Reconstruction, for his vote would be needed
to support the cause of human rights and "the party of the Union"
— meaning, of course, the Republican party.^
Sumner cared httle for the Constitution except for the clause
about guaranteeing a republican form of government to the states,
and on this he based the power of Congress to act. The Declaration
of Independence was to him the supreme law and above the Consti-
tution, and to make the government conform to that document was
his aim. He wearied his colleagues with his continual harping on
the Declaration of Independence as the fundamental law, upon which
footing the seceded states must return. That, he declared, would
destroy slavery and all inequality of rights, political and civil.*
The Conquered Province theory was originated by Thaddeus
Stevens, the Radical leader of the House of Representatives, who,
however, refused to call it a theory. He made no attempt to har-
monize his plan with the Constitution, and frankly expressed his
1 Cong. Globe, Feb. ii, 1862. ^ Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1863.
» Globe, Feb. 25, 1865, and Dec. 4, 1865. See Henry Adams, " Historical Essays."
* Speeches in the Globe, 1 865-1 867.
340 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
opinion that there was nothing in the Constitution providing for sucl
an emergency; that the laws of war alone should govern the action
of Congress, allowing no constitutions to interfere/ It was impos-
sible to execute the Constitution in the seceded states, he said, which
the victors must treat "as conquered provinces and settle them with
new men and exterminate or drive out the present rebels as exiles
from this country." ^ Every inch of the soil of the southern states
should be held for the costs of the war, to pay damages to the "loyal"
citizens and pensions to soldiers and their famihes, and slavery should
be abolished.^ Secession, according to Stevens, was so far success-
ful that the southern states were out of the Union and the people had
no constitutional rights/ All ties were broken by the war. The
states in their corporate capacities made war, and were out of the
Union so far as the conqueror might choose to consider them, and
must come back into the Union as new states or remain as conquered
provinces with no rights except such as the conqueror might choose
to grant. Perpetual ascendency of the North must be secured by
giving the ballot to the negro, by confiscation, and by banishment.
The Constitution, in his opinion, had been torn to atoms ; it was now
a "bit of worthless parchment," and there could be no reconstruction
on the basis of that instrument. Congress had absolute jurisdiction
over the whole question.^ Stripped of its violence, Stevens's theory
was probably the correct one from the point of view of pubHc law.
It was more in accord with historical facts. It recognized the great
changes wrought by war in the structure of the government. It was
frank, expHcit, and practical. Unfortunately, the statesmanship
necessary to carry to success such a plan was entirely lacking in its
supporters.
Sumner would limit the authority of Congress only by the pro-
visions of the Declaration of Independence; Stevens would have
Congress unchecked by any law. By martial law and the law of
nations, he meant no law at all, as his utterances show ; nothing must
stand in the way of the absolute powers of Congress. Both theories
agreed in reducing the states to a territorial status. Sumner would
1 Globe, Aug. 2, i86i. 2 Qiojjg^ jan. 8, 1863.
8 Globe, Jan. 22, 1864. * Globe, Jan. 8, 1863.
^ GlobeyTitc.. 4, 1865, March 10, 1866; Taylor, "Destruction and Reconstruction,'*
p. 244.
EARLY ATTEiMPTS AT RESTORATION 34I
leave the people of these states the rights of people in the United
States territories. Stevens would deny that they had any such rights
whatever under any law, but that they were to be considered con-
quered foes, with their Hves, Hberty, and property at the mercy of
the conqueror/
The Forfeited Rights theory, patched up to suit the more timid
Radicals who would not concede that the states had succeeded in
getting outside of the Union or that they could be destroyed, was,
in effect, the Stevens theory, though recognizing some kind of a sur-
vival of the states. The names and boundaries of the states alone
survived ; the poHtical institutions were entirely destroyed, and must
be reconstructed by Congress.
It is a waste of time to try to find a basis in the old Constitution
for any of the theories advanced. If a legal basis must be had, it
will have to be found in the Constitution as revolutionized by seventy-
five years of development and four years of war. The main purposes
of the congressional plans were to reduce the late dictatorial powers
of the President, to remove forever from poHtical power the poHtical
leaders of the South, to give the ballot to the negro as a measure of
revenge and to assure the continuation in power of the Republican
party.^
Owing to the fact that Congress was not in session for several
months after the downfall of the Confederacy, the President had a
good opportunity to put into operation the executive plan for restoring
the southern states to their proper standing in the Union.
Sec. 2. Presidential Plan in Operation
Early Attempts at Restoration
In the early spring of 1865, Governor Watts, in a speech calHng
upon the people to make renewed exertions against the invader,
said: **We hold more territory than a year ago, more of Texas,
Louisiana, and Arkansas, Georgia is overrun but is ready to rise.
Our financial condition is better than four years ago. Arms, com-
^ See also Dunning, " Essays," pp. 106-108.
2 See Dunning, " Essays," pp. 99-112 ; Texas versus White (1869), 7 Wallace 700;
Scott, " Reconstruction during the Civil War " ; McCarthy, " Lincoln's Plan of Recon-
struction"; Burgess, "Reconstruction and the Constitution," pp. l-l^Z'
342 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
missary and quartermaster's stores are more abundant now."^ Bui
there were no more men. A month later Lee had started on the
march to Appomattox ; two months later Dick Taylor was surrender-
ing the last Confederate armies east of the Mississippi ; three months
later the war governors of Alabama were in northern prisons, and not
a vestige of the Confederate or state governments remained. There
was no government.
Even before the collapse of the Confederacy there were indica-
tions of an approaching revolution in the state government, to be
carried out by the union of all discontented factions. The object
was to gain control of the state government or to organize a new one
and return to the Union. This movement was strongest in north
Alabama and was supported and encouraged by the Federal miHtary
authorities. One of the disaffected clique testified before the Sub-
committee on Reconstruction that in the last years of the war a "Re-
construction" or ** Union" party was organized in Alabama, which,
at the time of the surrender, had a majority in the lower house of
the legislature.^ But the Senate, elected in 1861, held over and pre-
vented any action by the House. During the year 1865 the "Union"
party hoped to secure both the governorship and the Senate in the
first elections which were to occur under the new constitution, and
thus secure control of the state. But the invasion and surrender
stopped the movement.^
There were indications during the winter and spring of 1865
that Reconstruction movements were going on in the northern half
of the state. After the invasion of the state in April many people
more influential than the ordinary peace party men began to think
of Reconstruction. General Thomas authorized the citizens of Mor-
gan, Marshall, Lawrence, and the neighboring counties to organize
a civil government based on the Alabama laws of 186 1. J. J. Giers,
a brother-in-law of State Senator Patton (later governor), was sent
by the miHtary leaders to "reorganize civil law." Thomas invited
1 N. V. Times, April 4, 1865. 2 Elected in 1863.
8 Testimony of M. J. Saffold, Report Joint Committee, 1866, Pt. Ill, p. 60. The
" union " men greatly exaggerated the strength of the " union " sentiment in the state
during the war and their individual part in the peace movement. This vt^as neces-
sary in order to secure recognition as representatives of a strong " union " element.
When the plan of the President was so modified as to leave them in their natural position
of no influence, they became very bitter against it and played the martyr act to perfection.
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT RESTORATION 343
the people of the other northern counties to do Hkewise and thus show
that they were ''forced into rebellion." Colonel Patterson of the
Fifth Alabama Cavalry accepted the terms for his forces, and Giers
stated that Roddy's men were so pleased with Thomas's letter that
they released their prisoners and stopped fighting. A Reconstruction
meeting was held at Somerville, Morgan County, and was largely
attended by soldiers. This was early in April. ^ In the central and
southern portions of the state the movement did not begin until the
Federal forces traversed the country. General Steele with the second
army of invasion reported from Montgomery, May i, 1865, that J.
J. Seibels, L. E. Parsons, and J. C. Bradley^ had approached him
and had told him that two-thirds of the people of the state would take
up arms to "put down the rebels."^ A meeting was held at Selma,
in Dallas County, on May 10, and called upon the governor to con-
vene the legislature and take the state back into the Union. Judge
Byrd,* one of the speakers, said that the war had decided two things
— slavery and the right of secession — and both against the South.
He counselled a spirit of conciliation and moderation, and in this he
expressed the general sentiment of the people.^
A more important meeting was held the next day in Montgomery.
A number of the more prominent politicians met to take steps to place
the state in the way of readmission to the Union.® George Reese ^
of Chambers County presided over the meeting and Albert Roberts
was secretary. Seibels introduced resolutions, which were adopted,
pledging to the United States government earnest and zealous coop-
eration in the work of restoring the state of Alabama to its proper
relation with the Union at the earliest possible moment. The murder
1 Testimony of J. J. Giers, Report Joint Committee, Pt. Ill, p. 15 ; O. R., Ser. I,
Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, pp. 473, 485, 505, 506.
2 See pp. 143-148. 8 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, p. 560.
* Judge Byrd was elected to the Supreme Court in 1865. He was a distant relative
of Colonel William Byrd, of Westover, Va., Esq. Brewer, p. 224.
6 General C. C. Andrews, in O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, R. II, p. 727; N. Y. Com-
mercial Advertiser, May 27, 1865 ; N. Y. Tribune, June 2, 1865.
« There were present : Ex-Gov. John G. Shorter, M. A. Baldwin (Attorney-General,
Brewer, p. 445), W. B. Bell, A. B. Clitherall (Brewer, p. 479), all of whom had been
ardent secessionists, and L. E. Parsons (see p. 143), Col. J. C. Bradley, Col. J. J.
Seibels (Brewer, p. 459; see p. 143), W. J. Bibb, J. G. Struther, M. J. Saffold (Brewer,
p. 215), George Goldthwaite (Brewer, p. 451, A. and I. General). It was a fairly rep-
resentative body of government officials and " stay-at-homes."
■^ Garrett, p. 166. Reese was a " Union " man.
344 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of Lincoln and the attempt on the Hfe of Seward were condemned
as ''acts of infamous diabohsm revolting to every upright heart."
The bad effect the crime would have on political matters was deplored.
The desire was expressed that all guilty of participation in the attempt
might be brought to speedy and condign punishment, and "we shall
hold as enemies all who sympathize with the perpetrators of the foul
deed." The majority reported a memorial to the President asking
him to permit the governor of Alabama to convene the legislature,
which would call a convention in order to restore the state to her
political relations to the United States. This they believed was the
most speedy method. But if this were not permitted, then the Presi-
dent was requested to appoint a military governor from among the
most prominent and influential ''loyal" men of the state and invest
him with the power to call a convention. They were encouraged to
ask this, the memorial stated, by the recent statement of the President
of the principle that the states which attempted to secede were still
states, and not being able to secede would not be lost in territorial
or other division. "To forever put an end to the doctrine of secession ;
to restore our state to her former relations to the Union under the
Constitution and the laws thereof; to enable her to resume the
respiration of her life's breath in the Union, — is a work in which we
in good faith pledge you our earnest and zealous cooperation, and we
hazard nothing in the assurance that the people of Alabama will
concur with us with a majority approaching almost unanimity."
Colonel J. C. Bradley presented a memorial from the minority
of the committee. It was the same as the other memorial, except that
the part relating to the appointment of a military governor was
omitted. Such an official was not desired nor needed, he stated.
After some discussion both memorials were adopted and each person
present signed the one he preferred. The chairman appointed a
committee to bear the memorials to the President. The general
sentiment of the meeting and of the people seemed to be that, since
they had failed to maintain their independence, there was nothing
left to do but to accept as a working basis the theory that a state
could not secede, and to get straight into the Union by having the
President restore the suspended animation of the Constitution, The
best and shortest way, they thought, was for Governor Watts to con-
vene the legislature, which should begin the work, and a convention
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT RESTORATION 345
of the people would complete it. Governor Watts and the Supreme
Court (Stone and Phelan) approved the action of the meeting, though
they took no part in it.^
Another meeting on the same day (May 11), at Guntersville,
in Marshall County, in the heart of the devastated section of the state,
proposed to submit cheerfully to the decision of war and return to
the Union. Two soldiers. Major A. C. Baird and Colonel J. L.
Sheffield,^ were the leaders in the meeting.^ Two mass-meetings were
held in Covington County (one at Andalusia on May 17) and passed
resolutions favoring a restoration of the Union. The Union General
Asboth said that these people had returned to their allegiance early
in April and had organized and armed to resist the "rebels." The
resolutions were signed by 280 and 376 persons respectively. Asboth
reported great excitement on account of the action taken by the meet-
ing."* On May 23 there was a meeting of citizens in FrankHn County.
James W. Ligon was president, H. C. Tompkins, vice-president,
and R. B. Lindsey (goveriior in 1870-1872) addressed the meeting.
This meeting seems to have been behind the times, for it accepted
the overtures of Thomas made April 13, and promised to assist cheer-
fully in restoring law and order. They were anxious to resume
former friendly relations to the United States and wanted a state
convention called to settle matters.^
About this time the President, General Grant, and Stanton, by
repeated orders, managed to reach the generals who were encouraging
the movement toward Reconstruction, and put an end to their plans
by ordering them not to recognize the state government in Alabama
and to prevent the assembly of the legislature.® Thereupon, on
1 N. Y. Commercial Advertiser, May 27, 1865 ; N. Y. Tribune, June 2, 1865 ;
Montgomery Mail, May 12, 1865. The members of the committee which went to
Washington were: Joseph C. Bradley, L. E. Parsons, M. J. Saffold, Lewis Owen,
George S. Houston, James Birney, W. J. Bibb, John M. Sutherlin, Albert Roberts, Luke
Pryor. None of the committee had been secessionists. Reese had been a "Union"
man, Saffold a "political agent." W. J. Bibb had made a visit to Washington during
the war and had a consultation with Lincoln. Parsons was a " Union " man. Houston
and Pryor (see Brewer, pp. 324, 326) were neither " Union " nor " secessionist," but
■" constitutional." The others were unknown to public life.
2 Formerly colonel of the 48th Alabama Infantry.
8 N. Y. Daily News, May 29, 1865. * O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, p. 826.
6 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, p. 971.
« O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, pp. 810, 854, 877.
346 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
May 23, a memorial was signed by 106 prominent citizens of Mobile,
asking the President to take steps to enable Alabama to be restored
to the Union. Robert H. Smith ^ and Percy Walker ^ were sent as
a committee to General Granger, who commanded in the city, to
ask him to transmit the memorial to the President. General Granger
did so with the indorsement that no impediment existed to immediate
restoration, that the signers were influential men and represented
the sentiment of the people of the state.^ At Athens, in Limestone
County, the citizens met and adopted resolutions declaring that all
must be restored to the Union ; that the state officials should be recog-
nized, but that a new election should be held under the laws of Alabama
as they were before secession; that a convention was not necessary
and in the present unsettled condition of the county it would be
dangerous to hold one; that the constitution of 181 9, changed by
amendment, should be used. The murder of Lincoln was deplored.*
Similar meetings were held all over the state, especially in north
Alabama.^
The "loyal" element held a meeting in north Alabama about the
first of June.® Resolutions were introduced by K. B. SeawcU to
the effect that the government of Alabama had been illegally set
aside in 1861 by a combination of persons regardless of the best
interests of the state, that secession was not the act of the people,
and that the Confederacy was a usurpation. It was decided that
Alabama must go back to the Union, and the authority of the United
States was invoked to enable "loyal" citizens to form a state gov-
ernment.' The sentiments of the more violent "unionists" or tories
may be understood from a letter of D. H. Bingham,* then at West
Point, New York. He said that reconstruction must not be com-
1 Member of Congress, Confederate colonel of the 36th Alabama, former Whig.
Brewer, p. 425.
2 Former Whig, Adjutant and Inspector-General during the war. Brewer, p. 397.
8 N. Y. Herald, June 15, 1865.
* A'". Y. IVorld, June 13, 1865. The absence of the old names in all these move-
ments is noticeable. The old leaders had been strongly in favor of the Confederacy and
now took back seats while smaller men came forward. They never came into power again.
^ Huntsville Advocate, July 19, 1865.
6 In one of the mountain counties, but the exact location was never named in any
of the accounts of the convention.
7 N. Y. Herald, June 17, 1865.
^ He represented Talladega in the convention of 1867.
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT RESTORATION 347
mitted to the hands of the "rebels"; that Parsons, who was spoken
of for provisional governor, was not one of the ''union" men of Ala-
bama and would use his influence to secure control to the old slave
dynasty; that his appointment would be unfair to the ''union"
men; that the masses were coerced and deluded into fighting the
battles of slavery; "I, George W. Lane,* and J. H. Larcombe," he
said, "never gave way to secession." The non-slaveholding whites
in slaveholding districts were trained to obey, he wrote, and the offi-
cial class used its influence to keep the non- slaveholders in ignorance.
Hence the small number of slaveholders (of whom most were owners
of few slaves and hence were union men) controlled the "union"
population of over 5,000,000. He said that the Alabama delegates,
then in Washington,^ were not inactive in producing these results,
though they claimed to be "unionists." They were once "union"
men, but went over. Now they alleged that they were carried into
rebellion by a great wave of pubHc feeling. Such men should not be
trusted until they had passed through a probationary state.^
The southerners who wanted immediate restoration of constitu-
tional rights and privileges on the basis of the Crittenden Resolution
of 1861,^ soon found that this plan would not work; so, to make the
best of a bad situation, all accepted the Johnson plan and declared
that the state, since it had not had the right to secede, must still be in
the Union. The press and the prominent men, even those who would
be disfranchised by the President's plan, gave it a hearty support
in order to give peace to the land and restore civil government.^
At this time the Johnson plan promised to be one of merciless pro-
scription of the prominent men. As Johnson himself expressed it:
"The American people must be made to understand the nature of
the crime, the length, the breadth, the depth, and height of treason.
For the thousands who were driven into the infernal rebellion there
1 See above, p. 125.
2 Parsons, Bradley, Houston, Nicholas Davis, Pryor, Saffold, Bibb, Roberts, etc.
8 Letter in N. Y. Herald,]\xne 17, 1865.
* See McPherson, " Rebellion," p. 286.
^ The Mobile Register and Advertiser (John Forsyth, editor) supported the Presi-
dent's policy: "The states were never out of the Union" — July 18, 1865. The Hunts-
ville Advocate, July 19, said, "The presidential policy is simple, direct, and emphatic."
Henry W. Hilliard, General Cullen A. Battle, Ex-Governors Shorter, Moore, Watts, and
Fitzpatrick declared that there would be no opposition but a hearty effort " to get
straight."
348 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
should be amnesty, conciliation, clemency, and mercy. For the
leaders, justice — the penalty and the forfeit should be paid. The
people must understand that treason is the blackest of crimes and
must be punished." ^ The leaders were not afraid of such threats
and meant not to stand in the way. The people intended to make
the best they could out of a bad state of affairs. They believed then
and always that their cause was right, secession justifiable and neces-
sary ; that the provocation was great, and that they were the aggrieved
party; that the abolitionists and fanatics forced secession and civil
war. But since they were beaten in war, after they had done all
that men could do, they meant to accept the result and abide by the
decision of the sword. There was a general purpose to stand by the
government — certainly no dream of opposition to it. The people
meant (which was neither treasonable nor unreasonable) to ally them-
selves to the more conservative political party in the North in order
to secure as many advantages as possible to the South. Their aim
was to preserve as much of their old constitution as they could, all the
while recognizing that state sovereignty and slavery ended with the
war. Their course in ceasing at once all useless opposition and pro-
ceeding to secure reinstatement on the old terms was. The Nation
declared, *'a display of consummate political abihty." Southerners
like to think that had Lincoln lived his plan would have succeeded,
and that the most shameful chapter of American history would not
have to be written.^ Johnson helped to ruin his own cause and his
supporters along with it. The people never seem to have taken
seriously the proposed merciless plans of Johnson, and the opposi-
tion of moderate advisers and the pleasure of pardoning southern
"aristocrats" (and later Radical criticism) caused a distinct modi-
fication of his poHcy in the direction of mildness until the proscriptive
part was almost lost sight of.^
The southern leaders^ saw clearly that there was no hope for their
party unless the President could win the fight against the Radicals
1 Lilian Foster, "Andrew Johnson: Services and Speeches," pp. 199, 210, "Address
to Loyal Southerners," April, 1865.
2 There is little reason to believe that Lincoln could have succeeded in the struggle
with Congress.
^ See Foster, " Andrew Johnson," for change of feeling in Johnson as expressed in
his speeches in 1865 and 1866.
* " President Tamers " the Radicals called them.
THE PRESIDENT BEGINS RESTORATION 349
in Congress, and they attempted to disarm northern hostihty outside
Congress until the Radical party, aided by the rash conduct of the
President, educated the people of the North to the proper point for
approving drastic measures/
The President begins Restoration
On May 29 the President began his attempt at restoration by pro-
claiming amnesty to all, except certain specified classes of persons.
They were pardoned and therefore restored to all rights of property,
except in slaves, on condition that the following oath be taken: —
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) in the presence of Al-
mighty God, that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States, and the Union of the states thereunder ; and
that I will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all laws and procla-
mations which have been made during the existing rebellion, with reference to
the emancipation of slaves : So help me God." ^
Fourteen classes of people were excluded from the benefits of this
proclamation ; of these twelve were affected in Alabama : —
(i) The civil or diplomatic officers, or domestic or foreign agents of the Con-
federacy ; (2) those who left judicial positions under the United States to aid the
Confederacy ; (3) all above the rank of colonel in the army and lieutenant in the
navy ; (4) those who left seats in the United States Congress and aided the Con-
federacy ; (5) those who resigned commissions in the United States army and
navy to escape service against the Confederacy ; (6) persons who went abroad
to aid the Confederacy in a private capacity ; (7) graduates of the naval and
military academies who were in the Confederate service ; (8) the war governors
of Confederate states ; (9) those who left the United States to aid the Con-
federacy; (10) Confederate sailors (considered as pirates) ; (11) all in confine-
ment as prisoners of war or for other offences; (12) those who supported the
Confederacy and whose taxable property was over $20,000.
The classes excluded embraced practically all Confederate and
state officials, for the latter had acted as Confederate agents, all the
old political leaders of the state, many of the ablest citizens who had
not been in politics but had attained high position under the Con-
federate government or in the army, the whole of the navy, — officers
and men, — several thousand prisoners of war, a number of political
1 McCuUoch, p. 517 and Preface; Nation, Oct. 26, 1865; Mayes, "L. Q. C.
Lamar" ; Reid, "After the War," pp. 404, 405, 578 ; Mobile Register and Advertiser,
July 18, 1865 ; Huntsville Advocate, July 18, 1865.
2 McPherson, p. 10 ; Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 310.
350 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAxMA
prisoners, and every person in the state whose property in 1861 was
assessed at $20,000 or more. According to the proclamation the
assessment was to be in 1865, but it was made on the basis of 1861,
at which time slaves were included and a slaveholder of very moderate
estate would be assessed at $20,000. In 1865 there were very few
people worth $20,000.
It was provided that persons belonging to these excepted classes
might make special application to the President for pardon, and the
proclamation promised that pardon should be freely granted.^ The
oath could be taken before any United States officer, civil, mihtary,
or naval, or any state or territorial civil or military officer, quahfied
to administer oaths.^ In Alabama 120 army officers were sent into
all the counties to administer the amnesty oath. These officers
were strict in barring out ''all improper persons" and subscription
went on slowly until the military commander issued orders that all
who were eligible must take the oath. Less than 50,000 persons
took the oath; 90,000 had voted in i860.
There was a fight for appointment to the provisional governor-
ship. William H. Smith of Randolph and D. C. Humphreys of
Madison, both of whom had opposed secession, then entered
the Confederate service, and later deserted; D. H. Bingham of
Limestone, who had been a tory during the war; and L. E. Par-
sons of Talladega, who had aided the Confederacy materially and
damned it spiritually — all wanted to oversee the restoration of the
state.^
June 21, 1865, the President, acting as commander-in-chief
of the army and under the clause in the Constitution requiring the
United States to guarantee to each state a repubUcan form of gov-
ernment and protect each state against invasion and domestic vio-
lence,* proceeded to breathe the breath of life into the prostrate state
by appointing Lewis E. Parsons provisional governor.®
1 McPherson, p. lo,
2 G. O., Nos. 5, 13, and 14, Department of Alabama, 1865.
* A^. V. Herald, June 21, 1865 ; Brewer and Garret, sub. nom.
* Article II, section 2 : Article IV, section 4.
^ Lewis Eliphalet Parsons, born 181 7, Boone County, New York, was the son of a
farmer and the grandson of the celebrated Jonathan Edwards. He came to Alabama
in 1840 and practised law in Talladega, was a Whig, later a Douglas Democrat, and
on both sides during the war. See above, p. 143.
THE PRESIDENT BEGINS RESTORATION 351
It was made the duty of Parsons to call a convention of delegates
chosen by the "loyal" ^ people of the state. This convention v/as to
amend or alter the state constitution to suit the changed state of
affairs, to exercise all the powers necessary to enable the people to
restore the state to its constitutional relations with the central
authority, and to set up a repubhcan form of government. All
voters and delegates must have taken the oath of amnesty, and must
have the qualifications for voters prescribed by the Alabama consti-
tution and laws prior to the secession of the state. This excluded
the fourteen proscribed classes and said nothing of the negroes.
The convention, when assembled, was to prescribe qualifications for
voters and for office holders. The military and naval officers of the
United States were directed to assist the provisional officials and to
refrain from hindering and discouraging them in any way. The
Secretary of State was directed to put in force in the state of Ala-
bama all laws of the United States, the administration of which be-
longed to the State Department. The Secretary of the Treasury
was directed to nominate assessors, collectors, and other treasury
officials, and to put into execution in Alabama the revenue laws of
the United States. The Postmaster- General was ordered to establish
post-offices and post routes and to enforce the postal laws. The
Attorney-General and the Federal judges were directed to open the
United States courts in the state. The Secretary of the Navy and
the Secretary of the Interior were ordered to put in execution the
regulations of their respective departments, so far as related to
Alabama.^
In making appointments to office in the southern states, the depart-
ments were to give preference to ** loyal" ^ persons of the district or
state where they were to serve. If no " loyal" persons could be found
in the state or district, such persons might be imported from other
states or districts.
In this measure the difference appears betv/een the Lincoln and
the Johnson plan of restoration. Lincoln beUeved that the executive
should only make things easy for the people to erect a government
for themselves. He kept as much as possible in the background
1 Here " loyal " seems to mean those who had taken the amnesty oath.
2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 323.
8 Those who could take the iron-clad test oath of 1862.
352 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and let it appear that the movement originated with the people.
Several times he merely suggested that negroes with certain quali-
fications should be granted the suffrage. Johnson, on the othei
hand, made it clear that he was the source of all authority in the
movement. He himself made stringent regulations of the suffrage^
thus creating a body of citizens, and set up a government of his own
for the purpose of creating a new state government. The people were
to do as he bade them. He did not suggest negro suffrage in any form
and was, like most southern Unionists, opposed to it. The Johnson
provisional government was a military government with the Presi-
dent as the source of authority. Parsons was a military governor
appointed by the commander-in-chief and paid by the War Depart-
ment.^ Lincoln's provisional government would have been popular
government based on election by the people.
The appointment of Parsons gave general satisfaction to all
parties except the more violent tory element in the northern part of
the state, who wanted men like D. H. Bingham or William H. Smith*
A correspondent of The Nation who travelled among them in August,
1865, when this element of the people seemed likely to form a strong
portion of the new ruling class of the South, before the President
modified his plans, said of them: they are ignorant and vindictive,
live in poor huts, drink much, and all use tobacco and snuff; they
want to organize and receive recognition by the United States govern-
ment in order to get revenge — really want to be bushwhackers
supported by the Federal government; they ''wish to have the
power to hang, shoot, and destroy in retaliation for the wrongs they
have endured"; they hate the "big nigger holders," whom they
accuse of bringing on the war and who, they are afraid, would
get into power again; they are the ''refugee," poor white element
of low character, shiftless, with no ambition.^ To proscribe the
mass of leading citizens, the experienced men in pubHc affairs, as
Johnson's plan at first promised to do, would have had serious
results, but his later, more liberal, poHcy restored the rights of all
except the more prominent. But the old leaders were never again
leaders, thinking it more politic to put forward less well-known men.
At first Johnson had the mountaineer's dislike of the "slave aris-
1 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 26, p. 97, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
2 James Redpath in The Nation, Aug. 17, 1865, condensed.
THE PRESIDENT BEGINS RESTORATION 353
tocracy," as he called it, and his plan was devised to humiliate and
ruin this class/
A month after his appointment Governor Parsons issued (July
20) a proclamation to the people, drawn largely from the census of
i860, showing how prosperous the state was at that time and inviting
attention to the present condition of affairs. The question of slavery
and secession, he said, had been decided against the South, but every
political and property right, except slavery, still remained. He
thus repudiated any former belief he may have had in the right of
secession. A funny comparison was made in exuberant language
and with many mixed metaphors, likening the Union to a steamship
and the state of Alabama to a man swimming around in the water,
trying to get on board. The following officers of the Confederate
state government who were in office on the 2 2d of May,^ 1865,
were reappointed to serve during the continuance of the provisional
government : justices of the peace, constables, members of common
councils, judges of courts, except probate, county treasurers, tax
collectors and assessors, coroners, and municipal officers. Judges
of probate and sheriffs who were in office on May 22 were directed
to take the amnesty oath and serve until others were appointed.
All officers reappointed were to take the amnesty oath and give new
bond. The right was reserved to remove any officer for disloyalty
or for misconduct in office. Thus there was a continuity between
the Confederate administration and the "restoration" administration.
The civil and criminal laws of the state as they stood on January
II, 1 86 1, except as to slavery, were declared in full force, and an
election of delegates to a constitutional convention was ordered for
August 31, and the convention was to meet on September 10.' No
one could vote in the election or be a candidate for election to the
convention who was not a legal voter according to the law on January
II, 1 86 1, and all voters and candidates must first take the amnesty
oath or must have been pardoned by the President. Instructions
were given as to how a person who was excluded from the bene-
fits of the amnesty proclamation might proceed in order to secure a
1 See Foster, "Andrew Johnson," pp. 199, 210, 214, 220, 250.
2 The 22d of May was the date when the Confederate state government ceased to
exist.
8 Garrett, p. 735, says Aug. 30 and Sept. 12. The convention met on Sept. 12.
354 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
pardon. A list of questions was appended by which ''an improper
person" might test his case and see how bad it was. They ran like
this : —
(i) Are you under arrest ? Why ? (2) Did you order, advise, or aid in
the taking of Fort Morgan and Mount Vernon ? (3) Have you served on any
" vigilance " committee for the purpose of trying cases of disloyalty to the Con-
federate States ? (4) Did you order any persons to be shot or hung for disloy-
alty to the Confederate States ? (5) Did you shoot or hang such a person ?
(6) Did you hunt such a person with dogs ? (7) Were you in favor of the
so-called ordinance of secession ? (8) You are not bound to answer any except
the first of these questions. (9) Will you be peaceable and loyal in the future ?
(10) Have proceedings been instituted against you under the Confiscation
Act ? (11) Have you in your possession any property of the United States?^
Parsons appointed to assist him a full staff of secretaries as fol-
lows : Wm. Garrett, Secretary of State ; M. A. Chisholm, Comptroller
of Accounts; L. P. Saxton, Treasurer; CoUins, Adjutant-Gen-
eral; M. H. Cruikshank, Commissioner for the Destitute; John B.
Taylor, Superintendent of Education.
A report on the condition of the treasury on September i, 1865,
shows that of $791,294 in the treasury on May 24, 1865, only $337
was in silver and $532 in gold. The rest was in state and Confederate
money, now worthless. The financial status of the provisional
treasury was uncertain. Receipts from July 20 to September 21,
1865, were $1766 and disbursements had been $1572. The bonded
debt of the state, held in London, was $1,336,000, in New York,
$2,109,000, a total of $3,445,000.^
Parsons could hardly do otherwise than reappoint the old state
officials as temporary officers, but it created some dissatisfaction in
the state and much in the North ; and in truth the Confederate state
officers in 1865 were not, in general, very efficient, being old men,
cripples, incapables, "bomb-proofs," "feather beds," and deadheads.
They were not much liked by any party unless perhaps by the few
who put them in office. The Huntsville Advocate may have been
voicing the objections of either "tory" or "rebel" when it condemned
Governor Parsons 's reappointment of the de facto state officers —
1 Parsons's Proclamation, July 20 (or 22), 1865; in JV. Y. Herald, July 26 and Aug.
II, 1865 ; Garrett, p. 735 ; McPherson, p. 21.
2 Parsons's Message to Convention, Sept. 21, 1865 ; Proclamation, July 20, 1865 ; in
N. Y. Herald, Aug. 11, 1865.
THE PRESIDENT BEGINS RESTORATION 355
''they are not the proper persons to rekindle the fires of patriotism
in the hearts of the people."^
The provisional governor was obliged to rely upon inferior ma-
terial in restoring the state government. Though the President's
plan soon was shorn of its worst proscriptive features, the work of
restoration had begun by excluding the natural leaders from a share
in the upbuilding of the state, and they were thus rendered somewhat
indifferent to the process. The class to whom the task fell was good,
but it was not the best. The best men went into the southern army
or otherwise committed themselves strongly to the cause of the Con-
federacy. The strong men of the state who sulked in their tents
during the war were few in numbers, and they were usually disgruntled
and cranky, and now, without influence, were much disliked by the
people. The so-called "union" men who stayed at home in "bomb-
proof" offices, or as teachers, overseers, ministers, etc., were not the
kind of men to reconstruct the shattered government. The few who
had openly espoused the Union cause had not the character, ex-
perience, and training necessary to fit them to rule a state. Though
the administration began on a basis of very inferior material, yet the
modification of the plan of the President gradually admitted the
second-rate leaders to poHtical privileges, and, had the experiment
continued, they would have gradually resumed control of the pohtics of
the state. It was in some degree the hope of this that made them willing
to submit to proscription and exclusion for a while and support the re-
construction measures of the President. They hoped for better times.^
Parsons revised the official fists thoroughly, and many of the old
officers were discharged and new ones appointed. However, they
had fittle to do ; the army and the Freedmen's Bureau usurped their
functions. A proclamation of August 19, 1865, directed the probate
judge, sheriff, and clerk in each county to destroy, after August 31,
old jury fists and make new ones from the fist of names of "loyal"
citizens who had taken the amnesty oath and registered. Circuit
court judges were directed to hold special sessions of court for the
trial of state cases and to have their grand juries inquire particularly
into the cases of cotton and horse steafing, now common crimes.''
^ Huntsville Advocate, Aug. 17, 1865.
2 See McCuUoch, p. 517 and passim; N. Y. Tribune, May 4, 1866; Mobilt
Times, April 25, 1866.
8 N. V. Herald, Sept. 3, 1865.
356 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
" Proscribing Proscription "
One of the principal occupations of the provisional government
v^as securing pardons for those who were excluded from the general
amnesty of May 29, 1865. Governor Parsons was for reconcihation,
and those who hoped to profit by the disfranchisement of the leaders
complained of the lenient treatment of the latter. Parsons 's poHcy
of "proscribing proscription" was greatly disliked by those who
would profit by disfranchisement. If it were continued, they saw
there would be no spoils for them. One of the aggrieved parties
related a case which might well have been his own: A prominent
"union" man went to the President to get his pardon, stating that
he had been as much a Union man as possible for the last four years.
"I am delighted to hear that," the President said. Directly the
*' union" man said that he had been forced to become somewhat
imphcated in the rebelHon, that he had been obliged to raise money
by selHng cotton to the Confederates, and, as he was worth over
$20,000, it was necessary to get a pardon. "Well, sir," the
dent answered, "it seems that you were a Union man who was wiUing
to let the Union slide. Now I will let you shde." On the other hand,
Judge Cochran of Alabama told the President that he had been a
rabid, bitter, uncompromising rebel; that he had done all he could
to cause secession, and had fought in the ranks as a private ; that he
regretted very much that the war had resulted as it had ; that he was
sorry they had not been able to hold out longer. But he now accepted
the results. The President asked: "Upon what ground do you base
your appHcation for pardon? I do not see anything in your state
ment to justify you in making such an appHcation." Judge Cochran
replied, "Mr. President, I read that where sin abounds, mercy and
grace doth much more abound, and it is upon that principle that
ask for pardon." The pardon was granted.^
The President in the end granted pardons to nearly all persons
who applied for them, but not a great number appHed. The total
number pardoned in Alabama from April 15, 1865, to December 4,.
1868, was less than 2000, and of these most were those who had beert
worth over $20,000 in 186 1 and had aided the Confederacy with their
1 Testimony of M. J. Saffold, Report of Joint Committee, 1866, Pt. Ill, pp. 59-63*
"PROSCRIBING PROSCRIPTION" 357
substance. For this offence (for offence it was in Johnson's eyes)
1456 people (of whom 72 were women) were pardoned before the
general amnesty in 1868/ How many of this class of excepted persons
did not ask for pardon is not known. It is certain that all who pos-
sessed that amount of wealth assisted the Confederacy. Half at
least of the $20,000 must have been slave property.^
Few of the state and Confederate officials applied for pardon.
Many worth over $20,000 in 1861 did not apply. Most of those who
were wealthy in 1861 lost all they had in the war. To December
31, 1867, the President had pardoned in Alabama only 12 generals,
viz. Battle, Baker, F. M. Cockerill, Clayton, Deas, Duff C. Green,
Holtzclaw, Morgan, Moody, Pettus, Roddy, and Wood; 11 mem-
bers of the Confederate Congress had been pardoned, i former
United States judge, i former member United States Congress, i West
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 16, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Others were pardoned for having aided the Confederacy in the following occupa-
tions : agents of the Nitre and Mining Bureau ; tax collector and state assessor ; tax
receiver (Confederate) ; general officer of the Confederate army ; postmasters who had
held office before the war ; members of the state legislature ; cotton agents ; foreign
agents and commissioners ; graduates of West Point and Annapolis ; resigning United
States service to join Confederacy ; mail contractors ; clerks of the Confederate govern-
ment ; state and Confederate judges ; members of Congress ; receivers of subscriptions
for the Confederacy ; marshals and deputy marshals ; clerks of state and Confederate
courts ; agents for the purchase of supplies ; members of advisory board ; cotton bond
agent ; Confederate government official ; commissioner of appraisement ; depositary ;
route agent ; commissioner of Indian affairs ; member of convention of 1861 ; prize
commissioner ; commissioner to take testimony ; Indian agent ; Confederate financial
agent ; commissioner to examine prisoners held by military authorities ; agent of the
Produce Loan; receiver of the tax-in-kind; leaving loyal state; commissioner of " fifteen
million loan " ; agent to receive subscriptions for cotton and produce loans ; depot
agent to receive the tax-in-kind ; agent under sequestration laws ; enrolling officer ; im-
pressment agent ; Treasury agent; Confederate contractor; sequestration commissioner;
agent to collect provisions for the army ; district attorney ; state printer ; border agri-
culturist ; custom officer ; agent to receive titles ; commissioner to examine political
prisoners. Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 16, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., gives a list of those pardoned.
Some of the more well-known men pardoned were : R. M. Patton, " agent for the sale
of rebel bonds, and worth over $20,000" ; Nicholas Davis, " member of rebel provisional
Congress" ; Charles Hays, worth over $20,000; Benjamin Fitzpatrick, "resigned United
States Senate"; J. G. Gilchrist, "member of Secession Convention"; S. F. Rice,
worth over $20,000 ; S. S. Scott, Indian agent ; H. C. Semple, worth over $20,000 ;
Thomas H. Watts, "member of rebel convention, voted for ordinance of secession,
colonel in rebel army, attorney-general of the would-be Southern Confederacy, rebel
governor of Alabama, and worth $20,000"; M. J. SaflFold, "commissioner to examine
political prisoners, and state printer."
358 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
\
Point graduate ; 2 naval officers, and 2 governors. These v^ere the
only prominent political leaders vi^ho appHed for pardon/
Sec. 3. The *' Restoration " Convention
Personnel and Parties
The election for delegates was held August 31, and the conven-
tion met in Montgomery September 12 and adjourned on September
30. The total vote cast for delegates w^as about 56,000,^ a very
large vote when all things are considered. This being a representa-
tive body of the men who were to carry out the Johnson plan of
restoration, it will be of interest to examine closely the personnel of
the convention. There were 99 delegates, of whom only 18 were
under forty years of age, the majority being over fifty ; it was a body
of old rather than middle-aged men ; 26 were natives of Alabama ;
24 were born in Georgia ; Virginia, North Carolina, and South Caro-
lina furnished 28; Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 14; 6 were
from northern states, and i from Ireland. There were 23 Metho-
dists; 19 Baptists; 16 Presbyterians (the most able members), and
5 Episcopalians; 34 belonged to no church (not a m.ark of respecta-
bihty at that time). There were 33 lawyers and 42 farmers and
planters; 6 physicians, 9 merchants, 2 teachers, and 7 ministers.
The proportion of ministers and non-church-members is remarkable.
As to politics, 45 were old Whigs and had voted for Bell and Everett
electors in 1861, 24 voted for Breckenridge, and 30 for Douglas; 18
had been in favor of immediate secession and a few of these were
now called "precipitators"; 11 had been in the convention of 1861,
and 10 had then voted for secession. Only one member of the con-
vention of 1 86 1 from the southern and central parts of the state was
returned to the convention of 1865. All the others had by their
course in the war made themselves inehgible. Fifty-two had had
no previous experiences in public life. There were two ex-gov-
ernors, two former members of Congress, and one who had been
minister to Belgium.^
There were several extreme "union" men, a few "precipitators,'*
^ The names and offences of those pardoned are given in Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 99, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. ; No. 16, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. ; and No. 31, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 //. Y. Herald, Oct. 15, 1865. ^ Montgomery Daily Advertiser, Oct. I, 1865.
PERSONNEL AND PARTIES
359
who, however, made no factious opposition, and a large majority
of conservative men. The votes on test questions showed a wide
difference between the extremists from north Alabama and the other
members. The proportion was about 63 conservatives to 36 north
Alabama anti- Confederates. It was the old sectional division.
The minority was made up about equally of rampant ''union"
men and old con-
servative Whigs ; the
majority, of the more
liberal Whigs and
conservative Demo-
crats. Neither party
was as united as
the parties had been
in 1 86 1. There were
almost as many minor
divisions as there
were members, but
the most of them
acted together in
order to transact
business, and none
were allowed to ob-
struct. As a body
the convention was
much inferior in
ability to that of
1 86 1 and lacked ex-
perience. Nearly all
were men of ordinary
ability, while those
of 1 86 1 were the best from both sections of the state. Yet this was
quite a respectable conservative body.^ The secessionists and former
Democrats were the ablest members, and were more inclined to
accept the results of war in a philosophical spirit, and, making the
best of things, to go to work to bring order out of political chaos.
The Herald correspondent said that John A. Elmore was the strongest
1 N. Y. Herald, Sept. 26 and Oct. 15, 1865.
PARTIES IN THE CONVENTION OP 1866.
I I Conservative, Confederate Element.
Radical, Anti- Confederate Element,
which mustered from 20 to 35 votes
in the Convention,
Delegations from these counties were
divided. O Black Counties.
36o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
man in the convention. He had been an ardent secessionist of the
Yancey school, yet in the convention he did more than any other
man to bring the weaker men around to correct views and harmony
of action.^
Ex- Senator and Ex- Governor Fitzpatrick was chosen to preside,
and Governor Parsons administered the amnesty oath. The con-
vention at once notified President Johnson of the desire and intention
of the people to be and to remain loyal citizens of the United States.
It indorsed his administration and policy and asked him to pardon
all who were not included in the amnesty proclamation of May 9,
1865.^
Debates on Secession and Slavery
The debate on the action to be taken as to the ordinance of seces-
sion was warm and extended over the entire session. The dispute
was concerning the form of words to be used in repeahng or other-
wise getting rid of the ordinance of secession. One delegate pro-
posed that it be declared "unconstitutional and therefore illegal
and void"; another wanted it declared "null and void"; another,
"the so-called ordinance of secession, null and void"; others, "un-
constitutional, null and void"; "unauthorized, null and void"; or
"unauthorized and void from the beginning." The minority proposi-
tion to declare it "unauthorized, null and void," was laid on the
table by a vote of 69 to 21, the minority being from north Alabama.
A proposition to declare it "unconstitutional, null and void" was
lost by the same vote. And all similar propositions fared about the
same.^ However, a proposition to say that "it is and was uncon-
stitutional" secured 34 votes against 59. Clark of Lawrence, who
had been in the convention of 1861, wanted this convention to declare
the ordinance of secession "unauthorized, null and void," because,
he said, in 186 1, the majority of the people voted for "union and coop-
eration," and that, as the convention refused to submit its work to
the people, the people were misrepresented and the ordinance of
secession was unauthorized. Yet he would not say that it was un-
constitutional and void from the beginning. Other members said
that the convention of 1861 had full authority. From the act of the
1 N. Y. Herald, Sept. 26, 1865. 2 Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 28.
3 Journal of the Convention, 1865, pp. 16, 57, 58 ; N, Y. Herald, Sept. 26 and
Oct. 15, 1865.
DEBATES ON SECESSION AND SLAVERY 361
legislature of i860 which provided for the caUing of the convention,
the people understood that it had full authority and they also knew
that it would use its authority to secede. ''Unauthorized" would
mean that there was no cause for calUng the convention of 1861, and
would even deny the right to secede as a revolutionary right. It
would mean consent to the doctrine of passive obedience, and also
that the convention of 1861 and those who supported it had usurped
authority, and "we thereby impUedly should leave the memory of
our dead who died for their country to be branded as traitors and
rebels and turn over the survivors, so far as we are concerned, to the
gibbet." ^ The ordinance favored by the majority of the conven-
tion declared that the ordinance of secession "is null and void,"
and was adopted by a unanimous vote.^ All other ordinances,
resolutions, and proceedings of the convention of 1861, and such
provisions of the constitution of 1861 as were in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States, were declared null and void.'
The state bonded debt in aid of the war was $3,844,500, which
was held principally in Mobile. There were other indirect war
debts, but no one knew the amount. On a test vote early in the
session the convention was divided, 58 to 34, against repudiating the
war debt.^ Later, by a vote of 60 to 19, all debts created by the state
of Alabama, directly or indirectly in aid of the war, were declared
void, and the legislature was forbidden to pay any part of it, or of
any debts contracted directly or indirectly by the Confederacy or
its agents or by its authority.^
1 Annual Cyclopsedia (1865), pp. 16, 17 ; Journal of the Convention, 1865, pp. 57, 58.
2 The vote cast was 92, probably all who were present. Journal of the Conven-
tion, p. 59 ; N. Y. Herald, Sept. 26, 1865 ; Shepherd, " Constitution and Ordinances,"
1865, p. 48 ; Code of 1867, Ordinance No. 13, Sept. 25, 1865. Early in the session
Mardis of Shelby, a " loyal " member, proposed a resolution to the effect that the ordi-
nance of secession was " unconstitutional and therefore illegal and void, [and that] the
leaders of the rtbellion having been forced to lay down their arms and turn over to the
conservative people of the state the reigns of the civil government by which the state
has become more peaceful and loyal to the United States government. She is now
entitled to all the rights as before ordinance of secession." Journal of the Conven-
tion, 1865, p. 16. The resolutions of the "loyalists" were curiosities, and the secretary
did not always expurgate bad spelling, etc.
3 Shepherd, " Constitution and Ordinances," 1865, p. 49 ; Ordinance No. 14.
4 N. y. Herald, Sept. 22, 1865.
6 Annual Cyclopedia (1865), p. 17 ; N. Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1865 ; N. Y. Herald,
Oct. 15, 1865 ; Shepherd, « Constitution and Ordinances," 1865, pp. S3, 54 ; Ordinances
362 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
In the debate in regard to the abohtion of slavery, Mr. Colemai
of Choctaw ^ desired to know by what authority the people of Alabama
had been deprived of their constitutional right to property in slaves.^
He urged the convention not to pass an ordinance to abolish slavery,
but to leave the President's proclamations and the acts of Congress
to be tested by the Supreme Court; that there was no such thing
as secession; a state could not be guilty of treason, and Alabama
had committed no crime; individuals had done so; others were
loyal and were entitled to their rights. Not only those who had
always been loyal but also those who had taken the amnesty oath
were entitled to their property ; ^ those pardoned by the President
were entitled to the same rights, and Congress had no authority
to seize property except during the lifetime of the criminal. The
Federal government had no right to nullify the Constitution. The
abohtion of slavery should be accepted as an act of war, not as
the free and voluntary act of the people of Alabama which latter
course would prevent the "loyahsts" of Alabama, from receiving
compensation for slaves. He denied that slavery was non-existent;
Lincoln's proclamation did not destroy slavery ; it was a question
for the Supreme Court to decide, and to admit that Lincoln's procla-
mation destroyed slavery was to admit the power of the President
and Congress to nullify every law of the state. For all these reasons
it was inexpedient for the convention to declare the abohtion of
slavery.
Judge Foster of Calhoun answered that the war had settled the
question of slavery and secession; that the question of slavery was
beyond the power of the courts to decide, and, besides, a decision
of the Supreme Court would not be respected. The question had to
be decided by war, and having been so decided, there was no appeal
from the decision. The institution of slavery had been destroyed
Nos. 25-28, September, 1865. In spite of this ordinance certain war debts were paid*
Fowler, Superintendent of Army Records, was paid j$3000 for his work during the war,
the legislature buying the records from him. Coleman, a Confederate judge, was paid
for services during the war. See Acts 65-66 and the Journal of the Convention of 1867^
The newspaper reports give summaries of the debates on the more important ordinances ;
the Journal of the Convention gives only the votes and resolutions.
1 Chairman of the committee on suffrage, Convention of 1901.
2 It seems to have been taken for granted by the convention that slavery was
already abolished.
* The amnesty proclamation expressly excepted property in slaves.
DEBATES ON SECESSION AND SLAVERY 363
by secession. The question was not open for discussion. Slavery,
he said, does not exist, is utterly and forever destroyed, — by whom,
when, where, is no matter. The power of arms is greater than
all courts. Citizens should begin to make contracts with their
former slaves. Should the Supreme Court declare the proclamations
of the Presidents and the acts of Congress unconstitutional, slavery
would not be restored. Whether destroyed legally or illegally, it
was destroyed, and the people had better accept the situation and
restore Federal relations.^
Mr. White of Talladega^ proposed to abide by the proclamations
of the President and the acts of Congress until the Supreme Court
should decide the question of slavery. White said that he had
opposed secession as long as he could; that the states were not out
of the Union, but had all their rights as formerly.^ Mr. Lane of
Butler wanted an ordinance to the effect that since the institution
of slavery had been destroyed in the state of Alabama by act of the
Federal government, therefore slavery no longer exists. This was
lost by a vote of 66 to 17.^ On September 22, 1865, an ordinance
was adopted by a vote of 89 to 3 which declared that the institution
of slavery having been destroyed, neither slaver}^ nor involuntary ser-
vitude should thereafter exist in the state, except as a punishment for
crime. All provisions in the constitution regarding slavery were
struck out, and it was made the duty of the next legislature to pass
laws to protect the freedmen in the full employment of all their
rights of person and property and to guard them and the state against
any evils that might arise from their sudden emancipation.^ Mr.
Tahafero Towles of Chambers, a ''loyalist," proposed an ordinance
to make all "free negroes"^ who were not inhabitants of the state
1 Annual Cyclopsedia (1865), p. 14 ; N. Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1865.
2 " Loyalist," and later a " scalawag." » N. Y. Herald, Oct. 15, 1 865.
* Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 49.
5 Journal of the Convention, 1865, pp. 49, 50 ; N'. Y. Herald, Oct. 15, 1865 ; Shep-
herd, "Constitution and Ordinances," 1865, p. 45, Ordinance No. 6. The three mem-
bers who voted against the abolition ordinance were Crawford of Coosa, Cumming
of Monroe, and White of Talladega. They wanted to let the Supreme Court decide.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, a year later, held that, as a matter of history which
the court would recognize, slavery was dead as a result of war before the passage of the
ordinance of Sept. 22, 1865.
« That class of men called all negroes "free negroes" and "freedmen" for years
after the war as a term of contempt.
364 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
before 1861 leave the state. Mr. Langdon of Mobile regretted]
this proposition, and thought it would do harm. Mr. Towles ex-
plained that he lived near the Georgia line and that he was much
annoyed by the negroes who came into Alabama from Georgia. Mr.
Patton^ of Lauderdale opposed such a policy. It was unwise, he
said; let people go where they pleased; he would invite people
from all parts of the Union to Alabama. Mr. Mudd of Jefferson
thought that such a measure would be extremely unwise. Mr.
Hunter of Dallas said that it was very unwise, that it would do no
good, and at such a time would be harmful. Passions must be
allayed. Towles withdrew the resolution.^
Mr. Saunders of Macon introduced a memorial to the President
to release President Davis. It was referred to a committee and
was not heard from.^ General Swayne of the Freedmen's Bureau
sent to the convention a memorial from a negro mass-meeting in.
Mobile praying for the extension of suffrage to them. It was unani-
mously laid on the table.^
"A White Man's Government"
General Swayne had made an arrangement with the governor
by which the state officials were required to act as agents of the
Freedmen's Bureau. The convention now passed an ordinance
requiring these officers to continue to discharge the duties of agents
of the Bureau "until the adjournment of the next general assembly.'*
Seventeen north Alabama men opposed the passage of this ordinance.*
Mr. Patton-of Lauderdale proposed an ordinance in regard to
the basis of representation in the general assembly. It was not
correctly understood in north Alabama, which section, thinking it
called for representation based on population, rose in wrath. The
Huntsville Advocate said: "This is a white man's government
and a white man's state. We are opposed to any changes in the
convention except such as are necessary to get the state into the
Union again." ® Mr. Patton explained that the purpose of his meas-
1 Afterwards second provisional governor. 2 ^, y; Times, Sept. 30, 1865.
8 N. Y. Herald, Oct. 15, 1865. * N. Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1865.
^Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 80; Shepherd, "Constitution and Ordi-
nances," 1865, p. 61, Ordinance No. 34.
6 Huntsville Advocate, Sept. 28, 1865. A "Johnson reconstruction paper."
I
"A WHITE MAN^S GOVERNMENT" 365
ure was to base representation on the white population. He cheerfully
indorsed north Alabama doctrine, "This is a white man's govern-
ment and we must keep it a white man's government." ^ The ordi-
nance as passed provided for a census in 1866, and the apportion-
ment of senators and representatives according to white population
as ascertained by the census. The delegates from the white counties
of north Alabama and southeast Alabama voted for the ordinance,
and thirty delegates from the Black Belt voted against it.^
This measure destroyed at a blow the political power of the Black
Belt, and had the Johnson government survived, the state would have
been ruled by the white counties instead of by the black counties.
This was partly the result of antagonism between the white and
black counties.
Early in the session Mr. Sheets of Winston, "loyahst," demanded
that all amendments to the Constitution adopted by the convention
should be referred to the people for ratification or rejection, except
such as related to slavery.^ Mr. Webb of Greene, chairman of the
Committee on the Constitution, reported that, on account of the state
of the times, it was not expedient to refer the amendments to the
people. Mr. Clark of Lawrence * wanted the people to have an
opportunity to show whether they favored the work of the convention.
He said that, in 1861, had the ordinance of secession been referred
to the people, it would have been defeated.
The members who were in favor of not sending the amendments
to the people said that there was not time, and that there were too
many other elections; that the people had confidence in the conven-
tion or they would not have elected the delegates who were there.
But the north Alabama delegates insisted that their constituents
not only expected to have the amendments submitted to them, but
that they (the delegates) had pledged that they would have the amend-
ments sent before the people.^ The north Alabama party could
not consistently do anything but object to the adoption of the con-
stitution by proclamation. Some had never recognized the supreme
1 Huntsville Advocate, Oct. 12, 1865.
2 Shepherd, p. 57, Ordinance No. 30 ; Journal of the Convention, 1865, pp. 67, 68.
See Constitution of 1865, Article IV, Section 4.
* Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 34.
* A member of the convention of 1861.
6 N. V. Herald, Oct. 15, 1865.
366 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
authority of a constitutional convention; others were opposed to the
expediency of adoption by proclamation. By a vote of 6i to 25 the
constitution was proclaimed in force without reference to the people/
Legislation
The convention did some important legislative work necessary
to put the business of administration in running order again. All
the laws enacted during the war not in conflict with the United States
Constitution, and not relating to the issue of money and bonds nor
to appropriations, were ratified and declared in full force since their
dates.^ All officials acts of the state and county officials, all judg-
ments, orders, and decrees of the courts, all acts and sales of trustees,
executors, administrators, and guardians, not in conflict with United
States Constitution were ratified and confirmed. Deeds, bonds,
mortgages, and contracts made during the war were declared vaHd
and binding. But in cases where payments were to be made in
Confederate money the courts were to decide what the true value
of the consideration was at the time.^ Divorces granted during
the war by the chancery court were declared vaHd.'' Marriages
between negroes, whether during slavery or since emancipation, were
declared valid ; and in cases where no ceremony had been performed,
but the parties recognized each other as man and wife, such relation-
ship was declared vaHd marriage. The children of all such mar-
riages were declared legitimate. Fathers of bastard negro children
were required to provide for them. The freedmen were placed under
the same laws of marriage as the whites, except that they were not
required to give bond.^ The legislature was commanded to pass
laws prohibiting the intermarriage of whites with negroes or with
persons of mixed blood.®
In view of the lawlessness prevailing in some of the counties,
the provisional governor was authorized to call out the mihtia in each
county, and the mayors of Huntsville, Athens, and Florence were
given police jurisdiction over their respective counties until the
1 Journal of the Convention, 1865, p. 74.
2 Shepherd, p. 44, Ordinance No. 5. « Shepherd, p. 54, Ordinance No. 26.
* Shepherd, p. 46, Ordinance No. 7. ^ Shepherd, p. 63, Ordinance No. 39.
^ Shepherd, p. 74, Ordinance No. 42. See Constitution, 1865, Article IV, Sec-
tion 31.
"RESTORATION" COMPLETED 367
legislature should act. The ante-bellum militia code was declared in
force, and all other laws in regard to the militia were repealed/
The governor was ordered to pay the interest on the bonded debt
of the state that was made before 1861, and the convention pledged
the faith of the people that the old debt should be paid in full with
interest.^ The state was divided into six congressional districts.
The negro was no longer counted in the "Federal number," and the
representation of the state in Congress was thus reduced. Elections
were ordered for various offices in November and December, 1865, and
March and May, 1866. The provisional governor was authorized
to act as governor until another was elected and inaugurated. It
was ordered that in the future no convention be held unless first the
question of convention or no convention be submitted to the people
and approved by a majority of those voting.'
Finally, the convention asked that the President withdraw the
troops from the state, the people and the convention having com-
phed with all the conditions and requirements necessary to restore
the state to its constitutional relations to the Federal government.'*
The convention adjourned on September 30, having been in session
ten days in all. The constitution went into effect gradually, Par-
sons enforcing some of it; Patton and the newly elected legislature
organized the government under it from December, 1865, to May,
1866. But it never became more than a provisional constitution,
which was set aside by the President at pleasure.
Sec. 4. ** Restoration " Completed
By convention ordinance and by constitutional amendment the
civil rights of the freedmen were made secure, family relations
legahzed, property rights secured; the courts of law were open to
them, and in all cases affecting themselves, their evidence was admis-
sible. The admission of negro testimony was generally approved
by the bar and the magistracy, but disliked by the ignorant classes
of whites. All magistrates and judicial officers who refused to admit
negro testimony or to act as Bureau agents were removed from office by
the governor. One mayor (of Mobile) and one judge were removed.
1 Shepherd, pp. 44, 53, 65, Ordinances Nos. 4, 23, 43.
2 Shepherd, pp. 49, 62, 68, Ordinances Nos. 15, 37, 49-
» Ordinances Nos. 8, i6, 22, 33. * Shepherd, p. 70.
368 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Affairs were going on well, though the civil government was
weakened and lost prestige by being subordinated to the mihtary
authorities.^ The convention having authorized Parsons to organize
the militia to aid in restoring order, several companies were organized
and instructed to act solely in aid of the civil authorities and in sub-
ordination to them. They were to act alone only when there was
no civil officer present.^
Among the whites there was a vague but widespread fear of negro
insurrections, and toward Christmas this fear increased. The negroes
were disappointed because of the delayed division of lands, and
their temper was not improved by the reports of adventurers, black
and white, who came among them as missionaries and sharpers.
There was a general and natural desire among the freedmen to get
possession of firearms, and all through the summer and fall they
were acquiring shotguns, muskets, and pistols in great quaAtities.
Most of the guns were worthless army muskets, but new arms of the
latest pattern were supplied by their ardent sympathizers in the
belief that the negroes were only seeking means of protection. A
sharper who claimed to be connected with the government travelled
through some of the black counties, telling the negroes that they
were mistreated and must arm themselves for protection. He
sold them certificates for $2.50 each which he said would entitle the
bearers to muskets if presented at the arsenals at Selma, Vicksburg,
etc.^ Hence arose the fears of the whites who were poorly armed.
In several instances where there was fear of negro insurrection
the civil authorities, backed by the militia, searched negro houses
for concealed weapons, and sometimes found supplies of arms, which
were confiscated. There was a general desire to disarm the freed-
men until after Christmas, when the expected insurrection failed to
materiaHze ; but no order for disarming was issued by the governor,
and a bill for that purpose was defeated in the legislature. Some
of the miHtia companies undertook to patrol the country to scare
the negroes with a show of force,^ and in some places disguised
patrols rode through the negro settlements to keep them in order.
1 N. Y. Herald, Oct. 15, 1865 ; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 26, 39th Cong., ist Sess. (Par-
sons); Report Joint Committee, 1866, Pt. Ill, pp. 138-141.
* Parsons's Proclamation, Sept. 28, 1865. ^ Montgomery Advertiser, May 12, 1866.
* In Macon, Russell, and Lowndes counties.
"RESTORATION" COMPLETED
369
There were several instances of unauthorized disarming and lawless
plunder under the pretence of disarming the blacks, by marauders
who took advantage of the state of pubhc feehng and followed the
example of the disguised patrol bands. General Swayne himself
was afraid of negro insurrection, and before Christmas did not inter-
fere with the attempts of the whites to control the blacks. After
Christmas the negroes quieted down, and most of them made some
pretence of working. The next case of disarming that occurred
brought the interference of General Swayne, who ordered that neither
the civil nor the miHtary authorities should again interfere with the
negroes under any pretext, unless by permission from himself. He
threatened to send a negro garrison into any community where the
blacks might be interfered with. After that, he says, the people
were "more busy in making a living," and the miHtia organizations
disbanded. Two classes of the population were now beyond the
reach of the civil government, the "loyalists" and the negroes, and
the civil authorities maintained that these were the source of most
disorder.^
An act of Congress, July 2, 1862, prescribed that every person
elected or appointed to any office under the United States govern-
ment should, before entering upon the duties of the office, subscribe
to the "iron-clad" test oath,^ which obliged one to swear that he
had never aided in any way the Confederate cause. Outside of
the few genuine Union men of North Alabama, there were not
half a dozen respectable white men in the state who could take
1 N. Y. Daily News, Sept. 7, 1865 ; N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 6, 1866; Swayne's Re-
port, Jan., 1866, in Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess.; Report Joint Committee
of Reconstruction, 1866, Pt. Ill, p. 140 (Swayne).
2 " I, A. B., do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms
against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof ; that I have voluntarily
given no aid, countenance, counsel or encouragement to persons engaged in armed
hostility thereto ; that I have never sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the
functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pretended authority, in hostility
to the United States ; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended
government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimi-
cal thereto ; and I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and
ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic ; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same ;
that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion,
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
about to enter. So help me God." McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 193.
2 B
1
3/0 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
such an oath. Those who had been opposed to secession had nearly
all aided in the prosecution of the war or had held office under the
Confederate government. The thousands who had fallen away
from the Confederates in the last year of the war could not take the
oath. The women could not take it, and few even of the negroes
could. Those who could take the oath were detested by all, and
the unfitness of such persons for holding office was clearly recognized
by the administration. By law, certain Federal offices had to be
filled by men who hved in the county or state. The Federal ser-
vice did not exist in Alabama at the end of the war, and the Presi-
dent and Cabinet, agreeing that the requirement of the oath could
not be enforced, made temporary appointments in the Treasury and
postal service of men who could not take the oath. In Alabama
the men appointed were the old conservatives, those who had opposed
secession. The officers appointed were marshals and deputy mar-
shals, collectors and assessors of internal revenue, customs officers,
and postmasters. Objection was made in Congress to the payment
of these officers, and Secretary McCulloch of the Treasury made
a report on the subject. He stated that it was difficult to find com-
petent persons who could take the oath, and that it was better for the
public service and for the people that their own citizens should per-
form the unpleasant duty of collecting taxes from an exhausted people.
There was no civil government whatever, and it was necessary that
the Federal service be established. In regard to future appoint-
ments, he said, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find
competent men in the South who could take the oath, that very few
persons of character and intelligence had failed to connect themselves
in some way with the insurgent cause. The persons who could pre-
sent clean records for loyalty would have been able to present equally
fair records to the Confederate government had it succeeded, or else
they lacked the proper qualifications. Northern men of requisite
quahfications would not go South for the compensation offered.
For the government to collect taxes in the southern states by the
hands of strangers was not advisable. Better for the country politi-
cally and financially to suspend the collection of internal revenue
taxes in the South for months or years than to collect them by men
not identified with the taxpayers in sympathy or interest. It would
be a calamity to the nation and to the cause of civil liberty every-
"RESTORATION" COMPLETED
371
where if, instead of a policy of conciliation, the action of the
government should tend to intensify sectional feeling. To make
tax-gatherers at the South of men who were strangers to the
people would be a most unfortunate course for the government
to pursue, and fatal consequences, he thought, would follow such
a poHcy. He asked that the oath be modified so that the men
in office could take it.^ The Postmaster- General made similar
recommendations.^
For years after the war the test oath obstructed administration
and justice in the South. The Alabama lawyers could not take the
oath, and United States courts could not be held because there were
no lawyers to practise before them. There were many cases of prop-
erty Hbelled which should have come before the United States courts,
but it was not possible.^ As men of character could not be found
to fill the offices, the Post-office Department tried to get women to
take the post-offices, but they could not take the test oath. Many
post-offices remained closed, and mail matter was sent by express.
Letters were thrown out at a station or given to a negro to carry
to the proper person. Juries in the Federal courts had to take prac-
tically the same oath as the "iron-clad," and the jury oath was in
existence long after the others were modified. So for years a fair
jury trial was in many localities impossible."*
The effect of the proscription by the test oaths of the only men
who were fit for office was distinctly bad. It drove the old Whig-
cooperationist-Unionist men into affihation with the secessionists
and Democrats. The division of the whites into different parties
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 81, 39th Cong., ist Sess., McCuUoch, Report, March 19, 1866;
McCuUoch, "Men and Measures," pp. 227, 233. The Finance Committee reported in
favor of paying these officials, accepting as correct the secretary's statement. They
were paid, in spile of the opposition of Sumner, who voted not to pay " those rebels."
McCuUoch, p. 232.
2 On March 17, 1866, the Postmaster-General, in a letter to the President, stated
that the test oaths of July 2, 1862, and March 3, 1863, hindered the reconstruction of
the postal service in the South. Of 2258 mail routes in 1861, only 757 had been re-
stored. Before the war there were 8902 postmasters, and in 1866 there were but 2042,
of whom 420 were women and 865 others could not take the oath. Ho. Ex. Doc, No.
81, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 N. Y. News, Dec 8 and Oct. 23, 1865 ; N. Y. Times, July 2, 1866.
*Cox, "Three Decades," p. 603; Reid, "After the War," pp. 401, 402; M Y,
Daily News, Oct. 23 and Dec. 8, 1865 ; A^. K Times, July 2, 1866.
372 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was made less likely. The Senate regularly rejected nominations
made by the President of men who could not take the oath/ and
the mihtary authorities were inchned to enforce the taking of the
test oath by the state and local officials of the provisional govern-
ment.^
The convention ordered an election, on November 30, for gov-
ernor, state and county officials, and legislature. There were three
candidates for governor, all respectable, conservative men, old-line
Whigs, from north Alabama, the stronghold of those who had opposed
secession. They were R. M. Patton of Lauderdale, M. J. Bulger
of Tallapoosa, and W. R. Smith of Tuscaloosa.^ The section of
Alabama where the spirit of secession had been strongest refrained
from putting forward any candidate. The radical ''loyahsts " had
no candidate. The few prominent men of that faction saw that
it would be poKtical suicide for them to commit themselves to the
Johnson plan after he had begun the pardoning process, and were
now working to overthrow the present poHtical institutions. Only
in case the plan of the Radicals in Congress should succeed would
the ''loyahsts" get any share in the spoils. The Conservative candi-
dates were in sympathy with the north Alabama desire for ''a white
man's government." Mr. Patton in the late convention had secured
the revision of the constitution so as to base representation on the
white population. During the war General M. J. Bulger, the second
candidate, made a speech at Selma in which he said he had opposed
secession and had refused to sign the ordinance, but had deemed
it his duty to fight when the time came and had served through-
out the war. There could be, he said, no negro suffrage, no negro
1 Selma Times, April lo, 1866. The rejection of such men as Dr. F. W. Sykes of
Lawrence as tax commissioner was especially discouraging to the anti-Democratic party
in the state. Sykes had been an obstructionist in the legislature during the war.
Brewer, p. 309.
2 One official who had suffered from objections made against his past record inserted
the following advertisement in the Selma Times, April 11, 1866: —
" Having been elected twice, given three approved bonds, and sworn in five times,
I propose opening the business of the city courts of Selma.
" E. M. Garrett,
" Clerk City Court of Selma r
* There were no nominating conventions ; the candidates were announced by cau-
cuses of friends. Several other men were spoken of, but the contest narrowed down tCK
three.
"RESTORATION" COMPLETED 373
equality/ W. R. Smith had been the leader of the cooperationists
in the convention of 1861. The election resulted in the choice
of R. M. Patton of Lauderdale over Bulger and Smith by a good
majority.^
The new legislature met on November 20, but Patton was not
inaugurated until a month later, owing to the refusal of the Washing-
ton administration to allow Parsons to resign the government into the
hands of what the administration intended should be the permanent,
''restored" state government. The object in the delay was the
desire of the President to have the Thirteenth Amendment ratified
before he rehnquished the state government. It was a queer mixture
of a government — an elected constitutional legislature and a governor
and state administration appointed by the commander-in-chief of
the army.^ The legislature was recognized, but the governor elected
at the same time was not. Several acts of legislation were done by
this mihtary-constitutional government during the thirty days of its
existence, the most important being the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment by the legislature. This was done with the under-
standing, the resolution stated, that it did not confer upon Congress
the power to legislate upon the political status of the freedmen in
Alabama.* The amendment was ratified December 2, 1865, and
1 N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1865.
2 R. M. Patton, 21,442 ; M. J. Bulger, 15,234 ; W. R. Smith, 8194. The total vote
was 44,870; the registration to Sept. 22, 1865, had been 65,825 ; the vote for dele-
gates to the convention had been about 56,000 ; the vote for presidential electors in
i860 had been 89,579. The falling off in the vote may be explained by the death and
disfranchisement of voters and by the indifference of south Alabama people to the north
Alabama candidates.
8 The convention in September had proceeded to correct the theory of the situation
by conferring the powers of a civil governor upon Parsons, and authorizing him to act as
governor until the elected governor should be qualified.
* McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 21. Alabama was the twenty-seventh state to
ratify, and with seven other seceding states made up the necessary three-fourths of the
thirty-six states. So far the Johnson state governments were recognized. Tribune
Almanac, 1866. Later, when all that the "restoration" administration had done was
found to be useless or worse than useless, an Alabama writer, in "The Land We Love,"
complained : —
"The constitutional amendment abolishing slavery could only be passed constitu-
tionally when the southern states were in the Union. We were then in the Union
for the few weeks during which time this was being done. For this brief privilege
we lost 4,000,000 of slaves valued at j^ 1,200,000,000. We have every reason to
be thankful for being wakened out of our brief dream of being in the Union. A few
374 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
on the loth, Secretary Seward telegraphed to Parsons that the time
had arrived when in the judgment of the President the care and
conduct of the proper affairs of the state of Alabama might be
remitted to the constitutional authorities chosen by the people.
Parsons was relieved, the instructions stated, from the trust imposed
in him as provisional governor. When the governor-elect should
be qualified, Parsons was to transfer papers and property to him and
retire.^ On the strength of these instructions Governor Patton was
inaugurated December 13, 1865. In his inaugural address the new
governor said that the extinction of slavery was one of the inevi-
table results of the war. "We shall not only extend to the f reed-
men all their legitimate rights," he stated, '^but shall throw around
them such effectual safeguards as will secure them in their full and
complete enjoyment. At the same time it must be understood that
poHtically and socially ours is a white man's government. In the
future, as has been the case in the past, the state affairs of Alabama
must be guided and controlled by the superior intelligence of the
white man. The negro must be made to reahze that freedom does
not mean idleness and vagrancy. Emancipation has not left him
where he can live without work," ^
Though Patton was inaugurated on December 13, the Washington
authorities did not authorize the formal transfer of the government
until December 18, and the charge was made on December 20,
1865.
The legislature at once elected ex- Governor Parsons and George
S. Houston to the United States Senate. The people had already
elected six congressmen of moderate politics.^ So far as concerned
more weeks of such costly sleep would have stripped us entirely of houses and
lands."
1 N. V. Herald, Dec. 19, 1865.
2 Inaugural Addresses, Dec. 13, 1865 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 19.
3 Both Parsons and Houston had been " Unionists," but neither could have sub-
scribed to the oath exacted from members of Congress. The representatives chosen
were: (i) C. C. Langdon, Whig, Bell and Everett man, of northern birth, opposed
secession, a member of the legislature of i86i ; (2) George C. Freeman, Whig, Bell
and Everett man, opposed secession, captain and major 47th Alabama ; (3) CuUen A.
Battle, Democrat, major-general C.S.A.; (4) Joseph W. Taylor, Whig, Bell and Everett
man, opposed secession ; (5) Burwell T. Pope, Whig, opposed secession ; (6) Thomas
J. Foster, Whig, Bell and Everett man, opposed secession. None of the congressmen-
elect could subscribe to the test oath. The people would have voted for no man who
could take the test oath.
"RESTORATION" COMPLETED 375
the state of Alabama, the presidential plan of restoration was com-
plete, if Congress would recognize the work.
A proclamation of the President on December i, revoking and
annulling the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, expressly ex-
cepted all the southern states and the southern border states. It
was not until April 2, 1866, that the President declared the rebelHon
at an end.^ He had little faith in his restored governments, or else
he liked to interfere, and he still retained the power to do so.
1 McPherson, p. 15.
CHAPTER IX
THE SECOND PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION
Status of the Provisional Government
It was generally understood in the state that while Congress was
opposed to the presidential plan of restoration and repudiated it as
soon as it convened, yet if the state conventions should abohsh sla-
very, and the state legislatures should ratify the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, their representatives would be admitted to Congress. This
was the meaning, it seemed, of a resolution offered in the Senate
December 4, 1865, by Charles Sumner, one of the most radical of the
Radical leaders/ On the same day, in the House of Representatives,
Thaddeus Stevens, the Radical leader of the lower house, introduced
a resolution, which was adopted, to appoint a joint committee of the
Senate and House to inquire into conditions in the southern states.
Until the committee should make a report, no representatives from the
southern states should be admitted to Congress.^ Under this reso-
lution, the Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction was appointed.
In order to support a report in favor of the congressional plan of
reconstruction and to justify the overturning of the southern state
governments, the committee took testimony at Washington which
was carefully calculated to serve as a campaign document. Such
Radicals as Stevens professed to beheve that the arbitrary rule of the
President was hateful to the southern people. Stevens said: "That
they would disregard and scorn their present constitutions forced
upon them in the midst of martial law, would be most natural and
just. No one who has any regard for freedom of elections can look
upon these governments, forced upon them in duress, with any favor." ^
Just exactly how much of this he meant may be inferred from his later
^ Cong, Globe, Dec. 4, 1865.
2 Globe, Dec. 4, 1865. This was a distinct refusal to recognize, for the present at
least, the restoration as done by the President.
3 Cong. Globe, Dec. 18, 1865.
376
STATUS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 377
course as leader of the Radicals of the House, in the movement which
forced the negro-carpet-bag government upon the southern states.
Now Stevens proposed to "take no account of the aggregation of
whitewashed rebels who, without any legal authority, have assem-
bled in the capitals of the late rebel states and simulated legislative
bodies."'
The Republican caucus instructed Edward McPherson, clerk of
the House, to omit from the roll the names of the members-elect
from the South as certified by the Secretary of State. This was
done, and the southern congressmen were not even allowed the
usual privileges of contestants.^
As soon as the leaders in Congress felt that they were strong
enough to carry through their plan to destroy the governments erected
under the President's plan, they agreed that no senator or represen-
tative from any southern state should be admitted to either branch
of Congress until both houses should have declared such state enti-
tled to representation.^ The state governments were recognized as
provisional only, and for a year or more Congress was occupied in
the fight with the President over Reconstruction. The consequence
was that Patton became provisional governor of a territory and not
the constitutional governor of a state. The state suffered from much
government at this time. First, came the mihtary authorities with
military com^missions ; then, the Freedmen's Bureau with its courts
supported by the mihtary; the Bureau also acted independently of
the army and with civilian officers ; it was also a part of the Parsons
provisional government, and later of the Patton government, and so
controlled the minor officials of the state administration. To com-
pUcate matters further, the President constantly interfered by order
or direction with all the various administrations, for all were subject
to his supervision. The many governments were bound up with one
1 Herbert, "Solid South," p. 12.
2 McPherson made a collection of extracts from various newspapers relating to his
action in omitting the names of the southern members. Few of the editorials seem to
indicate any belief that a grave constitutional question was to be settled. Most of the
editors believed that he had exceeded his authority, but approved his action because
the southern members were Democrats. The general opinion seemed to be that their
pohtics alone was a cause of offence. See McPherson's scrap-book, " The Roll of the
yjth Congress," in the Library of Congress.
8 G/ol>g, March 2, 1866.
378 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
another, and by interfering with the action of one another increased
the general confusion. The people lost respect for authority, and only
pubhc opinion served to regulate the conduct of individuals.
Legislation about Freedmen
For several months the industrial system was entirely disorgan-
ized, especially in the neighborhood of the cities, and many people
realized the absolute necessity of laws to regulate negro labor. The
negro insisted on taking a living from the country without working
for it. There were also fears of insurrection by the idle negroes who
were waiting for the division of spoils, and General Swayne of the
Bureau felt a touch of the apprehension.^
When the legislature met, a few of the demagogues who had told
their constituents that they would soon regulate all troubles intro-
duced many bills to regulate labor, and thousands of copies were
printed for distribution. On December 15 it was agreed to print
ten thousand copies of all bills relating to freedmen.^ This was done,
and though the governor had not approved them, the country mem-
bers went home with pockets full of bills introduced by themselves, to
show to their constituents and to scare the negroes into work. The
regulations proposed made special provision for the freedmen, and
under different circumstances it would have been well for the negro
if they had been passed into law and enforced ; but it was not good
policy at this time to propose such regulations, in view of the fact that
the Radicals were watching for such action and hoping for it. How-
ever, it is probable that nothing that the southern whites could have
done would have met with the approval of the Radicals.
Governor Patton asked General Swayne for advice in regard to
the pending bills relating to freedmen, and Swayne informed him of
the probable bad effect on public opinion in the North. After Christ-
mas the Senate passed some obnoxious bills, and these the governor
vetoed. The other bills that came up from the lower house failed to
pass in the Senate. Similar bills, modified in many details, but which
would have been of much use could they have been enforced as law,
were passed by both houses only to be vetoed by the governor. The
1 Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
2 Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), p. 601.
LEGISLATION ABOUT FREEDMEN 3;79
negroes were now showing a disposition to work, and the legislature
did not attempt to pass the bills over the governor's veto. Next, a
law relating to contracts between whites and blacks was attempted.
General Swayne was known to favor such a law, but Governor Pat-
ton vetoed it. He declared that such a law would cause much trouble ;
he had information that everywhere freedmen were going to work on
terms satisfactory to both parties and that they were disposed to dis-
charge their obligations, and there should not be, he said, one law
for whites and another for blacks; special laws for regulating con-
tracts between whites and freedmen would do no good and might
cause harm ; the common law gave sufficient remedy for violations of
contracts, viz. damages. General Swayne had been strongly of the
opinion that contracts regularly made and carefully inspected on
behalf of the negro were necessary. Later he came to the conclu-
sion that the negro needed no protection by contract or by special
law; that he had a much better protection in the demand for his
labor, and would only be injured by artificial safeguards; contracts
would cause litigation, and it was best for both parties to be able to
break an engagement at pleasure. He was of the opinion that the
whites preferred contracts, while the negro disHked to bind himself
to anything. Hunger and cold, he declared, were the best incentives
to labor. Swayne further reported that all objectionable bills relat-
ing to freedom had been vetoed.^
A bill passed both houses to extend to freedmen the old criminal
laws of the state formerly applicable to free persons of color. Gov-
ernor Patton vetoed the bill on the ground that a system of laws
enacted during slavery was not applicable to present conditions.
He showed how the proposed laws would act, and the legislature not
only accepted the veto, but repealed all such laws then in the code and
on the statute books.^ At the close of the session there were two laws
on the statute books which made a distinction before the law between
negroes and whites. The first made it a misdemeanor, with a pen-
1 Swayne's Reports, Dec, 26, 1865, Jan. 31, 1866, and Oct. 31, 1866, in Ho. Ex. Doc,
No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., and Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., ist Sess. ; Patton's
Message, Jan. 16, 1866 ; N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1866 ; N. V. Evening Post, Jan. 29, 1865 ;
McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 21 ; McPherson's scrap-book, " Freedmen's Bureau
Bill," 1866.
2 McPherson, "Reconstruction," pp. 21, 22; Act, approved Feb. 23, 1866, Penal
Code of Ala., pp. 6-8; Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), pp. 121, 124.
380 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
alty of $ioo fine and ten days' imprisonment, to purchase or receive
from a "free person of color" any stolen goods, knowing the same to
have been stolen/
The second act gave the freedmen the right to sue and be
sued, to plead and be imprisoned, in the state courts to the same
extent as whites. They were competent to testify only in open
court, and in cases in which freedmen were concerned directly
or indirectly. Neither interest in the suit nor marriage should
disquahfy any black witness.^ This law, if restrictive at all, was
never in force in the lower courts where minor magistrates and
judicial officers presided; for, by the order of the convention and
later of the legislature, the state officials were ex officio agents of
the Freedmen's Bureau, and sworn to make no distinction between
white and black.^
Two laws were passed for the purpose of regulating labor, in theory
applicable equally to white and black. They had the approval of
General Swayne, who was always present when labor legislation was
discussed."* The first law made it a misdemeanor to interfere with,
to hire, entice away, or induce to leave the service of another any
laborer or servant who had made a contract in writing, as long as the
contract was in force, unless by consent of the employer given in
writing or verbally ''in the presence of some reputable white person."
The penalty for inducing a laborer to break a contract was a fine of
$50 to $500, — in no case less than double the amount of the injury
sustained by the employer ; and half the fine was to go to the injured
1 Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), Act of Dec. 15, 1865; Penal Code of Ala., p. 12.
The compilers of the Penal Code placed this act in the Code separate from the rest, as
irreconcilable with the provisions of the Code and with other legislation. That is, they
refused to codify it and left it for the courts to decide. The law was meant to suppress
a common practice of encouraging negroes to steal cotton, etc., for sale.
2 Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), p. 98; Penal Code, pp. 164, 165. In one respect
the negro had a better standing in court than the white : he was a competent witness
in his own behalf, and his wife might also be a witness.
8 Acts, Dec. II and 26, 1865. See below, Ch. XII.
* In an interview with General Swayne, in 1 901, he informed me that he was present
when the bills were drawn up. The governor and the president of the Senate in con-
sultation decided that all measures already brought forward should be vetoed or dropped ;
the apprentice and contract laws as they stood on the statute book were then drawn up,
and no objection was made to them by General Swayne, who was present by request.
He made suggestions as to what would be acceptable to the Bureau and to northern
public opinion.
LEGISLATION ABOUT FREEDMEN 381
party/ The compilers of the Penal Code refused to incorporate
this statute into the code on the ground that it was inconsistent with
other provisions of the code as adopted by the legislature. The Penal
Code had an old ante-bellum provision which made it a penal offence
to entice, decoy, or persuade a servant or apprentice to leave the ser-
vice of his master. The penalty was a fine of $20 to $100, and im-
prisonment for not more than three months might also be allowed.^
The second labor law defined the relations of master and appren-
tice. The war had made orphans of many thousand children, white
and black, and there were few people who could look after them.
Under slavery no regulation of such things had been necessary for
negro children. Now the children were running wild, in want,
neglected, becoming criminals and vagabonds. Negro fathers ran
off when freedom came, left their wives and children, and took unto
themselves other and younger wives. The negro mother, left alone,
often incapable and without judgment, could not support her chil-
dren; and many negro children were found both of whose parents
had died, or who had deserted them. As a result of the war, there
were many white orphan children and many widowed mothers who
were unable to care for their children. For years (1862-187 5) there
was much suffering among the children of the poorer whites and the
negroes. The apprentice law was an extension of an old statute,
and was designed to make it possible to care for these dependent
children. It was made the duty of county officials to report to the
probate courts all minors under the age of eighteen who were desti-
tute orphans, or whose parents refused or were unable to support
them; and the court was to apprentice them to suitable persons.
In case the minor were the child of a freedman, the former owner
should have the preference when he or she should be proven a
suitable person. In such cases the probate judge was to keep a
record of all the proceedings. The master to whom the minor was
apprenticed was obhged to give bond that he would furnish the
apprentice sufficient food and clothing, treat him humanely, furnish
medical attention in case of sickness, and teach or have him taught
to read and write, whether white or black, if under the age of fifteen.
1 Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), pp. Ill, 112 (Act of Feb. 16, 1866); Penal Code,
p. 13.
* Penal Code, pp. 50, 51,
382 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Power was given to inflict such punishment as a father or guardian
might inflict on a child or ward, but in no case should the punish-
ment be cruel. In case the apprentice should leave the employment
of the master without the consent of the latter, he niight be arrested
by the master and carried before a justice of the peace, whose duty
it was to remand the apprentice to the service of his master. If the
apprentice refused to return, he was to be committed to jail until
the next session of the probate court, which would investigate the
case, and, if convinced that the apprentice had nbt good cause for
leaving his master, would punish the apprentice under the vagrancy
laws. If the court should decide that the apprentice had good cause
to leave his master, he was to be released from the indenture and
the master fined not more than $ioo, which was to be given to the
apprentice. Apprenticeship was to end at the age of twenty-one for
men and eighteen for women. Parents could bind out minor children
under the regulations of this act.^ It was a penal offence to sell or
give intoxicating liquors to apprentices or to gamble with them.^
The definition of vagrancy was extended to include stubborn and
refractory servants, laborers, and servants who loitered away their
time or refused, without cause, to comply with a contract for service.
A vagrant might be fined $50 and costs, and hired out until the fine
was paid, but could not be hired for a longer time than six months.
The proceeds of fines and hiring in all cases were to go to the county
treasury for the benefit of the poor.^
1 Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), pp. 128-131 (Act Feb. 23, 1866).
2 Penal Code, pp. 34, 35.
8 Penal Code of Ala., pp. 10-12; Acts of Ala. (i 865-1 866), pp. 119-121. This
was another act which the compilers refused to incorporate into the Penal Code. It
was an amendment to the law already on the statute books, and the constitution of
the state provided that the law revised or amended must be set forth in full (Article IV,
Section 2.) The next legislature repealed this and similar laws as being in conflict with
the Code. Acts of Ala. (1866-1867), pp. 107, 115, 504. It was never in force, being
practically repealed by the later adoption of the Penal Code, which had the old ante-
bellum law of vagrancy, which provided a fine of ^10 to ^50 for the first offence, and for
a second conviction, $50 to ^100 and hard labor for not more than six months. (See
Penal Code, p. 37). The laws regulating labor and vagrancy were so carelessly drawn
that it would have been practically impossible to enforce them. Not only were they
technically unconstitutional, but they were also in conflict with the provisions of the
Code. The consequence was confusion and the suspension of both Code and statutes.
Colonel Herbert, in "The Solid South" (pp. 31-36), gives a summary of similar laws
of the northern states which were more stringent than the Alabama laws. As a matter
THE NEGRO UNDER THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 383
These statutes form the so-called "Slave Code" or "Black Code"
of the state which was so harshly criticised by the Radicals as being
designed to reenslave the negroes/ There is no doubt that if enforced
they would have affected the blacks more than the whites, though
they were meant to apply to both.^ Something of the kind was felt
to be a necessity. There were hundreds of negroes wandering about
the country, living by petty theft, and some rascally whites made it
a business to purchase stolen property, especially cotton, from them.
White vagrants were numerous. The refuse of both armies and
numbers of the most worthless whites, who had lost all they had in
the war, travelled about the country as tramps, their sole occupation
being to victimize the ignorant by some scheme. Stringent laws,
strictly enforced, would have done much to restore order.^
The Negro under the Provisional Government
The lawlessness prevalent in the state consequent upon civil war
and emancipation had resulted in filling the jails with all sorts and
conditions of criminals — mostly negroes — who were charged with
minor offences, such as stealing, fighting, burning, which were com-
mitted during the jubilee after the coming of the Federal troops.
They were clearly guilty of the crimes alleged, since they were im-
prisoned by consent of the Freedmen's Bureau, which allowed no
negro to be arrested without its permission. There were some whites
confined for similar small offences, and there were many "union"
men, or "rebels," according to locality, who were under arrest for
crimes committed during the war. Most of the crimes were not seri-
of fact, all the states had similar laws, but in the South they had always been a dead
letter on the statute book.
1 See Blaine, " Twenty Years," Vol. II, p. 93.
2 It was not possible then, nor is it now, to pass any law in regard to labor contracts,
vagrancy, or minor crimes, that would not affect the negroes to a much greater degree
than the whites. All laws regulating society, if strictly enforced, would bear with much
greater force upon blacks than upon whites.
3 Neither Swayne nor Howard made any objection to the apprentice and vagrancy
laws, and so far as I can gather from the reports of General Swayne, they were not
enforced. If so, there were no results unfavorable to the freedmen. In 1901, in an
interview, Swayne stated that all measures that he considered objectionable had either
failed to pass the Senate or had been vetoed by the governor. He intimated that he
had a great deal to do with the suppression of such measures and the framing of new
•ones.
384 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
ous or were committed under the abnormal conditions of war. The
governor, after consultation with General Swayne, "with entire single-
ness of purpose" (Swayne), issued a proclamation of amnesty and
pardon* for all offences, except murder and rape, committed between
April 13, 1 86 1, and July 20, 1865.^ Many hundred prisoners were
thus liberated, among them eight hundred freedmen^ confined for
penitentiary offences. No bad results followed.*
By state law and military order the negro was now freed from
slavery and given all the civil rights possessed by the whites, unless
in certain cases of law between whites in the higher courts where the
negro was not permitted to testify. In all cases concerning his own
race, directly or indirectly, his standing before the court was the same
as that of a white or better. The races were forbidden to intermarry.
The apprentice and vagrancy laws, which were meant to regulate
the economic relations between the races, could not be enforced be-
cause of technical and practical difficulties, and because the officials
who were to enforce them were ex officio agents of the Bureau and
therefore forbidden to enforce such laws. The Bureau upheld the
negro in all his rights and much beyond. There was the most urgent
demand for his labor, and to secure his wages there was a lien on the
employer's crop. The negro was free to come and go when he
pleased, and his pleasure led him to do this so often that written
contracts fell into immediate disfavor on account of the useless liti-
gation and disputes that ensued. Many of the more thrifty blacks-
began to acquire small bits of property.
The travellers who visited the South in the fall of 1865 and in
1866 agreed (except Schurz) that there was no thought of reenslave-
ment of the negro by the white; that the white was more afraid of
the negro than the negro of the white ; that there was no need of
protection, for the demand for his labor would protect him. There
were more colored artisans than white, and all were sure of employ-
ment. At first the strong conviction that they were not free unless
they were careering around the country in idleness resulted in a gen-
1 Feb. 13, 1866.
2 The date of the beginning of the provisional government.
8 General Swayne's account.
^Montgomery Advertiser, Feb. 14, 1865; Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866;
Swayne's Testimony, Report Joint Committee, Pt. Ill, pp. 138-141.
THE NEGRO UNDER THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 385
eral wandering. In the fall and winter a large majority returned to
their old homes. "Once being assured of their hberty to go and
come at will, they generally returned to the service of the southerner." ^
The courts gave substantial justice, it was reported; the judge and
jury would prefer the case of a black to that of a mean white man;
negro testimony in lawsuits was more and more favored, and the
standing of the negro in the courts became more and more secure.
Conditions as to the treatment of the negroes were steadily improv-
ing.^ An unfriendly critic who travelled through the Gulf states
said that the negro was fairly well paid and fairly well treated.^ A
charge to the grand jury of Pike County by Judge Henry D. Clay-
ton, on September 9, 1866, will serve to show the sentiments of the
judicial officers and members of the bar as well as juries. It was
reprinted at the North as a campaign document. The following is a
summary : —
A certain class of our population is clothed with civil rights and
privileges that it did not possess until recently, and in deahng with
them some embarrassment will be felt. One of the results of the war
was the freedom of the black race. We deplore the result as injuri-
ous to the country and fatal to the negroes, but we are in honor bound
to observe the laws which acknowledge their freedom. "When I
took off my sword in surrender, I determined to observe the terms of
that surrender with the same earnestness and fidelity with which I
first shouldered my musket." We may cherish the glorious memo-
ries of that past, in the history of which there is nothing of which we
need be ashamed, but now we have to reestablish society and rebuild
our ruined homes. Those unwilHng to submit to this condition of
things may seek homes abroad." We are bound to this soil for better
or for worse. What is our duty ? Let us deal with the facts as they
are. The negro has been made free, though he did not seek freedom.
Nominally free, he is beyond expression helpless by his want of self-
reliance, of experience, of abihty to understand and appreciate his
condition. For promoting his welfare and adapting him to this new
1 Truman's Report, April 19, 1866; Mrs. Clayton, "White and Black," p. 152 ^/
passim; "Our Women in the ^zx," passim ; The Nation, Oct. 5, 1865; Reid and
Trowbridge.
2 Truman's Report, April 19, 1865. « The NaHon, Feb. 15, 1866.
♦ Referring to the emigration movement to Mexico, Brazil, Europe, etc.
2 c
386 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
relation to society, all agencies from abroad will prove inadequate.
The task is for us who understand him. To remedy the evil grow-
ing out of abolition two things are necessary: (i) we must recognize
the freedom of the race as a fact, enact just and humane laws, and
wilHngly enforce them; (2) we must in all our relations with the negro
treat him with perfect fairness. We shall thus convince the world
of our good faith, get rid of the system of espionage [the Freedmen's
Bureau] by removing the pretext for its necessity, and secure the
services of the negroes, teach them their place, and convince them
that we are their friends. We need the labor of the negro and it is
worth the effort to secure it. We owe the negro no grudge; he has
done nothing to provoke our hostility ; freedom was forced upon him.
''He may have been the companion of your boyhood; he may be
older than you, and perhaps carried you in his arms when an infant.
You may be bound to him by a thousand ties which only a southern
man knows, and which he alone can feel in all their force. It may be
that when, only a few years ago, you girded on your cartridge box
and shouldered your trusty rifle to go to meet the invaders of your
country, you committed to his care your home and your loved ones;
and when you were far away upon the weary march, upon the dread-
ful battle-field, in the trenches, and on the picket Kne, many and many
a time you thought of that faithful old negro, and your heart warmed
toward him." ^
Movement toward Negro Suffrage
The Freedmen's Bureau and the provisional government had set
aside, repealed, or suspended laws which treated the negro as a sepa-
rate class. It was soon seen that the civil government had little real
authority, being frequently overruled by the officials of the army
1 This charge was published in the general presentments of the Pike County grand
jury and was immediately taken up by the northern Democratic and the conservative
Republican papers and given a wide publication. Mrs. Clayton republished it in her
l)ook (pp. 156-165). Judge Clayton was disfranchised by the Reconstruction Acts, and
not until 1 874 was he again able to hold judicial office. The bench and bar were gen-
erally in favor of admitting the negro to the fullest standing in the courts. Under slav-
ery, when a case turned on negro testimony, extra-legal trials were often held and the
decision given by "lynch -law" jury, the court officials presiding. In 1865 the lawyers
and judges were ready to admit negro testimony, according to General Swayne, but
made more or less objection in order not to alienate those of the people who objected.
MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGRO SUFFRAGE 387
and Bureau and by the President. The civil officials became accus-
tomed to considering Swayne or Woods, the commander of the troops
in Alabama, rather than the state government, as the source of author-
ity. It was known that the Radicals were bent on giving the ballot
to the negro and on disfranchising southern political and military
leaders. Some poHticians began to consider the question of giving
the ballot to the negro under certain restrictions. This was not done
from any faith in the political intelligence of the negro, or behef that
he was fitted for or needed the exercise of the franchise ; for it was and
is an article of the poHtical faith of the southern people that the exer-
cise of suffrage is a high privilege, an historical and inherited right,
not the natural and absolute right of all men. The reasons were very
different, and were based entirely on expediency and necessity:
(i) Such action would forestall the Radical programme and disarm,
to some extent, the hostile party at the North. (2) It would enable
the native leaders, by conferring the privilege on the negro, to gain
his confidence, control his vote, and thereby make it harmless. It
was certain, it seemed, that two widely separated white political par-
ties would arise as soon as outside pressure should be removed, and
each hoped to get control of most of the negro vote. (3) Such a meas-
ure would increase the representation of the state in the Congress,
thus giving them needed strength at a critical period. (4) The Black
Belt hoped in this way to regain its former poHtical influence. The
new constitution, by making the white population the basis of repre-
sentation, had transferred poHtical supremacy to the white counties.
As early as October, 1865, Truman remarked that some leaders
were thinking of giving the ballot to the negroes. He thought that
suffrage for the negroes would harm them and would inflame the
lower classes of whites against them. But if left to the leaders and
politicians, they, for the sake of increased representation in Congress,
would bring the people around, and by 1870 the negro would be vot-
ing.^ About the same time a correspondent of The Nation observed
that there was no great objection to giving the negro the ballot because
the white leaders thought that they could control it. It would not
be opposed by the planters of the South, but by the middle and poorer
classes, — the merchants, mechanics, and laborers.^ Early in 1866
1 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 43, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
. 2 The Nation, Oct. 5, 1865.
388 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Representative Brooks ^ of Lowndes, a black county, introduced a
bill in the lower house providing for a qualified negro suffrage based
on education and property. It was laid on the table, but not before
a calm and dispassionate discussion. The bill proposed by Brooks
was opposed more because it disfranchised a large number of whites
than because it gave suffrage to the negro. The debates showed
that later the legislature would do something along that hne if assured
that such a course would result in readmission into the Union. In
the discussion the idea was urged that something must be done to
prevent the Radicals from taking the question of suffrage to the cen-
tral government. This, it was held, would be dangerous to the South,
with its peculiar population, to which general Federal legislation
would not well apply, and hence it would be dangerous for the suffrage
question to become one of national instead of state concern. Then,
too, the people were intensely weary of provisional rule, and wanted
to resume their proper position in the Union.^
The people of the north Alabama white counties, the hilly section
of the state, were opposed to any form of negro suffrage, though some
of their leaders who understood the state of affairs were willing to
think of it as a last resort to defeat the intentions of the Radicals.
The Black Belt people, who had less prejudice against the negro and
who were sure that they could control him and gain in poHtical
power, were more favorably inchned. Left alone, the various inter-
ests would have united to carry through the project in time. Suffrage
so conferred upon the blacks would have been strictly hmited, — a
premium offered, not a right acknowledged, — under the control of
the native white leaders and supporting their interests, just exactly
the situation of the lower-class voters everywhere else, and the reverse
of the southern situation since 1867.
One of the north Alabama leaders, L. Pope Walker,^ after consult-
ing with other prominent men, went to Montgomery and conferred
with General Swayne in regard to the state of affairs. Swayne gave
assurance that a qualified negro suffrage would be favorably received
1 Brooks was a cousin of Preston Brooks of South Carolina, and had been president
of the convention of 1861. The measure was indorsed by Governor Patton, Judge
Goldthwaite, and a respectable minority. Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 226.
2 McPherson's scrap-book, " Fourteenth Amendment," p. 55.
* First Confederate Secretary of War, brigadier-general, C.S.A.
MOVEMENT TOWARD NEGRO SUFFRAGE
389
at the North, would create a good impression, and assist, perhaps,
in an early restoration of the state to the Union. He knew that
suffrage for the negro brought about in this way would result in gain-
ing the black vote for the southern and probably for the Democratic
party. Though a behever in the rights of all men to vote and a strong
RepubHcan, Swayne was not then committed to the Radical pro-
gramme and was ready to encourage the movement. An opportu-
nity for the entering wedge was now at hand. Many of the minor
magistrates and the sheriffs were also administering the affairs of the
Freedmen's Bureau, and consequently were more or less under the
direction of Swayne, who was the assistant commissioner in Alabama.
His instructions to agents, before the convention, directed that all
laws be administered without regard to color. Governor Parsons
approved these directions and required all provisional officers to take
oath accordingly. The convention sanctioned this arrangement,
and ordered it to continue until the close of the next general assembly.
This general assembly had practically continued the arrangements
already made. In consequence, the state officials, whether willingly
or not, were still, at the time when the movement for negro suffrage
began, obhged to obey the directions of Swayne. The bulk of the
people being opposed to the movement, it was proposed to make an
experiment on the responsibiHty of the Freedmen's Bureau and to
use that much-disHked institution as an instrument, for the people
would not be much surprised at anything it would do. So the sheriff
of Madison County, in the winter of 1866-1867, when some local
election was at hand, wrote to General Swayne, asking if the election
laws also were to be carried out regardless of color. He announced
his wilHngness to carry out instructions. Here was an opportunity
to begin the experiment, but pubHc feeling became so irritated by the
Radical measures in Congress that nothing was done, the election
was not held, and the Reconstruction Acts, coming soon after, preju-
diced the people more strongly than ever against anything of the
kind.^
1 For this incident my authority is a statement of General Swayne made to me in
1901. He was much interested in the movement, and was positive that in time the
native whites would have given the suffrage to the negro had not the Reconstruction
Acts and other legislation so alienated the races. General Swayne gave me full explana-
tions of his policy in Alabama. His death, a year after the interview, prevented him
from verifying some details. His account, though given thirty-five years after the occur-
390 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
About December i, 1866, a bill was introduced into the state- j
legislature ''to amend the constitution of the state according to im-
partial suffrage, and then ask representation, leaving the amnesty^
question in the hand of Congress." Reporting this action to Chief
Justice Chase, Swayne added: "This I am told is popular, and the
member is sustained by his constituents." ^ The legislature, at the
same time, intended to reject the Fourteenth Amendment.
It has been stated that in February, 1867, an effort was made,
with the indorsement of the President, to induce the southern legis-
latures which had rejected the Fourteenth Amendment to adopt a
quahfied negro suffrage. This was tried in Alabama and North
Carohna, and probably hastened congressional Reconstruction.^
With the passage of the Reconstruction Acts and other congres-
sional action in regard to the negroes, affairs changed complexion
rapidly. The alienation of the races began. It was seen that the
negro vote would now be controlled by worthless outsiders and native
whites. The expected division of the whites into two well-defined
parties did not occur; there was an almost united white party. A
few whites, indeed, there were who were ready to try negro suffrage,
not those, however, who had been thinking of it during the past two
years. The result of the war had intensified party spirit. The old
"Union" men were intensely bitter against the secessionists or "pre-
cipitators," and in the present crisis some otherwise good citizens
were so blinded by party passion as to put revenge above the welfare
of their country, and were ready to accept the aid of their former slaves
in their fight against the men whom they considered responsible for
the present condition of affairs. Others who now took up negro
suffrage were mere poHticians, content to take office at any price to
the country, and who could never hope for office until existing insti-
tutions were destroyed.^
rences, was correct so far as I could compare it with the printed matter available. It
agreed almost exactly with his reports as printed in the public documents, though he
had not those at hand, and had not seen them for thirty years. I have several times
been told by old citizens that negroes voted in 1866, in minor elections, by consent of
the whites.
1 " Diary and Correspondence of S. P. Chase," in the Annual Report of the Amer.
Hist. Assn. (1902), Vol. II, p. 517.
2 Stephen B. Weeks, in Polit. Set. Quarterly (1894), Vol. IX, pp. 683-684.
8 See Herbert, "Solid South," pp. 29, 30, 37.
NEW CONDITIONS OF CONGRESS 391
New Conditions of Congress and Increasing Irritation
The first general assembly under the provisional government rati-
fied the Thirteenth Amendment, ''with.the understanding that it does
not confer upon Congress the power to legislate upon the poHtical
status of freedmen in this state." ^ The same legislature requested
the President to order the withdrawal of the Federal troops on duty
in Alabama, for their presence was a source of much disorder and
there was no need of them.^
The President was asked to release Hon. C. C. Clay, Jr., who
was still in prison.^ At the end of the session a resolution was adopted
approving the poHcy of President Johnson and pledging cooperation
with his "wise, firm, and just" work; asserting that the results of
the late contest were conclusive, and that there was no desire to renew
discussion on settled questions; denouncing the misrepresentations
and criminal assaults on the character and interest of the southern
people; declaring that it was a misfortune of the present political
conditions that there were persons among them whose inter-
ests were promoted by false representations; confidence was ex-
pressed in the power of the administration to protect the state from
malign influences; slavery was abolished and should not be rees-
tabhshed; the negro race should be treated with humanity, justice,
and good faith, and every means be used to make them useful and
inteUigent members of society; but "Alabama will not voluntarily
consent to change the adjustment of pohtical power as fixed by the
Constitution of the United States, and to constrain her to do so in
her present prostrate and helpless condition, with no voice in the
councils of the nation, would be an unjustifiable breach of faith." *
During the year 1866 there was a growing spirit of independence
in the Alabama poHtics. At no time had there been a subservient
spirit, but for a time the people, fully accepting the results of the
war, were disposed to do nothing more than conform to any reasonable
conditions which might be imposed, feehng sure that the North would
1 Resolution, Dec. 2, 1865, Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), p. 598.
2 Resolution, Jan. 16, 1866, Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), p. 603.
3 Resolution, Dec. 15, 1865, Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), p. 604.
* Resolution, Feb. 22, 1866, Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), p. 607; McPherson, p. 22;
Se/ma Times, P'eb. 27, 1867.
392 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
impose none that were dishonorable. To them at first the President
represented the feeUng of the people of the North, perhaps worse.
The theory of state sovereignty having been destroyed by the war,
the state rights theories of Lincoln and Johnson were easily accepted
by the southerners, who were content, after Johnson had modified
his policy, to leave affairs in his hands. When the serious differences
between the executive and Congress appeared, and the latter showed
a desire to impose degrading terms on the South, the people believed
that their only hope was in Johnson. They believed the course of
Congress to be inspired by a desire for revenge. Heretofore the
people had taken Httle interest in public affairs. Enough voters went
to the polls and voted to establish and keep in operation the provi-
sional government. The general belief was that the political ques-
tions would settle themselves or be settled in a manner fairly
satisfactory to the South. Now a different spirit arose. The south-
erners thought that they had compHed with all the conditions ever
asked that could be complied with without loss of self-respect.
The new conditions of Congress exhausted their patience and irri-
tated their pride. Self-respecting men could not tamely submit to
such treatment.*
During the latter part of 1865 and in 1866, ex-Governor Parsons
travelled over the North, speaking in the chief cities in support of
the policy of the President. He asked the northern people to rebuke
at the polls the political fanatics who were inflaming the minds of the
people North and South. He demanded the withdrawal of the mili-
tary. There had been, he said, no sign of hostiHty since the surrender ;
the people were opposed to any legislation which would give the negro
the right to vote; and it was the duty of the President, not of Con-
gress, to enforce the laws.^
Much angry discussion was caused by the passage of the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill in 1866. The Bureau officials had caused them-
selves to be hated by the whites. They were a nuisance, when no
worse, and useless, — a plague to the people. Though there were
comparatively few in the state, they were the cause of disorder and
ill-feeling between the races. Though there was now even less need
of the institution than a year before, the new measure was much more
^ See N. Y. Herald, April 17, 1866 (Alabama correspondence).
■■2 McPhersoii's scrap-book, "The Campaign of 1866," Vol. I, pp. 84, 122.
NEW CONDITIONS OF CONGRESS 393
offensive in its provisions.^ There was great rejoicing when the
President vetoed the bill, which the Mobile Times called ''an infamous
disorganization scheme of radicahsm." The Bureau had become a
poHtical machine for work among white and black. The passage
of the bill over the veto was felt to be a blow at the prostrate
South.'
The Civil Rights Bill of 1866 was also a cause of irritation. There
was a disposition among the officials of the Freedmen's Bureau to
enforce all such measures before they became law. Orders were
issued directing the application of the principles of measures then
before Congress. The United States commissioner in Mobile de-
cided that under the "Civil Rights Bill" ^ negroes could ride on the
cars set apart for the whites. Horton, the Radical miUtary mayor
of Mobile, banished to New Orleans an idiotic negro boy who had
been hired to follow him and torment him by offensive questions.
Horton was indicted under the "Civil Rights Bill" and convicted.
The people of Mobile were much pleased when a "Yankee official
was the first to be caught in the trap set for southerners." ^
Another citizen of Mobile, a magistrate, was haled before a Fed-
eral court, charged with having sentenced a negro to be whipped,
contrary to the provisions of the " Civil Rights Bill." The magistrate
explained that there was nothing at all offensive about the whip-
ping. He had not acted in his magisterial capacity, but had him-
self whipped the negro boy for lying, stealing, and neglect of duty
while in his employ.^ The agent of the Bureau at Selma notified
the mayor that the "chain gang system of working convicts on the
streets had to be discontinued or he would be prosecuted for violation
of the ' Civil Rights Bill.' " ^ Judge Hardy of Selma decided in a case
brought before him that the "Civil Rights Bill" was unconstitu-
tional. He declared it to be an attack on the independence of the
judiciary.^
1 See Burgess, " Reconstruction," pp. 64-67.
2 McPherson's scrap-book, "Freedmen's Bureau Bill, 1866," pp. 47, 128.
3 The reconstruction laws of Congress were almost invariably referred to as " Bills "
even in official documents and military orders.
4 McPherson's scrap-book, "Civil Rights Bill, 1866," pp. 136, 151.
^ McPherson's scrap-book, "Civil Rights Bill, 1866," p. 135.
6 McPherson's scrap-book, " Civil Rights Bill, 1866," p. no.
■^ McPherson's scrap-book, "Civil Rights Bill, 1866," p. 120.
394 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment
In the fall of 1866 the proposed Fourteenth Amendment w'<
submitted to the legislature. There was no longer any belief that
further yielding would do any good; the more the people gave the
more was asked. State Senator E. A. Powell wrote to John W.
Forney that the people would do nothing about the Fourteenth
Amendment because they were convinced that any action would be
useless. Condition after condition had been imposed and had been
absolved; slavery had been abohshed, secession acknowledged a
failure, and the war debt repudiated by the convention; the legisla-
ture had ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, had secured the negro
in all the rights of property and person; and after all the state was
no nearer to restoration.^ This was the view of nearly all the news-
papers of the state, and in this they represented popular opinion.
They were intensely irritated by the fact that, although they had made
so many concessions, still they were excluded from representation
in Congress, and were heavily and unjustly taxed.^ Moreover,
they were opposed to the amendment because it branded their best
men as traitors.^ One newspaper, alone, advocated adoption of
the amendment as the least of evils.^
John Forsyth, in the Mobile Register, said: ''It is one thing to
be oppressed, wronged, and outraged by overwhelming force. It is
quite another to submit to voluntary abasement" by adopting the
Fourteenth Amendment. It should be rejected, he said, because it
would disfranchise the very best of the respectable whites, the beloved
leaders of the people. Judge Busteed, in a charge to the Federal
grand jury, delivered a pohtical harangue advocating the adoption
of the Amendment. Many ultra "union" men in north Alabama
opposed the Amendment for three reasons: (i) though it would dis-
franchise the leaders, the great mass of the white people would still
be allowed to vote, especially those who had not held civil office dur-
ing the war; (2) some of these "union" men had been ardent seces-
sionists at the beginning and had thus compromised themselves,
1 McPherson's scrap-book, " Fourteenth Amendment," pp. ^^, 34.
2 The cotton tax, for instance.
8 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 226.
* N. V. Tribune, Nov. 30, 1866. I have not been able to discover what the name
of the paper was, but very likely it was the Mobile National.
REJECTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 395
or had been elected to the legislature or to some ''bomb-proof" office
during the war — as ''obstructionists," they claimed — and the pro-
posed amendment would disfranchise them along with the Confeder-
ate leaders ; (3) this class as a rule disHked the negro and never wanted
negro suffrage if it were possible to secure the overthrow of existing
institutions without it. Two planters of the Black Belt were ready
for negro suffrage to one "buckra." ^ Those men who considered
themselves "unionists" wanted no negro suffrage, nor anything
so weak as the Fourteenth Amendment ; but desired some kind of a
mihtary regime in which the United States government should place
them in permanent possession of the state administration and exclude
all who were not like themselves. The test should be a poHtical
one, they said. It seems to be a fact that a few hundred such men
with, at the most, five thousand followers expected to have the whole
state administration under their direction for years. Yet it would
have required a special law of exemption for each of them in order
to protect them from the proscription which was to be visited upon
the ex- Confederates. For these "unionists" had often betrayed
both sides during the war. Their most patriotic duty had been
"obstruction."
By most persons the question of negro political rights was con-
sidered to belong to the state and was not a matter for the Federal
government to regulate. "Loyalists" as well as "rebels" were afraid
to leave negro affairs to the regulation of Congress. In his annual
message to the legislature, in November, 1866, Governor Patton
advised the legislature not to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,
on the ground that it could do no good and might do harm. It
involved a creation of a penalty after the act. On this point, he said
that it was an ex post facto law, and contrary to the whole spirit of
modern civilization ; that such a mode of dealing with citizens charged
with offences against government belonged only to despotic tyrants;
that it might accomplish revengeful purposes, but that was not the
proper mode of administering justice; that adoption would vacate
merely all offices in most of the unrepresented states — governors,
judges, legislators, sheriffs, justices of peace, constables — and the
state governments would be completely broken up and reduced to
utter and hopeless anarchy; that the disabilities imposed by the
1 McPherson's scrap-book, " P^ourteenth Amendment," pp. 39, 55, 56.
396 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
test oath were seriously detrimental to the interests of the govern-
ment; that ratification of the Amendment could not accompHsh any
good to the country and might bring upon it irretrievable disaster/
Under the circumstances, the legislature refused to consider
the Amendment. But the governor during the next fev^ wrecks v^as
induced by various considerations to recommend the ratification,
and on December 7, 1866, he sent a special message stating that
there v^as a purpose on the part of those v^ho controlled the national
legislation to enforce their own terms of restoration at all hazards;
and that their measures would immeasurably augment the distress
already existing and inaugurate endless confusion. The cardinal
principle of restoration seemed to be, he said, favorable action on
the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon principle he was opposed to
it. Yet necessity must rule. So now he recommended reconsidera-
tion. If they should ratify and restoration should follow, they might
trust to time and their representatives to mitigate its harshness.
If they should ratify and admission should be delayed, it would serve
as a warning to other states and thus prevent the necessary number
for ratification.^
The message created excitement in the legislature and the chances
were favorable for ratification; but ex-Governor Parsons, who was in
the North, advised against it. He thought the northern people would
support the President in the matter. The legislature refused to
ratify by a vote of 27 to 2 in the Senate, and 69 to 8 in the House. ^
Potter of Cherokee gave notice that on January 15 he would move
to reconsider the vote. Governor Patton, moreover, was convinced
1 Governor's Message, Nov. 12, 1866, in House Journal (i 866-1 867), p. 35 ; N. Y.
Tribune, Nov. 19, 1866 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1866), pp. ii, 12.
2 House Journal (1866-1867), p. 198.
8 McPherson, p. 194; McPherson's scrap-book, "Fourteenth Amendment," p. 55;
N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1867. General Wager Swayne to S. P. Chase, Dec. 10, 1866,
wrote, in substance, that — the evident intention of Congress to enforce its own plan
makes it s#em possible to secure from the Alabama legislature the ratification of the
Amendment ; that the Senate was ready to ratify in spite of the governor's message
against it, and of the certain disapproval of " the people, poor, ignorant, and without
mail facilities," but a despatch had been sent to Parsons in the North for advice, and he
advised rejection; inspired, it was asserted by the President, the cry was raised, "we
can't desert our President," and the measure was lost ; but when they return (in Janu-
ary) they will be prepared for either course, and the governor will recommend ratifica-
tion. " Diary and Correspondence of S. P. Chase," in the Annual Kept, of the Amer.
Hist. Assn. (1902), Vol. II, pp. 516-517.
REJECTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 397
that Congress meant to carry out its plan of reconstruction, and that
opposition might make matters worse. General Swayne kept a
strong pressure upon him, assuring him that Congress would have
its own way. During the Christmas hohdays the governor made
speeches in north Alabama in favor of ratifying the Amendment.
Congress would require it, he said. On principle he opposed the
measure, but it must come at last. "Look the situation squarely in
the face," he said; only 2000 or 3000 men (himself included) would
be deprived of office, and to oppose Congress was to ruin the state, to
territorialize it. There were men in Washington, he said, who were
already working in order to be made provisional governor under the
new regime.^ After the recess Patton sent a second message recom-
mending that the Amendment be adopted, since it was the evident
purpose of Congress to enforce their own terms.^ For a day or two
it was considered. General Swayne and the governor using their influ-
ence with the members, and it seemed almost sure to be ratified. But
Parsons, then in Montgomery, telegraphed (January 17, 1867) to
the President that the legislature was reconsidering the Amendment.
Johnson replied saying that no possible good could come of such
action; that he did not believe the people of the country would sus-
tain "any set of individuals" in attempts to change the whole charac-
ter of the government, but that they would uphold those who stood by
the Constitution; and that there should be no faltering on the part
of those who were determined to sustain the coordinate departments
of the government in accordance with its original design. For the
third time the Amendment failed to pass.^ One of the last resolutions
passed by the provisional legislature before it was abolished by the
Reconstruction Acts was on February i, 1867, in regard to memori-
ahzing Congress to estabhsh a uniform system of bankruptcy. Relief
was needed, they stated, "yet the promptings of self-respect forbid
the propriety of further intruding our appeals upon a Congress which
refuses to recognize the state of Alabama for any purpose other than
. that of taxation. It is a source of regret that Congress has assumed
1 N. V. Times, Jan. 9, 1867. Patton also went to Washington during the recess.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1866), pp. ii, 12.
3 McPherson, pp. 352, 353; McPherson's scrap-book, "Fourteenth Amendment,"
pp. 60, 66. The telegrams are in the Impeachment Testimony, Vol. I, pp. 271-272.
Interview with General Swayne, 1 901.
398 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
an attitude toward the state of Alabama totally incompatible with
the mutual obHgations of allegiance and protection." ^
Political Conditions, 1 865-1 867; Formation of Parties
In the convention of 1865 two well-defined parties had appeared,
though generally, at that time, for the sake of harmony they acted
together. These parties grew farther and farther apart. One of
them, consisting of most of the people, especially of the central and
southern section of the state, supported the policy of the President.
The other party was a motley opposition. In it were the few original
*' Union" men, the tories, and many more self-styled "union" men,
who saw an opportunity for advancement for themselves if the present
government were overthrown. There were others who thought that
the old ruling class should now retire absolutely from public Hfe and
allow their former followers to take their places. There was a fair
sprinkling of respectable men who were bitterly opposed to any party
or policy that suited the former Democrats, and beheving that Con-
gress would not be too severe, they were willing to see three or four
thousand of the leaders disfranchised in order to get the state back
into the Union. They were willing also to become leaders them-
selves in the place of those disfranchised.
During the year 1866 these parties were organized to some degree,
held meetings, and made bids for northern support. The opposition
worked into the hands of the Radical party at the North, though
many of them did not favor the full Radical programme, especially as
regarded negro suffrage. The other party took the name of the
''Conservative" or "Democratic and Conservative." It was composed
of former Democrats, Whigs, Know-nothings, Anti-Know-nothings,
Bell and Everett men, — nearly all of the respectable voting people.
These alhed with the "Conservative" party in other southern states
and with the Democrats in the North and formed the "National
Union Party." Its platform was essentially the presidential plan of
Reconstruction.^ The campaign of 1866 was made on many issues,
— the Civil Rights Bill, Freedmen's Bureau Bill, Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the plans of Reconstruction. Ex- Governor Parsons and other
prominent Alabamians spoke in the cities of the North in support of
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 15. 2 gee McPherson, pp. 118, 240, 241.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1865-1867 399
the policy of the President. Ex-Governor Shorter, in a public letter,
said that he had been a "rebel" until the close of the war, and under-
stood the feeling of the people of Alabama. There had not been
since the surrender and there was not now, he said, any antagonism
to the United States government, and Reconstruction based on the
assumption of this would be harmful and hopeless. The people had
given their allegiance to the government and had remodelled their
state organizations in good faith. ^
''Southern outrages" now began afresh. The Radical press and
Radical politicians began to manufacture tales of outrage and cruelty
on the part of the southern whites against negroes. There had
been all along a disposition to look for "outrages" in the South, and
the reports of Schurz and the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
seemed to put the seal of truth on the tissue of falsehoods, and for
campaign purposes "outrages" were increased. For several years,
judging from some accounts, the entire white population — men,
women, and children — must have given much of their time to perse-
cuting, beating, and kiUing negroes and .northern men. The Radical
papers seized upon the silly things said or done by the idlers of
bar-rooms and street corners or printed in the small newspapers and
magnified them into the "threatening voice of a whole people."
Against this mistake General Swayne repeatedly protested. He had
no special Hking for the southern people, but he scorned to misrepre-
sent the true state of affairs for political capital. During his stay in
the state (more than two years) the tenor of his reports was : There
was no trouble from the southern whites; northern men were wel-
comed in a business way; disorder and lawlessness existed in sec-
tions of the state, but this was a natural result of long war and civil
strife among the people. In his reports, Swayne repeatedly stated
that as time went on the condition of affairs was gradually improv-
ing. Newspaper correspondents sent to write up conditions in the
South went among the most worthless part of the population, in bar-
rooms, hotel lobbies, on street corners, in country groceries, and
wrote up the doings and sayings of these people as representative of
all. Even E. L. Godkin was not above doing such a thing at times.^
1 N. V. Herald, July 19, 1 866.
2 According to his own report. See Nation, Feb. 15, 1866. Mart, " American His-
tory as told by Contemporaries," Vol. IV, p. 49.
400 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
These writers carefully recorded the idle talk about the negro and the
North and dressed it up for Radical information. A favorite plan
was to find some woman, coarse and vulgar and cruel-minded, and
describe her ^and her speeches as representative of southern women.
The southern newspapers repubhshed such correspondence as speci-
mens of Radical methods. The whites were more and more irritated.
This aggravating correspondence and the more aggravating editorials
continued in some papers long after the Reconstruction period.^
On the other hand, northern men received Httle or no social wel-
come in the South. Most of them would not have been sought after
in any section; few representatives of northern culture came South.
The indiscretions of some caused the ostracism of all. But that was
not the sole reason. General Swayne seemed surprised at '' social
exclusion" and mentioned it before the Reconstruction sub-committee.
But, said an Alabama correspondent, what else can he expect ? Why
is he surprised? Can the sister, the mother, and the father who
have lost their loved ones care to meet those who did the deeds ? They
meet with respectful treatment ; let them not ask too much.^
What the people needed and wanted was a settled and certain pol-
icy. The mixed administrations of the provisional authorities and
the President, of the Freedmen's Bureau and the army, did not result
in respect for the laws. The talk of confiscation and disfranchise-
ment kept the people irritated. They thought that they had already
comphed with the conditions imposed precedent to admission to the
Union and now beHeved that Congress was acting in bad faith. Many
were willing to affihate even with conservative Republicans in order
to overthrow the Radicals. Much was hoped for in the way of good
results from the ''National Union" movement. Few or none of the
northern business men in the state thought that the Radical plan
was necessary. They did not expect or desire its success.^
1 Report of B. C.Truman, April 9, 1866 ; Report of Joint Committee, 1866, Pt. Ill,
passim; Report of Schurz with accompanying documents; N. Y. Times, Sept. 9 and
Oct. 3, 1866; Nation, Feb. 15, et passim ; World and Tribune; Herald and Tribune
correspondent, 1865 ; Montgomery Mail and Advertiser ; Selma Times ; Tuscaloosa
Monitor and Blade, 1865 to 1875. Of the New York papers the A^(2//<?» and Tribune
were especially violent at first, but changed later. The Times and the Herald had fair
correspondents most of the time.
2 N. v. Daily News, May 7, 1866 (Montgomery correspondent).
3 See N. Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1866 (Federal soldier), Oct. 3, 1866 (Ohio man) ; N. Y.
News, May 7, 1866 (Montgomery correspondent).
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1865-1867 401
There was a convention of the Conservative party at Selma in
July, 1866. Delegates were elected to the National Union conven-
tion at Philadelphia/ The Selma convention indorsed the policy of
Johnson and condemned the Radical party as the great obstacle to
peace. The most prominent njpn of the state were present, repre-
senting both of the old parties — Whigs and Democrats.^ The na-
tional platform adopted in Philadelphia stated the principles to which
the southerners had now committed themselves, viz. : the war had
decided the national character of the Constitution; but the restric-
tions imposed by it upon the general government were unchanged
and the rights and authority of the states were unimpaired; repre-
sentation in Congress and in the electoral college was a right guaran-
teed by the Constitution to every state, and Congress had no power
to deny such right; Congress had no power to regulate the suffrage;
there is no right of withdrawal from the Union ; amendments to the
Constitution must be made as provided for by the Constitution, and
all states had the right to a vote on an amendment; negroes should
receive protection in all rights of person and property; the national
debt was declared inviolable, the Confederate debt utterly invalid;
and Andrew Johnson's administration was indorsed.^
Ex-Governor Parsons and others from Alabama spoke in New
York, New Jersey, Maine, and Pennsylvania, at National Union meet-
ings. Parsons told the North that the conservative people of Alabama
were in charge of the administration, and would not send extreme
men to Congress; the representatives chosen had opposed secession.
The "Union" party, — a large one in the state, — he said, had hoped
that after the war each individual would have to answer for himself,
but instead all were suffering in common.'*
1 Lewis E. Parsons (New York), Whig; George S. Houston; A. B. Cooper (New
Jersey), Whig ; John Forsyth, State Rights Democrat ; R. B. Lindsay (Scotch), Douglas
Democrat ; James W. Taylor, Whig ; Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Douglas Democrat.
2 Some of them were W. H. Crenshaw (Democrat), who presided, — Crenshaw was
then president of the Senate ; John G. Shorter (Democrat), war governor of Alabama ;
H. D. Clayton (Whig), Confederate general ; C. C. Langdon (Whig) ; William S. Mudd
(Whig) ; William Garrett (Whig) ; M. J. Bulger (Douglas Democrat), Confederate
general; C. A. Battle (Democrat), Confederate general; A. Tyson (Whig). See
Brewer and Garrett, and N. V. Times, Aug. 3 and 9, 1866.
2 McPherson, pp. 240, 241.
* N. V. Times, Aug. 27, 1866. By "Union" party. Parsons evidently meant those
who opposed secession.
2 D
^
402 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The opposition party was weak in numbers and especially weak
in leaders. The tory and deserter element, with a few from the
obstructionists of the war time and malcontents of the present who
wanted office, made up the native portion of the party. Northern
adventurers, principally agents of tlie Freedmen's Bureau, teachers
and missionaries, and men who had failed to succeed in some south-
ern speculation, with a number of those who follow in the path of
armies to secure the spoils, composed the ahen wing of the opposition
party.^ The fundamental principle upon which the existence of the
party was based required the destruction of present institutions and
the creation of a new pohtical people who should be kept in power by
Federal authority. The northern soldiers of fortune saw at once that
it would be necessary to give the ballot to the negro. The native
Radicals dishked the idea of negro suffrage and seemed to think that
the central government should proscribe all others, place them in
power and hold them there by armed force until they could create a
party.
Such a party could secure a northern alhance only with the extreme
Radical wing of the Repubhcan party. A convention of "Southern
Unionists" was held in Washington, in July, 1866, which issued an
address to the "loyahsts" of the South, declaring that the reconstruc-
tion of the southern state governments must be based on constitu-
tional principles, and the present despotism under an atrocious
leadership must not be permitted to remain ; the rights of the citizens
must not be left to the protection of the states, but Congress must
take charge of the matter and make protection coextensive with citi-
zenship; under the present state governments, with "rebels" con-
trolling, there would be no safety for loyalists, — they must rely on
Congress for protection. A meeting of "southern loyaHsts " was called
to be held in September, in Independence Hall in Philadelphia.^
The Alabama delegates to this convention were George Reese, D. H.
Bingham, M. J. Saffold, and J. H. Larcombe. This Philadelphia
convention condemned the "rebellion as unparalleled for its causeless-
ness, its cruelty, and its criminaHty." "The unhappy pohcy" of the
President was "unjust, oppressive, and intolerable." The pohcy of
Congress was indorsed, but regret was expressed that it did not pro-
1 The northern business men were on the side of the whites.
2 McPherson, p. 124.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1865-1867 403
Me by law for the greater security of the "loyal" people in the
.uthern states. Demand was made for "the estabhshment of in-
fluences of patriotism and justice" in each of the southern states.
Washington, Lincoln, the Declaration of Independence, Philadelphia,
and Independence Hall — all w^re brought in. The question of
negro suffrage was discussed, and most of the delegates favored it.
Of the five delegates from Alabama, two announced themselves
against it.^ At a Radical convention in Philadelphia about the same
time the delegates from Alabama were Albert Griffin, an adventurer
from Ohio; D. H. Bingham, a bitter tory, almost demented with
hate; and M. J. Saffold, who had been an obstructionist during
the war. Here was the beginning of the alHance of carpet-bagger
and scalawag that was destined to ruin the state in six years of peace
worse than four years of war had done. The convention indulged
in unstinted abuse of Johnson and demanded "no mercy" for Davis.
Bingham was one of the committee that presented the hysterical report
demanding the destruction of the provisional governments in the
South. Saffold opposed the negro suffrage plank. He had no preju-
dice himself, he explained, but thought it was not expedient. He
was hissed and evidently brought to the correct opinion.^
After the report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction in 1866
it was beheved by the Radicals that Congress would be victorious over
the President, and the party in Alabama that expected to control the
government under the new regime began to hold meetings and organ-
ize preparatory to dividing the offices. January 8-9, 1867, a thinly
attended "Unconditional Union Mass-meeting" was held at Moulton,
in Lawrence County. Eleven of the counties of north Alabama were
represented, the hill and mountain people predominating. Nicholas
Davis, who presided, said that none but "loyal" men must control
the states, lately in rebellion.^ The action of Congress was com-
1 McPherson, p. 242. 2 j^^ y. Times, Sept. 8, 1866.
3 Davis was of good middle-class Virginia stock. A Whig in politics, Mrs. Chesnut
called him " a social curiosity." In convention of 1861 he voted against immediate se-
cession, threatened resistance among the hills of north Alabama, and ended by signing
the ordinance of secession ; was chosen to succeed Dr. Fearn in the Confederate Pro-
visional Congress; was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 19th Alabama Infantry, but
declined ; commanded a battalion for a while ; his "loyalty" consisted in his leaving the
Confederate service and returning to Huntsville within the Federal lines. Brewer,
p. 365, (Barrett, pp. 341, 342; Smith's Debates, passim. He soon fell out with the carpet-
baggers and " formed a party of one."
404 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
mended by the convention; the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
was indorsed; and Congress was asked to distinguish between the
"precipitators" and those " coerced or otherwise led by the usurpers." ^
They asked for $ioo a year bounty for all Union soldiers from north
Alabama, and for the compensation of Unionists for property lost
during the war. The leaders here present were Freedmen's Bureau
agents, Confederate deserters, and former obstructionists.^
A "Union" convention was held in Huntsville, March 4, 1867.
Seventeen north Alabama counties were represented by much the
same crowd that attended the Moulton convention.^ General Swayne
was there, carried along by the current, and, it was said, hoping for
high office under the new regime.^ The convention declared that a
large portion of the people of the South had been opposed to secession,
but rather than have civil war at home had acquiesced in the revolu
tion; that the true position of these "unionists" now was with the
party that would protect them against future rebeUion ; it was neces
sary that the Federal government be strengthened; the "union"
men of each county were asked to hold meetings and send delegates
to a state convention to be held during the summer.^
The spring of 1867 saw the white Radical party stronger than it
ever was again. The few native whites who were to take part in
the Reconstruction had chosen their side. After this time the party
gradually lost all its respectable members. The carpet-baggers and
1 The disposition of some of the north Alabama leaders (even among the Con-
servatives) to play the childish act was one of the disgusting features of Reconstruction.
^ N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1867. Among those present were: D. C. Humphreys
(Douglas Democrat), Confederate officer, who deserted to Federals (he was in the
first carpet-bag legislature, and later judge of the Supreme Court of the District of Colum-
bia; see Garrett, p. 364); John B. Callis, agent of the Freedmen's Bureau, Veteran
Reserve Corps, member of Congress, 1868 ; C. C. Sheets, in convention of 1861, refused
to sign ordinance of secession and deserted to Federals, a member of Congress, 1868 ;
Thomas M. Peters, Whig, deserted to Federals, later judge of Supreme Court of Ala-
bama (see Brewer, p. 309 ; Garrett, p. 440) ; F. W. Sykes, member of legislature dur-
ing war, soon returned to Conservative party (Brewer, p. 309); J.J. Hinds, afterward
a notorious scalawag.
^ One new man was S. C. Posey of Lauderdale, who had been in the convention of
1861 and refused to sign the ordinance of secession and was in the legislature during
the war. Returned soon to Conservative party. Brewer, p. 299, Garrett, p. 389.
* The Radical party might have done much worse than to send him to the Senate.
Warren and Spencer, the senators elected, were far inferior in character and abilities to
Swayne. He was too decent a man to suit the Radicals and was soon dropped.
6 N. Y. Herald, March 6, 1867.
POLITICAL CONDITIONS, 1865-1867 405
Bureau agents had not yet shown their strength. The scalawags did
not foresee that to the carpet-baggers would fall the Hon's share of
the plunder, owing to their control over the negro vote.
The President's plan failed, not because of any inherent defect in
itself, but because of the bunghng manner in which it was adminis-
tered. If President Jonhson had been content to place confidence in
any one of the agencies to which were intrusted the government of
the South, it would have been better. Had the governments set up
by him been endowed with vigor, it is probable that Congress would
not have fallen wholly under the control of the Radicals. The pen-
alty for the indiscretions of the President was visited upon the South.
To-day the southern people like to believe that, had Lincoln lived,
his pohcy would have succeeded, and the horrors of Reconstruction
would have been mitigated or prevented. Johnson's policy was that
of Lincoln, except that he reserved to himself a much larger part in
setting up and running the provisional governments. He estabhshed
state governments, pronounced them constitutional, completed, per-
fected, and asked Congress to recognize them before he had proclaimed
the rebelHon at an end or restored the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus}
He interfered himself, and allowed or ordered the army to inter-
fere, in the smallest details of local administration. The mihtary
rule in Alabama was on the whole as well administered as it could be,
which is seldom well. There were too few soldiers and the posts
were too widely separated for the exercise of any firm or consistent
authority. But the people were sorry to see even the worst of this
give place to the reign of carpet-bagger, scalawag, and negro. The
interference of the army and the President discredited the civil gov-
ernment in the minds of the people. The absolute rule of the Presi-
dent over the whole of ten states, though never used for bad purposes,
was, nevertheless, not to be viewed with equanimity by those who
were afraid of the almost absolute power that the executive had
assumed during the war. That the power had not been used for bad
purposes was no guarantee against future misuse. There was some
excuse for the pretended fright of the Radical leaders, like Sumner
and Stevens, and the real anxiety of more moderate men, at the dicta-
1 The proclamation announcing that the rebellion had ended was issued April 2,
1866. McPherson, p. 15.
4o6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
torial course of Johnson. But it must be said that a desire for
share in poHtical appointments was a cause of much of this "real
anxiety."
From 1865 to 1868, and even later, there was, for all practical pur-
poses, over the greater part of the people of Alabama, no government
at all. There was little disorder; the people were busy with their
own affairs. Public opinion ruled the respectable people. Until the
close of Reconstruction, the military and civil government touched
the people mainly to annoy. From 1865 to 1874 government and
respect for government were weakened to a degree from which it has
not yet recovered. The people governed themselves extra-legally
and have not recovered from the practice.
By taking cases from the civil authorities for trial before military
commission, by dictating the course of the civil government, by nulli-
fying the actions of the highest executive officers, the acts of the leg-
islature, and the decisions of the highest courts, the army was mainly
responsible for the lack of confidence in the civil administration.
CHAPTER X
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1865-1866
In the account of the affairs thus far we have seen many evidences
of the active participation of the mihtary power of the United States
in the conduct of government in Alabama. It will be useful at this
point to examine with some care the form and scope of the authority
concerned during the period of the provisional state government's
existence.
The Mihtary Division of the Tennessee (1863), under General
Grant, included the Department of the Cumberland, under the com-
mand of General George H. Thomas. Several counties of north
Alabama in the possession of the Federals formed a part of this
department and for three years were governed entirely by the army,
except for two short intervals, when the Federal forces were flanked
and forced to retire. Anarchy then reigned, for the civil govern-
ment had been almost entirely destroyed in ten of the northern coun-
ties. June 7, 1865, the Mihtary Division of the Tennessee was
reorganized under General Thomas, and included in it was the De-
partment of Alabama, commanded by General C. R. Woods, with
headquarters at Mobile. In October, 1865, Georgia and Alabama
were united into a mihtary province called the Department of the
Gulf, under General Woods. This department was still in the
Military Division of the Tennessee, commanded by General Thomas.
June I, 1866, Alabama and Georgia were formed into the Depart-
ment of the South and were still in Thomas's Mihtary Division of the
Tennessee. General Woods commanded, with headquarters at
Macon, Georgia. Alabama was ruled by General Swayne from
Montgomery. August 6, 1866, the Mihtary Division of the Tennes-
see was discontinued and was made a department, General Thomas
retaining the command. In this department Georgia and Alabama
formed the District of the Chattahoochee, with headquarters at
Macon, commanded by General Woods. The Sub-district of Alabama
407
408 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
^
was commanded by General Swayne, who was also in charge of the
Freedmen's Bureau at Montgomery. This organization lasted
until the Third Military District, under the Reconstruction Acts of
March 2, 1867, was formed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and
General Thomas (immediately superseded by General Pope) was
put in command.^
The Military Occupation
Within a month after the surrender of Lee, Alabama was occupied
by Federal armies, and garrisons were being stationed at one or more
points in all the more populous counties. Everywhere, the state
and county government was broken up by the mihtary authorities,
who were forbidden to recognize any civil authority in the state.
Into each of the 52 counties soldiers were sent to administer the
oath of allegiance to the United States to any one who wished to take
it. Most people were indifferent about it.^
For several months there was no civil government at all, and no
government of any kind except in the immediate vicinity of the army
posts and the towns where military officers and Freedmen's Bureau
agents regulated the conduct of the negroes, and incidentally of the
whites, well or badly, according to their abihties and prejudices.
Some of the officers, especially those of higher rank, endeavored to
pacify the land, gave good advice to the negroes, and were consid-
erate in their relations with the whites; others incited the blacks
to all sorts of deviltry and were a terror to the whites.^ Each
official in his little district ruled as supreme as the Czar of all the
Russias. He was the first and last authority on most of the affairs
of the community.
Early in the summer each city and its surrounding territory was
formed into a mihtary district under the command of a general
1 Van Home, Life of Thomas, pp. 153, 399, 400, 408 ; Huntsville Advocate, June 9,
1866 (for copy of order relating to Department of the South that I have not found else-
where); G. O. No. I, Mil. Div. Tenn., June 20, 1865 ; G. O. No. 118, W. Dept., June
27, 1865 ; G. O. No. I, Dept. Ala., July 18, 1865 ; G. O. No. i, Dist. Ala., June 4, 1866;
G. O. No. I, Dept. Tenn., Aug. 13, 1866; G. O. No. 42, Dept. Tenn., Nov. i, 1866.
The general and special orders cited in this chapter are on file in the War Department
at Washington.
2 O. R., Ser. I, Vol. XLIX, Pt. II, pp. 505, 560, 727, 826, 854, 971; Report of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. III.
8 Miller, "Alabama," p. 236 ; Acts of Ala. (1865-1866), pp. 598, 601.
THE MILITARY OCCUPATION 409
officer, who was subject to the orders of General Woods at Mobile.
There were the districts of Mobile, Montgomery, Talladega, and
Huntsville — each with a dozen or more counties attached. Then
there were isolated posts in each. The district was governed by
the rules applying to a "separate brigade" in the army.^ The dif-
ferent posts, districts, and departments were formed, discontinued,
reorganized, with lightning rapidity. Hardly a single day passed
without some change necessitated by the resignation or muster out
of officers or troops. Commanding officers stayed a few days or
a few weeks at a post, and were reheved or discharged. Some of
the officers spent much of their time pulhng wires to keep from being
mustered out. Others resigned as soon as their resignations would
be accepted. Few or none had any adequate knowledge of condi-
tions in their own districts, nor was it possible for them to acquire
a knowledge of affairs in the short time they remained at any one
post.
After the estabhshment of the provisional government, the army
was supposed to retire into the background, leaving ordinary matters
of administration to the civil government. This it did not do, but
constantly interfered in all affairs of government. The army officers
cannot be blamed for their meddhng with the civil administration,
for the President did the same and seemed to have Httle confidence
in the governments he had erected, though he gave good accounts of
them to Congress. The struggle at Washington between the Presi-
dent and Congress over Reconstruction confused the mihtary authori-
ties as to the proper poHcy to pursue. The instructions from the
President and from General Grant were sometimes in conflict.
In August, 1865, the mihtary commander published the President's
Amnesty Proclamation of May 29, 1865, and sent officers to each
county to administer the oath.^ Instructions were given that "no
improper persons are to be permitted to take the oath." The oath
was to be signed in triplicate, one copy for the Department of State,
one for military headquarters, and one for the party taking the oath.
Regulations were prescribed for making special applications for
1 That is, the officers had the privileges and authority of officers of a division. G. O.
Nos. I, 9, 17, 29, 54, Dept. Ala., 1865; G.O. No. i, Mil. Div. Tenn., 1865.
2 The " Amnesty Oath." The oath of allegiance had already been administered
to all who would take it. See McPherson, "Reconstruction," pp. 9, 10.
4IO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
pardon by those excepted under the Amnesty Proclamation. There
were 120 stations in the state where officials administered the oath
of amnesty.^ The mihtary authorities gave the term "improper
persons" a broad construction and excluded many who apphed to
take the oath. The various officers differed greatly in their enforce-
ment of the regulations. Special appHcations for pardon had to go
through military channels, and that meant delays of weeks or months ;
so, after civil officials were appointed in Alabama, "improper per-
sons" took the oath before them, and then their papers were sent at
once to Washington for the attention of the President. There was
some scandal about the provisional secretary of state accepting
reward for pushing certain apphcations for pardon. But there was no
need to use influence, for the President pardoned all who appHed.
Soon after Parsons was appointed provisional governor, an order
stated that the United States forces would be used to assist in the
restoration of order and civil law throughout the state and would act
in support of the civil authorities as soon as the latter were appointed
and quahfied. The military authorities were instructed to avoid
as far as possible any assumption or exercise of the functions of
civil tribunals. No arrest or imprisonment for debt was to be made
or allowed, and depredations by United States troops upon private
property were to be repressed.^
The Army and the Colored Population
As acting agents of the Freedmen's Bureau, the army officers had
to do with all that concerned the negroes ; but sometimes, in a differ-
ent capacity, they issued regulations concerning the colored race. It
is difficult to distinguish between their actions as Bureau agents and
as army officers. On the whole, it seems that each officer of the
army considered himself ex officio an acting agent of the Bureau.
Soon after the occupation of Montgomery, an order was issued
prohibiting negroes from occupying houses in the city without the
consent of the owner. They had to vacate unless they could get
permission. Negroes in rightful possession had to show certificates
to that effect from the owner. All unemployed negroes were advised
1 G. O. Nos. 13 and 14, Dept. Ala., 1865.
2 G. O. No. 3, Dept. Ala., July 21, 1865. There was complaint about the stealing
of cotton by troops.
I
THE ARMY AND THE COLORED POPULATION 411
to go to work, as the United States would not support them in idle-
ness.^ This order was intended to discourage the tendency of the
negro population to flock to the garrison towns. The first troops
to arrive were almost smothered by the welcoming blacks, who were
disposed to depend upon the army for maintenance. The officers
were at first alarmed at the great crowds of blacks who swarmed
around them, and tried hard for a time to induce them to go back
home to work. Their efforts were successful in some instances.
In view of the fact that the posts and garrisons were the gathering
places of great numbers of unemployed blacks, an order, issued in
August, 1865, instructed the commanders of posts and garrisons to
prohibit the loitering of negroes around the posts and to discourage
the indolence of the blacks.^
In Mobile some kind of civil government must have been set up
under the direction of the military authorities, for we hear of an order
issued by General Andrews that in all courts and judicial proceed-
ings in the District of Mobile the negro should have the same stand-
ing as the whites.^ These may have been Bureau courts.
It was represented to the military commander that the negroes
of Alabama had aided the Federals in April and May, 1865, by
bringing into the hnes, or by destroying, stock, provisions, and prop-
erty that would aid the Confederacy, and that they were now being
arrested by the officers of the provisional government for larceny
and arson. So he ordered that the civil authorities be prohibited
from arresting, trying, or imprisoning any negro for any offence com-
mitted before the surrender of Taylor (on May 4, 1865), except by
permission of military headquarters or of the assistant commissioner
of the Freedmen's Bureau.'' When the Federal armies passed through
the state in April and May, 1865, thousands of negroes had seized
the farm stock and followed the army, for a few days at least. There
was more of this seizure of property by negroes after garrisons were
stationed in the towns. The order was so construed that practically
no negro could be arrested for steahng when he was setting out for
1 G. O. No. 6, Post of Montgomery, May 15, 1865. This order is printed on thin,
blue Confederate writing paper, which seems to have been shaped with scissors to the
proper size. Supplies had not followed the army.
2 G, O. No. 24, Dept. of Ala., Aug. 25, 1865.
8 G. O. No. 6, Post of Mobile, in N. V. Daily News, June 27, 1865.
4 G. O. No. 48, Dept. Ala., Oct. 18, 1865.
412 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
town and the Bureau. A few weeks before the order was issued,
Woods stated, "I do not interfere with civil affairs at all unless
called upon by the governor of the state to assist the civil authorities."^
Terrible stories of cruel treatment of the negroes were brought
to Woods by the Bureau officials, and he sent detachments of soldiers
to investigate the reports. Nothing was done except to march through
the country and frighten the timid by a display of armed force,
which was evidently all the agents wanted. One detachment scoured
the counties of Clarke, Marengo, Washington, and Choctaw, investi-
gating the reports of the agents.^
The commanding officers at some posts authorized militia offi-
cers of the provisional government to disarm the freedmen when
outbreaks were threatened. But after Christmas General Swayne
ordered that no authority be delegated by officers to civiHans for
dealing with freedmen, but that such cases be referred to himself
as the assistant commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau.^ There
had been great fear among some classes of people that the negroes
would engage in plots to massacre the whites and secure possession
of the property, which they were assured by negro soldiers and Bureau
agents the governor meant them to have. About Christmas, 1865,
the fear was greatest. For six months the blacks had been eagerly
striving to get possession of firearms. The soldiers and speculators
made it easy for them to obtain them. In Russell County $3000
worth of new Spencer rifles were found hidden in negro cabins.^
There were few firearms among the whites, for all had been used
in war and were therefore seized by the United States government.
Some feared that the negroes were preparing for an uprising, but it
is more probable that they merely wanted guns as a mark of freedom.
The purchase of firearms by whites was discouraged by the army.
The sale of arms and ammunition into the interior was forbidden,
but speculators managed to sell both. General Smith, at Mobile,
had one of them — Dieterich — arrested and confined in the mihtary
prison at Mobile.^ The Mobile Daily Register was warned that it
1 Statement of General Woods, Sept. 4, 1865, Document No. 11, accompanying the
Report of Schurz.
2 See statement of Woods, Sept. 4, 1865, Schurz's Report.
8 G. O. No. 4, Dept. Ala., Jan. 26, 1866.
* N. Y. Daily News, Sept. 7, 1865.
5 Statement of Gen. T. K. Smith, Sept. 14, 1865, in Schurz's Report.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY THE ARMY 413
must not print articles about impending negro insurrections/ a very
good regulation ; but the violent negro sheet in Mobile was not noticed,
though it was a cause of excitement among the blacks.
In the fall of 1866 it was reported to the Secretary of State, Mr.
Seward, that negroes were being induced to go to Peru on promise
of higher wages. Seward induced Howard, the commissioner of the
Freedmen's Bureau, to have the Bureau annul or disapprove all
contracts of freedmen to go beyond the hmits of the United States.
General Swayne, who was now both assistant commissioner and
military commander, was directed to enforce Howard's order in
Alabama.^
Administration of Justice by the Army
From April to December, 1865, all trade and commerce had to
go on under the regulations prescribed by the army. The restric-
tions placed on trade caused demoraHzation both in the army and
among the Treasury agents, who worked under the protection of
the military.^ It was ordered that civilians guilty of steahng govern-
ment cotton should be punished, after trial and conviction by mih-
tary commission, according to the statutes of Alabama in force before
the war. Later all cases of theft of government property were tried
by military commission."^
When the cotton agents were tried by mihtary commission ^ there
arose a conflict of authority between the mihtary authorities and
the Federal Judge. One agent, T. C. A. Dexter, was arrested and
sued out a writ of habeas corpus before Busteed, the Federal judge.
The writ was served on General Woods and Colonel Hunter
Brooke, who presided over the military commission. The officers
declined to obey, saying that a military commission had been con-
vened to try Dexter, and that no interference of the civil authorities
would be permitted. Busteed ordered Dexter to be discharged, and
Woods to appear before him and show why he should not be prose-
cuted for contempt of court. Woods paid no attention to this order,
and Busteed sent the United States marshal to arrest him. The
1 Statement of General Woods, Sept. 4, 1865.
2 G. O. No. 5, Sub-dist. Ala., Oct. 13, 1866. « See Ch. VI, sec. i.
4 G. O. No. 30, Dept. of Ala., Sept. 4, 1865 ; Statement of General Woods, Sept.
4, 1865, in Schurz's Report.
^ See Ch. VI, sec. i.
414 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
marshal reported that he was unable to get into the presence of Woods,
because the military guard was instructed not to allow him to pass.
Woods sent a message to Busteed that the writ had not been restored
in Alabama. Busteed made a protest to the President and asserted
that the trial could not lawfully proceed except in the civil courts.
President Johnson sustained the course of General Woods, and
thereby gave a blow to his provisional government, for Busteed at
once adjourned his court — the only Federal court in the state.
The sentiment of the people was with Busteed in spite of his own
notorious character and that of the defendant. All wanted the civil
government to take charge of affairs.^
Of the cases of civilians tried by summary courts in the summer
of 1865, there is no official record; of the cases tried by miHtary
commission during 1865 and 1866, only incomplete records are to
be found. A partial list of the cases, with charges and sentences, is
here given : —
Wilson H. Gordon,^ civilian, murder of negro, May 14, 1865. Convicted.
Samuel Smiley,-^ civilian, murder of negro, 1865. Acquitted.
T. J. Carver,^ cotton agent, stealing cotton. Fined $90,000 and one year's
imprisonment.
T. C. A. Dexter,* cotton agent, stealing cotton (3321 bales) and selling
appointment of cotton agent to Carver for $25,000. Fined $250,000 and im-
prisonment for one year.
William Ludlow,^ civilian, stealing United States stock. Four years' im-
prisonment.
L. J. Britton,^ civilian, guerilla warfare and robbery. Fined $5000 and
imprisonment for ten years. (Fine remitted by reviewing officer.)
George M. Cunningham,"' late Second Lieutenant 47th 111. Vol. Inf., stealing
government stores. Fined $500,
John C. Richardson,^ civilian, guerilla warfare and robbery. Imprisonment
for ten years.
Owen McLarney,^ civilian, assault on soldier. Acquitted.
William B. Rowls,*' civilian, guerilla warfare and robbery. Imprisonment for
ten years.
Samuel Beckham,^ civilian, receiving stolen property. Imprisonment for
three years.
1 N. Y. Herald, Nov. 26 and Dec. 15, 1865.
2 Document No. 19, accompanying Schurz's Report.
8 G. O. No. 55, Dept. Ala., Oct. 30, 1865. * G. O. No. 8, Dept. Ala., Feb. 17, 1866.
6 G. O. No. I, Dept. Ala., Jan. 5,1866. 6 g. O. No. 13, Dept. Ala., 1866.
' G. O. No. 17, Dept. Ala., 1866. « q. O. No. 20, Dept. Ala., 1866.
I
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY THE ARMY 415
John Johnson,! civilian, robbery and pretending to be United States officer.
Fined $100, "to be appropriated to the use of the Freedmen's Bureau."
Abraham Harper,^ civilian, robbery and pretending to be United States
officer. Fined $100 "to be appropriated to the use of the Freedmen's
Bureau."
Most of the civilians tried by the military commissions were camp
followers and discharged soldiers of the United States army. Those
charged with guerilla warfare were regularly enhsted Confederate
soldiers and were accused by the tory element, who were guilty
of most of the guerilla warfare.^ It was impossible to punish outlaws
for any depredations committed during the war, and for several
months after the surrender, if they claimed to be ''loyahsts," which
they usually did. The civil authorities were forbidden to arrest,
try, and imprison discharged soldiers of the United States army for
acts committed while in service.^ A similar order withdrew all
''loyal" persons from the jurisdiction of the civil courts so far as
concerned actions during or growing out of the war.^ The negroes
had already been withdrawn from the authority of the civil courts
so far as similar offences were concerned.^
Upon the complaint of United States officials collecting taxes
and revenues of the refusal of individuals to pay, the mihtary com-
manders over the state were ordered to arrest and try by military
commission persons who refused or neglected ''to pay these just
dues." «
Numerous complaints of arbitrary arrests and of the unwarranted
seizure of private property called forth an order from General
Thomas, directing that the persons and property of all citizens must
be respected. There was to be no, interference with or arrests of
1 G. O. No. 23, Dept. Ala., 1866.
There were other trials, hut the records are missing and the names of the parties
are unknown. A large number of cases were prosecuted before military commissions
convened at the instance of the Freedmen's Bureau.
2 For two years after the war the Confederate sympathizers in north Alabama suf-
fered from persecution of this kind. During the war the Confederates in north Ala-
bama had been classed as guerillas by the Federal commanders.
3 G. O. No. 29, Mil. Div. Tenn., Sept. 21, 1865 ; G. O. No. 42, Dept. Ala., Sept.
26, 1865.
* G. O. No. 3, H. Q. A., Jan. 12, 1866 ; G. O. No. 7, Dept. Ala., Feb. 12, 1866.
6 G. O. No. 48, Dept. Ala., Oct. 18, 1865.
6 G. O. No. 6, Mil. Div. Tenn., Feb. 21, 1866.
4l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
citizens unless upon proper authority from the district commander,
and then only after well- supported complaint/ J
The local military authorities were directed to arrest persons
who had been or might be charged with offences against officers,
agents, citizens, and inhabitants of the United States, in cases where
the civil authorities had failed, neglected, or been unable to bring the
offending parties to trial. Persons so arrested were to be confined
by the military until a proper tribunal might be ready and wilhng
to try them.^ This was another one of many blows at the civil govern-
ment permitted by the President, who allowed the army to judge for
itself as to when it should interfere.
These are the more important orders issued by the military
authority relating to public affairs in Alabama during the existence
of the two provisional or ''Johnson" state governments. It will be
seen from the scope of the orders that the local mihtary officials had
the power of constant interference with the civil government. A
large part of the population was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of
the civil administration. The officials of the latter had no real power,
for they were subject to frequent reproof and their proceedings to
frequent revision by the army officers. Both Governor Parsons and
Governor Patton wanted the army removed, confident that the civil
government could do better than both together. Parsons appealed
to Johnson to remove the army or prohibit its interference.^ He
complained that the mihtary officials had caused and were still
causing much injustice by deciding grave questions of law and equity
upon ex parte statements. Personal rights were subject to captious
and uncertain regulations. The tenure of property was uncertain,
and citizens felt insecure when the army decided complicated cases
of title to land and questions of public morals. A military com-
mission at Huntsville, acting under direction of General Thomas,
had assumed to decide questions of title to property, and in one case,
a widow was alleged to have been turned out of her home."* The
citizens of Montgomery were indignant because the mihtary author-
ities had issued licenses for the sale of liquor, and had permitted
1 G. O. No. 25, Mil. Div. Tenn., Sept. 13, 1865.
2 G. O. No. 44, H. Q. A., July 6, 1866; G. O. No. 13, Dept. of the South, July 21, 1866.
8 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 26, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
* P. M. Dox to Governor Parsons, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 26, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
RELATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE 417
prostitution by licensing houses of ill repute. Circular No. i, Dis-
trict of Montgomery, September 9, 1865, required that all public
women must register at the office of the provost marshal; that each
head of a disorderly house must pay a Hcense tax of $25 a week in
addition to $5 a week for each inmate, and that medical inspection
should be provided for by mihtary authority. In case of violation
of these regulations a fine of $100 would be imposed for each offence,
and ten to thirty days' imprisonment. The bishop and all the clergy
of the Episcopal Church were suspended and the churches closed
for several months because the bishop refused to order a prayer
for the President.^ The restaurant of Joiner and Company, at
Stevenson, was closed by order of the post commander because two
negro soldiery were refused the privilege of dining at the regular
table. ^ Admiral Semmes, after being pardoned, was elected mayor
of Mobile, but the President interfered and refused to allow^ him
to serve. Many arrests and many more investigations were made
at the instigation of the tory or ''union" element, and on charges
made by negroes.^
Relation between the Army and the People
The unsatisfactory character of the military rule was due in
a large measure to the fact that the white volunteers were
early mustered out, leaving only a few regulars and several regi-
ments of negro troops to garrison the country.^ These negro
troops were a source of disorder among the blacks, and were
under slack disciphne. Outrages and robberies by them were of
frequent occurrence. There was ill feehng between the white and
the black troops. Even when the freedmen utterly refused to go
to work, they behaved well, as a rule, except where negro troops
were stationed. There is no reason to beheve that it was not more
the fault of the white officers than of the black soldiers, for black
soldiers were amenable to disciphne when they had respectable
officers. Truman reported to the President that the negro troops
1 See p. 327. . 2 Selma Times, Feb. 3, 1866.
3 There were really three governments in Alabama based on the war powers of the
President : (i) the army ruling through its commanders ; (2) the Freedmen's Bureau,
with its agents ; (3) the provisional civil government.
4 Circular No. i, Aug. — , 1865; G. O. No. 21, Dept. Ala., April 9, 1866.
41 8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
should be removed, because "to a great extent they incite the f reed-
men to deeds of violence and encourage them in idleness." ^ The
white troops, most of them regulars, behaved better, so far as their
relations with the white citizens were concerned. The general officers
were as a rule gentlemen, generous and considerate. So much so,
that some rabid newspaper correspondents complained because
the West Pointers treated the southerners with too much considera-
tion.^ In the larger posts discipHne was fairly good, but at small,
detached posts in remote districts the soldiers, usually, but not always,
the black ones, were a scourge to the state. They ravaged the coun-
try almost as completely as during the war.^ The numerous reports
of General Swayne show that there was no necessity for garrisons
in the state. He wanted, he said, a small body of cavalry to catch
fugitives from justice, not a force to overcome opposition. The
presence of the larger forces of infantry created a great deal of dis-
order. The soldiers were not amenable to civil law, the refining
restraints of home were lacking, and discipHne was relaxed.'*
Of the subordinate officers some were good and some were not,
and the latter, when away from the control of their superior officers
and in command of lawless men, ravaged the back country and
acted Hke brigands. For ten years after the war the general orders
of the various military districts, departments, and divisions are filled
with orders publishing the results of court-martial proceedings, which
show the demoralization of the class of soldiers who remained in the
army after the war. The best men clamored for their discharge
when the war ended and went home. The more disorderly men, for
whom life in garrison in time of peace was too tame, remained, and
all sorts of disorder resulted. Finally ''Benzine" boards, as they
were called, had to take hold of the matter, and numbers of men
1 De Bow's Review, i866. DeBow made a trip through the South. Natio7t, Oct. 5
and 26, 1865 ; Truman, Report to President, April 9, 1866. See also Grant, Letter to
President, Dec. 18, 1865.
2 Colonel Herbert says that the relations between the soldiers and the ex- Confed-
erates were very kindly, but the latter hoped the army would soon be removed, when
civil government was established. " Solid South," p. 30.
2 Miller, "Alabama," p. 242; Resolutions of theJLegislature, Jan. 16, 1866.
* Testimony of Swayne, Report Joint Committee, 1866, Pt. Ill, p. 139; various
reports of Swayne as assistant commissioner of Freedmen's Bureau. It was noticeable
that when Swayne was placed in command of the army in the state there was less
interference and better order than before, though he never obtained the cavalry.
RELATION BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE 419
who had done good service during the war were discharged because
they were unable to submit to discipline in time of peace.
The rule of the army might have been better, especially in 1865,
had there not been so many changes of local and district commanders
and headquarters. Some counties remained in the same military
jurisdiction a month or two, others a week or two, several for two
or three days only. The people did not know how to proceed in
order to get military justice. Orders were issued that business must
proceed through military channels. This cut off the citizen from
personal appeal to headquarters, unless he was a man of much in-
fluence. Often it was difficult to ascertain just what military channels
were. Headquarters and commanders often changed before an ap-
phcation or a petition reached its destination.^
The President merited failure with his plan of restoration because
he showed so little confidence in the governments he had estabHshed.
He was constantly interfering on the slightest pretexts. He asked
Congress to admit the states into the Union, and said that order
was restored and the state governments in good running order, while
at the same time he had not restored the writ of habeas corpus, had
not proclaimed the ''rebellion" at an end, and was in the habit of
allowing and directing the interference of the army in the gravest ques-
tions that confronted the civil government. In this way he discredited
his own work, even in the eyes of those who wished it to succeed.
His intentions were good, but his judgment was certainly at fault.
1 For instance : In the city of Mobile a petition of some kind might be made out
in proper form and given to the commander of the Post of Mobile. The latter would
indorse it with his approval or disapproval, and send it to the commander of the District
of Mobile, who likewise forwarded it with his indorsement to the commander of the
Department of Alabama at Mobile or Montgomery. In important cases the paper had
to go on until it reached headquarters in Macon, Nashville, Louisville, Atlanta, or
Washington, and it had to return the same way.
The following orders relate to the changes made so often : —
G. O. Nos. I, 9, 10, 12, 17, 19, 20, 27, Dept. Ala., from July 18 to Sept. i, 1865 ;
G. O. No. 18, Dept. Ala., March 30, 1866; G. O. No. i, Dist. Ala., June i, 1866 ; G. O.
No. I, Sub-dist. Ala., Oct. — , 1866; G. O. No. i, Mil. Div. Tenn., June 20, 1865 ; G. O.
Nos. I and 42, Dept. of the Tenn., Aug. 13 and Nov. i, 1866; G. O. No. i, Dept. of the
South, June i, 1866; G. O. No. i, Dept. of the Gulf, , 1865 ; G. O. No. i, Dist. of
the Chattahoochee, Aug. — , 1866.
There were numerous general orders from local headquarters of the same nature.
See also Van Home, " Life of Thomas," pp. 153, 399, 400, 418; and Sen. Ex. Doc, No.
13, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
420 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
The army authorities went on in their accustomed way until
Swayne was placed in command, June i, 1866, when a more sensible
policy was inaugurated, and there was less friction. Swayne aspired
to control the governor and legislature by advice and demands rather
than to rule through the army. There were few soldiers in the state
after the summer of 1866. Order was good, except for the dis-
turbing influence of negro troops and individual Bureau agents.
There were in remote districts outbreaks of lawlessness which neither
the army nor the state government could suppress. The infantry
could not chase outlaws; the state government was too weak to
enforce its orders or to command respect as long as the army should
stay. At their best the army and the civil administration neutralized
the efforts and paralyzed the energies of each other. There were
two governments side by side, the authority of each overlapping
that of the other, while the Freedmen's Bureau, a third government,
supported by the army, was much inclined to use its powers. The
result was that most of the people went without government.
On the 28th of March, 1867, the policy of Johnson came to its logi-
cal end in failure. General Grant then issued the order which over-
turned the civil government established by the President. In Alabama,
which was to form a part of the Third Military District, all elections
for state and county officials were disallowed until the arrival of the
commander of the district. All persons elected to office during
the month of March (after the passage of the Reconstruction Acts)
were ordered to report to military headquarters for the action of
the new military governor.^ Military government then entered on
a new phase.
1 G. O. No. I, Sub-dist. Ala., March 28, 1867,
CHAPTER XI
THE WARDS OF THE NATION
Sec. I. The Freedmen's Bureau
Department of Negro Affairs
Any account of the causes of disturbed conditions in the South
during the two years succeeding the war must include an examina-
tion of the workings of the Freedmen's Bureau, the administration
of which was uniformly hostile to the President's pohcy and in favor
of the Radical plans.
As soon as the Federal armies reached the Black Belt, it became
a serious problem to care for the negroes who stopped work and
flocked to the camps. Some of the generals sent them back to their
masters, others put them to work as laborers in the camps and on
the fortifications. Officers — usually chaplains — were temporarily
detailed to look after the blacks who swarmed about the army, and
thus the so-called "Department of Negro Affairs" was established
extra-legally, and continued until the passage of the Freedmen's
Bureau Act in 1865. The "Department" was supported by cap-
tured and confiscated property, and was under the direction of the
War Department.^
For a year after north Alabama was overrun by the Federal
troops, no attempt was made to segregate the blacks; but in 1863 a
camp for refugees and captured negroes was established on the
estate of ex-Governor Chapman, near Huntsville in Madison county,
and Chaplain Stokes of the Eighteenth Wisconsin Infantry was
placed in charge. It was not intended that the negroes should remain
there permanently, but they were to be sent later to the larger con-
centration camps at Nashville. No records were kept, but the
report of the inspector states that several hundred negroes were
1 P'reedmen's Bureau Report, Oct. 20, 1869; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 143, 4»t Cong., 2d
Sess.
421
422 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
received before August, 1864, of whom only a small proportion wa
sent to Nashville. Those who remained were employed in cultivat-
ing the land, — planting corn, cotton, sorghum, and vegetables, —
and in building log barracks and other similar houses. Schools
were established for the children. The War Department issued
three-fourths rations to the negroes, and the aid societies also helped
them, although this colony was nearer self-sustaining than any other.^
In 1864 the Treasury Department assumed partial charge of
negro refugees and captive slaves. Regulations provided that cap-
tured and abandoned property should be rented and the proceeds
devoted to the purchase of supplies for the blacks, who, when pos-
sible, were to be employed as laborers. In each special agency there
was to be a "Freedmen's Home Colony" under a ''Superintendent
of Freedmen," whose duty it was to care for the blacks in the colony,
to obtain agricultural implements and supplies, and to keep a record
of the negroes who passed through the colony. A classification of
laborers was made and a minimum schedule of wages fixed as
follows : —
No. I hands, males, 18 to 40 years of age, minimum wage, $25
per month; No. 2 hands, males, 14 to 18, 40 to 55 years of age,
minimum wage, $20 per month; No. 3 hands, males, 12 to 14 years
of age, minimum wage, $15 per month; corresponding classes of
women, $18, $14, $10, respectively.
It was the duty of the superintendent to see that all who were
physically able secured work at the specified rates. He acted as an
employment agent, and the planters had to hire their labor through
him. He exercised a general supervision over the affairs of all freed-
men in the district. Beside paying the high wages fixed by the
schedule, the planter was obliged to take care of the young children
of the family hired by him; to furnish without charge a separate
house for each family with an acre of ground for garden, medical
attendance for the family, and schoohng for the children; to sell
food and clothing to the negroes at actual cost; and to pay for full
time unless the laborer was sick or refused to work. Half the wages
was paid at the end of the month, and the remainder at the end of
the contract. Wages due constituted a first hen on the crop, which
could not be moved until the superintendent certified that the wages
1 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 28, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU ESTABLISHED 423
had been paid or arranged for. Not more than ten hours a day labor
was to be required. Cases of dispute were to be settled by civil
ourts (Union), where established, — otherwise the superintendent
\as vested with the power to decide such cases. Provision was
made for accepting the assistance of the aid societies, especially in
the matter of schools.^ Under such regulations it was hardly pos-
sible for the farmer to hire laborers, and we find that only 205 negroes
were disposed of by the colony near Huntsville. If the wages could
have been paid in Confederate currency, they would have been
reasonable; but United States currency was required, and most
people had none of it.
In the fall of 1864 the army again took charge of negro affairs
and administered them along the lines indicated in the Treasury
regulations. Wherever the army went its officers constituted them-
selves into freedmen's courts, aid societies, etc., and exercised abso-
lute control over all relations between the two races and among the
blacks.
The Freedmen's Bureau Established
The law of March 3, 1865, created a Bureau in the War Depart-
ment to which was given control of all matters relating to freedmen,
refugees, and abandoned lands. All officials were required to take
the iron- clad test oath.^ No appropriation was made for the purpose
of carrying out this law, and for the first year the Bureau was main-
tained by taxes on salaries and on cotton, by fines, donations, rents
of buildings and lands, and by the sales of crops and confiscated
property.^ On July 16, 1866, a second Bureau Bill, ampHfying the
law of March 3, 1865, and extending it to July 16, 1868, was passed
over the President's veto. In 1868 the Bureau was continued for
one year, and on January i, 1869, it was discontinued, except in
educational work.^ There is no indication that the provisions of
the laws had much effect on the administration of the Bureau. From
the beginning it had entire control of all that concerned freedmen,
1 Regulations, July 9, 1864.
2 Stats.-at- Large, Vol. XIII, pp. 507-509. See also O. O. Howard, "The Freedmen
during the War," in the New Princeton Review, May and Sept., 1886.
3 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 7, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
4 McPherson, " Reconstruction," pp. 69-74, I47-I5i» 349» 350» 37^ ; Burgess, " Re-
construction," pp. 87-90.
424
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
who thus formed a special class not subject to the ordinary lawsJ
In Alabama there were nearly 500,000 negroes thus set apart, of ,
whom 100,000 were children and 40,000 were aged and infirm/ ■
It was several months before the organization of the Bureau
was completed in Alabama. Meanwhile army officers acted as
ex officio agents of the Bureau, and regulated negro affairs. They
were disposed to persuade the negroes to go home and work, and
not congregate around the military posts. They issued some rations
to the negroes in the towns who were most in want, but discouraged
the tendency to look to the United States for support. Only a small j
proportion of the race was affected by the operations of the Bureau
during the months of April, May, and June, 1865. In north and :
south Alabama, above and below the Black Belt, the negroes were
more under control of the Bureau than in the Black Belt itself. The
assistant commissioner for Tennessee had jurisdiction over the negroes
in north Alabama, who had been under nominal northern control
since 1862. The Bureau was established at Mobile in April and
May, under the control of the army, and was an offshoot of the Loui-
siana Bureau, T. W. Conway, assistant commissioner for Louisiana,
being for a short while in charge of negro affairs in Alabama. At
the same time there was at Mobile one T. W. Osborn, who was called
the assistant commissioner for Alabama. Later he was transferred
to Florida, and in July, 1865, General Wager Swayne succeeded
Conway in Alabama.^
There were but few regular agents in Alabama before the arrival
of General Swayne. A few stray missionaries and preachers, repre-
senting the aid societies, came in, and were placed in charge of the
camps of freedmen near the towns. Conway appointed agents at
Mobile, DemopoHs, Selma, and Montgomery, who were officers in
the negro regiments.^ For several months the army officers were
almost the only agents, and, as has been stated, the higher officials,
and some of the subordinates pursued a sensible course, giving the
negroes sensible advice, and laboring to convince them that they
1 AT. y. Times, Oct. 31, 1865.
2 Circular No. 16, Sept. 19, 1865 (Howard); Circular No. 6, June 13, 1865 (How-
ard); Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.; Circular No. i, July 14, 1865 (Con-
way); Circular No. 2, July 14, 1865 (Conway).
8 One of them — Chaplain C. W. Buckley — was guardian of the blacks at Mont-
gomery. He afterwards played a prominent part in carpet-bag politics.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU ESTABLISHED 425
could not expect to live without work. Others encouraged them in
idleness and violence and advised them to stop work and congregate
in the towns and around the mihtary posts. The black troops and
their commanders were a source of disorder and cause of irritation
between the races. The officers of these troops, and others also,
were probably often sincere in their convictions that the southern
white, especially the former slave owner, could not be trusted in
anything where negroes were concerned, that he was the natural
enemy of the black and must be guarded against. ^
It was on June 20, 1865, that General Swayne was appointed
assistant commissioner for Alabama, and on July 14, T. W. Con-
way directed all officials of the Bureau in the state (except those
in north Alabama who were under the control of the assistant com-
missioner of Tennessee) to report to Swayne on his arrival.^ On
July 26 the latter assumed charge and appointed Charles A. Miller
as his assistant adjutant-general, later another saviour of his country
in Reconstruction days. General Swayne stated that on his arrival
he was kindly received by most of the people, and that he was "agree-
ably disappointed" in the temper of the people and their attitude
toward him. Howard's instructions made it the duty of the assist-
ant commissioner or his agents to adjudicate all differences among
negroes and between negroes and whites. Exclusive and final
jurisdiction was vested in him.^
The Bureau in Alabama was organized in five departments :
(i) the Department of Abandoned and Confiscated Lands; (2) the
Department of Records (Labor, Schools, and SuppHes) ; (3) the De-
partment of Finance ; (4) the Medical Department ; (5) the Bounty
Department. Before the end of August, 1865, the organization was
completed, on paper, and the state had been divided into five dis-
tricts, each controlled by a superintendent. These districts were:
1 Ku Klux Rept., p. 441 ; N. V. World, July 20, 1865; oral accounts and letters.
It was on this theory that the Bureau was established, and at the head of the institution
was placed General O. O. Howard, who was a soft-hearted, unpractical gentleman, with
boundless confidence in the negro and none whatever in the old slave owner. A man of
hard common sense like Sherman would have done less harm and probably much good
with the Bureau.
2 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
8 Circular No. 5, June 2, 1865 (Howard); Circular No. 2, July I4i 1865 (Conway);
Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
426 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
(i) Mobile, with seven counties; (2) Selma, with ten counties;
(3) Montgomery, with nine counties; (4) Troy, with six counties;
(5) DemopoHs, with eight counties; later, (6) north Alabama, con-
sisting of twelve counties, was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of
the assistant commissioner of Tennessee, General Fiske, and became
the sixth division in Alabama.
The officials of the Freedmen's Bureau, except the state officials
and subordinate employees, numbered, in 1865, twenty- seven army
officers, and two civilians.^ By November the Bureau was well
organized, and as many offices as possible were estabhshed to
examine into labor contracts. Each superintendent had charge of
the issue of rations in the county where he was stationed, and in each
of the other counties of his district he had an assistant superintendent.
It was the duty of these seventy-five or more officers to investigate
complaints against county or state officials, who had been made ex
officio Freedmen's Bureau agents; and when a negro made a com-
plaint, Swayne forced Parsons to appoint a new officer. Later, when
complaint was made, Swayne would replace a civil agent by a regular
Bureau agent. Thus the Bureau gradually passed out of the hands
of the state officials. The superintendents and the assistant superin-
tendents had the power to arrest outlaws and evil-doers. They
could also delegate the charge of contracts to responsible persons.
Depots were established from which supplies were issued to the
counties, each county furnishing transportation and distributing the
supplies under the observation of the superintendent.^
General Swayne was succeeded, January 14, 1868, by Brevet
Brigadier- General Julius Hayden, who in turn was succeeded, March
^ Freedmen's Bureau Report, Dec, 1865.
2 In November, 1866, the following army officers, most of whom were members of
the Veteran Reserve Corps, were made superintendents of these depots : Montgomery^
Capt. J. L. Whiting, V.R.C.; Mobile, Brevet Major G. H. Tracy, 15th Infantry; Hunts-
ville, Brevet Col. J. B. Callis, V.R.C.; Selma, Lieut. George Sharkley; Greenville, James
F. McGogy, Late First Lieut. U.S.A.; Tuscaloosa, Capt. W. H. H. Peck, V.R.C.;
Talladega, J. W. Burkholder, A.A.G., U.S.A.; Demopolis, Brevet Major C. W. Pierce,
V.R.C. Other Bureau officials who afterward became well-known carpet-baggers were :
Major C. A. Miller, 2d Maine Cavalry, A.A.G.; Major B. W. Norris, Additional Pay-
master ; Lieut.-Col. Edwin Beecher, Additional Paymaster ; Rev. C. W. Buckley, Chap-
lain 47th U.S.C. Infantry. Other officers of the V.R.C. who arrived later were Capt.
Roderick Theune, Lieuts. George F. Browing, G. W. Pierce, John Jones, P. E. O'Conner,
and Joseph Logan. See Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 21, 40tli
Cong., 2d Sess. With one exception these later assisted in Reconstruction.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES 427
31, 1868, by Brevet Brigadier- General O. L. Shepherd, Colonel of the
Fifteenth Infantry, and he was reheved on August 18, 1868, by Brevet
Lieutenant- Colonel Edwin Beecher, who wound up the affairs of the
Bureau in the state, except the educational and bounty divisions/
The sub-districts were continued during the existence of the Bureau.
These consisted of four to six counties each, and were sometimes
under the charge of regular army officers, sometimes under civiHans.^
The Tribune correspondent had doubts of the benefits of the Freed-
men's Bureau where army officers, especially West Pointers, were
in charge. The West Pointers were strict with the negroes, there
was no idleness; the negro had to work; and the officers always
took the side of the white.^
Pressure from the northern Radicals was brought to bear on
Swayne, as time went on, to force him to do away more and more
with army officers and civil officials of the state, and to substitute
civilians from the North, who had a different plan for helping the
negro. The alien agents were opposed to Swayne's plan of appoint-
ing native whites as agents, and told him tales of outrage that had
been committed, but he paid no attention to them. The Bureau
officers told much more horrible tales than any of the army officers.*
The Nation's correspondent seemed disappointed because the
Freedmen's Bureau and the people and the negro were getting along
fairly well.^
The Freedmen's Bureau and the Civil Authorities
There was, according to the state laws of 1861, no provision for
the negro in the courts, and Swayne asked Governor Parsons to
issue a proclamation opening the courts to them and giving them
full civil rights. He reminded Parsons that he (Parsons) was merely
a military official, and that the law administered by him was martial
law, which had its limits only in the discretion of the commander.
1 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Oct. 24, 1869.
2 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Oct. 24, 1868.
* McPherson's scrap-book, " P'reedmen's Bureau Bill, 1866," p. 128.
* For examples, see Schurz's Report and accompanying documents, Nos. 20, 21,
22, 28; Taylor, "Destruction and Reconstruction"; article by Schurz in McClure's
Magazine, Jan., 1904.
fi The Nation, Feb. 15, 1866.
428 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Parsons and his advisers thought that the people would oppose such
action and so refused to issue the proclamation/
. Thereupon Swayne himself issued a proclamation, stating that
exclusive control of all matters relating to the negroes belonged to
him. He v^^as unwilling, however, he said, to establish tribunals
in Alabama conducted by persons foreign to her citizenship and
strangers to her laws. Consequently, all judicial officers, magis-
trates, and sheriffs of the provisional government were made Bureau
agents for the administration of justice to the negroes. The laws
of the state were to be applied so far as no distinction was made on'
account of color. Processes were to run in the name of the provi-
sional government and according to the forms provided by state law.
The mihtary authorities were to support the civil officials of the
Bureau in the administration of justice. Each officer was to signify
his acceptance of this appointment, and failure to accept or refusal
to administer the laws without regard to color would result in the
substitution of martial law in that community.^
This order was remarkable for several reasons. In the first place,
it was rather an arrogant seizure of the provisional administration
and subordination of it to the Bureau. All officials were forced to
accept by the threat of martial law in case of refusal to serve. Again,
Swayne was not in command of the mihtary forces of the state, though
the army was directed to support the Bureau. This law gave to
Swayne unhmited discretion, so that by a short order he practically
placed himself at the head of the whole administration, — civil and
mihtary, — and throughout his term of service in Alabama he never
allowed anything to stand in his way.^ Again, the act of March 3,
1865, provided that all officials of the Bureau must take the "iron-
clad," and it is doubtful if. a single state official could have taken it.
Swayne did not require it.
As soon as Swayne's proclamation was made known, the majority
of the judges and magistrates applied to Governor Parsons for in-
structions in the matter. Parsons, who dishked the Bureau, but who
1 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, p. 138.
2 G. O. No. 7, Montgomery, Aug. 4, 1865.
8 No one ever knew exactly how far the military commander was bound to obey
the assistant commissioner and vice versa. The problem was at last solved by making
Swayne military commander also.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES 429
was a timid and prudent man, issued a proclamation requiring com-
pliance, and even enforced compliance by removing those who refused
and appointing in their places nominees of Swayne. The entire
body of state and county officials finally signified their acceptance,
and the negro was then given exactly the same civil rights as possessed
by the whites/ Had all the state officials refused to serve, there
would have ensued an interesting state of affairs; an official of the
Freedmen's Bureau would have overturned the state government
set up by the President. It was, however, done with a good purpose,
and for a while worked well by not working at all. Swayne was a
man of common sense, a soldier, and a gentleman, and honestly
desired to do what was best for all — the negro first. He did not
profess much regard for the native white, and he made it plain that
his main purpose was to secure the rights which he thought the negro
ought to have. Incidentally, he pursued a wise and conciHatory
poHcy, as he understood it, toward the whites, for he saw that this
was the best way to aid the negro. The work of the Bureau under
his charge was probably the least harmful of all in the South, and
for most of the harm done he was not responsible. General Swayne
attributed what he termed his success with the Freedmen's Bureau
to the fact that he used at first the native state and county officials
as his agents, and thus dispensed to some extent with alien civilians
and army officials, who were obnoxious to the mass of the people.
The requisite number of army officials of proper character could
not have been secured, and they would not have understood the
conditions. The $ame was true of ahen civiHans. Even the best
ones would have incHned toward the blacks in all things, and thus
would have incensed the whites, or they would have been "seduced by
social amenities" to become the instruments of the whites, or they
would have become merchantable. In any case the negro would
suffer. General Swayne said that he thoroughly understood that
he was expected by the Radicals to pursue no such policy, and that
he half expected to be forced from the service for so doing. In-
fluence was brought to bear to cause him to change and with some
success.
Later some few officials were removed, the most notable case
1 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, p. 138 (testimony of
General Wager Swayne).
430 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
being that of Major H. H. Slough and the pohce of Mobile.* It
was reported to Swayne that Slough was not enforcing the laws
without regard to color. A staff officer was sent at once to Mobile
to demand instant acceptance or rejection of Swayne's proclamation.
The mayor rejected it, and Swayne then" informed Parsons that
Mobile had to have either a new mayor, or martial law and a
garrison of negro troops.^ Parsons yielded, and made all the changes
that Swayne demanded. Two commissions were made out, — one ap-
pointed John Forsyth as mayor, and the other, F. C. Bromberg, a
''Union" man. Swayne was to deliver the commission he wished. He
went to Mobile and decided to try Forsyth, who at that time was down
the bay at a pleasure resort. Swayne went after him in a tug, and
met a tug with Forsyth on board coming up the bay. He hailed it
and asked it to stop, but the tug only went the faster. He chased
it for several miles,^ and at length the pursued boat was overtaken.
Swayne called for Forsyth, and all thought that he was to be arrested.
But to the great rehef of the party the appointment as mayor was
offered to him, and Forsyth soon decided to accept the office. As
Swayne said, he was a "hot Confederate," a Democrat, and would
fight, and no one would dare criticise him. He soon had the con-
fidence of both white and black.*
The order admitting the testimony of and conferring civil rights
upon the negro was favored by most of the lawyers of the state. The
"testimony" was the fulcrum to move other things. The tendency
of the law of evidence is to receive all testimony and let the jury decide.
So there was no trouble from the lawyers, and their opinion greatly
influenced the people. None of the respectable people of Alabama
were opposed to allowing the negro to testify. They were not afraid
of such testimony, for no jury would ever convict a reputable man
on negro testimony alone. This was one objection to it — its unre-
liabihty and consequent possible injustice.
1 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Pt. Ill, p. 138.
2 Swayne did not hesitate to intimidate such men as Parsons, He would treat old
men — former senators, governors, and congressmen — as if they were bad boys ; he
himself was under thirty.
^ The reason for this was that the day before several Federal drunken ofificers had
been careering around the bay in a boat, and Forsyth, who was on this boat, did not
want his party of ladies to meet them.
* Statement of Swayne, 1901 ; N. Y. News, Aug. 21, 1865.
BUREAU SUPPORTED BY CONFISCATIONS 431
Bureau supported by Confiscations
Landlords were prevented from evicting negroes who had taken
possession of houses or lands until complete provision had been
made for them elsewhere. Thus the negroes would do nothing
and kept others from coming in their places/ "Loyal" refugees
and freedmen were made secure in the possession of land which
they were cultivating until the crops were gathered or until they
were paid proper compensation/ Little captured, abandoned, or
confiscated private property remained in the hands of the Bureau
officials after the wholesale pardoning by the President. As soon as
pardoned, the former owner regained rights of property except in
slaves, though the personal property had been sold and the proceeds
used for various purposes.^ There was, however, a great deal of
Confederate property and state and county property that had been
devoted to the use of the Confederacy. In every small town of the
state there was some such property — barns, storehouses, hospital
buildings, foundries, iron works, cotton, suppHes, steamboats, block-
ade-runners. An order from the President, dated November 11,
1865, directed the army, navy, and Treasury officials to turn over
to the Freedmen's Bureau all real estate, buildings, and other property
in Alabama that had been used by the Confederacy. The sale of
this property furnished sufficient revenue for one year, and, until
withdrawn several years later, the educational department was
sustained by the proceeds of similar sales."* The failure of Congress
to appropriate funds made it almost necessary to use state officials
as agents, as there was no money to pay other agents. The Con-
federate iron works at Briarfield were sold for $45,000, three blockade-
runners in the Tombigbee River for $50,000, and some hospital
buildings for $8000. There was besides a large amount of Con-
federate property in Selma, Montgomery, Demopolis, and Mobile.
Of private property, at the close of 1865, the Bureau was still holding
2 1 16 acres of land and thirteen pieces of town property.^' A year
1 Circular No. 20 (Freedmen's Bureau), War Dept., Nov. 30, 1865.
2 Circular No. 15, Sept. 12, 1865. ^ McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 13.
* Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. VI, p. 352 ; G. O.
No. 64, Dept. Ala., Dec. 10, 1865 ; Swayne's Report, Jan. 31, 1865 ; Freedmen's
Bureau Reports, Dec, 1865, and Nov., 1866.
6 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Dec, 1895 ; Swayne's Reports, Jan. 31 and Oct. 31,
1866, in Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, and Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
432 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
later all of this property, except seven pieces of town property, hac
been restored to the owners/
In 1866 a blockade- runner was sold for $4000 and a war vessel
in the Tombigbee for $27,351.93. The expenses of the Bureau in
1865, so far as accounts were kept, amounted to $126,865.77.^ This
sum was obtained from sales of Confederate property. There was,
also, a tax on contracts of from 50 cents to $1.50, and a fee on
licenses for Bureau marriages. But the money thus obtained seems
to have been appropriated by the agents, who kept no record. Rations
were issued by the army to the Bureau agents and there was no
further accountabiHty. No accounts were kept of the proceeds from
the sales of abandoned and confiscated property, a neglect which led
to grave abuses. All records were confused, loosely kept, and un-
businessHke. There were, also, funds from private sources at the
disposal of the authorities, besides the appropriations of 1866 and
1867, those in the former year being estimated ut $851,500. There
was little or no supervision over and no check on the operations of the
agents. It has been stated that the salaries proper of the Bureau
agents in Alabama amounted to about $50,000 annually.^ State
officials acting as agents received no salaries. It is impossible to
ascertain the amount expended in Alabama, though the entire ex-
penditure accounted for in the South was nearly twenty million
dollars; much was not accounted for.
During the two decades preceding the war many individual
planters had erected chapels and churches for the use of the negroes
1 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Nov. i, 1866.
2 Ho. Rept., No. 121, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.; Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., ist Sess»
3 Freedmen's Bureau Reports, Dec, 1865, and Nov., 1866; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 142,.
41st Cong., 2d Sess.; Miller, "History of Alabama," p. 240. Congress appropriated
^20,000,000, and there was an immense amount of Confederate property confiscated and
sold for the benefit of the Bureau. Of this no account was kept. One detailed estimate
of Bureau expenses is as follows : —
Appropriations by Congress ^20,000,000
General Bounty Fund 8,000,000
Freed men and Refugee Fund 7,000,000
Retained Bounty Fund (Butler) 2,000,000
School Fund (Confiscated Property) 2,500,000
Total ^39,500,000
Edwin De Leon, " Ruin and Reconstruction of the Southern States," in Southertt
Magazine^ 1874. See also Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 142, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
THE LABOR PROBLEM 433
in the towns and on the plantations. Some few such buildings
belonged to the negroes and were held in trust by the whites for them,
but most of them were the property of the planters or of church
organizations that had built them. General Swayne ordered that all
such property should be secured to the negroes/ These buildings
were used for schools and churches by the missionary teachers and
religious carpet-baggers who were instructing the negro in the proper
attitude of hostility toward all things southern.
The Bureau issued a retroactive order, requiring negroes to take
out Hcenses for marriages, and all former marriages had to be again
solemnized at the Bureau. Licenses cost fifty cents, which was con-
sidered an extortion and was supposed to be for Buckley's benefit.^
The Labor Problem
The Bureau inherited the poHcy of the ''superintendents" in
regard to the regulation of negro labor, and the first regulations by
the Bureau were evidently modelled on the Treasury Regulations
of July 29, 1864. The monthly wage was lowered, but there was
the same absurd classification of labor with fixed wages. The first
of these regulations, promulgated in Mobile in May, 1865, was to
this effect : —
Laborers were to be encouraged to make contracts with their
former masters or with any one else. The contracts were to be sub-
mitted to the ''Superintendent of Freedmen" and, if fair and honest,
would be approved and registered. A register of unemployed persons
was to be kept at the Freedmen's Bureau, and any person by apply-
ing there could obtain laborers of both sexes at the following rates :
first class, $10 per month; second class, $8 per month; third class,
$6 per month ; boys under 14 years of age, $3 per month ; girls under
14 years of age, $2 per month. Colored persons skilled in trade
were also divided into three classes at the following rates : men and
women receiving the same, first class, $2.50 per day; second class, $2
per day; third class, $1.50 per day. Mechanics were also to receive
not less than $5 per month in addition to first-class rates. Wages
were to be paid quarterly, on July i and October i, and the final
1 G. O. No. 4, July 28, 1865.
2 N. Y. News, Sept. 7, 1865 (Montgomery correspondent); Ku Klux Kept., p. 441;
oral accounts.
2 F
434 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
payment on or before the expiration of the contract, which was to
be made for not less than three months, and not longer than to the
end of 1865. In addition to his wages, the contracts must secure
to the laborer just treatment, wholesome food, comfortable clothing,
quarters, fuel, and medical attendance. No contract was binding
nor a person considered employed unless the contract was signed by
both parties and registered at the Bureau office, in which case a
certificate of employment was to be furnished. Laborers were
warned that it was for their own interest to work faithfully, and that
the government, while protecting them against ill treatment, would
not countenance idleness and vagrancy, nor support those capable of
earning an honest hving by industry. The laborers must fulfil
their contracts, and would not be allowed to leave their employer
except when permitted by the Superintendent of Freedmen. For
leaving without cause or permission, the laborers were to forfeit all
wages and be otherwise punished. Wages would be deducted in
cases of sickness, and wages and rations withheld when sickness
was feigned for purposes of idleness, the proof being furnished by
the medical officer in attendance. Upon feigning sickness or refusing
to work, a laborer was to be put at forced labor on the public works
without pay. A reasonable time having been given for voluntary
contracts to be made, any negro found without employment would
be furnished work by the superintendent, who was to supply the army
with all that were required for labor, and gather the aged, infirm,
and helpless into "home colonies," and put them on plantations.
Employers and their agents were to be held responsible for their
conduct toward laborers, and cruelty or neglect of duty would be
summarily punished.^ The ignorance of conditions shown by these
seemingly fair regulations is equalled in other regulations issued by
the Bureau agents during the summer and fall of 1865. It is no
wonder that the negroes could not find work in Mobile when they
wanted it.
Instructions from Howard directed that agreements to labor
must be approved by Bureau officers. Overseers were not to be
tolerated. All agents were to be classed as officers, whether they
were enhsted men or civihans. Wages were to be secured by a Hen
on the crops or the land, the rate of pay being fixed at the wages paid
^ Montgomery Mail, May 12, 1865.
THE LABOR PROBLEM 43c
for an able-bodied negro before the war, and a minimum rate was
10 be published. All contracts were to be written and approved by
the agent of the Bureau, who was to keep a copy of the documents/
At Huntsville, in north Alabama, orders were issued that freed-
men must go to work or be arrested and forced to work by the mihtary
authorities. Contracts had to be witnessed by a friend of the freed-
men, and were subject to examination by the mihtary authorities.
Breach of contract by either party might be tried by the provost
marshal or by a mihtary commission, and the property of the em-
ployer was hable to seizure for wages. ^
At first the planters thought that they saw in the contract system
a means of holding the negro to his work, and they vigorously de-
manded contracts.^ This suited Swayne, and he issued the following
regulations, which superseded former rules : —
1. All contracts with freedmen for labor for a month or more
had to be in writing, and approved by an agent of the Freedmen' s
Bureau, who might require security.
2. For plantation labor: (a) contracts could be made with the
heads of families to embrace the labor of all members who were able
to work; (b) the employer must provide good and sufficient food,
quarters, and medical attendance, and such further compensation
as might be agreed upon; (c) such contracts would be a hen upon
the crops, of which not more than half could be moved until full
payment had been made, and the contract released by the Freed-
men's Bureau agent or by a justice of the peace in case an agent was
not at hand.
3. The remedies for violation of contracts were forfeiture of
wages and damages secured by lien.
4. In case an employer should make an oath before a justice
of the peace, acting as an agent of the Bureau, that one of his laborers
had been absent more than three days in a month, the justice of the
1 Howard's Circular, May 30, 1865; War Department Circular No. ii, July 12, 1865.
2 Huntsville Advocate, July 26, 1865. This was when the army officials were con-
ducting the Bureau. Later the civilian agents charged %2 for making every contract,
and the negroes soon wanted the Bureau abolished so far as it related to contracts.
N. V. Times, March 12, 1866 (letter from Florence, Ala.). In Madison County some of
the negroes tarred and feathered a Bureau agent who had been collecting $1.50 each
for drawing contracts. A". V. Herald, Dec. 22, 1867.
^ Swayne's Report, Jan. 31, 1866.
436 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
peace could proceed against the negro as a vagrant and hand
over to the civil authorities.
5. Vagrants when convicted might be put to work on the roads
or streets or at other labor by the county or municipal authorities,
who must provide for their support ; or they might be given into the
charge of an agent of the Freedmen's Bureau. This was usually
done and the agent released them. Besides this, he often interfered
and took charge of the negro vagrants convicted in the community.
6. All contracts must expire on or before January i, 1866.^
The lien upon the crop was to be enforced by attachment, which
must be issued by any magistrate when any part of the crop was
about to be moved without the consent of the laborer. The plaintiff
(negro) was not obliged to give bond.^ These regulations had no
effect in reorganizing labor, and were only a cause of confusion.
A committee of citizens of Talladega, appointed to make sug
gestions in regard to enforcing the regulations of the Freedmen's
Bureau concerning contracts, reported that: (i) contracts for a]
month or more between whites and blacks should be reduced to
writing and witnessed; (2) civil officers should enforce these con-
tracts according to law and the regulations of the Freedmen's Bureau;
(3) the law of apprenticeship should be applied to freedmen where
minors were found without means of support; (4) civil officers
should take duties heretofore devolving upon the Freedmen's Bureau
in matters of contract between whites and blacks. This practically
asked for the discontinuance of the Freedmen's Bureau as being
superfluous.^
When enforced, the contract regulations caused trouble. The
lien on the crop for the negro's wages prevented the farmer from
moving a bale of cotton if the negro objected. No matter whether
the negro had been paid or not, if he made complaint, the farmer's
whole crop could be locked up until the case was settled by a magis-
trate or agent ; and the negro was not backward in making claims
1 These regulations bear the approval of the other two rulers of Alabama — General
Woods and Governor Parsons. See G. O. No. 12, Aug. 30, 1865.
2 G. O. No. 13, Sept., 1865. This order was in force until 1868. See N. Y. Worlds
Nov. 20, 1867.
^ These propositions vv^ere approved by A. Humphreys, assistant superintendent
at Talladega, and by General Chetlain, commanding the District of Talladega. Selnm
Times, Dec. 4, 1865.
THE LABOR PROBLEM 437
for wages unpaid or for violation of contract. The average southern
farmer had to move a great part of his crop before he could get
money to satisfy labor and other debts, and when the negro saw the
first bale being moved, he often became uneasy and made trouble.*
The contract system resulted in much litigation, of which the negro
was very fond ; he did not feel that he was really free until he had
had a lawsuit with some one. It gave him no trouble and much
entertainment, but was a source of annoyance to his employer. The
Bureau agents were particular that no negro should work except
under a written contract, as a fee of from fifty cents to a dollar and
a half was charged for each contract. If a negro was found working
under a verbal agreement, he and his employer were summoned
before the agent, fined, and forced into a written contract. When
the negroes refused to work, the planters could sometimes hire the
Bureau officials to use their influence. The whites charged that it
was a common practice for the agents to induce a strike, and then
make the employers pay for an order to send the blacks back to work.^
This was the case only under alien Bureau agents, for where the
magistrates were agents, all went smoothly with no contracts. The
end of 1865 and the spring of 1866 found the whites, who at first
had insisted on written contracts, weary of the system and disposed
to make only verbal agreements, and the negro had usually become
afraid of a written contract because it might be enforced. The
legislature passed laws to regulate contracts, which Governor Patton
vetoed on the ground that no special legislation was necessary; the
laws of supply and demand should be allowed to operate, he said.
Swayne also said that contracts were not necessary, as hunger and
cold on the part of one, and demand for labor on the part of the other,
would protect both negro and white.^
Some planters, having no faith in free negro labor, refused to
1 Sehna Messenger, Nov. 15, 1865; N. Y. World, Nov. 20, 1867.
2 Ku Klux Kept., p. 441 ; N. Y. News, Sept. 7, 1865 ; oral accounts.
3 Swayne's Report, Jan., 1866. Rev. C. W. Buckley, in a report to Swayne (dated
Jan. 5, 1866), of a tour in Lowndes County, stated that while the Bureau and the army
and the "government of the Christian nation," each had done much good, all was
as nothing to what God was doing. The hand of God was seen in the stubborn and per-
sistent reluctance of the negro to make contracts and go to work; God had taught the
8,000,000 arrogant and haughty whites that they were dependent upon the freedmcn ;
God had ordained that " the self-interest of the former master should be the protection
of the late slaves."
438 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
give the negro employment requiring any outlay of money. And
"freedmen were not uncommon who believed that work was no part
of freedom." There was a disposition, Swayne reported, to preserve
as much as possible the old patriarchal system, and the general beHef
was that the negro would not work ; and he did refuse to work regu-
larly until after Christmas.^ Some planters thought that the govern-
ment would advance supplies to them,^ and they asked Howard
to bind out negroes to them. Howard visited Mobile and irritated
the whites by his views on the race question.^
Freedmen's Bureau Courts
In Alabama, the state courts were made freedmen's courts, — to
test, as Howard said, the disposition of the judges; Swayne says
that it was done from reasons of policy, and because at first there
were not enough aliens to hold Bureau courts. The reports were
favorable except from north Alabama, where the "unionists" were
supposed to abound.^ In all cases where the blacks were concerned
the assistant commissioner was authorized to exercise jurisdiction,
and the state laws relating to apprenticeship and vagrancy were
extended by his order to include freedmen. The Bureau officials
were made the guardians of negro orphans, but each city and county
had to take care of its own paupers.^ Freedmen's Bureau courts
were created, each composed of three members appointed by the
assistant commissioner, one of whom was an official of the Freed-
men's Bureau, and two were citizens of the county. Their juris-
diction extended to cases relating to the compensation of freedmen
to the amount of $300, and all other cases between whites and blacks,
and criminal cases by or against negroes where the sentence might
be a fine of $100 and one month's imprisonment.
In his report for 1866, Swayne states that "martial law admin-
istered concurrently" by provisional and military authorities was
in force throughout the state ; that the cooperation of the provisional
government and the Freedmen's Bureau had secured to the freed-
men the same rights and privileges enjoyed by the other non-voting
inhabitants; in some cases, he said, on account of prejudice, the
1 Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1865. 2 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Oct. 24, 1868.
8 De Bow's Revietu, 1866. * Freedmen's Bureau Report, Dec, 1865.
^ Howard's Circular Letter, Oct. 4, 1 865.
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU COURTS 439
laws were not executed, but this was not to be remedied by any num-
ber of troops, since no good result could be obtained by force/ Dur-
ing 1865 and 1866 General Swayne repeatedly spoke of tKe friendly
relations between the Freedmen's Bureau and the state officials —
Governors Parsons and Patton and Commissioner Cruikshank,
who was in charge of relief of the poor.
By means of the Bureau courts the negro was completely removed
from trial by the civil government or by any of its officers, except
when the latter were acting as Bureau agents, which, as time went on,
was less and less often the case, and the negro passed entirely under
the control of the alien administration, and an army officer and
two or three carpet-baggers administered what they called justice
in cases where the negroes were concerned. The negroes frequently
broke their contracts, telling the provost marshal that they had been
lashed, and this caused the employer to be arrested and often to be
convicted unjustly. The white planter was much annoyed by the
disposition on the part of the blacks to transfer their faihngs to him
in their tales to the ''office," as the negro called the Bureau and its
agents. "The phrase flashed like lightning through the region of
the late Confederacy that at Freedmen's Bureau agencies 'the
bottom rail was on top.' The conditions which this expression
implied exasperated the whites in like ratio as the negroes were
delighted."^ In the Ku Klux testimony, the whites related their
grievances against the Bureau courts conducted by the ahens: the
Bureau men always took a negro's word as being worth more than
a white's; the worst class of blacks were continually haling their
employers into court; the simple assertion of a negro that he had
not been properly paid for his work was enough to prevent the sale
of a crop or to cause the arrest of the master, who was frequently
brought ten or fifteen miles to answer a trivial charge involving per-
haps fifty cents ;^ the negroes were taken from work and sent to
places of refuge — "Home Colonies " ^ — where hundreds died of
1 Report, Oct. 31, 1866.
2 Herbert, " Solid South," p. 31 ; N. Y. News, Sept. 3, 1865 (Selma correspondent).
8 In one case the agent in Montgomery sent to Troy, fifty-two miles distant, and
arrested a landlord who refused to rent a house to a negro. The negro told the Bureau
agent that he was being evicted.
* There were several plantations near Montgomery, Selma, Mobile, and Huntsville
where negroes were thus collected.
440 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
^
disease caused by neglect, want, and unsanitary conditions; the
Bureau courts encouraged complaints by the negroes; the trials of
cases were made occasions for lectures on slavery, rebellion, political
rights of negroes, social equality, etc., and the negro was by official
advice taught to distrust the whites and to look to the Bureau for
protection/ The Bureau perhaps did some good work in regulating
matters among the negroes themselves, but when the question was
between negro and white, the justice administered was rather one-
sided.^ Genuine cases of violence and mistreatment of negroes were
usually not tried by the Bureau courts, but by military commission.
The following humorous advertisement shows the result of a legiti-
mate interference of the Bureau : —
" Do You Like
The Freedmen's Court ? If so, come up to Burnsville and I
will rent or sell you three nice, healthy plantations with Freednien. Come soon
and get a bargain. I am ahead of any farmer in this section, except on one
place, which said court ' Busteed ' to-day because some of the Freedmen got
flogged. — John Y. Burns." ^
The Bureau courts, after the aliens came into control, proceeded
upon the general principle that the negro was as good as or better
than the southern white, and that he had always been mistreated
by the latter, who wished to still continue him in slavery or to cheat
1 In Montgomery, the Rev. C. W. Buckley, a " hard-shell " preacher, looked after
negro contracts. A negro was not allowed to make his own contract, but it must be
drawn up before Buckley. When a negro broke his contract, Buckley always decided
in his favor, and avowed that he would sooner believe a negro than a white man. His
delight was to keep a white man waiting for a long time while he talked to the negro,
turning his back to and paying no attention to the white caller. He preached to the
negroes several times a week, not sermons, but political harangues. The audience was
composed chiefly of negro women, who, if they had work, would leave it to attend the
meetings. They would not disclose what Buckley said to them, and when questioned
would reply, "It's a secret, and we can't tell it to white folks." Buckley advocated
confiscation, but Swayne, who had more common sense, frowned upon such theological
doctrines.
2 Barker, a carriage-maker at Livingston, was arrested and confined in prison for
some time, and finally was released without trial. He was told that a negro servant had
preferred charges against him, and later denied having done so. Such occurrences were
comrnon. Ku Klux Rept. Ala. Test., pp. 357, 371, 390, 475, 487, 1132; Ho. Ex. Doc,
No. 27, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.; Swayne's Reports, Dec, 1865, and Jan., 1866.
8 Selma Times, April ii, 1866. Busteed was a much-disliked carpet-bag Federal
judge. Mr. Burns survived the Busting, and was a member of the Constitutional Con-
vention of 1901.
CARE OF THE SICK 441
him out of the proceeds of his labor, and who, on the sh'ghtest provo-
cation, would beat, mutilate, or murder the inoffensive black. The
greatest problem was to protect the negroes from the hostile whites,
the agents thought. The aliens did not understand the relations
of slave and master, and assumed that there had always been hostility
between them, and that for the protection of the negro this hostility
ought to continue. A system of espionage was estabhshed that was
intensely galling. Men who had held high offices in the state, who
had led armies or had represented their country at foreign courts, —
men Hke Hardee, Clanton, Fitzpatrick, etc., — were called before
these tribunals at the instance of some ward of the nation, and before
a gaping crowd of their former slaves were lectured by army sutlers
and chaplains of negro regiments.*
Care of the Sick
The medical department of the Freedmen's Bureau gave free
attendance to the refugees and freedmen. In 1865 there were in
the state 4 hospitals, capable of caring for 646 patients, with a
staff of II physicians and 26 male and 22 female attendants. In the
hospitals in 1866 were 18 physicians and 16 male and 18 female
attendants.^ In 1866 there were 6 hospitals, which number was
increased in 1867 to 8, with a staff of 13 physicians and 50 male
and 40 female attendants. In 1868- 1869 there were only three
hospitals.
In 1865 no refugees were treated, but there were 2533 negro
patients, of whom 602, or 24 per cent, died. To August 31, 1866, 271
refugees had been treated, of whom 8 died, and 4153 negroes, of whom
460 died. From September i, 1866, to June 30, 1867, 220 refugees
1 The Bureau courts continued to act even after the state was readmitted to the
Union. In 1868, two constables arrested a negro charged with house-burning in Tus-
cumbia. Col. D. C. Rugg, the Bureau agent at Huntsville, raised a force of forty negroes
and came to the rescue of the negro criminal. " If you attempt to put that negro on the
train," he said, " blood will be spilled. I am acting under the orders of the military
department." The officers were trying to take him to Tuscumbia for trial. Rugg thought
the Bureau should try him, and said, " These men [the negroes] are not going to let you
take the prisoner away, and blood will be shed if you attempt it." N, Y. Worlds Oct. 23,
1 868; Tuscaloosa Times.
2 Probably more. Freedmen's Bureau Report, Nov. I, 1866.
442 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
were treated and 6 died; 2203 negroes, and 186 died; to Octobe?'
31, 1866, 3801 freedmen, of whom 473 died, and 305 refugees, of
whom 12 died. After July, 1868, 289 freedmen were treated.^
These statistics show the relative insignificance of the relief
work.
Smallpox was the most fatal disease among the negroes in the
towns, and several smallpox hospitals were estabhshed. In Selma
the complaint was raised that the assistant superintendent encouraged
the negroes to stay in town, and insisted on caring for all their sick,
but when an epidemic of smallpox broke out, he notified the city
that he could not care for these cases. The Bureau sent supplies
for distribution by the county authorities to the destitute poor and
to the smallpox patients. But the relief work for the sick amounted
to but httle.^
The Issue of Rations
The Department of Records had charge of the issue of supplies
to the destitute refugees and blacks. Among the whites of all classes
in the northern counties there was much want and suffering. The
term ''refugee" was interpreted to include all needy whites,^ though
at first it meant only one who had been forced to leave home on
account of his disloyalty to the Confederacy. The best work of the
Bureau was done in relieving needy whites in the devastated districts ;
and for this the upholders of the institution have never claimed credit.
The negro had not suffered from want before the end of the war,
but now great crowds hastened to the towns and congregated around
the Bureau offices and mihtary posts. They thought that it was
the duty of the government to support them, and that there was to
be no more work.
Before June, 1865, rations were issued by the army officers. From
June, 1865, to September, 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau issued
2,522,907 rations to refugees (whites) and 1,128,740 to freedmen.
1 Bureau Reports, 1 865-1 869.
2 Freedmen's Bureau Reports, 1865-1870 ; Hardy, "History of Selma"; N. K
World, Nov. 13, 1865.
2 The Southern Famine Relief Commission of New York, which worked in Alabama
until 1867, reported that there was much greater suffering from want among the whites
than among the blacks. This society sent corn alone to the state, — 65,958 bushels.
See Final Proceedings and General Report, New York, 1867.
THE ISSUE OF RATIONS
443
The following table shows the number of people fed each month in
Alabama by the Freedmen's Bureau before October, 1866:—
Whi
TE
Black
Months
Men
Women
Boys
Girls
Total
Men
Women
Boys
Girls
Total
1865.
Nov. .
72
483
821
875
2,521
327
656
346
615
1,944
Dec. .
1866.
271
909
1,059
1,090
3*329
464
860
345
574
2,243
Jan. .
349
2,377
1,735
2,764
7,225
538
1,053
742
1,002
3,335
Feb. .
1,285
3,641
3,806
5,039
13,771
894
1,455
880
1,095
4,324
March .
1,181
4,971
5,796
6,758
18,616
995
2,007
1,389
1,662
6,053
April .
1,038
4,340
4,844
6,642
16,864
1,176
2,331
1,904
2,771
8,182
May .
1,743
5,821
6,939
9,064
23,567
1,479
3,433
2,898
3,576
14,526
June .
1,912
5,661
6,932
8,092
22,577
1,654
3,170
2,846
3,151
10,821
July .
1,585
5,036
7,108
8,076
21,805
1,294
2,472
2,379
2,648
8,793
Aug. :
1,376
4,528
5,932
6,836
18,672
1,178
2,025
2,112
2,247
7,562
Sept. .
1,368
4,454
5,547
6,543
17,912
1,242
2,225
1,939
2,126
7,532
Totals
12,180
42,201
50,429
61,779
166,589
11,241
21,687
17,780
21,407
72,115
Men, 23,421; vi^omen, 63,888;
issued, 3,789,788; value, ^643,590.18.
children, 151,295; aggregate, 238,704; rations
During the month of September, 1865, 45,771 rations were issued
to 1971 refugees, and 36,295 rations to 3537 freedmen; in October,
1865, 2875 refugees and 21 51 freedmen drew 153,812 rations. From
September i, 1866 to September i, 1867, 214,305 rations were issued
to refugees and 274,329 to freedmen. From September i, 1867, to
September i, 1868, refugees drew only 886 rations, and freedmen
86,021. Fewer and fewer whites and more and more freedmen
were fed by the Bureau.^
In 1865 and 1866, the crops were poor, and in 1866 there were
at least 10,000 destitute whites and 5000 destitute blacks in the
state. The Bureau asked for 450,000 rations per month, but did not
receive them. The agents were now (1866) beginning to use the
issue of rations to control the negroes, and to organize them into
political clubs or ''Loyal Leagues." During this time (1866-1867),
however, the state gave much assistance, and cooperated with the
1 Freedmen's Bureau Reports, 1865-1868.
444 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Freedmen's Bureau. Some of the agents of the Bureau sold the
supphes that should have gone to the starving.^
The Bureau furnished transportation to 217 refugees and to 521
freedmen who wished to return to their homes, and to a number of
northern school teachers. These transactions were not attended
by abuses.^
Demoralization caused by the Freedmen* s Bureau
After the Federal occupation, when the negroes had congregated
in the towns, the higher and more responsible officers of the army
used their influence to make the blacks go home and work. If left
to these officers, the labor question would have been somewhat
satisfactorily settled; they would have forced the negroes to work
for some one, and to keep away from the towns. But the subordinate
officers, especially the officers of the negro regiments, encouraged
the freedmen to collect in the towns. Few supplies were issued to
them by the army, and there was every prospect that in a few weeks
the negroes would be forced by hunger to go back to work. The
establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau, however, changed condi-
tions. It assumed control of the negroes in all relations, and upset
all that had been done toward settHng the question by gathering
many of the freedmen into great camps or colonies near the towns.
One large colony was established in north Alabama, and many tem-
porary ones throughout the state,' into which thousands who set
out to test their new-found freedom were gathered. On one plan-
tation, in Montgomery County, in July, 1865, 4000 negroes were
placed. There was another large colony near Mobile.* A year later
the Montgomery colony had 200 invalids. Perhaps more misery was
caused by the Bureau in this way than was reheved by it. The
want and sickness arising from the crowded conditions in the towns
was only in slight degree relieved by the food distributed, and the
hospitals opened. There were 40,000 old and infirm negroes in the
state, and thousands died of disease. Not one-tenth did the Bureau
reach. The helpless old negroes were supported by their former
1 Ho. Rept., No. 121, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
8 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Dec, 1865.
* Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866 ; N. Y. Daily News^ Sept. 7, 1865 (Montgomery
correspondent) .
DEMORALIZATION CAUSED BY THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU 445
masters, who now in poverty should have been relieved of their care.
Those who were fed were the able-bodied who could come to town
and stay around the office. The colonies in the negro districts became
hospitals, orphan asylums, and temporary stopping places for the
negroes; and the issue of rations was longest and surest at these
places.^ Several hundred white refugees also remained worthless
hangers-on of the Bureau.
The regular issue of rations to the negroes broke up the labor
system that had been partially estabhshed and prevented a settle-
ment of the labor problem. The government would now support
theoi, the blacks thought, and they would not have to work. Around
the towns conditions became very bad. Want and disease were fast
thinning their numbers. They refused to make contracts, though the
highest wages were offered by those planters and farmers who could
afford to hire them, and the agents encouraged them in their idle-
ness by teUing them not to work, as it was the duty of their former
masters to support them, and that wages were due them, at least
since January i, 1863.^ They told them, also, to come to the towns
and Hve until the matter was settled.* Domestic animals near the
negro camps were nearly all stolen by the blacks who were able but
unwilling to work. These marauders were frequently shot at or
were thrashed, which gave rise to the stories of outrage common at
that time.
Doctor Nott of Mobile wrote that in or near Mobile no labor
could be hired ; that it was impossible to get a cook or a washerwoman,
while hundreds were dying in idleness from disease and starvation,
deceived by the false hopes aroused, and false promises of support
by the government, made by wicked and designing men who wished
to create prejudice against the whites, and to prevent the negroes
from working by telHng them that to go back to work was to go back
to slavery. The negro women were told that women should not
work, and they announced that they never intended to go to the
field or do other work again, but " Hve like white ladies." * Wherever
1 Trowbridge, " The South," p. 446.
2 In the convention of 1867 this teaching bore fruit in the ordinance authorizing
suits by former slaves to recover wages from Jan. i, 1863.
8 iV. y. World, Nov. 13, 1865 (Selma correspondent); oral accounts.
^De Bow's Review, March, 1866 (Dr. Nott); N, Y, Times, Oct. 3, 1865; Moni-
gomery Advertiser, March 21, 1866.
446 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
it was active the Bureau demoralized labor by arousing false hopes
and by unnecessary intermeddling. It has been claimed for the
Bureau that it was a vast labor clearing-house, and that a part of its
work was the establishment of a system of free labor. ^ In other
states such may have been the case ; in Alabama it certainly was not.
The labor system partially established all over the Black Belt in 1865
was deranged wherever the Bureau had influence. The system
proposed by the Bureau was simply that of old slave wages paid for
work done under a written contract. The excessive wages and the
interference of the agents in the making of contracts made it impos-
sible for the system to work, and Swayne acquiesced in the mollifi-
cation of the Bureau rules by black and white, saying that natural
forces would bring about a proper state of affairs. Wherever the
Bureau had the least influence, there industry was least demoralized.
So far from acting as a labor agency, its influence was distinctly in
the opposite direction wherever it undertook to regulate labor. The
free labor system, such as it was, was already in existence when the
Bureau reached the Black Belt, and, in spite of that institution,
worked itself out.^
A general belief grew up among the freedmen that at Christmas,
1865, there would be a confiscation and division of all land in the
South. The soldiers, — black and white, — the preachers, and
especially the Bureau agents and the school-teachers, were responsi-
ble for this belief. Swayne reported that an impression, well-nigh
universal, prevailed that the confiscation, of which they had heard
for months, would take place at Christmas, and led them to refuse
any engagement extending beyond the holidays, or to work steadily
in the meantime.^ Christmas or New Year's the negro thought would
1 DuBois in Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901.
2 A Tallapoosa County farmer stated that for three years after the war the crops
were very bad. Yet the whites who had negroes on their farms felt bound to support
them. But if the whites tried to make the negroes work or spoke sharply to them, they
would leave and go to the Bureau for rations. P. M. Dox, a Democratic member of
Congress in 1870, said that in north Alabama, in 1 866-1 867, negro women would not
milk a cow when it rained. Servants would not black boots. There was a general
refusal to do menial service. Ala. Test., pp. 345, 1132. The Alabama cotton crop
of i860 was 842,729 bales; of 1865, 75,305 bales; of 1866, 429,102 bales; of 1867,
239,516 bales ; of 1868, 366,193 bales. Of each crop since the war an increasingly
large proportion has been raised by the whites.
* Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866.
DEMORALIZATION CAUSED BY THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU 447
be the millennium. Each would have a farm, plenty to eat and drink,
and nothing to do, — "forty acres of land and a mule." There is
no doubt that the "forty acres and a mule" idea was partly caused
by the distribution among the negroes of the lands on the south
Atlantic coast by General Sherman and others, and by the provisions
of the early Bureau acts. " Forty acres and a mule" was the expecta-
tion, and to this day some old negroes are awaiting the fulfilment
of this promise.^ Many went so far, in 1865, as to choose the land
that would be theirs on New Year's Day ; others merely took charge
at once of small animals, such as pigs, turkeys, chickens, cows, etc.,
that came within their reach.^
On account of this behef in the coming confiscation of property
and their implicit confidence in all who made promises, the negroes
were deceived and cheated in many ways. Sharpers sold painted
sticks to the ex- slaves, declaring that if set up on land belonging to
the whites, they gave titles to the blacks who set them up. A docu-
ment purporting to be a deed was given with one set of painted sticks.
In part it read as follows : "Know all men by these presents,
that a naught is a naught, and a figure is a figure ; all for the white
man, and none for the nigure. And whereas Moses lifted up the
serpent in the wilderness, so also have I lifted this d — d old nigger
out of four dollars and six bits. Amen. Selah ! " In the campaign
of 1868 this was circulated far and wide by the Democrats as a
campaign document. There is record of the sale of painted sticks in
Clarke, Marengo, Sumter, Barbour, Montgomery, Calhoun, Macon,
Tallapoosa, and Greene counties, and in the Tennessee valley. The
practice must have been general. In Sumter County, 1865-1866,
1 Within the last five years I have seen several old negroes who said they had been
paying assessments regularly to men who claimed to be working to get the " forty acres
and the mule " for the negro. They naturally have little to say to white people on the
subject. From what I have been told by former slaves, I am inclined to think that the
negroes have been swindled out of many hard-earned dollars, even in recent times, by
the scoundrels who claim to be paying the fees of lawyers at work on the negroes' cases.
2 Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866; Freedmen's Bureau Report, Dec, 1865; Grant's
Report; Truman's Report, April 9, 1866; De Bow's Revieiv, March, 1866; Montgomery
Advertiser, March I, 1866; N. Y. News, Nov. 25, 1865 (Selma correspondent); A'. Y.
World, Nov. 13, 1865; N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1865; A^. K. NrMS, Sept., and Oct. 2, 7,
1865. B. W. Norris, a Bureau agent from Skowhegan, Maine, told the negroes the tale
of "forty acres and a mule," and they sent him to Congress in 1868 to get the land for
them. He told them that they had a better right to the land than the masters had.
■" Your work made this country what it is, and it is yours." Ala. Test., pp. 445, 1131.
448 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the seller of sticks was an ex-cotton agent. He had secured th
striped pegs in Washington, he said, and his charge was a dollar
a peg. He instructed the buyer how to "step off" the forty acres,,
and told them not to encroach upon one another and to take half in
cleared land and half in woodland.^ In Clarke County, as late as
1873, the sticks were sold for three dollars each if the negro possessed
so large a sum ; but if he had only a dollar, the agent would let a
stick go for that. Some of the negroes actually took possession of
land, and went to work.^ In Tallapoosa County the painted pegs
were sold as late as 1870.^ In 1902 a man was arrested in south
Alabama for collecting money from negroes in this way. It was
said that one cause of the survival of this practice was the course of
Wendell Phillips, who, in the Antislavery Standard, advocated the
distribution of land among the negroes, eighty acres to each, or forty
acres and a furnished cottage. The speeches of Thaddeus Stevens
on confiscation were widely distributed among the negroes. His
Confiscation Bill of March, 1867, caused expectations among the
negroes, who soon heard of such propositions.^ General Wilson,
on his raid, had taken all the stock from Montgomery and had left
with the planters his broken-down mules and horses. The military
authorities of the Sixteenth Army Corps had declared that these
animals belonged to the planters, who had already used them a
year. But the Rev. C. W. Buckley, a Bureau chaplain, promised
them to the negroes, who began to take possession of them.^
The subordinate agents of the Bureau frequently were broken-
down men who had made failures at everything they had undertaken ; *
some were preachers with strong prejudices, and others were the
dregs of a mustered- out army, — all opposed to any settlement of
the negro question which would leave them without an office. Such
men sowed the seeds of discord between the races and taught the
negro that he must fear and hate his former master, who desired
above all things to reenslave him.' In this way they were ably
abetted by the northern teachers and missionaries.
1 Ala. Test., p. 314. 2 Ball, "Clarke County," p. 627. » Ala. Test., p. 1133.
4 Ala. Test., p. 460; see Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), article " Confiscation."
^Montgomery Advertiser, March, 1866. Buckley was known among the "raalig-
nants" as "the high priest of the nigger Bureau." N. Y. World, Dec. 22, 1867.
6 N. Y. Herald, July 23, 1865; Herbert, « Solid South," p. 30.
^ De Bald's Review, 1866: oral accounts.
f
DEMORALIZATION CAUSED BY THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU 449
There were some favorable reports from the Bureau in Alabama,
principally from districts where the native whites were agents. But
in the summer of 1866 Generals Steedman and Fullerton, accompanied
by a correspondent, made a trip through the South inspecting the
institution. They reported that in Alabama it was better conducted
than elsewhere in the South ; that all of the good of the system and
not all of the bad was here most apparent. Over the greater part of
the state, they said, it interfered but Httle with the negro, and con-
sequently the affairs of both races were in better condition. Gen-
eral Patton thought that Swayne was the best man to be at the head
of the Bureau, yet he was sure that the institution was unnecessary,
its only use being to feed the needy, which could be done by the
state with less demoralization. The negro, he said, should be left
to the protection of the law, since there was no discrimination against
him. As long as free rations were issued, the blacks would make
no contracts and would not work. Swayne, Patton declared, was
doing his best, but he could not prevent demoraHzation, and the
very presence of the Bureau was an irritation to the whites, thus
operating against the good of the negro. He stated that in Clarke
and Marengo counties, where there were no agents, the relations
between the races were more friendly than in any other black counties,
and there the negro was better satisfied. The southern people knew
the negro and his needs, Steedman and Fullerton reported, and he
should be left to them ; the Bureau served as a spy upon the planters ;
it was the general testimony that where there was no northern agent,
there the negro worked better, and there was less disorder among
the blacks and less friction between the races. The fact was clearly
demonstrated in west Alabama, where there was little interference on
the part of the Bureau, and where the negro did well.^
An account of conditions in one county where the agents were
army officers and were somewhat under the influence of the native
whites will be of interest. When the army and the Bureau came to
Marengo County, the white people, who were few in number, deter-
mined to win their good will. There were *'stag" dinners and
feasts, and the eternal friendship of the officers, with few exceptions,
1 N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1866 (letter of northern traveller); Steedman and Fuller-
ton's Reports ; N. V. Herald, June 24, 1866 ; Columbus (Ga.) Sun, Nov. 22, 1865 :
N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1866.
2 G
450 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was won. The exceptions were those who had political ambitions.
The population, being composed largely of negroes, was under the
control of the "office," which here did not heed the tales of "rebel
outrages." The negro received few supplies and did well, though
afterwards, in places doubtful pohtically, supphes were issued for
pohtical purposes. One planter in Marengo gave an order to the
negroes on his plantation to do a certain piece of work. They refused
and sent their head man to report at the "office." He brought back
a sealed envelope containing a peremptory order to cease work.
The negroes were ignorant of the contents, so the planter read the
letter, called the negroes up, and ordered them back to the same
work. They went cheerfully, evidently thinking it was the order of
the Bureau. At any time the Bureau could interfere and say that
certain work should or should not be done. Another planter hved
twelve miles from DemopoHs. One day ten or twelve of the negro
laborers went to DemopoHs to complain to the "office" about one
of his orders. The planter went to Demopolis by another road,
and was sitting in the Bureau office when the negroes arrived. They
were confused and at first could say nothing. The planter was silent.
Finally they told their tale, and the officer called for a sergeant and
four mounted men. "Sergeant," he said, "take these people back
to Mr. DuBose's on the nm.^ You understand ; on the runT^ They
ran the negroes the whole twelve miles, though they had already
travelled the twelve miles. Upon their arrival at home the sergeant
tied them to trees with their hands above their heads, and left them
with their tongues hanging out. It was the most terrible punish-
ment the negroes had ever received, and they never again had any
complaints to pour into the ear of the "office." ^ The white soldiers
^usually cared Httle for the negroes, it is said.
From the first the Bureau was unnecessary in Alabama. The
negro had felt no want before the beginning of the war, and the
efforts of the general officers of the army, besides hunger and cold,
would have soon forced him to work. He was not mistreated except
in rare cases which did not become rarer under the Bureau. Cotton
was worth fifty cents to a dollar a pound, and the extraordinary
demand for labor thus created guaranteed good treatment. Much
more suffering was caused by the congregation of the black population
1 Account by Col. J. W. DuBose in manuscript.
THE FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS-BANK
451
m the towns than would have been the case had there been no relief.
Not a one did it really help to get work, because no man who wanted
work could escape a job unless it prevented, and with its red tape
it was a hindrance to those who were industrious. Its interference in
behalf of the negro was bad, as it led him to beheve that the govern-
ment would always back him and that it was his right to be supported.
Thus industry was paralyzed. Yet as first organized by Swayne, the
Bureau would have been endurable, though it would have been a
disturbing element, and the negro would have been the greater suf-
ferer from the disorder caused by it; but, as time went on. General
Swayne was gradually forced by northern opinion to change his poHcy,
and to put into office more and more northern men as subordinate
agents. These men, of character already described, had to Hve by
fleecing the negroes, by fees, and by steaHng suppHes.^ Then, recog-
nizing the trend of affairs and seeing their great opportunity, they
began to organize the negro for poHtical purposes; they themselves
were to become statesmen. The Bureau was then manipulated as
a political machine for the nomination and election of state and
federal officers, and the public money and property were used for
that purpose. The Howard Investigation refused to enter that field,
but the testimony shows that the Bureau agents, teachers, the
savings-bank, and missionaries industriously carried on poHtical
operations.^
In 1869 the Bureau was intrusted with the payment of bounties
to the negro soldiers who had been discharged or mustered out. There
were several thousand of these in Alabama. Gross frauds are said
to have been perpetrated by the officials in charge of the distribution.
The worst scandals were in north Alabama, where most of the negro
soldiers lived.^
Sec. 2. The Freedmen's Savings-bank
The Freedmen's Savings and Trust Company was an institution
closely connected with the Freedmen's Bureau, and had the sanction
1 Herbert, "Solid South," pp. 30, 31; N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1866.
2 Ho. Kept., No. 121, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.; Ku Klux Kept., p. 441. See chapter in
regard to Union League.
8 See also DuBois, in Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 241, 4l8t
Cong., 2d Sess.
L
452 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and support of the government, especially of the Bureau officials.
Many of the trustees of the bank were or had been connected with
the Bureau/ and it was generally understood by the negroes
that it was a part of the Bureau. It possessed the confidence of
the blacks to a remarkable degree and gave promise of becoming
a very valuable institution by teaching them habits of thrift and
economy.^
The central office was in Washington, and several branch banks
were estabhshed in every southern state. The Alabama branch
banks were established at Huntsville, in December, 1865, and at
Montgomery and Mobile early in 1866. The cashiers at the respective
branches, when the bank failed, in 1874, were Lafayette Robinson,
who seems to have been an honest man though he could not keep
books, Edwin Beecher,^ and C. R. Woodward, both of whom seem
to have had some picturesque ideas as to their rights over the
money deposited. A bank-book was issued to each negro depositor,
and in the book were printed the regulations to be observed
by him. On one cover there was a statement to the effect that the
bank was wholly a benevolent institution, and that all profits were
to be divided among the depositors or devoted to charitable enter-
prises for the benefit of freedmen. It was further stated that the
*' Martyr" President Lincoln had approved the purpose of the bank,
and that one of his last acts was to sign the bill to estabhsh it. On
the cover of the book was the printed legend : * —
" I consider the Freedmen's Savings and Trust Company to be greatly needed
by the colored people and have welcomed it as an auxiliary to the Freedmen's
Bureau." — Major-General O. O. Howard.
To the negro this was sufficient recommendation. There was also
printed on the cover a very attractive table, showing how much a
1 Ho. Kept., No. 121, p. 47, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Some of the prominent incorporators were Peter Cooper, William C. Bryant,^
A. A. Low, Gerritt Smith, John Jay, A. S. Barnes, J. W. Alvord, S. G. Howe, George L^
Stearns, Edward Atkinson, and A. A. Lawrence. The act of incorporation was approved
by the President on March 3, 1865, at the same time the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was
approved. Numbers of the incorporators and bank officials were connected with the
Bureau. See Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 16, 43d Cong., 2d Sess.
* A Bureau paymaster.
* Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 16, 43d Cong., 2d Sess.
THE FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS-BANK 453
man might save by laying aside ten cents a day and placing it in the
bank at 6 per cent interest. The first year the man would save, in
this way, $36.99, the tenth year would find $489.31 to his credit.
And all this by saving ten cents a day — something easily done
when labor was in such demand. This unique bank-book had on
the back cover some verses for the education of the freedmen.
The author of these verses is not known, but the negroes thought
that General Howard wrote them.
" 'Tis little by little the bee fills her cell ;
And little by little a man sinks a well ;
'Tis little by little a bird builds her nest ;
By littles a forest in verdure is drest ;
'Tis little by little great volumes are made ;
By littles a mountain or levels are made ;
'Tis little by little an ocean is filled ; ^
And little by little a city we build ;
'Tis little by little an ant gets her store ;
Every little we add to a little makes more ;
Step by step we walk miles, and we sew stitch by stitch ;
Word by word we read books, cent by cent we grow rich."
The verses were popular, the whole book was educative, and it
was not above the comprehension of the negro. If all the teaching
of the negro had been as sensible as this Httle book, much trouble
would have been avoided. It was a proud negro who owned one
of these wonderful bank-books, and he had a right to be proud.
Many at once began to make use of the savings-banks, and small
sums poured in. Only the negroes in and near the three cities —
Huntsville, Montgomery, and Mobile — where the banks were
located seem to have made deposits, for those of the other towns
and of the country knew httle of the institution. During the
month of January, 1866, deposits to the amount of $4809 were
made in the Mobile branch. This was all in small sums and
was deposited at a time of the year when money was scarcest
among laborers.^ In 1868 the interest paid on long-time deposits
to depositors at Huntsville was $38.02 ; at Mobile, $1349.40. On
May I, 1869, the deposits at Huntsville amounted to $17,603.29;
at Mobile, $50,511.66.
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess.
454
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The following statements of the two principal banks will sh
how the scheme worked among the negroes : —
qa
Total deposits to March 31, 1870
Total number of depositors
Average amount deposited by each .
Drawn out to March 31, 1870 .
Balance to March 31, 1870
Average balance due to each depositor
Spent for land (known) .
Dwelling houses ....
Seeds, teams, agricultural implements
Education, bouks, etc.
HuNTsviLLE Branch
^89445.10
500
^17.89
70,586.60
18,858.50
47.114
1,900.00
800.00
5,000.00
1,200.00
Mobile Branch
$539634-33
3,260
^165.60
474,583.60
64,750-83
39-82
50,000.00
15,000.00
Statement of the
Business done during August, 1872
HUNTSVILLE
Mobile
Montgomery
Deposits for the month
Drafts for the month .
Total deposits ....
Total drafts ....
Total due depositors
$7,343-50
10,127.61
416,617.72
364,382.51
52,235.21
;^I 1,1 36.05
18,645.62
1,039,097-05
933,424.30
105,672.75
J558,5 22.90
8,679.60
238,106.08
213,861.71
24,244.37 1
These branch banks exercised a good influence over the negro
population, even over those who did not become depositors. The
negroes became more economical, spent less for whiskey, gewgaws,
and finery, and when wages were good and work was plentiful, they
saved money to carry them through the winter and other periods of
lesser prosperity. Some of those who had no bank accounts would
save in order to have one, or, at least, save enough money to help
them through hard times. Much of the money drawn from the
banks was invested in property of some kind. Excessive interest in
pohtics prevented a proper increase in the number of depositors and
in the amount of deposits.
In 1874, after the bank failed through dishonest and inefficient
management, the Habilities to southern negro depositors amounted
1 See Williams, "History of the Negro Race in America," Vol. II, p. 410. August
was a month in which there was little money-making among the negroes. It was vaca-
tion time, between the " laying by " and the gathering of the crop. ;
THE FREEDMEN'S SAVINGS-BANK
455
to $3,299,201/ A total business of $55,000,000 had been done.
The following table, compiled by Hoffman, will show the total busi-
ness of the bank, 1866 to 1874.^
Year
Total Deposits
Deposits each
Year
Due Depositors
Gain each Year
1866
;^305.i67
^5^305,167
;!5 1 99,283
;S5i99,283
1867
1,624,853
1,319,686
366,338
167,054
1868
3,582,378
1,957,525
638,299
271,960
1869
7,257,798
3,675,420
1,073,465
435,166
1870
12,605,782
5,347,983
1,657,006
583,541
1871
19,952,947
7,347,165
2,455,836
798.829
1872
31,260,499
11,281,313
3,684,739
1,227,927
1873
4,200,000
1874
55,000,000
3,013,670
In Alabama the depositors lost, for the time at least, $35,963 at
Huntsville; $29,743 at Montgomery; $95,144 at Mobile. After
years of delay dividends were paid ; but few of the depositors profited
by the late payment.^ The philanthropic incorporators took care
to desert the faihng enterprise in time, and Frederick Douglass, a
well-known negro, was placed in charge to serve as a scapegoat.
No one was punished for the crooked proceedings of the institution.
Several of the incorporators were dead; the survivors pleaded good
intentions, ignorance, etc., and finally placed the blame on their dead
associates. Their sympathy for the negro did not go the length of
assuming money responsibihty for the operations of the bank, and
thus saving the negro depositors. There were several of the incor-
porators who could have assumed all the Habilities and not felt the
burden severely. Agents and lawyers got most of the later proceeds,
and the good work was all undone, for the negro felt that the United
States government and the Freedmen's Bureau had cheated him.
It is said to have affected his faith in banks to this day."*
1 Hoffman, " Race Traits and Tendencies," p. 290, says $3,013,699.
2 Hoffman, p. 290 ; also Sen. Rept., No. 440, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. Williams, Vol.
n, p. 411, states that the total deposits amounted to $57,000,000, an average of $284
for each depositor.
3 Dividends were declared as follows : Nov. i, 1875, 20%; March 20, 1875-1878,
10%; Sept. I, 1880,10%; June i, 1882, 15%; May 12, 1883,7%; making 62% in all.
To 1886, $1,722,549 had been paid to depositors, and there was a balance in the
hands of the government receivers of $30,476.
4 Williams, " History of the Negro Race," Vol. U, pp. 403-410 ; Fred Douglass,
"Life and Times," Ch. XIV; Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 16, 43d Cong., 2d Sess.; DuBois,
456 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA^
\
Sec. 3. The Freedmen's Bureau and Negro Education
As the Federal armies occupied southern territory and numbers
of negroes were thrown upon the care of the government which gath-
ered them into colonies on confiscated plantations, there arose a de-
mand from the friends of the negro at the North that his education
should begin at once. An educated negro, it was thought, was
even more obnoxious to the slaveholding southerner than a free
negro ; hence educated negroes should be multiplied. No doubt was
entertained by his northern friends but that the negro was the equal
of the white man in capacity to profit by education. To educate the
negro was to carry on war against the South just as much as to invade
with armed troops, and various aid societies demanded that, as the
negro came under the control of the United States troops, schools be
estabhshed and the colored children be taught. The Treasury agents,
who were in charge of the plantations and colonies where the negroes
were gathered, were instructed by the Secretary- to establish schools in
each ''home" and ''labor" colony for the instruction of the children
under twelve years of age. Teachers, supplied by the superin-
tendent of the colony, who was usually the chaplain of a negro regi-
ment, or by benevolent associations, were allowed to take charge of
the education of the blacks in any colony they decided to enter.^ Be-
fore the end of the war only three or four such schools were established
in Alabama. One was on the plantation of ex-Governor Chapman,
in Madison County, another at Huntsville, and one at Florence.
The law of March 3, 1865, creating the Freedmen's Bureau, gave
to its officials general authority over all matters concerning freedmen.
Nothing was said about education or schools, but it was understood
that educational work was to be carried on and extended, and after
the organization of the Bureau in the State of Alabama its "Depart-
ment of Records" had control of the education of the negro. For the
support of negro education the second Freedmen's Bureau Act,
July 16, 1866, authorized the use of or the sale of all buildings and
lands and other property formerly belonging to the Confederate States
" The Souls of Black Folk" ; the various reports of the Freedmen's Bureau and of the
commissioners appointed to settle the affairs of the Freedmen's Savings and Trust
Company, to 1902 ; Hoffman, " Race Traits and Tendencies," pp. 289, 290 ; Pleming,
" Documents relating to Reconstruction," Nos. 6 and 7.
^ Regulations of the Treasury Dept., July 29, 1864.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO EDUCATION 457
or used for the support of the Confederacy. It directed the
authorities of the Bureau to cooperate at all times with the aid
societies, and to furnish buildings for schools where these societies sent
teachers, and also to furnish protection to these teachers and schools/
The southern churches had never ceased their work among the
negroes during the war,^ and immediately after the emancipation of
the slaves all denominations declared that the freedmen must be
educated so as to fit them for their changed condition of life.^ The
churches spoke for the controUing element of the people, who saw
that some kind of training was an absolute necessity to the continua-
tion of the friendly relations then existing between the two races. The
church congregations, associations, and conferences, and mass meet-
ings of citizens pledged themselves to aid in this movement. Dr. J.
L. M. Curry first appeared as a friend of negro education when, in
the summer of 1865, he presided over a mass meeting at Marion,
which made provision for schools for the negroes. On the part of
the whites whose opinion was worth anything, there was no objection
worth mentioning to negro schools in 1865 and 1866.* In the latter
year, before the objectionable features of the Bureau schools appeared,
General Swayne commented upon the fact that the various churches
had not only declared in favor of the education of the negro, but had
aided the work of the Bureau schools and kept down opposition to
them. He was, however, inclined to attribute this attitude somewhat
to poHcy. He wrote with special approval of the assistance and en-
couragement given by the Methodist Episcopal Church South,
through Rev. H. N. McTyeire (later bishop), who was always in
favor of schools for negroes. He reported, also, that there was a
growing feehng of kindliness on the part of the people toward the
schools. Where there was prejudice the school often dispelled it, and
the movement had the good will of Governors Parsons and Patton.^
1 McPherson, " Rebellion," pp. 594, 595 ; McPherson, " Reconstruction," pp. 147-
151. 2 See Ch. IV, sec. 7.
8 DuBois {Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901) declares that the opposition to the
education of the negro was bitter, for the South believed that the educated negro was a
dangerous negro. This statement is perhaps partially correct for fifteen or twenty
years after 1870, but it is not correct for 1865- 1869.
4 The Gulf States Hist. Mag., Sept., 1902; Report of .General Swayne to Howard,
Dec. 26, 1865. The evidence on this point that is worthy of consideration is con-
clusive. It is all one way. See also Chs. XIX and XX, below.
^ Report of Swayne, Oct. 31, 1866.
458 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
\
Just after the military occupation of the state there was the great-
est desire on the part of the negroes, young and old, for book learn-
ing. Washington speaks of the universal desire for education/ The
whole race wanted to go to school ; none were too old, few too young.
Old people wanted to learn to read the Bible before they died, and
wanted their children to be educated. This seeming thirst for educa-
tion was not rightly understood in the North ; it was, in fact, more a
desire to imitate the white master and obtain formerly forbidden privi-
leges than any real desire due to an understanding of the value of
education; the negro had not the shghtest idea of what "education"
was, but the northern people gave them credit for an appreciation
not yet true even of whites. There were day schools, night schools,
and Sunday-schools, and the "Blue-back Speller" was the standard
beginner's text. Yet, as Washington says, it was years before the
parents wanted their children to make any use of education except
to be preachers, teachers. Congressmen, and politicians. Rascals
were ahead of the missionaries, and a number of pay schools were
estabhshed in 1865 by unprincipled men who took advantage of this
desire for learning and fleeced the negro of his few dollars. One
school, estabhshed in Montgomery by a pedagogue who came in the
wake of the armies, enrolled over two hundred pupils of all ages, at
two dollars per month in advance. The school lasted one month, and
the teacher left, but not without collecting the fees for the second month.^
When General Swayne arrived, he assumed control of negro edu-
cation, and a "Superintendent of Schools for Freedmen" was ap-
pointed. The Rev. C. M. Buckley, chaplain of a colored regiment
and official of the Freedmen's Bureau, was the first holder of this
office. In 1868, after he went to Congress, the position was held by
Rev. R. D. Harper, a northern Methodist preacher, who was super-
seded in 1869 by Colonel Edwin Beecher, formerly a paymaster of
the Bureau and cashier of the Freedmen's Savings Bank in Mont-
gomery. There also appeared a person named H. M. Bush as "Su-
perintendent of Education," a title the Bureau officials were fond of
assuming and which often caused them to be confused with the state
officials of hke title.^.
1 " Up from Slavery," pp. 29, 30,
2 Daily News, Sept. 7, 1865 (Montgomery correspondence). Oral accounts.
5* G. O. No. 1 1, July 12, 1865 (Montgomery) ; Freedmen's Bureau Reports, 1865-1869.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO EDUCATION 459
The sale of Confederate property at Selma, Briarfield, and other
places, small tuition fees, and gifts furnished support to the teachers.
General Swayne was deeply interested in the education of the blacks,
and thought that northern teachers could do better work for the col-
ored race than southern teachers. Most of the aid societies had
spent their funds before reaching Alabama, but Swayne secured some
assistance from the American Missionary Association. The teachers
were paid partly by the Association,, but mostly by the Bureau. The
Pittsburg Freedmen's Aid Commission established schools in north
Alabama, at Huntsville, Stevenson, Tuscumbia, and Athens, and also
had a school at Selma. The Cleveland Freedmen's Union Commis-
sion worked in Montgomery and Talladega by means of Sunday-
schools. A great many of the schools with large enrolments were
Sunday-schools. The American Missionary Association, besides fur-
nishing teachers to the Bureau, had schools of its own in Selma, Talla-
dega, and Mobile. The American Freedmen's Union Commission
(Presbyterian branch) also had schools in the state. The Freedmen's
Aid Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church (North) did some
work in the way of education, but was engaged chiefly in inducing
the negroes to flee from the wrath to come by leaving the southern
churches. At Stevenson and Athens schools were established by aid
from England.^ In 1866 the Northwestern Aid Society had a school
at Mobile.^ At the end of 1865, the Bureau had charge of eleven
schools at Huntsville, Athens, and Stevenson, one in Montgomery
with II teachers and 497 pupils, and one in Mobile with 4 teachers
and 420 pupils.^ Some ill feehng was aroused by the action
of the Bureau in seizing the Medical College and Museum at Mobile
and using it as a schoolhouse. Even the Confederate authorities had
not demanded the use of it. Before the war it was said that the
museum was one of the finest in America. Many of the most costly
models were now taken away, and a negro shoemaker was installed
in the chemical department.''
The attitude of the southern rehgious bodies enabled the Bureau
to extend its school system in 1866, and to secure native white teachers.
^ Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866; Freedmen's Bureau Report, 1866.
2 Swayne's Report., Oct. 31, 1866.
8 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Dec, 1865 ; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
* Daily News^ Oct. 21, 1865 (Mobile correspondent) ; De Bow's Review, 1866 (Dr.
Nott).
46o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Schools taught by native whites, most of whom were of good charaC'
ter, were estabHshed at Tuskegee, Auburn, Opelika, Salem, Green
ville, Demopohs, Evergreen, Mount Meigs, Tuscaloosa, Gainesville
Marion, Arbahatchee, Prattville, Haynesville, and King's Station, —
in all twenty schools. There were negro teachers in the schools at
Troy, Wetumpka, Home Colony (near Montgomery), and Tuscaloosa
The native whites taught at places where no troops were stationed,
and General Swayne stated that they were especially willing to do
this work after the churches had declared their intention to favor the
education of the negro. It was of such schools that he said theii
presence dispelled prejudice.^- The history of one of these schools
is typical : In Russell County a school was established by the Bureau,
and Buckley, the Superintendent of Schools, who had no available
northern teacher, allowed the white people to name a native white
teacher. Several prominent men agreed that a Methodist ministe
of the community was a suitable person. The neighbors assured him
that his family should not suffer socially on account of his connection
with the school, and that they wanted no northern teacher in the com
munity. The minister accepted the offer, was appointed by the
Bureau, and the school was held in his dooryard, out buildings, and ve
randas, his family assisting him. The negroes were pleased, and big
and little came to school. The relations between the whites anc
blacks were pleasant, and all went well for more than two years, unti
pohtics alienated the races, and the negroes demanded a northern
teacher or one of their own color.^ The schools at Huntsville, Mobile
Montgomery, Selma, Tuscumbia, Stevenson, and Athens, wher
troops were stationed, were reserved for the northern teachers who
were sent by the various aid societies. The disturbing influence o;
the teachers was thus openly acknowledged. The Bureau cooperate
by furnishing buildings, paying rent, and making repairs, and, in
some instances, by giving money or supphes.^
The statistics of the Bureau schools are confused and incomplete
In 1866 one report states that there were 8 schools with 31 teachers
and 1338 pupils under the control of the Bureau. General Swayne'
1 Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866.
2 The account of this particular school was given me by Dr. O. D. Smith of Auburnj
Ala., who was one of the men who chose the white teacher.
^ Swayne's Report, Oct. 31, 1866.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO EDUCATION 461
list includes the schools at the various places named above, and re-
ports 43 schools in 23 of the 52 counties, with 68 teachers and a maxi-
mum enrolment of 3220 pupils — the average being much less.*
Buckley's report for March 15, 1867, gives the number of negro
schools of all kinds as 68 day schools and 27 night schools. The total
enrolment for the winter months had been 5352 ; the average attend-
ance, 4217. At this time the Bureau was supporting 38 day schools,
19 night schools, and paying 49 teachers. Benevolent societies under
supervision of the Bureau were conducting 21 day schools, 7 night
schools, with 36 teachers and a total enrolment of 2157 pupils. Be-
sides these there were 10 private schools with 443 pupils. In all the
schools, there were 75 white and 20 negro teachers. There wxre more
than 100,000 negro children of school age in the state who were not
reached by these schools.
The following table, compiled from the semiannual reports on
Bureau schools in Alabama, will show the shght extent of the educa-
tional work of the Bureau. The list includes all the schools in charge
of the Bureau, or which received aid from the Bureau.
July 1, 1867
July i, 1868
Jan. I, 1869
July i, 1869
July i, 1870
Day schools
122
59
33
79
23
Night schools
53
19
2
I
4
Private schools (negro
teachers)
8
22
4
I
—
Semi-private
25
48
25
55
2
Teachers transported by
Bureau ....
122
22
29
3
—
School buildings owned by
negroes ....
27
13
I
4
II
School buildings owned by
Bureau ....
38
36
29
66
—
White teachers .
126
67
49
65?
—
Negro teachers .
24
28
12
23?
—
White pupils (refugees)
23
—
—
—
—
Black pupils
9,799
4,040
3,330
5,131
2,110
Tuition paid by negroes
$1,542.00
$3,206.56
$1,431-50
$1,248.95
$1,446.30
Bureau paid for tuition
6,693.00
2,09773
1,219.75
2,938.50
22,559.88
Bureau paid for school ex-
18,685.07
penses ....
Total expenditures
8,235.00
6,463.72
2,723.25
4,18745
240,061.18
1 Report, Oct. 31, 1866.
462 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
These statistics showing expenditures are not complete, but they
are given as they are in the reports, which are carelessly made from
carelessly kept and defective records. There was a disposition on
the part of the Bureau to claim all the schools possible in order to
show large numbers. Many of these so-called schools were in reality!
only Sunday-schools, — that is, they were in session only on Sundays,]
— (and the missionary Sunday-schools were counted), and were not!
as good as the Sunday-schools which for years before the war had
been conducted among the negroes by the different churches. Thej
Bureau did not consider of importance the private plantation and
mission schools supported by the native whites, nor the state schools, j
which largely outnumbered the Bureau schools, but only those aided
in some way by itself. The schools entirely under the control of the
Bureau had small enrolment. Assistance was given to all the schools
taught by northern missionaries, to some taught by native whites, '
and to some taught by negroes. It was given in the form of build-
ings, repairs, supplies, and small appropriations of money for salaries.
Rent was paid by the Bureau for school buildings not owned by the
schools or by the Bureau. Accounts were carelessly kept, and after
General Swayne left, if not before, abuses crept in. At least one of
the aid societies received money from the Bureau, and its representa
tives established a reputation for crookedness that was retained after
the Bureau was a thing of the past. This society, — The American
Missionary Association, — along with other work among the negroes,
carried on a crusade against the Cathohc Church which was endeav-
oring to work in the same field. Church work and educational work
were not separated. A building in Mobile, valued at $20,000, was
given by the Bureau to the association as a training school for negro
teachers. The society charged the Bureau rent on this building, and
there were other similar cases where the Bureau paid rent on its
own buildings which were used by the aid societies.^
1 Rent was usually paid at the rate of ^20 a month for thirty pupils. Ho. Rept.,
No. 121, pp. 47, 369, 374, 377, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. The books of the American Mis-
sionary Association showed that it had received, in 1868 and 1869, from the Freedmen's
Bureau for Alabama, the following amounts in cash, though how much it received before
these dates is not known.
December, 1867 $4000.00
October, 1868 583.86
February, 1868 25.41 (?)
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO EDUCATION 463
As already stated, for two years there was little or no opposition
by the whites to the education of the negro, and to some extent they
even favored and aided it. The story of southern opposition to the
schools originated with the lower class of agents, missionaries, and
teachers. Of course, to a person who had taken the aboHtionist pro-
gramme in good faith, it was incomprehensible that the southern
whites could entertain any kindly or Hberal feehngs toward the blacks.
But Buckley reported, as late as March 15, 1867, that the native
whites favored the undertaking, and that no difficulty was experi-
enced in getting southern whites to teach negro schools. Some of
these teachers were graduates of the State University, some had been
county superintendents of education. Crippled Confederate soldiers
and the widows of soldiers sought for positions in the schools.^ There
were also some northern whites of common sense and good char-
acter engaged in teaching these Bureau schools. But too many
of the latter considered themselves missionaries whose duty it was
to show the southern people the error of their sinful ways, and who
taught the negro the wildest of the social, poHtical, and religious
doctrines held at that time by the more sentimental friends of the
ex-slaves.
The temper and manner and the behefs in which the northern
educator went about the business of educating the negro are shown
in the reports and addresses in the proceedings of the National
January, 1869 1^218.25
April, 1869 683.53
May, 1869 139749
June, 1869 95.87
July, 1869 527.00
September, 1869 . . 3049.59
November, 1869 3469.50
December, 1869 2083.78
For building (?) 20,000.00
An item in the account of the Association was " Chicago to Mobile, $20,000," No
one was able to explain what it meant unless it was the $20,000 building in Mobile used
as a training school for negro teachers and on which the Bureau paid rent. In the
southern states the Bureau paid to the American Missionary Association, as shown by
the books of the latter, $213,753.22. Judging from the variable items not noted above,
rent was evidently not included nor even all the cash. Ho. Kept., No. 121, p. 369
et seq., 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (Howard Investigation).
1 Buckley's Report for March 15, 1867 ; Semiannual Report on Schools for Freed-
men, July 4, 1867 ; General Clanton in Ku Klux Rept. Ala. Test.
464 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAiMA
Teachers' Association from 1865 to 1875. The crusade of the teacj
ers in the South was directed by the people represented in this asso-
ciation, and its members went out as teachers. Some of the senti-
ments expressed were as follows: Education and Reconstruction
were to go hand in hand, for the war had been one of ''education and
patriotism against ignorance and barbarism." ^ " The old slave states
[were] to be a missionary ground for the national schoolmaster," ^
and knowledge and intellectual culture were to be spread over this
region that lay hid in darkness.^ There was a demand for a national
school system to force a proper state of affairs upon the South, for
free schools were necessary, they declared, to a repubHcan form of
government, and the free school system should be a part of Recon-
struction. The education of the whites as well as the blacks should
be in the future a matter of national concern, because the "old rebels"
had been sadly miseducated, and they had been able to rule only
because others were ignorant and had been purposely kept in igno-
rance. Much commiseration was expressed for "the poor white
trash" of the South. The "rebels" were still disloyal, and, as one
speaker said, must be treated as a farmer does stumps, that is, they
must be "worked around and left to rot out." The old "slave lords"
must be driven out by the education of the people, and no distinction
in regard to color should be allowed in the schools. The work of
education must be directed by the North, for only the North had
correct ideas in regard to education. Nothing good was found in
the old southern life; it was bad and must give way to the correct
northern civiHzation. The work of "The Christian Hero" was
praised, and it was declared that it ought to inspire an epic even
greater than the immortal epic of Homer.^
The missionary teachers who came South were supported by this
sentiment in the North, and they could not look with friendly eyes
upon anything xione by the southern whites for the negroes. Alto-
gether there were not many of these heralds of hght, and it was a
year before the character of their teaching became generally known
1 Francis Wayland. 2 g q_ Greene, president of the association.
3 President Hill of Harvard College.
* Reports, Proceedings, and Lectures of the National Teachers' Association, 1865
to 1880 ; Reports of the Freedmen's Aid Societies of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
For results of the mistaken teachings of the radical instructors, see Page's article on
"Lynching" in the North American Review, Jan., 1904.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO EDUCATION 465
to the whites or its results were plainly seen. Their dislike for all
things southern was heartily reciprocated by the native whites, who
soon acquired a dislike for the northern teacher which became second
nature. The negro was taught by the missionary educators that he
must distrust the whites and give up all habits and customs that would
remind him of his former condition ; he must not say master and mis-
tress nor take off his hat when speaking to a white person. In
teaching him not to be servile, they taught him to be insolent. The
missionary teachers regarded themselves as the advance guard of a
new army of invasion against the terrible South. In recent years
a Hampton Institute teacher has expressed the situation as follows:
'' When the combat was over and the Yankee schoolma'ams followed
in the train of the northern armies, the business of educating the
negroes was a continuation of hostilities against the vanquished, and
was so regarded to a considerable extent on both sides." The North
in a few years became disappointed and indifferent, especially after
the negro began to turn again to the southern whites.^
The negro schools felt the influence of the politics of the day, be-
sides suffering from the results of the teachings of the northern peda-
gogues. Buckley made a report early in 1867, stating that conditions
were favorable. On July i, 1868, Rev. R. D. Harper, "Superin-
tendent of Education," reported that there was a reaction against
negro schools; that the whites were now hostile to the negro schools
on account of their teachers, who, the whites claimed, upheld the
doctrines of social and political equality ; the negroes were too much
interested in politics in 1867 and 1868, and spent their money in the
campaigns ; the teachers of the negro schools were intimidated, ostra-
cized from society, and could not find board with the white people.
Because of this, he said, some schools had been broken up. The
civil authorities, he declared, winked at the intimidation of the teach-
ers.^ Beecher, the Assistant Commissioner and "Superintendent of
Education," reported that the schools had been supported on confis-
cated Confederate property until 1869, and that this source of supply
1 Miss Alice M. Bacon, in the Slater Fund Trustees, Occasional Papers, No. 7, p. 6.
Armstrong, at Hampton, Va., was a shining exception to the kind of teachers described
above.
2 The Reconstruction government was now in power. There were, at this time,
thirty-one Bureau schools at thirty-one points in the state.
2 H
466 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
}
being exhausted, the teachers were returning to the North. He
reported that 100,000 children had never been inside a schoolhousjB I
The night schools were not successful because the negroes were un-
able to keep awake. A year later, Beecher reported that the schools
were recovering from unfavorable conditions, and that some of the
teachers who had proven to be immoral and incompetent had been
discharged.
The last reports (1870) stated that there was less opposition by
the whites to the Bureau schools.^ This can be partly accounted
for by the fact that the majority of the obnoxious northern teachers
had returned to the North or had been discharged. The best ones,
who had come with high hopes for the negroes, sure that the blacks
needed only education to make them the equal of the whites, were j
bitterly disappointed, and in the majority of cases they gave up the
work and left. Not all of them were of good character and a number
were discharged for incompetency or immorahty ; others were coarse
and rude. The respectable southern whites resigned as soon as the
results of the teaching of the outsiders began to be realized, and those
who remained were beyond the pale of society. The white people
came to believe, and too often with good reason, that the alien teach-
ers stood for and taught social and poHtical equality, intermarriage
of the races, hatred and distrust of the southern whites, and love and
respect for the northern dehverer only. Social ostracism forced the
white teachers to. be content with negro society. Naturally they
became more bitter and incendiary in their utterances and teachings.
Some negroes were only too quick to learn such sentiments, and the
generally insolent behavior of the negro educated under such condi-
tions was one of the causes of reaction against negro education. The
hostility against negro schools was especially strong among the more
ignorant whites, and during the Ku Klux movement these people
burned a number of schoolhouses and drove the teachers from the
country where a few years before they had been welcomed by some
and tolerated by all.
The results of the attempts by the Bureau and the missionary
societies to educate the negro were almost wholly bad. DuBois
makes the astonishing statement that the Bureau estabhshed the free
1 Freedmen's Bureau Reports, 1 867-1 870.
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND NEGRO EDUCATION 467
public school system in the South/ It is true that some of the schools
hen estabhshed have survived, but there would have been many
more schools to-day had these never existed. For the whites the
pubHc school system of Alabama existed before the war ; the example
of the Bureau in no way encouraged its extension for the blacks;
reconstructive educational ideals caused a reaction against general
public education. In 1865 to 1866 the thinking people of the state,
such men as Dr. J. L. M. Curry and Bishop McTyeire, were heartily
in favor of the education of the negro, and all the churches were also
in favor of giving it a trial. As conditions were at that time, even
the best plan for the education of the negro by alien agencies would
have failed. General Swayne hoped to use both northern and south-
ern teachers, but it was not possible that the temper of either party
would permit cooperation in the work. Buckley seems to have had
ghmmerings of this fact, when he tried to get southern teachers for
the schools. But the damage was already done. The logical and
intentional result of the teachings of the missionaries was to ahenate
the races. If the negro accepted the doctrine of the equality of all
men and the behef in the utter sinfulness of slavery and slaveholders,
he at once found that the southern whites were his natural enemies.
Unwise efforts were made to teach the adult blacks, and they
were encouraged to beheve that all knowledge was in their reach;
that without education they would be helpless, and with it they would
be the white man's equal. Some of the negroes almost worshipped
education, it was to do so much for them. The schools in the cities
were crowded with grown negroes who could never learn their letters.
All attempts to teach these older ones failed, and the failure caused
grievous disappointment to many. The exercise of common sense
by the teachers might have spared them this. But the average New
England teacher began to work as if the negroes were Mayflower
descendants. No attention was paid to the actual condition of the
negroes and their station in life. False ideas about manual labor
were put into their heads, and the training given them had no prac-
tical bearing on the needs of life.^
1 Atlantic Monthly, March, 1901.
2 Sir George Campbell, " White and Black," pp. 131, 383 ; Thomas, "The Ameri-
can Negro," p. 240 ; Washington, " The Future of the American Negro," pp. 25-27,
55 ; De Bow's Review, 1866; Slater Fund Trustees, Occasional Papers, No. 7. Wash-
468 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
From the table given above it will be seen that the Bureau schools
reached only a very small proportion of the negro children. The
missionary schools not connected with the Bureau were few. It is
likely that for five years there were not more than two hundred north-
ern teachers in the state, yet the effect of their work was, in con-
nection with- the operations of the political and rehgious missionaries,
to make a majority perhaps of the white people hostile to the edu-
cation of the negro. The crusading spirit of the invaders touched
the most sensitive feehngs of the southerners, and the insolence and
rascality of the educated negroes were taken as natural results of
education. The good was obscured by the bad. The innocent
missionary suffered for the sins of the violent and incendiary. The
educated black rascal was pointed out as a fair example of negro
education. The damage was done, not so much by what was actu-
ally taught in the relatively few schools, as by the ideas caught by
the entire negro population that came in contact with the missionaries.
Naturally the blacks were more likely to accept the radical teachers.
A most unfortunate result was the withdrawal of the southern church
organizations and of all white southerners from the work of training
the negro. The profession had been discredited. One of the hard-
est tasks of the negro educators of to-day — hke Washington or
Councill — is to undo the work of the aliens who wrought in passion
and hate a generation before they began. The evil of the Bureau
system did not die with that institution, but when the reconstruction-
ists undertook to mould anew the institutions of the South, the educa-
tional methods of the Bureau and its teachers were transferred into
the new state system which they helped to discredit.^
ington tells of the craze for the education in Greek, Latin, and theology. This educa-
tion would make them the equal of the whites, they thought, and would free them from
manual labor, and above all fit them for office-holding. Nearly all became teachers,
preachers, and politicians. "Up from Slavery," pp. 30, 80, 81 ; " P'uture of the Ameri-
can Negro," p. 49.
1 From the surrender of the Confederate armies, to his death in 1903, Dr. Curry
was a stanch believer in the work for negro education. No other man knew the whole
question so thoroughly as he. And he had the advantage of a close acquaintance with
the negro from his early childhood. His observations as to the effects of alien efforts
to educate the black will be found in the Slater Fund Occasional Papers, and in an
address delivered before the Montgomery Conference in 1900. See also Ch. XIV.
WHY THE BUREAU SYSTEM FAILED 469
Why the Bureau System Failed
There have been many apologies for the Freedmen's Bureau,
many assertions of the necessity for such an institution to protect
the blacks from the whites. It was necessary, the friends of the in-
stitution claimed, to prevent reenslavement of the negro, to secure
equahty before the law, to estabhsh a system of free labor, to relieve
want, to force a beginning of education for the negro, to make it safe
for northern missionaries and teachers to work among the blacks.
It was, of course, not to be expected that the victorious North would
leave the negroes entirely alone after the war, and in theory there
were only two objections to such an institution well conducted, —
(i) it was not really needed, and (2) it was, as an institution, based
on an idea insulting to southern white people. It meant that they
were unfit to be trusted in the shghtest matter that concerned the
blacks. It was based on the theory that there was general hostihty
between the southern white and the southern black, and that the gov-
ernment must uphold the weaker by estabhshing a system of espion-
age over the stronger. The low characters of the officials made the
worst of what would have been under the best agents a bad state of
affairs. In 1865 it was necessary for the good of the negro that social
and economic laws cease to operate for a while and allow the feehngs of
sentiment, duty, and gratitude of the Southern whites to work in behalf
of the black and enable the latter to make a place for himself in the new
order. After the surrender there was, on the part of the whites, a
strong feehng of gratitude to the negroes, that was practically uni-
versal, for their faithful conduct during the war. The people were
ready, because of this and many other reasons, to go to any reasonable
lengths to reward the blacks. The Bureau made it impossible for
this feehng to find expression in acts. The negro was taken from
his master's care and in ahen schools and churches taught that in all
relations of Hfe the southern white man was his enemy. The whites
came to believe that negro education was worse than a failure. The
southern churches lost all opportunity to work among the negroes.
Friendly relations gave way to hostihty between the races. The bet-
ter elements in southern society that were working for the good of
the black were paralyzed and the worst element remained active.
The friendship of the native whites was of more value to the blacks
470 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
than any amount of theoretical protection against inequahties in legis-
lation and justice. Finally, the claim that the Bureau was essential
in estabhshing a system of free labor is ridiculous. The reports of
the Bureau officials themselves show clearly, though not consciously,
that the new labor system was being worked out according to the
fundamental economic laws of supply and demand, and largely in
spite of the opposition of the Bureau with its red tape measures.
The Bureau labor poHcy finally gave way everywhere before the
unauthorized but natural system that was evolved.^
1 I have talked with many who uniformly assert that they were unable to conform to
the Bureau regulations. It was better to let land remain uncultivated. Wherever possi-
ble no attention was paid to the rules. The negro laborers themselves have no recol-
lections of. any real assistance in labor matters received from the Bureau. They
remember it rather as an obstruction to laboring freely.
PART V
CONGRESSIONAL RECONSTRUCTION
r
CHAPTER XII
MILITARY GOVERNMENT UNDER THE RECONSTRUCTION ACTS
Sec. I. The Administration of General Pope
The Military Reconstruction Bills
The Radicals in Congress triumphed over the moderate Repub-
licans, the Democrats, and the President, when, on March 2, 1867,
they succeeded in passing over the veto the first of the Reconstruc-
tion Acts. This act reduced the southern states to the status of
military provinces and established the rule of martial law. After
asserting in the preamble that no legal governments or adequate pro-
tection for life and property existed in Alabama and other southern
states, the act divided the South into five mihtary districts, subject to
the absolute control of the central government, that is, of Congress.^
Alabama, with Georgia and Florida, constituted the Third Military
District. The mihtary commander, a general officer, appointed by
the President, was to carry on the government in his province. No
state interference was to be allowed, though the provisional civil ad-
ministration might be made use of if the commander saw fit. Offend-
ers might be tried by the local courts or by military commissions, and
except in cases involving the death penalty, there was no appeal be-
yond the military governor. This rule of martial law was to continue
until the people^ should adopt a constitution providing for enfran-
chisement of the negro and for the disfranchisement of such whites
as would be excluded by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. As soon as this constitution should be
ratified by the new electorate (a majority voting in the election) and
the constitution approved by Congress, and the legislature elected
under the new constitution should ratify the proposed Fourteenth
1 The President and the Supreme Court now being powerless.
2 That is, blacks and such whites as were not " disfranchised for participation in the
rebellion or for felony."
473
474
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Amendment, then representatives from the state were to be admitte
to Congress upon taking the "iron-clad" test oath of July 2, 1862/,
And until so reconstructed the present civil government of the stat
was provisional only and might be altered, controlled, or aboHshed,
and in all elections under it the negro must vote and those who would]
be excluded by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment must be dis
franchised.^
The President at once (March 11, 1867) appointed General
George H. Thomas to the command of the Third MiHtary District,
with headquarters at Montgomery, but the work was not to General
Thomas's Hking, and at his request he was reheved, and on March 15
General Pope was appointed in his place.^ Pope was in favor of
extreme measures in dealing with the southern people and stated that
he understood the design of the Reconstruction Acts to be "to free
the southern people from the baleful influence of old political
leaders." '
The act of March 2 did not provide for forcing Reconstruction
upon the people. If they wanted it, they might initiate it through
the provisional governments, or if they preferred, they might remain
under martial law. While all people were anxious to have the state
restored to the Union, most of the whites saw that to continue under
martial law, even when administered by Pope, was preferable to Re-
construction under the proposed terms. Consequently the movement
toward Reconstruction was made by a very small minority of the peo-
ple and had no chance whatever of making any headway.
Therefore, in order to hasten the restoration of the states and to
insure the proper poHtical complexion of the new regime. Congress
assumed control of the administration of the law of March 2, by the
supplementary act of March 23, 1865. "To facihtate restoration"
the commander of the district was to cause a registration of all men
1 July II, 1868, the oath was modified for those whose disabilities had been removed
by Congress; Feb. 15, 1871, those not disfranchised by the Fourteenth Amendment
were allowed to take the modified oath of July 11, 1868, instead of the iron-clad oath.
See MacDonald, " Select Statutes." The Alabama representatives all took the " iron
clad " oath.
2 Text of the Act, McPherson, "Reconstruction," pp. 191, 192; G. O. No. 2, 3d
M. D., April 3, 1867. For criticism, Burgess, "Reconstruction," pp. 1 12-122; Dun
ning, "Civil War and Reconstruction," pp. 123, 126-135, ^43-
'^ G. O. Nos. 10 and 18, H. Q. A., March 11 and 15, 1867 ; McPherson, p. 200.
^ Report of Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 321.
POPE ASSUMES COMMAND 475
over twenty-one not disfranchised by the act of March 2, who could
lake the prescribed oath ' before the registering officers. The com-
mander was then to order an election for the choice of delegates to a
convention. He was to apportion the delegates according to the
registered voting population. If a majority voted against holding
the convention, it should not be held. The boards of registration,
appointed by the commanding general, were to consist of three loyal
persons. They were to have entire control of the registration of
voters, and the elections and returns which were to be made to the
military governor. They were required to take the ''iron-clad" test
oath, and the penalties of perjury were to be visited upon official or
voter who should take the oath falsely. After the convention should
frame a constitution, the mihtary commander should submit it to
the people for ratification or rejection. The same board of registra-
tion was to hold the election. If the Constitution should be ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in the election where a majority of
the registered voters voted, and the other conditions of the act of
March 2 having been complied with, the state should be admitted
to representation in Congress.^
Pope assumes Command
On April i, 1867, General Pope arrived in Montgomery and
assumed command of the Third Mihtary District. General
^ The oath was : " I, , do solemnly swear (or affirm), in the presence of
Almighty God, that I am a citizen of the State of Alal)ama; that I have resided in said
State for months, next preceding this day, and now reside in the county of in
said State; that I am twenty-one years old ; that I have not been disfranchised for par-
ticipation in any rebellion or civil war against the United States, nor for felony com-
mitted against the laws of any State or of the United States ; that I have never been a
member of any State legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in any State
and afterward engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States or given
aid and comfort to the enemies thereof; that I have never taken an oath as a member
of Congress of the United States, as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the
Constitution of the United States and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the United States or given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof; that I will
faithfully support the Constitution and obey the laws of the United States, and will, to
the best of my ability, encourage others to do so, so help me God ! " McPherson, " Re-
construction," pp. 192, 205; G. O. No. 5, 3d M. D., April 8, 1867.
2 McPherson, " Reconstruction," pp. 192-194 ; Burgess, " Reconstruction," pp. 129-
135 ; Dunning, "Civil War and Reconstruction," pp. 124, 125.
476 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Swayne was continued in command of Alabama as a sub-distr^P
Pope announced that the officials of the provisional government
would be allowed to serve out their terms of office, provided the
laws were impartially administered by them. Failure to protect
the people without distinction in their rights of person and property
would result in the interference of the mihtary authorities. Civil
officials were forbidden to use their influence against congressional
reconstruction. No elections were to be held unless negroes were
allowed to vote and the whites disfranchised as provided for in the
act of March 2. However, all vacancies then existing or which
might occur before registration was completed would be filled by
military appointment. The state mihtia was ordered to disband.^
General Swayne proclaimed that he, having been intrusted with the
"administration of the military reconstruction bill" in Alabama,
would exact a literal compHance with the requirements of the Civil
Rights Bill. All payments for services rendered the state during
the war were peremptorily forbidden.^ The Herald correspondent
reported that Pope's early orders were favorably received by the con-
servative press of Alabama, and that there was no opposition of
any kind manifested. The people did not seem to reahze what was
in store for them. The army thought necessary to crush the "rebel-
lious" state was increased by a few small companies only, and now
consisted of fourteen companies detached from the Fifteenth and
the Thirty-third Infantry and the Fifth Cavalry, amounting in all
to 931 men, of whom eight companies were in garrison in the arsenal
at Mount Vernon and the forts at Mobile.^ The rest were stationed
at Montgomery, Selma, and Huntsville.
Writing to Grant on April 2, Pope stated that the civil officials
were all active secessionists and would oppose Reconstruction. But
the people were ready for Reconstruction, which he predicted would
be speedy in Alabama. Five days later he wrote that there would
be no trouble in Alabama; that Governor Patton and nearly all the
civil officials and most of the prominent men of the state were in
' G. O. Nos. I and 2, 3d M. D., April i and 3, 1866 ; N. Y. Herald, April 6, 1867 ;
Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 19; McPherson, pp. 201, 205; Report of Secretary of War,
1867, Vol. I, p. 322 ; Herbert, " Solid South," p. 38.
2 G. O. No. I, Dist. Ala., April 2, 1867; McPherson, p. 206.
3 Report of Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 466 ; N. Y. Herald, April 6, 1867.
Gknkkal George H. Thomas, in com- General Wager Swayne, Assistant
mand of the district including Alabama, Commissioner of BYeedmen's Bureau.
1864-1867.
General John Pope, First Commander General GEOk(iK (i. Mkadk (in Jicld
of Third Military District. uniform). Commander of Third Mili-
tary District.
FEDERAL COMMANDERS,
Who ruled the State, 1865-1868.
CONTROL OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT 477
favor of the congressional Reconstruction and were canvassing the
state in favor of it/ He was evidently of changeable opinions.
However, he was so impressed with the goodness of Alabama and
the badness of Georgia, that, in order to be near the most difficult
work, he asked Grant to have headquarters removed to Atlanta,
which was done on April 11.^
The Georgia people were evidently so bad that they caused a
change in his former favorable opinion of the people in general, or
rather of the whites, for in a letter to Grant, July 24, 1867, we find a
frank expression of his sentiments in regard to Reconstruction. He
thought the disfranchising clauses were among the wisest provisions
of the Reconstruction Acts ; that the leading rebels should have been
forced to leave the country and stay away; that all the old official
class was opposed to Reconstruction and was sure to prevail unless
kept disfranchised ; that it was better to have incompetent loyal men
in office than rebels of ability, — in fact, the greater the abihty the
greater the danger; that in order to retain the fruits of reconstruc-
tion the old leaders must be put beyond the power of returning to in-
fluence. He had by this time evidently become somewhat disgusted
with the reconstructionists, for he intimated that none of the whites
were fit for self-government, and was strongly of the opinion that, in
a few years, intelligence and education would be transferred from
the whites to the negroes. He predicted ten thousand majority for
Reconstruction in Alabama, but thought that in case Reconstruction
succeeded in the elections, some measures would have to be taken to
free the country of the turbulent and disloyal leaders of the reaction-
ary party, or there would be no peace.^
Control of the Civil Government
Pope instructed the post commanders in Alabama to report to
headquarters any failures of civil tribunals to administer the laws in
accordance with the Civil Rights Bill or the recent acts of Congress.
They were, above all, to watch for discrimination on account of
color, race, or political opinion. While not interfering with the
1 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 20, 40th Cong., ist Sess.
2 G. O. No. 52, H. Q. A., April 11, 1867.
* 8 Report of Secretary of W^ar, 1867, Vol. I, p. 353.
4/8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
functions of civil officers, they were instructed to give particular
attention to the manner in which such functions were discharged.*
Civil officials were warned that the prohibition against their using
influence against Reconstruction would be stringently enforced.
They were not to give verbal or written advice to individuals, com-
mittees, or the public unless in favor of Reconstruction. Officials
who violated this prohibition were to be removed from office and
held accountable as the case demanded.^ District and post com-
manders were ordered to report to Pope all state, county, or munici-
pal officials who were ''disloyal" to the government of the United
States, or who used their influence to "hinder, delay, prevent, or
obstruct the due and proper administration of the acts of Con-
gress. " ^ Later, Grant and Pope decided that the pardles of
soldiers were still in force and that any attempt to "prevent the
settlement of the southern question would be a violation of
parole."''
In May, Pope issued orders informing the officials of Alabama
of their proper status. There was no legal government in Alabama,
they were told, and Congress had declared that no adequate protec-
tion for life and property existed. The military authorities were
warned that upon them rested the final responsibility for peace and
security. Consequently when necessary they were to supersede the
civil officials. In towns, the mayor and chief of police were required
to be present at every public meeting, with sufficient force to render
disturbance impossible. It would be no excuse not to know of a
meeting or not to apprehend trouble. Outside of towns, the sheriff
or one of his deputies was to be present at such gatherings, and in
case of trouble was to summon a posse from the crowd, but must
not summon officers of the meeting or the speakers. It was declared
the duty of civil officials to preserve peace, and assure rights and
privileges to all persons who desired to hold public meetings. In
case of disturbance, if it could not be shown that the civil officials did
their full duty, they would be deposed and held responsible by the
military authorities. When the civil authorities asked for it, the
commanders of troops were to furnish detachments to be present at
poHtical meetings and prevent disturbance. The commanding officers
1 G. O. No. 4, 3d M. D., April 4, 1867. 2 g. O. No. 10, 3d M. D., April 23, 1867.
3 G. O. No. 48, 3d M. D., Aug. 6, 1867. * Annual Cyclopedia (1867), p. 17. *
CONTROL OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT 479
were to keep themselves informed in regard to political meetings and
hold themselves ready for immediate action/
From the beginning, Pope, supported and advised by General
Swayne, pursued extreme measures. There were soon many com-
plaints of his arbitrary conduct. In his correspondence with Gen-
eral Grant he complained of the attitude of the Washington adminis-
tration toward his acts, and largely to support Pope (and Sheridan
in the Fifth District), Congress passed the act of July 19, 1867,
which was the last of the Reconstruction Acts, so far as Alabama was
concerned. This law declared that the civil governments were not
legal state governments and were, if continued, to be subject abso-
lutely to the military commanders and to the paramount authority
of Congress. The commander of the district was declared to have
full power, subject only to the disapproval of General Grant, to
remove or suspend officers of the civil government and appoint
others in their places. General Grant was vested with full power of
removal, suspension, and appointment. It was made the duty of the
commander to remove from office all who opposed Reconstruction.^
Pope had already been making use of the most extreme powers, and
the only effect of the act was to approve his course. Pope gave the
laws a very broad interpretation, beheving that Reconstruction should
be thoroughly done in order to leave no room for future trouble
and embarrassment. Grant, on August 3, wrote to him' approving
his' sentiments, and went on to say : "It is certainly the duty of the dis-
trict commander to study what the framers of the Reconstruction
laws wanted to express, as much as what they do express, and to
execute the law according to that interpretation.'"' This was cer-
tainly a unique method of interpretation and would justify any pos-
sible assumption of power.
There had been several instances of prosecution by state authori-
1 G. O. No. 25, 3d M. D., May 29, 1867. (This was to favor Radical meetings.
There were many stump speakers sent down from the North to tell the negro how to
vote, and it was feared they might excite the whites to acts of violence.) N. Y. Herald,
June 4, 1867 (explanatory order).
2 McPherson, "Reconstruction," pp. 335, 336; Dunning, pp. 153, 154-
5 As long as Pope was in command at Montgomery and Atlanta, he and Grant kept
up a rapid and voluminous (on the part of Pope) correspondence. They were usually
agreed on all that pertained to Reconstruction, both now being extreme in their views.
* Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 30,40th Cong., 2d Sess.; No. 20, 40th Cong., ist Scss.;
McPherson, p. 312.
48o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
\
ties of soldiers and officials for acts which they claimed were done
under military authority. Pope disposed of this question by order-
ing the civil courts to entertain no action against any person for
acts performed in accordance with military orders or by sanction of
the mihtary authority. Suits then pending were dismissed. The
miHtary authorities were to enforce the order strictly and report all
officials who might disobey.^ A few weeks later a decree went forth
that all jurors should be chosen from the lists of voters registered
under the acts of Congress. They must be chosen without discrimi-
nation in regard to color, and each juror must take an oath that he
was a registered voter. Those who could not take the oath were
to be replaced by those who could.^
So much for the general regulation and supervision of the civil
authorities by the army. There were but a few hundred troops
intrusted with the execution of these regulations, which were, of
course, enforced only spasmodically. The more prominent officials
were closely watched, but the only effect in country districts was to
destroy all government. Many judges, while wilhng to have their
jurors drawn from the voting lists, refused to accept ignorant negroes
on them, or to order the selection of mixed juries, and many courts
were closed by military authority. Judge Wood, of the city court
of Selma, had a jury drawn of whites. A military commission,
sitting in Selma, refused to allow cases to be tried unless negroes
were on the jury. Pope's order was construed as requiring negroes
on each jury, and he so meant it.^ Later, he pubHshed an order
requiring jurors to take the "test oath," which would practically
exclude all the whites.* Prisoners confined in jail under sentence
by jurors drawn under the old laws were liberated by the army offi-
cers or by Freedmen's Bureau officials. Twice in the month of
December, 1867, there were jail deliveries by mihtary authorities in
Greene County.^
Within the first month Pope began to remove civil officials and
appoint others. Mayor Joseph H. Sloss of Tuscumbia was the
1 G. O. No. 45, 3d M. D., Aug. 2, 1867; McPherson, p. 319.
2 G. O. Nos. 53 and 55, 3d M. D., Aug. 19 and 23, 1867; Report of the Secretary
of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 331 ; McPherson, p. 319.
3 See Se/ma Messenger, Jan. 17, 1868, * See McPherson, p. 312.
^ Eutaw Whig and Observer, Dec. 12 and 24, 1867.
CONTROL OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT 481
first to go. Pope alleged that the election had not been conducted
in accordance with the acts of Congress and forthwith appointed a
new mayor. No complaint had been made, the removal being caused
by outside influence.^ At this election, negroes for the first time in
Alabama had voted under the Reconstruction Acts. Sloss had re-
ceived two-thirds of all votes cast. Evidently the blacks had been
controlled by the whites, which was contrary to the spirit of the
Reconstruction.
Immediately after a riot in Mobile ^ following an incendiary
speech by ''Pig Iron" Kelly of Pennsylvania, one of the visiting
orators. Colonel Shepherd of the Fifteenth Infantry assumed com-
mand of the city. The poHce were suspended. Breach of the
peace was punished by the mihtary authorities. Out-of-door con-
gregations after nightfall were prohibited. Notice of pubhc meet-
ings had to be given to the acting mayor in time to have a force on
hand to preserve the peace. The publication of incendiary articles
in the newspapers was forbidden. The provost guard was directed
to seize all large firearms in the possession of improper persons and
to search suspected persons for small arms. The special poHce,
when appointed, were ordered to restrict their duties to enforcing
the city ordinances. All offences against military ordinances would
be attended to by the military authorities. A later order prohibited
the carrying of large firearms without special permission. Deposits
of such arms were seized.^
Pope declared all offices vacant in Mobile and filled them anew,'*
in the face of a report by Swayne that reasonable precautions had
been taken to prevent disorder. The blame for this action of Pope's
fell upon Swayne, who had to carry out the orders. The officers
appointed by Pope refused to accept office, and then he seems to have
offered to reappoint the old officials, and they declined. Thereupon
he lost his temper and directed Swayne to fill the vacancies in the
city government of Mobile ''from that large class of citizens who have
1 S, O. No. 2, 3d M. D., April 15, 1867 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 20; Mont-
gomery Mail, April 30, 1867.
- See p. 509.
8 G. O. Nos. 35, 38, 40, Post of Mobile, 1867; Annual Cyclopsedia (1867), pp. 20-23;
N. V. Times, May 21, 1867.
* N. V. World, May 28, 1867; S. O. No. 34, 3d M. D., May 31, 1867; Herbert,
" Solid South," p. 40; N. Y. Times, May 21, 1867.
2 I
482 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
]
heretofore been denied the right of suffrage and participation in
municipal affairs and whose patriotism will prevent them from
following this disloyal example." He was referring to the refusal
of the former members of the city government to accept reappointment
after suspension, and meant that negroes should now be appointed.
Swayne offered positions to some of the most respected and influ-
ential negroes, who declined, saying that they preferred white officials.
Negro poHcemen were appointed.^ In October a case came up in
Mobile which caused much irritation. The negro policemen were
troublesome and insolent, and one day a little child ran out into the
street in front of a team driven by a negro, who paid no attention to
the mother's call to him to stop his horses. Some one snatched
the baby from under the heels of the horses, and the scared and
angry mother relieved her feelings by calling the driver a ''black
rascal." The negro policemen came to her house, arrested her,
and with great brutahty dragged her from the house and along the
street. Another woman asked the negroes if they had a warrant
for the arrest of the first woman. She was answered by the polite
query, "What the hell is it your business?" Mayor Horton, Pope's
appointee, fined the woman ten dollars ^ — for violation of the Civil
Rights Bill, it is to be presumed, since that was considered to cover
most things pertaining to negroes.
This Mayor Horton had a high opinion of his prerogatives as
military mayor of Mobile. The Mobile Tribune had been publish-
ing criticisms on his administration and also of Mr. Bromberg, one
of his political brethren. Archie Johnson, a crippled, half-witted
negro newsboy, was, it is said, hired to follow the mayor about, sell-
ing his Tribune papers, much to the annoyance of Mayor Horton.
On one occasion Archie cried, "Here's yer Mobile Tribune, wid
air about Mayor Horton and his Bromberg rats." This was too
much for the mihtary mayor, and, considering the offence as one
against the Civil Rights Bill, he sentenced the negro to banishment
to New Orleans. Archie soon returned and was again exiled by
the mayor. Here was an opportunity for the people to get even
1 S. O. No. 38, 3d M. D., June 6, 1867; S. O. No. 27, 3d M. D., May 22, 1867;
N. V. Tribune, June 12, 1867; Selma Messenger, June 18, 1867; Evening Post, May,
1867; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), pp. 20-25; Mobile Register, Oct. — , 1867.
2 Mobile Register, Oct. — , 1867.
CONTROL OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT 483
with Horton, and suit was brought in the Federal court before
Busteed, who was now somewhat out with his party. Horton was
fined for violation of the Civil Rights Bill/
Many officials were removed and many appointments made
by Pope. His removals and appointments included mayors, chiefs
of police, tax assessors and collectors, school trustees, county com-
missioners, justices of the peace, sheriffs, judges, clerks of courts,
baihffs, constables, city clerks, sohcitors, superintendents of schools,
aldermen, common councils, and all the officials of Jones and Col-
bert counties.^ Pope was roundly abused by the newspapers and
by the people for making so many changes. I have been unable
to find, however, the names of more than thirty-four officials of
any consequence who were removed by Pope. He made 224 ap-
pointments to such offices, besides minor ones. A clean sweep
of all officials from mayor to pohcemen was made in Mobile and
again in Selma. Most vacancies were caused by expiration of term
of office or by forced resignation.^
As there was need of money to pay the expense of the conven-
tion soon to assemble, and as the taxpayers were beginning to under-
stand for what purposes their money was to be used and were in
many instances refusing to pay, Pope issued an order to the post
and detachment commanders directing them to furnish military
aid to state tax-collectors.'' The bitterest reconstructionists were
heartily in favor of aid to the tax- collecting branch of the ** rebel"
administration. They needed money to carry out their plans.
When the terms of the tax-collectors expired, they were ordered to
continue in office until their successors were duly elected and quali-
fied,^ which, of course, meant to continue the present administra-
tion until the reconstructed government should take charge. Pope
was very careful not to allow the civil government to spend any of
the money coming in from taxes. He said that he thought it proper
1 Herbert, " Solid South," pp. 40, 41 ; N. Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1867. See above, p. 393.
2 S. O. Nos. 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 3d
M. D., 1867; Report of the Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 327. (Some of the per-
sons appointed were B. T. Pope and David P. Lewis, judges ; George P. Goldthwaite,
solicitor ; and B. F. Saffold, mayor of Selma.)
' Report of the Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 364.
* G. O. No. 77, 3d M. D., Oct. 19, 1897 ; McPherson, p. 319.
5 G. O. No. 103, 3d M. D., Dec. 21, 1867.
484 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to prohibit the state treasurer from paying out money for the sup-
port of families of deceased Confederate soldiers, for wooden legs
for Confederate soldiers, etc., since the convention soon to meet
would probably not approve expenditure for such purposes/ Later
the treasurer was ordered to pay the per diem of the delegates and
the expenses of the convention, though Pope expressed doubt, for
once, of his authority in the matter.^
General Swayne, at Montgomery, who had long been at the head
of the Freedmen's Bureau in the state and also mihtary commander
of the District of Alabama since June i, 1866, found himself rele-
gated to a somewhat subordinate position after Pope assumed com-
mand in the Third District. The latter took charge of everything.
If a negro policeman were to be appointed in Mobile, Pope made
the appointment and issued the order. Nor did he always send
his orders to Swayne to be republished. In consequence, Swayne
dropped out of the records somewhat, but he had to bear much of
the blame that should have fallen on Pope, though he was in full
sympathy with the views of the latter. He was, however, a man
of much more ability than Pope, of sounder judgment, and had
had legal training. Consequently, Pope rehed much upon him for
advice in the many knotty questions that came up, often coming
from Atlanta to Montgomery to see Swayne, and as a rule none of
his well-known proclamations were ever issued when under the
latter's influence. The orders written for him or outlined by Swayne
were stringent, of course, but clear, short, and to the point. Pope's
own masterpieces were long, rhetorical, and blustering. His favorite
valedictory at the end of an order was a threat of martial law and
mihtary commissions.
General Swayne was still at the head of the Freedmen's Bureau,
and in this capacity he made his authority felt. In April, 1867,
he ordered probate judges to revise former actions in apprenticing
minors to former owners and to revoke, all indentures made since
the war if the minors were able to support themselves. Though
the vagrancy law had never been enforced and had been repealed
by the legislature, he declared its suspension. The chain-gang
1 Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, Vol. I, p. 333; McPherson, p. 316.
2 S. O. 254, 3d M. D., Nov. 26, 1867; Pope to Swayne, Nov. 20, 1867; N. Y,
World, Dec. 14, 1867.
POPE AND THE NEWSPAPERS 485
system was abolished, except in connection with the penitentiary.^
In the fall, in order to secure pay for negro laborers, he ordered
a lien on the crops grown on the farm where they were employed.
This lien was to attach from date of order and to have preference
over former liens.^
Pope and the Newspapers
When Pope first assumed command, it was reported that the
conservative papers were, at the worst, not hostile to him ; ^ but within
a few weeks he had aroused their hostihty and the battle was joined.
Pope beheved that the papers had much to do with inciting hostihty
against the visiting orators from the North, resulting in such dis-
turbances as the Kelly riot in Mobile. Consequently, instructions
were issued prohibiting the publication of articles tending to incite
to riot. This order was aimed at the conservative press. No one
except the negroes paid much attention to the Radical press. How-
ever, after the Mobile trouble the military commander was some-
what nervous and wanted to prevent future troubles. The negroes,
now much excited by the campaign, were supposed to be much
influenced by the violent articles appearing in the Radical paper
of Mobile, — the National. On May 30 an article was printed in
that paper instructing the freedmen when, where, and how to use
firearms. It went on to state: ''Do not, on future occasions [hke
the Kelly riot], waste a single shot until you see your enemy, be sure
he is your enemy, never waste ammunition, don't shoot until neces-
sary, and then be sure to shoot your enemy. Don't fire into the air."
Fearing the effect upon the negroes of such advice, the commanding
officer at Mobile suppressed the edition of May 30, and prohibited
future publication unless the proof should first be submitted to the
commandant according to the regulations of May 19, issued by
Pope. Instead of approving the action of the Mobile officer, Pope
strongly disapproved of and revoked his orders. The Mobile com-
mander was informed that it was the duty of the military authori-
ties, not to restrict, but to secure, the utmost freedom of speech. No
officers or soldiers should interfere with newspapers or speakers
on any pretext whatever. "No satisfactory execution of the late
1 G. O. No. 3, Sub-dist. Alabama, April 12, 1867 ; McPherson, p. 319.
2 McPherson, p. 319. ^ ^. Y- Herald, April 6, 1867.
486 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
acts of Congress is practicable unless this freedom is secured and
its exercise protected," Pope said. However, ''treasonable utter-
ances" were not to be regarded as the legitimate exercise of the free-
dom of discussion/
The conservative papers managed to keep within bounds, and
Pope was unable to harm them. Finally he decided to strike at
them through the official patronage. By the famous General Order
No. 49,^ he stated that he was convinced that the civil officials were
obeying former instructions^ only so far as their personal conversa-
tion was concerned, and were using their official patronage to en-
courage newspapers which opposed reconstruction and embarrassed
civil officials appointed by mihtary authority by denunciations and
threats of future punishment. Such use of patronage was pro-
nounced an evasion of former orders and an employment of the
machinery of the state government to defeat the execution of the
Reconstruction Acts. Therefore it was ordered that official advertis-
ing and official printing be given to those newspapers which had not
opposed and did not then oppose Reconstruction or embarrass officials
by threats of violence and of prosecution as soon as the troops were
withdrawn.'' This order affected nearly every newspaper in the
state. There were sixty-two counties, and each had public printing
and advertising. On an average, at least one paper for each county
was touched in the exchequer, and as Pope reported, ''a hideous
outcry" arose from the press of the state.^ There were only five or
six Reconstruction papers in the state, and a modification of the
order in practice was absolutely necessary. Pope was so roundly
abused by the newspapers. North and South, and especially in Ala-
bama and Georgia, that he seems to have been aflfected by it. He
endeavored to explain away the order by saying that it related only
to military officials and not to civil officials. He did not say that in
the order, though he may have meant it, and was now using the
remarkable method of interpretation suggested to him by Grant in
regard to the Reconstruction Acts. Several accounts of newspapers
for public advertisements were held up and payments disallowed.
1 N. Y. Tribune, June i, 1867 ; N. Y. Herald, June 4, 1867 ; G. O. No. 28, 3d
M. D., June 3, 1867 ; Report of the Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 326.
2 Aug. 12, 1867. 3 G. O. Nos. I and 10.
* G. O. No. 49, 3d M. D., Aug. 12, 1867.
^ Report of the Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, p. 235.
TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS 487
The best-known of these papers were the Selma Times and the Eutaw
Whig and Observer} The order was strictly enforced until General
Meade assumed command of the Third Military District.
Trials by Military Commissions
The newspapers state that many arrests of citizens were made
by military authorities, and in the spring of 1868 they generally
remarked that the jails were filled with prisoners thus arrested who
were still awaiting trial. Most of these were probably arrested
under the Pope regime, since Meade, his successor, was not so extreme.
However, Pope, in spite of his threats, had but few persons tried by
military commissions. D. C. Ballard was convicted of pretending
to be a United States detective and of stealing ninety-five bales of
cotton, and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.^ One
David J. Files was arrested for inciting the Kelly riot at Mobile.
Pope said that he was the chief offender and had him imprisoned
at Fort Morgan until he could be tried by a military commission.
He was fined $100.^ Wilham A. Castleberry was convicted by a
mihtary commission, fined $200, and imprisoned for one year for
purchasing stolen property and for assisting a deserter to escape.
Jesse Hays, a justice of the peace in Monroe County, was sentenced
to five months' imprisonment and fined $100 for prescribing a pun-
ishment for a negro that could not be prescribed for a white, that
is, fifty lashes. Matthew Anderson and John Middleton, who were
tried for carrying out the sentence imposed on the negro, were ac-
quitted." These are all the cases that I have been able to find of
trial of civilians by military commission under Pope. In one case
there was a direct interference by Pope with the administration of
justice. Daniel and James Cash had been indicted in Macon County
for murder and had made bond. They were later indicted and ar-
rested in Bullock County. Pope ordered that they be released and
that all civil officials let them alone.^
1 Selma Messenger, Dec. 25, 1867. 2 q. O. No. 25, 3d M, D., 1867.
8 S. O. No. 53, 3d M. D., June 27, 1867 ; G. O. No. 44, 3d M. D., Aug. i, 1867 ;
Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 30, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
* G. O. No. 94, 3d M. D., 1867.
6 S. O. No. 96, 3d M. D., Aug 5. 1867; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 30, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
There were other cases not referred to in general and special orders, but this was the
only case in which Pope himself directly interfered.
488 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Registration and Disfranchisement
But the prime object of Pope's administration was not merely
carry on the government in his miHtary province, but to see that the
Reconstruction was rushed through in the shortest possible time
and in the most thorough manner, according to the intentions of
the Congressional leaders as he understood them. As already
stated, he had very clear ideas of what should be done, and from the
first was hampered by no few doubts as to the limits of his power.
The Reconstruction laws were given the broadest interpretation. In
the Hberal interpretation of his powers Pope was equalled only by
Sheridan in the Fifth District.
A week after his arrival in Montgomery Pope directed Swayne to
divide the state into registration districts. Army officers were to be
used as registrars only when no civilians could be obtained. Gen-
eral supervisors were to look after the working of the registration, and
there was to be a general inspector at headquarters. Violence or
threats of violence against registration officials would be punished by
military commission.^ May 21, 1867, the state was divided into
forty-two (later forty-four) registration districts, so arranged as to
make the most effective use of the black vote.^ A board of registra-
tion for each district was appointed, each board consisting of two
whites and one negro. Since each had to take the "iron-clad" test
oath, practically all native whites were excluded, those who were on
the Hsts being men of doubtful character and no ability. There were
numbers of northerners. For most of the districts the white registrars
had to be imported. It is not saying much for the negro members
to say that they were much the more respectable part of the
boards of registration.^ Again it was stated that in order to secure
full registration, the compensation would be fixed at so much for
each voter — fifteen to forty cents, the price varying according to
density of population. Five to ten cents mileage was paid in order
1 G. O. No. 5, 3d M. D., April 8, 1867.
2 In this way, white majorities in ten counties were overcome by black majorities in
the adjoining counties of the district.
2 Of the registrars who later became somewhat prominent in politics, the whites
were Horton, Dimon, Dereen, Sillsby, "William M. Buckley, Stanwood, Ely, Pennington,
Haughey — all being northern men. Of the negro members of the boards. Royal,
Finley, Williams, Alston, Turner, Rapier, and King (or Godwin) rose to some promi-
nence, and their records were much better that those of their white colleagues.
REGISTRATION AND DISFRANCHISEMENT 489
to enable the registrars to hunt up voters. They were directed to
inform the negroes what their poHtical rights were and how necessary
it was for them to exercise those rights. Voters were to be registered
in each precinct, and later, in order to register those missed the first
time, the board was to sit, after due notice, for three days at each
county seat. Any kind of interference with registration, by threats
or by contracts depriving laborers of pay, was to be punished by mih-
tary commission. The right of every voter under the acts of Congress
to register and to vote was guaranteed by the military. In case of
disturbance the registrars were to call upon the civil officials or upon
the nearest military authorities. If the former refused or failed to
protect the registration, they were to be punished by a miHtary com-
mission.^ May I, Colonel James F. Meline was appointed inspector
of registration for the Third MiHtary District,^ and William H. Smith
was appointed general supervisor for Alabama.^ Boards of regis-
tration were authorized to report cases of civil officials using their
influence against reconstruction.'' When a voter wished to remove
from his precinct after registration, he was to be given a certificate
which would enable him to vote anywhere in the state. If he should
lose this certificate, his own affidavit before any civil or mihtary
official would suffice to obtain a new certificate.^
On June i, Pope issued pamphlets containing instructions to
registrars which were especially definite as to those former state offi-
cials who should be excluded from registration. The list of those
who were to be disfranchised included every one who had ever been
a state, county, or town official and later aided the Confederacy ; ^
former members of the United States Congress, former United States
officials, civil and mihtary, members of state legislatures and of the
convention of 1861 ; all officials of state, counties, and towns during
the war; and finally judicial or administrative officials not named
elsewhere.' The records fail to show that any officials were not ex-
^ G. O. No. 20, 3d M. D., May 21, 1867. 2 g. Q. No. 12, 3d M. D., 1867.
8 Smith was later the first Reconstruction governor of Alabama.
* G. O. No. 41, 3d M. D., 1867. 6 G. O. No. 50, 3d M. D., Aug. 15, 1867.
6 Governor, secretary of state, treasurer, comptroller, sheriff, judicial officers of every
kind, and all court clerks and other officials, commissioners, tax assessors and collectors,
county surveyors, treasurers, mayor, councilmen, justices of the peace, solicitors.
■^ Special Instructions to Registrars in Alabama, Report of the Secretary of War,
1867, Vol. I, p. 339.
490 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
eluded from registration except the keepers of poorhouses, coroners^
and health officers. Instructions issued later practically repeated
the first instructions and added former officials of the Confederate
States to the list of disfranchised. The registrars were reminded to
enforce the disfranchising clauses of the acts both as to voters and
candidates.^
The stringent regulations of Pope caused much bitter comment^
and the Washington administration was besought to revoke them.
Complaints were coming in from other districts, and on June i8,
1867, at a Cabinet meeting, the questions in controversy were brought
up point by point, and the Cabinet passed its opinion on them. A
strict interpretation of the Reconstruction Acts was arrived at, which
was much more favorable toward the southern people. Stanton
alone voted against all interpretation favorable to the South. The
interpretation of the acts thus obtained was issued as a circular, the
opinion of the Attorney- General, through the War Department and
sent to the district commanders on June 20.^ As soon as Pope re-
ceived a copy of the opinion of the Attorney-General he wrote to Grant
protesting against the enforcement of the opinion as an order, so
far as it related to registration. If enforced, his instructions to
registrars would have to be revoked. According to all rules of military
obedience, it was his duty to consider the instructions sent him
through the adjutant -general's office as binding, though in this case
the instructions were not in the technical form of an order, but he
expressed doubt if they were to be considered as an order to him.
Grant telegraphed to him to enforce his own construction of the
acts until ordered to do otherwise.*
In order to remove all doubt in the matter. Congress, in the act
of July 19, 1867, sustained Pope's interpretation of the acts and made
it law. The construction placed upon the laws by the Cabinet was
repudiated, and officers acting under the Reconstruction Acts were
not to consider themselves bound by the opinion of any civil officer
of the United States."* This was aimed at the Attorney- General and
1 Registration Orders, June 17, 1867.
2 Record of Cabinet Meeting, June i8, 1867, in Ho. Ex. Doc., No. 34, 40th Cong.,.
1st Sess. ; Burgess, p. 136 ; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 20, 40th Cong., ist Sess.
8 Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 20, 40th Cong., ist Sess.; McPherson, p. 31 1. See above, p. 479.
* McPherson, pp. 335, 336 ; Burgess, pp. 138-142.
THE ELECTIONS AND THE CONVENTION 491
the Cabinet. The law also gave the registrars full judicial powers to
investigate the records of those who appHed for registration. Witnesses
might be examined touching the quahfications of voters. The boards
were empowered to revise the lists of voters and to add to or strike
from it such names as they thought ought to be added or removed.
No pardon or amnesty by the President was to avail to remove
disability.^
The Elections and the Convention
After the passage of this law it was smooth sailing for Pope.
Registration went on with such success that on August 31 he was
induced to order an election to be held on October i to 4, for the
choice of delegates to a convention, and an apportionment of delegates
among the various districts was made at the same time. In the
distribution the black counties were favored at the expense of the
white counties.^
The work of the registrars was thoroughly done. The negro
enrolment was enormous; the white enrolment was small. The
registration of voters before the elections was: whites, 61,295;
blacks, 104,518; total, 165,813.^ For the convention and for dele-
gates 90,283 votes were cast. Of these 18,553 were those of whites,
and 71,730 were negro votes. Against holding a convention, 5583
white votes were cast, and 69,947 registered voters failed to vote —
37,159 whites and 32,788 blacks." The names of the delegates
chosen were published in general orders, and the convention was
ordered to meet in Montgomery on November 5.^ During the
session of the convention Pope took a rest from his labors and spent
some time in Montgomery. He was a great favorite with the recon-
structionists and was accorded special honors by the convention.
But he did not think as highly of reconstructionists as when he first
assumed command, and the antics of the "Black Crook" convention
1 McPherson, pp. 335, 336.
2 G. O. No. 59, 3d M. D., Aug. 31, 1867; Journal of Convention of 1867, pp. 3-5;
Report of the Secretary of War, 1867, Vol. I, pp. 356, 357; Tribune Almanac, 1868.
3 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 53, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. Tribune Almanac, 1867, 1868;
Report of Col. J. F. Meline, Inspector of Registration, Jan. 27, 1868. These figures are
based on the latest reports of 1867. According to the census of 1866, there would be
in 1867, 108,622 whites over twenty-one years of age, and 89,663 blacks.
* Meline's Report, Jan. 27, 1868. See also Ch. XIII below.
^ G. O. No. 76, Oct. 18, 1867 ; Journal of Convention of 1867, pp. 1-3.
492
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
made him nervous. After a month's session he was glad to see it
disband/
One of. the last important acts of Pope's administration was to
order an election for February 4 and 5, 1868, when the constitution
should be submitted for ratification or rejection, and when by his
advice candidates for all offices were to be voted for. Two weeks;
beforehand the registrars were to revise their lists, adding or strik-
ing off such names as they saw fit. Polls were to be opened at such
places as the board saw fit. Any voter might vote in any place to
which he had removed by making affidavit before the board that he/
was registered and had not voted before.^
Removal of Pope and Swayne
Both Pope and Swayne had been charged with being desirous of
representing the states of the Third Military District in the United
States Senate. Pope had made himself obnoxious to the President,
and the white people of Alabama and Georgia were demanding his
removal. So, on December 28, 1867, an order was issued by the
President, relieving Pope and placing General Meade in command
of the Third Military District. General Swayne was at the same
time ordered to rejoin his regiment,^ and a few days later his place was
taken by General Julius Hayden.* The whites were greatly relieved
and much pleased by the removal of both Pope and Swayne. The
former had become obnoxious on account of the extreme measures
he had taken in carrying out the Reconstruction Acts, on account of
his irritating proclamations, his attitude toward the press, etc. Gen-
eral Swayne had long enjoyed the confidence of the best men. His
influence over the negroes was supreme, and had been used to pro-
1 McPherson, p. 319; Journal of Convention, 1867, pp. no, in, 276; A^. V,
World, Dec. 14, 1867. When the convention passed a resolution indorsing the "firm
and impartial, yet just and gentle," administration of Pope, three delegates voted
against it because they said Pope had not done his full duty in removing disloyal per-
sons from office but, after being informed of their politics, had left them in office.
Journal of Convention, 1867, pp. no, in. For account of the convention, see below,
Ch. XIV.
2 G. O. No. loi, Dec. 20, 1867 ; McPherson, p. 319 ; Journal of Convention, p. 267.
^ The 45th United States Infantry, a negro regiment.
4 McPherson, p. 346 ; G. O. No. 104, H. Q. A. (A. G. O.), Dec. 28, 1867 j G. O.
No. I, 3d M. D., Jan. i, 1868.
REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS 493
mote friendly relations between the races. But as soon as the Recon-
struction was taken charge of by Congress and party hnes were
drawn, all his influence, personal and official, was given to building
up a Radical party in the state and to securing the negroes for that
party. He was high in the councils of the Union League and con-
trolled the conventions of the party. The change of rulers is said
to have had a tranquillizing effect on disturbed conditions in Alabama.*
But the people of Alabama would have been pleased with no human
being as military governor invested with absolute power.
Sec. 2. The Administration of General Meade
Registration and Elections
On January 6, 1868, General Meade arrived in Atlanta and
assumed command of the Third MiHtary District.^ His first and
most important duty was to complete the mihtary registration of
voters, and hold the election for ratification of the constitution and
for the choice of officials under it. Registration had been going on
regularly since the summer of 1867, and after the convention had
adjourned there was a rush of whites to register in order to defeat
the constitution by refraining from voting on it. As the time for
the election drew near the friends of the Reconstruction, much alarmed
at the tactics of the Conservative party, brought pressure to bear
upon Grant, who suggested to Meade that an extension of time be
made. Consequently, the time for the election was extended from
two to five days in order to enable the remotest negro to be found
and brought to the polls. At the same time the number of voting
places was limited to three in each county,^ in order to lessen the
influence of the whites over the blacks.
General Meade was opposed to holding the election for state
officials at the same time with that on ratification of the constitution.
He thought it would be difficult to secure the adoption of the con-
stitution on account of the prescriptive clauses in it, but in his opinion
1 Herbert, "Solid South "; N. V. Times, Jan. 24, 1868.
2 G. O. No. 3, 3cl M. D., Jan. 6, 1868.
3 G.O.No. 16, 3d M. D., Jan. 27, 1868; Annual Cyclopnedia (1868), p. 15; Report
of Major-General Meade's Military Operations and Administration of the 3d M. D., etc.
(pamphlet); AT. Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1868.
494
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the candidates * nominated by the convention were even more obnox-
ious to the people than the constitution, and many would refrain
from voting on that
account. Swayne, who
seems to have still been
in Montgomery, ad-
mitted the force of the
objection, but Grant
objected to any change
until too late to make
other arrangements.^
The election took
place on February i
to 5, and passed off
without any disorder.
Meade reported that
the charges of fraud
made by the Radicals
were groundless, and
that the constitution
had been defeated on
its merits, or rather
demerits. Both the con-
stitution and the candi-
dates were obnoxious
to a large number of
the friends of Recon-
struction. He reported
that the constitution failed of ratification by 13,550 votes, and ad-
vised that the convention assemble again, revise the constitution of
its proscriptive features, and again submit to it the people.^
1 See Ch. XV for " convention " candidates.
2 Report of Meade, etc., 1868; Telegrams of Meade to Grant, Jan. II, 12, and 18,
and of Grant to Meade, Jan. 13 and 18.
8 Report of Meade, etc., 1868; Herbert, "Solid South," pp. 48, 49. In his first
report Meade estimated that the constitution failed of ratification by 81 14 votes (Her-
bert, "Solid South," p. 49). In his report at the end of the year, based on the official
report of General Hayden, vk^hich vi^as made a month after the election, he changed the
number to 13,550. See also Ch. XVI, on the rejection of the constitution.
KEGISTIIATION OF VOTERS UNDER
RECONSTRUCTION ACTS, 1867.
Votei-s about evenly divided
according to color.
I I Majority of Whites registered.
g^^ Majority of Blacks registered.
Q White counties where disfranchisement
has created a black majority.
White voters, 74,450 : Black voters, 90,340.
After the lists were revised by Meade.
ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS 495
Administration of Civil Affairs
Pending the decision of the Alabama question by Congress,
Meade carried on the mihtary government as usual. He thoroughly
understood that his power was unhmited. No more than Pope did
he allow the civil government to stand in the way. There was,
however, a vast difference in the administrations of the two men.
Meade was less given to issuing proclamations, but was firmer and
more strict, and less arbitrary. He was not under the influence of
the Radical politicians in the slightest degree, and was abused by
both sides, especially by the Radical adventurers. It was a thankless
task, for which he had no liking, but his duty was done in a soldierly
manner, and his administration was probably the best that was
possible.
He made it clear to the civil authorities that he was the source
of all power, and that they were responsible to him and must obey
all orders coming from him. If they refused, he promised trial by
a military commission, fine, and imprisonment. They must under
no circumstances interfere, under color of state authority, with the
military administration. He had no admiration for the "loyal"
element; and when a bill was before Congress providing that the
officials of the civil government be required to take the "iron-clad"
test oath or vacate their offices, he made a strong protest and declared
that he could not fill half the offices with men who could take the
test oath.^ After the February elections pohtical influence was
brought to bear to force Meade to vacate the offices of the civil govern-
ment and to appoint certain individuals of the proper pohtical beliefs.
The persons voted for in the elections were clamorous for their places.
Grant suggested that when appointments were made, the men recently
voted for be put in. Meade resisted the pressure and made few
changes, and these only after investigation. Removals were made
for neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, refusing to obey orders, and
"obstructing Reconstruction." Many appointments were made on
account of the deaths or resignations of the civil officials.' Few of
1 G. O. No. 42, 3d M. D., March 12, 1868 ; McPherson, p. 320; Meade's Report, 1868.
2 In one case he reinstated Charles R. Hubbard, Clerk of the District Court, uho
had been removed by Swayne. This was contrary to instructions from the War Depart-
ment, which forbade the reappointment of an officer who had been removed. Annual
Cyclopaedia (1868), p. 15.
496 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
the officials appointed by him could take the test oath, and he was
much abused by the Radicals for saying that it would be impossible
fill half the offices with men who could take the oath. He was con
stantly besought to supersede the civil authority altogether and rul
only through the army. In this connection, he reported that he
was greatly embarrassed by the want of judgment and of knowledge
on the part of his subordinates, and by the great desire of those who
expected to profit from mihtary intervention. So he issued an order
informing the civil officials that as long as they performed their duties
they would not be interfered with. The army officials were informed
that they should in no case interfere with the civil administration
before obtaining the consent of Meade; that the military was to
act in subordination to and in aid of the civil authority ; ^ and that
no soldiers or other persons were to be tried in court for acts done
by mihtary authority or for having charge of abandoned land or
other property.^
There was much disorder by thieves and roughs on the river
boats during the spring of 1868. To facihtate trials of these law-
breakers, Meade directed that they be arrested and tried in any
county in the state where found, before any tribunal having juris-
diction of Such ofi'ences.^
The courts were not interfered with as under Pope's rule. The
judges continued to have white jurors chosen, and the army officers,
as a rule, approved. In one case, however, in Calhoun County,
there was trouble. One Lieutenant Charles T. Johnson, Fifteenth
Infantry, attended the court presided over by Judge B. T. Pope.
He found that no negroes were on the jury, and demanded that the
judge order a mixed jury to be chosen. The judge declined to comply,
and Johnson at once arrested him. Johnson found that the clerk
of the court did not agree with him, and he arrested the clerk also.
Pope was placed in jail until released by Meade.'* The conduct of
Johnson was condemned in the strongest terms by Meade, who
ordered him to be court-martialed. A general order was published
1 Report of Meade, etc., 1868 ; G. O. No. 10, 3d M. D., Jan. 15, 1868.
2 G. O. No. 7, Jan. ii, 1868, republishing G. O. No. 3, War Department, 1866.
8 G. O. No. 47, 3d M. D., March 21, 1868.
* Pope was in feeble health, and this treatment hastened his death, which occurred
shortly after being released from jail. Brewer, " Alabama," p. 524.
ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS 497
reciting the facts of the case and expressing the severest censure of
the conduct of Johnson. Meade informed the pubhc generally
that even had Judge Pope violated previous orders, Johnson had
nothing to do in the case except to report to headquarters. More-
over, Johnson was wrong in holding that all juries had to be com-
posed partly of blacks. This order stopped interference with the
courts in Alabama.^
Meade did not approve of Pope's policy toward newspapers, and
on February 2, 1868, he issued an order modifying General Order
No. 49 on the ground that it had in its operations proved embarrass-
ing. In the future, pubhc printing was to be denied to such papers
only as might attempt to intimidate civil officials by threats of violence
or prosecution, as soon as the troops were withdrawn, for acts per-
formed in their official capacity. However, if there was but one
paper in the county, then it was to have the county printing regardless
of its editorial opinions. '' Opposition to reconstruction, when con-
ducted in a legitimate manner, is," the order stated, "not to be con-
sidered an offence." Violent and incendiary articles, however, were
to be considered illegal,^ and newspapers were warned to keep within
the bounds of legitimate discussion. The Ku Klux movement,
especially after it was seen that Congress was going to admit the state,
notwithstanding the defeat of the constitution, gave Meade some
trouble. Its notices were pubhshed in various papers, and Meade
issued an order prohibiting this custom. The army officers were
ordered to arrest and try offenders. Only one editor came to grief.
Ryland Randolph, the editor of the Independent Monitor, of Tusca-
loosa, was arrested by General Shepherd and his paper suppressed
for a short time.^
General Meade was no negrophile, and hence under him there
1 G. O. No. 53, 3d M. D., April 7, 1868 ; A". Y. Herald, April i, 1868. Judge Pope
was arrested for violating Pope's G. O. Nos. 53, 55, which certainly provided for mixed
juries. Meade was simply putting his own interpretation on these orders.
2 G. O. No. 22, 3d M. D., Feb. 2, 1868 ; Report of Meade, etc., 1868.
3 Report of Meade, etc.. 1868; Independent Monitor, April and May, 1 868. The
Independent Monitor was a long-established and well-known weekly paper. F. A. P.
Barnard, who was afterwards president of Columbia College, New York, was, when a
professor at the University of Alabama, the editor of the Monitor, and under him it won
a reputation for spiciness which it did not lose under Randolph. See also Ch. XXI, for
Randolph and the Ku Klux Klan.
2 K
498 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
were no more long oration orders on the rights of "that large class
of citizens heretofore excluded from the suffrage." He set himselj
resolutely against all attempts to stir up strife between the races,
and quietly reported at the time, and again a year later, that the
stories of violence and intimidation, which Congress accepted without
question, were without foundation. He ordered that in the state
institutions for the deaf, dumb, bhnd, and insane, the blacks should
have the same privileges as the whites. The law of the state allowed
to the sheriffs for subsistence of prisoners, fifty cents a day for white
and forty cents a day for negro prisoners. Meade ordered that the
fees be the same for both races, and that the same fare and accom-
modations be given to both. Swayne had aboHshed the chain-gang
system the year before, because it chiefly affected negro offenders.
Meade gave the civil authorities permission to restore it.^
The convention had passed ordinances which amounted to stay
laws for the relief of debtors. In order to secure support for the
constitution, it was provided that these ordinances were to go into
effect with the constitution. Complaint was made that creditors
were oppressing their debtors in order to secure payment before the
stay laws should go into effect. Though opposed in principle to
such laws, Meade considered that under the circumstances some
rehef was needed. The price of cotton was low, and the forced
sales were ruinous to the debtors and of httle benefit to the credi-
tors. Therefore, in January, he declared the ordinances in force to
continue, unless the constitution should be adopted. A later order,
in May, declared that the ordinances would be considered in force
until revoked by himself.^
Trials by Military Commissions
When the ghostly night riders of the Ku Klux Klan began ta
frighten the carpet-baggers and the negroes, Meade directed all
officials, civil and mihtary, to organize patrols to break up the secret
organizations. Civil officials neglecting to do so were held to be
guilty of disobedience of orders. Where army officers raised posses
1 G. O. No. 31, Feb. 28, 1868; G. O. No. 44, March 18, 1868; G. O. No. 69, April
24, 1868; McPherson, p. 320; Report of Meade, etc., 1868.
2 G. O. No. 6, Jan. 10, i868 ; G. O. No. 79, May 20, 1868; McPherson, p. 320;
Report of Meade, 1868.
TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS 499
aid in maintaining the peace, the expenses were charged to the
unties or towns where the disturbances occurred.^
Nearly all prisoners arrested by the mihtary authorities were
turned over to the civil courts for trial. Mihtary commissions were
frequently in session to try cases when it was beheved the civil author-
ities would be influenced by local considerations. The following
list of such trials is complete: H. K. Quillan of Lee County and
Langdon ElHs, justice of the peace of Chambers County, were tried
for ''obstructing reconstruction" and were acquitted; Richard Hall
of Hale County, tried for assault, was acquitted;^ Joseph B. F.
Hill, Wilham Pettigrew, T. W. Roberts, and James Steele of Greene
County were sentenced to hard labor for five years, for "whipping a
hog thief, and threatening to ride him on a rail";^ Samuel W.
Dunlap, Wilham Pierce, Charles Coleman, and John Kelley, impli-
cated in the same case, were fined $500 each, and sentenced to one
year's imprisonment; Frank H. Munday, Hugh L. White, John
Cullen, and Samuel Strayhorn, charged with the same offence, were
each fined $500, and sentenced to hard labor for two years ; * Ryland
Randolph, editor of the Monitor, was tried for ''obstructing recon-
struction" in his paper and for nearly kilhng a negro, and was ac-
quitted. During the trial Busteed granted a writ of habeas corpus,
and Meade and Grant both were prepared to submit to the decision
of the court, but Randolph wanted the mihtary trial to go on.^
Meade was much irritated by the careless conduct of officers
in reporting cases for trial by mihtary courts which were unable to
stand the test of examination. After frequent failures to substantiate
1 Report of Meade, 1868.
2 G. O. No. 64, 3d M. D., April 19, 1868 ; Se/ma Times and Messenger, April 29,
1868.
8 This was the offence according to conservative testimony. The Radical testimony
did not differ greatly, but the "hog thief" happened to be a carpet-bag politician also.
* These were the " Eutaw cases," and were tried at Selma. Meade commuted some
of the sentences at once. The prisoners were sent to Dry Tortugas, and were later par-
doned by Meade. The officials spoiled the effect of his leniency by putting the pardoned
prisoners ashore at Galveston, Texas, without money and almost without clothes, while
some of the party were ill. Annual Cyclopaedia (1868), p. 17; Selma Times and Mes-
senger, May 5, 1868 ; N. Y. World, May 28, 1868; G. O. No. 80, 3d M. D., May 20,
1868.
^Independent Monitor, April and May, 1868; Report of Meade, 1868; G. O.
No. 78, 3d M. D., May 13, 1868.
500 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
charges in cases sent up for trial, orders were issued that subordinate
officials must exercise the greatest caution and care in preferring
charges, and in all cases must state the reasons why the civil authori-
ties could not act. Sworn statements of witnesses must accompan)
the charges, and the accused must be given an opportunity to for
ward evidence in his favor/
The Soldiers and the Citizens
The troops in the state during 1867 and 1868, though sadl^
demorahzed as to disciphne, gave the people Httle trouble excep
in the vicinity of the military posts. The records of the courtSrmarti
show that the negroes were the greatest sufferers from the outrag
of the common soldiers. The whites were irritated chiefly by th
arrogant conduct of a few of the post commanders and their subor-
dinates. At Mount Vernon, Frederick B. Shepard, an old man
was arrested and carried before Captain Morris Schoff, who shoi
the unarmed prisoner as soon as he appeared. For this murdei
Schoff was court-martialed and imprisoned for ten years.^ Johnson
the officer who arrested Judge Pope, was cordially hated in middle
Alabama. He arrested a negro who refused to vote for the const!
tution; in a quarrel he took the crutch of a cripple and struck him
over the head with it; hung two large United States flags over the
sidewalk of the main street in Tuscaloosa, and when the schoolgirls
avoided walking under them, it being well understood that Johnson
had placed them there to annoy the women, he stationed soldiers
with bayonets to force the girls to pass under the flags. For his
various misdeeds he was court-martialed by Meade.^
Most of the soldiers had no love for the negroes, carpet-baggers
and scalawags, and at a Radical meeting in Montgomery, th(
soldiers on duty at the capitol gave three groans for Grant, and
1 G. O. Nos. 64 and 65, 3d M. D., April 19 and 20, 1868.
During the eight months of Meade's administration in the Third District, there were
thirty-two trials by military commission in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. Only fifteen
persons were convicted. The sentences in four cases were disapproved, in eight cases
remitted, and two cases were referred to the President, leaving only one person confined
in prison. Report of Meade, 1868.
2 Selma Messenger, Oct. 25, 1867.
* Montgomery Mail, June 17, 1868; Independent Monitor, June 16, 1868.
FROM MARTIAL LAW TO CARPET-BAG RULE 501
hree cheers for McClellan and Johnson. For this conduct they
eve strongly censured by Major Hartz and General Shepherd, their
commanders.^
The soldiers sent to Hale County knocked a carpet-bag Bureau
agent on the head, ducked a white teacher of a negro school in the
creek, and cuffed the negroes about generally.^
From Martial Law to Carpet-bag Rule
The act providing for the admission of Alabama in spite of the
defeat of the constitution was passed June 25, 1868.^ Three days
later Grant ordered Meade to appoint as provisional governor and
lieutenant-governor those voted for'' in the February elections, and
to remove the present incumbents.^ So Smith and Applegate were
appointed as governor and lieutenant-governor, their appointments
to take effect on July 13, 1868, on which date the legislature said to
have been elected in February was ordered to meet.®
Until the state . should comply with the requirements of the
Reconstruction Acts all government and ail officials were to be con-
sidered as provisional only. The governor was ordered to organize
both houses of the legislature, and before proceeding to business
beyond organization each house was required to purge itself of any
members who were disquaHfied by the Fourteenth Amendment.''
A few days later, Congress having admitted the state to represen-
tation, Meade ordered all civil officials holding under the provisional
civil government to yield to their duly elected successors. The
military commander in Alabama was directed to transfer all
property and papers pertaining to the government of the state to
the proper civil authorities and for the future to abstain from any
interference or control over civil affairs. Prisoners held for offences
against the civil law were ordered to be delivered to state officials.*
This was, in theory, the end of military government in Alabama,
though, in fact, the army retired into the background, to remain
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1868), p. 17; Montgomery Advertiser, June 5, 1868.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 1 285-1 286.
8 McPherson, p. 337; see below, Ch. XV.
* Only the Radical candidates had been voted for.
6 Report of Meade, 1868. « G. O. No. 91, 3d M. D., June 28, 1868.
7 G. O. No. 100, July 9, 1868. 8 G. O. No. loi, July 14, 1868.
502 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
for six years longer the support and mainstay of the so-called civ.
government.^ ^H
The rule of the army had been intensely galling to the people
but it was infinitely preferable to the regime which followed, am
there was general regret when the army gave way to the carpet-baj
government. In January, 1868, a day of fasting and prayer waj
observed for the dehverance of the state from the rule of the negrc
and the ahen.
i
1 The volume of orders numbered 598 in the Adjutant-General's office at Washing
ton contains the General Orders of the Third Military District. Volume 599 relates t^ I
civil affairs in the same district.
CHAPTER XIII
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1867
Attitude of the Whites
In the preceding chapter the part of the army in executing the
Reconstruction Acts has been set forth. In the three succeeding
chapters I shall sketch the poHtical conditions in the state during the
same period. The people of Alabama had, for several months before
March, 1867, foreseen the failure of the President's attempt at Recon-
struction. The ''MiHtary Reconstruction Bill" was no worse than
was expected; if Hberally construed, it was even better than was
expected. And there was a possibihty that Reconstruction under
these acts might be delayed and finally defeated. Though President
Johnson was said to be hopeful of better times, the people of Ala-
bama were decided that no good would come from longer resistance.
A northern observer stated that they were so fearfully impoverished,
so completely demorahzed, by the break-up of society after the war,
that they hardly comprehended what was left to them, what was
required of them, or what would become of them. Still, they had a
clear conviction that Johnson could do no more for them. Every one,
except the negroes, was too much absorbed in the struggle for exist-
ence to pay much attention to pohtics. The whites seemed generally
willing to do what was required of them, or rather to let affairs take
their own course and trust that all would go well. They had given
up hope of an early restoration of the Union, but the Radicals, they
thought, could not rule forever.^
On March 19, 1867, Governor Patton published an address advis-
ing acquiescence in the plan of Congress. He had all along been
opposed to Radical Reconstruction, but he now saw that it could not
be avoided and wished to make the best of it. He said that a few
thousand good men would be disfranchised, but that there were other
1 N. Y. Herald, June 27, 1867.
503
504 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
good men and from these a wise and patriotic convention could be
chosen. He advised that negro suffrage be accepted as a settled fact,
with no ill feeling against the freedmen; that antagonism between
the races should be discouraged, and that no effort be made to con-
trol the votes of the blacks/ More consideration, Patton thought,
should have been given to Congress as the controlhng power ; antago-
nism to Congress had caused infinite mischief. It was folly, he
added, to expect more favorable terms, and further opposition might
cause harsher conditions to be imposed.^
Other prominent men advised the people to accept the plan of
Congress and to participate in the Reconstruction. Nearly all the
leading papers of the state, in order to make the best of a bad situa-
tion, now supported congressional Reconstruction. Consequently,
when General Pope arrived in April, the people were ready to accept
the situation in good faith, and desired that he should make a speedy
registration of the voters and end the agitation.^ Even at this late
date the southern people seem not to have foreseen the inevitable
results of this revolution in government.*
1 Washington (in "The Future of the American Negro," pp. ii, II2, 136) thinks
it unfortunate that the native whites did not make stronger efforts to control the politics
of the negro, and prevent him from falling under the control of unscrupulous aliens.
But any attempt to influence the negro voters was looked upon as " obstructing recon-
struction," and, in fact, was contrary to the spirit of the reconstruction laws and rendered
a person liable to arrest. This was recognized by Patton and others, who, however,
never dreamed that the negroes would be so successfully exploited by political adven-
turers, or perhaps they would have pursued a different policy. General Clanton, the
leader of the Conservatives, said that early in 1867 the whites had endeavored to keep
the blacks away from Radical leaders by giving them barbecues, etc. On one occasion
a Radical, who had once been kept from mistreating negroes by the military authorities
at Clanton's request, told the negroes that the whites intended to poison them at the
barbecue. Two long tables had been set, one for each race, and the preachers, speakers,
and the whites were present, but the blacks did not come. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test.,
pp. 237, 246.
2 N. Y. Herald, March 26, 1867.
« Herbert, " Solid South," p. 39; Herbert, " Political History " in " Memorial Record
of Alabama," Vol. I, p. 88; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 16.
* Northern observers who were friendly to the South saw the danger much more
clearly than the southerners themselves, who seemed unable to take negro suffrage seri-
ously or to consider it as great a danger as it is generally believed they did. Two years
of the Freedmen's Bureau had not wholly succeeded in alienating the best of the whites
and the negroes. The whites thought that the removal of outside interference would
quiet the blacks. To give the negro the ballot was absurd, they thought, but they did
not consider it necessarily as dangerous as it turned out to be. A remarkable prophecy
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RADICAL PARTY 505
The Organization of the Radical Party
While a large number of the influential men of the state were
ready to accept the situation, *'not because we approve the pohcy of
the reconstruction laws, but because it is the best we can do," and
while a larger number were more or less indifferent, there were many
who were opposed to Reconstruction on any such terms, preferring
a continuance of the mihtary government until passions were calmer
and a more hberal pohcy proposed. There was, however, no organ-
ized opposition to Reconstruction for two months or more, and even
then it was rendered possible only by the arbitrary conduct of Gen-
eral Pope and the violent agitation carried on among the negroes by
the Radical faction. For several months, in the white counties of
north Alabama the so-called "loyal" people, reenforced by numbers
of the old "Peace Society" men, had been holding meetings looking
toward organization in order to secure the fruits of Reconstruction.
These meetings were continued, and by them it was declared that the
people of Alabama were in favor of Reconstruction by the Sherman
Bill, to which only the original secession leaders were opposed, and
the Sherman plan, negro suffrage and all, was indorsed as a proper
punishment for the planters.^ After the beginning of congressional
Reconstruction, however, the centre of gravity in the Radical party
shifted to the Black Belt, and no one any longer paid serious attention
of Reconstruction is found in Calhoun's Works, Vol. VI, pp. 309-310. The behavior of the
negro during and after the war, in spite of malign influences, had been such as to reas-
sure many whites, who began to believe that to accept negro suffrage and get rid of the
Freedmen's Bureau and the army would be a good exchange. The northern friendly
observers saw more clearly because, perhaps, they better understood the motives of the
Radicals. The N. V. Herald said : " Briefly, we may regard the entire ten unrecon-
structed southern states, with possibly one or two exceptions, as forced by a secret and
overwhelming revolutionary influence to a common and inevitable fate. They are all
bound to be governed by blacks, spurred on by worse than blacks — white wretches who
dare not show their faces in respectable society anywhere. This is the most abominable
phase barbarism has assumed since the dawn of civilization. It was all right and proper
to put down the rebellion. It was all right, perhaps, to emancipate the slaves, although
the right to hold them had been acknowledged before. But it is not right to make
slaves of white men, even though they may have been former masters of blacks. This
is but a change in a system of bondage that is rendered the more odious and intolerable
because it has been inaugurated in an enlightened instead of a dark and uncivilized
age." See Annual Register, 1867.
1 See McPherson's scrapbook, "The Campaign of 1876," Vol. I, p. 105, for an
account of a typical meeting.
506 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to the few thousand "loyal" whites in north Alabama. The fii
negro meetings held were in the larger towns, Selma leading with a
large convention of colored "Unionists," who, under the guidance of
a few white officers of the Freedmen's Bureau, declared in favor of
mihtary Reconstruction/ The Montgomery reconstructionists held a
meeting in the capitol "in which whites and blacks fraternized." The
meeting was addressed by several "rebel" officers: A. C. Felder,
Doster, and H. C. Semple, and by General Swayne and John C»
Keffer from the north. General Swayne and Governor Patton served
as vice-presidents. The blacks were eulogized and declared capable
of political equality ; and it was urged that only those men in favor of
mihtary Reconstruction should be supported for office.^ In Mobile,
a meeting held on April 17 resolved that "everlasting thanks" were
due to Congress for its wisdom in passing the Reconstruction Acts.
Both whites and negroes spoke in favor of the rights of the negro to
hold office, sit on juries, and ride in the same cars and eat at the same
tables with whites. The prejudices of the whites, they declared,
must give way. At a meeting of negroes only the next day one of
the speakers made a distinction between political and social rights.
He said that the latter would come in time but t;hat the former must
be had at once; they were defined as the right to ride in street cars
with the whites, in first- class cars on the railroad, to have the best
staterooms on the boats, to sit at public tables with whites, and to go
to the hotel tables "when the first bell rang." What social rights
were he did not explain. Negroes attended these meetings armed
with clubs, pistols, muskets, and shotguns, most of which, of course,
would not shoot ; but several hundred shots were fired, much to the
alarm of the near-by dwellers.^
To counteract the effect of these meetings, the "moderate" recon-
structionists held a meeting in Mobile, April 19, presided over by
General Withers, the mayor of the city. Several influential citizens
and also a number of colored men were vice-presidents. Judge
Busteed, a "moderate" Radical, spoke, urging all to take part in the
Reconstruction and not leave it to the ignorant and vicious. Resolu-
tions were passed to the effect that the blacks would be accorded every
legal right and privilege. The "moderate" spirit of Pope was com-
1 Selma Times, March 19, 1867. ^ f^^ y. Herald, March 27, 1869.
8 N. y. Herald, April 25, 1869 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), p. 19.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RADICAL PARTY 507
mended, and cooperation was promised him. All were urged to
register and vote for delegates to the convention.*
A state convention of negroes was called by white Radical politi-
cians to meet in Mobile on May i, and in all of the large towns of the
state meetings to elect delegates were held under the guidance of the
Union League. The delegates came straggling in, and on May 2 and 3
the convention was held. It at once declared itself ''Radical," and
condemned the efforts of their oppressors who would use unfair
and foul means to prevent their consoHdation with the Radical party.
Swayne and Pope were indorsed, a standing army was asked for to
protect negroes in their political rights, and demand was made for
schools, to be supported by a property tax. Violations of the Civil
Rights Bill should be tried by mihtary commission, and the Union
League was estabhshed in every county. Finally, the convention
resolved that it was the undeniable right of the negro to hold office,
sit on juries, ride in any public conveyances, sit at pubhc tables, and
visit places of public amusement.^
The Alabama Grand Council of the Union League, the machine
of the Radicals in Alabama,^ met in April and formulated the princi-
ples upon which the campaign was to be conducted. Congress was
thanked for putting the reorganization of the state into the hands of
*' Union" men; the return to the principle that "all men are created
equal" and its apphcation to a "faithful and patriotic class of our
fellow-men" was hailed with joy; any settlement which denied the
ballot to the negro could not stand, they asserted; and "while we
believe that rebellion is the highest crime known to the law, and that
those guilty of it hold their continued existence solely by the clemency
of an outraged but merciful government, we are nevertheless willing
to imitate that government in forgiveness of the past, and to reclaim
to the Republican Union party all who, forsaking entirely the prin-
ciples on which the rebellion was founded, will sincerely and earnestly
unite with us in estabhshing and maintaining for the future a gov-
ernment of equal rights and unconditional loyalty;" "we consider
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), p. 19; N. Y. Herald, April 25, 1869.
2 N. V. Herald, May 17, 1869 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), pp. 18, 21. It is notice-
able all through Reconstruction that most of the demands for social rights or privileges
came from Mobile mulattoes.
* For an estimate of the importance of the Union League, see Ch. XVI.
508 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
willingness to elevate to power the men who preserved unswerving^
adherence to the government during the war as the best test of
sincerity in professions for the future;" and **if the pacification
now proposed by Congress be not accepted in good faith by those
who staked and forfeited their hves, their fortunes, and their sacred
honor, in rebellion, then it will be the duty of Congress to enforce
that forfeiture, by the confiscation of the lands at least of such a
stiff-necked and rebelhous people;" "the assertion that there are
not enough intelligent and loyal men in Alabama to administer
the government is false in fact, and mainly promulgated by those
who aim to keep treason respectable by retaining power in the
hands of its friends and votaries." ^ This was a declaration of
principles to which self-respecting whites could hardly be expected
to subscribe. That was the very reason for its proclamation.
The Radical leaders in control of the machinery of the Union
League began to discourage the accession of whites to the party.
The negro vote was to be their support, and not too many whites
were desired at the division of spoils.^ Other causes conspired to
drive the respectable people from the ranks of the reconstructionists.
Prominent politicians were sent into the state to tell the negro that,
having received his freedom from the Repubhcan party, to it his
vote was due. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts made a bit-
ter speech against the southern w^hites at the capitol in Montgomery.
The negroes were informed that the Republican party was entitled
to their votes, and the whites were asked to join them, as subordinates
perhaps.^ This speech was dehvered on May ii, and from this date
may be traced the organized opposition to Reconstruction. General
James H. Clanton * repHed to Wilson, maintaining that the southern
1 McPherson, " Reconstruction," pp. 249, 250. The last assertion refers to such
statements as those of Secretary McCulloch and the Postmaster-General in regard to the
character of the " loyalists." See McCulloch, " Men and Measures," p. 228.
2 See Herbert, " Solid South," p. 41.
2 On March 15, 1867, Senator Wilson, in a speech in favor of negro suffrage, said
that when the purpose of the act of March 2 was carried out, the " majority of these
states will, within a twelvemonth, send here senators and representatives that think as
we think, and speak as we speak, and vote as we vote, and will give their electoral vote
for whoever we nominate as candidate for President in 1868. The power is all in our
hands." Cong. Globe, March 15, 1867.
* Clanton had been a Whig, had opposed secession, made a brilliant war record,
became the leader of the Democratic and Conservative party in 1866, and led the fight
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RADICAL PARTY 509
white was the real friend of the negro and declaring in favor of full
political and educational rights for the negro, while asserting that
Wilson's plan would result in a black man's party, controlled by
aliens/ This speech of Clanton's had the effect of rousing the people
to organized resistance against the plans of the Radicals.
On May 14, Judge "Pig Iron" Kelly of Pennsylvania spoke in
Mobile to an audience of one hundred respectable whites and two
thousand negroes, the latter armed. His language toward the whites
was violent and insulting, an invitation for trouble, which inflamed
both races. A riot ensued for which he was almost solely to blame.^
Several whites were killed or wounded and one negro. From the
guarded report of General Swayne it was evident that the blame lay
upon Kelly for exciting the negroes. It was a most unfortunate
affair at a critical period, and the people began to understand the
kind of control that would be exercised over the blacks by ahen
politicians.^
In May the Alabama Sentinel, a short-lived reconstructionist news-
paper in Montgomery, assisted by a negro mass-meeting, nominated
Grant for the presidency and Busteed for vice-president. The plat-
form demanded that the negro have his rights at once or upon his
oppressors must fall the consequences. The RepubHcan party was
indorsed as the negro party, the only party that had done anything
for the negro.*
When the registrars were appointed it was necessary, in order to
get competent men, to import both blacks and whites into some dis-
tricts. The whites were brought from north Alabama or sent out
from the Bureau contingents in the towns. They were members of
the Union League, and it was a part of their duty to spread that organ-
against the carpet-bag government until his death in 187 1. He was killed in Knox villa
by a hireling of one of the railroad companies which had looted the state treasury and
against which he was fighting. Brewer, p. 466; Garrett, pp. 632-645.
1 See Herbert, " Solid South," p. 40; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 249.
2 AT. Y. Tribune, May 16, 1867, editorial. When the shots were fired Kelly showed
the white feather, and reclined upon the platform behind and under the speaker's chair;
afterwards he ran hatless to the hotel, and told the clerk to " swear he was out."
A special boat at once took him from the city to Montgomery.
3 N. Y. Tribune, May 16, 1767; N. Y. Times, May 21, 1867; N. Y. World, May 28,
1867; Mobile Times, ,1867; Mobile Register, ,1867; EveningPostt ,1867;
Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), pp. 22, 23.
* N. Y. Herald, May 26, 1867.
510 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
ization among the negroes of the Black Belt, thus carrying out that
part of their instructions which directed them to instruct the negroes
in their rights and privileges/ The Radical organization steadilyj
progressed, but even thus early two tendencies or lines of poHc]
appeared which were to weaken the Radicals and later to render pos-l
sible their overthrow. The native white reconstructionists, livingJ
mostly in the white counties, wanted a reconstruction in which they
(the native "unionists") should be the controUing element. They
were in favor of negro suffrage as a necessary part of the scheme and
because it would not directly interfere with them, as the negro was
supposed to be content with voting. These white '^ scalawags" were
thus to gather the fruits of reconstruction. But the " carpet-baggers,"
or the alien-bureau-missionary element, having worked among the
negroes and learned their power over them, intended to use the
negroes to secure office and power for themselves. They were less
prejudiced against the negroes than were the " scalawags " and were
willing to associate with them more intimately and to give them small
offices when there were not enough carpet-baggers to take them. It
was soon discovered that the native white "unionist" and the black
"Unionist," like oil and water, would not mingle. However, all
united temporarily to gain the victory for reconstruction, each faction
hoping to be the greater gainer.
On June 4, 1867, a "Union Republican Convention" met in
Montgomery, and at the same time the Union League held its con-
vention. The Union League was merely a select portion of the
Union Republican Convention and met at night to slate matters for
the use of the convention next day. F. W. Sykes of Lawrence
County ^ was chairman pro tem., and William H. Smith of Randolph
County was permanent chairman.^ The delegates to the convention
1 See Herbert, "Solid South," p. 43; oral accounts, etc.
2 Sykes soon deserted the Radicals, and was a Seymour elector the next year. Later
he was a candidate for the U. S. Senate against Spencer. Brewer, p. 309.
8 He was the north Alabama candidate for appointment as provisional governor in
1865, but was defeated by Parsons, the middle Alabama candidate. Parsons made him
a judge, but he resigned because the lawyers who argued before him spoke in insulting
phrases concerning his war record. In 1867 Pope appointed him superintendent of
registration for the state. He was a prominent member of the Union League. Brewer,
p. 508; JV. Y. Herald^ June 20, 1867; Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
Pt. III.
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE RADICAL PARTY 511
consisted of a large number of office-seekers, ''union*' men, deserters,
''scalawags," ex-Union army officers, and employees of the Freed-
men's Bureau, and negroes/ There were one hundred negroes and
fifty whites. The negroes sat on one side of the house and the whites
on the other, but the committees were divided equally by color. The
committee on permanent organization consisted of "three Yankees,"
four "palefaces," and six negroes, who nominated several negroes and
Bureau men for officials.^ The Mail said that the negroes presented
a better appearance than the whites, that they were cleaner and better
dressed. General Swayne took a prominent part in the proceedings,
and with Smith and the negroes voted out Busteed.^ Griffin (of
Ohio) from Mobile offered a resolution dictated by Swayne, declaring
that the recent opinions of the Attorney- General upon the registra-
tion of votes were dangerous to the restoration of the Union accord-
ing to the plan of Congress.* The proceedings were turbulent, there
was much angry discussion, and the meeting ended in a fight after
^ N. Y. Hei-ald, June 20, 1867, a northern Republican account.
2 Nicholas Davis of Madison County and Judge Busteed were both candidates for the
chairmanship. But the negroes and Union Leaguers were hostile to Davis, because he
did not like negro politicians and carpet-baggers and was opposed to the Union League.
Busteed was not a favorite for practically the same reasons, and because the negroes
thought he was trying to " ride two horses at once." He had spoken at a meeting of
moderate reconstructionists in Mobile, had presided over the Kelly meeting where the
riot occurred, and was believed to be in favor of moderate measures. He wrote a letter
to the president of the convention, advising moderation and criticising certain methods
of the Radicals. This letter was styled the " God save the Republic " letter, and was
characterized, his enemies Said, by its bad taste and malignant spirit, and was a stab at
his best friends. He was chosen a member of the Lowndes County delegation, but his
name was erased from the list of delegates. He then asked to have the privileges of the
floor as a courtesy, but his request was denied. One cause of dislike of him was that
he was believed to have senatorial aspirations, and expected the support of the moder-
ates, or " rebel " reconstructionists. But he was very unfortunate, for the " rebels " also
thought he was trying to play a double game and were dropping him. Suits were pend-
ing against him charging him with malfeasance in office, fraudulent conversion of money,
and corrupt abuse of the judicial office. Ex-Governor Watts, Judges S. F. Rice and
Wade Keys, John A. Elmore, H. C. Semple, D. S. Troy, and R. H. Goldthwaite were
the parties prosecuting him. N. Y. Herald, June 20, 1867; Brewer, p. 365; Montgomery
Mail, June 5, 1867.
8 Swayne, as well as Busteed, was an aspirant for senatorial honors. Busteed had
succeeded in causing the rejection of Albert Griffin, the editor of the Mobile Nationalist^
as register in chancery. Griffin was Swayne's friend, and now each gave the other the
benefit of his influence. N. Y. Herald, June 20, 1867; Montgomery Mail, June 5, 1867.
* N. Y. Herald, June 17, 1867.
512 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
having indorsed the Radical programme and declaring against th(
United States cotton tax and the state poll tax/ and agreeing to suj
port only "union" or ** loyal" men for office.^
Conservative Opposition Aroused
Though the leaders complained of the "appalling apathy of the
whites in pohtical matters," ^ a change was coming. The teachings
of the Radicals were beginning to have effect on the negroes, some of
whom were becoming hostile to the whites and were resisting the
white officers of the civil government. Their old behef in "forty
acres of land and a mule" was revived by the speeches of Thaddeus.
Stevens, which were widely circulated by the agents of the Union
League, who were sent through the country to distribute the speeches
and to organize the movement resulting from it. Many of the whites
now began to beheve that at last confiscation would be enforced and
that the negroes and low whites of the Union League would become
the landowners.^ Clanton had been at work for two months, and on
July 23, as chairman of the state committee of the Conservative party,,
called a convention of that party to meet in Montgomery on Sep-
tember 4.^ Meetings of the Conservative party were held in the
larger towns. A slight hope was entertained that the whites might
be able, by uniting, to obtain some representation in the convention.
At a meeting in Montgomery, in August, Joseph Hodgson ^ urged the
1 The only taxes that affected these people.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1869), pp. 25, 26; Montgomery Mail, ^xme 5, 1867; N. Y.
Herald, June 19, 20, 1867.
^ Montgomery Advertiser, July 19, 1867.
* Herbert, pp. 43, 44; N. Y. Herald, June 20 and 27, 1867. Most of the violent
and radical schemes originated and were advocated by the white Radical leaders. Gen-
erally the negro leaders made moderate demands. Holland Thompson, a negro leader^
in a speech at Tuskegee, advised his race not to organize a negro military company, as.
it would be sure to cause trouble. He said that the negro did not ask for social equality.
He told the negroes to stop buying guns and whiskey and go to work. McPherson's.
scrapbook, "The Campaign of 1867," Vol. I, p. 107. In striking contrast were the
speeches of such white men as B. W. Norris and A. C. Felder, who undertook to per-
suade the negroes that Reconstruction was the remedy for all the ills that affected
humanity. McPherson's scrapbook, "The Fourth of July" (1867), pp. 124, 125.
^ Herbert, p. 44.
® Lawyer, colonel of 7th Alabama Cavalry, superintendent of education, 1870-1872^
author of " The Cradle of the Confederacy," " Alabama Manual and Statistical Register,"
editor Montgomery Mail, Mobile Register, etc.
CONSERVATIVE OPPOSITION AROUSED 513
people to take action and save the state from " Brownlowism," ^ as
the worst results were to be feared from inaction ; the enemies of the
Conservatives were making every effort to control the constitutional
convention ; the Conservatives were in favor of conceding every legiti-
mate result of the war and were wilHng to grant suffrage to the negro
by state action — the only legitimate way ; at the same time the negro
must assist in guaranteeing universal amnesty. The negroes were
asked by the speaker to reflect and to learn for what purpose the
Radical leaders were using them. The best people of the state, he
said, and not the worst, ought to reconstruct the state under the
Sherman law.^
Although strenuous efforts were made to secure a large attendance
at the Conservative convention in September, there were only thirteen
of the sixty-two counties represented. General M. J. Bulger was
chosen to preside. Resolutions were adopted asserting the old con-
stitutional view of the Federal government and declaring that the
present state of affairs was destructive of federal government, in which
each state had the absolute right to regulate the suffrage. An appeal
was made to the negroes not to follow the counsels of bad*men and
designing strangers. The convention favored the education of the
negro so as to fit him for his moral and political responsibilities.^
About the time of the meeting of the Conservative convention an
event occurred which showed the results of the teachings of the Radi-
cal leaders. A plan was formed by the more violent blacks to pre-
vent the meeting of the Conservatives. Some of the more sensible
negroes used their influence as a '' Special Committee on the Situation'*
to prevent the attempt to break up the convention, and L. J. Williams,
a prominent negro politician, was the chairman of the committee.
The white Radicals did nothing to prevent violence. Later a negro
Conservative speaker was mobbed by the negroes and was rescued
only by the aid of General Clanton. Other negroes who sided with
the whites were expelled from their churches."*
The registrars continued to instruct ''that part of the population
1 A reign of terror had followed the reconstruction of Tennessee under " Parson '*
Brownlow.
2 N. V. Times, Aug. 19, 1867.
8 N. Y. Herald, Sept. 6, 1867; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 28; Herbert, p. 44.
* Herbert, pp. 44, 45; N. Y. Herald, Sept. 6, 1867.
2L
514 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
which has heretofore been denied the right of suffrage" in the mys-
teries of citizenship or membership in the Union League. By the
time of the election they were so effectively instructed that they were
sure to vote as they were told by the League leaders. Nearly all of
the respectable white members of the League in the Black Belt had [
fallen away, and but few remained in the white counties. Governor \
Patton yielded to Radical pressure, wrote Reconstruction letters, ap- i
peared at Reconstruction meetings, and deferred much to Pope and
Swayne. He was harshly criticised by the Conservatives for pursuing j
such a course. '
The Elections; the Negro's First Vote
The elections, early in October, were the most remarkable in the
history of the state. For the first time the late slaves were to vote,
while many of their former masters could not. Of the 65 counties
in Alabama, 22 had negro majorities (according to the registration)
and had 52 delegates of the 100 total, and in nearly all of the others
the negro minority held the balance of power. ^ To control the negro
vote the*Radicals devoted all the machinery of registration and elec-
tion, of the Union League, and of the Freedmen's Bureau. The
chiefs of the League sent agents to the plantation negroes, who were
showing some indifference to politics, with strict orders to go and
vote. They were told that if they did not vote they would be reen-
slaved and their wives made to work the roads and quit wearing
hoopskirts.^ In Montgomery County, the day before election, the
Radical agents went through the county, summoning the blacks to
come and vote, saying that Swayne had ordered it and would punish
them if they did not obey. The negroes came into the city by thou-
sands in regularly organized bodies, under arms and led by the League
poKticians, and camped about the city waiting for the time to vote.
The danger of outbreak was so great that the soldiers disarmed them.
They did not know, most of them, what voting was. For what or
for whom they were voting they knew not, — they were simply obey-
ing the orders of their Bureau chiefs.^ Likewise, at Clayton, the
negroes were driven to town and camped the day before the election
1 Montgomery Sentinel, July 3, 1867; N. V. Herald, Aug. 5, 1867.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 357. A frequent threat.
2 N. Y. World, Nov. ii, 1867; Harris, "Political Conflict in America," p. 479.
THE ELECTIONS; THE NEGROES FIRST VOTE 515
!)egan. There was firing of guns all night. Early the next morning
the local leaders formed the negroes into companies and regiments
and marched them, armed with shotguns, muskets, pistols, and
knives, to the court-house, where the only polling place for the county
was situated. The first day there were about three thousand of
them, of all ages from fifteen to eighty years of age, and no whites were
allowed to approach the sacred voting place. When drawn up in
line, each man was given a ticket by the League representatives, and
no negro was allowed to break ranks until all were safely corralled in
the court-house square. Many of the negroes had changed their
names since they were registered, and their new ones were not on the
books, but none lost a vote on that account.^
In Marengo County the Bureau and Loyal League officers lined up
the negroes early in the morning and saw that each man was supplied
with the proper ticket. Then the command, ''Forward, March!"
was given, the Hne filed past the poUing place, and each negro depos-
ited his ballot. About twelve o'clock a bugle blew as a signal to
repeat the operation, and all the negroes present, including most of
those who had voted in the morning, lined up, received tick-ets, and
voted again. Late in the afternoon the farce was gone through the
third time. Any one voted who pleased and as often as he pleased.^
In Dallas County the negroes were told that if they failed to vote
they would be fined $50. The negroes at the polls were lined up and
given tickets, which they were told to let no one see. However, in
some cases the Conservatives had also given tickets to negroes, and a
careful inspection was made in order to prevent the casting of such
ballots. The average negro is said to have voted once for himself
and once "for Jim who couldn't come." The registration lists were
not referred to except when a white man offered to vote. Most of
the negroes had strange ideas of what voting meant. It meant free-
dom, for one thing, if they voted the Radical ticket, and slavery if
they did not. One negro at Selma held up a blue (Conservative)
ticket and cried out, "No land! no mules! no votes! slavery
again !" Then holding up a red (Radical) ticket he shouted, "Forty
acres of land ! a mule ! freedom ! votes ! equal of white man !" Of
course he voted the red ticket. Numbers of them brought halters
1 N. V. Herald, Oct. 13, 1867.
* Accounts of negroes and whites who were at the polls.
5l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
\
for their mules or sacks "to put it in." Some country negroes
were given red tickets and told that they must not be persuaded to
part with them, as each ticket was good for a piece of land. The
poor negroes did not understand this figurative language and put the
precious red tickets in their pockets and hurried home to locate the
land. Another darky was given a ticket and told to vote — to put
the ballot in the box. ''Is dat votin'?" ''Yes." "Nuttin' more,
master?" "No." "I thought votin' was gittin' sumfin." He went
home in disgust. The legend of "lands and mules" was revived
during the fall and winter of 1 867-1 868, and many negroes were
expecting a division of property. By this time they were be-
ginning to feel that it was the fault of their leaders that the divi-
sion did not take place, and there were threats against those who
had made promises. However, the sellers of painted sticks again
thrived — perhaps they had never ceased to thrive.^ General Swayne
reported about this time that the giving of the ballot to the negro
had greatly improved his condition.^
The election went overwhelmingly for the convention and for the
Radical candidates. The revision of the voting lists before election
struck off the names of many "improper" whites and placed none on
the list; with the negroes the reverse was true. The whites had no
hope of carrying the elections in most of the counties, and as the negroes
were intensely excited, and as trouble was sure to follow in case the
whites endeavored to vote or to control the negro vote, most of the
Conservatives refrained from voting. Even at this time a large num
ber of people were unable to believe seriously that the negro voting
had come to stay. To them it seemed something absurd and almost
ridiculous except for the ill feelings aroused among the negroes. Such
a state of affairs could not last long, they thought. Two Conserva-
tive delegates and ninety-eight Radical delegates were elected to the
convention.^
1 Se/ma Messenger, Oct. 10 and 12, Dec. 20 and 22, 1867, and Jan. 2, 1868; Mont-
gomery Mail, Jan. 30, 1868; Ball, "Clarke County"; oral accounts.
2 Freedmen's Bureau Report, Nov. i, 1867.
8 Sen. Ex. Doc, No, 53, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 238, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess. The N. Y. Tribune, Oct. 21, 1867, gives slightly different figures. Statements
of the vote do not agree. There was much confusion in the records. For statistics, see
above, pp. 491, 494.
CHAPTER XIV
THE << RECONSTRUCTION" CONVENTION
Character of the Convention
The delegates elected to the convention were a motley crew —
white, yellow, and black — of northern men, Bureau officers, "loyal-
ists," "rebels," who had aided the Confederacy and now perjured
themselves by taking the oath. Confederate deserters, and negroes/
The Freedmen's Bureau furnished eighteen or more of the one hun-
dred members. There were eighteen blacks.^ Thirteen more of the
members had certified, as registrars, to their own election and with
six other members had certified to the election of thirty-one, nineteen
of whom were on the board of registration. No pretence of residence
was made by the northern men in the counties from which they were
elected. Several had never seen the counties they represented, a
slate being made up in Montgomery and sent to remote districts to
be voted for. Of these northern men, or foreigners, there were thirty-
seven or thirty- eight, from Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ver-
mont, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa, New Jersey, Illinois,
Ireland, Canada, and Scotland.^ The native whites were for the most
1 Samuel A. Hale, a dissatisfied Radical from New Hampshire, a brother of John P.
Hale, wrote to Senator Henry Wilson, on Jan. i, 1868, concerning the character of the
members of the convention. He said that many were negroes, grossly ignorant ; a
large proportion were northern adventurers who had manipulated the negro vote; and
all were " worthless vagabonds, homeless, houseless, drunken knaves." Hale had lived
for several years in Alabama. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 1815-1830.
2 There is doubt about four or five men, whether they were black or white. The
lists made at the time do not agree.
3 N. Y. World, Nov. n, 1867, and F'eb. 22, 1868; Selma Messenger, Dec. 20 and
22, 1867; Annual Cyclopedia (1867), p. 30; Herbert, "Solid South," p. 45. A partial
list of aliens as described by a northern correspondent : A. J. Applegate of Wisconsin ;
Arthur Bingham of Ohio and New York ; D. H. Bingham of New York, who had lived
in the state before the war, an old man, and intensely bitter in his hatred of southerners;
W. H. Block of Ohio; W. T. Blackford of New York, a Bureau official, "the wearer of
one of the two clean shirts visible in the whole convention " ; M. D. Brainard of New
York, a Bureau clerk who did not know, when elected to represent Monroe, whi-re his
5i8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
part utterly unknown and had but little share in the proceedings
the convention/ Of the negro members two could write well and
were fairly well educated, half could not write a word, and the others
had been taught to sign their names and that was all. There were
many negroes who could read and write, but they were not sent to
the convention. Perhaps the carpet-baggers feared trouble from
them and wanted only those whom they could easily control.^
county was located ; Alfred E. Buck of Maine, a court clerk of Mobile appointed by
Pope; Charles W. Buckley of Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois, chaplain of a
negro regiment, later a Bureau official ; William M. Buckley of New York, his brother ;
J. H. Burdick of Iowa, extremely radical ; Pierce Burton of Massachusetts, who had
been removed from the Bureau for writing letters to northern papers, advocating the
repeal of the cotton tax, but now that the negroes desired the repeal of the tax, the
breach was healed ; C. M. Cabot of (unknown), member of Convention of 1865; Datus
E. Coon of Iowa; Joseph H. Davis of (unknown), surgeon U.S.A., member of
convention of 1865; Charles H. Dustan of Illinois; George Ely of Massachusetts and
New York ; S. S. Gardner of Massachusetts, of the Freedmen's Bureau ; Albert Griffin
of Ohio and Illinois, Radical editor; Thomas Haughey of Scotland, surgeon U.S.A.;
R. M. Johnson of Illinois, lived in Montgomery and represented Henry County; John C.
Keffer of Pennsylvania, chairman of Radical Executive Committee, " known to malig-
nants as the * head devil ' of the Loyal League " ; David Lore of (unknown) ; Charles A.
Miller of Maine, Bureau official, " wore the second clean shirt in the convention " ; A. C.
Morgan of (unknown) ; B. W. Norris of Maine, Commissioner of National Cemetery,
1863-1865, Commissary and Paymaster, 1864-1866, Bureau official; E. Woolsey Peck
of New York; R. M. Reynolds of Iowa, six months in Alabama and "knew all about
it" ; J. Silsby of Massachusetts, another Bureau reverend ; N. D. Stanwood of Massa-
chusetts, a Bureau official who had caused several serious negro disturbances in Lowndes
County; J. P. Stow of (unknown); Whelan of Ireland ; J. W. Wilhite of (unknown),
U.S. sutler ; Benjamin Yordy of (unknown), a Bureau official and revenue official who
never saw the county he represented ; Benjamin Rolfe, a carriage painter from New
York, was too drunk to sign the constitution, and was known as "the hero of two
shirts," because when he failed to pay a hotel bill in Selma his carpet-bag was seized,
and was found to contain nothing but two of those useful garments. Ku Klux Rept.,
Ala. Test., passim ; N. V. World, Nov. ii, 1867; Herbert, p. 45.
^ Some of the better known were : R. Deal of Dale County, a Baptist preacher, one
of those who, in 1865, negligently reconstructed the state, and the hope was now ex-
pressed that "he has better success in reconstructing souls than sovereignties" ; W- C.
Ewing of Baine County, "one of the original Moulton Leaguers who, in 1865, first
organized the Radical party in Alabama," a bitter Radical ; W. R. Jones of Covington,
had been barbarously murdered in " a rebel outrage," but came to the convention not-
withstanding ; B. F. Saffold, an officer of the Confederate army and military mayor of
Selma ; Henry C. Semple, ex-Confederate, nephew of President Tyler ; Joseph H. Speed,
cousin of Attorney-General Speed.
2 The negro members were : Ben Alexander of Greene, field hand ; John Caraway
of Mobile, assistant editor of the Mobile Nationalist ; Thomas Diggs of Barbour, field
hand ; Peyton Finley, formerly doorkeeper of the House ; James K. Green of Hale, a
carriage driver ; Ovid Gregory of Mobile, a barber ; Jordan Hatcher of Dallas and
CHARACTER OF THE CONVENTION
519
Griffin of Ohio was appointed temporary chairman, and on the
otion of Keffer of Pennsylvania, Robert Barbour of New York was
made temporary secretary and later permanent secretary. KeflFer
nominated Peck, a New Yorker who had resided for some years in
Alabama, for president of the convention, and he was unanimously
elected.^ There were several negro clerks in the convention. The
disgusted Conservatives designated the aggregation by various epi-
thets, such as "The Unconstitutional Convention," "Pope's Conven-
tion," "Swayne's World-renowned Menagerie," "The Circus,"
"Black and Tan," "Black Crook," etc. The last, which was prob-
ably given by the New York Herald correspondent, seems to have
been the favorite name. The white people still persisted in looking
upon the whole affair as a more or less irritating joke.
The carpet-baggers intended that the convention should be
purged of "improper" persons, and one of them proposed that the
test oath be taken. This aroused opposition on the part of the ex-
" rebels," who did not care to perjure themselves more than was neces-
sary. Coon of Iowa then proposed a simple oath to support the
Constitution, which after some wrangHng was taken.^ Caraway, a
negro, wanted no chaplain to officiate in the convention who had not
remained loyal to the United States. Skinner of Franklin said: "Let
none offer prayer who are rebels and who have not fought under the
stars and stripes." This was to prevent such reverend members of
the convention as Deal of Dale from officiating. Finally, the presi-
dent was empowered to appoint the chaplain daily. A colored chap-
lain was called upon once in a while, and one of them invoked the
blessings of God on "Unioners and cusses on rebels." ^
Washington Johnson of Russell, field hands, were the blackest negroes in the conven-
tion ; L. S. Latham of Bullock ; Tom Lee of Perry, field hand, who had a reputation
for moderation ; Alfred Strother of Dallas ; J. T. Rapier of Lauderdale, educated in
Canada ; J. W. McLeod of Marengo ; B. F. Royal of Bullock ; J. H. Burdick of Wilcox;
H. Stokes and Jack Hatcher of Dallas ; Simon Brunson and Benjamin Inge of Sumter;
Samuel Blandon of Lee ; Lafeyette Robinson and Columbus Jones of Madison. Beverly,
"History of Alabama," p. 203; N. Y. World, Nov. ii, 1867; Owen, "Official and
Statistical Register," p. 125.
1 Journal Convention of 1867, pp. 3-5.
2 Journal Convention of 1867, p. 5 ; N. Y. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867 ; Annual Cycle-
pKflia (1867), p. 30.
3 Selma Messenger, Dec. 22, 1867 ; Journal Convention of 1867, p. 6 ; N. K. Worlds
Nov. II, 1867.
520 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Another way of showing the loyalty of the body was by directing
a committee to bring in an ordinance changing the names of the
counties "named in honor of rebellion and in glorification of traitors. "
Keffer of Pennsylvania was the author of this resolution. Steed of
Cleburne wanted the name of his county changed to Lincoln, and
Simmons of Colbert wanted his county to be named Brownlow.
The test votes on such questions were about 55 to 30 in favor of
changing. Baine, Colbert, and Jones counties, estabHshed by the
"Johnson" government, were abohshed.^
The president was directed to drape his chair with two "Fed-
eral" flags. Generals Pope and Swayne, and Governor Patton, as
friends of Reconstruction, were invited to seats in the convention and
were asked to speak before the body. Pope was becoming somewhat
nervous at the conduct of the supreme rulers of the state and in his
speech counselled moderation and fairness. He also commended
them for the "firmness and fearlessness with which you have con-
ducted the late campaigns, "- and congratulated them upon "the
success which has thus far crowned your efforts in the pacification
of this state and its restoration to the Union. "^ The most radical
members of the convention were bringing pressure to bear to force
Pope to declare vacant at once all the offices of the provisional gov-
ernment and fill them with reconstructionists. In this they were
aided by northern influence. Pope, however, refused to make the
change, and thus displeased the Radicals, who wanted offices at
once.^
The first ordinance of the convention reconstructed Jones County,
named for a Confederate colonel, out of existence, and the second,
third, and fourth arranged for the pay of the convention. The presi-
dent received $10 a day and the members $8 each; the clerks from
$6 to $8, and the pages $4.'' The president and members received
40 cents as mileage for each mile travelled. To cover these expenses
an additional tax of 10 per cent on taxes already assessed was levied.
The comptroller refused to pay the members until ordered by Pope.
1 Journal, pp. 69-71, 249, 251, 264 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 32 ; N. Y. Herald^
March 16, 1867.
2 Journal, pp. 10, 12, 13; N. V. World, Nov. 20, 1869; Annual Cyclopaedia
(1867), p. 30.
3 Journal, pp. 13, iio. III, 276; N. Y. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867.
* Twice the pay in the convention of 1865.
»
THE RACE QUESTION 521
The latter hesitated to give the order, as he doubted if he had the
authority. However, he finally said that he would order payment
provided the compensation be fixed at reasonable rates, and that the
payments be not made before the convention completed its work.
He further added that the convention must be moderate in action;
"I speak not more for the interests of Alabama than for the interests
of the poHtical party upon whose retention of power for several years
to come the success of Reconstruction depends." When Pope urged
moderation, it is Hkely that something serious was the matter. A
proposition to reduce the pay of the members from $8 to $6 per day
was lost by a vote of 35 to 57. A few days before the close of the
convention, Pope ordered the payment of the per diem to the hungry
delegates, many of whom refused to accept the state obligations
called "Patton money." They were told that it was receivable for
taxes, and one answered for all: " Oh, damn the taxes ! We haven't
got any to pay." ^
The Race Question
The colored delegates brought up the negro question in several
forms. First, Rapier of Canada wanted a declaration that negroes
were entitled to all the privileges and rights of citizenship in Alabama.^
Then Strother of Dallas demanded that the negroes be empowered
to collect pay from those who held them in slavery, at the rate of $10
a month for services rendered from January i, 1863, the date of the
Emancipation Proclamation, to May 20, 1865. An ordinance to this
effect was actually adopted by a vote of 53 to 31.^ The scalawags, as
a rule, wished to prohibit intermarriage of the races, and Semple of
Montgomery reported an ordinance to that effect. He would pro-
hibit intermarriage to the fourth generation. The negroes and car-
pet-baggers united to vote this down, which was done by a vote of
48 to 30. Caraway (negro) of Mobile wanted life imprisonment for
any white man marrying or living with a black woman, but he said
it was against the Civil Rights Bill to prohibit intermarriage. This
seems to have irritated the scalawags. Gregory (negro) of Mobile
wanted all regulations, laws, and customs wherein distinctions were
1 Journal, pp. 79, 178, 249-251 ; Pope to Swayne, Nov. 20, 1867; N. Y. World,
Dec. 14, 1867 ; G. O. No. 254, 3d M. D., Nov. 26, 1867.
2 Journal, p. 57. « Journal, p. 61 ; N. Y. Herald, Nov. 15, 1867.
522 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
made on account of color or race to be abolished, and thus allow
intermarriages. The convention refused to adopt the report pro-
viding against amalgamation/ The Mobile negroes alone seem to
have been opposed to the prohibition of intermarriage. The con-
vention of 1865 had recognized the vahdity of all slave marriages
and had ordered that they be considered legal. During 1865 and
1866 the fickle negroes, male and female, made various experiments
with new partners, and the result was that in 1867 thousands of
negroes had forsaken the husband or wife of slavery times and "taken
up" with others. All sorts of prosecutions were hanging over them,
and an ordinance was passed for the rehef of such people. It directed
that marriages were to date from November 30, 1867, and not from
1865 or earlier. All who were Hving together in 1867 were to be con-
sidered man and wife, and all prosecutions for former misconduct
were forbidden.^
Caraway (negro) of Mobile succeeded in having an ordinance
passed directing that church property used during slavery for colored
congregations be turned over to the latter.^ Some of this property
was paid for by negro slaves and held in trust for them by white
trustees. Most of it, however, belonged to the planters, who erected
churches for the use of their slaves.
Not much was said about separate or mixed schools for the races.
There was a disposition on the part of the leaders to keep such ques-
tions in the background for a time in order to prevent irritating dis-
cussions. A proposition for separate schools was voted down on
the ground that it was better for the children of both races to go to
school together and wear off their prejudices. This was the carpet-
baggers' view, but most of the blacks finally voted against a measure
providing for mixed schools, because, they said, they did not want ta
send their children to school with white children. The matter was
hushed up and left unsettled.*
In spite of efforts to keep the question in the background, the
social equaHty of the negro race was demanded by one or two irre-
1 Journal, p. 189; Herbert, "Solid South," p. 46; N. Y. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867;
Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 33.
2 Journal, pp. 262, 263.
« Journal, pp. 15, 212, 263 ; N. V. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867.
* Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 33 ; Sebna Messenger, Dec. 22, 1867.
I
THE RACE QUESTION 523
pressible Mobile mulattoes, and a discussion was precipitated. The
scalawags with few exceptions were opposed to admitting negroes
to the same privileges as whites, — in theatres, churches, on railroads
and boats, and at hotels, — though they were wiUing to require equal
but separate accommodations for both races. Semple reported from
his committee an ordinance requiring equal and separate accommo-
dations, but declared that equaHty of civil rights was not affected
by such a measure. By a vote of 32 to 46 this measure failed to
pass.^ Griffin^ (white) of Ohio briefly attacked Semple for pro-
posing such an iniquitous measure. McLeod (negro) said he did
not exactly want social equahty, and added "suppose one of you
white gentlemen want a negro in the same car with you. The con-
ductor would not allow it. This should be changed." Caraway
(negro) objected to having his wife travel in the coach with low and
obscene white men. Jim Green (negro) said it was a "common
thing to put cuUud folks in de same cyar wid drunk and low white
folks. We want nebber be subjic to no sich disgrace," but wanted
to be allowed to go among decent white people. Gregory (negro)
made some scathing observations at the expense of Semple and his
associates, who were hoping to make poHtical use of the negro, yet
did not want to ride in the same car with him. How could the dele-
gates, he said, go home to their constituents, nineteen-twentieths of
whom were negroes, after voting against their enjoying the same
rights as the whites ? Did Semple feel polluted by sitting by Finley,
his colored colleague? Why then should he object to sitting in the
same car with him ? He (Gregory) was as good a man as Napoleon
on his throne, and could not be honored by sitting by a white man,
but "in de ole worl de cuUud folks ride wid de whites" and so it
should be here. Rapier (negro) of Canada said that the manner
in which colored gentlemen and ladies were treated in America was
beyond his comprehension. He (Rapier) had dined with lords in
his hfetime, and though he did not feel flattered by sitting by a white
man, yet he would vote for social equality. Some of the negroes
feebly opposed the agitation of the question on the ground that the
civil and poHtical rights of the negro were not yet safe and should
not be endangered by the agitation of the social question. Griffin
1 Journal, p. 149; N. Y. World, Dec. 14, 1867.
2 Dubbed " the incarnate fiend " by the whites because of his violent prejudice.
524 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of Ohio and Keffer of Pennsylvania supported the negroes in all
their demands. The carpet-baggers in general were in favor of social
equahty, but most of them thought it much more important that the
spoils be secured first. The negroes were placated with numerous
promises and by a special resolution opening the galleries to "their
ladies" and inviting the latter to be present^ at the sessions of the
convention.
Debates on Disfranchisement
The debates on the question of suffrage were the most extended
and showed the most violent spirit on the part of most of the members.
Dustan of Iowa proposed that the new constitution should in no
degree be proscriptive, but his resolution was voted down by a vote
of 30 to 51. Some of the negroes voted for it.* Rapier (negro) pro-
posed that the convention memoriahze Congress to remove the pohti-
cal disabihties of those who might aid in reconstruction according to
the plan of Congress. This was adopted and Griffin, the most radi-
cal member of the committee, was made chairman to make merciful
recommendations. Gardner of Massachusetts, representing Butler
County, said that there were persons in the state who should have
been tried and convicted of felony and would thus have been dis-
franchised, but owing to fault of courts and juries they were not con-
victed. He wanted a special commission to disfranchise such persons.
The majority report on the franchise^ called for the disfranchisement
of those who had mistreated Union prisoners, those who were dis-
franchised by the Reconstruction Acts, and those who had registered
under the acts and had later refrained from voting. Such persons
were not to be allowed to vote, register, or hold office. An oath was
to be taken repudiating belief in the doctrine of secession, accepting
the civil and pohtical equality of all men, and agreeing never to at-
tempt to Hmit the suffrage. "The only question is," they reported,
*' whether we have not been too Hberal. " It was necessary that all
who registered be forced to vote in the election on pain of being dis-
1 iV. Y. World, Dec. 14, 1867; Montgomery Mail, Nov., 1867; N. Y. Herald,
Nov. 13 and 23 and Dec. 8, 1867.
2 Journal, pp. 8, 12, 17 ; N. Y. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867.
' By Griffin of Ohio, Keffer of Pennsylvania, Norris of Maine, and Davis of (?).
It was said that Norris and Davis had to be influenced by Swayne to sign the majority
report. N. Y. World, Nov. 20, 1867.
I
DEBATES ON DISFRANCHISEMENT 525
franchisee!, in order to get a sufficient number of voters to the polls,
though the report stated that Congress was not bound by the law of
March 23 to reject the constitution if a majority did not vote; the
convention had the right to say that men must vote or be disfran-
chised ; as to the oath, any one who would refuse to take it had no
faith in American principles and was hostile to the Constitution and
laws of the United States/
The minority report ' objected to going beyond the acts of Con-
gress in disfranchising whites. Lee (negro) said that such a course
would endanger the ratification of the constitution and if the negroes
did not get their rights now, they would never get them. He wanted
his rights at the court-house and at the polls and nothing more. Char-
ity and moderation would be better than proscription.^ Speed said
that the measure would disfranchise from 30,000 to 40,000 men
beyond the acts of Congress.^ Griffin of Ohio, speaking in favor of
the majority report, said that ''the infernal rebels had acted like
devils turned loose from hell," and that his party could not stand
against them in a fair political field; and therefore proscription was
necessary. Another advocate of sweeping disfranchisement wanted
all the leading whites disfranchised until 1875, i^ order to prevent
them from regaining control of the government.^
Numerous amendments were offered to the majority report.
Haughey of Scotland wanted to disfranchise all Confederates above
the rank of captain, and all who had held any civil office anywhere,
or who had voted for secession. A stringent test oath was to dis-
cover the disabihties of would-be electors. Again, he wanted every
elector to prove that on November i, 1867, he was a friend of the
Reconstruction Acts. He would have voters and office-holders
swear to accept the civil and political equality of all men, and to
resist any change, and also swear that they had never held office,
aided the Confederacy, nor given aid or comfort to Confederates.®
Nearly all the amendments included a provision forcing the voter
or office-holder to accept the political and civil equality of all men,
1 Journal, pp. 30-34 ; N. V. World, Nov. 20, 1867.
2 By Speed of Virginia, Whelan of Ireland, and Lee (negro).
* Journal, pp. 36, 37 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 31.
* Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 32 ; N. Y. World, Nov. 20, 1867.
6 N. Y. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 31.
* Journal, pp. 42, 55, 82, 100.
526 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
i
and to swear never to change. Springfield of St. Clair thought that
all who were opposed to Reconstruction should be disfranchised, and
Russell of Barbour, with Applegate of Wisconsin, held that all Con- ^
federates should be disfranchised who had voluntarily aided theW
Confederacy.^ ~
D. H. Bingham of New York thought that voters should swear
that on March 4, 1864, they preferred the United States government
to the Confederacy, and would have abandoned the latter had they
had the opportunity.^ Applegate thought that no citizen, officer,
or editor who opposed congressional Reconstruction ought to be
permitted to vote before 1875.^ Silsby of Iowa would also exclude
from the suffrage those who had killed negroes during the last two
years, who opposed Reconstruction, or dissuaded others from attend-
ing the election.'' Garrison of Blount wanted to disfranchise those
who were in the convention of 1861 and voted for secession. Con-
federate members of Congress who voted for the conscription law,
those disfranchised by the Reconstruction Acts, Confederates above
the rank of captain, and state and Confederate officials of every
kind above justice of the peace and bailiff.^ Skinner of Franklin
wanted to disfranchise enough rebels to hold the balance of power.
"We have the rod over their heads and intend to keep it there.''®
The most liberal amendments were proposed by Peters of Lawrence,
who would continue the disfranchisement made by Congress unless
the would-be voter would swear that he was in favor of congres-
sional Reconstruction. Rapier (negro) would have all disabilities
removed by the state as soon as they were removed by Congress.''
The price of pardon in all ordinary cases was support of congres-
sional Reconstruction.
The debate lasted for four days, and it was all that Swayne could
do to prevent a division in the Radical party. An agent was sent
to Washington for instructions. The violent character of the pro-
ceedings of the convention made the northern friends of Reconstruc-
tion nervous, and Horace Greeley persuaded Senator Wilson to exert
his influence to prevent the adoption of extreme measures by the
convention. Wilson wrote to Swayne that the convention and espe-
cially such men as D. H. Bingham were doing much harm to Recon-
1 Journal, pp. 47, 48, 54, 83. 2 journal, p. 47. ' Journal, p. 47. * Journal, p. 45.
fi Journal, p. 53. « Sg/ma Messenger, Dec. 22, 1867. ^ Journal, pp. 84, 85.
DEBATES ON DISFRANCHISEMENT 527
struction and to the Republican party. The northern Republican
press generally seemed afraid of the action of the convention, and
suggested more Hberal measures. So we find Pope and Swayne
advocating moderation.' Peck, the president of the convention,
still spoke out for the test oath and disfranchisement. It was neces-
sary to secure the fruits of Reconstruction, and the test oath would
keep out many ; but, he said, if the old leaders, who were honorable
men, should take the oath, they would abide by it,^ and Reconstruc-
tion would then be safe. The oath finally adopted, which had to
be taken by all who would vote or hold office, was the usual oath to
support the Constitution and laws with the following additions:
*'I accept the civil and poHtical equahty of all men; and agree not
to attempt to deprive any person or persons, on account of race, color
or previous condition, of any political or civil right, privilege or
immunity, enjoyed by any other class of men; and furthermore,
that I will not in any way injure or countenance in others any attempt
to injure any person or persons on account of past or present sup-
port of the government of the United States, the laws of the United
States, or the principles of the political and civil equahty of all men,
or for affihation with any pohtical party. " ^ It was finally settled that
in addition to those disfranchised by the Reconstruction Acts others
should be excluded for violation of the rules of war.* They could
neither register, vote, nor hold office until relieved by the vote of the
general assembly for aiding in Reconstruction, and until they had
accepted the pohtical equahty of all men.^ It was estimated that
the suffrage clause would disfranchise from voting or holding office
40,000 white men. The oath was likely to exclude still more.
Bingham thought the oath as adopted was a back-down, and de-
manded the iron-clad oath. The committee on the franchise wanted
1 N. Y. World, Nov. 20 and Dec. 6 and 14, 1867.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 33.
8 Code of Alabama, 1876, p. 1 13. Griffin said that the oath required the voter
never to favor a change in the new constitution so far as the suffrage was concerned ;
that "it was the determination of the committee to forever fasten this constitution on
the people of Alabama. He wanted to tie the hands of rebels, so that complete political
equality should be secured to the negro." Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), p. 32.
4 This was aimed at the Confederate soldiers of north Alabama, who had imprisoned
and in some cases hanged the tories and outlaws of that section.
^ Code of Alabama, 1876 ; Constitution of i868. Article VII.
528 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to prohibit the legislature from enfranchising any person unless
had aided in Reconstruction.*
Legislation by the Convention
The convention organized a new militia system, giving most of
the companies to the black counties. All officers were to be loyal
to the United States, that is, they were to be reconstructionists. No
one who was disfranchised could enlist. The proceeds of the sale
of contraband and captured property taken by the mihtia were to
be used in' its support.^ Stay laws were enacted to go into force
with the adoption of the constitution, also exemption laws which
exempted from sale for debt more property than nineteen-twentieths j
of the people possessed.^ The war debt of Alabama was again
declared void, and the ordinance of secession stigmatized as ''uncon-
stitutional, null and void."^ Contracts made during the war,
when the consideration was Confederate money, were declared null
and void at the option of either party, as were also notes payable
in Confederate money and debts made for slaves. Bingham forced
through an ordinance providing for a new settlement in United States
currency of trust estates settled during the war in Confederate securi-
ties.^ Judicial decisions in aid of the war were declared void. De-
fendants in civil cases against whom judgment was rendered during
the war were entitled to a revision or to a new trial.®
The negroes were complaining about the cotton tax, and a memo-
rial was addressed to Congress, asking for its repeal on the ground
that when the tax was imposed the state had no voice in the govern-
ment ; that it was oppressive, amounting to 20 per cent of the gross
value of the cotton crop, and fell heavily on the negroes, who were
the principal producers ; that for two years the tax had made cotton
cultivation unprofitable, and had driven away capital.''
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1867), pp. 34, 35 ; Journal, pp. 186, 187.
2 Journal, pp. 257-262 ; N. Y. World, Nov. 20, 1867.
8 Journal, pp. 265-269. * Journal, pp. 255, 571.
6 Journal, pp. 271, 272, 273 ; N. Y. World, Nov. ii, 1867.
^ Journal, pp. 272, 273.
'' Journal, p. 63. The whites had for more than two years been asking for the
repeal of this unjust tax, but they were not heeded. As soon as the negroes demanded
its repeal, it was repealed. That was certainly one advantage they received from the
possession of political rights. One petition from the negroes asked that the tax be
LEGISLATION BY THE CONVENTION
529
A memorial to Congress was adopted by a vote of 50 to 6, asking
that the part of the reconstruction law which required a majority
of the registered voters to vote in the election for the adoption of
the constitution be repealed. It was now seen that the Conserva-
tives would endeavor to defeat the constitution by refraining from
voting/
An ordinance was passed to protect the newly enfranchised negro
voters. The penalty for using "improper influence" and thereby
deceiving or misleading an elector was to be not less than one nor
more than ten years' imprisonment or fine of not more than $2000.
The election was ordered for February 4, 1868, to be held under
direction of the mihtary commander. In order to bring out a large
number of voters, elections were ordered for the same time for all
state and county officers, and for members of Congress — several
thousand in all. The officers thus elected were to enter at once upon
their duties, and hold office for the proper term of years, dating from
the legal date for the next general election after the admission of
the state.^
Among the scalawag members of the convention, who saw that
the carpet-baggers would rule the land by controlling the negro vote,
there was much dissatisfaction and at length open revolt. Nine
members signed a formal protest against the proposed constitution,
stating that a government framed upon its provisions would entail
upon the state greater evils than any that then threatened.^ Another
member protested against the test oath, against the extension of pro-
scription, and against the absence of express provision for separate
schools.'* The constitution was adopted by a vote of 66 to 8, 26
not voting. A few days after the adjournment, 15 or 20 scalawag
members united in an address to the people of Alabama, protesting
against the proposed constitution because it was more proscriptive
than the acts of Congress, because of the test oath, because the course
of the convention had shown that the government would be in the
repealed because, in many instances, it was greater than the value of the land. If this
was not done, they wanted the land taken from the owners and worked in common.
N. Y. Herald, Nov. 13, 1867.
1 Journal, p. 244. '^ Journal, pp. 266, 267.
8 Journal, p. 240; Meade, Speed, Semple, Cabot, Graves, J. L. Alexander, Ewing,
Latham, and Ilurst.
* Journal, p. 242 ; J. P. Stow of (?).
530 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
hands of a few adventurers under the control of the blacks, to whom
they had promised mixed schools and laws protecting the negro in his
rights of voting, eating, travelHng, etc., with whites. For these reasons
they urged that the constitution be rejected.^
Just before the convention adjourned, Caraway (negro) offered
a resolution, which was adopted, stating that the constitution was
founded on justice, honesty, and civilization, and that the enemies
of law and order, freedom and justice, were pledged to prevent its
adoption. But he asserted that God would strengthen and assist
those who did right; therefore he advised that a day be set apart
*' whereby the good and loyal people of Alabama can offer up their
adorations to Almighty God, and invoke His aid and assistance to
the loyal people of the state, while passing through the bitter strife
that seems to await them."^
A study of the votes and debates leads to the following general
conclusion: The majority of the scalawags were ready to revolt
after finding that the carpet-bag element had control of the negro
vote; the negroes with a few exceptions made no unreasonable and
violent demands unless urged by the carpet-baggers; the carpet-
baggers with a few extreme scalawags were disposed to resort to
extreme measures of proscription in order to get rid of white leaders
and white majorities, and to agitate the question of social equality
in order to secure the negroes, and to drive off the scalawags so that
there would be fewer with whom to share the spoils.^
1 Address of Protesting Delegates to the People of Alabama, Dec. lo, 1867.
2 Journal, p. 243.
8 The Codes of Alabama for 1876 and 1896 do not recognize the validity of the
constitution of 1868. It is listed as the "Constitution (so-called) of the State of Ala-
bama, 1868." The president of the convention of 1875 said, "What is called the
present constitution of the state of Alabama is a piece of unseemly mosaic, composed
of shreds and patches gathered here and there, incongruous in design, inharmonious in
action, discriminating and oppressive in the burdens it imposes, reckless in the license it
confers on unjust and wicked legislation, and utterly lacking in every element to inspire
popular confidence and the reverence and affection of the people." Journal, 1875, P* 5*
CHAPTER XV
I THE "RECONSTRUCTION" COMPLETED
*< Convention »» Candidates
The debates in the convention over mixed schools, proscription,
militia, and representation had seemingly resulted in a division be-
tween the carpet-baggers, who controlled the negroes, and the more
moderate scalawags. The carpet-baggers and extreme scalawags of
the convention resolved themselves into a body for the nomination of
candidates for office. This body formed the state Union League
convention. Of the loi delegates to the convention, 67 or 68 had
signed the constitution, and of these at least 56 were candidates for
office under it. Full tickets were nominated by the convention and
by the local councils of the Union League. In the black counties
only members of the League were nominated, and it was practically
the same in the white counties, where the League then had but few
members. Nearly all the election officials were candidates. Men
represented one county in the convention, and were candidates in
others for office.^
The state of politics in the average Black Belt county was like that
in Perry or Montgomery. In Perry, the Radical nominees for
probate judge, state senator, sheriff, and tax assessor were from
Wisconsin; for representative, two negroes and one white from
Ohio, and for tax collector, a northern man.^ In Montgomery, for
the legislature, one white from Ohio and one from Austria, and three
negroes; for probate judge, clerk of circuit court, sheriff, and tax
assessor, men from New York and other northern states.* One
or two negroes ran independently in each Black Belt county. In
1 Ely, a delegate from Russell, was a candidate in Montgomery; Brainard, a dele-
gate from Monroe, was a candidate in Montgomery; R. M. Johnson, a delegate from
Henry, was also a candidate in Montgomery. These men, however, lived in Mont-
gomery and had never seen the counties they represented.
2 Selma Messenger, Jan. lo, 1868.
8 Herbert, "Solid South," p. 47 ; N. Y. World, Feb. 5, 1868.
532 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
" Convention " Candidates
\
^^
Name
Nativity
Candidate for
Ben Alexander ....
Negro
Legislature ^™
A. J. Applegate
Ohio and Wisconsin
Lieutenant Governor ^M
\V. A. Austin .
Negro
State Senate H
Arthur Bingham .
New York
State Treasurer |^|
W. H. Black .
Ohio
Probate Judge 2H
\V. T. Blackford
Illinois
Probate Judge '^m
Samuel Blandon
Negro
Legislature
Mark Brainard .
New York
Clerk Circuit Court
Alfred E. Buck .
Maine
Clerk Circuit Court j •
C. W. Buckley .
New York, Mass., and Illinois
Congress j
W. M.Buckley*
New York and Massachusetts
State Senator 1
J. H. Burdick .
Iowa
Probate Judge ^
John Caraway . .
Negro
Legislature H
Pierce Burton .
Massachusetts
Legislature V
J. Collins . . .
North
State Senate ^H
Datus E. Coon .
Iowa
State Senate |^|
Tom Diggs . .
Negro
Legislature '^^H
Charles W. Dustan
Iowa
Major-General Militia 1
S. S. Gardner .
Massachusetts
Legislature 1
George Ely . .
New York, Conn., and Mass.
Probate Judge 1
Peyton Finley .
Negro
Legislature ^^fl
Jim Green . .
Negro
Legislature ^^H
Ovide Gregory .
Negro
Legislature ^H
Thomas Haughey
Scotland
Congress ■
G. Horton . .
Massachusetts
Probate Judge ■
Benjamin Inge .
Negro
Legislature 1
A. W. Jones* .
Alabama
Probate Judge 1
Columbus Jones
Negro
Legislature j
John C. Keffer .
Pennsylvania
Supt. of Industrial Resources
S. F. Kennemer
Alabama
Legislature
Tom Lee . . .
Negro
Legislature
David Lore . .
Negro (?)
Legislature
J. J. Martin . .
Georgia
Probate Judge
B. O. Masterson
Unknown
Legislature
C.'A. Miller . .
Massachusetts and Maine
Secretary of State
Stephen Moore *
Alabama (?)
Senate
A. L. Morgan .
Indiana
Clerk Circuit Court
J. F. Morton * .
Unknown
Senate
B. W. Norris .
Maine
Congress
E. W. Peck . .
New York
Chief Justice
Thomas M. Peters
Tennessee
Supreme Court
G. P. Plowman .
Alabama
Probate Judge
R. M. Reynolds
Iowa
Auditor
Benjamin Rolfe .
New York
Tax Collector
"CONVENTION'^ CANDIDATES
"Convention" Candidates (^continued)
533
Name
F. Royal . . .
F. Saffold . . .
-^ilsby* . . . .
I . V. Simmons . .
W illiam P. Skinner
; . R. Smith* . .
if. J. Springfield * .
\ D. Stanwood * .
J, P. Stow . . .
J,ittleberry Strange
[ames R. Walker *
B. L. Whelan . .
C. O. Whitney . .
J.A. Yordy . . .
Nativity
Negro
Alabama
Massachusetts
Tennessee
Alabama
Massachusetts
Alabama
Maine and Massachusetts
Connecticut
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia, Ireland, and Mich.
North
North
Candidate for
Senate
Supreme Court
Clerk Circuit Court
Commissioner
Chancellor
Circuit Judge
Legislature
Legislature
Senate
Circuit Judge
Sheriff
Circuit Judge
Senate
Senate 1
the white counties the extreme scalawags had a better chance for
office, and most of the moderate reconstructionists fell away at once,
leaving the spoils to the Radicals. It is doubtful if there were enough
white men in the state who could read and write and who supported
the new constitution, to fill the offices created by that instrument.
Hence the assignment of candidates to far-off counties, and the
admission of negro candidates.^ The state ticket was headed by an
^ N. Y. World, Feb. 13 and 22, 1868; Selma Times and Messenger , Feb. 28,
1868 ; Cong. Globe, March 11, 1868 ; Herbert, " Solid South " ; Beverly, " Alabama " ;
Owen, p. 125.
The above list is not complete, as there were undoubtedly other candidates among
those who did not sign the constitution, since a number of them fell into line later.
The starred names are those of candidates who were also registrars, and who not only
conducted their own elections for the convention, but also for office under the new con-
stitution. Three members of the majority who signed the report were not eligible for
office when the election came off, two being in jail, — one for stealing and the other for
fraud, — while a third "had been betrayed into an act of virtue by dying." N. Y.
World, Feb. 13, 1868.
2 After the election, Governor Patton, who at first had supported Reconstruction,
issued an address complaining that nearly all the candidates voted for were strangers to
the people ; that many were ignorant negroes, and that in one county all the commis-
sioners-elect were hegroes who were unable to read ; that unlicensed lawyers, wholly
uneducated, were chosen for state solicitors ; that the strangers were too often of bad
-character ; and that the Radical party consisted almost entirely of negroes, the native whites
having forsaken the party as soon as the negroes fell under the control of the imported
Radicals who ran the machine. N, Y. Times, April 23, 1868.
534 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I
d
Alabama tory, William H. Smith, and the other candidates for
offices were from Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maine, and New York, fiv
of them being officers of the Freedmen's Bureau/ The candidate
for Congress were from Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, New York
Maine, and Nebraska. In several instances the candidate ha
from two or more different states.^
'Campaign on the Constitution
The campaign in behalf of the constitution did not differ
character from that in behalf of the convention. The Radical can-
didates for office, working through the Union League, drilled the
negroes in the proper political faith. Nearly all the whites having
gone over to the Conservatives, or withdrawn from pohtics, httle or
no attention was paid to the white voters. All efforts were directed^
toward securing the negro vote. Agents were sent over the stati
by the League to organize the negroes, who were again told the ol
story: If the constitution is not ratified, you will be reenslave
and your wives will be beaten and your children sold ; if you do noi
get your rights now you will never get them. A subsidized press
distributed campaign stories among those negroes who could read
and they spread the news. In this way the remotest darky hean
that he was sure to return to slavery if the constitution failed a
ratification.^ The Union League assessed its members, especiall
1 Herbert, p. 47.
2 Montgomery Mail, July 25, 1868 ; N. Y. World, Sept. 22, 1868.
* The Radical papers in Alabama were supported almost entirely by campaign
funds and by appropriations from the government for printing the session laws of the
United States. They styled themselves the "Official Journals of the United States
Government." When one offended and the Washington patronage was withdrawn, it
always collapsed. In 1867 the reconstructionist papers in the state were Alabama
State Sentinel, The Nationalist, Elmore Standard, East Alabama Monitor, Alabama
Republican, The Tallapoosian, The Reconstructionist, Huntsville Advocate, Moulton
Union, Livingston Messenger. See Journal Convention of 1867, p. 242. The
circulation of each paper was small and almost entirely among the negroes. Special
campaign editions were printed and scattered broadcast. The constitution was printed
in all of the above-named papers, and also in a Washington paper which was franked
by the thousands from Congressmen through the Union League as a campaign docu-
ment. N. Y. World, Feb. 22, 1868.
* See, for example. The Nationalist, Feb. 4, 1868 (editorial). On Jan. 16, 1868, an
" Address to the Laboring Men of Alabama " stated in part, " If you fail to vote and
the constitution fails to be ratified, your right to vote hereafter closes and all participa-
CAMPAIGN ON THE CONSTITUTION 535
those who happened to be holding office under the military govern-
ment, for money for campaign purposes.^
The Radicals were forced by the general denunciation of the
constitution, both in the North and in the South, to make some state-
ment in regard to the matter. So on January 2, 1868, the Radical
campaign committee issued an address stating that there had been
general and severe criticism of some features of the constitution,
and that Congress would expect a revision, though the state would be
admitted promptly even before revision. The existence of pohtical
disabilities need not fetter the party, the address stated, in the choice
of a candidate. A RepubHcan nomination was a proof that the
candidate was a "proper" person, and his disabilities would be at
once removed. This was a way to mitigate the proscription.^
From the first the Conservatives^ had no hope of carrying the
election against the reconstructionists, who had control of the
machinery of election and were supported by the army and the gov-
ernment. There was little organized opposition to the convention
election, because the people were indifferent and because the leaders
feared that a contest at the polls would result in riots with the negroes.
To the Conservatives the convention at first was a joke; the dis-
position was rather to stand off and keep quiet, and let the Radicals
try their hands for a while; they could not stay in power forever.
Later, the violent opinions and extreme measures of the convention
excited the alarm of many of the whites; the moderate reconstruc-
tionists deserted their party ; a large minority of the convention refused
to sign the constitution ; and a number made formal protests. The
nomination of candidates by the Union League membership of the
convention and the character of the nominees showed that rule by
ahen and negro was threatened. The Conservative party, now
embracing nearly all the whites except the Radical candidates, deter-
mined to oppose the ratification of the constitution. Many of the
whites,^ now thoroughly discouraged, left the state forever — going
tion on your part in the administration of the laws of the state is at an end." Moni'
gomery Mail, Jan., 1868.
* Selnia Messenger, Jan. 24, 1868.
2 Cong. Globe, March 28, 1868, p. 2195.
" Not yet called Democrats, but sometimes " Democratic and Conservative."
* Popular accounts say thousands, but not as many went this time as later, in the
early 70's.
536 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
^
1
to the north and west, to Texas especially, and to South Ameri
and Mexico/
On December lo a number of the delegates to the convention,
some of whom had signed the constitution, united in an address to
the people advising against its adoption. All of them were native
whites and former reconstructionists. They declared that under the
proposed government designing knaves and political adventurers,
who had a jealous hatred of the native whites, would use the blacks
for their own selfish purposes; that this was clearly shown in the
convention when the black delegation, with one honorable excep-
tion, moved like slaves at the command of their masters.^ Several
hundred citizens sent a petition to the President, setting forth that
some of the delegates to the convention were not residents of the state, I
that others did not, and had not, resided in the counties which they
pretended to represent, and that others belonged to the army or
were officials of the Freedmen's Bureau, and were thus not legally
quahfied to sit in the convention. The petitioners asked for an
investigation.^ One of the delegates. Graves of Perry County, took
the stump against the constitution framed by "strangers, deserters,
bushwhackers, and perjured men," who were characterized by "a
fiendish desire to disqualify all southern men from voting or hold-
ing office who are unwilling to perjure themselves with a test
oath." '
The so-called "White Man's Movement" in Alabama is said to
have been originated in 1867, by Alexander White and ex- Governor
L. E. Parsons.^ At a Conservative meeting in Dallas County, in
January, 1868, the former offered a series of resolutions declaring
that American institutions were the product of the wisdom of white
men and were designed to preserve the ascendency of the white
race in political affairs; that the United States government was a
white man's government, and that white men should rule America ;
that the negro was not fit to take part in the government, as he had
never achieved civiHzation nor shown himself capable of directing
the affairs of a nation ; that the right of suffrage was the fountain of
all political power, therefore the negro should not be invested with
1 Herbert, p. 46, and Journal Convention of 1867.
2 Cot!g. Globe, March 12, 1868, p. 1824. * Selma Messenger, Dec. 22, 1867.
^ Selma Messenger, Dec. 20, 1 867. ^ Both later became Radicals.
CAMPAIGN ON THE CONSTITUTION 537
the right. Parsons proposed the same resolutions at a Conservative
conference in Montgomery in January, 1868/
The Conservative executive committee decided to advise the
whites to refrain from voting, and thus defeat the constitution by
taking advantage of the law requiring a majority of the registered
voters to vote on the question of ratification before the constitution
could be ratified. No nominations for office were made for fear
that some whites might thus vote on the constitution, and also for
fear of conflicts between the races in case of contest at the polls. All
were advised to register and to remain away from the polls on elec-
tion day. It was thought that less irritation would be caused in
Congress and elsewhere if the constitution failed in this way than
if it were voted down directly. The whites could be more easily,
persuaded to remain away than to go to the polls, and fewer negroes
would vote if the whites did not vote. The people were urged to
form organizations to carry out this non-participating programme.^
In every county in the state the Conservatives held meetings, oppos-
ing the constitution and pledging all the whites to stay away from
the polls. The Conservative press from day to day made known
new objections to the constitution: it exempted from sale for debt
$3000 worth of property, — whereas the old constitution exempted
$500, — and this would exempt every Radical in the state from paying
his debts ; the power of taxation was in the hands of the non-tax-
payers ; the distribution of representation was unequal, favoring the
black counties;^ mixed schools and amalgamation of the races were
not forbidden, but were encouraged by the reconstructionists ; a large
number of whites were disfranchised from voting or holding office,*
while all the blacks were enfranchised; the test oath required all
voters to swear that they would accept the poHtical equality of the
1 Tuskegee News, Oct. I, 1 874.
2 N. Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1898 ; Montgomery Mail, Jan. 17, 1868 ; Herbert, p. 48 ;
Annual Cyclopoedia (1868), p. 15.
3 Thirty-five white counties with a population of 393,441 — 282,282 whites and
111,159 blacks — had 135 representatives, or one representative to II, 24! of the
population. Twenty-four black counties with a population of 580,717 — 252,407
whites and 328,300 blacks — had 65 representatives, or one to 8933. Three small
white counties were not represented, but had to vote with others. Selma Times and
Messenger, March 10, 1868 ; Cong. Globe, 1867-1868, pp. 2197,2198.
* Variously estimated at from 10,000 to 40,000.
538 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
negro and never change their opinions; the Board of Education
was given legislative power, and could pass measures over the gov-
ernor's veto; an ordinance, which was kept secret, required the
governor to organize at once 137 companies of mihtia, to be assigned
almost entirely to the black counties, and under such regulations
that it was certain that few whites could serve ; this mihtia, when in
service, was to be paid hke the regular army, and was to get the pro-
ceeds from all property captured or confiscated by it; the govern-
ment, under this constitution, would cost from one and a half to
two miUion dollars a year.^
Under the proposed constitution it was certain that for a while
the government would be in the hands of the extremest Radical
.clique. The machinery, of the Radical party, of the registration
and elections and the candidates nominated by the League were of
this faction. The continued rule of the military was preferred by
the whites to the rule of the carpet-baggers and the negro. Another
reason why the Conservatives wished to keep the state out of the
Union still longer was to prevent its electoral vote from being cast
for Grant in the fall of 1868. During 1865 and 1866 Grant's moder
ate opinions had won the regard of many of the people, but his course
during the last year had caused him to be intensely disliked. Though
many meetings were held in opposition to the constitution, the cam-
paign on the Conservative side was quiet and unexciting. The
thirtieth day of January was set apart as a day of fasting and prayer
to deliver the people of Alabama **from the horrors of negro
domination." ^
Vote on the Constitution
The registration before the election of delegates to the conven
tion was 165,123,^ of whom 61,295 were whites and 104,518 were
blacks. Registration continued, and all the eligible whites registered
It is probable that more whites than negroes registered during Decem
ber and January. And the revision demanded by all honest people
1 Selma Times and Messenger, March lo, 1868. The minority report, March 17]
1868, of Beck of Kentucky and Brooks of New York, on the admission of Alabama,
sums up the Conservative objections to the constitution. See Cong. Globe, March 17,
1868, p. 1937.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1868), p. 15 ; N. Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1865 ; Selma Times and
Messenger, March 10, 1868.
2 Tribune Almanac, 1868. Pope reported 164,800 ; Meline, i65,cxx).
VOTE ON THE CONSTITUTION 539
evidently had the effect of striking off thousands of negro names;
for at the end of the year the registration stood: whites, 72,748;
})lacks, 88,243; total, 160,991/ By February i, 1868, the registra-
tion amounted to about 170,000,^ of whom about 75,000 were whites
and 95,000 were blacks. Therefore, more than 85,000 registered
voters must participate in the election, or, according to the law, the
constitution would fail of adoption.^
The registrars were those who had been appointed by Pope in
1867. More than half of them were candidates for election to office.
Meade was not favorably impressed with the character of the candi-
dates nominated by the constitutional convention and by the local
councils of the Union League, and he advised against holding the
election for officers at the same time that the vote was taken on the
constitution. He thought that the nominees were not such men as
the friends of Reconstruction would choose if they had a free choice.
He beheved that the ratification would be seriously affected if these
candidates were to be voted for at the same time. Swayne admitted
the force of the objection, but was afraid that a revocation of the
permission to elect officers at the same time would be disastrous to
Reconstruction. Later he agreed that the two elections should not
be held at the same time. But Grant objected to making the change,
and the election went on.^
General Hayden, Swayne's successor, removed a dozen or more
of the registrars who were candidates for important offices,^ and
in consequence was abused by the Radicals, who accused him of
*' hobnobbing with the rebels." He was "utterly loathed by loyal
men," and they at once began to work for his removal.® Every
1 Tribune Almanac, 1868. The methods of the registrars may be imagined, since
Meade had more than 15,000 names of negroes struck from the lists.
2 It is impossible to obtain exact figures of the registration ; no one ever knew
exactly what they were, and accounts never agree. Meade's estimate was 170,734,
Report, 1868. Another estimate was 170,000, Cong. Globe, March 17, 1868, p. 1904 ; and
still another 171,378, Alabama Manual and Statistical Register, p. xxiii. It is evident
that the registration was about 170,000.
3 In 1867 the vote on holding a convention had been more than a majority of
registered voters.
* Report of Meade, 1868, published in Atlanta.
^ For instance, William H. Smith, candidate for governor.
^ The Nationalist, Aug. 24, 1868 ; Mobile Register, Feb. 6, 1868 ; Report of Meade,
1868.
540 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
"our!
election official was obliged to take the iron-clad test oath, and
one- third of them were negroes, it was not Hkely that any of them
were hostile to Reconstruction, as was afterwards claimed.
The elections were to begin on February 4 and last for two da;
At the suggestion of General Grant the time was extended to fou
days, and a storm coming on the first day, instructions were sent
out to keep the polls open until the close of the 8th of February.
But in the remote counties no notice of the extension of time wasi
received. There were three voting places in each county and a
person might vote at any one of them (or at all of them if he chose).
Late instructions ordered election officials to receive the vote of any
person who had registered anywhere in the state. Of the 62
counties, 20 voted four days; 13, two days; 27, five days; and
in 2 there were no elections.^
Besides being told the old stories of returning to slavery, of forty
acres and a mule, of social rights, etc., various new promises were
made to the negroes. One was promised a divorce if he would vote
for Reynolds as Auditor, and it was said that Reynolds kept his
promise, and saw that the negro afterward secured it. Numerous
negro pohticians were, according to promise, relieved from ''the pain
of bigamy" by the first Reconstruction legislation. The disciplin
of the League was brought to bear on indifferent black citizens
and by threats of violence or of proscription many were driven t
the polls. On February 3 the negroes began to flock to the votin
places, each with a gun, a stick, a dog, and a bag of rations, as directs
by their white leaders. It was again necessary for them to vote
''early and often." The Radical candidates were desperately afraid
that the constitution would fail of ratification, and every means
was taken to swell the number of votes cast. Many negroes voted
rolls of tickets given them by the candidates. They voted one day
in one precinct, and the next day in another, or several times in the
same place. Little attention was paid to the registration lists, but
every negro over sixteen who presented himself was allowed to vote.
Hundreds of negro boys voted; it was said that none were ever
turned away. Where the whites had men at the polls to challenge
voters, it was found almost impossible to follow the fists because so
many of the negroes had changed their names since registration
1 Report of Meade, 1868.
THE CONSTITUTION FAILS OF ADOPTION 541
The sick at their homes sent their proxies by their friends or relatives.
In one case the Radicals voted negroes under the names of white
men who were staying away. The voters migrated from one county
to another during the elections and voted in each. This was espe-
cially the case in Mobile, Marengo, Montgomery, Macon, Lee,
Russell, Greene, Dallas, Hale, and Barbour counties.* The Mobile
Register claimed that negro women were dressed in men's clothes
and voted. The Radical chairman of the Board of Registration in
Perry County stated that one-third of the votes polled in that county
were illegal.^ In Mobile, when a negro man appeared whose name
was not on the voting list and was challenged by the Conservatives,
he was directed by a ''pirate" ^ to go to one D. G. Johnson, a regis-
trar, who would give him, not a certificate of registration, but a ballot,
indorsed with the voter's name and Johnson's signature. This
ballot was to serve as a certificate and was also to be voted.^
The Constitution fails of Adoption
The result of the voting was: for the constitution, 70,812 votes;
against it, 1005. The 18,000 white votes for the convention had
dwindled down to 5000 for the constitution. For ratification,
13,550 more votes were necessary, and the ratification had failed.
So General Meade reported. The reasons for the falling off of the
white vote have already been indicated. The black vote fell off
also. One cause of this was the chilling of the negro's faith in his
political leaders, who had made so many promises about farms, etc.,
and had broken them all. Many of the old aristocratic negroes
1 Montgomery Mail, Feb. 4, 5, 12, and 19, 1868; N. Y. World, March 14, 1868;
Cong. Globe, March 17, 1868, p. 1937; Mobile Register, Feb. 6, 1868; Selma Times,
and Messenger, Feb. 29, 1868.
"^ Selma Times and Messenger, Feb. 29, 1868.
8 A political adviser at the polls.
* The Conservatives had challenged such voters several times and Johnson sent the
following order : —
"At Office, Mobile, Feb. 5, 1868.
"The Judges of the Election at the Mississippi Hotel will receive all ballots en-
dorsed by the voter and my signature. The certificate of voters is in my possession.
" Respectfully,
" D. G. Johnson,
« Registrar District No. i."
^Mobile Register, Feb. 6, 1868.
^
542 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
would have nothing to do with such leaders as the carpet-bagge"
and scalawags, and this class and many others also were influenced
by the whites to stay away from the polls. The general absence of
respectable whites at the elections made it easier to convince the old
Conservative negroes/ In two white counties — Dale and Henry —
no elections were held because there were not enough reconstru
tionists to act as election officials-^ Some whites, probably not many
were kept away by threats of social and business ostracism. Most
of the reconstructionists cared nothing for such threats, as they could
not be injured.^
The Radicals explained the result of the election by asserting
that many whites were registered illegally, foreigners, minors, etc.,
that the voters were intimidated by threats of violence, social ostra-
cism, and discharge from employment; that the voting places were
too few and the time too short in many of the counties; that there
was a great storm and the rivers were flooded, preventing access lo
the polls in some places ;"* that the Conservatives interfered with the
votes, and tore off that part of the ballot that contained the vote on
^ Cong. Globe, March 17, 1868, p. 1937; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 303, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess.; N. Y. World, March 14, 1868.
2 In Henry County the registrars had all forsaken the party and resigned. On the
last day the United States troops opened the polls and 29 people voted. Abbeville Reg-
ister, Feb. 16, 1868. In Dale County it was much the same way. After a careful
search one John Metcalf of Skipperville was found to make complaint on behalf of the
reconstructionists. It was a sad story : " We had," he said, " depended on Mr. Deal,
the delegate to the convention, to bring the registration books, ' but he fused with the
destructive party' and we couldn't register. On the fourth day an election was held
anyway, but the Conservatives would not let us hold it on the fifth. It was the almost
united wish of the voters of the county to adopt the constitution. There are about
150 in the county that are opposed to it, and they united on the fifth and broke us up.
We would have polled 1400 to 1500 votes for the constitution." Ho. Mic. Doc, No.
Ill, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 In Montgomery 41 whites of 4200 voted. Of these 15 were carpet-baggers and
nearly all were candidates for office. The Montgomery Mail of Feb. 1 1 printed the
entire list, with sarcastic comments on their past history and present aspirations. The
list was headed, Our White Black List, The Roll of Dishonor. See Cong. Globe, March 1 1,
1868, p. 1827.
* The storm played a very effective part in the debates in Congress later. Moving
tales were told of negroes swimming the swollen streams in order to get to the polls.
One instance was given where, in swimming the Alabama River, which was beyond its
banks and floating with ice, a negro was drowned. Cong. Globe, 1 867-1 868, p. 2865.
The river at this point when out of its banks is not less than a mile wide, and there was
never any ice in it since the glacial epoch.
THE CONSTITUTION FAILS OF ADOPTION 543
the constitution; that many election officials were hostile to recon-
struction, and had turned off 10,000 voters because of slight defects
in the registration; that there were not 170,000 voters in the state
but only 160,000, as several thousand had removed from the state;
that in spite of all obstructions the vote for the constitution, if properly
counted, was 81,000 instead of 70,000, and that there were 120,000
"loyal" voters in the state; that the ballot-boxes in Lowndes County
were stolen, and that the returns from Baine, Colbert, and Jones
counties had been fraudulently thrown out;^ that General Hayden
had especially desired the defeat of Reconstruction, and that he had
managed the election in such a way as to enable the "rebels" to
gain an apparent victory ; and that practically all the army officers
were opposed to the Radical programme, which was now true ; and
finally, that the attendance of Conservatives as challengers at the
polls in some places was "a means of preventing the full and free
expression of opinion by the ballot." ^
After a thorough investigation General Meade reported that the
election had been quiet, and that there had been no disorder of any
kind; that there had been no frauds in mutilating negroes' tickets
by tearing off the vote for the constitution, and that the other charges
of fraud would prove as illusive ; that the vote for the governor and
other officials was less than that for the constitution; and that a
more liberal constitution would have commanded a majority of
votes. He said, "I am satisfied that the constitution was lost on
its merits ; " that the constitution was fairly rejected by the people,
under the law requiring a majority of the registered voters to cast
their ballots for or against, and that this rejection was based on the
merits of the constitution itself was proved by the fact that out of
19,000 white voters for the convention, there were only 5000 for
1 The Conservatives claimed that the Lowndes county box was stolen by the Radicals
themselves as soon as they saw the constitution had failed of ratification, in order to give
point to charges of fraud. In the same way the returns from Baine, Colbert, and Jones
counties were so tampered with by the Radical election officials that the military can-
vassers were obliged to reject them. Montgomery Mail, Feb. 12, 1868; Cong. Globe,
1867-1868, p. 2139.
'■^ The Nationalist, Feb. 13 and 20, and Aug. 24, 1868; N. Y. World, March 14,
1868; Selma Times and Messenger, Feb. 28, 1868; Cong. Globe, March li, 1868,
pp. 1818, 1823. This is a statement signed by Griffin of Ohio, Keffer of Pennsyl-
vania, Burton of Massachusetts, Hardy and Spencer of Ohio, and indorsed by Joshua
Morse, who signed himself as " disfranchised rebel."
544 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
4\
the constitution; it might also be partially explained by the fa(
that the constitutional convention had made nominations to all the'
state offices, which ticket was ''not acceptable in all respects to the
party favoring reconstruction." ^ He recommended that Congress
reassemble the convention, which should revise the constitution]^ I
eliminating the objectionable features, and again submit it to the^
people. However, as he afterwards stated, ''my advice was not fol-
lowed." The tone of Meade's report showed that he did not expect
Congress to refuse to admit the state. Indeed, at times the staid
general seemed almost to approach something like disrespect toward.^ .
that highly honorable body. fl 1
When the Radicals began to make an outcry about fraud, Meade '
complained that they were not specific in their charges, and told the
leaders to get their proofs ready. The state Radical Executive Com-
mittee issued instructions for all Radicals to collect affidavits con-
cerning high water, storms, obstruction, fraud, violence, intimidation,
and discharge, and send them to the Radical agents at Washington,
who were urging the admission of the state, notwithstanding the
rejection of the constitution. They refused to send these reports
to Meade, who was not in sympathy with the Radical programme.
Many of what purported to be affidavits of men discharged from
employment for voting were printed for the use of Congress. Most
of them were signed by marks and gave no particulars. The usual
statement was "for the reason of voting at recent election." ^
^ Report of Meade, 1868. Meade made this report to Grant at the time, and at the
end of the year he made practically the same, though perhaps a little stronger. The
Nationalist (Albert Griffin of Ohio, editor) said, April 9, 1868, that the statements of
Meade, the "military saphead," were " false in letter and false in spirit."
2 Ho. Mis. Doc, No. ill, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. The whites were complaining
loudly because of the scarcity of labor, and few would discharge a negro laborer, no
matter how often he might vote the Radical ticket. General Hayden sent a list of
eighteen questions in regard to the election to every election official. They covered
every possible point, and full answers were required. One of the questions was ift
regard to the proportion of white voters. A summary of the answers is here given :
I. Elmore County. Intimidation and threats of discharge ; of the looo to 1200 whites-
who registered, from 12 to 15 voted. 2. Autauga. No intimidation, but threats of
discharge ; of the 900 whites registered, 200 voted. 3. Chambers. Fair election, with
23 white voters of the 1400 registered. 4. Russell. Threats of discharge ; one-thirty-
sixth of the whites voted. 5. Tallapoosa. "Persuasion and arguments" deterred the
blacks from voting; 20 whites voted of the 1500 who registered. 6. Coosa. Two
discharges ; one-third of the whites voted. 7. Montgomery. " Ostracism," and tw»
THE CONSTITUTION FAILS OF ADOPTION 545
The Nationalist gave fifteen flippant reasons why the constitu-
tion had failed, and then asserted that the state was sure to be ad-
mitted in spite of the failure of ratification. Agents were sent to
discharges ; 41 whites voted of the 4200 who registered. 8. Macon. Fair election
and 4 whites voted of the 800 registered. 9. Lee. One discharge and threats ; 30 or
40 whites voted of 1500 registered. 10. Randolph. Fair election. 11. Clay. Threats
of ostracism and one discharge. 12. Crenshaw. Two discharges. 13. Lowndes.
Three threats of discharge ; " too much challenging ; " 10 whites voted of 850 regis-
tered. 14. Barbour. Four threats of discharge; "whites afraid of social proscrip-
tion." 15. Bullock. "Needless questions " to voters, and three threats of discharge ;
no whites voted. 16. Pike. One threat of discharge ; one-fourth of the whites voted.
17. Butler. Eight threats; 3 whites of 1400 voted. 18. Covington. "Threats-"
225 whites voted of the 9CX). 19. Coffee. " Threats " and " proscription." 20-21. Dale
and Henry. No election ; no registrars ; none would serve. In Dale County were a
number of " outrageous acts committed by a Mr. Oats." 22-27. Mobile, Washington,
Bahhvin, Clarke, Monroe, and Conecuh. "Threats and social ostracism ; " 125 of 3750
whites voted. 28. Walker. Fair election ; one negro driven away ; " more whites
voted than were expected." 29-30. Winston and Jackson. More whites voted than
were expected ; one threat in Jackson. 31-32. Madison and Lauderdale. Fair
elections; in Lauderdale 150 of 1500 whites voted. 33. Lawrence. "Persuasion;"
311 of 1400 whites voted. 34-35. Colbert zxvA Franklin. Twenty-five per cent of the
whites voted ; 75 per cent " were opposed to article 7, paragraph 4, of constitution."
36-38. Limestone, Morgan, and Cherokee. Fair elections ; few whites voted. 39. Mar-
shall. " Threats " ; one-third of the whites voted. 40. De Kalb. Fair ; 650 of the
900 whites. 41. Baine. " Handbills advised people not to vote ; " only one-fifth
voted. 42. Bldunt. One threat ; " persuasion ; " one-fourth of the whites voted.
43. St. Clair. Threats ; one-third of the whites voted. 44-45. Marion and Jones.
Fair ; two-sevenths of the whites voted. 46. Fayette. Speeches published against the
constitution, three drunken men threatened the managers at one box ; liquor
given to negroes to " vote against their intentions," all of which " prevented full
and free expression of opinion by ballot " ; two-sevenths of the whites voted. 47. Shelby.
Fair ; one-fourth of the whites voted. 48. Talladega. Fair, though threats were
heard ; three-tenths of the whites voted. 49. Perry. Fair ; 24 of the 1066 whites
voted. 50. Bibb. Fair; 167 of the I02l whites. 51. Dallas. Fair; 78 whites
voted ; others suffered from " want of independence." 52. Wilcox. Ten threats ;
12 whites of 800. 53. Tuscaloosa. One threat; one-fifth of the whites voted.
54. Pickens. " Threats too numerous to mention ; " 60 to 70 of the 1 100 whites
voted. 55. Jefferson. Fair ; one-fifth of the whites voted. 56. Sumter. Threats
against blacks; whites to be ostracized. 57. Greene. Threats, though the "Union
Men " were afraid to tell who threatened them ; 446 ballots had " Constitution " torn
off. 58. Marengo. Voters were refused at one box because the names were not on
the list, though the parties were willing to swear they had been registered. Threats and
speeches were made at the polls and one man made 16 discharges ; 16 whites of the
997 voted. 59-62. No reports from Choctaiu, Calhoun, Cleburne, and //ale.
Nearly all officials reported quiet elections; the assertions about threats were
almost invariably hearsay. Even the few specific instances were based on hcarsav.
The worst complaint was that Conservatives sometimes attended and challenged the
votes of certain negroes, and made speeches or used persuasion to induce the negroes
th"
546 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Washington to urge the acceptance by Congress of the constituti
and Radical ticket. At first all, however, were not hopeful. The;
was a general exodus of the less influential carpet-baggers from the
state, such a marked movement that the negroes afterwards corOi
plained of it. Some returned North; others went to assist in the
construction of other states.^
C. C. Sheets, a native Radical, speaking of the failure of th
ratification, declared that a year earlier the state might have been
reconstructed according to the plan of Congress, but a horde of
army officers sent South, followed by a train of office-seekers, went
into poHtics, and these "with the help of a class here at home
even less fit and less honest," if possible, had disgusted every one.^
While waiting for Congress to act, the so-called legislature niet,
February 17, 1868, at the office of the Sentinel in Montgomery.
Applegate, the candidate for heutenant-governor, called the "Senate"
to order, and harangued them as follows : Congress would recognize
whatever they might do ; it was absolutely necessary for the assembly
to act before Congress, as the life of the nation was in danger and
there was a pressing "necessity for two Senators from Alabama to
sit upon the trial of that renegade and traitor, Andrew Johnson"; he
stated that General Meade was in consultation with them and would
sustain them; ^ if protection were necessary, Major-General Dustan^
could, at short notice, surround them with several regiments of
loyal mihtia.^ They attempted to transact some business, but the
not to vote. Much importance was attached to the ridicule and jeers of the white
leaders. These reports were made by the election officials, who were thoroughgoing
reconstructionists. General Meade denied the charges of fraud and intimidation.
It will be noticed that the heaviest white vote was cast in the counties where there
were few negroes, and where the Peace Society had been strongest during the war.
If the estimates given above by the registrars were correct, it is doubtful if 5000 whites
voted in the election, as was asserted. The judges were supposed to mark " C " on the
ballot of a negro and " W" on that of a white. Ho. Mis. Doc, No. iii, 40th Cong.,
2d Sess.; Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 303, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. ; Report of Meade, 1868;
Montgomery Mail, Feb. 19, 1868; N. Y. World, March 14, 1868.
1 Strobach, the Austrian, went so far off in the Northwest that after the state was
admitted he could not return to the special session of the legislature. He drew his pay,
however, the Speaker certifying that he was present. N. Y. World, Oct. 8, 1868;
Montgomery Mail, April 14, 1869 ; Nationalist, Feb. 18, 1868.
2 In North Alabamian, 1868. ^ He had evidently not seen Meade's report.
* Dustan had been a candidate for major-general of militia.
^ Annual Cyclopaedia (1868), p. 16.
THE ALABAMA QUESTION IN CONGRESS 547
unfriendly attitude of Meade and Hayden discouraged them; and
they disbanded, to await the action of Congress.
The Alabama Question in Congress
February 17, 1868, a few days after the election, Bingham of
Ohio introduced a joint resolution in the House to admit Alabama
with its new constitution.^ The Radicals of Alabama assumed
that it was only a question of a short time before they would be in
power. On March 10, Stevens, from the Committee on Recon-
struction, reported a bill for the admission of Alabama. During
the lengthy debate which followed, the Radical leaders undertook
to show that when Congress passed the law of March 23, it did noW
know what it was doing, and that therefore the law could not now
be considered binding. The carpet-bag stories about frauds in the
election, icy rivers, etc., were again told. During the debates it
developed that Beck of Kentucky and Brooks of New York, the
minority members of the Committee on Reconstruction, had not
been notified of the meeting of the committee, which was called to
meet at the house of Stevens, and hence knew nothing of the report
until it was printed. They made strong speeches against the bill
and introduced the protests of the delegates to the convention, the
reports of Meade, and the petition of the whites of the state against
the proposed measure, and on March 17 introduced the minority
report, which had to be read as part of a speech in order to get it
printed. It was a summary of the Conservative objections to the
constitution. For the moment Thaddeus Stevens seemed to be
convinced that it was not desirable to admit Alabama. ''After a
full examination," he said, "of the final returns from Alabama,
which we had not got when this bill was drawn, I am satisfied, for
one, that to force a vote on this bill and admit the state against our
own law, when there is a majority of twenty odd thousand against
the constitution, would not be doing such justice in legislation as
will be expected by the people." So the*measure was withdrawn.'
But the next day Farnswctrth of lUinois reported a new bill providing
1 Globe, Feb. 17, 1868, p. 1 21 7.
2 Cong. Globe, March 10, 11, and 17, 1868, pp. 1790, 1818, 1821, 1823, 1824, 1825,
1827, 1934, 1935, I937> 1938.
548 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA '
for the admission of Alabama. . He argued that 7000 whites had
voted for the constitution, and that 20,000 whites belonged to tlJ I
Union Leagues in the state,^ and that only by fraud had the constitu^ i
tion been defeated. Kelly of Pennsylvania, of "Mobile riot" fame,
said that "the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." He was con-
vinced that typographical and clerical errors in the voting lists had
turned thousands away.^ Spalding of Ohio proposed a substitute,
which was adopted, making the new constitution the fundamental
law for a provisional government, and placing in office the candidates
who were voted for. The legislature was to be convened to adopt
amendments to the constitution and resubmit the latter to the people.
The bill passed the House, but was not taken up in the Senate.^ In
•the debates on this bill Paine of Wisconsin said: "These men [the
whites] during the war were traitors. They have no right to vote or
to hold office, and for the present this dangerous power is most right-
fully withheld." WiUiams, a Republican of Pennsylvania, objected
to accepting a negro minority government. Stevens closed the de-
bate, saying that Congress had passed an act "authorizing Alabama
and other waste territories of the United States to form constitutions
so as, if possible, to make them fit to associate with civihzed com-
munities"; the House had foreseen difficulties about requiring a
majority to vote, and had passed an act to remedy it, but the Senate
had let it lie for two months; he knew that he was outside the con-
stitution, which did not provide for such a case ; he wanted to shackle
the whites in order to protect the blacks."*
The effect of establishing a new provisional government on the
basis of the constitution just rejected would be to require a new
registration and disfranchisement according to that instrument.
The proposal pleased the local Radicals very much. This plan was
probably preferred by all the would-be officers except those who had
been candidates for Congress and who could not sit until the state
was admitted. The Nationalist^ said: "If we can get the offices,
we, and not a * mihtary saphead ' [Meade], can conduct the next
election ; we can by the Spalding bill get^ the government, rule the
1 Both statements were incorrect.
2 Globe, March i8 and 26, 1868, pp. 1972, 2138, 2139, 2140.
8 McPherson, " Reconstruction," p. 337 ; Globe, March 28, 1868, pp. 2193, 2216.
* Globes March 28, 1868, pp. 2203, 2209, 2214. ^ April 23, 1868.
THE ALABAMA QUESTION IN CONGRESS 549
[state as long as we please provisionally, and, when satisfied we can
hold our own against the rebels, submit the constitution to a vote. We
must wait until sure of a RepubHcan majority if we have to wait
] five years. " ' The carpet-baggers were in high hope. A girl appHed
I to one of the managers of the Montgomery ''soup house" for a
i ticket for ten days, saying that she would not need it longer, as her
I father by the end of that time would be a judge. ^
The whites began to close ranks, to leave no room in their midst
for the white man of the North, the ruler and ally of the black. Social
and business ostracism was declared against all who should take
office under the Reconstruction Acts. They were turned away from
respectable hotels.^
The Independent Monitor, now the head and front of opposition
to Reconstruction, gave the following advice to the white people,
who, however, did not need it: "We reiterate the advice hitherto
offered to those of our southern people who are not ashamed to
honor the service of the ' lost cause ' and the memory of their kith
and kin whose lives were nobly laid down to save the survivors from
a subjection incomparably more tolerable in contemplation than in
realization. That advice is not to touch a loyal leaguer's hand;
taste not of a loyal leaguer's hospitality ; handle not a loyal leaguer's
goods. Oust him socially; break him pecuniarily; ignore him
politically; kick him contagiously; hang him legally; or lynch him
clandestinely — provided he becomes a nuisance as Claus or Wilson. "^
The Conservative Executive Committee addressed a memorial
to Congress against the proposed measures. In conclusion the
address stated : "We are beset by secret oath-bound poHtical societies,
our character and conduct are systematically misrepresented to you
and in the newspapers of the North ; the intelligent and impartial
administration of just laws is obstructed; industry and enterprise
are paralyzed by the fears of the white men and the expectation of
the black that Alabama will soon be delivered over to the rule of the
1 Nationalist, April 9, 1868.
2 Independent Monitor, April 21, 1868.
8 Yordy, a carpet-bag Bureau agent, registrar, and senator-elect from Sumter County,
was turned out of a hotel at Eutaw and told to go to the negro inn. Tuscaloosa Inde-
pendent Monitor, Sept. i, 1868.
* Globe, March 28, 1868, p. 2140. Claus and Wilson were two carpet-baggers of
Tuscaloosa.
550 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
latter; and many of our people are, for these reasons, leaving th
homes they love for other and stranger lands. Continue over us, if
you will, your own rule by the sword. Send down among us honor-
able and upright men of your own people, of the race to which you
and we belong, and, ungracious, contrary to wise policy and the
institutions of the country, and tyrannous as it will be, no hand will
be raised among us to resist by force their authority. But do not^
we implore you, abdicate your rule over us, by transferring us to
the blighting brutality and unnatural dominion of an aHen and
inferior race. "^
Alabama Readmitted to the Union
The proposition to establish a Radical provisional government
for Alabama was forgotten in the Senate during the progress of the
impeachment trial, and on May ii Stevens introduced a bill pro-
viding for the admission of Georgia, Louisiana, North and South
CaroHna, and Alabama.^ A motion by Woodbridge of Vermont to
strike Alabama from the bill was lost by a vote of 60 to 74. Farns-
worth said it was nonsense to make any distinction between Alabama
and the other states. The bill passed the House on May 14, by a
vote of 109 to 35, and went to the Senate. On June 5 Trumbull
from the Judiciary Committee reported the bill with Alabama struck
out because the constitution had not been ratified according to law.
Wilson of Massachusetts moved to insert Alabama in the bill.
Alabama, he said, was the strongest of all the states for the policy of
Congress, and it would be unjust to leave her out. Sherman re-
peated the old charges of fraud in the elections, which had been con-
tradicted by General Meade, from whose report Sherman quoted
garbled extracts. It was absolutely necessary, he said, to admit
Alabama in order to settle the Fourteenth Amendment before the
presidential election. Hendricks of Indiana objected because of
proscriptive clauses in the constitution, which would disfranchise
from 25,000 to 30,000 men. Pomeroy of Kansas said it would be
**a cruel thing" to admit the other states and leave out Alabama.
Morton of Indiana was of the opinion that the bill with Alabama in
it would pass over the President's veto as well as without it, and said
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1868), p. 16; Cong. Globe, March ii, 1868, p. 1825.
2 Globe, May 11, 1868, p. 2412.
ALABAMA READMITTED TO THE UNION
551
that Congress must waive the condition and admit Alabama/ The
Radicals of Alabama kept the wires hot sending telegrams to their
agents in Washington and to Wilson and Sumner, urging the inclu-
sion of Alabama in the bill. On June 9 the Senate in Committee
of the Whole amended the bill as reported from the Committee on
the Judiciary by inserting Alabama. On this the vote stood 22 to
21. The next day Senator Trumbull moved to strike out Alabama,
but the motion was lost by a vote of 24 to 16. So the report of the
Judiciary Committee was revised by the insertion of Alabama, and
the bill passed by a vote of 31 to 5, 18 not voting.^ The House Com-
mittee on Reconstruction recommended concurrence in certain
amendments that the Senate had made, which was done by a vote
of 1 1 1 to 28, 50 not voting. The bill was then signed by the Speaker
and the President pro tern, of the Senate and sent to the President.*
The President returned the bill with his veto on June 25. "In the
case of Alabama," he said, "it violates the plighted faith of Congress
by forcing upon that state a constitution which was rejected by the.
people, according to the express terms of an act of Congress requiring
that a majority of the registered electors should vote upon the ques-
tion of its ratification."^ The bill was at once passed by both houses
over the President's veto, in the Senate by a vote of 35 to 8, 13 not
voting, and in the House by a vote of 108 to 31, 53 not voting.^
The bill as passed declared that Alabama with the other southern
states had adopted by large majorities the constitutions recently
framed, and that as soon as each state by its legislature should ratify
the Fourteenth Amendment it should be admitted to representation
upon the fundamental condition "that the constitution of neither of
said states shall ever be so amended or changed as to deprive any
citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote in
said state who are entitled to vote by the constitution thereof herein
recognized" except as a punishment for crime,* As soon as the
1 Cong. Globe, June 5 and 6, 1868, pp. 2858, 2865, 2867, 29CX), 2964; McPherson,
"Reconstruction," p. 340 ; Foulke, " Life of Morton," Vol. II, p. 47.
2 Globe, June 9 and 10, 1868, pp. 2965, 3017.
» Globe, June 12, 1868, pp. 3089, 3090, 3097. * Globe, June 25, 1868, p. 3484.
* Globe, June 25, 1868, pp. 3466, 3484 ; McPherson, p. 338.
« McPherson, p. 337. The present constitution of the state, adopted in 1901,
nullifies this fundamental condition. Other southern states have also disregarded this
limitation.
I
552 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
new legislature should meet and ratify the Fourteenth Amendment,
the officers of the state were to be inaugurated. No one was
hold office who was disquahfied by the proposed Fourteenth Amen
ment/
June 29, Grant wrote to Meade that to avoid question he should
remove the present provisional governor and install the governor
and lieutenant-governor elect, this to take effect at the date of con-
vening the legislature. So in July, by general order. Governor
Patton was removed and Smith and Applegate installed. After
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by the legislature,
Meade directed all provisional officials to yield to their duly elected
successors. The military commanders transferred state property,
papers, and prisoners to the state authorities.^ And for six years
the carpet-bagger, scalawag, and negro, with the aid of the army,
misruled the state.
The members of Congress returned from their migrations ' and
.presented themselves with their credentials to Congress.^ Brooks
of New York objected to the admission of these men on the ground
that they were there in violation of the act of Congress in force at the
time of the election. But on July 21 all were admitted by a vote
of 125 to 33, 52 not voting. After taking the iron-clad test oath,
they took their seats among the nation's lawmakers. Spencer and
Wariier were admitted to the Senate on July 25, and also took the
iron-clad oath.^
1 Mcpherson, p. 338. 2 G. O. No. loi, July 14, 1868.
* Warner, who was said to have gone to his own state — Ohio — and run for office,
now returned.
* The credentials were signed by E. W. Peck, president of the convention of 1867,
who certified to their election. Globe, July 24, 1868, p. 4294.
6 Globe, July 17, 18, 21, and 25, 1868, pp. 4173, 4213, 4293, 4295, 4459, 4466.
Senator George E. Spencer. Senator Willard Warner.
C. W. Buckley.
John B. Callis.
J. T. Rai'Ier. Charles Hays.
SOME RADICAL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
CHAPTER XVI
THE UNION LEAGUE OF AMERICA
Origin of the Union League
In order to understand the absolute control exercised over the
blacks by the alien adventurers, as shown in the elections of 1867-
1868, it will be necessary to examine the workings of the secret oath-
bound society popularly known as the "Loyal League." The iron
discipline of this order wielded by a few able and unscrupulous
whites held together the ignorant negro masses for several years
and prevented any control by the conservative whites.
The Union League movement began in the North in 1862, when
the outlook for the northern cause was gloomy. The moderate
policy of the Washington government had alienated the extremists;
the Confederate successes in the field and Democratic successes in
the elections, the active opposition of the "Copperheads" to the
war policy of the administration, the rise of the secret order of the
Knights of the Golden Circle in the West opposed to further con-
tinuance of the war, the strong southern sympathies of the higher
classes of society, the formation of societies for the dissemination
of Democratic and southern literature, the low ebb of loyalty to
the government in the North, especially in the cities— all these causes
resulted in the formation of Union Leagues throughout the North.^
This movement began among those associated in the work of the
United States Sanitary Commission. These people were important
neither as politicians nor as warriors, and they had sufficient leisure
to observe the threatening state of society about them. "Loyalty
must be organized, consoHdated, and made effective, " they declared.
The movement, first organized in Ohio, took effective form in
Philadelphia in the fall of 1862, and in December of that year the
Union League of Philadelphia was organized. The members were
1 President Jay's Address, March 26, 1868 ; Bellows, " History Union League Qub
of New York," pp. 6-9 ; "Chronicle of rhiladclphia Union League," pp. 5-8.
553
554 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
ilOT
pledged to uncompromising and unconditional loyalty to the Uni
the complete subordination of political ideas thereto, and the re-
pudiation of any belief in states' rights. The New York Union
League Club followed the example of the Philadelphia League,
early in 1863, and adopted, word for word, its declaration of prin-i
ciples/ Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, Baltimore, and other cities
followed suit, and soon Leagues modelled after the Philadelphia plan
and connected by a loose bond of federation were formed in every;
part of the North. These Leagues were social as well as political]
in their aims. The "Loyal National League" of New York, an
independent organization with thirty branches, was absorbed byi
the Union League, and the "Loyal PubHcation Society" of New
York, which also came under its control, was used to disseminate
the proper kind of poHtical literature.
As the Federal armies went South, the Union League spread
among the disaffected element of the southern people.^ Much interest
was taken in the negro, and negro troops were enlisted through its
efforts. Teachers were sent South in the wake of the armies to
teach the negroes, and to use their influence in securing negro enlist
ments. In this and in similar work the League acted in cooperation
with the Freedmen's Aid Societies, the Department of Negro Affairs,
and later with the Freedmen's Bureau. With the close of the war
it did not cease to take an active interest in things poHtical. It was
one of the earliest bodies to declare for negro suffrage and white
disfranchisement,^ and this declaration was made repeatedly during
the three years following the war, when it was continued as a kind of
Radical bureau in the RepubHcan party to control the negro vote in
the South. Its agents were always in the lobbies of Congress, clamor-
ing for extreme measures ; the Reconstruction poHcy of Congress was
heartily indorsed and the President condemned. Its headquarters
were in New York, and it was represented in each state by "State
Members." John Keffer of Pennsylvania was "State Member"
for Alabama.
1 " Chronicle of Philadelphia Union League," pp. 5-8 ; Bellows, " Union League
Club," p. 9.
2 First Annual Report of Board of Directors of Union League of Philadelphia;
Bellows, pp. 9, 32 ; " Chronicle of Philadelphia Union League," pp. 70, 1 12.
^ See Bellows, " History Union League Club."
ORIGIN OF THE UNION LEAGUE
555
Part of the work of the League was to distribute campaign litera-
ture, and most of the violent pamphlets on Reconstruction questions
will be found to have the Union League imprint. The New York
League alone circulated about 70,000 pubHcations,^ while the Phila-
delphia Union League far surpassed this record, circulating 4,500,000
political pamphlets^ within eight years. The literature printed con-
sisted largely of accounts of "southern atrocities." The conclusions
of Carl Schurz's report on the condition of the South justified,
the League historian claims, the pubHcation and dissemination of
such choice stories as these: A preacher in Bladon (Springs), Ala-
bama, said that the woods in Choctaw County stunk with dead
negroes. Some were hanged to trees and left to rot; others were
burned alive.
It is quite Hkely that such Leagues as those in New York and
Philadelphia, after the first year or two of Reconstruction, grew
away from the strictly political ''Union League of America" and
became more and more social clubs. The spiritual relationship was
close, however, and in political behef they were one. The eminently
respectable members of the Union Leagues of Philadelphia and
New York had little in common with the southern Leagues except
radicahsm. Southern ''Unionists" vi^ho went North were enter-
tained by the Union League and their expenses paid. In 1866
the Philadelphia convention of southern "Unionists" was taken
in hand by the League, carried to New York, and entertained at the
expense of the latter. In 1867 several of the Leagues sent delegates
to Virginia to reconcile the two warring factions of Radicals. The
formation of the Union League among the southern "Unionists"
was extended throughout the South within a few months of the close
of the war, but a "discreet secrecy" was maintained. In Alabama
it was easy for the disaffected whites, especially those who had
been connected with the Peace Society, to join the order, which
soon included Peace Society men, "loyalists," deserters, and many
anti-administration Confederates. The most respectable element con-
1 Bellows, p. 90.
2 There were 144 different pamphlets published by the Philadelphia League and
44 posters ; 56,380 pamphlets were issued in 1865 ; 867,000 pamphlets were issued in
1866 ; 31,906 pamphlets were issued in 1867 ; 1,416,906 pamphlets were issued in 1868 ;
4,500,000 pamphlets were issued in eight years. "Chronicle of Philadelphia Union
League," pp. 106, 107, 145.
556 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
sisted of a few old Whigs who had an intense hatred of the Demo
crats, and who wanted to crush them by any means. In this stage
the League was strongest in the white counties of the hill and moun-
tain countr}\^
Extension to the South
Even before the end of the war the Federal officials had estab-
lished the organization in Huntsville, Athens, Florence, and other
places in north Alabama. It was understood to be a very respect-
able order in the North, and General Burke, and later General
Crawford, with other Federal officers and a few of the so-called j
"Union" men of north Alabama, formed lodges of what was called
indiscriminately the Union or Loyal League. At first but few native
whites were members, as the native "unionist" was not exactly the
kind of person the Federal officers cared to associate with more than
was necessary. But with the close of hostilities and the estabhsh-
ment of army posts over the state, the League grew rapidly. The
civihans who followed the army, the Bureau agents, the missionaries,
and the northern school-teachers were gradually admitted. The
native "unionists" came in as the bars were lowered, and with them
that element of the population which, during the war, especially in
the white counties, had become hostile to the Confederate adminis-
tration. The disaffected pohticians saw in the organization an
instrument which might be used against the politicians of the central
counties, who seemed likely to remain in control of affairs. At this
time there were no negro members, but it has been estimated that
in 1865, 40 per cent of the white voting population in north Alabama
joined the order, and that for a year or more there was an average
of half a dozen "lodges" in each county north of the Black Belt.
Later, the local chapters were called "councils." There was a
State Grand Council with headquarters at Montgomery, and a
Grand National Council with headquarters in New York. The
Union League of America was the proper designation for the entire
organization.
The white members were few in the Black Belt counties and
1 " Chronicle of Philadelphia Union League," p. 169 ; Bellows, pp. 90, 99, 100, 102 ;
Reports of the Executive Committee, Union League Club of N. Y., 1865-18.66 ; Century
Magazine^ Vol. VI, pp. 404, 949; oral accounts.
EXTENSION TO THE SOUTH 557
even in the white counties of south Alabama, where one would expect
to find them. In south Alabama it was disgraceful for a person to
have any connection with the Union League; and if a man was a
member, he kept it secret. To this day no one will admit that he
belonged to that organization. So far as the native members were
concerned, they cared little about the original purposes of the order,
but hoped to make it the nucleus of a pohtical organization; and
the northern civiHan membership, the Bureau agents, preachers,
and teachers, and other adventurers, soon began to see other pos-
sibilities in the organization.^
From the very beginning the preachers, teachers, and Bureau
agents had been accustomed to hold regular meetings of the negroes
and to make speeches to them. Not a few of these whites expected
confiscation, or some such procedure, and wanted a share in the
division of the spoils. Some began to talk of political power for
the negro. For various purposes, good and bad, the negroes were,
by the spring of 1866, widely organized by their would-be leaders,
who, as controllers of rations, reHgion, and schools, had great in-
fluence over them. It was but a shght change to convert these
informal gatherings into lodges, or councils, of the Union League.
After the refusal of Congress to recognize the Restoration as eilFected
by the President, the guardians of the negro in the state began to
lay their plans for the future. Negro councils were organized,
and negroes were even admitted to some of the white councils which
were under control of the northerners. The Bureau gathering of
Colonel John B. Callis of Huntsville was transformed into a League.
Such men as the Rev. A. S. Lakin, Colonel Callis, D. H. Bingham,
Norris, Keffer, and Strobach, all aliens of questionable character
from the North, went about organizing the negroes during 1866
and 1867. Nearly all of them were elected to office by the support
of the League. The Bureau agents were the directors of the work,
and in the immediate vicinity of the Bureau offices they themselves
organized the councils. To distant plantations and to country
districts agents were sent to gather in the embryo citizens.^ In
1 I am especially indebted to Professor L. D. Miller, Jacksonville, Ala., for many
details concerning the Loyal Leagues. Pie made inquiries for me of people who knew
the facts. I have also had other oral accounts. See also Ku Klux Rejit., Ala. Test.
(Pierce), p. 305 ; (Lowe), p. 894 ; (Forney), p. 487.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. (Sayre), p. 357 ; (Governor Lindsay), p. 170 ; (Nicholas
558 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
every community in the state where there was a sufficient number
of negroes the League was organized, sooner or later/ In north
Alabama the work was done before the spring of 1867 ; in the Black
Belt and in south Alabama it was not until the end of 1867 that th^
last negroes were gathered into the fold. ^B
The effect upon the white membership of the admission of negroes
was remarkable. With the beginning of the manipulation of the
negro by his northern friends, the native whites began to desert the
order, and when negroes were admitted for the avowed purpose of \
agitating for political rights and for political organization afterwards,
the native whites left in crowds. Where there were many blacks, as
in Talladega, nearly all of the whites dropped out. Where the blacks
were not numerous and had not been organized, more of the whites
remained, but in the hill counties there was a general exodus.^ Pro-
fessor Miller estimates that five per cent of the white voters in Talla-
dega County, where there were many negroes, and 25 per cent of
those in Cleburne County, where there were few negroes, remained
in the order for several years. The same proportion would be nearly
correct for the other counties of north Alabama. Where there were
few or no negroes, as in Winston and Walker counties, the white
membership held out better, for in those counties there was no fear
of negro domination, and if the negro voted, no matter what were
his pohtics, he would be controlled by the native whites. What the
negro would do in the black counties, the whites in the hill counties
cared but little. The sprinkling of white members served to furnish
leaders for the ignorant blacks, but the character of these men was
extremely questionable. The native element has been called ''low-
down, trifling white men," and the ahen element "itinerant, irrespon-
sible, worthless white men from the North." Such was the opinion
of the respectable white people, and the later history of the Leaguers
Davis), p. 783 ; (Richardson), pp. 815, 855 ; (Ford), p. 684 ; (Lowe), p. 892 ; (Forney),
p. 487 ; Miller, " Alabama," p. 246 ; Herbert, " Solid South," pp. 36, 41 ; also oral
accounts.
1 There is a copy of the charter of a local council in the Alabama Testimony of the
Ku Klux Report, p. 1017. The Montgomery Council was organized June 2, 1866, and
three days later General Swayne, of the Freedmen's Bureau, joined it. It was charged
that even thus early he was desirous of representing Alabama in the Senate. Herbert,
pp. 41-43.
2 N. V. Herald, Aug. 5, 1867.
THE CEREMONIES OF THE LEAGUE 559
iuis not improved their reputation/ In the black counties there were
practically no white members in the rank and file. The ahen ele-
ment, probably more able than the scalawag, had gained the con-
fidence of the negroes, and soon had complete control over them.
The Bureau agents saw that the Freedmen's Bureau could not sur-
vive much longer, and they were especially active in looking out for
places for the future. With the assistance of the negro they had hoped
to pass into offices in the state and county governments.
The Ceremonies of the League
One thing about the League that attracted the negro was the
mysterious secrecy of the meetings, the weird initiation ceremony
that made him feel fearfully good from his head to his heels, the im-
posing ritual and the songs. The ritual, it is said, was not used in
the North ; it was probably adopted for the particular benefit of the
African. The would-be Leaguer was told in the beginning of the
initiation that the emblems of the order were the altar, the Bible,
the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United
States, the flag of the Union, censer, sword, gavel, ballot-box, sickle,
shuttle, anvil, and other emblems of industry. He was told that the
objects of the order were to preserve liberty, to perpetuate the Union,
to maintain the laws and the Constitution, to secure the ascendency of
American institutions, to protect, defend, and strengthen all loyal
men and members of the Union League of America in all rights of
person and property,^ to demand the elevation of labor, to aid in the
education of laboring men, and to teach the duties of American citizen-
ship. This sounded well and was impressive, and at this point the
negro was always willing to take an oath of secrecy, after which he
was asked to swear with a solemn oath to support the principles of the
Declaration of Independence, to pledge himself to resist all attempts
to overthrow the United States, to strive for the maintenance of
liberty, elevation of labor, education of all people in the duties of
1 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test. (Lowe), p. 872 ; (English), pp. 1437, M38 ; (Lindsay),
p. 170; N.Y. Herald, K\xg. 5, 1869, and June 20, 1867; Professor Miller's account;
oral accounts.
2 In Sumter County a northern teacher of a negro school informed a planter that
the Leaguers were sworn to defend one another, and that he, the planter, would be
punished for striking a Leaguer whom he had caught stealing and had thrashed. Selma
Times and Messenger, July 21, 1868.
560 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
citizenship, to practise friendship and charity to all of the order, and
to support for election or appointment to office only such men as were
supporters of these principles and measures/
The council then sang "Hail Columbia" and "The Star-Spangled
Banner," after which an official harangued the candidate, saying
that, though the designs of traitors had been thwarted, there were yet
to be secured legislative triumphs with complete ascendency of the
true principles of popular government, equal hberty, elevation and
education, and the overthrow at the ballot-box of the old oligarchy
of political leaders. After prayer by the chaplain, the room was
darkened, the "fire of Hberty"^ lighted, the members joined hands in
a circle around the candidate, who was made to place one hand on
the flag and, with the other raised, swore again to support the govern-
ment, to elect true Union men to office, etc. Then placing his hand
on a Bible, for the third time he swore to keep his oath, and repeated
after the president "the Freedman's Pledge": "To defend and per-
petuate freedom and union, I pledge my life, my fortune, and my
sacred honor. So help me God!" Another song was sung, the
president charged the members in a long speech concerning the prin-
ciples of the order, and the marshal instructed the members in the
signs. To pass one's self as a Leaguer, the "Four L's" were given:
(i) with right hand raised to heaven, thumb and third finger touch-
ing ends over palm, pronounce "Liberty"; (2) bring the hand down
over the shoulder and say "Lincoln"; (3) drop the hand open at
the side and say "Loyal"; (4) catch the thumb in the vest or in the
waistband and pronounce "League."^ This ceremony of initiation
was a most effective means of impressing the negro, and of control-
ling him through his love and fear of the secret, mysterious, and mid-
night mummery. -An oath taken in daylight would be forgotten
1 The Montgomery Council, May 22, 1867, resolved "That the Union League is the
right arm of the Union Republican party of the United States, and that no man should
be initiated into the League who does not heartily indorse the principles and policy of
the Union Republican party." Herbert, "Solid South," p. 41. A Confederate could
not be admitted to the League unless he would acknowledge that during the war he
had been guilty of treason.
2 Alcohol on salt burns with a peculiar flame, making the faces of those around,
especially the negroes, appear ghostly.
3 A copy of the constitution and ritual was secured by the whites and published in
the Montgomery Advertiser, July 24, 1867 ; printed also in Fleming, " Documents relat-
ing to Reconstruction," No. 3.
ORGANIZATION AND METHODS 56 1
l)efore the next day; not so an oath taken in the dead of night under
ich impressive circumstances. After passing through the ordeal,
he negro usually remained faithful.
Organization and Methods
In each populous precinct there was at first one council of the
League. In each town or city there were two councils, one for the
whites, and another, with white officers, for the blacks.^ The council
met once a week, sometimes oftener, and nearly always at night, in
the negro churches or schoolhouses.^ Guards, armed with rifles and
shotguns, were stationed about the place of meeting in order to keep
away intruders, and to prevent unauthorized persons from coming
within forty yards. Members of some councils made it a practice
to attend the meetings armed as if for battle. In these meetings the
negroes met to hear speeches by the would-be statesmen of the new
regime. Much inflammatory advice was given them by the white
speakers; they were driUed into the behef that their interests and
those of the southern whites could not be the same, and passion,
strife, and prejudice were excited in order to solidify the negro race
against the white, thus preventing political control by the latter.
Many of the negroes still had hopes of confiscation and division of
property, and in this they were encouraged by the white leaders.
Professor Miller was told ^ by respectable white men, who joined
the order before the negroes were admitted and who left when they
became members, that the negroes were taught in these meetings
that the only way to have peace and plenty, to get ''the forty acres
and a mule," would be to kill some of the leading whites in each com-
munity as a warning to others. The council in Tuscumbia received
advice from Memphis to use the torch, that the blacks were at war
with the white race. The advice was taken. Three men went in
front of the council as an advance guard, three followed with coal-
^ The Montgomery Council was composed of white Radicals, and the Lincoln Coun-
cil in the same city was for blacks. Most of the officers of the latter were whites.
Herbert, p. 41.
2 This fact will partly explain why there were burnings of negro churches and
schoolhouses by the Ku Klux Klan. These were political headquarters of the Radical
party in each community.
3 See Miller, "Alabama," pp. 246, 247 ; Lester and Wilson, " Ku Klux Klan," pp.
45, 46.
562 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
oil and fire, and others guarded the rear. The plan was to burn the
whole town, but first one negro and then another insisted on having
some white man's house spared because "he is a good man." The
result was that no residences were burned, and they compromised by
burning the Female Academy. Three of the leaders were lynched.^
The general behef of the whites was that the objects of the order were
to secure pohtical power, to bring about on a large scale the confis-
cation of the property of Confederates,^ and while waiting for this
to appropriate all kinds of portable property. Chicken-houses, pig-
pens, vegetable gardens, and orchards were invariably visited by
members when returning from the midnight conclaves. This evil
became so serious and so general that many believed it to be one of
the principles of the order. Everything of value had to be locked
up for safe-keeping.
As soon as possible after the war each negro had suppHed him-
self with a gun and a dog as badges of freedom. As a usual thing,
he carried them to the League meetings, and nothing was more natural
than that the negroes should begin drilling at night. Armed squads
would march in military formation to the place of assemblage, there
be drilled, and after the close of the meeting, would march along the
roads shouting, firing their guns, making great boasts and threats
against persons whom they disHked. If the home of such a person
happened to be on the roadside, the negroes usually made a practice
of stopping in front of the house and treating the inmates to unlimited
abuse, firing off their guns in order to waken them. Later mihtary
parades in the daytime were much favored. Several hundred negroes
would march up and down the roads and streets, and amuse them-
selves by boasts, threats, and abuse of whites, and by shoving whites
off the sidewalks or out of the road. But, on the whole, there was
very little actual violence done the whites, — much less than might
have been expected. That such was the case was due, not to any
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. (Lindsay), pp. 170, 179; (Nicholas Davis), p. 783;
(Richardson), pp. 839, 355 ; (Lowe), pp. 872, 886, 907 ; (Pettus), p. 384 ; (Walker),
pp. 962, 975.
2 Thaddeus Stevens's speech on confiscation, through the Loyal League, had a wide
circulation in Alabama. Agents were sent to the state to organize new councils and
to secure the benefits of the proposed confiscation ; free farms were promised the
negroes. N. V. Herald, June 20, 1867. Many whites now believed that wholesale
confiscation would take place.
ORGANIZATION AND METHODS 563
isible teachings of the leaders, but to the fundamental good nature
the blacks, who were generally content with being impudent.^
The relations between the races, with exceptional cases, continued
to be somewhat friendly until 1 867-1 868. • In the communities where
the League and the Bureau were estabhshed, the relations were soon-
est strained. For a while in some locaHties, before the advent of the
League, and in others where the Bureau was conducted by native
magistrates, the negroes looked to their old masters for guidance and
advice, and the latter, for the good of both races, were most eager to
retain a moral control over the blacks. Barbecues and picnics were
arranged by the whites for the blacks, speeches were made, good
advice given, and all promised to go well. Sometimes the negroes
themselves would arrange the festival and invite prominent whites
to be present, for whom a separate table attended by the best waiters
would be reserved; and after dinner there would be speaking by
both whites and blacks. With the organization of the League, the
negroes grew more reserved, and finally unfriendly to the whites.
The League alone, however, was not responsible for the change.
The League and the Bureau had to some extent the same personnel,
and it is impossible to distinguish clearly between the work of the
League and that of the Bureau. In many ways the League was
simply the political side of the Bureau. The preaching and teaching
missionaries were also at work. On the other hand, among the lower
classes of whites, a hostile feehng quickly sprang to oppose the feehng
of the blacks.
When the campaign grew exciting, the disciphne of the order was
used to prevent the negroes from attending Democratic meetings
or hearing Democratic speakers. The League leaders even went
farther and forbade the attendance of the blacks at Radical political
meetings where the speakers were not indorsed by the League.
Almost invariably the scalawag disliked the Leaguer, black or white,
and often the League proscribed the former as pohtical teachers.
Judge Humphreys was threatened with political death unless he
joined the League. This he refused to do, as did most whites where
there were many negroes. All Republicans in good standing had to
join the League. Judge (later Governor) D. P. Lewis was a member
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. (Sanders), pp. 1803, 1811 ; (Dox), p. 432; (Herr),
pp. 1662, 1663.
564 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
for a short while, but he soon became disgusted and pubHshed a de
nunciation of the League. Nicholas Davis and J. C. Bradley, botl
scalawags, were forbidden by the League to speak in the court-houst
at Huntsville because they were not members of the order. At a
Republican mass- meeting a white repubhcan wanted to make a speech.
The negroes voted that he should not be allowed to speak because he
was ''opposed to the Loyal League." He was treated to abuse and
threats of violence. He then went to another place to speak, but was
followed by the crowd, which refused to allow him to say anything^
The League was the machine of the Radical party, and all candidates
had to be governed by its edicts. Nominations to office were usuall)r
made in its meetings.^
Every negro was ex colore a member or under the control of th
League. In the opinion of the League, white Democrats were bac
enough, but black Democrats were not to be tolerated. The firs'
rule was that all blacks must support the Radical programme. I
was possible in some cases for a negro to refrain from taking an active
part in political affairs. He might even fail to vote. But it wa;
martyrdom for a black to be a Democrat ; that is, try. to follow hi!
old master in politics. The whites, in many cases, were forced tc
advise their faithful black friends to vote the Radical ticket that the]
might escape mistreatment. There were numbers of negroes, as lat(
as 1868, who were inclined to vote with the whites, and to bring then
into line all the forces of the League were brought to bear. The]
were proscribed in negro society, and expelled from negro churches
nor would the women "proshay" (appreciate) a black Democrat
The negro man who had Democratic inchnations was sure to find
that influence was being brought to bear upon his dusky sweetheart
or wife to cause him to see the error of his ways, and persistent ad-
herence to the white party would result in the loss of her. The
women were converted to Radicalism long before the men, an
almost invariably used their influence strongly for the purpose ol
the League. If moral suasion failed to cause the dehnquent to se
the Hght, other methods were used. Threats were common from the
first and often sufficed, and fines were levied by the League on recal-
citrant members. In case of the more stubborn, a sound beating
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. (Lowe), pp. 886, 887, 894, 997; (Davis), p. 783;
(Cobbs), p. 1637; (Pettus), p. 6393.
ORGANIZATION AND METHODS
565
w as usually effective to bring about a change of heart. The offending
Jarky was ''bucked and gagged," and the thrashing administered,
ic sufferer being afraid to complain of the way he was treated.
There were many cases of aggravated assault, and a few instances of
murder. By such methods the organization succeeded in keeping
under its control almost the entire negro population.^ The discipHne
i)\er the active members was stringent. They were sworn .to obey
the orders of the officials. A negro near Clayton disobeyed the
' Cap'en " of the League and was tied up by the thumbs ; and another
for a similar offence was "bucked" and whipped. A candidate
having been nominated by the League, it was made the duty of every
member to support him actively. Failure to do so resulted in a fine
or other more severe punishment, and members that had been ex-
pelled were still under the control of the officials.^
The effects of the teachings of the League orators were soon seen
in the increasing insolence and defiant attitude of some of the blacks,
in the greater number of steahngs, small and large, in the boasts,
demands, and threats made by the more violent members of the order.
Most of them, however, behaved remarkably well under the circum-
stances, but the few unbearable ones were so much more in evidence
that the suffering whites were disposed to class all blacks together as
unbearable. Some of the methods of the Loyal League were similar
to those of the later Ku Klux Klan. Anonymous warnings were sent
to the obnoxious individuals, houses were burned, notices were posted
at night in pubhc places and on the doors of persons who had incurred
the hostiHty of the League.^ In order to destroy the influence of the
whites where kindly relations still existed, an " exodus order" was issued
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. (Ford), p. 684; (Herr), p. 1665 ; (Pettus), p. 381 ;
(Jolly), pp. 283, 291 ; (Sayre), p. 357 ; (Pierce), p. 313 ; iV. Y. Herald, Dec. 4, 1867,
Oct. 2, 1868; Herbert, "Solid South," p. 45. One Wash Austin, a Democratic negro,
was attacked by a mob, pursued, and when he reached home his wife called him " a
damned Conservative," struck him on the head with a brick, and then left him. Norris
V. Hanley, in Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 15, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
2 A^. Y. Herald, Oct. 13 and Nov. ii, 1867, Eufaula correspondence; Ku Klux
Kept., Ala. Test. (Sanders), p. 1812; (Pettus), p. 381; (Herr), p. 1663; (Pierce),
p. 313 ; (Sayre), p. 357 ; Harris, " Political Conflict in America," p. 479.
8 A notice posted on the door of a citizen of Dallas County was to this effect, •' Irvin
Hauser is the damnedest rascal in the neighborhood, and if he and three or four others
don't mind they will get a ball in them." Sclma Times and Messenger, April 21, 1868 ;
oral accounts ; see also Brown, " Lower South," Ch. IV ; Herbert, pp. 3, 8.
566 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA ^
through the League, directing all members to leave their old homes ^p
obtain work elsewhere. This was very effective in preventing control
by the better class of whites. Some of the blacks were loath to leave
their old homes, but to remonstrances from the whites the usual reply i
was: "De word done sont to de League. We got to go." ^ !
In Bullock County, near Perote, a council of the League was or-J
ganized under the direction of a negro emissary, who proceeded ^B
assume the government of the community. A list of crimes and pun-
ishments was adopted, a court with various officials established, and
during the night all negroes who opposed them were arrested. But
the black sheriff and his deputy were arrested by the civil authorities.
The negroes then organized for resistance, flocked into Union Springs,
the county seat, and threatened to exterminate the whites and take
possession of the county. Their agents visited the plantations and
forced the laborers to join them by showing orders purporting to be
from General Swayne, giving them the authority to kill all who re-
sisted them. Swayne sent out detachments of troops and arrested
fifteen of the ringleaders, and the Perote government collapsed.^
When first organized in the Black Belt, and before native whites
were excluded from membership, numbers of whites joined the League
upon invitation in order to ascertain its objects, to see if mischief were
intended toward the whites, and to control, if possible, the negroes
in the organization. Most of these became disgusted and withdrew,
or were expelled on account of their politics. In Marengo County
several white Democrats joined the League at McKinley in order to
keep down the excitement aroused by other councils, to counteract
the evil influences of alien emissaries, and to protect the women of
the community, in which but few men were left after the war. These
men succeeded in controlling the negroes and in preventing the dis-
cussion of politics in the meetings. The League was made simply a
club where the negroes met to receive advice, which was to the effect
that they should attend strictly to their own affairs and vote without
reference to any secret organization. Finally, they were advised to
withdraw from the order.^
1 T^e Macon Telegraph, March 12, 1905.
2 N. Y. Herald, Dec. 5 and 22, 1867 ; Montgomery Advertiser, Dec. 4, 1867 (J. M.
Chappell) .
3 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. (Lyon), pp. 1422, 1423 ; (Abrahams), pp. 1382, 1384.
rov -rrrin lox.
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4
ORGANIZATION AND METHODS 567
For two years, 1 867-1 869, the League was the machine in the
Radical party, and its leaders formed the ''ring" that controlled party
action. Nominations for office were regularly made by the local and
state councils. It is said that there were stormy times in the councils
when there were more carpet-baggers than offices to be filled. The
defeated candidate was apt to run as an independent, and in order
to be elected would sell himself to the whites. This practice resulted
in a weakening of the influence of the machine, as the members were
sworn to support the regular nominee, and the negroes believed that
the terrible penalties would be inflicted upon the political traitor.
The officers would go among the negroes and show their commissions,
which they pretended were orders from General Swayne or General
Grant for the negroes to vote for them.^ A political catechism of
questions and answers meant to teach loyalty to the Radical party
was prepared in Washington and sent out among the councils, to be
used in the instruction of negro voters.^
After it was seen that existing pohtical institutions were to be over-
turned, the white councils and, to a certain extent, the negro coun-
cils became simply associations for those training for leadership in
the new party soon to be formed in the state by act of Congress.
The few whites who were in control did not care to admit more white
members, as there might be too many to share in the division of the
spoils. Hence we find that terms of admission were made more
stringent, and, especially after the passage of the Reconstruction Acts,
in March, 1867, many applicants were rejected. The ahen element
was in control of the League. The result was that where the blacks
were numerous the largest plums fell to the carpet-baggers. The
negro leaders, — politicians, preachers, and teachers, — trained in the
League, acted as subordinates to the white leaders in controlling
the black population, and they were sent out to drum up the coun-
try negroes when elections drew near. They were also given minor
positions when offices were more plentiful than carpet-baggers. All
together they received but few offices, which fact was later a cause
of serious complaint.
1 See Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test. (Alston), p. 1017; (Herr), p. 1665; (Sayre),
p. 357; (Pierce), p. 313.
^ Sel/na Messenger, July 19, 1867; see Fleming, "Documents relating to Recon-
struction," No. 3.
568 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The largest white membership of the League was in i865-i86(
and after that date it constantly decreased. The largest negro mem-
bership Was in 1867 and 1868. Only the councils in the towns re-
mained active after the election of 1868, for after the discipline of 1867
and 1868 it was not necessary to look so closely after the plantation
negro, and he became a kind of visiting member of the council in the
town/ The League as an organization gradually died out by 1869,
except in the largest towns. Many of them were transformed into
political clubs, loosely organized under local poHtical leaders. The
Ku Klux Klan undoubtedly had much to do with breaking up the
League as an organization. The League as the ally and successor of
the Freedmen's Bureau was one of the causes of the Ku Klux move-
ment, because it helped to create the conditions which made such a
movement inevitable.^ In 1870 the Radical leaders missed the sup-
port formerly given by the League, and an urgent appeal was sent out
all over the State from headquarters in New York by John Keffer
and others advocating the reestablishment of the Union Leagues to
assist in carrying the elections of 1870.^
However, before its dissolution, the League had served its purpose.
It made it possible for a few outsiders to control the negro by ahen-
ating the races poHtically, as the Bureau had done socially. It enabled
the negroes to vote as Radicals for several years, when without it they
either would not have voted at all or they would have voted as Demo-
crats along with their former masters. The order was necessary to
the existence of the Radical party in Alabama. No ordinary politi-
cal organization could have welded the blacks into a solid party.
The Freedmen's Bureau, which had much influence over the negroes
for demoralization, was too weak in numbers to control the ^legroes
in poHtics. The League finally absorbed the personnel of the Bureau
and inherited its prestige."*
1 It is certain that the estimate of i8,ocx) white and 70,000 black members at the
same time is not correct. As the latter increased in numbers the former decreased.
Early in 1867 Keffer said there were 38,000 whites and 12,000 blacks in the League.
N. Y. Herald, May 7, 1867. Perhaps he meant the total enrolment early in the year.
In 1868 he claimed 20,000 whites, about 17,000 too many.
2 Lester and Wilson, " Ku Klux Klan," p. 47 ; also Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., passim.
3 Montgomery Mail, Aug. 20, 1870.
* In the Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., the Conservative and sometimes the Radical
witnesses assert that the Ku Klux movement was caused partly by the workings of the
Union League.
PART VI
CARPET-BAG AND NEGRO RULE
CHAPTER XVII
TAXATION AND THE PUBLIC DEBT
Taxation during Reconstruction
After the war it was certain that taxation would be higher and
expenditure greater, both on account of the ruin caused by the war that
now had to be repaired, and because several hundred thousand negroes
had been added to the civic population. Before the war the negro
was no expense to the state and county treasuries ; his misdemeanors
were punished by his master. Yet neither the ruined court-houses,
jails, bridges, roads, etc., nor the criminal negroes can account for
the taxation and expenditure under the carpet-bag regime. During
the three and a half years after the war, under the provisional govern-
ments, most of the burned bridges, court-houses, and other public
buildings had been replaced; and there were relatively few negroes
who were an expense to the carpet-bag government.
After the overthrow of Reconstruction, Governor Houston stated
that the total value of all property in Alabama in i860 was
$725,000,000, and that in 1875 i^ was $160,000,000.^ In 1866 the
assessed valuation was $123,946,475;^ in 1870 it was $156,770,385,^
and in 1876, after ten years of Reconstruction, it was $135,535,792.''
Before the war the taxes were paid on real estate and slaves. In i860
the taxes were paid upon slave property assessed at $152,278,000,
and upon real estate assessed at $155,034,000.^
Although there was some property left in 1865, the owners could
barely pay taxes on it. The bank capital was gone, and no one had
money that was receivable for taxes. Consequently, it was impos-
sible to collect general taxes, and the state government was obliged
to place temporary loans and levy hcense taxes. No regular taxes
1 Senate Journal, 1875-1876, p. 214. ^ Ku Klux Rept., p. 318.
'■^ Ku Klux Rept., p. 171. * Auditor's Report, 1902, p. 19.
^ Ku Klux Rept., p. 170; Census of i860. The assessed valuation of property
increased 117% from 1850 to i860. The comptroller's report of Nov. 12, 1858, states
that the slave property of the state at that time paid nearly half the taxes. This was
true of all ordinary taxes to 1865. See Senate Journal, 1866-1867, p. 291.
57«
5/2 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
were collected during 1865 and 1866. The first regular tax was
levied in 1866, and was collected in time to be spent by the Reconstruc-
tion convention/ For four years after the surrender the crops were
bad, and when called good they were hardly more than half of the
crops of 1860.^ However, if no state taxes were paid by the impov-
erished farmers, there still remained the heavy Federal tax of $12.50
to $15 per bale on all cotton produced.
The rate of taxation before the war on real estate and on slaves
was one-fifth of one per cent. After the war the taxes were raised
by the provisional government to one-fourth of one per cent, and
license taxes were added. The reconstructed government at once
raised the rate to three-fourths of one per cent on property of all de-
scriptions,^ and added new license taxes, more than quadrupHng the
1 Journal Convention of 1 867, p. 125 ; Patton's Report to the Convention, Nov.
II, 1867.
2 Cotton crop, i860 842,729 bales
Cotton crop, 1865 75>305 bales
Cotton crop, 1866 429,102 bales
Cotton crop, 1867 239,516 bales
Cotton crop, 1868 366,193 bales
Most of the war crop was confiscated by the United States. The crops of 1866-1868
show the effects of politics among the negro laborers rather than unfavorable seasons.
Hodgson, "Alabama Manual and Statistical Register," 1869.
8 The exemption laws were so framed as to release the average negroes from paying
tax, and also the class of whites that supported the Radical policy. The following list
will show the incidence of taxation for 1870: —
Value
Tax
Lands
^81,109,102.03
$607,979.52
Town property .
36,005,780.50
268,865.89
Cattle ....
1,180,106.00
8,851.36
Mules ....
4,845,736.00
36,042.68
Horses ....
2,214,376.00
16,599.83
Sheep and goats
111,001.00
832.50
Hogs ....
277.735-50
2,083.02
Wagons, carriages, etc.
131,235.00
8,480.81
Tools ....
237.53450
1,769.96
Farming implements
235,600.00
1,744.71
Household furniture .
1,691,807.00
12,731.98
Cotton presses .
41,360.00
310.30
Besides these items, heavy taxes were laid on the following : wharves, toll bridges,
ferries, steamboats, and all water craft, stocks of goods, libraries, jewellery, plate and silver-
TAXATION DURING RECONSTRUCTION
573
former rate. Under Lindsay, the Democratic governor in 1871-
1872, the rate was lowered to one-half of one per cent. The assess-
ment of property under Reconstruction was much more stringent than
before. There were only five other states that paid a tax rate as high
as three-fourths of one per cent, and four of these were southern states.*
Before the war the county tax was usually 60 per cent of the
state tax, never more. The city and town tax was insignificant.
After the war the town and city taxes were greatly increased, the
county tax was invariably as much as the state tax, and many laws
were passed authorizing the counties to levy additional taxes and to
issue bonds. The heaviest burdens were from local taxation, not
from state taxes.^ In Montgomery County, the county taxes before
the war had never been more than $30,000, and had been paid by
slaveholders and owners of real estate. During Reconstruction the
taxes were never less than $90,000, and every one except the negroes
had to pay on everything that was property. In fact, the taxes in
this county were about quadrupled.^ In Marengo County the taxes
before the war were $12,000; after 1868 they were $25,000 to $30,000,
notwithstanding the fact that property had depreciated two-thirds
in value since the war. Land worth formerly $50 to $60 an acre now
sold for $3 to $15.^ In Madison County, the state taxes in 1858 were
$23,417.63 (gross); in 1870, $66,745.53 (net). The state land tax
in 1858 in the same county was $7,213.10; in 1870, $51,445.30.
Madison County taxes were : —
-
State Tax
County Tax
Total
In 1859
In 1869 .
^26,633.71
65,410.85
^i3»3i6.85
65,410.85
^39,950-56
130,821.70
ware, musical instruments, pistols, guns, jacks and jennies, race-horses, watches, money
in and out of the state, money loaned, credits, commercial paper, capital in incorporated
companies in or out of the state, bonds except of United States and Alabama, incomes
and gains over $1000, banks, poll tax, insurance companies, auction sales, lotteries, ware-
houses, distilleries, brokers, factors, express and telegraph companies, etc. See Ku Klux
Report and Auditor's Report, 1871.
1 Revenue Laws of Ala,, 1 865-1 870; Report of the Debt Commission, Jan. 24, 1876;
Governor Lindsay's Message, Nov. 21, 1871 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 227, 340,
976, 1056, 1504.
2 See Acts of Ala., 1868-18^4, passim.
8 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 240, 360. * Ala. Test., pp. 1303, 1304.
574
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
The general testimony was that the exemption laws relieved from
taxation nearly all the negroes, except those who paid taxes before the i
war.'
The following table will show the taxation for i860 and 1870:
Census Valuation
State Tax
County Tax
Town Tax
i860 .
1870 .
^432,198,7622
156,770.387
^530,107
i,477»4i4
^309,474
1,122,471
^11,590
403,937
Administrative Expenses
Table of Receipts and Expenditures of the State Government
Year
Receipts
Expenditures
Year
Receipts
Expenditures
i860
1865
1866
1867
1868
1868
1869
1870
$530,107.00
2,282,355.97 3
606,494.39 5
819,434.85 '
1,066,860.24 "
2,233,781.97 ^
1,394,960.30
1,336,398.85
187I
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1886
$1,422,494.67 9
$1,640,116.99 ^^
^^1,626,782.93 3
62,967.80 ^
691,048.86
724,760.56"^
1,788,982.43 '
686,451.02 8
1,283,586.52
2,081,649.39
2,237,822.06 11
725,000.00
781,800.64
888,724.33
500,000.00 12
682,591.49
818,366.70
1 Ala. Test., pp. 461, 963, 964.
'^ Taxes are paid on $307,312,000, slaves included ; see Census of i860 ; Census of
1870; Ku Klux Rept., pp. 170, 171, 175, 317, 318.
3 Includes receipts and disbursements in Confederate money.
* License taxes only.
^ License taxes, bond issues, and temporary loans.
^ Interest paid on the public debt with bond issues included, and expenses of the
convention of 1867. The actual expenses of the state administration were $262,627.47.
"^ The first figures for 1868 include the receipts from taxes and the expenditures for
state purposes only ; the other figures include the proceeds from sale of bonds used for
state purposes. The Radicals always gave the first set of figures, and the Democrats the
second.
8 $620,000 should be added for the sale of bonds and state obligations.
^ Issue of bonds to railroads included.
10 Includes interest paid on railroad bonds.
11 Currency had depreciated. Many claims went unpaid. The " home debt "
amounted to $823,454.64. The actual state expenses were $1,384,044.46.
12 State expenses only. Democrats in power. See Auditor's Reports, 1869-1873,
1900 ; Ku Klux Rept., pp. 170, 174, 176, 1055, 1057 ; Report of the Debt Commission,
1876 ; Journal Convention of 1867, p. 125.
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
575
The average yearly cost of state, county, and town administration
from 1858 to i860 was $800,000; from 1868 to 1870, the average cost
of the state administration alone was $1,107,080, the cost of state,
county, and town government being at least $3,000,000.^ The pro-
visional state government disbursed in the year 1866-1867, $676,476.54,
of which only $262,627.47 was spent for state expenses; the remainder
was used for schools.^
The greater expenditure of the Reconstruction government can,
in small part, be explained by the greater number of officials and by
the higher salaries paid.^
Salaries
Before the War
During Reconstruction
Governor .
Governor's clerk .
Secretary of State
Treasurer .
Departmental clerks
Supreme Court judge
Circuit judges
Chancellors
Member of Legislature, per diem
Stationery executive departments
^2,000.00
5CX).oo
1,200.00
1,800.00
1,000.00 each
3,000.00
13,500.00
4,500.00 three
4.00
1,200.00
^4,000.00
5,400.00, two
2,400.00, fees and charges
2,800.00
1,500.00
4,000.00
36,000.00
15,000.00
6.00
12,708.77*
The administration of Lindsay to a great extent had to pay the
debts of the former administration. Expenses were curtailed when
possible, and notwithstanding the fact that the indorsed railroads
defaulted in 1871, the business of the state was conducted much more
economically, and there were fewer and smaller issues of bonds and
1 Ku Klux Rept., pp. 170, 174, 176; Auditor's Reports, 1 869-1 870; Reports of
the Alabama Debt Commission.
2 Report of Governor Patton to the Convention, Nov. 11, 1867; Journal Con-
vention of 1867, p. 125.
8 See Tuskegee News, June 3, 1875 ; Auditor's Reports, 1 868-1 874.
* The average legislator in 1 872-1 873 was paid $904.00 and mileage. The Senate
had 33 members and 44 attending officers, clerks, and secretaries ; the lower house, with
a membership of 100, had from 77 to 84 attending officials. Besides these there were
dozens of pages, doorkeepers, firemen, assistants, etc. In 1869 there were 105 regular
capitol servants who received $31,900 in wages. Auditor's Report, 1 869-1 873 ; Mont-
gomery Mail, Dec. 31, 1870. There were about 10 in 1900.
576 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
obligations.^ The Senate, however, had but one Democrat in it,
and the House was only doubtfully Democratic, as the Democratic
members were young and inexperienced men or else discontented
scalawags.^ Consequently, the tide of corruption and extravagance
was merely checked, not stopped. The capitol expenses of Smith
and of Lindsay for a year make an instructive comparison : —
1
Governor Smith
1869-1870
Governor Lindsay
1871-1872
Contingent expenses
Stationery, fuel, etc.
Clerical services
Public printing
^47,197.28
24,310.07
27,883.77
80,279.18
^20,531.84
8,847.23
21,883.03
49,716.43
Other expenses, in so far as they were under the control of Lindsay,
formed a like contrast.^ The cost of holding sessions of the legis-
lature under the provisional government was $83,856.60 in 1865-
1866, and $83,852 in 1866-1867. Under Smith it was about $90,000
per session, and there were three regular sessions the first year. One
session (1870-1871) under Lindsay cost $95,442.30, and two under
Lewis, 1873-1874, cost $175,661.50 and $166,602.65 respectively.*
The cost of keeping state prisoners for trial was about $50,000 a year.
The Reconstruction legislature cut down expenses by passing a law
to liberate criminals of a grade below that of felon, upon their own
recognizance.^
The Democrats complained of the way the reconstructionists
spent the contingent fund of the state. This abuse was never so bad
as in other southern states at the time, but still there was continual
steahng on a small scale. Some examples ® may be given : Governor
Lewis spent $800 on a short visit to New York and Florida ; ^ the
governor's private secretary received $21,000 for services rendered
1 Journal of the "Capitol" Senate, 1872, p. 19-34; in Senate Journal, 1873.
2 The older and abler men were disfranchised.
8 Montgomery Mail, Sept. 22, 1872. * Auditor's Reports, 1869-1873.
^ The purpose of the act was to liberate negro prisoners and save money for the
officials to spend in other ways.
'° These items are taken from the accounts of Lewis's administration.
■^ The Investigating Committee remarked that had he chartered a parlor car and paid
hotel bills at the rate of ;f 10 a day, he would have been unable to spend ^800 on that
trip.
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES 577
,1 distributing the ''political" bacon in 1874;^ the treasurer drew
Si 200 to pay his expenses to Mobile and New York, though he had
no business to attend to in either place, and travelled on roads over
which he had passes; ex-Governor W. H. Smith, when attorney for
the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad, was paid $500 by the state
for services rendered in connection with his own road, and the com-
mittee was unable to discover the nature of these services; the sec-
retary of state charged $9 5 2 for signing his name to bonds, though
it was his constitutional duty to do so without charge; a bill of sta-
tionery from Benedict of New York cost $7761.58, when the bid of
Joel White of Montgomery on the same order was $4336.54; $50
was allowed to John A. Bingham (presumably a relative of the treas-
urer) for signing enough bonds to purchase a farm for the peniten-
tiary. Such purchases as these were common: one refrigerator,
$65; one looking-glass, $5; one clothes-brush, $1.50. Very few of
the small accounts against the contingent fund were itemized. In
no case were any of them accounted for by proper vouchers. The
private secretary of the governor was in the habit of approving and
allowing accounts against the contingent fund, even going so far as
to approve the governor's own accounts. The Investigating Com-
mittee said that the private secretary seemed to be the acting governor.^
The Florida commissioners, J. L. Pennington, C. A. Miller, and
A. J. Walker, who were appointed to negotiate for the cession to Ala-
bama of West Florida, spent $10,500, of which Walker, the Demo-
cratic member, spent $516, and Miller and Pennington spent the
remainder, "according to the best judgment and discretion" of them-
selves. They claimed that part of it was used to entertain the Florida
commissioners, and part to influence the elections in West Florida.^
The governor was accused of transferring appropriations. In one
case, he drew out of the treasury $484,346.76, ostensibly to pay the
interest on the pubhc debt, and used it for other purposes. A com-
mittee appointed to investigate was able to trace all of it except
$75,196.56, which sum could not be accounted for. The accounts
I[ 1 See Ch. XXIV.
2 Report of the Committee to Investigate the Contingent Fund, 1875 ; Senate
Journal, 1 874-1 875, pp. 581-607.
3 Caffey, "The Annexation of West Florida to Alabama," p. 10; Senate Journal,
1 869-1 870, pp. 234-244.
5/8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
were carelessly kept. The auditor, treasurer, and governor never
seemed to know within a million or two of dollars what the public
debt was. The reports for the period from 1868 to 1875 do not show
the actual condition of the finances, and the Debt Commission ir
1875 was unable to get accurate information from the state records,
but had to advertise for information from the creditors and debtor
of the state.*
Effect on Property Values
The misrule of the Radicals in Alabama resulted in a genera
shrinkage in values after 1867, especially in the Black Belt, where
financial and economic chaos reigned supreme, and where the carpet
bagger flourished supported by the negro votes. Recuperation was
impossible until the rule of the aHen was overthrown. This wai
done in some of the white counties in 1870. At that date land values
were still 60 per cent below those of i860, and the numbers of live
stock 40 per cent below. This was due largely to the condition o
the Black Belt counties under the control of the Radicals.^
Thousands of landowners were unable to pay the taxes assessedj
and their farms were sold by the state. The Independent Monitor,
on March 8, 1870, advertised the sale of 1284 different lots of lane
(none less than forty acres) in Tuscaloosa County, and the next week
2548 more were advertised for sale, all to pay taxes Often, it was
complained, the tax assessor failed to notify the people to ''give in'
their taxes, and thus caused them trouble. In some cases, where
costs and fines were added to the original taxes, it amounted to con
fiscation. In 187 1, F. S. Lyon exhibited before the Ku Klux Com
mittee a copy of the Southern Republican containing twenty-one anc
a half columns of advertised sales of land lying in the rich counties
of Marengo, Greene, Perry, and Choctaw.^ One Radical declared
that he wanted the taxes raised so high that the large landholders
would be compelled to sell their lands, so that he, and others Hke him,
could buy."* Property sold for taxes could be redeemed only by pay
ing double the amount of the taxes plus the costs. A tax sale deed
1 Report of the Committee to examine the Offices of Auditor and Treasurer, 1875 >
Report of the Debt Commission, 1875, 1876.
2 See Edwin DeLeon, " Ruin and Reconstruction of the Southern States," in the
Southern Magazine, Jan., 1874.
8 Ala. Test., p. 1409. * State Journal, April 19, 1874.
EFFECT ON PROPERTY VALUES 579
was conclusive evidence of legal sale, and was not a subject for the
decision of a court/
There were hundreds of mortgage sales in every county of the
state during the Reconstruction period. At these sales everything
from land to household furniture was sold. The court-house squares
on sale days were favorite gathering places for the negroes, who came
to look on, and a traveller, in 1874, states that in the immense crowds
of negroes at the sales there were some who had come a distance of
sixty miles.^ Each winter, from 1869 to 1875, there was an exodus
of people to Texas and to South America, driven from their homes
by mortgages, taxes, the condition of labor, and corrupt government.
Landowners sold their lands for what they would bring and went to
the West, where there were no negroes, no scalawags, and no carpet-
baggers.^
Most of the farmers and tenants of that period were unable to
send their children to school and pay tuition. The reconstructed
school system failed almost at the beginning. Consequently, tens of
thousands of children grew up ignorant of schools, most of them the
children of parents who had had some education. Hence the special
provision for them in the constitution of 1901. The first Democratic
legislature restricted taxation to three-fifths of one per cent and local
taxation to one-half of one per cent. The rates were lowered gradu-
ally, until in the early nineties the rate was only two-fifths of one per
cent. Since that time, the rate has again increased until in 1899 the
state tax was again three- fourths of one per cent, the increase being
used for Confederate pensions and for schools.
But in addition to the expenditure of the sums raised by extraor-
dinary taxation, the Reconstruction administration greatly increased
the bonded debt of the state and by mortgaging the future left a heavy
burden upon the people that has as yet been but shghtly lessened.
1 Ala. Test., p. 1409, The Radical newspapers that had the public printing made
money from the tax sale notices by dividing each lot into sixteenths of a section, adver-
tising each, and charging for each division. The author of the tax sale law was Pierce
Burton, a Radical editor.
2 Scribner's Monthly, Aug., 1874 ; King, "The Great South."
^Southern Argus, Jan. 17 and Feb. 8, 1872; Sa-ibner's Monthly, Aug., 1874;
Herbert, "Solid South," pp. 64, 67. Colonel Herbert believes that during the six
years of Reconstruction the state gained practically nothing by immigration, while it lost
more by emigration than it had by the Civil War.
58o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Public Bonded Debt
After 1868 it is impossible to ascertain what the public debt of the
state was at any given time until 1875, when the first Democratic
legislature began to investigate the condition of the finances.
In i860 the total debt — state bonds and trust funds — was
$5,939,654.87 (and the bonded debt was $3,445,000), most of which
was due to the failure of the state bank. The payment of the war
debt, which amounted to $13,094,732.95, was forbidden by the Four-
teenth Amendment. In 1865 the total bonded debt with three years'
unpaid interest was $4,065,410, while the trust funds amounted to
$2,910,000. Governor Patton reissued the bonds to the amount of
$4,087,800, and the sixteenth section and the university trust funds
with unpaid interest raised the total debt, in 1867, to $6,130,910.
In July, 1868, when the state went into the hands of the reconstruc-
tionists, the total debt was $6,848,400. The provisional government
had been increasing the debt because no taxes were collected during
1865 and 1866. Taxes were collected in 1867, but before the end of
1868 the debt amounted to $7,904,398.92, and after that date no one
knew, nor did the officials seem to care, exactly how large it was.^
State and county and town bonds were issued in reckless haste
by the plunderers, but the reports do not show the amounts issued;
no correct records were kept. The acts of the legislature authorized
the governor to issue about $5,000,000 state bonds, besides the direct
bonds issued to railroads, which amounted to about $4,000,000 not
including interest. The counties, besides being authorized to levy
heavy additional taxes, were permitted to issue bonds for various
purposes.^ A number of acts gave the counties general permission
1 Auditor's Reports, 1869-1873 ; Comptroller's Reports, 1861-1865, 1866; Patton's
Report, 1867, to the Convention; Journal Convention of 1867, pp.46, 123; Ku Klux
Rept., pp. 169, 317, 1055.
2 The following is a partial list compiled from the session laws : —
Issues of County Bonds
1868.
Walker County .
. j55i4,ooo.oo
1869.
Pickens County .
$100,000.00
1868.
Dallas County
. 50,000.00
1870.
Baldwin County .
5,000.00
1868.
Bullock County .
. 40,000.00
1870.
Bibb County
5,000.00
1868.
Limestone County
. 100,000.00
1870.
Choctaw County
(?) unlimited
1869.
Hale County
. 60,000.00
1870.
Crenshaw County
. 10,000.00
1869.
Greene County .
. 80,000.00
1872.
Pickens County .
. 30,000.00
THE PUBLIC BONDED DEBT 581
to issue bonds, but there are no records accessible of the amounts
raised. There were issues of town and county bonds without legis-
lative authorization. This practice is said to have been common,
but in the chaotic conditions of the time little attentioit was paid to
such things and no records were kept.
To dispose of its bonds the state had a large number of financial
agents in the North and abroad. Some of these made no reports at
all; others reported as they pleased. Certain bonds were sold in
1870 by one of the financial agents, and two years later the proceeds
had not reached the treasury or been accounted for. In like manner
some bond sales were conducted in 1871 and in 1872.^ Not only
was no record kept of the issues of direct and indorsed bonds, but no
records were kept of the payment of interest and of the domestic
debts of the state. Some of the financial agents exercised the author-
ity of auditor and treasurer and settled any claim that might be pre-
sented to them. Some agents, who paid interest on bonds, returned
the cancelled coupons; others did not. In Governor Lewis's office
$20,000 in coupons were found with nothing to show that they had
been cancelled. One lot of bonds was received with every coupon
attached, yet the interest on these had been paid regularly in New
York.^
Provision was made for the retirement of all ''state money";
but if the treasury was empty when it came in, it was apt to be reissued
Issues of County Bonds {continued)
1873.
Butler County
, ^12,000.00
(?)
Chambers County
$150,000.00
1873-
Jefferson County
. 50,000.00
(?)
Lee County
. 275,000.00
1873.
Montgomery County . 130,000.00
(?)
Randolph County
. 100,000.00
1873.
Madison County
. 130,000.00
(?)
Barbour County .
. (?)
(?)
Dallas County
. 140,000.00
(?)
Tallapoosa County
. 125,000.00
Issues of Town
AND Cl
TY Bonds
1868.
Troy .
. $75,000.00
187I.
Selma
$500,000.00
1869.
Eutaw .
. 20,000.00
1872.
Prattville .
. 50,000.00
1869.
Greensboro .
. 15,000.00
1873-
Mobile
. 200,000.00
I87I.
Mobile
1 ,400,000.00
Opelika
. 25,000.00
And in addition each county and town had a large floating debt in " scrip " or
local obligations. Speculators gathered up such obligations and sold them at reduced
prices to those who had local taxes, fines, and licenses to pay.
1 Auditor's Reports, 1 871-1872 ; Report of Committee on Public Debt, 1876 ;
McClure, " The South : Industrial, Financial, and Political Condition," p. 83.
2 Report of the Committee on Public Debt, 1876; Senate Journal, 1872-1873,
p. 544; Auditor's Report, 1873.
582 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
without any authority of law. A large sum was returned, but nc
record was made of it, and it was not destroyed. Later it was dis-
covered among a mass of waste paper, where any thief might have
taken it and .put it again into circulation. One transaction may be
cited as an illustration of the management of the finances: in 1873
the state owed Henry Clews &^ Company $299,660.20. Governor
Lewis gave his notes (twelve in number) as governor, for the amount,
and at the same time deposited with Clews as collateral security
$650,000 in state bonds. Clews, when he failed, turned over the
governor's notes to the Fourth National Bank of New York, to which
he was indebted. He had already disposed of, so the state claimed,
the $650,000 in bonds which he held as collateral security; and a year
later, according to the Debt Commission, he still made a claim against
the state for $235,039.43 as a balance due him. Thus a debt of
$299,660.20 had grown in the hands of one of the state agents to
$1,184,689.63, besides interest.^
In 1872 it was estimated that the general liabihties of the state,
counties, and towns amounted to $52,762,000.^ The country was
flooded with temporary obHgations receivable for pubhc dues, and
the tax collectors substituted these for any coin that might come into
their hands. There was much speculation in the depreciated cur-
rency by the state and county officials. During Lewis's first year
(1873), the state bonds were quoted at 60 per cent, but on November
17, 1873, he reported, "This department has been unable to sell for
money any of the state bonds during the present administration
He raised money for immediate needs by hypothecation of the state
securities. Thus came about the remarkable transaction with Clews.
The state money went down to 60 per cent, then to 40 per cent before
the elections of 1874, and at one time state bonds sold for cash at
20 and 21 cents on the dollar.^
1 Senate Journal, 1875-1876, pp. 212, 213 ; Report of the Committee on the Public
Debt, 1876. In his book Clews tells how he invested in the securities of the struggling
southern states, being desirous of assisting them. But when the ungrateful states re-
fused to pay the claims that he and others like him presented, he says it was because
they, the creditors, were northern men. See Clews, "Twenty-eight Years in Wall
Street," pp. 550, 551.
2 DeLeon, " Ruin and Reconstruction," in the Southern Magazine, Jan., 1874. The
state debts of the ten southern states were then estimated at ^291,626,015, while the
debts of the other twenty-seven states amounted to only $293,872,552.
* Houston's Message, 1876 ; Senate Journal, 1 874-1 875, p. 7.
THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT 583
The Financial Settlement
After the overthrow of the Radicals in 1874 taxation was limited,
:penditures were curtailed, and the administration undertook to make
me arrangement in regard to the pubhc debt. For two years the
ate had been bankrupt; for nearly four years the railroads aided by
1 c state had been bankrupt ; the debt was enormous, but how large
IK) one knew. A commission, consisting of Governor Houston,
Levi W. Lawler, and T. B. Bethea, was appointed to ascertain and
adjust the public debt.^ After advertising in the United States and
abroad, the commission found a debt amounting in round numbers
10 $30,037,563. Some claims were not ascertained; many creditors
or claimants not being heard from and many fraudulent bonds not
being presented. The debt was divided into four classes: (i) the
recognized direct debt, consisting of state bonds (exclusive of bonds
issued to railroads), state obhgations, state certificates or "Patton
money," unpaid interest and other direct debts of the state, — in all,
amounting to $11,677,470; (2) the state bonds issued to railroads
under the law providing for the substitution of $4000 state bonds
per mile instead of $16,000 per mile in indorsed bonds, which in all
amounted to $1,156,000; (3) a class of claims of doubtful character,
among them that of Henry Clews 6^ Company, amounting in all to
$2,573,093; (4) the indorsed bonds of the state-aided railroads,
amounting to $11,597,000 (several miUions having been retired), and
state bonds loaned to railroads, — which debt, with the unpaid interest
on the same, amounting to $3,024,000, was in all $14,641,000.
Summary of Debt
Class One $11,667,470
Class Two i,i56,cx)o2
Class Three 2,573,093
Class Four 14,641,000
Total $2>o,oz^,S^^^
The interest on this debt at the legal rate of 8 per cent would be
over $2,000,000, more than twice the total yearly income of the state.
1 Act of Dec. 17, 1874. "^ Later increased to $1,192,000.
' Report of the Debt Commission, 1876. This was nearly half the value of the
farm lands of the state, which were worth $67,700,000, and was much more than the
gross value of a year's cotton crop.
584 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The commission and the legislature declared that in the present con
dition of the finances the state could not pay the interest, that it would
be several years before the state could pay any interest at all. More-
over, it could not recognize as valid many items in the great debt.
After conference with the representatives of the more innocent credit-
ors, the debt was thus adjusted: —
I. (a) The state proposed for the next few years to confine its atten-
tion to paying domestic claims and to retiring state obKgations.
(b) New bonds were issued to the amount of $7,000,000, to be ex-
changed for outstanding state bonds sold by the state to bona fide
purchasers. These bonds, known as Class A, were to draw interest
for five years at 2 per cent, for the next five years at 3 per cent, at
4 per cent for the next ten years, and thereafter at 5 per cent. These
bonds were issued to the most innocent creditors and constituted the
least questionable part of the debt.
II. On the $1,192,000 railroad debt of Class Two the state
accepted a clear loss of one-half, and issued $596,000 in bonds, known
as Class B, to be exchanged at the rate of one for two. These bonds
drew interest at 5 per cent.
III. Class Three was the worst of all, and none of the items were
at the time recognized, though the commissioners were authorized to
take $310,000 of Class A bonds and distribute the amount among the
innocent holders of the $650,000 bonds sold by Henry Clews when
held by him as collateral. The other Clews claims were emphatically
repudiated as fraudulent.
IV. Class Four was more complicated, (a) The state gave
$1,000,000 in bonds. Class C, drawing interest at 2 per cent for five
years and at 4 per cent thereafter, to the holders of the Alabama and
Chattanooga first mortgage indorsed bonds. The state was then
reheved of further responsibiHty. (b) To the holders of the $2,000,000
state bonds issued to the Alabama and Chattanooga road, and which
the commissioners were inclined to consider fraudulent, the state
transferred its Hen on the property of the Alabama and Chattanooga
road, provided the bonds be returned to the governor.
The claims of the holders of the indorsed bonds of five other rail-
roads were left for future settlement. They were declared fraudulent,
and the state finally declined to recognize them. The Montgomery
and Eufaula road had a loan of $300,000 in state bonds and an
THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT 585
indorsement of $960,000. The road was sold for $2,129,000, and
the state was secured against further loss/
This act of settlement caused the issue of $8,596,000 in bonds.
There were besides several miUions more in bonds, state obligations,
claims, etc. The Commission reported that the innocent holders of
the bonds were very reasonable in their demands.^ Henry Clews
declined to give the Commission any information in regard to his
agency for the state, but the Commission declared that he had in his
possession, or had transferred improperly, coupons on which inter-
est had been paid, and which he had not surrendered to the state.
They recommended a fresh repudiation of any claim founded on
Clews' securities.^ The Commission also discovered that Josiah
Morris & Company of Montgomery had possession of $650,000 in
state bonds which they refused to release without legal proceedings.''
There is not available sufficient evidence on which to base an account
of the history of town and county debts. Some towns, unable to pay,
gave up their charters; others still pay interest on the carpet-bag
debt. For years in several counties the income was not large enough
to pay the interest on its Reconstruction debt.
After the arrangement of state obligations, the state debt soon
rose to par and above. The Democratic administration was eco-
nomical even to stinginess. Salaries were everywhere reduced 25
per cent, the pay of the members of the legislature from $6 to $4 per
day, and mileage from 40 cents to 10 cents.^ The people of the
state even complained of too much economy. It was said that a
"deadhead" could not borrow a sheet of writing paper in the capi-
tol, nor in a county court-house.
There was not an honest white person who Hved in the state
during Reconstruction, nor a man, woman, or child, descended from
such a person, who did not then suffer or does not still suffer from the
1 Report of the Debt Commission, Jan. 24, 1876; Senate Journal, 1875-1876, pp.
203-232 ; Report of the Joint Committee on the Public Debt, Feb. 23, 1876; Annual
Cyclopaedia (1875), p. 14 ; " Northern Alabama," p. 52 ; Final Report of the Committee
of the Alabama and Chattanooga Bondholders, London, 1876 ; McClure, "The South,"
p. 83 ; Second Report of the Debt Commission, Dec. 13, 1876.
2 Senate Journal, 1 876-1 876, p. 316. 8 Second Report, Dec. 13, 1876.
* Second Report of the Debt Commission, Dec. 13, 1876.
^ Annual Cyclopaedia (1875), p. 14 ; "Northern Alabama," pp. 51, 51 ; Acts of 1874-
1875.
586 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
direct results of the carpet-bag financiering. Homes were sold d
mortgaged ; schools were closed, and children grew up in ignorance ;
the taxes for nearly twenty years were used to pay interest on the
debt then piled up. Not until 1899 was there a one-mill school tax
(until then the interest paid on the Reconstruction debt was larger
than the school fund), and not until 1891 was the state able to care
for the disabled Confederate soldiers. The debt has been slightly
decreased by the retirement of state obligations, but the bonded debt
remains the same. In 1902 it was $9,357,600, on which an annual
interest of $448,680 was paid,^ about one-fourth of the total income of
the state.
The corrupt financiering in itself was not, by any means, the
worst part of Reconstruction. It was only a phase of the general
misgovernment. Though the whites were conservative and econom-
ical during the period of the provisional government and did not
spend money or pledge credit recklessly, yet when the carpet-baggers
began to loot the treasury, the people were not at first alarmed.
Many were in sympathy with any honest scheme to aid internal im-
provements. Their Confederate experience made them accustomed
to the appropriations of large sums* — in paper.
Though from the first there were several newspapers that de- ■
nounced the financial measures of the reconstructionists and warned
purchasers against buying the bonds issued under doubtful author-
ity, still it was only the thinking men who understood from the be-
ginning the danger of financial wreck. When the railroads became
bankrupt, the people began to understand, and when the state failed
two years later to meet its obligations, they had learned thoroughly
the condition of affairs. Extraordinary taxation had helped to
teach them.
1 Auditor's Report, 1902, p. 14.
CHAPTER XVIII
RAILROAD LEGISLATION AND FRAUDS
Federal and State Aid to Railroads before the War
For forty years before the Civil War there was a feeling on the
part of many thoughtful citizens that the state should extend aid to
any enterprise for connecting north and south Alabama. It was an
issue in political campaigns ; candidates inveighed against the politi-
cal evils resulting from the unnatural union of the two sections.
South Alabama was afraid that the northern section wanted connec-
tions with Charleston and the Atlantic seaboard, and not with Mobile
and the Gulf; the planters of the Black Belt wanted the mineral
region made accessible ; the merchants of Mobile wanted all the trade
from north Alabama; the Whig counties of south and central Ala-
bama wanted closer connections with the white counties for the
purpose of enlightening them and preventing the continual Demo-
cratic majorities against the Black Belt at elections.
At first it was proposed to build plank roads and turnpikes be-
tween the sections and thus bring about the desired unity. These
failed, and then there was a demand for railroads. There were also
other reasons for internal improvements. Not only ought the two
antagonistic sections to be consohdated, but emigration to the West
must be prevented, for thousands of the citizens of the state had
gone to Texas during the two decades before the war. There was a
general feeling that the state only needed railroads to make it im-
mensely wealthy, and a large ''western" element demanded that
the state or the Federal government assist in thus developing the
resources of the state and in uniting its people. During the session
of 1855-1856, though the governor vetoed thirty-three bills passed
in aid of railroads, still the legislature voted $500,000 to two roads.
However, conservative sentiment, strict constructionist theories,
sectional jealousies, and the knowledge of the sad experience of the
587
588 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
State in other public enterprises ^ operated against state aid to internal
improvements, and before the $500,000 bonds were issued the act
appropriating them was repealed, thus putting an end to the last
attempt at direct state aid before the war.^
In 1850 Senator Douglas of Illinois began the policy of Federal
aid to railroads by securing the passage of a bill in aid of the lUinois
Central Railroad. The Alabama delegation was then opposed to
such a measure, but Douglas visited Alabama, conferred with the
directors of the Mobile Railroad, and promised to include that road
in his bill in return for the support of the Representatives and Sena-
tors from Alabama and Mississippi. The directors then brought in-
fluence to bear, and the two state legislatures instructed their con-
gressmen to support the measure, which was passed.
Thus began the Federal poHcy of granting alternate sections of
pubHc land along a road to the state for the corporation. Later, the
grants were made directly to the corporation. Before 1857, land
to the extent of 307,373 acres had been granted to Alabama rail-
roads,^ and liberal aid had also been given for improving the river
system of the state. ^ By the act of admission to the Union in 1819,
Alabama was entitled to 5 per cent of the proceeds from the sales of
public lands, to be used for internal improvements. Three per cent
was to be expended by the legislature, and 2 per cent by Congress.
In 1841 Congress rehnquished the ''two per cent fund'' to the
state to aid railroads and other pubhc enterprises from "east to west"
and from "north to south." The State Bank failed and the "three
per cent fund" was lost, but the legislature assumed it as a debt and
issued state bonds to the railroads to the amount of $858,498. The
"two per cent fund" was loaned before the war as follows: —
To east and west roads . , . ^^256,438.85
To north and south roads . . . 202,551.02
Balance 52,246.23
Total ;^5 1 1,236.10 5
1 E,g, the State Bank.
2 T. XL Clark, " Railroads and Navigation," in " Memorial Record of Alabama,"
Vol. II, pp. 322-323 ; Martin, " Internal Improvements in Alabama," pp. 72-77 ; Gar-
rett, " Public Men," pp. 577, 580.
^ Martin, " Internal Improvements," pp. 65-68.
* Martin, " Internal Improvements," p. 42 et seq.
^ Martin, "Internal Improvements," pp. 68-71 ; Auditor's Report, Oct. 12, 1869.
GENERAL LEGISLATION IN AID OF RAILROADS 589
In 1850 there were two railroads in the state with a total of 132.5
miles of track, which cost $1,946,209. In i860, there were eleven
roads, 743 miles long, costing $17,591,188.^ During the Civil War
the roads received much aid from the state and Confederate govern-
ments, though during this time only a few miles of track were built
and some grading done. At the end of the war all were completely
worn out or had been destroyed. The want of railroad communi-
cation with the armies and between the various sections of the state
caused much suffering among soldiers and civihans, and after the
war the people were more than ever anxious to have roads built.
For two years the railway companies were busy repairing the old
roads, but by 1867 popular opinion demanded new roads.
General Legislation in Aid of Railroads
The provisional legislature, on February 19, 1867, passed an act
which served as a basis for all later legislation. The governor was
authorized to indorse its first mortgage bonds to the extent of $12,000
per mile, when 20 miles of a new road should have been com-
pleted, and to continue the indorsement at that rate as the road
was built. No indorsed bonds were to be sold by the road for less
than 90 cents on the dollar, and the proceeds were to be used only
for construction and equipment. The state was to have two direc-
tors, appointed by the governor, on the board of each road receiv-
ing state aid.^ The Reconstruction Acts of Congress were passed a
few days later, however, and there was no opportunity for this law to
go into effect.
The first Reconstruction legislature^ increased the endowment
to $16,000 a mile, authorized the indorsement of bonds in five-mile
blocks instead of twenty-mile blocks, as before, and to the roads that
proposed to extend outside of the state it promised aid for 20
miles beyond the boundaries of the state." The next session Gov-
ernor Smith, in a message to the legislature, stated that the indorse-
1 Census, 1850, i860. 2 Acts of Ala., 1866-1867, pp. 686-694.
3 The constitution of 1867, Art. 13, Sec. 13, provided that the credit of the state
should not be given nor loaned except in aid of railways or internal improvements, and
then only by a two-thirds vote of each house.
* Acts of Ala., Aug. 7 and Sept. 22, 1868. The promoters of the roads claimed
that the old law was useless, but that ^16,000 a mile would attract northern and Euro-
pean capital, Herbert, " Solid South," p. 52,
1
590 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
ment law was defective; that he was in favor of lending the credit
of the state, but objected to a general statute requiring indorsement
of any road; that there was danger that the roads would depend
entirely upon indorsement and would have no paid-up capital;
moreover, taking advantage of the railroad fever, roads would be
built where they were not needed; that aid should be given only
to those capitalists whose enterprises promised success. Finally,
he advised that the law be repealed and aid be given only in specific
cases. ^
The legislature responded to the Governor's message by another
general law, practically reenacting the former laws. By its provi-
sions proof was required that the five-mile block had been built and
that the road-bed, rails, bridges, and cross-ties were in good order,
before the first issue of the bonds was made. The company was to
show what use was made of the bonds. The indorsement was to
constitute a first Hen in favor of the state, and in case of default of
interest by the road, the governor was to seize and sell the road if
necessary.^ A few days later a sweeping measure was passed, declar-
ing that all acts and "things done in the state" for railroad pur-
poses were ratified and made legal.^ This was the last general
legislation enacted while the railroad boom continued. Governor
Lindsay and the pseudo- Democratic lower house stood out against
railroad legislation, and the indorsed roads were in bad condition
when the next scalawag governor was elected. Under Governor
Lewis, in 1873, an act was passed to reheve the state of some of its
obligations. Roads entitled to an indorsement might take instead a
loan of $4,000 per mile in state bonds, and roads already indorsed
might exchange indorsed bonds for state bonds at the rate of four
for one. But no state bonds were to be given for fraudulent issues
of indorsed bonds, and when exchanges were made the road was
released from all obhgations to the state. ^ Had the roads accepted
this offer, the state would have suffered only a loss of $482,000 in
interest each year. However, from this time on the state authorities
1 Governor's Message, Nov. 15, 1869. The carpet-bag auditor also advocated the
repeal of the law. He thought that no road should be indorsed for more than ^10,000
a mile, since the average value was less than ^13,000 a mile.
2 Act of Feb. 21, 1870, Acts of Ala., 1869-1860, p. 149.
8 Act of March i, 1870, Acts of Ala., 1 869-1 870, p. 286.
* Act of April 21, 1873, Acts of Ala., 1872-1873, p. 45.
1
THE ALABAMA AND CHATTANOOGA RAILROAD 591
were busy trying to extricate the state from the bankruptcy caused
by indorsing the raihoad bonds.
The Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad
The Alabama and Chattanooga Raihoad was the first of the
roads to apply for aid under the indorsement law, and was in the
worst condition. The story of this road is the story of all, only of
greater length and more disgraceful. The Alabama and Chatta-
nooga Railroad Company was made up of two older corporations,
which, passing into the hands of Boston financiers, united in order
to secure the spoils from the state. Before the union the officials
had secured special legislation for one of the old roads, the Wills
Valley. The sharpers who were engineering the scheme had agents
at Montgomery when the Reconstruction legislature met, and these
were instrumental in having the indorsement raised from $12,000
to $16,000 a mile. The second corporation was the Northeast and
Southwest Alabama Railroad.^ The proposed road would be 295
miles long, and when completed would be entitled to $4,720,000
from the state in indorsed bonds. The law was explicit in regard
to indorsation, but Governor Smith, notwithstanding his opposition
to the principle of the law, was criminally careless, if no worse, in the
way he administered it. The first 20 miles were not built as
required by law, but were purchased from the old Northeast and
Southwest Alabama Railroad. Moreover, the road was never prop-
erly equipped, and the 20 miles from Chattanooga, on which
indorsement amounting to $320,000 was secured, were only rented
from another corporation (which was already indorsed to the amount
of $8000 per mile by the state of Georgia), and the rent was paid
from the proceeds of the indorsed bonds, which by law should have
been appHed only to construction and equipment. Nor was the
rented road equipped.^
lActs of Oct. 6 and Nov. 17, 1868, Acts of Ala., 1868, pp. 207, 347; Herbert,
"Solid South," p. 52; Annual Cyclopgedia (1871), pp. 7, 8. The railroad must have
intended to profit by the indorsement, and must have paid for it, for when, a year later,
ex-Governor Patton, who for the sake of respectability was made the nominal presi-
dent, was in Boston, he was reproached by the Alabama and Chattanooga officials for
allowing their charter to cost them ^200,cxdo. See Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 232.
2 Alabama vs. Burr, 115 United States Reports, p. 418. Burr, J. C. Stanton, and
D. N. Stanton had been prosecuted by the state of Alabama for the fraudulent use of
indorsed bonds.
592 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
The indorsed bonds of the road to November 15, 1869, amounted
to $1,800,000/ and Auditor Reynolds reported in 1870 that the in-
dorsement to September 30, 1870, was $3,840,000 on 240 miles.^
These figures should have been correct, but they were not. In fact,
240 miles had been roughly finished, but the indorsement was far
above the legal hmit. On December 5, 1870, a few days before he
retired from office, Smith reported to the legislature that he had in-
dorsed the Alabama and Chattanooga road for $4,000,000 for 250
miles.^ The facts, as afterwards disclosed, were that only 240 miles
were completed, and of these only 154 were in Alabama. Yet he had
issued bonds to the amount of $4,720,000, covering not only the whole
295 miles of the proposed road, but also including $580,000 in excess
of what the law allowed to the completed road, which with equip-
ment was worth only $4,018,388. So here were $1,300,000 in bonds
which were clearly fraudulent. There was no further indorsement
of this road.'*
As if the enormous issue of indorsed bonds was not enough for
the Stantons of Boston, who were in control of the corporation, a
second descent of railroad promoters was made on the legislature in
1869-1870, and $2,000,000 in direct state bonds were obtained for
the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad. Indorsement was not
enough for them. The act stated that the bonds were to be issued
from time to time as needed for use in construction v/ithin the state,
and in return the railroad lands were to be mortgaged to the state.^
In order to secure the passage of this act, the most shameful bribery
was resorted to by the agents of the railroad and of the New York
capitalists who were financing the Stantons. One of the Stantons
came to Montgomery, also an agent from the banking house of
Henry Clews & Company, and agents from other houses interested
in the Stanton scheme. The Stantons themselves had no money
except what they received from the state. On February 4, 1870,
the bill failed in the House ; but on February 5 a reconsideration was
moved and the bill was referred back to the committee with direc-
1 Governor Smith's Message, Nov. 15, 1869. ^ Auditor's Report, 1870.
^ Message in Independent Monitor, Dec. 13, 1 870.
^Independent Monitor, June 14, 1871 ; Ku Klux Rept., pp. 172, 317; Ku Klux
Rept., Ala. Test., p. 193 ; Auditor's Report, 1871.
5 Act of Feb. II, 1870, Acts of Ala., 1869- 1870.
THE ALABAMA AND CHATTANOOGA RAILROAD 593
ions '4o report within fifteen minutes." The report was favorable,
and the members having seen the hght, the bill was passed by a vote
of 62 to 27/ From the first, specific charges of bribery had been
made against those who, within three days, had changed from active
opposition to support of the measure.^ A year later the House had
a majority of young and inexperienced Democrats, and they ordered
an investigation. The Senate, with one solitary exception, was still
Radical. The investigation brought to light many unpleasant facts
relating to the methods employed in securing the passage of the
$2,000,000 appropriation and other railroad bills. Jerre Haralson,
a negro member, told his experience. Jerre was opposing the grant
and posing as a Democrat because he had not been sufficiently
remembered on previous occasions when the spoils were divided.
Hearing that something was to be divided, he went to Stanton's room,
where, he said, there were many members. Caraway, the negro
member from Mobile, told Haralson that he (Caraway) would not
vote for the grant for less than $500. Stanton had four rooms at
the Exchange Hotel, to which, at his invitation, all the purchasable
members went. Stanton would take the members, one at a time,
into the hall, after which that member would leave. Haralson, to
his sorrow, was not called into the hall, but the next day he heard
from the other negro members that money was to be had, so he called
again. Stanton then accused Haralson of being a Democrat, but
Haralson repHed that he had left that party, and after receiving a
"loan" of $50, he went home.^
George B. Holmes, of the firm of Holmes & Goldthwaite,
bankers, testified that Gilmer, president of the South and North
^Montgomery Mail, Jan. 25, 1871 ; Southern Argus, Feb. 2, 1872, and Feb. 28,
1873; Somers, " Southern States," p. 157; Report of the House Railroad Investiga-
tion Committee, 1871 ; Herbert, "Solid South," pp. 52, 53. Colonel Herbert says that
the Alabama and Chattanooga officials demanded the ^2,000,000 and received it.
" Solid South," p. 53. The legislature that voted the gift of $2,000,000 was composed
as follows: Senate, 32 Radicals and i Democrat ; House, 85 Radicals (of whom 20 were
negroes) and 15 doubtful Democrats. The carpet-bag editor of the Demopolis Re-
publican said : " Men who never paid ten dollars' tax in their lives talk as flippantly of
millions as the schoolboy of his marbles. Meanwhile, outsiders talk of buying and
selling men at prices which would have been a disgrace to a slave before the war."
Montgomery Mail, Jan. 25, 1 87 1.
2 Annual Cyclopredia (1870'!, p. 10.
3 Report of the House Railroad Committee, 1871 ; Ku Klux Rept., p. 319.
2Q
1
594 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Alabama Railroad (Stanton had all the roads in need of ''boodle"
working with him), asked him for $25,000 to be used at the capitol.
Gilmer told Holmes that the banker of the road had refused it, as
had also the Farley bank. Finally, Farley and Holmes each agreed
to furnish $12,000 to Gilmer. John Hardy, the chairman of the
committee, had asked for $25,000 to oil the bearings of the poHtical
machine, and for that amount had agreed to have the bill passed.
At the last moment Hardy demanded $10,000 more, which Holmes
obtained from Josiah Morris. The committee was thus gotten
into condition "to report within fifteen minutes," and the legisla-
ture made ready to accept the report.^ Two years later. Governor
Lindsay stated in his message that the Alabama and Chattanooga
$2,000,000 bill had not passed the legislature by the two-thirds vote
as required by law.^ The law provided for the issue of the state
bonds for $2,000,000 from time to time as the road was completed.
Instead, however, they were issued in reckless haste, within a month,
and hurried away to Europe for sale. The proceeds were used to
build a hotel and an opera house in Chattanooga, where Stanton was
accused of trying to imitate Fiske and Gould of Erie.^
When Governor Lindsay went into office, he could not find the
"scratch of a pen" relating to railroad indorsement. Governor
Smith, as later developments showed, had become careless with his
1 Ku Klux Kept., p. 319; House Journal, 1870-1871, p. 236; Report of the
House Railroad Investigating Committee, 1871 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test,, p. 232;
J. P. Stow, Radical senator from Montgomery, said that when Hardy left at the end of
the session, he carried away ^150,000. Not all of it was his own ; some of it he had
collected for others. One senator is said to have held his vote at ^locx) regularly.
2 Senate Journal, 1873 ; Appendix containing Journal of the Capitol Senate, 1872,
pp. 19-34; Lindsay's Message, 1872, to the Capitol Legislature. Lindsay said that all
the Democrats worked hard to prevent the passage of the ^2,000,000 bill ; that he him-
self worked in the lobby until three o'clock in the morning trying to defeat the thieves.
Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 199.
3 Ku Klux Rept., p. 318 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 196 ; Report of the
House Investigation Committee, p. 1871. Ex-Governor Patton testified that though
president of the Alabama and Chattanooga road, he had opposed the bill and in conse-
quence had been displaced, D. N. Stanton of Boston being elected. Patton stated that
none of the capital stock had at this time been paid in by the stockholders.
In 1870-1871 "another set of financiers had made up their minds to come down
South and help Alabama. Their demand was for ;^5,cxx),ooo with which to set furnaces
and factories going. They were too late. If they had only come the session before,
there was no chance for a bill containing ^5,000,000, properly pressed, to have failed."
But the lower house now had a Democratic majority. Herbert, " Solid South," p. 57.
THE ALABAMA AND CHATTANOOGA RAILROAD 595
bond indorsement and kept no records, or else destroyed them or
carried them away. Auditor Reynolds reported in 187 1 that his
office had official knowledge only of the indorsement of the Mobile
and Montgomery road/ In his message of January 24, 1871, Lind-
say said, "To what extent bonds under the various statutes have been
indorsed and issued by the state it is impossible to inform you. No
record can be found in any department of the action of the executive
in this regard." None of the securities required by law could be
found. Lindsay was unable to ascertain even the form of the in-
dorsed bonds, except those of the Mobile and Montgomery and the
Montgomery and Eufaula roads. Lindsay telegraphed to Smith's
secretary, who rephed that there was no record of the bond issues
except the certificates of the railroad presidents. Lindsay found
some of these, which were plain certificates: "This is to certify that
five more miles of the ( ) railroad has been finished." On
each five-mile certificate, hke the one above, the road drew $80,000.
Yet the law was strict in requiring proof of completion, of good
rails, bridges, road-bed, and equipment. At this time 45 or 50
miles of the Alabama and Chattanooga road had not been com-
pleted, and 50 miles more had only a temporary track hastily thrown
together in order to get the indorsement. Governor Lindsay believed
that the road as planned promised great success, and was of the
opinion that had the bonds been issued according to law the road
would have been completed. He had to correspond with the rail-
road officials in order to ascertain the amount of the bonds. ^ A
few days before Smith went out of office he reported $4,000,000
indorsement on 244 miles of the Alabama and Chattanooga road.
Lindsay found no record of this. Almost immediately (January,
187 1 ) the Alabama and Chattanooga road defaulted in payment of
interest, and Lindsay was authorized by the legislature to go to New
York and provide for the payment of interest on 4000 bonds legally
issued and held by innocent purchasers.^ Statements were con-
stantly appearing in the state press that fraudulent issues had been
1 Senate Journal, 1870-1871, p. 78; Lindsay's Message, Nov, 21, 1871 ; Senate
Journal, 1870-1871.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 195, 196; Lindsay's Messages, 1871-1872 ; Lind-
say's Statement of Facts, April 22, 1871 ; Report of Commissioners of the Public Debt,
Jan. 24, 1876.
8 Act of Feb. 25, 1 87 1.
596 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
made, and the Democratic papers were warning purchasers againsi
them, declaring that when the people of Alabama again came into,
power, they had no intention of paying them.
The carpet-bag regime had numerous financial agents in New
York, Philadelphia, Boston, London, Germany, and elsewhere.
Most of the agents in New York gave Lindsay assistance in his inves
tigations. Souter & Company stated they had sold 4000 first
mortgage Alabama and Chattanooga bonds (all that were legal),
and 2000 state bonds for the Alabama and Chattanooga Company,
all for more than 90 cents on the dollar. Erlanger et Cie., of
Paris, had purchased the state bonds at 95 cents in gold. Lindsay
soon discovered that 1300 Alabama and Chattanooga bonds in excess
had been issued, 580 in excess of what the road would be entitled to
when completed. Braunfels of Erlanger et Cie. testified that he had
loaned $300,000 on 500 bonds numbered between 4000 and 4720
The trustees under the first deed of trust held bonds 4720 to 4800 and
had refused to sell them, knowing them to be fraudulent ; 344 bonds
of the fraudulent excess had been partly sold and partly hypothecated
to Drexel & Company of Philadelphia; thirty had been hypothe
cated to a firm in Boston for locomotives. Lindsay saw some of
these fraudulent bonds, which were signed by Governor Smith and
sealed with the seal of the state.^ Lindsay, through the state agents,
Duncan, Sherman, & Company, recognized as legal the first 4000
of these indorsed bonds and the 2000 state bonds and ordered inter
est to be paid on them. All the others were rejected as fraudulent.
1 Statement of Facts which influenced Governor Robert B. Lindsay in his Action in
regard to the Bonds of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company, April 22,
1871 ; Lindsay's Message, Nov. 21, 1871. While Lindsay was in New York, Ex-Gov-
ernor Smith called on him and half acknowledged the whole affair. Ala. Test., p. 199.
Afterwards in a letter Smith strongly protested that some of the bonds signed and sealed
by himself were fraudulent, and blamed Governor Lindsay and the legislature for
recognizing them. He acknowledged that his carelessness had resulted in the present
state of affairs. Somers, "Southern States," p. 158. April 3, 1871, Smith wrote, " I
admit that if I had attended strictly to the indorsement and issue of these bonds, that all
this never would have occurred." Herbert, " Solid South," p. 53.
2 Statement of Facts, April 22, 1871 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 198, 199.
Lindsay said that since the Alabama and Chattanooga road was indorsed under the
laws of 1867 and 1868, it did not come under the laws of 1870. Consequently, when
the Alabama and Chattanooga defaulted, the state was not bound to pay interest on thi
^2,0OO,cx)O state bonds until the legislature acted in March, 1 87 1.
In his Statement of Facts, Lindsay relates a suggestive and illuminating incident:
THE ALABAMA AND CHATTAiNOOGA RAILROAD 597
The acts of February 25 and March 8, 1871/ authorized the
■overnor to pay interest on the Alabama and Chattanooga bonds
Ahich were in the hands of innocent purchasers on January i, 1871.
At that date at least 500 of the fraudulent issue had not been sold.
The other 700 or 800 bonds numbered above 4000 were declared
fraudulent by Lindsay on the ground that the part of road which
called for the extra bonds simply did not exist. At this time he
paid interest on the railroad bonds, amounting to $545,000,^ and
later to $834,000. No interest was paid on bonds held by the road
or hypothecated by its officials. The governor was authorized to
|)roceed against the road, and, in July 187 1, Colonel John H. Gindrat,
the governor's secretary, was ordered to seize the road and act as re-
ceiver. The road had ceased running two weeks before. Stanton
claimed that the default had been caused by the threats of repudia-
tion, and when Gindrat went to take charge every possible obstacle
I )n Dec. 13, 1870, John Demerett, an Alabama and Chattanooga bondholder, brought
suit in the Superior Court of King's County, New York, against the Alabapia and
Chattanooga Railroad Company, the state of Alabama, and one F. B. Loomis (of
the Alabama and Chattanooga Company), alleging that the said railway company was
about to place on the market 500 first mortgage bonds numbered from 4800 to 5300,
indorsed by the governor of Alabama in violation of the law. Demerett prayed for an
injunction to restrain the company frum selling the bonds. The records showed that
the state of Alabama appeared by her attorney, one William D. Vieder, who declared on
affidavit that he was employed by Henry Clews & Company, financial agents of Ala-
bama. Vieder filed an answer in behalf of Alabama, stating that the bonds numbered
4801 to 5300 were properly indorsed, and were of the same class as others issued by the
company, that the indorsement was in conformity to law, and that in no case would the
bonds be repudiated. The injunction was dissolved and the company permitted to sell.
To the Ku Klux Committee Lindsay suggested that Smith might have signed the
illegal bonds after hs went out of office, as they were not placed on the market until
January, 1871. (See Ala. Test., p. 197.) But the Demerett case seems to disprove
this and to show that the bonds were issued while Smith was governor. The House
Railroad Investigation Committee, in 1871, reported that Smith asserted that the fraudu-
lent indorsements were secured by the active cooperation of Henry Clews & Com-
pany, Souter & Company, and Braunfels of Emile Erlanger et Cie., with the Stantons.
Southern Argus, Feb. 2, 1875. Lindsay further stated that there were evidences oi
collusion between Stanton and Smith to secure the election of the latter in 1870 at all
hazards. They wanted to gain time in order to conceal the irregularity in the issue of
bonds. Stanton furnished much money to the campaign fund, and on election day
marched to the registration office at the head of 900 railroad employees, who came from
the entire length of the road, had them registered, gave each of them a Radical ticket,
and then voted them in a body. Ala. Test., pp. 193, 197.
1 Acts of Alabama, 1 870-1 871, pp. 12, 13.
2 Ku Klux Kept., p. 172.
598 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and embarrassment were imposed by the company. Besides, at the
Mississippi end of the Hne the employees had seized the road in order
to secure their pay. Gindrat pacified them, and went slowly along
the road toward Georgia, where he was stopped at the state
Hne. Not only had Alabama indorsed that part of the road within
Georgia and Tennessee, for $16,000 a mile, but Georgia had also
indorsed it for $8000 a mile, and the part within her boundaries she
seized. The governor was forced to employ a large number of
attorneys and institute legal proceedings, not only in Alabama, but
also in Georgia, Tennessee, Mississippi, and in the Federal courts.
Bullock, the carpet-bag governor of Georgia, would not run the road
in Georgia in connection with the Alabama section, and not until
there was a new governor (Conley) could connections be made over
the whole line.^
For his action in repudiating the fraudulent bonds and in seizing
the road, Lindsay was much abused by all the railroad interests, by
the hungry promoters who wanted more money from the state, and
by a section of his own party which was influenced by prominent
Democrats who were officers of the road,^ and especially by influen-
tial Democratic lawyers. This fact was important in weakening
the Democratic cause in 1872. There were some who opposed the
seizure of the road because they believed that in the then unsettled
condition of affairs the state would not be able to manage the road
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1871), pp. 7, 8 ; Lindsay's Message, Nov. 21, 1871 ; Senate
Journal, 1871-1872, pp. 44, 320; Report of John H. Gindrat, Receiver of the Alabama
and Chattanooga Railroad, 1871.
The engineers in the employ of the state reported tbaf to put the road in Alabama
in fair condition at the time it was seized wooW require ^507,983.74. Twenty-four
miles of rails were old ones that Sherman had burned. Report of F'arrand and Thom,
Nov. 9, 1 87 1 ; Senate Journal, 1871-1872, p. 43. To complete the road, Gindrat
reported that ^1,000,000 w'ould be needed. Senate Journal, 1871-1872, p. 337.
At the time the road was seized $10,500,000 from all sources had disappeared.
Part of it was spent on the road, which, with all equipment, in 1 87 1 was valued at
$6,120,995. i-^^ estimate of its value in 1873 was $4,183,388.) The capital stock
authorized was $7,500,000, of which only $2,700,000 was ever paid in. Ku Klux Rept.,
pp. 172, 173; Auditor's Report, 1871 and 1873. The earnings of the road from No-
vember, 1872, to November, 1873, were $232,583.96. The expenses of the road from
November, 1872, to November, 1873, were $1,083,851.90. Report of the Receiver of
the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad, 1873.
2 Rice and Chilton, attorneys of the Alabama and Chattanooga road, gave the state
much trouble. Rice was a scalawag, but several partners he had at that time and later
were Democrats.
THE ALABAMA AND CHATTANOOGA RAILROAD 599
successfully ; there were others who believed that the state should not
acknowledge the legahty of the indorsement by seizure of the road.
The Debt Commission in 1876 reported that, although the laws were
strict, yet they had been violated in letter and in spirit before indorse-
ment. But though many (including the Debt Commission) beheved
the issues illegal, yet by the seizure of the road the state acknowledged
the obligations.^
The history of the road while in the hands of the state authorities
was not pleasant to Democrat or Radical. The state had first seized
the section of the road that was in Alabama, and had gone into the
state courts to get the remainder. The litigation promised to be end-
less, and the case was taken to the Federal courts. Finally the road
was sold at a bankrupt sale, and Lindsay purchased it for the state,
paying $312,000. The Circuit Court reversed this action, and there
was a new case in which Busteed, district judge, adjudged the com-
pany bankrupt. In May, 1872, the Federal court placed the road
in the hands of receivers for the first mortgage bondholders, who were
to issue $1,200,000 in certificates to run the road, — this to be a
lien prior to the claim of the state. August 24, 1874, the same court
placed the road in the hands of the trustees of the first mortgage
bondholders.
The road, while in the hands of the state receiver, was either
badly managed or was unsuccessful because of the obstruction by
the other roads and by capitahsts. Several attempts were made, by
Governors Lindsay, Lewis, and Houston, to sell the road, but with
no success. Finally, in 1876, the Debt Commission arranged with
the holders of the first mortgage bonds to turn over to them the whole
claim of the state to the road, the state paying $1,000,000, besides the
interest, to be out of the business.^
1 During the whole time there was a large element in favor of not recognizing the
legality of the bond issues authorized by the carpet-bag legislatures. The carpet-bag
government was not a government of the people, but was imposed and upheld by
military force, some said, and had no right to vote away the money of the people with-
out their consent. The Se/ma Times, March 5, 1874, voiced this sentiment: "Alabama
must and will be ruled by whites. . . . We will not pay a single dollar of the in-
famous debt, piled upon us by fraud, bribery, and corruption, known as the 'bond
swindle' debt. Let the bondholders take the railroads." See Senate Journal, 1875-
1876, pp. 213-221.
'■^Annual Cyclopaedia (1871), p. 8; (1872), pp. 8, 9; Lewis's Message, Dec. 20,
1872; Senate Journal, 1872-1873, p. 43; Lewis's Message, Nov. 1874; Senate Jour-
6oO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Governor Lindsay had paid $834,000 interest on the Alabama
and Chattanooga bonds, and in 1874 there were arrears amounting
to $1,054,000/ Congress had made a grant of land, six sections per
mile, amounting to 1,000,000 acres, for all the roads within the boun
daries of Alabama, and the state held a mortgage on this land. Much
of it was sold fraudulently by the railroad company, and titles wer^
given where there had been no sales. One railroad agent pocketed
$33,447.97 received from fraudulent sales of this land. The state
never received a cent.^
Other Indorsed Railroads
The story of the other roads that applied for aid is similar, though
shorter and of a meaner nature. The Savannah and Memphis road
was the only one that failed to default.^ It was indorsed for $640,000,
but when the House committee was investigating, in 187 1, as there was
no record of any indorsement, the president refused to appear or to
give any information.^ Later it was ascertained that at the time that
the road was worth only $263,000 it had been indorsed to the extent
of $320,000.^
The South and North Alabama Railroad was a persistent appli-
cant for legislative favors. On December 30, 1868, the available por-
tion of the ''two and three per cent fund," amounting to $691,789.43,
was turned over to the South and North road.® The road secured
indorsement at the rate of $16,000 a mile along with other roads, but
this was not enough, and, on March 3, 1870, the legislature increased
its indorsement to $22,000 a mile.^ Governor Smith knew so Kttle of
nal, 1874-1875; Final Report of the Committee of the Alabama and Chattanooga
Bondholders, London, 1876; Acts of Ala., Dec. 21, 1872; Acts of Ala., March 20,
1875.
1 Lewis's Message, Nov., 1874.
2 Ku Klux Rept., p. 173; Governor Houston's Message, Dec, 1875; Senate Jour-
nal, 1875-1876.
8 Governor Lewis's Message, Nov., 1874; Senate Journal, 1874-1875.
* Report of House Railroad Committee ; Auditor's Report, 1873.
^ Auditor's Report, 1 87 1.
^ Martin, "Internal Improvements," p. 70; Auditor's Report, 1869; Acts of Dec.
30, 1869, Acts of Ala., 1868, pp. 487, 494. The South and North road was merely an
expansion of "The Mountain Railroad Company," an old corporation.
■^ Acts of 1869-1880, p. 374.
Governor L. E. Parsons.
Governor William H. Smith.
Governor D. P. Lewis.
Negro Members of Convention of 1875 are on the left. The white man in
the back row is Sam. Rice.
SOME RECONSTRUCTIONISTS.
OTHER INDORSED RAILROADS 6oi
A hat he did in regard to railroads that in his last message he stated
that the South and North road was indorsed for $1,440,000, that is,
for ninety miles at $16,000 a mile,^ while he raised the indorsement of
the Selma and Gulf to $22,000 a mile, thus confusing the two roads.
The House Railroad Committee declared that by means of bribery
the road had secured one hundred miles of indorsement, amounting
to $2,200,000.^ When Lindsay was asked to indorse more bonds for
this road, he made an investigation which convinced him that too
many bonds had already been issued, and he refused to sign any
more. Under the law the road was entitled to 1900 one-thousand-
dollar indorsed bonds, but had received 2200,^ an indorsement of
$2,200,000, while the road equipped was valued at only $1,625,200.*
When it became known that fraudulent issues had been made, the
Investigating Committee called before them the ex-treasurer of the
state, Arthur Bingham, of Ohio. He claimed and was allowed
the constitutional privilege of refusing to testify on the ground that
his testimony would tend to incriminate himself.^ In 1870 it was
estimated that including the "three per cent" fund the road had
received from the state $2,000,000 more than the cost of building it.^
Governor Lewis, in 1873, reported that the South and North road
was indorsed for $4,026,000, including $2,200,000 that was not
recorded on the books of the state. ^
The East Alabama and Cincinnati corporation consisted of Gov-
ernor W. H. Smith, three senators (two of whom were J. J. Hinds
and J. L. Pennington), and two members of the lower house. Stanton
of the Alabama and Chattanooga was also connected with it ; in fact,
he was connected in some way with nearly all the schemes to secure
state aid. The road was mortgaged to Henry Clews & Company
for $500,000. It had no money of its own, but secured state indorse-
ment for $400,000 and a bond issue of $25,000 from the town of
Opelika. This indorsement by Governor Smith was not discovered
1 Message, in Tndepettdent Monitor, Dec. 13, 1870.
2 Report of House Railroad Inv. Com., 1871. See also Report of Auditor, 1870,
which says ^1,980,000 indorsement.
3 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 197.
♦ Auditor's Report, 1871.
^ Ku Klux Rept., p. 318 ; Report of House Railroad Inv. Com., 1871.
^ Montgomery Mail, Feb. 24, 1 870.
"^ Message, Nov. 17, 1874.
602 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
until 187 1, when Lindsay was accused of issuing the bonds. This he
flatly denied, and he was correct. The Tennessee and Coosa rivers
road had $33,513.25, if no more, of the ''two per cent fund." On
March 2, 1870, that road was released from its indebtedness to the
state (part of the "two and three per cent funds") on condition that
it apply for no further aid. But now, in order to get the indorsement,
a part of this road was transferred to the East Alabama and Cincin-
nati road, to pass as a new road. With an indorsement of $4oo,cxx)
besides the $25,000 Opehka bonds, the road equipped was valued at
only $264,150.^
The Selma and Gulf was another road without resources of its
own, and, so far as it was completed, was built with state aid. Gov-
ernor Smith, in clear violation of the law, the committee reported,
indorsed the road for $480,000. Some one, probably Smith, though
Lindsay was accused of it, raised this amount to $640,000, $160,000
of which was not recorded. At this time the road was valued at
$424,900, and the company threatened to default unless further aid
was extended. Smith thought that the road was indorsed for $22,000
a mile and reported $660,000 indorsement.^
The Mobile and Alabama Grand Trunk road, valued at $704,225,
was indorsed by the state for $800,000. The city of Mobile also
issued $1,000,000 in bonds for this road.^ There was no record of
an application for aid from the New Orleans and Selma Railroad.
Neither Smith nor Lindsay reported it, yet its financial agent had
secretly secured an indorsement of $320,000, contrary to law. The
road was valued at $255,350. It had no resources except $140,000
in Dallas County bonds, and its president. Colonel WiUiam M. Byrd,
resigned rather than be a party to the stealing.^
The promoters of the Selma, Marion, and Memphis road placed
General N. B. Forrest at the head of the enterprise, and for three
years he worked hard to make the road a success. Governor Smith
indorsed the road for $720,000, or $18,000 a mile, when only forty
1 Report of House Railroad Inv. Com., 1871 ; Lewis's Message, Nov. 17, 1873;
Auditor's Report, 1869; Auditor's Report, 1873 ; House Journal, 1871-1872, pp. 305,
353 ; Acts of 1 869-1 870, p. 290.
2 Southern Argus, Feb. 2, 1872 ; Governor Lewis's Message, Nov. 17, 1873 ; Audi-
tor's Report, 1871 and 1873.
^ Lewis's Message, Nov. 17, 1873 ; Auditor's Report, 1873; Act of Jan. 17, 1870.
* Southern Argus, Feb. 2, 1872; Auditor's Report, 1873; Lewis's Messages, 1873.
OTHER INDORSED RAILROADS
603
L.iles were completed. In 1873 ^^e road was valued at $738,400.
When the company failed, as was intended from the first, General
Forrest gave up every dollar he could raise in order to pay debts due
on contracts, and he himself was left a poor man.^
The Montgomery and Eufaula road obtained something over
$30,000 of the "three per cent fund" from the state, and in 1868
the governor was authorized by the legislature to indorse the road,
notwithstanding this debt to the state, which was considered simply as
an indorsement.^ Under this act the road was indorsed for $1,280,000,
and in addition state direct bonds to the amount of $300,000 were
issued to the company in 1870. For this loan there was no security.
Lewis Owen, a former president, refused to answer when it was charged
that bribery had been used to secure the passage of the bill. At this
time the road was valued at $825,289. In 1873 capitalists offered
to lease the road for enough to pay the interest on its bonds, provided
the state would release the road from all claims and give to it the
$330,000 already loaned. This was done. Later it was seized by
the state and eventually sold for sufficient money to cover losses
caused by the indorsement.^
The Mobile and Montgomery road secured $2,500,000 by special
act of the legislature.^ The road was valued at $2,516,250 ^ and was
already built, hence the indorsement was safe.
The total indorsement was about $17,000,000.
Value of all Railroads in the State (from the Auditor's Reports)
1871, 1496 miles
1872, 1629 miles
1873* 1793 miles
1874, miles
1875, miles
1875, (returns from railroad officials)
^25,943,052.59
29»58o,737-64
25,408,110.76
22,747,444.00
12,033,763.39
9.654,684.99
^Southern Argus, Feb. 2, 1872 ; Auditor's Reports, 1871 and 1873; Mathes,
"General Forrest," p. 362 ; Wyeth, " Life of General Nathan P.eford Forrest," pp. 617,
619. When Smith had indorsed this road for ^720,000, he reported the amount as
$640,000. Independent Monitor, Dec. 13, 1 870.
2 Act of Dec. 30, 1868.
« Senate Journal, 1872-1873, pp. 416-422 ; Acts of Ala., 1872-1873, p. 58; Audi^
tor's Reports, 1871, 1873; Governor Lewis's Report, Nov. 17, 1873.
4 Act of Feb. 25, 1870.
^ Auditor's Report, 1873.
604 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Summary
1
Name of Road
Alabama and
Chattanooga
E.Alabama and
Cincinnati
Mobile and Ala-
bama G.T. .
Montgomery
and Eufaula .
Mobile and
Montgomery
Savannah and
Memphis . ,
Selma and Gulf
Selma, Marion,
and Memphis
New Orleans
and Selma
South and North
Alabama . .
295
25
50
60
45
Value
PEK
Mile
^15,000
12,000
13,000
10,600
10,000
10,000
14,000
15,000
O H "
S 16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16,000
16.000
16,000
16,000
Value of
Road
^4,018,388.00
264,150.00
704,225.00
1,157,071.60
2,516,250.00
498,810.00
424,900.00
738,400.00
225,350.00
2,877,730.00
Indorse-
ment OF
Road
$5,300,000 ^
400,000
880,000 2
1,280,000 3
2,500,000 4
640,000
640,000 5
765,000 6
320,000
4,026,000 "
Present
Road
Ala. Great
Southern
Remarks
Seized
Completed
by stalel
;ted. I
Mobile and
Birm'gh'mj
Central of
Georgia j
L'svilleand!
Nashville
Never completed.
Seized and leased
by the state.
Did not default
never completed
Never completed.
Never completed.
B'ham, Sel-
ma &N.0.! Never completed.
L'svilleand
Nashville
County and Town Aid to Railroads
An act of December 31, 1868, authorized the counties, towns, and
cities to subscribe to railroad stock. The road corporation was to be
voted on by the people. If ''no subscription" was voted, a new elec-
tion might be ordered within twelve months, and if again voted down,
the matter was to be considered as settled. If a subscription was
voted, an extra tax was to be levied to pay the interest on the bonds ;
the taxpayer was to be presented with a tax receipt which was good
for its face value in the county or city railroad stock. ^ Several of the
counties and towns issued bonds and incurred heavy debts which
have burdened them for years. No one seems to have profited by
1 ^1,300,000 fraudulent indorsement ; $2,000,000 in state bonds in addition.
2 No record of $80,000 indorsement.
* Also "three per cent fund" amounting to $30,000+, and state bonds amounting
to $300,000. No record of $720,000.
* No record of $1,500,000. ^ -^q record of $160,000. Also a loan of $40,000.
6 No record of $45,000. "^ Including $2,200,000, of which no record was found.
8 Act of Dec. 31, 1868 ; Acts of 1868, p. 514.
COUNTY AND TOWN AID TO RAILROADS
605
ic issues except the promoters/ The counties that suffered worst
liom Reconstruction bond issues were Randolph, Chambers, Lee,
Tallapoosa, and Pickens. These were hopelessly burdened with debt
and became known as the "strangulated" counties. There was,
after the Democrats came into power, much legislation for their
relief. The state gave them the state taxes to assist in paying off
the debt and also loaned money to them. Several cities and towns,
notably Mobile, Selma, and Opehka, were so deeply in debt that
they were unable to pay interest on their debts. They lost their
charters, ceased to be cities, and became districts under the direct
control of the governor. There are still several such districts in the
state. The constitution of 1875 forbade state, counties, or towns to
engage in works of internal improvement, or to lend money or credit
to such, or to any private or corporate enterprise.
It is impossible to secure complete statistics of the railroad bond
issues of counties and towns. Some issues were made in igno-
rance, without authority of law, others were made under the pro-
visions of a general law. Naturally, the counties that suffered most
were those of the Black Belt under carpet-bag control. The follow-
ing is a summary of the issues made under special acts : —
County
OR Town
Barbour .
Chambers
Dallas
Greene
Hale .
Lee
Madison
Pickens
Randolph
Tallapoosa
Eutaw
Greensboro
Mobile
Mobile
Opelika
Prattville
Troy .
Date
Amount
$150,000
140,000
1869
80,000
1869
60,000
275,000
1873
130,000
1869
100,000
100,000
125,000
1869
20,000
1869
15,000
1871
1, 00c ,000
1873
200,000
25,000
1872
50,000
1868
75,000
Road Aided
Vicksburg and Brunswick
East Alabama and Cincinnati
New Orleans and Selma
Selma, Marion, and Memphis
Selma, Marion, and Memphis
East Alabama and Cincinnati
Memphis and Charleston
Selma, Marion, and Memphis
Selma. Marion, and Memphis
Selma, Marion, and Memphis
Mobile and Northwestern
East Alabama and Cincinnati
South and North Alabama
Mobile and Girard
Authority
Act, Dec. 31,
Act, Dec. 31,
Act, Dec. 31,
Act, Mar. 3,
Act, Mar. 3,
Act, Dec. 31,
Act, Mar. 27,
Act, Mar. 3,
Act, Dec. 31,
1868
1868
1868
1870
1870
1868
1873
1870
1868
Act, Mar. 2, 1870
Act, Mar. 3, 1870
Act, Mar. 8, 1871
Act, Mar. 7, 1873
Act, Jan. 23, 1872
Act, Oct. 8, 1868
Vote
loii to 550
2260 to 301
Also earlier
12 12 to 607
98 to 35
164 to I
'^Southern Argus, June 14, 1872; Miller, "Alabama," p. 278; Acts of Ala.,
passim] "Northern Alabama,'i p. 737; Brown, "Alabama," p. 291; IIcrI)ert, "Solid
South," p. 53.
CHAPTER XIX
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS
School System before Reconstruction
The public school system of the state of Alabama was organizec
in 1854, and was an expansion of the Mobile system, which was parti)
native and partly modelled on the New York-New England systems.'
By 1856 it was in good working order. The school fund for 1855
was $237,515.00; for 1856, $267,694.41, and the number of children
in attendance was 100,279, which was about one- fourth of the white
population. For 1857 the fund amounted to $281,874.41 ; for 18583
$564,210.46, with an attendance of 98,274 children.^ The schools
were not wholly free, since those parents who were able to do so paic
part of the tuition.^ In i860 there were also 206 academies, with ai
enrolment of 10,778 pupils, and in the state colleges there were 212c
students.
In spite of the war the system managed to exist until 1864, anc
some schools were still open in 1865, at the time of surrender. FeM
of the private schools and colleges survived until that time, and ihi
majority of the school buildings of all kinds were either destroy ec
during the war, or after its close were placed in the hands of the Freed
men's Bureau or of the army. The State Medical College was used
for a negro primary school for three years, and was not given up until
the reconstructionists came into power. An attempt in 1865 was
made to reopen the University, although the buildings had been burned
by the Federals in 1865. The trustees met, elected a president anc
two professors, but on the day appointed for the opening (in October)
only one student appeared.'*
1 A commission from Mobile visited the schools in New York, Boston, and other
cities of the North.
2 Exclusive of Mobile County, which, as the honored pioneer, has always been out-
side of, and a model for, the state system.
8 Clark, "History of Education in Alabama," pp. 221-241 ; Report of the United
States Commissioner of Education, 1876, p. 6.
* The son of ex-Governor Watts. Clark, p. 94.
606
SCHOOL SYSTEM BEFORE RECONSTRUCTION 607
During the summer and fall of 1865 and during the next year the
various religious denominations of the state and mass-meetings of
citizens declared that the changed civil relations of the races made
negro education a necessity. The Freedmen's Bureau was estab-
lished and anticipated much of the work planned by the churches and
by southern leaders, but the methods employed by the ahen teachers
caused many whites to become prejudiced against negro education/
The provisional government adopted the ante-bellum pubhc
school system and put it into operation. The schools were open to
both races, from six to twenty years of age, separate schools being
provided for the blacks. The greater part of the expenditure of the
provisional government was for schools. Relatively few negroes at-
tended the state schools proper, as every influence was brought to
bear to make them attend the Bureau and missionary schools, and
the state negro schools soon fell into the hands of the Bureau educa-
tors, who drew the state appropriation.
The colleges at Marion, Greensboro, Auburn, Florence, and other
places were reopened in 1866-186 7. The legislature loaned $70,000
to the University, besides paying the interest on the University fund.
For three years the University was being rebuilt, and so well were its
finances managed that in 1868, when the carpet-baggers came into
power, the buildings were completed and the institution out of debt,
although it had used only half of the loan from the state. ^
The Reconstruction convention of 1867 was much more interested
in pohtics than in education. The negro members demanded free
schools and special advantages for the negro, and a few carpet-baggers
had much to say about the mahgn influence of the old regime in keep-
ing so many thousands in the darkness of ignorance. The scalawags
demanded separate schools for the races, but pressure was brought
to bear and most of them gave way. Sixteen of the native whites
refused to sign the constitution and united in a protest against the
action of the convention in refusing to provide separate schools.^
1 See Ch. XI, Sec. 3.
2 Clark, p. 95 et passim. In 1869 N. B. Cloud, the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, asked the legislature to make the loan a gift, since the destruction of the
buildings was "the natural fruits of secession," the fault of the ** purblind leaders" who
" pretended to secede." Therefore he thought the state was responsible for the damage
done the University.
2 See Journal Convention of 1867, p. 242 e^ passim, and above, Chs. XIV and XV.
6o8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The School System of Reconstruction i|
The new constitution placed all public instruction under the con-
trol of a Board of Education consisting of the Superintendent of Public^
Instruction and two members from each congressional district/ the ■
latter to serve for four years, half of them being elected by the people
every two years. Full legislative powers in regard to education were
given to the Board. Its acts were to have the force of law, and the
governor's veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote. The legis-
lature might repeal a school law, but otherwise it had no authority
over the Board.^ This body also acted as a board of regents for the j
State University. One school, at least, was to be estabHshed in every
township in the state, though some townships did not have half a
dozen children in them. The school income was fixed by the con-
stitution at one-fifth of all state revenue, in addition to the income
from school lands, poll tax, and taxes on railroads, navigation, banks,
and insurance.^ The legislature added another source of income by
chartering several lotteries and exempted them from taxation pro-
vided they paid a certain amount to the school fund. On October lo,
1868, the Mutual Aid Association was chartered "to distribute books,
paintings, works of art, scientific instruments and apparatus, lands, etc.,
stock and currency, awards, and prizes." For this privilege it was to
give $2000 a year to the school fund.^ Two months later the Mobile
Charitable Association was formed, which paid $1000 a year to the
school fund,^ and a number of other lotteries were chartered soon after.
1 There were four congressional districts.
2 The supreme court decided in regard to the Board of Education : "The new
system has not only administrative, but full legislative, powers concerning all matters
having reference to the common school and public educational interests of the state. It
cannot be destroyed nor essentially changed by legislative authority." Report of the
Commissioner of Education, 1873, p. 5. But in 1873-1874 the legislature, however, by
refusing appropriations, did manage to nullify the work of the Board.
3 Constitution of 1867, Art. XI.
* In 1871 the legislature repealed this act, and a case that arose was carried to the
United States supreme court, which, reversing a former decision of the state supreme
court, held that the action of one legislature could not restrain subsequent legislatures
from legislating for the public welfare by suppressing practices that tended to corrupt
public morals. Besides, the court professed itself unable to find in the act any authority
for a lottery. See Boyd vs. Alabama, 94 United States Reports, p. 645 (opinion by
Justice Field).
^ Act of Dec. 31, 1868. At the same time the office of Commissioner of Lotteries
was created, with a salary of $2000 a year.
THE SCHOOL SYSTEM OF RECONSTRUCTION 609
The school system, as a whole, did not differ greatly from the old,
cpt that it was top-heavy with officials, and in that all private
istance was discouraged by a regulation forbidding the use of the
i)lic money to supplement private payments. The first Board of
I.ducation probably contained a collection of as worthless men as
lid be found in the state.^ The elections had gone by default, and
Ml ice only the most incompetent men had offered themselves for
educational offices, the work suffered. Dr. N. B. Cloud, an incapable
of ante-bellum days, was chosen Superintendent of Public Instruction.
TR' was a man without character, without education, and entirely
y ihout administrative ability. Before the war he was known as a
el master to his few slaves. In August, 1868, he proceeded to put
1 ic system into operation by appointing sixty-four county superin-
t indents, of Radical politics, each of whom in turn appointed three
trustees in each township. The stream rose no higher than its source,
and the school officials were a forlorn lot. One of them signed for
his salary by an X mark. Another, J. E. Summerford, the superin-
tendent of Lee County, was a man of bad morals, and so incompe-
tent that, when attempting to examine teachers for licenses, he in
turn was contemptuously questioned by them on elementary subjects.
In revenge for this expression of contempt, he revoked the Hcense of
every teacher in the county. One county superintendent was a
preacher who had been expelled from his church for misappropriat-
ing charity funds. But Cloud paid no attention to charges made
against the integrity of his school officials.
Cloud proceeded with much haste to open the schools. A year
later he made a report which is an interesting document. There was
little progress to be noted, but much space was devoted to an appre-
ciation of that "glorious document," the constitution of 1867, the
crowning glory of which — the article on education — should "entitle
the members to the rare merit of statemen and sages." This provi-
sion for education, he said, was the first blow struck in the South,
^ This is the opinion of two subsequent members — one a Democrat and one a
Radical. See also Ku Klux Report, Ala. Test., p. 426. The members were G. L.
Putnam, A. B. Collins (Collins was made a professor in the University, but murdered
Ilaughey, the Radical Congressman, and fled from the state), W. D. Miller, Jesse H.
Booth, Thomas A. Cook, James Nichols, William H. Clayton, Gustavus A. Smith, — four
scalawags and four carpet-baggers. The first two named resigned to accept offices
created by the board. See Register of the University of Alabama, 1831-1901, p. 20.
2 R
6lO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and especially in Alabama, to clear out the last vestige of ignor
with all its attendant evils ; and now, in spite of the burdens impose
by the unwise legislation of the past forty years, the bosoms of t
citizens expanded with a noble pride in the present system of school
After this he proceeds to business. He reports that in ever
county and in almost every township in the state his officials met wit
opposition, not, he confesses, on account of opposition to schools, bu
on account of the objectionable government and its agents. Th
reports from the white counties, especially, indicate opposition t
the estabHshment of negro schools, while in the Black Belt this oppa
sition was not so strong. Everywhere, he states, the opposition die(
out, more or less, in time.^
Before the new system went into operation, a meeting of th
Board was held in Montgomery to clear away the remains of the oL
system. They voted to themselves a secretary, sergeant- at- arms
pages, etc., hke the House of Representatives; all school offices weri
declared vacated and all school contracts void ; separate schools wen
provided for the races where the parents were unwilling to send t<
mixed schools ; eleven normal schools were provided for, with no dis
tinction of color; and a bill was introduced by G. L. Putnam anc
passed into a law, the object of which was to merge the Mobile school
into the state system and also to make an office for Putnam. A sun
of money had been appropriated by the previous legislatures to pa;
the teachers in the state schools, and now the Board declared thai
any association, society, or teacher in a school open to the pubHc
should have a claim for part of this money.^ The county superin
tendents were made elective after 1870; cooperation with the Freed
men's Bureau was declared desirable, and the Bureau was askec
to furnish or to rent houses, or to assist in building, while the aic
societies were asked to send teachers who would be paid by the state
and who would be subject to the same regulations as native teachers
The "Superintendent of Education" of the Bureau was to hav
supervision over the Bureau schools, but he, in turn, would be undei
the supervision of Cloud.^
1 Report, Nov. lo, 1869.
2 This was done at the instance of the aid societies from the North which had been
doing work among the negroes.
3 Acts, Aug. II, 1868. Public School Laws (pamphlet). See also Acts of Ala,
1868, pp. 147-160.
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY 6ll
Reconstruction of the State University
The Board then tried to reconstruct the University. After the
appearance of the lone student in 1865, the efforts of the trustees had
been directed only towards completing the buildings. In 1868, after
the constitution of 1867 had failed of adoption, the old trustees met,
elected a president and faculty, and ordered the University to be
opened in October, 1868. A few weeks later Congress imposed the
constitution on the state, and the Board of Education as regents took
charge of the University. Their first act was to declare null and void
all acts of any pretended body of trustees since the secession of the
state. This was done in order to repudiate a debt made by the Uni-
versity with a New York firm in 1861. No suitable candidate for
the presidency was presented, and the regents chose for that position
Mr. Wyman, the acting president.^ He decKned, and the position
was then sought for and obtained by the Rev. A. S. Lakin, a Northern
Methodist preacher, who had been sent to Alabama in 1867 by Bishop
Clark of Ohio, to gather the negroes of the Southern Methodist Church
into the northern fold.^ Lakin, accompanied by Cloud, went to the
University to take charge. Wyman, who was then in charge, refused
to surrender the keys, and a Tuscaloosa mob, or Ku Klux Klan, sere-
naded Lakin and threatened to lynch him if he remained in town. It
is said that he was saved from the mob by Wyman, who hid him
under a bed. The next morning Lakin decided that he did not like
the place and left.^ He did not resign, however, and three years later
still had a claim pending for a full year's salary. On this he collected
$800 from the Board of Regents.^
1 Clark, p. 98. 2 See Ch. XX.
8 Nicholas Davis, a north Alabama Republican, had this to say about Lakin to the Ku
Klux subcommittee : " He called on me to explain why I said unkind things about his
being candidate for president of the Alabama University, and I said, ' Mr. Lakin, you
and I are near neighbors, and I don't want to have much to do with you — not much ;
but I think this : didn't you try to be president of the Alabama University ? ' He said he
did. I said, ' It would have been a disgrace to the state. You don't know an adjective
from a verb, nor nothing else.' ... He says, * . . . but I rather didn't like what you
said.' I said, ' Doctor, you will have to like it or let it alone.' He let it alone." — Ku
Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 784.
* Clark, p. 98, is not correct on this point ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. iii,
112, 113, 114 ; account of Dr. O. D. Smith of the second Board of Education ; Inde-
pendent Monitor, Aug. 9 and Sept. i, 1868.
6l2 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
(From the Independent Monitor, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, Scptcmlior 1, 18C8.]
A PROSPECTIVE SCENE IN THE CITY OF OAKS, 4TH OF MARCH, 18G9.
"H<ang, curs, lian^! ***** TAciV complexion is perfect gallowa. Stand fast, cood
fate, to their hanging i ***** if they be not bom to be hanged, our case ia miserable."
The aLovo cut represents the fate in store for those great ppsts of Sotithcrn society —
the carpet-bagger and scalawag— if found in Dixie's hxnd after the break of day on tho
4th of March next.
Tho genus carpet-bagger is a man with a lank head of dry hair, a lank stomach, and
long legs, club knees, and splay feet, dried legs,audlank jaws, with eyes like a fish and
mouth like a shark. Add to this a habit of sneaking and dodging about in unknown
places, habiting with negroes in dark dens and back streets, a look like a hound, and tho
suiell of a polecat.
Words are wanting to do full justice to the gcnvs scalawag. He is a cur with a con-
tracted head, downward look, slinking and uneasy gait; sleeps in tho woods, like old
Crossland, at the bare idea of a Ku-KIux raid.
Our scalawag is the local leper of the community. Unlike the carpet-bagger, he fa
native, which is so much tho worse. Once he was respected in his circle, liis head was
level, and he would look his neighbor in the face. Now, possessed of the itch of office
and the salt rheum of radicalism, he is a mangy dog, slinking through the alleys, hunt-^
ing the governor's office, defiling with tobacco juice the steps .of the ca pi tol, stretching
bis lazy carcass in the sun on the square or the benches of the mayor's court.
He waiteth,, for tho troubling of the political waters, to the end that ho may step in
and be healed of the itch by the ointn)ent of office. For office he " bums," as a toper
■' bums " for the satisfying dram. For office, yet in prospective, he hath bartered respect-
ability ; hath abandoned business and ceased to labor with his hands, but employs his
feet kicking out boot-heels against lamp-post and corner-curb while discussing the
question of office.
It requires no seer to foretell tho inevitable events that are to result from the coming
fall election throughout tho Southern States.
The unprecedented reaction is moving onward with the swiftness of a velocipede,
with the violence of a tornado, and with the crash of an avalanche, sweeping negroism
jDrom the face of the earth.
Woe, woe, woe to the inhabitants of Alabama who have recently become squatter-
It was in connection with Lakin's short visit that the Independent
Monitor pubHshed the famous hanging picture of the carpet-bagger
(Lakin) and the scalawag (Cloud). ^
1 For the picture see Ala. Test., p. 113, or the Independent Monitor, Sept i, 1868.
Ryland Randolph, the editor of the Monitor at that time, says that the picture was
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY 613
The next offer of the presidency was made to R. D. Harper, a
Northern Methodist Bureau minister, who at one time was the
Bureau "Superintendent of Education" for the state, and who or-
ganized the Bureau schools and the Northern Methodist churches in
north Alabama. He, after some consideration, dechned the position,
which, to an ahen, was one of more danger than honor. ^
Difficulty was also experienced in securing a faculty. Some of
the faculty elected by the old board of trustees were reelected. Geary
of Ohio was given the chair of mathematics, and Goodfellow of
Chicago, who had previously been a clerk of the lower house of the
legislature, was elected commandant and professor of military sci-
ence. The latter said that he did not know anything about his work,
but that he guessed he could learn. General John H. Forney, a
Confederate and native, was also elected to a chair, the Board, it is
said, voting for him under a misapprehension. The native contingent
refused to serve under the regents, and the vacancies had again to be
filled.^ Loomis of lUinois was elected professor of Ancient Lan-
guages ; J. De F. Richards of Vermont, professor of Natural Philoso-
phy and Astronomy, etc. W. J. Collins, who was elected professor
of Oratory and Rhetoric, wrote, ''I except the situation." The
Monitor said, "We predict an uncomfortable time for the aggrega-
tion." ^ That paper chronicled all the weaknesses, pecuharities, and
failings of the faculty. If one of them drank a Httle too much and
staggered on the street, the Monitor informed the pubhc* Upon the
arrival of an heir in the Coffins family, Randolph promptly demanded
that he be named for him, — Ryland Randolph Coffins, — and the
name stuck.
Finally, as it seemed impossible to secure a president, the regents
made from a rough woodcut, fashioned in the Monitor office. The Cincinnati Commer-
cial published an edition of 500,000 copies of the hanging picture for distribution as a
campaign document. A Columbus, Ohio, newspaper also printed for distribution a
larger edition containing the famous picture. This was during the Seymour-Grant
campaign, and the Democratic newspapers and leaders of the state were furious at
Randolph for furnishing such excellent campaign literature to the Radicals.
1 Clark, p. 98 ; Independent Monitor, Jan. 5 and March 23, 1869.
2 Selma Times and Messenger, Aug. 9, 1868.
3 Clark, pp. 98, 99. Monitor, Jan. 5, March i and 23, 1869. " The Reconstruction
University," a farce, was acted at the court-house for the benefit of the brass band.
There was no hope whatever that the reconstructed faculty would have a pleasant time.
4 See the Monitor, March i, 1869.
6l4 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
determined to open the University with Richards as acting presiden
On April i, 1869, the University opened with thirty students, twenty-
eight of whom were beneficiaries.^ The Monitor said that the mem-
bers of the faculty were known as Shanghai, Cockeye, Tanglefoot,
Old Dicks, etc. Another woodcut appeared in the Monitor — of
Richards, this time.^
Thirty was the highest enrolment reached under the Reconstruc-
tion faculty. The number gradually dwindled away until at the end
of the session there were only ten. The next session ended with only
three. In October, 1870, there were ten students, four of whom
were sons of professors. Wilham R. Smith ^ was elected president
during this session, but he reported that there was no prospect of
success under the present conditions and resigned. By the end of
the session not one student remained. The scientific apparatus was
scattered and lost, as were also the museum specimens and hbrary
books, and the $2000 object-glass of the telescope had disappeared.^
The people of Alabama did not favor the continuance of the Uni-
versity under the reconstructed faculty, and were glad when the doors
were closed. The Ku Klux Klan took part in the work of breaking
down the venture. Notices were posted on the doors, directed to the
^ Richards was at the same time state senator from Wilcox, sheriff of the same
county, contractor to feed prisoners, and professor in the University. His income from
all the offices was about ^12,000, the professorship paying about ^2500.
2 Report of Cloud, Nov., 1869. Clark, p. 99.
^ See Monitor f April 6, 1869. The editor of the Alonitor finally came to grief
because of his attacks on the Radical faculty. His paper had charged Professor V. H.
Vaughn with drunkenness, whipping his wife, incompetence, etc. After a year of such
pleasantries, Vaughn, who was a timid man, determined to secure assistance and be
revenged. In the University was a student named Smith, son of a regent and nephew
of the governor, who, on account of his Union record, was given the position of
steward of the mess hall, after the removal of the old steward. Smith had been in
trouble about abstracting stores from the University commissary, and the Monitor had
not spared him. So he and Vaughn with their guns went after Randolph, and Smith
shot him " while Vaughn stood at a respectful distance." Randolph lost his leg from
the shot. Smith and Vaughn were put in jail, but through the connivance of the offi-
cials made their escape. Vaughn went to Washington and was given an office in Utah
territory. See Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 1979.
* He was a competent man, well educated and possessing administrative ability. In
the secession convention he had led the cooperationist forces.
s Clark, pp. 99-101 ; Monitor, Jan. 10 and 25 and March 28, 1871. The Register
of the University (p. 218) gives only thirteen names for the session 1870-1871. No
record was kept at the University.
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY 615
indents, advising them to leave. One sent to the son of Governor
Miiith read as follows : —
David Smith : You have received one notice from us, and this shall be our
last. You nor no other d — d son of a d — d radical traitor shall stay at our Uni-
versity. Leave here in less than ten days, for in that time we will visit the place
and it will not be well for you to be found out there. The state is ours and so
shall our University be.
Written by the Secretary by order of the Klan.
Charles Muncel, son of Joel Muncel, the pubHsher, of Albany,
New York,^ received the following notice : —
Charles Muncel : You had better get back where you came from. We
don't want any d — d Yank at our colleges. In less than ten days we will come
to see if you obey our warning. If not, look out for hell, for d — n you, we will
show you that you shall not stay, you nor no one else, in that college. This is
your first notice ; let it be your last.
The Klan by the Secretary.
The next warning was sent to a lone Democrat : —
Horton : They say you are of good Democratic family. If you are, leave
the University and that quick. We don't intend that the concern shall run any
longer. This is the second notice you have received ; you will get no other. In
less than ten days we intend to clear out the concern. We will have good
Southern men there or none.
By order of the K. K. K.^
Before the summer of 1871 the reconstructed faculty had abso-
lutely failed ; there never had been any chance for them to succeed.
The regents were unfitted to manage educational affairs, and they
chose men to the faculty who would have been objectionable any-
where.^ The professors and their famihes were socially ostracized.
Even southern men who accepted places in the Radical faculty were
made to feel that they were scorned; no one would sit by them at
public gatherings or in church. The men might have survived this
treatment, but not so the women. In 1871 the Superintendent of
Public Instruction and two members of the board of regents were
1 See Register of the University of Alabama, p. 217.
2 These notices were printed in the Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 418. They
were fastened to the door with a dagger. The students who were notified left at
once.
2 See Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 426 (Speed).
6l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Democrats. The faculty was reorganized for the eighth time since
1865, and a facuky of natives was elected. The efifect upon the
attendance was marked. In April, 1871, there were three students
and in June none, while during the session of 1 871- 1872, 107 stu-
dents were enrolled. In 1873 ^^^ ^^74 the Radicals again had con-
trol, but they did not attempt to reconstruct the University.^
When the land grant college, provided for in the Morrill act of
1862, was estabhshed in 1872, there was no attempt made to appoint
a reconstructed faculty or board of trustees. But there was sharp
competition among the towns of the state to secure the college. The
legislature was to choose the location, and many of the members let
it be known that their votes were to be had only in return for mate-
rial considerations. It was finally located at Auburn, in Lee County.]
One Auburn lobbyist went out on the floor of one of the houses and]
there paid a negro solon $50 to talk no more against A-uburn. The
next day the same negro was again speaking against the location at
Auburn. His purchaser went to him and remonstrated. The negro
acknowledged that he had accepted the $50 not to speak against
Auburn, but said, "Dat was yistiddy, boss." Another Auburn man
promised a cooking stove to a negro of more domestic inchnations,^
and amidst the excitement forgot all about it ; but after the vote the
negro came up and demanded his stove. He received it. Another
was given a sewing-machine.^
There was no attempt to force the entrance of negroes into the
State University. Some reformers wanted the test made, but too
many scalawags were bitterly opposed to such a step, to say nothing
of the Ku Klux Klan. In December, 1869, the Board of Education
1 The following table gives the enrolment of students during Reconstruction : —
Session Students
1868-9
1869-70 30
187O-I 21
187I-2 107
1872-3 135
1873-4 53
1874-5 74
1875-6 Ill
1876-7 164
2 I have this account from the men who furnished the bribes.
TROUBLE IN THE MOBILE SCHOOLS 617
asked the legislature to provide a university for the negroes/ and
-cveral colored normal schools were estabhshed. In 1871, Peyton
Finley, the negro member of the Board of Education,^ introduced a
series of resolutions declaring that the negro had no desire to push
any claim to enter the State University, but that they wanted one of
their own, and Congress was urged to grant land for that purpose.^
But not until December, 1873, "^^^ ^^^ Lincoln school at Marion,
Perry County, designated as the colored university and normal school,
where a liberal education was to be given the negro.''
Trouble in the Mobile Schools
For more than a year Cloud had trouble in the schools of Mobile.
The Mobile schools (always independent of the state system) were
under the control of a school board appointed by the military authori-
ties in 1865. When all offices and contracts were vacated, G. L. Put-
nam, a member of the Board of Education, and also connected with
the Emerson Institute, which was conducted at Mobile by the Ameri-
can Missionary Association, had secured the enactment, because he
wanted the position, of a school law providing for a superintendent of
education for Mobile County. In August, 1868, Cloud gave him the
office. The old school commissioners refused to recognize the
authority of Putnam, who was unable to displace them, because he
himself could not make bond. But, in order to give him some kind
of office. Cloud went to Mobile and proposed a compromise, which
was to appoint one of the old commissioners superintendent of edu-
cation and Putnam superintendent of negro schools under the super-
vision of the other superintendent and the board of commissioners,
which was still to exist. This was an arrangement Cloud had no
lawful authority to make.
As part of the compromise the principal and teachers of the Ameri-
can Missionary Association were to be retained and paid by the state.
1 Clark, p. 99.
'^ Finley had been doorkeeper for the first Board (i 868-1 870), and in 1870 was
elected to serve four years. He was a member of the convention of 1867 and of the
legislature. He had no education and no ability, but he was a sensible negro and was
an improvement on the white men of the preceding Board.
8 Journal of the Board of Education and Regents, June 20, 1871.
^ Act of Dec. 6, 1873, School Laws.
6l8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Emerson Institute (or ''Blue College," as the negroes called it)
was to remain in possession of the American Missionary Association,
but the school board and county superintendent were to have control
over the schools in it. Putnam, as superintendent of the "Blue Col-
lege" school, refused to allow the control of the board. He wanted
them to pay his teachers, but would have no supervision. The gen-
eral field agent of the American Missionary Association, Edward P.
Smith, offered the "schools and teachers" to the school commission-
ers to be paid but not controlled. "We ought now in some way," he
said, "to have our teachers recognized and paid for, from the public
fund, an amount equal to that paid for similar grades to other teachers
in Mobile." At the same time the state was paying $125 per month
for the use of the building over which the Association and Putnam
would allow no supervision. The county superintendent and the
commissioners, unable to secure any control over the Putnam schools,
refused to recognize them as a part of the Mobile system. Cloud
declared all the offices vacant, but the commissioners refused
to vacate. The case was carried into court and the commissioners
were put in jail. The supreme court ordered them released.
The Board of Education then met and abolished the Mobile
system and merged the special and independent schools of that
county into the general state system. This was done on Novem-
ber 13, 1869.^
The judiciary committee of the legislature, consisting of three
Radicals and one Democrat, was directed to investigate the conduct
of Cloud in the Mobile troubles. It was reported (i) that "Cloud had
appointed two superintendents in Mobile County, contrary to law;
(2) that on January 29, 1869, G. L. Putnam, who was not an official
of the state and who, according to the compromise, should have been
1 Clark, p. 232 ; Report of Qoud, Nov., 1869; Montgomery Mail, Sept. 16, 1870.
In connection with the act merging the Mobile schools into the state system, the Board
of Education took occasion to enlarge or complete its constitutional powers. There
was no limit, according to the Constitution, to the time for the governor to retain acts of
the Board. Governor Smith had pocketed several obnoxious educational bills, and the
Board now resolved " that the same rules and provisions which by law govern and
define the time and manner in which the governor of the state shall approve of or object
to any bill or resolution of the General Assembly shall also apply to any bill or resolution
having the force of law passed by this Board of Education." The governor approved
neither resolution nor the Mobile act, but they were both declared in force. Montgomery
Mail, Nov, 3, 1870.
TROUBLE IN THE MOBILE SCHOOLS 619
under the control of the county superintendent, drew from the state
treasury with the connivance of Cloud between $5000 and $6000,
with which he paid the teachers of " Blue College," who were in
the employ of the American Missionary Association and not of the
state of Alabama; (3) that in July, 1869, Cloud again appointed
Putnam superintendent of education for Mobile County, and sixty
days afterwards he made a bond which was declared worthless by
the grand jury, and after that Cloud gave Putnam a warrant for $9000,
which he was prevented from collecting only by an injunction;
(4) that while the injunction was in force as concerned both Putnam
and Cloud, the latter drew from the treasury $2000 or more of the
Mobile school funds to pay lawyers' fees ; (5) that while the injunc-
tion was still in force Cloud drew $3600 from the treasury for Put-
nam, the greater part or all of which was illegally used; (6) that
Cloud again drew a warrant for $3300, which the auditor, discovering
that Putnam was interested, refused to allow, and it was destroyed;
(7) the committee further stated that very large salaries were paid
to the teachers in " Blue College," or Emerson Institute, — that one of
them (Squires) received $4000 a year. The committee went beyond
the limit of the resolution and reported that county superintendents
were paid too much, and recommended the abolition of the Board of
Education by constitutional amendment, the reduction of the pay of
all school officials who acted as a sponge to absorb all the school funds,
and, finally, that no person should hold more than one school office at
the same time.^
Later investigation showed that Putnam had made out pay-rolls
for the teachers of the Emerson Institute for the last quarter of 1868
and presented them to A. H. Ryland, the county superintendent of
Mobile, for his approval. This Ryland refused to give, as the com-
promise in regard to the Institute dated only from January 22, 1869.
Putnam then went to his own American Missionary Association Negro
Institute Board, had the pay-rolls approved, and then, as "county
superintendent of education," drew $5327.20, Cloud certifying to the
correctness of his accounts.^ Putnam padded the pay-rolls and, in
order to draw principal's wages for each teacher, divided the Institute
into ten schools. As there were only ten teachers besides the principal,
1 Senate Journal, 1869-1870, p. 419.
2 Montgomery Mail, Sept. 16, 1870.
620 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
there were now eleven principals.^ Kelsey, the principal, stated tha
no matter how much Putnam obtained for "Blue College," the teach
ers received none of it, but were paid only their regular salaries by th(
Association. Kelsey himself was paid only $250 a quarter. Th(
teachers were under contract with the Association to teach for $15
month and board. Some of them testified that they had received nc
more. However, a part of the appropriation was turned into the
treasury of the Association, and we may well ask what became of th(
remainder of it.^
Irregularities in School Administration
Superintendent Cloud was handicapped, not only by his own inca
pacity, but also by the bad character of his subordinates, whom h
appointed in great haste from the unpromising material that supportec
the Reconstruction regime. Many of the receipts for the salaries wen
signed by the teachers with marks, some being unable to write thei
1 A specimen pay-roll of Emerson Institute ("Blue College") for the quarter end
ing March 31, 1869 : —
Months
Salary
Total
G. L. Putnam, Supt. of Colored Schools
H. S. Kelsey, Prin. Emerson Institute
E. I. Ethridge, Prin. Grammar School
Susie A. Carley, Prin. Lower School .
A. A. Rockfellow, Prin. Intermediate School
Sarah A. Primey, Prin. Intermediate School
M. L. Harris, Prin. Intermediate School »
M. A. Cooley, Prin. Intermediate School .
M. E. F. Smith, Prin. Intermediate School.
Ruth A. Allen, Primary School .
N. G. Lincoln, Primary School .
M. L. Theyer, Primary School .
Judge Rapier, legal opinion
American Missionary Association, fuel
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
^333.33
225.00
200.00
180.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
105.00
$lOOO.(X
6oo.o<
540.o<
3i5.o<
3i5-o<
3i5«
3i5.«
315.00
3i50(
3i5«
315-00
5o.o<
40.0Q
Total
^5425.oc
At this time the average salary of the teacher in the state schools was $42 a month,
2 Montgofuery Mail, Sept. 16, 1876. Cloud's Report, Nov., 1869, shows that
$10,447.23 had been drawn out of the treasury by Putnam, and he had also drawn
$2000 for his salary as county superintendent.
IRREGULARITIES IN SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION 62 1
own names. From the school officials he received inaccurate reports,
and on these he based his apportionments, which were defective, many
of the teachers not receiving their money. The county superintend-
ents had absolute authority over the school fund belonging to their
counties, and could draw it from the treasury and use it for private
purposes nearly a year before the salaries of the teachers were due.^
Complaint was made that the black counties received more than
their proper share of the school fund. In Pickens County the super-
intendent neglected to draw anything but his own salary, and a north
Alabama superintendent ran away with the money for his county.
Other superintendents were accused of scaling down the pay of the
teachers from 20 to 50 per cent, and it was estimated that in
some counties two-thirds of the school money never reached the
teachers. There was no check on the county superintendent, who
could expend money practically at his own discretion.^ Three trus-
tees were appointed in each township by the county superintendent;
these trustees, who were not paid, appointed for themselves a clerk
who was paid, and these clerks met in a county convention and fixed
the salary of the county superintendent.^
The bookkeeping in the office of State Superintendent Cloud was
irregular. Some of the accounts were kept in pencil, and for a whole
year the books were not posted. Of $235,000 paid to the county
superintendents only $10,000 was accounted for by them. In 1871,
$50,000 or more was still in the hands of the ex-superintendents, and
the state and the teachers were taking legal proceedings against
some of them.'' Both sons of Cloud embezzled school money and
1 Report of the Auditor, 1871 ; Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1871,
1876.
2 See Act of Dec. 2, 1869 ; Somers, " Southern States," pp. 169, 170.
3 The law stated that the trustees were to receive $2 a day, but Cloud said that it
was a mistake, as it should be the clerks who were paid, and thus it was done. There
were 1485 clerks in the state; they were paid about $60,000 a year. The county superin-
tendents received about $65,000, an average of $1000 each, which was paid from the
school fund. Before the war the average salary of the county superintendent was $300
and was paid by the county. In few counties was the work of the county superintend-
ent sufficient to keep him busy more than two days in the week. Many of the
superintendents stayed in their offices only one day in the week. The expenses of the
Board of Education were from $3000 to $5000 a year, not including the salary of the state
superintendent. Montgomery Mail, Sept. 15 and 16, 1870.
^ Hodgs(jn's Report, 1 871 ; Ala. Test., p. 233.
622 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
fled from the state/ Cloud receipted for one sum of $314 in payment'
for sixteenth- section lands. This he forgot to pay to the treasurer.
He issued patents for 4000 acres of school land and turned into the!
treasury only $323. A township in Marengo County rented its six J
teenth-section land ; nevertheless, Cloud paid to this county its six-j
teenth-section funds. In 1871 an investigation of Cloud's accounts
showed that a large number of his vouchers were fraudulent, hun^
dreds being in the same handwriting. He signed the name of J. H
Fitts & Company, financial agents of the University, to a receipt by
which he drew from the treasury several hundred dollars to advance
to a needy professor. He said, when questioned about it, that he
thought he could "draw on" Messrs. Fitts & Company. It after
wards developed that he did not know the difference between a receipt
and a draft. His accounts were so confused that he often paid the
same bill twice. In 1871, when he went out of office, the sum unac-
counted for by vouchers amounted to $260,556.37. After two years
he succeeded in getting vouchers for all but $129,595.71.^
In the black counties the school finances became confused, espe-<
cially as the negro and carpet-bag officials tolled the funds that passed
through their hands. At the end of 1870 the school funds of Selma
were $40,000 short. It was found practically impossible to collect a
poll tax from the negroes, the Radical collectors being afraid to insist
on the negroes' paying taxes. In Dallas County the collector refused to
allow the planters to pay taxes for their negro hands on the ground
that it would be a reHc of slavery. If the negroes refused to pay,
nothing more was said about it.^ In 1869 there were 200,000 polls
1 Qoud, the state superintendent, had power of attorney to act for certain county
superintendents. This he sub-delegated to his son, W. B. Cloud, who drew warrants for
$8551.31, which were allowed by the auditor. This amount was the school fund for the
following counties : Sumter, $1,535.59; Pickens, $6,423.17; Winston, $215.89; Cal-
houn, $176.66 ; Marshall, $200.00.
A clerk in the office of C. A. Miller, the secretary of state, forged Miller's name as
attorney and drew $3,238.39 from the Etowah County fund. ' Miller swore that he had
notified both auditor and treasurer that he would not act as attorney to draw money
for any one.
John B. Cloud bought whiskey with tax stamps. See Hodgson's Report, 1871 ;
Ala. Test., p. 233 ; Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 27, 1872.
2 Hodgson's Report, 1871; Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 27, 1872; Report of the
Commission to Examine State Offices, 1871.
^ Somers, pp. 169, 170.
OBJECTIONS TO THE RECONSTJ^UCTION EDUCATION 623
and only $66,000 poll tax was collected, which meant that only 44,000
men had paid the tax.^ In 1870 Somers states that the insurance
tax was $13,327, and the number of polls was 162,819. Yet from
both sources less than $100,000 was obtained.^
The Board of Education, according to the constitution, was to
classify by lot before the election of 1870. But in 1869, when the
matter was brought up, they 'refused to classify. Several vacancies
occurred, and these were filled by special election. Consequently
the Democrats in 1870 did not get a fair representation on the board.^
Objections to the Reconstruction Education
The Board of Education had the power to adopt a uniform series
of text-books for the pubhc schools ; Superintendent Cloud, however,
assumed this authority and chose texts which were objectionable to
the majority of the whites. This was especially the case with the
history books, which the whites complained were insulting in their
accounts of southern leaders and southern questions. Cloud was not
the man to allow the southern view of controversial questions to be
taught in schools under his control. About 1869 he secured a donation
of several thousand copies of history books which gave the northern
views of American history, and these he distributed among the teachers
and the schools. But most of the literature that the whites consid-
ered objectionable did not come from Cloud's department, but from
the Bureau and aid society . teachers, and was used in the schools
for blacks. There were several series of ^'Freedmen's Readers" and
''Freedmen's Histories" prepared for use in negro schools. But the
fact remains that for ten or fifteen years northern histories were taught
in white schools and had a decided influence on the readers. It
resulted in the combination often seen in the late southern writer, of
northern views of history with southern prejudices; the fable of the
''luxury of the aristocrats" and the numbers and wretchedness of the
"mean whites" was now accepted by numerous young southerners;
on such questions as slavery the northern view of the institution was
accepted, but on the other hand the tu quoque answer was made to the
North. Consequently, the task of the historian was not to explain
^ Montgomery Mail, Sept. 15, 1870.
2 Somers, " Southern States," p, 1 70 ; voters only counted as polls.
^ Montgomery Mail, Sept. 15, 1870.
624 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the southern civihzation, but to accept it as rather bad and to prove
that the North was partly responsible and equally guilty — a fruitless
work/
Cloud, in his first report, admitted that the opposition to schoolj
was rather on account of the officials than because the people dis-
liked free schools. He further stated that the opposition had ceasec
to a great extent. There were many whites in the Black Belt who
dishked the idea of free or ''pauper" schools, and to this day some
of them have not overcome this feeling. They beheved in education
but not in education that was given away, — at least not for the
whites. Each person must make an effort to get an education. How
ever, they, and especially the old slaveholders, were not opposd to
the education of the negro, beheving it to be necessary for the gooc
of society. In the white counties of north and southeast Alabama
there was less opposition to the pubHc schools for whites. But in
the same sections schools for the negroes were bitterly opposed b)/
the uneducated whites who were in close competition with them, foi
they knew that the whites paid for the negro schools, and also that
having a different standard of living, it would be easier for the negroes
to send their children to school than for them to send theirs. In the
Black Belt there were a few of these people, who disliked to see three
or four negro schools to one white school, for here the number of the
negroes naturally secured for them better advantages. The white
were so few in numbers that not half of them were within easy reach
of a school. Whenever the numbers of one or both races were small
it was (and has been ever since) a burden on a community to build
two schoolhouses and to support two separate schools, especially;
where the funds provided are barely sufecient for one.^
The Question of Negro Education
Before the negro question in all its phases was brought directly
into poKtics, and before the Radicals, carpet-baggers, and scalawags
had caused irritation between the races, there was a determination on
1 In recent years the people have demanded and obtained a different class of school
histories, such as those of Derry, Lee, Jones, Thompson, Cooper, Estill, and Lemmon.
Adams and Trent is an example of one of the compromise works that resulted from the
demand of the southerners for books less tinctured with northern prejudices.
2 Cloud's Report, Nov., 1869 ; Hodgson's Report, 1871 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test.,
p. 426 ; Montgomery Conference, " Race Problems," p. 107.
THE QUESTION OF NEGRO EDUCATION 625
the part of the best whites in pubhc and private hfe, as a measure of
self-defence as well as a duty and as justice, to do all that lay in their
power to fit the negro for citizenship. Most of the newspapers were
in favor of education to fit the negro for his changed condition. Now
that he had to stand alone, education was necessary to keep him from
steahng, from idleness, and from a return to barbarism; in some
parts of the Black Belt there was a tendency to return to African cus-
toms. It was necessary to substitute the discipline of education for
the discipline of slavery.^ The Democratic party leaders were in
favor of negro education, and General Clanton, who for years was
the chairman of the executive committee, repeatedly made speeches
in favor of it, and attended the sessions and examinations at the negro
schools, often examining the classes himself. He and General John B.
Gordon spoke in Montgomery at a public meeting and declared that
it was the duty of the whites to educate the negro, whose good behavior
during the war entitled him to it. Their remarks were cheered by
the whites.^ Colonel Jefferson Falkner, at a Baptist Association in
Pike County, advised that the negro be educated by southern men
and women. Pike was a white county, and while no objection was
raised to Falkner's speech, several persons told him that if he thought
southern women ought to teach negroes, he had better have his
own daughters do it. Falkner repHed that he was wilhng when their
services were needed.^ White people made destitute by the war or
crippled soldiers were ready to engage in the instruction of negroes ;
and the Montgomery Advertiser and other papers took the ground
that they should be employed, especially the disabled soldiers.^ Gen-
eral Clanton stated that many Confederate soldiers and the widows
of Confederate soldiers were teaching negro schools, that he had
assisted them in securing positions. Such work, he said, was indorsed
by most of the prominent people.^
The blacks in Selma signed an appeal to the city council for their
own white people to teach them, and the churches made preparations
to give instruction to the freedmen.® The Monroe County Agricul-
1 See Ala. Test., p. 236 (General Qanton).
2 Ku Klux Rept., p. 53 ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 234, 235.
8 Ala. Test., p. 1123.
* Montgomery Advertiser, July 30, 1866 ; Selma Times, June 30, 1866.
^ Ala. Test., p. 236.
6 Selma Times, Dec. 30, 1865 ; Gulf States Hist Mag., Sept., 1902.
2S
626 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
tural Association declared it to be the duty of the whites to teach the
negro, and a committee was appointed to formulate a plan for negro
schools/ Conecuh and Wilcox counties followed with similar decla-
rations. A public meeting in Perry County, of such men as ex- Gov-
ernor A. B. Moore and J. L. M. Curry, declared that sound pohcy
and moral obligation required that prompt efforts be made to fit the
negro for his changed poHtical condition. His education must be en-
couraged. The teachers, white and black, were to be chosen with
a careful regard to fitness. A committee was appointed to cooperate
with the negroes in building schoolhouses and in procuring teachers,
whom they assured of support.^
Besides the purely unselfish reasons, there were other reasons why
the leading whites wanted the negro educated by southern teachers.
It would be a step towards securing control over the negro race by
the best native whites, who have always believed and will always
believe that the negro should be controlled by them. The northern
school-teachers did not have an influence for good upon the relations
between the races, and thus caused the southern whites to be opposed
to any education of the negro by strangers, as it was felt that to
allow the negro to be educated by these people and their successors
would have a permanent influence for evil.^
The whites generally aided the negroes in their community to
build schoolhouses or schoolhouses and churches combined. School-
houses were in the majority of cases built by the patrons of the schools ;
if rented, the rent was deducted from the school money; the state
made no appropriation for building. In Dallas County forty negro
schoolhouses were built with the assistance of the whites. This was
usually done in the Black Belt, but was less general in the white
counties. In Montgomery the prominent citizens gave money to
help build a negro ''college" ; some paid the tuition of negro children
at schools where charges were made. White men were often members
of the board of colored schools. All this was before the negro was
seen to be hopelessly in the clutches of the northerners.'*
In spite of the fact that for several years there were southern
1 Trowbridge, "The South," p. 431.
^Marion Commonwealth ; meeting held May 17, 1866.
8 Montgomery Advertiser, July 24, 1867 ; Ala. Test., p. 236.
* Montgomery Advertiser, July r:4, 1867 ; Ala. Test., pp. 236, 246.
JABEZ LAMAR MONROE CURRY.
THE QUESTION OF NEGRO EDUCATION 627
whites who taught negroes, the schools were judged by the results of
the teaching of the northerners. The Freedmen's Bureau brought
discredit on negro education.^ The work of the various aid societies
was Httle better. The personnel of both, to a great extent, passed to
the new system, Bureau and Association teachers becoming state
teachers ; and in the transfer the teachers tried to secure a better stand-
ing for themselves than the native teachers had. Many of the north-
ern teachers were undoubtedly good people, but all were touched
with fanaticism and considered the white people hopelessly bad and
by nature and training brutal and unjust to negroes. The negro
teachers who were trained by them, both in the North and in the
South, and who occupied most of the subordinate positions in the
schools, had caught the spirit of the teaching. The native negro
teacher, however, never quite equalled his white instructor in wrong-
headedness. He persisted in seeing the actual state of affairs quite
often. But the results of some of the educational work done during
Reconstruction for the negro was to make many white people, espe-
cially the less friendly and the careless observers, beheve that educa-
tion in itself was a bad thing for the negroes. It became a proverb
that "schoohng ruins a negro," and among the ignorant and more
prejudiced whites this opinion is still firmly held. Not all of the
northern teachers were of good character, and the others suffered for
the sins of these. Almost from the first the doors of the southern
whites were closed against the northern teacher, not only on account
of the character of some and the objectionable teachings of many,
but because they generally insisted on being personally unpleasant;
and, had all of them beei; above reproach in character and training,
their opinions in regard to social questions, which they expressed on
every occasion, would have resulted in total exclusion from white
society. They really cared little, perhaps, but they had a great
deal to say on the subject, and made much trouble on account
of it.^
At first, when they wished it, some northern teachers were able
to secure board with white famiHes. After a few weeks such was not
the case, and, except in the cities where the teachers could live to-
1 See Ch. XI, Sec. 3.
^ For specimen letters written to their homes, see the various reports of the Freed-
men's Aid Society of the Methodist Church, and the reports of other aid societies.
628 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
}
gether, they were obliged to live with the negroes. This could pro-
duce only bad results. It at once caused them to be excluded from
all white society, and gained for them the contempt of their white
neighbors, at the same time losing them the support and even the
respect of the negroes. For the negro always insists that a white
person to be respected must hve up to a certain standard ; otherwisCj
he may like, or fear, or despise, but never respect. Again, some of the
doubtful characters caused scandal by their manner of Hfe among
the negroes, and in several instances male teachers were visited by
the Ku Klux Klan because of their irregular conduct with negro
women. One in Calhoun County was killed. Negro men who livec
with white women teachers were killed, and in some cases the
women were thrashed. Others were driven away.^ But on the
whole there was little violence, the forces of social proscription at
length sufficing to drive out the obnoxious teachers.^
Much was said during Reconstruction days about the burning of
negro schoolhouses by the whites. There were several such cases,
but not as many as is supposed. In the records only one instance
can be found of a school building being burned simply from opposi
tion to negro schools. As a rule the schoolhouses (and churches
also) were burned because they were the headquarters of the Union
League and the general meeting places for Radical politicians, or
because of the character of the teacher and the results of his or her
teachings. Regular instruction of the negro had been going on for
two years or more before the Ku Klux Klan began burning school
houses. When one was burned, the Radical leaders used the fact
with much effect among the negroes; and. in several instances it was
practically certain that the Radical leaders, when the negroes were
wavering, fired a church or a schoolhouse in order to incense them
against the whites, who were charged with the deed. When a school
house was burned, the negroes were invariably assisted to rebuild by
the respectable whites. The burnings were condemned by all respect
1 The best-known instances of the killing of such negroes were in Tuscaloosa and
Chambers counties. The Ku Klux Report gives only about half a dozen cases of
outrages on teachers. See Ala. Test., pp. 52, 54, 67, 71, 140, 252, 755, 1047, 1140, 1853.
Cloud in his report made no mention of violence to teachers, nor did the governor.
Lakin said a great deal about it, but gave no instances that were not of the well-known
few. There was much less violence than is generally supposed, even in the South.
2 Ala. Test., p. 252.
THE QUESTION OF NEGRO EDUCATION 629
able persons, and also by the party leaders on account of the bad
effect on political questions/
Some teachers of negro schools fleeced their black pupils and their
parents unmercifully. Teachers of private schools collected tuition
in advance and then left. In Montgomery, a teacher in the Swayne
school notified his pupils that they must bring him fifty cents each by
a certain day, and that he, in return, would give to each a photograph
of himself.^ In Eutaw, Greene CountJ^, th^Rev. J. B. F. Hill, a North-
ern Methodist preacher who had been expelled from the Southern
Methodist Church, taught a negro school and taxed his forty little
scholars twenty-five cents each to purchase a forty- cent water
bucket.^
In the cities where there were several negro schools, it was found
difficult at first to keep the small negro in attendance in the same
school. A little negro would attend a school until he discovered that
he did not Hke the teacher or the school, and then he would go to an-
other. A rule was made against such impromptu transfers, and then
the small boy changed his name when he decided to try another
school. Finally, the teacher was required to ask the other children
the newcomer's name before he was admitted.^
The negro children were poorly supplied with books, and what
few they did have they promptly lost or tore up to get the pictures.
1 See Ala. Test, pp. 236, 1889 ; Somers, " Southern States," p. 169 ; Report of the
Joint Committee on Outrages, 1868. In Crenshaw, Butler, and Chambers counties some
schools existed for a year or more until teachers of bad character were elected. Then
the neighborhood roughs burned the school buildings. Neither Cloud nor any other
official reported cases of such burnings. The legislative committee could discover but
two, and in both instances the women teachers were of bad character. In the records
can be found only seventeen reports of burnings, and several of these were evidently
reports of the same instance ; few were specific. Lakin, who spent several years in
travelling over north Alabama, and who was much addicted to fabrication and exag-
geration, made a vague report of " the ruins of a dozen " schoolhouses. (Ala. Test., pp.
140, 141.) There may have been more than half a dozen burnings in north Alabama,
but there is no evidence that such was the case. The majority of the reports originated
outside the state through pure malice. The houses burned were principally in the white
counties and were, as Lakin reports, slight affairs costing from ^25 to ^75. It was so
evident that some of the fires were caused by the carelessness of travellers and hunters
who camped in them at night, that the legislature passed a law forbidding that practice.
See Acts of Ala., p. 187. About as many schoolhouses for whites were destroyed as for
blacks. Some were fired by negroes for revenge, others were burned by accident.
2 Weekly Mail, Aug. 18, 1869. * Demopolis New Era, April i, 1868.
* Hodgson's Report, Nov. ii, 1871.
630 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The attendance was very irregular. For a few days there would
be a great many scholars and perhaps after that almost none, for
the parents were willing to send their children when there was
no work for them to do, but as soon as cotton needed chopping
or picking they would stop them and put them to work.^ If the
negroes suspected that the trustees, who were (later) Democrats,
had appointed a Democratic teacher, they would not send their
children to school to hin^ and in this they were upheld by their
new leaders.^
When the public funds were exhausted, the majority of the white
schools continued as pay schools, but the negro schools closed at once,
for after 1868 the interest of the negro in education was no longer
strong enough to induce him to pay for it. The education given the
negro during this period was Httle suited to prepare him for the prac-
tical duties of life. The New England system was transplanted to
the South, and the young negroes were forced even more than the
white children. As soon as a Kttle progress was made, the pupils
were promoted into the culture studies of the whites. Those who
learned anything at all had, in turn, to teach what they had learned ;
their education would help them very little in everyday life.^ Negro
education did not result in better relations between the races. The
northern teacher believed in the utter sinfulness of slavery and in all
the stories told of the cruelties then practised. The Advertiser gave
as one reason why the southern whites should teach negro schools,
that northern teachers caused trouble by using books and tracts with
illustrations of slavery and stories about the persecution and cruelties
of the whites against the blacks.^ General Clanton stated that in
the school in which he had often attended the exercises and examined
the classes, and where he had paid the tuition of negro children, the
teachers ceased to ask him to make visits ; that the school-books had
"Radical pictures" of the persecuted slaves and the freedman; that
Radical speeches were made by the scholars, reciting the wrongs done
the negro race ; finally, that the school was a pohtical nursery of race
1 Hodgson's Report, Nov. 15, 1871. ^ Hodgson's Report, Nov. 15, 1871.
3 For opinions in regard to the value of the early education among the negroes, see
Washington's " Future of the American Negro " and " Up from Slavery " ; W. H.
Thomas's " American Negro " ; P. A. Bruce's " Plantation Negro as a Freeman " ; J. L.
M. Curry, in Montgomery Conference.
* Afontgoviery Advertiser^ July 24, 1867.
THE FAILURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 63 1
prejudice, and that where the negroes were greatly in excess of the
whites, it was a serious matter/ He also said that the teachers from
the North were responsible for the prejudice of the whites against
negro schools. The native whites soon refused to teach, and if they
had wished to do so, they probably could have gotten no pupils. The
primary education of the negro was left to the northern teachers
and to incompetent negroes ; higher education was altogether under
the control of the alien. It was most unfortunate in every way, he
added, that the southern white had had no part in the education of
the negro. ^ The higher education of the negroes in the state continued
to be directed by northerners. Washington and Councill have done
much toward changing the nature of the education given the negro;
they have also educated many whites from opposition to friendhness
to negro schools.
The Failure of the Educational System
In 1870 Cloud was a candidate for reelection, but was defeated
by Colonel Joseph Hodgson, the Democratic candidate.^ When
1 Ala. Test., p. 236.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test. Dr. J. L. M. Curry, who, in 1865, began his work
for the education of the negro, has thus expressed his opinion of the early attempts to
educate the blacks : " The education was unsettling, demoralizing, pandered to a wild
frenzy for schooling as the quick method of reversing social and political conditions.
Nothing could have been better devised for deluding the poor negro, and making him
the tool, the slave, of corrupt taskmasters. . . . With deliberate purpose to subject the
southern states to negro domination and secure the states permanently for partisan
ends, the education adopted was contrary to common sense, to human experience, to all
noble purposes. The aptitude and capabilities and needs of the negro were wholly dis-
regarded. Especial stress was laid on classics and liberal culture to bring the race per
salium to the same plane with their former masters, and realize the theory of social and
political equality. Colleges and universities, established and conducted by the Freed-
men's Bureau and northern churches and societies, sprang up like mushrooms, and the
teachers, ignorant and fanatical, without self-poise, proceeded to make all possible mis-
chief." Montgomery Conference, " Race Problems," p. 109. See also the papers of
Rev. D. Clay Lilly and Dr. P. B. Barringer in Montgomery Conference, " Race Prob-
lems," p. 130 ; William H. Baldwin and Dr. Curry in Second Capon Springs Confer-
ence ; Barringer, "The American Negro: His Past and Future"; Barringer, W. T.
Harris, and J. D. Dreher in Proceedings Southern Education Association, 1900; Hay-
good, "Pleas for Progress" and "Our Brother in Black" ; Abbott, "Rights of Man,"
pp. 225-226.
^ The United States Commissioner of Education, in his report for that year, made
before the elections, stated that in educational matters the state of Alabama was about
1
632 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Hodgson appeared as president of the Board, Cloud refused to yielc
on the ground that Hodgson was not eligible to the office, having
once challenged a man to a duel. The Board, however, refusec
to recognize Cloud, and he was obHged to retire.^
The first year of the reform administration was a successful one ir
spite of the fact that the state was bankrupt and the treasury ceasec
to make cash payments to county superintendents early in 1872.'
The second year was a fair one, although the treasury could not pa)
the teachers, for the Radical senate refused to make the appropria^
tions for which their own constitution provided. However, the
attendance of both whites and blacks increased, notwithstanding the
fact that the United States Commissioner of Education reported that
Alabama had retrograded in educational matters.^ The school
officials elected in 1870 were much superior to their predecesso
in every way. A state teachers' association was organized, anc
institutes were frequently held. Four normal schools were estab-
lished for black teachers and four for whites. Private assistance
for public schools was now sought and obtained, and hundreds o:
the schools continued after the public money was exhausted.'*
Hodgson did valuable service to his party and to the state
in exposing the corrupt and irregular practices of the preced-
ing administration. His own administration was much more
to take a " backward step," meaning that it was about to become Democratic. Report,
1870, p. 15. Later he made similar remarks, much to the disgust of Hodgson, who wj
an enthusiast in educational matters.
1 Journal of the Board of Education and Regents, 1870. Dr. O. D. Smith, who was
one of the newly elected Democratic members of the Board, says that Cloud refused to«
inform the Board of the contents of Hodgson's communications. Thereupon Hodgson
addressed one to the Board directly and not to Cloud. When it came in through the
mail, Cloud took possession of it, but Dr. Smith, who was on the lookout, called his
attention to the fact that it was addressed to the Board and reminded him of the penal-
ties for tampering with the mail of another person. The secretary read Hodgson's com-
munication, and the Board was then free to act. The Democratic members convinced
the Radicals that if Cloud continued in office they would not be able to draw their per
diem, so Cloud was compelled to vacate at once. "When he left he had his buggy
brought to the door, and into it he loaded all the government coal that was in his office
and carried it away.
2 Hodgson's Report, 1872.
^ See Hodgson's Report, 1871.
* Hodgson's Report, 1871 ; Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1876, p. 7
Journal of the Board of Education and Regents, 1871 ; Acts of the Board of Education,
pamphlet.
THE FAILURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
633
rronomical than that of his predecessor, as the following figures will
show: —
Salaries of county superintendents
Expenses of county superintendents .
Expenses of disbursement
Clerical expenses (at Montgomery) .
Cost of administration
1870
^57.776.50
21,202.86
78,979.36
364446
86,123.82
r87i
^^34,259.50
4,752.00
39,009.50
1,978.71
44,588.21
Decrease
$23,517.00
16,450.86
39,969.86
1.565-75
41,535-61^
In the fall of 1872, owing to the operation of the Enforcement
Acts, the elections went against the Democrats. The Radicals
filled all the offices, and Joseph H. Speed was elected Superintendent
of PubHc Instruction.^ Speed was not wholly unfitted for the posi-
tion, and did the best he could under the circumstances. But no-
where in the Radical administration did he find any sympathy with
his department, not even a disposition to comply with the direct
provisions of the constitution in regard to school funds. So low had
the credit of the state fallen that the administration could no longer
sell the state bonds to raise money. The taxes were the only resources,
and the office-holding adventurers, feeling that never again could
they have an opportunity at the spoils, could spare none of the money
for schools. Practically all of the negro schools and many of the
white ones were forced to close, and the teachers, when paid at all
by the state, were paid in depreciated state obligations.
The constitution required that one-fifth of all state revenue in
addition to certain other funds be appropriated for the use of schools.
Yet year by year an increasing amount was diverted to other uses.
The poll tax and tne insurance tax were used for other purposes. At
the end of 1869, $187,872.49, which should have been appropriated
for schools, had been diverted. In 1872, $330,036.93 was lost to
1 And this was the case notwithstanding the fact that the county superintendents
were now allowed mileage at the rate of eight cents a mile in order to get them to come
to Montgomery for their money and thus to decrease the chances of corrupt practices of
the attorneys. Hodgson complained that many old claims which should have been
settled l)y Cloud were presented during his administration.
2 Speed was a southern Radical. During the war he was a state salt agent at the
salt works in Virginia. He was a member of the Board of Education from 1870 to 1872,
and was far above the average Radical office-holder in both character and ability.
634 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the schools by failure to appropriate, and in 1873, S456, 138.47 wa
lost in the same way. By the end of 1873 the shortage wa
$1,260,511.92, and a year later it was nearly two milhon dollars
During 1873 and 1874 schools were taught only where there wer
local funds to support them. The carpet-bag system had failec
completely.^
The new constitution made by the Democrats in 1875 abolishec
the Board of Education, and returned to the ante-bellum system
Separate schools were ordered; the administrative expenses coulc
not amount to more than 4 per cent of the school fund;^ no mone}
was to be paid to any denominational or private school;^ the con
stitutional provision of one-fifth of the state revenue for school us<
was abolished;^ and the legislature was ordered to appropriate t(
schools at least $100,000 a year besides the poll taxes, license taxes
and the income from trust funds. The schools began to improv
at once, and the net income was never again as small as under th(
carpet-bag regime.
Neither of the Reconstruction superintendents, Cloud or Speed
furnished full statistics of the schools. It appears that the averagi
enrolment of students under Cloud was, in 1870, 35,963 whites an(
1 Report of the Commissioner of Education, 1873, 1874, 1876; Speed's Report
1873. Speed was ill much of the time, and his bookkeeping was little better thai
Cloud's. Two clerks, who, a committee of investigation stated, were distinguished by
" total want of capacity and want of integrity," managed the department with " such
want of system ... as most necessarily kept it involved in inextricable confusion.
Money was received and not entered on the books. A sum of money in coin wa
received in June, 1873, and six months later was paid into the treasury in depreciatec
paper. Vouchers were stolen and used again. Bradshaw, a county superintendent, died
leaving a shortage of $10,019.06 in his accounts. A large number of vouchers wen
abstracted from the office of Speed by some one and used again by Bradshaw's adminis
trator, who was no other than Dr. N. B. Cloud, who made a settlement with Speed':
clerks, and when the shortage was thus made good, the administrator still had manj
vouchers to spare. This seems to have been Cloud's last raid on the treasury. Mont'
gomery Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1873; Report of the Joint Committee on Irregularities ii
the Department of Education, 1873.
2 Under the Reconstruction administrative expenses amounted to 16 per cent, anc
even more.
^ The experiences with the American Missionary Association, etc., made this pro-
vision necessary.
* The United States Commissioner of Education gave a disapproving account of
these changes. It was exchanging " a certainty for an uncertainty," he said. Speec
had not found it a " certainty " by any means.
THE FAILURE OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
635
16,097 blacks; under his Democratic successor the average enrol-
ment, in spite of lack of appropriations, was 66,358 whites and
41,308 blacks in 1871, and 61,942 whites and 41,673 blacks in 1872.
Speed evidently kept no records of attendance. In 1875, ^-fter the
Democrats came into power, the attendance was 91,202 whites and
54,595 blacks. The average number of days taught in a year under
Cloud was 49 days in white schools and the same in black; under
Hodgson the average length of term was 68.5 days and 64.33 days
respectively. Theoretically the salaries of teachers under Cloud
should have been about $75 per month, but they received increas-
ingly less each year as the legislature refused to appropriate
the school money. The following table will show what the school
funds should have been, as provided for by the constitution; the
sums actually received were smaller each successive year. In no
case was the appropriation as great as in the year 1858, nor was
the attendance of black and white together much larger in any
year than the attendance of whites alone in 1858 or 1859.
School Fund, 1868- 1875
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1524,621.681
500,409.182
581,389.293
604,978.50*
524,452.406
474,346.526
565.042.947
1 Plus the poll tax, which was not appropriated as required by the constitution, but
diverted to other uses.
2 There was a shortage of ^187,872.49, diverted to other uses.
3 Shortage unknown ; teachers were paid in depreciated state obhgations,
4 Shortage was $330,036.93.
6 Only $68,313.93 was paid, the rest diverted ; shortage now was $1,260,511.92.
6 None was paid, all diverted ; shortage nearly two millions.
7 All was paid (by Democrats, who were now in power).
CHAPTER XX
RECONSTRUCTION IN THE CHURCHES
Sec. I. The "Disintegration and Absorption" Policy and
ITS Failure
The close of the war found the southern church organizations
in a more or less demoralized condition. Their property was de-
stroyed, their buildings were burned or badly in need of repair, and
the church treasuries were empty. It was doubtful whether some of
them could survive the terrible exhaustion that followed the war.
The northern churches, ''coming down to divide the spoils," acted
upon the principle that the question of separate churches had been
settled by the war along with that of state sovereignty, and that it
was now the right and the duty of the northern churches to recon-
struct the churches in the South. So preparations were made to
"disintegrate and absorb" the " schismatical " southern religious
bodies.^
The Methodists
In 1864 the Northern Methodist Church declared the South a
proper field for mission work, and made preparations to enter it.
None were to be admitted to membership in the church who were
slaveholders or who were "tainted with treason."^ In 1865 the
bishops of the northern organization resolved that "we will occupy
so far as practicable those fields in the southern states which may
be open to us . . . for black and white ahke."^ The General Mis-
sionary Committee of the northern church divided the South into
departments for missionary work, and Alabama was in the Middle
Department. Bishop Clark of Ohio was sent (1886) to take charge
of the Georgia and Alabama Mission District. The declared pur-
1 McTyeire, " A History of Methodism," p. 670 ; Smith, " Life and Times of George
F. Pierce" ; Southern Review, April, 1872.
2 Buckley, " History of Methodism in the United States," pp. 516, 517.
^ Matlack, "Anti-Slavery Struggle and Triumph in the Methodist Episcopal Church,"
P« 339 ; Smith, " Life and Times of George F. Pierce," p. 530.
636
\
THE METHODISTS 637
pose of this mission work was to "disintegrate and absorb" the
southern church, the organization of which was generally believed
to have been destroyed by the war/
In August, 1865, three Southern Methodist bishops met at Colum-
bus, Georgia, to repair the shattered organization of the church and
to infuse new life into it. They stated that the questions of 1844
were not settled by the war; that, "A large portion of the Northern
Methodists has become incurably radical. . . . They have incor-
porated social dogmas and political tests into their church creeds."
They condemned the northern church for its action during the war
in taking possession of southern church property against the wishes
of the people and retaining it as their own after the war, and for
its more recent attempts to destroy the southern church.^
In the confusion following the war, before the church administra-
tion was again in working order, the Protestant Episcopal Church,
especially the northern section, attempted to secure the Southern
Methodists. Some Methodists wanted to go over in a body to the
Episcopalians. The great majority, however, were strongly opposed
to such action, and the attempt only caused more ill feehng against the
North.^
At the time there was a belief among the Northern Methodists
that in 1845 thousands of members had been carried against their
will into the southern church, and that they would now gladly seize
the opportunity to join the northern body, which claimed to be the
only Methodist Episcopal Church. Those thousands proved to be
as disappointing as the "southern loyahsts" had been, both in char-
acter and in numbers. The greatest gains were among the negroes,
and to the negroes the few whites secured were intensely hostile. In
1866, A. S. Lakin was sent to Alabama to organize the Northern
Methodist Church.^ After two years' work the Alabama Conference
1 Annual Cyclopsedia (1865), p. 552; Caldwell, "Reconstruction of Church and
State in Georgia" (pamphlet).
2 Annual Cyclopedia (1865), p. 552.
3 " The schismalical plans of the Northern Methodists and the subtle proselytism of
the Episcopalians" (Pierce). See Smith, "Life and Times of George F. Pierce," pp.
491, 499, 505, 530; West, "History of Methodism in Alabama," p. 717; McTyeire,
" A History of Methodism," p. 673.
* A Federal official in north Alabama who had known of I>akin in the North testi-
fied that he had had a bad reputation in New York and in Illinois and had been sent
638 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTIOxN IN ALABAMA
1
was organized, with 9431 members, black and white/ In 187 ii
Lakin reported 15,000 members, black and white.^ The white^
were from the "loyal" element of the population. There was greai
opposition by the white people to the establishment of the northerr
church. Lakin and his associates excited the negroes against the
whites and kept both races in a continual state of irritation. Gov-
ernor Lindsay stated before the Ku Klux Committee that in his opin-
ion the people bore with Lakin and his church with a remarkable
degree of patience ; that Lakin encouraged the negroes to force them-
selves into congregations where they did not belong and to obstrud
the services ; and that they also made attempts to get control of church
property belonging to the southern churches.^ No progress was
made among the whites, except in the white counties among the hill*
of north Alabama and in the pine barrens of the southeast. The
congregations were small and were served by missionaries. Lakir
and his assistants had a political as well as a religious mission —
General Clanton said that they were "emissaries of Christ and o]
the Radical party." They claimed, nevertheless, that they nevei
talked pohtics in the pulpit. Lakin once preached in Blountsville, anc
when he opened the doors of the church to new members, he saic
that there was no northern church, no southern church, there was
only the Methodist Episcopal Church.'* But every member of thii
South as a means of discipline. See Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 619 (L. W. Day
United States Commissioner). Governor Lindsay said that Lakin was a shrewd, cun-
ning, strong-willed man, given to exaggeration and lying, — one who had a "jaundicec
eye," " a magnifying eye," and who among the blacks was a power for evil. Ala. Test.j
p. 180.
1 N. Y. Herald, May 10, 1868 ; Buckley, " History of Methodism," Vol. II, p. 191.
2 In 1871, Lakin stated that of his 15,000 members, three-fourths were whites of
the poorer classes ; that there were under his charge 6 presiding elders' districts wit!
70 circuits and stations, and 70 ministers and 150 local preachers ; and that he hac
been assisted in securing the " loyal " element by several ministers who had beei
expelled by the Southern Methodists during the war as traitors. Ala. Test., pp. 124;
130. Governor Lindsay stated that some of the whites of Lakin's church were to b«
found in the counties of Walker, Winston, and Blount ; that there were few such whit<
congregations, and that some of these afterward severed their connection with the north'
em church, and by 1872 there were only two or three in the state. Lakin worked amonj
the negro population almost entirely, and his statement that three-fourths of his mem-
bers were whites was not correct. See Ala. Test., pp. 180, 208.
3 Ku Klux Rapt., Ala. Test., pp. iii, 112, 124, 180, 623, 957. Lakin secured all
church property formerly used by the southern church for negro congregations.
* Lakin never acknowledged the present existence of the southern church.
THE BAPTISTS 639
church, he added, must be loyal, and therefore no secessionist could
join. He said that he had been ordered by his conference not to
receive "disloyal" men into the church/
The political activity of these missionaries resulted in visits from
ihe Ku Klux Klan. Some of the most violent ones v^^ere whipped or
were warned to moderate their sermons. Political camp-meetings
were sometimes broken up, and two or three church buildings used
as Radical headquarters were burned.^ Every Northern Methodist
was a Republican; and to-day in some sections of the state the
Northern Methodists are known as " Republican " Methodists, as
distinguished from ''Democratic" or Southern Methodists.
The Baptists
The organization of the Baptist church into separate congrega-
tions saved it from much of the annoyance suffered by such churches
as the Methodist and the Episcopal, with their more elaborate
systems of government. Yet in north Alabama, there was trouble
when the negro members were encouraged by poHtical and eccle-
siastical emissaries to assert their rights under the democratic form
of government by taking part in all church affairs, in the elec-
tion of pastors and other officers. Often there were more negro
members than white, and under the guidance of a missionary from
the North these could elect their own candidate for pastor, regardless
of the wishes of the whites and of the character of the would-be
pastor. This danger, however, was soon avoided by the organization
of separate negro congregations.^
The Southern Baptist Convention, organized in 1845, continued
its separate existence. The northern Baptists demanded, as a pre-
1 Ala. Test., pp. 238, 758.
2 One of Lakin's relations was that while he was conducting a great revival meeting
among the hills of north Alabama, Governor Smith and other prominent and sinful scala-
wag politicians were under conviction and were about to become converted. But in
came the Klan and the congregation scattered. Smith and the others were so angry
and frightened that their good feelings were dissipated, and the devil reentered them, so
that he (Lakin) was never able to get a hold on them again. Consequently, the Klan
was responsible for the souls lost that night. Lakin told a dozen or more marvellous
stories of his hairbreadth escapes from death by assassination, — enough, if true, to ruin
the reputation of north Alabama men for marksmanship.
^ Shackleford, " History of the Muscle Shoals Baptist Association," p. 84.
640 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
requisite to cooperation and fellowship, a profession of loyalty
the government. During 1865 the southern associations expressec
themselves in favor of continuing the former separate societies, an(
severely censured the northern Baptists for their action in obtaining
authority from the Federal government to take possession of southei
church property against the wishes of the owners and trustees, and fo^
trying to organize independent churches within the bounds of southen
associations. They were not in favor of fraternal relations with th^
northern Baptist societies.^
The Presbyterians
In May, 1865, the Presbyterian General Assembly (New School
voted to place on probation the southern ministers of the Unitec
Synod South who had supported the Confederacy.^ Few, if any
offered themselves for probation, while as a body the United Synoc
joined the Southern Presbyterians (Old School). The Genera
Assembly (O. S.) of the northern church in 1865 stigmatized ^'se
cession as a crime and the withdrawal of the southern churches a!
a schism." The South, the Assembly decided, was to be treatec
as a missionary field, and loyal ministers to be employed withou:
presbyterial recommendation. Southern ministers and members
were offered restoration if they would apply for it, and submit tc
certain tests, namely, proof of loyalty or a profession of repentanci
for disloyalty to the government, and a repudiation of former opinions
concerning slavery.^ Naturally this policy was not very successful
in reconstructing their organization in the South. The General
Assembly (O. S.) of the Presbyterian Church in the South met
in the fall of 1865 at Macon, Georgia, and warned the churches
against the efforts of the northern Presbyterians to sow seeds oi
dissension and strife in their congregations.* A union was formed
with the United Synod South (N. S.), and the "Presbyterian
Church in the United States," popularly known as the Southern
1 Annual Cyclopsedia (1865), p. 106. In 1905 there is a much better spirit, and the
churches of the two sections are on good terms, though not united.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 705. See p. 23 and Ch. IV, Sec. 7, above.
^ Thompson, "History of the Presbyterian Churches," p. 167.
^ Annual Cyclopaedia (1865), p. 706.
THE PRESBYTERIANS 641
Presbyterian Church, was formed. To this acceded in 1867 the
Associate Reformed Church of Alabama/
The Episcopal Church in the United States during the war
had held consistently to the same theory in regard to the with-
drawal of the southern dioceses that the Washington adminis-
tration held in regard to the secession of the southern states.
There was no recognition of a withdrawal, nor of a southern organi-
zation. The Confederate church was called a schismatic body,
and its actions considered as illegal. The roll in the General Con-
vention was called as usual, beginning with Alabama.^ But after
the war a generous policy of conciliation was pursued ; the southern
churchmen were asked to come back; no tests or conditions were
imposed ; the House of Bishops of the northern church upheld Wilmer
in his trouble with the mihtary authorities. The acts of the southern
church during the war were recognized and accepted as vaHd by the
northern church. Such a policy easily resulted in reunion.
The attempt at Reconstruction in the churches had practically
failed. Only the Episcopal Church, one of the weakest in numbers,
had reunited.^ The others seemed farther apart than ever.
The other denominations had recognized the legal division of
their churches before the war. Now they acted on the principle
that territory conquered for the United States was also conquered
for the northern churches. Southern ministers and members were
asked to submit to degrading conditions in order to be restored to
good standing. They must repudiate their former opinions, and
renouncing their sins, ask for pardon and restoration. Naturally
no reunion resulted.
Sec. 2. The Churches and the Negro during Reconstruction
At the end of the war nearly every congregation had black mem-
bers as well as white, the blacks often being the more numerous.
With the changed conditions, the various denominations felt it neces-
sary to make declarations of policy in regard to the former slaves.
^ Carroll. " Religious Forces," p. 281 ; Thompson, " History of the Presbyterian
Churches," pp. 163, 171 ; Johnson, "History of the Southern Presbyterian Churches,"
pp. 333> 339-
2 Perry, p. 328 e/ seq.
^ Later the northern congregations of the Methodist Protestant Church rejoined the
main body, which was southern.
2 T
642 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
General Swayne, Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau
in Alabama, in his report for 1866, stated that at an early date the
several denominations expressed themselves as being strongly in
favor of the education of the negro. "The principal argument,"
he said, "was an appeal to sectional and sectarian prejudice, lest,
the work being inevitable, the influence which must come from it be
realized by others; but it is believed that this was the shield and
weapon which men of unselfish principle found necessary at first." *
The Baptists and the Negroes
The Alabama Baptist Convention, in 1865, passed the following
resolution in regard to the relations between the white and black
members : —
^^ Resolved, That the changed civil status of our late slaves does
not necessitate any change in their relations to our churches; and
while we recognize their right to withdraw from our churches and
form organizations of their own, we nevertheless believe that their
highest good will be subserved by their retaining their present relation
to those who know them, who love them, and who will labor for the
promotion of their welfare."
The Convention also ordered renewed exertions in the work
among the negroes by means of lectures, private instruction, and
Sunday-schools.^ In 1866 the North Alabama Baptist Association
directed that provision be made for the religious welfare of the negroes
and for their education in the common schools. The negroes were
to be allowed to choose their own pastors and teachers from among the
whites.^ But soon the results of the work of the northern mission-
aries and political emissaries were seen in the separation of the two
races in religious matters. The negroes were taught that the whites
were their enemies, and that they must have their own separate
churches. They were encouraged to assert their rights by obstruct-
ing in all the affairs of the churches, and in the north Alabama Bap-
tist churches, where they were in the majority, there was danger
1 Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 Riley, " History of the Baptists in Alabama," p. 310 ; Montgomery Advertiser,
Oct. 15, 1865; N. Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1865 ; George Brewer, "History of the Central
Association," pp. 46, 49.
8 Huntsville Advocate, May 16, 1866.
THE BAPTISTS AND THE NEGROES 643
that they would take advantage of the democratic system of the
church government and, prompted by emissaries from the North,
control the administration. They were, therefore, assisted by the
whites to form separate congregations and associations/
The principal work of the northern Baptists in central and south*
Alabama was to separate the blacks into independent churches,
and the second Colored Baptist Convention in the United States was
organized in Alabama in 1867. The free form of government of
this church attracted both ministers and members. In 1868 Bethel
Association (white) reported that a large number of the negroes
desired no rehgious instruction from the whites, although they were
in great need of it, and that this opposition was caused by ignorance
and prejudice. But, the report stated, there should be no relaxa-
tion in the effort to impart to them a knowledge of the Gospel ; that
the first duty of the church was to instruct the ignorant and super-
stitious at home before sending missionaries to the far-off heathen;
that all self-constituted negro preachers who claimed personal inter-
views with God and personal instruction from Him should be dis-
couraged, and only the best men selected as pastors. Advice and
assistance were now given to the negro congregations, which were
organized into associations as soon as possible. In 1872 three negro
churches with a white pastor apphed for admission to Bethel Associa-
tion. But it was thought best to maintain separate associations.'
For years the white Baptists of Alabama exercised a watchful care
over the colored Baptists, whom they assisted in the work of organizing
congregations and associations, and in the erection of schoolhouses
and churches. Church and school buildings destroyed by the Ku
1 Shackleford, " History of the Muscle Shoals Baptist Association," p. 84.
The Radical missionaries, in order to further their own plans, encouraged the
negroes to assert their equality by forcing themselves into the congregations of the
various denominations. Governor Lindsay related an incident of a negro woman who
went alone into a white church, selected a good pew, and calmly appropriated it. No
one molested her, of course. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 208.
America Trammell, a negro preacher of east Alabama, before the war and after-
ward as late as 1870 preached to mixed congregations of blacks and whites. A part
of the church building was set apart for the whites and a part for the blacks. Later he
became affected by the work of the missionaries, and in 1871 began to preach that
" Christ never died for the southern people at all ; that he died only for the northern
people." A white woman teacher lived in his house, and he was killed by the Ku Klux
Klan. Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 1119.
'■2 Ball, " History of Clarke Coanty," pp. 591, 630 ; Statistics of Churches, p. 171.
644 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
i
Klux Klan were rebuilt by the whites, even when the colored cot
gregation was only moderately well behaved. The whites in Mont-
gomery contributed to build the first negro Baptist church in that
city, and a white minister preached the sermon when the church
was dedicated and turned over to the blacks. A number of white
ladies were present at the services.^ For fifteen years Dr. I. T. Tichenoi
was pastor of the First Baptist Church in Montgomery. During
that time he baptized over 500 negroes into its fellowship. At th(
end of the war there were 300 white and 600 negro members. Dr
Tichenor tells the story of the separation as follows : "When a separa-
tion of the two bodies was deemed desirable, it was done by the colorec
brethren, in conference assembled, passing a resolution, couched ir
the kindliest terms, suggesting the wisdom of the division, and asking
the concurrence of the white church in such action. The white
church cordially approved the movement, and the two bodies unitec
in erecting a suitable house of worship for the colored brethren
Until it was finished they continued to occupy jointly with the white
brethren their house of worship, as they had done previous to this
action. The new house was paid for in large measure by the white
members, of the church and individuals in the community. As soon
as it was completed the colored church moved into it with its organ-
ization all perfected, their pastor, board of deacons, committees of al
sorts ; and the whole machiner}' of church life went into action withoul
a jar. Similar things occurred in all the states of the South." ^
The old plantation preachers were ordained and others called and
regularly ordained to the ministry by the whites. But good negro
preachers were overwhelmed by an influx of "self-called" pastors
who were often incompetent and often immoral. At last the whites
seem to have given up as hopeless their work for the negroes. In
1885 an urgent appeal from the Colored Baptist Convention for
advice and assistance met with no response from the white conven-
tion. PoHtics and prejudice, imprudent and immoral leaders, had
completed the work of separation. Still something was done by
the Home Mission Board towards instructing negro preachers and
deacons, and in 1895 this Board and the Home Mission Board of
the northern Baptists agreed to cooperate and aid such negro con
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 236, 1067.
2 " The Work of the Southern Baptists among the Negroes" (pamphlet).
THE PRESBYTERIANS AND THE NEGROES 645
\cntions as might desire it. But the Alabama negro convention has
not yet asked for assistance.^
The Presbyterians and the Negroes
In 1869, encouraged by the white members, the negro members
of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church in Tennessee and north
Alabama asked for and received separate organization and were
henceforth known as the African Cumberland Presbyterian Church.^
It is this division of the Cumberland Presbyterians that is now
(1905) hindering somewhat the union of the Cumberland Presbyterian
with the Northern Presbyterian organization. The blacks demanded
the separation of the races; the whites now demand that it be con-
tinued.
Various branches of the Northern Presbyterian organizations
worked in Alabama among the negroes. The principal result of
their work was the separation of the blacks into independent churches.
The Southern Presbyterian Church (Presbyterian Church in the
United States) made earnest efforts for the negro after the war, and
with some success. The Institute at Tuscaloosa for the educa-
tion of colored Presbyterian ministers is now the only school in the
South for negroes which is conducted entirely by southern white
teachers.^ The work of the Presbyterians among the negroes has
continued to the present day, though in 1898 a movement was started
to separate the blacks of the Southern Presbyterian Church into an
independent church. This movement was not successful, as not a
majority of the negro preachers desired separation. But the number
of colored Presbyterians has always been small.'*
^ See the Southern Baptist Convention Advanced Quarterly, p, 30, " Missionary-
Lesson, The Negroes," March 29, 1903, which is a most interesting, artless, southern
lesson. The northern Baptists also have a mission lesson on the negroes which is dis-
tinctly of the abolitionist spirit. The average student will get about the same amount of
prepared information from each. See " Home Mission Lesson No. 3, The Negroes."
2 Foster, " Sketch of History of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church," p. 300 ;
Carroll," Religious Forces," p. 294; Thompson, " History of the Presbyterian Churches,"
p. 193.
* Thompson, " History of the Presbyterian Churches," p. 193 ; ScouUer, " History
of the United Presbyterian Church of North America," p. 246.
* Montgomery Conference, " Race Problems," p. 1 14.
646 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Roman Catholics
The Roman Catholic Church did much work among the negroes
in the cities and at first with a fair degree of success. It was strongly
opposed by all Protestant denominations, both northern and southern,
and especially by the Northern Methodist Church, It seemed to
be dreadful news to the Methodists when it was reported that the-j
Catholic Church was about to open fifteen schools in Alabama for
the negro, where free board and tuition would be given/ The
American Missionary Association, supported in Alabama mainly by
money from the Freedmen's Bureau, used its influence among the :
negroes against the CathoHc Church, which, the Association stated I
in a report, ''was making extraordinary efforts to enshroud forever!
this class of the unfortunate race in Popish superstition and darkness." ^ j
But the Catholic Church had no place for the negro preacher
of little education and less character who desired to hold a high
position in the negro church. There was better prospect for pro-
motion in the Baptist and Methodist churches, and to those churches
went the would-be negro preacher and, through his influence, the
majority of his people.^
The Episcopalians
The Protestant Episcopal Church did nearly all of its work among
the negroes in the cities and among the negroes on the large planta-
tions of the Black Belt. This church offered little more hope of
advancement to the average negro preacher than the Roman Catholic,
and the hostiHty of the mihtary authorities to this church in 1865
and 1866 and the efforts of the missionaries and pohticians caused
a loss of most of the negro members that it had. In 1866 the laity
of the State Convention seemed rather unenthusiastic in regard to
work among the negroes, and left it to be managed by the bishop and
clergy. The General Convention established the ''Freedmen's
Commission " to assist in the work, which was not to be under the
jurisdiction of the bishop. Bishop Wilmer stated that he was un-
1 Eighth Annual Report of the Freedmen's Aid Society.
2 House Kept., No. 121, 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
8 See " Race Problems," p. 139, for a statement of the work now being done among
the negroes in Alabama by the Catholic Church.
THE METHODISTS AND THE NEGROES 647
villing to accept this "schism-breeding proposition," but would
be glad of assistance which would be under his direction as bishop.
No such aid was forthcoming. In 1867 only two congregations
of negroes were left, one in Mobile and one in Marengo County.
A few solitary blacks were to be found in the white congregations,
and during Reconstruction these suffered real martyrdom on account
of their loyalty to their old churches. They were ostracized by the
other negroes, were called heathen and traitors, and were left alone
in sickness and death. Under such treatment, the majority of the
negro members were forced to withdraw from the Episcopal churches.^
The Methodists and the Negroes
In 1 86 1 the Methodist Episcopal Church South had more than
200,000 colored members and 180,000 children under instruction.
One year after the surrender of Lee only 78,000 remained.^ The
Montgomery Conference, in November, 1865, decided that there was
no necessity for a change in the church relations of white and black ;
that in the church there should be no distinction on account of color
and race ; and that the negro had special claims on the whites. Pre-
siding elders and preachers were directed to do all that lay in their
power for the colored congregations, and establish Sunday-schools
and day schools for them when practicable.^ The Methodist Protes-
tants announced a similar policy.'' General Swayne of the Freed-
men's Bureau reported that he received much assistance toward
negro education from the Southern Methodist Church, and especially
from Reverend H. N. McTyeire (afterwards bishop).^
The Southern Methodist congregations lost their negro members
from the same causes that brought about the separation of the races
in other churches. The negroes were told by their new leaders that
for their safety they must consider the southerners as their natural
1 Whitaker, "The Church in Alabama," pp. 193, 205, 206-212. The work of the
Episcopal Church among the negroes is more promising in later years. See " Race
Problems," pp. 1 26-131. It is not a sectional church, with a northern section hindering
the work of a southern section among the negroes, as is the Methodist Episcopal Church.
2 Carroll, " Religious Forces," p. 263.
^ Montgomery Advertiser , Nov. 24, 1 865.
* Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. II, 1 865.
^ Report for 1866, Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
^
648 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
enemies ; * they were convinced that there was spiritual safety only
in the northern or in independent churches. All the forces of social
ostracism were employed against those who chose to remain in the
old churches. The southern planter was not able to support the
missionary who formerly preached to his slaves, the negroes would
not pay; and the church treasury was empty.^ In 1866 the General
Conference directed that the colored members be organized as sep-
arate charges when they so desired; that colored preachers and
presiding elders be appointed by the bishop, annual conferences
organized when necessary, and especial attention be directed towards
Sunday-schools for the negroes.^
Against all efforts of the Southern Methodists to work among
the negroes, the Northern Methodists struggled with a persistence
worthy of a better cause. Missionaries were sent South, narrow
and prejudiced, though sincere, men and women, who were possessed
with the fixed conviction that no good could come to the negro except
from the North ; in this conviction schools were estabhshed and
churches organized. The injudicious and violent methods of these
■ 1 Lakin fomented disturbances between the races. His daughter wrote slanderous
letters to northern papers, which were reprinted by the Alabama papers. Lakin told
the negroes that the whites, if in power, would reestablish slavery, and advised them, as a
measure of safety, physical as well as religious, to unite with the northern church. The
scalawags did not like Lakin, and one of them (Nicholas Davis) gave his opinion of him
and his talks to the Ku Klux Committee as follows: "The character of his [Lakin's]
speech was this : to teach the negroes that every man that was born and raised in the
southern country was their enemy, that there was no use trusting them, no matter what
they said, — if they said they were for the Union or anything else. * No use talking, they
are your enemies.' And he made a pretty good speech, too ; awful; a hell of a one ;
. . . inflammatory and game, too, . . . it was enough to provoke the devil. Did all the
mischief he could. ... I tell you, that old fellow is a hell of an old rascal." Ala. Test.,
pp. 784, 791. One of Lakin's negro congregations complained that they paid for their
church and the lot on which it stood, and that Lakin had the deed made out in his
name.
2 In the Black Belt and in the cities the slaveholders often erected churches or
chapels for the use of the negroes, and paid the salary of the white preacher who was
detailed by conference, convention, association, or presbytery to look after the religious
instruction of the blacks. Nearly always the negro slaves contributed in work or money
towards building these houses of worship, and the Reconstruction convention in 1867
passed an ordinance which transferred such property to the negroes whenever they
made any claim to it. See Ordinance No. 25, Dec. 2, 1867. See also Acts of 1868,
pp. 176-177; Governor Lindsay in Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., p. 180; Montgomery
Advertiser, Nov. 24, 1865.
^ Iluntsville Advocate, May 5, 1865; Carroll, " Religious Forces," p. 263.
THE METHODISTS AND THE NEGROES 649
persons and their bitter prejudices caused their exclusion from all
lesirable society, and naturally they became more violent and preju-
iced than ever. Their letters written to their homes showed that
I hey believed the native white to be possessed by an inhuman hatred
of the blacks, and that on the slightest provocation the whites would
< laughter the entire negro population/ They favored at least a partial
onfiscation in behalf of the negro. Through the Freedmen's Aid
Society the northern church entered upon work among the whites
also, opposing the southern church on the ground that it was sectional
and condemning all its efforts among the blacks as useless and harm-
ful. For years there was not a word of recognition of the work done
by the southern churches among the slaves.^ The missionaries were
afraid of "the old feudal forces" which were still working, they
thought, under various disguises such as "Historical Societies, Me-
morial Days, and monuments to the Confederate dead." ^ Their
work was thoroughly done. Two negro Methodist churches, organ-
ized in the North, secured the greater part of the negroes." Some
joined the Northern Methodist Church, "which also came down to
divide the spoils." ^
1 Reports of the Freedmen's Aid Society, 1 866-1 874.
2 The first recognition of such work, I find, is in the Report of the Freedmen's Aid
Society in 1878.
^ Tenth and Eleventh Reports of the Freedmen's Aid Society.
* These reHgious bodies were the African Methodist Episcopal and the African
Methodist Episcopal Zion. The former was organized in Philadelphia in 1816, and
the latter in New York in 1820. Both were secessions from the Methodist Episcopal
Church. See Statistics of Churches, pp. 543, 559. At first there were bitter feuds
between the blacks who wished to join the northern churches and those who wished to
remain in the southern churches, but the latter were in the minority and they had to go.
See Ala. Test., p. 180; Smith, " History of Methodism in Georgia and Florida" ; " Life
and Times of George F. Pierce," p. 491.
The main difference between the A. M. E. and the A. M. E. Zion Church, accord-
ing to a member of the latter, is that in one the dues are 25 cents a week and in the
other 20 cents.
^ McTyeire, " History of Methodism," pp. 670-673. A Southern Methodist negro
preacher in north Alabama was trying to reorganize his church and was driven away by
Lakin, who told his flock that there was a wolf in the fold. See Ala. Test , p. 430.
The statements of several of the negro ministers would seem to indicate that Lakin took
possession of a number of negro congregations and united them with the Cincinnati
Conference without their knowledge. Few of the negroes knew of the divisions in the
Methodist Episcopal Church, and most of them thought that Lakin's course was merely
some authorized reorganization after the destruction of war. One witness who knew
Lakin in the North said that he was an original secessionist, since, in Peru, Indiana, he
650 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
After 1866 the colored congregations still adhering to the Souther]
Methodists had been divided into circuits, districts, and conferences
By 1870 political differences and the efforts of other churches ha(
so ahenated the races that it was thought best to set up an independen
organization for the negroes, for their own protection. This wa
done in 1870 by the General Conference. Two negro bishops wen
ordained, and all church property that had ever been used for negn
congregations was turned over to the new organization, which wai
called the Colored Methodist Episcopal Church. A few negroei
refused to leave the white church, and in 1892 there were still 35'
colored members on its rolls. ^ Until recently there has been strong
opposition on the part of the other African churches to the Colorec
Methodist Episcopal Church because of its relations to the Southerr
Methodist Church. The latter has continued to aid and direct its
protege, and the opposition is gradually subsiding.^
After thirty years' experience, most people who have knowledg(
broke up a church and organized a secession congregation because he was opposed t<
men and women sitting together. The same person testified that once in north Alabams
Lakin asked for lodging one night at a white man's house. The host was treated to
lecture by Lakin on the equality of the races, and thereupon sent out and got a negro anc
put him in a bed to which Lakin was directed at bedtime. He hesitated, but slept witl
the negro. Ala. Test., pp. 791-794. Lakiu was a strange character, and for severs
years was a powerful influence among the Radicals and negroes of north Alabama. Se<
Ala. Test., p. 959. A Northern Methodist leader among the negroes of Coosa Count]
was the Rev. Dorman, who had formerly belonged to the southern church, but hac
been expelled for immorality. He lived with the negroes and led a lewd life. H«
advised the negroes to arm themselves and assert their rights, and required them to gc
armed to church. See Ala. Test., pp. 164, 230. Rev. J. B. F. Hill of Eutaw was anothei
ex-Southern Methodist who taught a negro school and preached to the negroes. H«
had been expelled from the Alabama Conference (Southern) for stealing money from th<
church, and it was charged that he tried to sell a coffin which had been sent him and ii\
which he was to send to Ohio the body of a Federal soldier who had died in Eutaw.
See Demopolis A^ew Era, April i, 1868. During the worst days of Reconstruction
number of negro churches which were used as Radical headquarters were burned by
the Ku Klux Klan. The Northern Methodist Church is the weakest of the three negrq
churches ; mountaineers and negroes do not mix well. The church is not favored by
the whites, and there is opposition to the establishment of a negro university at Anniston
by the Freedmen's Aid Society of this church, on the ground that socially, commercially,
and educationally the interests of the white race suffer where an institution is located by
this society. See Brundidge (Ala.) News^ Aug. 22, 1903.
1 McTyeire, " A History of Southern Methodism," p. 670 ; Carroll, " Religious
Forces," p. 263 ; Alexander, " Methodist Episcopal Church South," pp. 91-133.
2 Carroll, "Rehgious Forces," p. 263; Bishop Halsey in the N. Y. Independent^
March 5, 1891 ; Statistics of Churches, p. 604.
THE METHODISTS AND THE NEGROES 65 1
of the subject agree that the religious interests of the negro have
suffered from the separation of the races in the churches and from
the enforced withdrawal of the native whites from rehgious work
among the blacks. The influence of the master's family is no longer
felt, and instead of the white minister came the negro preacher,
with "ninety-five superstitions to five eternal truths," — superstitions,
many of them reminiscences from Africa/ There have been too
many negro churches; every one who could read and write wanted
to preach,^ and many of them claimed direct communication with
the Supreme Being; every one who appHed was admitted to the
churches; morahty and religion were only remotely connected;
leaders of the demi-monde were stout pillars of the church. A Pres-
byterian minister in charge of negro interests has stated that in his
church the personnel of the independent negro congregations is
inferior in character and morality to the congregations under the
supervision of the whites. In the colored Baptist associations it is
reported that frequent and radical changes have been the custom.
Discontented churches secede and form new associations, which
exist for a short while, and are then absorbed by other associations.
The boundaries of the associations also change frequently; the
church government seems to be in a kind of fluid state. Thought-
ful rehgious leaders now believe that the southern white, for the
good of both races, should again take part in the religious train-
ing of the negro.^ But the difficulties in the way of such a course
are almost insurmountable and date back to forced separation of the
races in the churches.
An editorial in the Nation in 1866 expressed the situation from
one point of view very clearly and forcibly : The northern churches
claim that the South is determined to make the religious division per-
manent, though "slavery no longer furnishes a pretext for separation."
Too much pains are taken to bring about an ecclesiastical reunion,
^ W. T. Harris, Richmond Meeting, Southern Educational Association (1900),
p. ICX).
2 See Washington, " Up from Slavery." One church with two hundred members
had eighteen preachers. Exhorters or " zorters " and " pot liquor " preachers were
still more numerous.
3 " Race Problems," pp. 114, 120, 123, 126, 130, 131, 135 ; Haygood, "Our Brother
in Black," /awiw ; Statistics of Churches, p. 171.
652 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and irritating offers of reconciliation are made by the northerr
churches, all based on the assumption that the South has not only
sinned, but sinned knowingly, in slavery and in war. We expect them
to be penitent and to gladly accept our offers of forgiveness. But
the southern people look upon a ''loyal" missionary as a politica
emissary, and ''loyal" men do not at present possess the necessary
qualifications for evangelizing the southerners or softening their
hearts, and are sure not to succeed in doing so. We look upon their
defeat as retribution and expect them to do the same. It will do no
good if we tell the southerners that "we will forgive them if they
will confess that they are criminals, offer to pray with them, preach
with them, and labor with them over their hideous sins."^
"Reconstruction" in the church was closely related to "Recon
struction" in the state, and was so considered at the time by the
reconstructionists of both.^ The same mistaken, intolerant poHcy
was followed, on the theory that the southern whites were as inca-
pable of good action in church as in state. Irritating and impossible
tests and conditions of readmission were proposed before reconcilia-
tion. Later the efforts to weaken and destroy the southern churches
after attempts at reunion had failed completed the ahenation, which
in several organizations seems to be permanent. There was a Solid
South in church as well as in politics.
1 The Nation, July 12, 1866, condensed.
2 Caldwell, " Reconstruction of Church and State in Georgia" (pamphlet). The cir-
culars of advice to the blacks by the Freedmen's Bureau officials repeatedly mention the
advisability of the separation of the races in religious matters. But this was less the
case in Alabama than in other southern states.
CHAPTER XXI
THE KU KLUX REVOLUTION
The Ku Klux movement was an understanding among southern
whites, brought about by the chaotic condition of social and poHti-
cal institutions between 1865 and 1876. It resulted in a partial
destruction of the Reconstruction and a return, as near as might be,
to ante-bellum conditions. This understanding or state of mind
took many forms and was called by many names. The purpose
was everywhere and always the same: to recover for the white
race control of society, and destroy the baleful influence of the alien
among the blacks.^
Causes of the Ku Klux Movement
When the surviving soldiers of the Confederate army returned
home in the spring and summer of 1865, they found a land in which
poHtical institutions had been destroyed and in which a radical social
revolution was taking place — an old order, the growth of hundreds
of years, seemed to be breaking up, and the new one had not yet
taken shape; all was confusion and disorder. At this time began a
movement which under different forms has lasted until the present
day — an effort on the part of the defeated population to restore affairs
to a state which could be endurable, to reconstruct southern society.
This movement, a few years later, was in one of its phases known
as the Ku Klux movement. For the pecuhar aspects of this secret
revolutionary movement many causes are suggested.
For several months before the close of the war the state govern-
ment was powerless except in the vicinity of the larger towns, the
country districts being practically without government. After the
surrender there was an interval of four months during which there
was no pretence of government except in the immediate vicinity
1 See Testimony of Minnis in Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test.; Brown, "Lower South,"
Ch. IV.
653
1
654 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of the points garrisoned by the Federal army. The people were
forbidden to take steps toward setting up any kind of government/
From one end of the state to the other the land was infested by a
vicious element left by the war, — Federal and Confederate deserters,
and bushwhackers and outlaws of every description. These were
especially troublesome in the counties north of the Black Belt. The
old tory class in the mountain counties was troublesome.^ Of the
little property surviving the wreck of war, none was safe from thiev-
ery. The worst class of the negroes — not numerous at this time —
were insolent and violent in their new-found freedom. Murders
were frequent, and outrages upon women were beginning to be heard
of.^ The whites, especially the more ignorant ones, were afraid of
the effects of preaching of the doctrines of equaHty, amalgamation,
etc., to the blacks. There were soon signs to show that some negroes
would endeavor to put the theories they had heard of into practice.'*
There was much talk of confiscation of property and division of
land among the blacks. The negroes beheved that they were going
to be rewarded at the expense of the whites, and many of the latter
began to fear that such might be the case. The Freedmen's Bureau
early began its most successful career in ahenating the races, by
teaching the black that the southern white was naturally unfriendly
to him. In this work it was ably assisted by the preaching and teach-
ing missionaries sent out from the North, who taught the negro to
beware of the southern white in church and in school. The Bureau
broke up the labor system that had been patched up in the summer
and fall of 1865, and people in the Black Belt felt that labor must
be regulated in some way.'""* In the white counties the poorer whites,
who had been the strongest supporters of the secession movement,
not because they hked slavery, but because they were afraid of the
competition of free negroes, began to show signs of a desire to drive
the negro tenants from the rich lands which they wanted for them-
1 See above, Ch. VIII, Sec. 2.
2 Saunders, "Early Settlers" ; Miller, "Alabama" ; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test.,
p. 394 (General Pettus); Somers, "Southern States," p. 153.
8 Ku Klux Kept., pp. 80-81 ; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 170 (Governor Lindsay).
* Ala. Test., pp. 433, 459 (P. M. Dox, M.C.); p. 1749 (W. S. Mudd); p. 476
(William H. Forney); Beard, "Ku Klux Sketches."
^ Somers, p. 153 ; Birmingham Age-Herald, May 19, 1901 (J. W. DuBose); Ala.
Test., p. 487 (Gen. William H. Forney).
CAUSES OF THE KU KLUX MOVEiMENT 655
selves.^ F'or years after the war it was almost impossible for the
farmer or planter to raise cows, hogs, poultry, etc., on account of
the thieving propensities of the negroes.^ Houses, mills, gins, cotton
pens, and corn-cribs were frequently burned.^ The Union I>eague
was believed by many to be an organization for the purpose of plun-
dering the whites and for the division of property when the confisca-
tion should take place/ It was also an active poHtical machine.
Nearly all the witnesses before the Ku Klux Committee who stated
the causes of the rise of Ku Klux said that the League was the prin-
cipal one. The whites soon came to beheve that they were per-
secuted by the Washington government. The cotton frauds in 1865 ;
the cotton tax, 1865-1868; the refusal to admit the southern states to
representation in Congress, though they were heavily taxed; the
passage of the Reconstruction Acts, by which the governments in
the South were overturned, the negroes enfranchised, and all the
prominent whites disfranchised, — all combined to make the white
people beheve that the North was seeking to humiliate them, to
punish them when they were weak. They did not contemplate such
treatment when they laid down their arms. As one soldier expressed
it : the treatment received was in violation of the terms of surrender
as expressed in their paroles ; the southern soldiers could have carried
on a guerilla warfare for years; the United States had made terms
with men who had arms in their hands; they had laid them down,
and the United States had violated these terms and punished individ-
uals for alleged crime without trial ; yet their paroles stated that they
were not to be disturbed as long as they were law-abiding ; the whole
Reconstruction was a violation of the terms of surrender as the southern
1 Ala. Test., p. 230 (General Clanton); pp. 1751, 1758, 1765 (W. S. Mudd).
2 Planters who before the war were able to raise their own bacon at a cost of 5
cents a pound now had to kill all the hogs to keep the negroes from stealing them, and
then pay 20 to 28 cents a pound for bacon. The farmer dared not turn out his stock.
Ala. Test., pp. 230, 247 (Clanton).
^ N. V. World, April 11, 1868 {Montgomery Advertiser). There was a plot to
burn Selma and Tuscumbia ; Talladega was almost destroyed ; the court-house of
Greene County was burned and that of Hale set on fire. In Perry County a young man
had a difficulty with a carpet-bag official and slapped his face. That night the carpet-
bagger's agents burned the young man's barn and stables with horses in them. It was
generally believed that the penalty for a dispute with a carpet-bagger was the burning
of a barn, gin, or stable. See also Brown, " Lower South," Ch. IV.
4 Ala. Test., p. 487 (Gen. William H. Forney).
656 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
soldiers understood it; it was punishment of a whole people by
legislative enactment, and contrary to the spirit of American institu-
tions. It was not a matter of law, but of common honesty/
General Clanton complained that the southern people passed
out of the hands of warriors into the hands of squaws.^ The govern-
ment imposed upon Alabama after the voters had fairly rejected it
according to act of Congress was administered by the most worth-
less and incompetent of whites — ahen and native — and negroes.
Heavy taxes were laid; the pubHc debt was rapidly increased; the
treasury was looted; pubhc office was treated as private property.
The government was weak and vicious; it gave no protection to
person or property ; it was powerless, or perhaps unwiUing, to repress
disorder; and was held in general contempt. The officials were
notoriously corrupt and unjust in administration. There were
many disorders which the people believed the state and Federal gov-
ernments could not or would not regulate.^ There was a general
feeHng of insecurity, in some sections a reign of terror. Innumerable
humiliations were infficted on the former political people of the state
by carpet-bagger and scalawag, using the former slave as an instru-
ment. Negro policemen stood on the street corners annoying the
whites, making a great parade of all arrests, sometimes even of white
women. The elections were corrupt, and the law was dehberately
framed to protect ballot-box frauds."* The highest officers of the
judiciary. Federal and state, took an active interest in pohtics, con-
trary to judicial traditions. Justice, so called, was bought and sold.
The most thoroughly political people of the world, the proudest
people of the EngHsh race, were the political inferiors of their former
slaves, and the newcomers from the North never failed to make this
fact as irritating as possible, by speech and print and action.^
In short, there was anarchy, social and poHtical and economic.
As the negro said, ''The bottom rail is on top." The strenuous
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 377, 381, 382, 400, statement of General Pettus,
the present junior Senator from Alabama. Pope and Grant continually reminded the old
soldiers that their paroles were still in force. Also Beard, " Ku Klux Sketches " ; testi-
mony of John D. Minnis, a carpet-bag official, in Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 527-571.
2 Ala. Test., p. 224.
3 Ala. Test., p. 873 (William M. Lowe). * See Ch. XXIII.
^ For general accounts : Lester and Wilson, " Ku Klux Klan " ; Beard, " Ku Klux
Sketches"; Brown, "The Lower South in American History," Ch. IV; Nordhoff,
SECRET SOCIETIES OF REGULATORS 657
editor Randolph said, "The origin of Ku Klux Klan is in the gall-
ing despotism that broods Hke a nightmare over these southern states,
— a fungus growth of mihtary tyranny superinduced by the fostering
of Loyal Leagues, the abrogation of our civil laws, the habitual
violation of our national constitution, and a persistent prostitution
of all government, all resources, and all powers, to degrade the white
man by the estabHshment of negro supremacy." ^
Secret Societies of Regulators, before Ku Klux Klan
On account of the disordered condition of the state in 1865, some
kind of a poHce power was necessary, the Federal garrisons being
but few and weak. The minds of all men turned at once to the old
ante-bellum neighborhood pohce patrol.^ This patrol had consisted
of men usually selected by the justice of the peace to patrol the entire
community once a week" or once a month, usually at night. The
duty was compulsory, and every able-bodied white was subject to it,
though there was sometimes commutation of service. The principal
need for this patrol was to keep the black population in order, and
to this end the patroUers were invested with the authority to inflict
corporal punishment in summary fashion. There were about two
companies, of six men and a captain each, to every township where
there was a dense negro population. The attentions of the patrol
were not confined to negroes alone, but now and then a white man
was thrashed for some misdemeanor.^ In this respect the patrol
was a body for the regulation of society, so far as petty misdemeanors
were concerned, and every respectable white man was by virtue of his
color a member of this pohce guard. He had the right, whether in
active patrol or not, to question any strange negro found abroad, or
any negro traveUing without a pass, or any white man found tamper-
ing with the negroes. It was to some extent a military organization
of society. Much of this was simply custom, the development of
hundreds of years, not a statute regulation, for that was a recent
" Cotton States in 1875 " ; Somers, "The Southern States." For documents, see Flem-
ing, " Docs, relating to Reconstruction." For innumerable details, see the Ku Klux
testimony and the testimony taken by the Coburn investigating committee.
1 Independent Monitor (Tuscaloosa), April 14, 1868.
2 The negroes called them " pateroUers."
^ Ala. Test., p. 490 (William H. Forney).
658 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
thing in the history of slavery. It was the old English neighborhood
pohce system become a part of the customary law of slavery. After
the war some regulation was necessary ; the whites were accustomed
to settHng such matters outside of law or court; it was bred into
their nature, and they returned perhaps unconsciously to the old
system.^
But now, under the regime of the Freedmen's Bureau backed
by the army, the old way of deahng with refractory blacks was
illegal. As a matter of fact there was no legal way to control them.
The result was natural — the movement to regulate society became a
secret one. The white men of each community had a general under-
standing that they would assist one another to protect women, children,
and property. They had a system of signals for communication,
but no disguises, and the organization was not kept secret except from
the negroes. In one locality the young men alone were united into
a committee for the regulation of the conduct of negroes. They
requested the women who lived alone on the plantations, the old
men, and others who were Hkely to be unable to control the negroes,
to inform the committee of instances of misconduct on the part of
the blacks. When such information came, it was immediately
acted upon, and the next day there were sadder and better negroes
on some one's plantation.^ As a rule one thrashing in a community
lasted a long time. In Hale County a vigilance committee was
formed to protect the women and children in a section of the black
country where there were few white men, most having been killed in
the war. They had a system of signals by means of plantation bells.
There were no disguises, and there was a public place of meeting.^
In the same county, in the fall of 1865, the whites near Newberne
asked General Hardee, then living on his plantation, to take command
of their patrol. His answer was: "No, gentlemen, I want you to
enroll my name for service, but put a younger man in command.
I have served my day as commander. I will be ready to respond
1 Ala. Test., p. 873 (William M. Lowe) ; p. 443 (P. M. Dox) ; oral accounts. It
must be remembered that, so far as numbers of whites are considered, the Black Belt
has always been as a thinly populated frontier region, where every white must care
for himself.
2 Rev. W. E. Lloyd and Mr. R. W. Burton, both of Auburn, Ala., and numerous
negroes have given me accounts of the policy of the black districts soon after the war.
8 Ala. Test , p. 1487 (J. J. Garrett).
SECRET SOCIETIES OF REGULATORS 659
when called upon for active duty. I want to advise you to get ready
for what may come. We are standing over a sleeping volcano." ^
In Limestone County a similar organization was composed of peace-
able citizens united to disperse or crush out bands of thieves.^ This
was in a white county in the northern section of the state, where the
people had suffered during the war, and were still suffering, from
the depredations of the tories. In Winston and Walker counties
the returning Confederate soldiers banded together and drove many
of the tories from the country, hanging several of the worst char-
acters.^ In central and southern Alabama the citizens resolved
themselves into vigilance committees and hanged horse thieves and
other outlaws who were raiding the country, some of them disguised
in the uniforms of Federal soldiers.'*
In Marengo County while negro insurrection v^as feared a secret
organization was formed for the protection of the whites. The
members were initiated in a Masonic hall. Regular meetings were
held, and each member reported on the conduct of the negroes in
his community. There were no whippings necessary in this section,
and after a few night rides the society dissolved. The Bureau and
Union League were never successful in getting absolute control over
the "Cane Brake" region, and therefore the negroes were better
behaved and there was less disorder.^
Before Christmas, 1865, when there seemed to be danger of out-
breaks of that part of the negro population who were disappointed
in regard to the division of property, there was a disposition among
the whites in some counties, especially in the eastern Black Belt, to
form militia companies, though this was forbidden by the Washington
authorities. Some of these companies regularly patrolled their
neighborhoods. Others undertook to disarm the freedmen, who
were purchasing arms of every description, and in order to do this
searched the negro houses at night. General Swayne, recognizing
the dangerous situation of the whites, forbore to interfere with
these mihtia companies until after Christmas, when, the negroes
1 Birmingham Age-Herald, May 19, 1901 (J. W. DuBose).
2 Ala. Test., p. 592 (L. W. Day).
^ Saunders, " Early Settlers " ; oral accounts.
* Ala. Test., p. 445 (P. M. Dox); Miller, "Alabama." The negroes still point out
and avoid the trees on which these outlaws were hanged.
^ J. W. DuBose and accounts of other members.
660 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
remaining peaceable, he issued an order forbidding further int(
ference ; ^ but the mihtia organizations persisted in some shape until
the Reconstruction Acts were passed.
In the eastern counties of the state there was in 1865 and 1866
an organization, preceding the Ku Klux, called the "Black Cavalry,"
It was a secret, oath-bound, night-riding order. Its greatest strengtt
was in Tallapoosa County, where it was said to have 200 to 30c
members. It was not only a band to regulate the conduct of th(
negroes, but there was a large element in it of the poorer whites
who wanted to drive the negro from the rich lands upon which slaver)
had settled them, in order to get them for themselves. This was
generally true of all secret orders of regulators in the white counties
from 1865 to 1875, ^^^ exactly the opposite was the case in the
Black Belt, where the planters preferred the negro labor, and nevei
drove out the blacks. The "Black Cavalry," it is said, drove more
negroes from east Alabama than the Ku Klux did.^
There were local bands of regulators policing nearly every dis-
trict in Alabama. Few of them had formal organizations or rose
to the dignity of having officers or names, but there were the "Men
of Justice," in north Alabama, principally in Limestone County,
and the "Order of Peace," partially organized in Huntsville early
in 1868,^ and many other local orders.
The Origin and Growth of Ku Klux Klan
The local bands of regulators in existence immediately after
the war were a necessary outcome of the disordered conditions pre-
vailing at the time, and would have disappeared with a return to
normal conditions under a strong government which had the respect
of the people. But during the excitement over the action of the
Reconstruction convention ih the fall of 1867 and the elections
of February, 1868, a new secret order became prominent in Ala-
bama; and when, after the people had defeated the constitution,
Congress showed a disposition to disregard the popular will as ex-
pressed in the result of the election, this order — Ku Klux Klan —
1 Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1866, Pt. Ill, p. 140 (Swayne).
2 Ala. Test., pp. 1125, 11 26 (Daniel Taylor); pp. 1 136, 1142 (Col. John J. HoUey).
* Ala. Test., p. 877 (Wm. M. Lowe); p. 664 (Daniel Coleman).
THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF KU KLUX KLAN 66l
sprang into activity in widely separated localities. The campaign
of the previous six months had made the people desperate when
they contemplated what was in store for them under the rule of
carpet-bagger, scalawag, and negro. The counter-revolution was
beginning.
The Ku Klux Klan originated in Pulaski, Tennessee, in the
fall of 1865.^ The founders were James R. Crowe, Richard R.
Reed, Calvin Jones, John C. Lester, Frank O. McCord, and John
Kennedy. Some were Alabamians and some Tennesseeans. Lester
and Crowe lived later in Sheffield, Alabama. Crowe and Kennedy
are the only survivors. It was a club of young men who had served
in the Confederate army, who united for purposes of fun and mis-
chief, pretty much as college boys in secret fraternities or country
boys as "snipe hunters." The name was an accidental corruption
of the Greek word kuklos, a circle, and had no meaning.^ The
officers had outlandish titles, and fancy disguises were adopted. The
regalia or uniform consisted of a tall cardboard hat covered with
cloth, on which were pasted red spangles and stars; there was a
face covering, with openings for nose, mouth, and ears; and a long
robe coming nearly to the heels, made of any kind of cloth — white,
black, or red — often fancy colored cahco. A whistle was used as a
signal.^
This scheme for amusement was successful, and there were
plenty of apphcations for admission. Members went away to other
towns, and under the direction of the Pulaski Club, or "Den" as it
was called, other Dens were formed. The Pulaski Den was in the
habit of parading in full uniform at social gatherings of the whites
at night, much to the dehght of the small boys and girls. Pulaski
was near the Alabama Hne, and many Alabama young men saw
these parades or heard of them, and Dens were organized over north
1 " The so-called Ku Klux organizations were formed in this state (Alabama) very
soon after the return of our soldiers to their homes, following the surrender. To the
best of my recollection, it was during the winter of 1866 that I first heard of the Klan
in Alabama." — Ryland Randolph. The quotations from Randolph are taken from his
letters, unless his paper, the Independent Monitor, is referred to.
2 "This fellow Jones up at Pulaski got up a piece of Greek and originated it, and
then General Forrest took hold of it." — Nicholas Davis, in Ala. Test., p. 783.
8 Lester and Wilson, " Ku Klux Klan," p. 17; Ala. Test., pp. 660, 661, 1282;
accounts of members.
I
662 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
5
Alabama in the towns. Nothing but horse-play and tomfoolery
took place in the meetings. In 1867 and 1868 the order appeared
in parade in the north Alabama towns and " cut up curious gyrations"
on the pubhc squares.^ The Klan had not long been in existence
and was still in this first stage, and was rapidly speeding, when a
pretty general discovery of its power over the negro was made. The
weird night riders in ghostly disguises frightened the superstitious
negroes, who were told that the spirits of dead Confederates were
abroad.^ There was a general behef outside the order that there
was a purpose behind all the ceremonial and frohc of the Dens;
many joined the order convinced that its object was serious; others
saw the possibilities in it and joined in order to make use of it. After
discovering the power of the Klan over the negroes, there was a
general tendency, owing to the disordered conditions of the time,
to go into the business of a pohce patrol and hold in check the thievingi
negroes, the Union League, and the "loyahsts." From being a series
of social clubs the Dens swiftly became bands of regulators, adding
many fantastic qualities to their original outfit. All this time the
Pulaski organization exercised a loose control over a federation of
Dens. There was danger, as the Dens became more and more
police bodies, of some of the more ardent spirits going to excess,
and in several instances Dens went far in the direction of violence
and outrage. Attempts were made by the parent Den to regulate
the conduct of the Dens, but owing to the loose organization, they
met with little success. Some of the Dens lost all connection with
the original order.
Early in 1867 the Grand Cyclops of the Pulaski Den sent requests
to the various Dens in the southern states to send delegates to a
convention in Nashville. This convention met in May, 1867. Dele-
gates from all of the Gulf states and from several others were present,
and the order of Ku Klux Klan was reorganized. There were at
• 1 Ala. Test., p. 660.
2 " It [the Klan] originated with the returned soldiers for the purpose of punishing
those negroes who had become notoriously and offensively insolent to white people, and,
in some cases, to chastise those white-skinned men who, at that particular time, showed
a disposition to affiliate socially with negroes. The impression sought to be made was
that these white-robed night prowlers were the ghosts of the Confederate dead, who had
arisen from their graves in order to wreak vengeance upon an undesirable class of white
and black men." — Randolph.
THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF KU KLUX KLAN 663
this time Dens in all the southern states, and even in Illinois and
Pennsylvania/ A constitution called the "Prescript" was here
adopted for the entire order. The administration was central-
zed, and the entire South was placed under the jurisdiction of its
officials. The former slave states except Delaware constituted the
Empire, which was ruled by the Grand Wizard ^ with a staff of ten
Genii; each state was a realm under a Grand Dragon and eight
Hydras ; the next subdivision was the Dominion, consisting of several
counties,^ ruled by a Grand Titan and six Furies ; the county as a
Province was governed by a Grand Giant ^ and four Goblins ; the
unit was the Den or community organization. There might be
several in each county, each under a Grand Cyclops and two Night
Hawks. The Genii, Hydras, Furies, Gobhns, and Night Hawks
were staff officers. Each of the above divisions was called a
Grand *. The order had no name, and at first was designated by
two **, later by three ***. The private members were called Ghouls.
The Grand Magi and the Grand Monk were the second and third
officers of the Den, and had the authority of the Grand Cyclops
when the latter was absent. The Grand Sentinel was in charge of the
guard of the Den, and the Grand Ensign carried its banner on the
night rides.^ Every division had a Grand Exchequer, whose duty
it was to look after the revenue,® and a Grand Scribe, or secretary,
who called the roll, made reports, and kept hsts of members (without
anything to show what the Hst meant), usually in Arabic figures,
1 Lester and Wilson, Ch. I ; Ala. Test., p. 1283 (Blackford); Somers, p. 152; oral
accounts.
2 General Forrest was the first and only Grand Wizard.
3 There could not be more than two Dominions in a single congressional district.
* There might be two Grand Giants in a province.
5 The office of Grand Ensign was abolished by the Revised and Amended Prescript,
adopted in 1868. The banner was in the shape of an isosceles triangle, five feet by
three, of yellow cloth with a three-inch red border. Painted on it in black was a
Draco volans, or Flying Dragon, and this motto, " Quod semper, quod umbique, quod ah
omnibus." This, in a note to the Prescript, was translated, " What always, what every-
where, what by all is held to be true."
<5 Sources of revenue: (i) sale of the Prescript to Dens for $10 a copy, of which
the treasuries of Province, Dominion, and Realm each received $2 and the treasury of
the Empire ^4 ; (2) a tax levied by each division on the next lower one, amounting to
lo'/n of the revenue of the subordinate division ; (3) a special tax, unlimited, might
l)c levied in a similar manner, when absolutely necessary; (4) the Dens raised money by
initiation fees (^i each), fines, and a poll tax levied when the Grand Cyclops saw fit.
664 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
I, 2, 3, etc. The Grand Turk was the adjutant of the Grand Cyclops,
and gave notice of meetings, executed orders, received candidates,
and administered the preliminary oaths. The officers of the Den
were elected semiannually by the Ghouls; the highest officers of;
the other divisions were elected biannually by the officers of the
next lower rank. The first Grand Wizard was to serve three years
from May, 1867.^ Each superior officer could appoint special deputies
to assist him and to extend the order. Every division made quarterly
reports to the next higher headquarters. In case a question of
paramount importance should arise, the Grand Wizard was invested
with absolute authority.^
The Tribunal of Justice consisted of a Grand Council of Yahoos
for the trial of all elected officers, and was composed of those of
equal rank with the accused, presided over by one of the next higher
rank ; and for the trial of Ghouls and non-elective officers, the Grand
Council of Centaurs, which consisted of six Ghouls appointed by the
Grand Cyclops, who presided.^
A person was admitted to the Den after nomination by a member
and strict investigation by a committee. No one under eighteen
was admitted. The oath taken was one of obedience and secrecy.
The Dens governed themselves by the ordinary rules of deliberative
bodies. The penalty for betrayal of secret was ''the extreme penalty
of the Law. " ^ None of the secrets was to be written. There was a
Register of alarming adjectives used in dating the wonderful Ku
Klux orders.^
In the original Prescript no mention was made of the peculiar
objects of the order. The Creed acknowledged the supremacy of
1 The Revised Prescript made all officers appointive except the Grand Wizard, who
was elected by the Grand Dragons, — a long step toward centralization.
2 It was by virtue of this authority that the order was disbanded in 1869.
8 The judiciary was abolished by the Revised Prescript.
* " We had a regular system of by-laws, one or two of which only do I distinctly
remember. One was, that should any member reveal the names or acts of the Klan, he
should suffer the full penalty of the identical treatment inflicted upon our white and
black enemies. Another was that in case any member of the Klan should become
involved in a personal difficulty with a Radical (white or black), in the presence of any
other member or members, he or they were bound to take the part of the member, even
to the death, if necessary." — Randolph.
^ "Terrible, horrible, furious, doleful, bloody, appalling, frightful, gloomy," etc.
The Register was changed in the Revised Prescript. It was simply a cipher code.
lllC
THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF KU KLUX KLAN 665
^ Divine Being, and the Preamble the supremacy of the laws of the
I'liited States/ The Revised and Amended Prescript sets forth
character and objects of the order: (i) To protect the weak,
the innocent, and the defenceless from the indignities, wrongs, and
CHARACTER AND OBJECTS OF THE ORDER.
This is an institution of Chivalry, Humanity,
Mercy, and Patriotism ; embodying in its genius
and its principles all that is chivalric in conduct,
noble in sentiment, generous in manhood, and
patriotic in purpose ; its peculiar objects being
First : To protect the weak, the innocent, and
the defenceless, from the indignities, wrongs, and
outtages of the lawless, the violent, and the
brutal*, to relieve the injured and oppressed; to
succor the suffering and unfortunate, and espe*
cially the widows and orphans of Confederate
soldiers.
Second: To protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and all laws passed in
conformity thereto, and to protect the States and
the people thereof from all invasion from any
source whatever.
Third : To aid and assist in the execution o€
all constitutional laws, and to protect tlic people
from urdawful seizure, and from trial except by
their peers in conformity to the lav.s of the land^
ARTICLE I.
I TITLXS.
Section 1. The officers of this Order shall
consist of a Grand Wizard of the Empire, and
his ten Genii ; a Grand Dragon of the Bealm^
3
Facsimile of Page 3 of the Revised and Amended Prescript of Ku Klux Klan.
outrages of the lawless, the violent, and the brutal ; ^ to reheve the
injured and oppressed ; to succor the suffering and unfortunate, and
^ The Rdvised Prescript says "the constitutional laws." Lester and Wilson, p. 54.
'^ Compare with the declaration of similar illegal societies, — the " Confreries " of
France in the Middle Ages, — which sprang into existence under similar conditions
seven hundred years before, " pour defendre les innocents et reprimer les violences
iniques." See Lavisse et Rambaud, " Histoire Generale," Vol. II, p. 466.
666 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
especially the widows and orphans of Confederate soldiers. (2)
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States and all lai
passed in conformity thereto, and to protect the states and peopl
thereof from all invasion from any source whatever. (3) To aid anj
assist in the execution of all "constitutional" laws, and to protect tl
people from unlawful arrest, and from trial except by their peei
according to the laws of the land.^
The questions asked of the candidate constituted a test sufficien
to exclude all except the most friendly whites. The apphcant fo
admission was asked if he belonged to the Federal army or the Radica
party, Union League, or Grand Army of the Republic, and if he wa
opposed to the principles of those organizations. He was asked if h
was opposed to negro equahty, political and social, and was in favo
of a white man's government, of constitutional liberty and equitabl
laws. He was asked if he was in favor of reenfranchisement am
emancipation of the southern whites, and the restoration to th
southern people of their rights, — property, civil, and political, — an(
of maintaining the constitutional rights of the South, and if he be
lieved in the inalienable right of self-preservation of the peopl
against the exercise of arbitrary and unlicensed power.
The Revised and Amended Prescript, made in 1868, was an attemp
to give more power of control to the central authorities in order t
enable them to regulate the obstreperous Dens. The purposes o
the order, omitted in the first Prescript, was clearly declared in th
revision. Little change was made in the administration of the order.
^ See also Lester and Wilson, pp. 55, 56.
2 I have before me the original Prescript, a small brown pamphlet about three inche
by five, of sixteen pages. The title-page has a quotation from " Hamlet " and one from
Burns. At the top and bottom of each page are single-line Latin quotations : " Damnant
quod non intelligunt " ; " Amici huniani generis " ; " Magna est Veritas, et prevalebit " ;
" Hie manent vestigia morientis libertatis " ; " Cessante causa, cessat eff ectus " ; " Dor-
mitur aliquando jus, moritur nunquam"; "Deo adjuvante, non timendum " ; "Nemo
nos impune lacessit," etc. This Prescript belonged to the Grand Giant of the Province
of Tuscaloosa County, the late Ryland Randolph, formerly editor of the Independent
Monitor, and was given to me by him. It is the only copy known to be in existence.
He called it the " Ku Klux Guide Book," and states that it was sent to him from head-
quarters at Memphis. An imperfect copy of the original Prescript was captured in 1868,
and printed in Ho. Mis. Doc, No. 53, pp. 315-321, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., and again in
the Ku Klux Kept., Vol. XIII, pp. 35-41.
There is a copy of the Revised and Amended Prescript in Columbia University
Library, the only copy known to be in existence. No committee of Congress ever dis-
THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF KU KLUX KLAN 66/
The order continued to spread after the reorganization in 1867.
There were scattered Dens over north Alabama and as far south as
Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery. It came first to the towns
id then spread into the country. It was less and less an obscure
uiganization, and more and more a band of regulators, using mystery,
disguise, and secrecy to terrify the blacks into good behavior. It was
in many ways a mihtary organization, the shadowy ghost of the Con-
federate armies.^ The whites were all well-trained mihtary men;
they looked to their mihtary chieftains to lead them. The best men
were members,^ though the prominent pohticians as a rule did not
belong to the order. They fought the fight against the Radicals on
the other side of the field.^
After the elections in February, 1868, the Ku Klux came into
greater prominence in Alabama, especially in the northern and
western portions, while south Alabama was still quiet.^
The counties of north Alabama infested were Lauderdale, Lime-
stone, Madison, Jackson, Morgan, Lawrence, FrankHn, Madison,
Winston, Walker, Fayette, and Blount. In central Alabama, Mont-
gomery, Greene, Pickens, Tuscaloosa, Calhoun, Talladega, Randolph,
Chambers, Coosa, and Tallapoosa.^ There were bands in most of
the other counties, and in the counties of the Black Belt. The order
seldom extended to the lower edge of the Black Belt. In the Black
covered this Prescript, and when the Klan disbanded, in March, 1869, it was strictly
ordered that all papers be destroyed. A few Prescripts escaped destruction, and years
afterward one of these was given to the Southern Society of New York by a Nashville
lady. The Southern Society gave it to Columbia University Library. It was printed
in the office of the Pulaski Citizen in 1868. The Revised and Amended Prescript
is reproduced in facsimile as No. 2 of the W. Va. Univ. " Docs, relating to Reconstruc-
tion." Lester and Wilson use it incorrectly (p. 54) as the one adopted in Nashville in
1867. At this time General Forrest is said to have assumed the leadership. See Wyeth,
"Life of Forrest," p. 619; Mathes, "General P'orrest," pp. 371-373; Ku Klux Rept.,
Vol. XIII, Forrest's testimony.
1 Somers, p. 153.
2 " Breckenridge Democrats, Douglas Democrats, Watts State Rights Whigs, Lang-
don Consolidation Know-Nothings," united in Ku Klux. Birmingham Age-Herald,
May 19, 1901 ; Ala. Test., p. 323 (Busteed) et passim.
^ But some survivors are now inclined to remember all opposition to the Radical
programme as Ku Klux, that is, to have been a Democrat then was to have been a
member of Ku Klux.
* General Terry, in Report of Sec. of War, 1869-1870, Vol. II, p. 88.
^ "The Ku Klux organizations flourished chiefly in middle and southern Alabama;
notaljly in Montgomery, Greene, Tuscaloosa, and Pickens counties." — Randolph.
66S CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Belt it met the Knights of the White Cameha, the White Brother
hood, and later the White League, and in a way absorbed them all.
The actual number of the men in regular organized Dens canno
be ascertained. It was estimated that there were 800 in Madisoi
County, and 10,000 in the state. ^ Others said that it included al
Confederate soldiers.^ The actual number regularly enrolled wa<
much less than the number who acted as Ku Klux when they con
sidered it necessary. In one sense practically all able-bodied native
white men belonged to the order, and if social and business ostracisn
be considered as a manifestation of the Ku Klux spirit, then the
women and children also were Ku Klux.
It is the nature and vice of secret societies of regulators to degen
erate, and the Ku Klux Klan was no exception to the rule. By 1865
the order had fallen largely under control of a low class of men whc
used it to further their own personal aims, to wreak revenge 01
their enemies and gratify personal animosities. Outrages became
frequent, and the order was dangerous even to those who foundec
it.^ It had done its work. The negroes had been in a measure con-
trolled, and society had been held together during the revolution o:
1865-1869. The people were still harassed by niany irritations anc
persecutions, but while almost unbearable, they were mostly of
nature to disappear in time as the carpet-bag governments collapsed
The most material evil at present was the misgovernment of thi
Radicals, and this could not last always. But though the organizec
Ku Klux Klan was disbanded, the spirit of resistance was highe:
than ever; and as each community had problems to deal with the)
were met in the old manner — a sporadic uprising of a local Klan
1 Ku Klux Kept., p. 21 ; Ala. Test., pp. 67, 68 (B. W. Norris) ; pp. 364, 39
(Swayne); p. 443 (P. M. Dox) ; p. 385 (General Pettus); p. 462 (William H. For
^^y); P* 77 (Parsons); pp. 1282, 1283 (Blackford); p. 547 (Minnis); p. 660 (Danie
Coleman); p. 323 (Busteed).
2 Ala. Test., p. 785 (Nicholas Davis); pp. 79, 80 (Governor Parsons).
3 Ala. Test., p. 1282.
* " Had these organizations confined their operations to their legitimate objects,
then their performances vi'ould have effected only good. Unfortunately the Klan began
to degenerate into a vile means of wreaking revenge for personal dislikes or personal
animosities, and in this way many outrages were perpetrated, ultimately resulting ii
casting so much odium on the whole concern that about the year 1870 there was a
almost universal collapse, all the good and brave men abandoning it in disgust. Many
outrages were committed in the name of Ku Klux that really were done by irresponsibl
parties who never belonged to the Klan." — Randolph.
THE KNIGHTS OF THE WHITE CAMELIA 669
As long as a carpet-bagger was in power, the principles of the Klan
were asserted.
The Knights of the White Camelia
I The order known as the Knights of the White Camelia origi-
nated in Louisiana in 1867/ and spread from thence through the
Gulf states. In Alabama it was well organized in the southwestern
counties, and to some extent throughout the lower Black Belt. It
probably did not exist in the southeastern white counties.^ The
former local vigilance committees, neighborhood patrol parties, and
disbanded militia were absorbed into the order, which gave them a
uniform organization and a certain loose union, and left them pretty
much as independent as before. There was a closer sympathy
between southwest Alabama and Louisiana than between the two
sections of Alabama, which perhaps will account for the failure of
Ku Klux Klan to organize in the southern counties. The White
Camelia came to Alabama from New Orleans via Mobile, and also
through southern Mississippi to southwestern Alabama. Later the
White League cartie the same way.
In June 1868 a convention of the Knights of the White Cameha
was held in New Orleans, and a constitution was adopted for the
order.^ The preamble stated that Radical legislation was sub-
versive of the principles of government adopted by the fathers, and
in order to secure safety and prosperity the order was founded for
the preservation of those principles. The order consisted of a Supreme
Council of the United States, and of Grand, Central, and Subordinate
councils. The Supreme Council with headquarters in New Orleans
consisted of five delegates from each Grand Council. It was the
1 It was evidently organized May 23, 1867, since the constitution directed that all
orders and correspondence should be dated with "the year of the B. — computing from
the 23d of May, 1867. . . . Thursday the 20th of July, 1868, shall be the 20th day of
the 7th month of the 2d year of the B. of the ." Constitution, Title VIII, Article 77.
2 Ala, Test., pp. 1282-1283 (Blackford); p. 9 (William Miller); accounts of former
members. P. J. Glover testified in the Coburn-Buckner Report, pp. 882-883 ('875),
that in 1867-1868 he was a nieml)er of the order of the White Camelia in Marengo
County, and that it cooperated with a similar order in Sumter County. The Ku Klux
'testimony relating to Alabama (p. 1338) shows that in 1871 Glover had denied any
knowledge of such secret orders.
* W. Va. Univ. Docs., No. i ; Brown, " Lower South," Ch. IV.
670 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
general legislative body of the order, and maintained communicatioi
within the order by means of passwords and cipher correspondence
Communication between and with the lowest organizations wa
verbal only. All officers were designated by initials/
In each state the Grand CounciP was the highest body, am
held its sessions at the state capital. The membership consisted o
delegates from the Central Councils — one delegate for one thousanc
members. The Grand Council had the power of legislation for thi
state, subject to the constitution of the order and the laws of thi
Supreme Council. In each county or parish there was a Centra
Council of delegates from Subordinate Councils.^ It was chargec
with the duty of collecting the revenue and extending the orde;
within its limits. The lowest organization was the Council (or Sub-
ordinate Council) in a community. This body had sole authorit;
to initiate members. In each county the Subordinate CounciL
were designated by numbers. Each was composed of several Circle
(each under a Grand Chief) ; each Circle of five Groups (each unde
a Chief) ; and each Group of ten Brothers. Officials of the orde
were elected by indirect methods. An ex-member states that ''during
the three years . of its existence here [Perry County] I believe iti
organization and discipHne were as perfect as human ingenuit;
could have made it." *
The constitution prohibited the order as a body from nominating
or supporting any candidate or set of candidates for pubHc office
Each subordinate rank had the right of local legislation. Quarter!]
reports were made by each division. The officers of the highe
councils were known only to their immediate subordinates. Whei
1 The officers of the Supreme Council were: (i) Supreme Commander, (2) Su
preme Lieutenant Commander, (3) Supreme Sentinel, (4) Supreme Corresponding
Secretary, (5) Supreme Treasurer.
2 The officers were Grand Commander, Grand Lieutenant Commander, etc.
8 The officers of a Central Council were Eminent Commander, etc. ; of a Subordi-
nate Council, Commander, etc.
* Dr. G. P. L. Reid, Marion, Alabama, formerly an official in the order. Mr. William
Garrott Brown gives the statement of one of the leaders of the order : " The authority
of the commander [this office I held] was absolute. All were sworn to obey his orders,
There was an inner circle in each circle, to which was committed any particular work ;
its movements were not known to other members of the order. This was necessarj
because, in our neighborhood, almost every southern man was a member." " Lower
South," p. 212.
Amioi hnraoiii ccncris
CBJtrn.
\Vc, tlia * • « J, reverently ackuowledgc
.. Mnies'r and Supreremcy of tha Divino Being,
;J n'cc(:i!:7e the Goodness and Providence of tlie
.>;«llie.
rKEAtlliLK.
Wf reoofrni/e oi;r relnticns th tljo United States
'.nornnicr.t, and ackncnr'.oJ^o tlio supremacy of
Ari'EIJt*TION.
Articlk I. Tiiis '-^rgaiiiz.i'.: •:: .-hftU bo styled and
uonominatcd the ^ *
TJTll.l'.
Art. 11. Tlio officers of '.las * shall cofttist of
.1 (Iraud Vi iziird of the Empire and hi.s ten Genii ;
:■. Grand Draifon of tha..E' :'.liii and his eight Ily-
drfi^ ; a Grand Titan of iIki Dominion and his six
F'lrie? : a Grand Giant of ilio rroviucc and his four
Goi-lii..- : a Grand Cyclop-* of tho Den and his two
Ni^rht Hawks ; a GrandWa^'i, a Grand Monk, a
Grand Exeheqner, a Grand Turk, a Grand Scribe,
a Grand Sentinel, and a Grand Ensign.
Fee. 2, The iPWy politic of thi.s * shall ho des-
ignated and. known ft»-*lG bonis,"
DIVISION?.
Art, II. This * shall be divided into five de-
portments, all combined,, conatitnting the Grand
* of the Empire. T{»*.ccnd department to^ be
called tho Grand *' ofOioEealm. The third, the
Grand ♦ oftheDomiai>n. Thefourth, the Grand
♦ of theP«Tince^ Thq'hitli, the * .of the Den.
DUTIES orfoFFICSES.^ .
GRAND *riZAK». .r. >", .
Art. IV. Soc.l. It8hf41bethodnty oTiheGrand
Wizard, who is the Supreme Officer of the Empire,
to communicate with an? reccirc reports from the
Magna est voritfts, ct pros valebit.
Facsimile of Page 2 of the Original
Prescript of Ku Klux Klan.
rt-iwiJAy,..
I OEM OF IMTIATION
T • I 1- iTi! fiitlftt) ansvir n nl t« all
T shftt 1 may
r in iiiiv other
, t 11 a Okth
Ilie tWrcf tba
<.r TheL C.
lollfnMiig <ln-
^ Ji.' AiiS— fV "fte
iirctbTin
.red to annwir for hiju-
lIiI hand and co»(f«ct
>>se queatif>ti8
1 ♦ I ' and be Bhall
ratir.' l.liiid!«I.I«l and .lisraiB-i <1 by the C]
us; tha ijnestiona the C shall addrcBS the can-
!« tfee Order wilt (J.'i *
,1 - ' . ) N- S
<Wh«.» «.fr.l ««HTi.i»t t . .. .' • - r the o wilt Ulc^rr tor., tie r'"!'l
Bombtr »b«tver n«tssarj-. The »ti»irtr« sbull bs promplM by the 0
1. r)o yon bdn,,;:; to tlio whitn race ? Ans— I <h
2 liul vm c^<T marry any woman who did not, ur does not, bulvjiig
toil n ..V. .... - Abb— Xo.
. ■ t M. never to marry any woman bojt on« -who belongs
1 .11 the Pliper'ifirUy of your race? An* — I do.
^ i' .. -.o. j^„._.se nev<>r to Tote (or a»y on<» for any office of honor,
profit or trust, who doe« not btlong to vour rare? Ans — 1 do.
6 Willyoa takes eoiiHin oath never t.i abstain from custiiig yonr
voto at any ekf tion in which ft candidate of the n»gro race ehall be op-
posed to a wbitv man attadn-d to your prineiple*, unless prevenUd by
neverc iSlnesa or nnv othtr phj-bical disability ' An'v—l will
Ar«-y<m opi>oped i
ing the control of the iioliUcal affairs of
Facsimile of Page from Ritual of the
Knights of the White Camelia,
THE KNIGHTS OF THE WHITE CAMELIA 6/1
a question came up that could not be settled it was referred to the
next higher council.
Only whites ^ over eighteen were admitted to membership, after
election by the order in which no adverse vote was cast. Each council
acted as a court when charges were brought against its members.
Punishment was by removal or suspension from office; there was
no expulsion from the order; punishment was simply a reducing
lo ranks. The candidate for membership into the order was re-
quired first to take the oath of secrecy, which was administered by
a subordinate official, who then announced him to the next higher
official.^ By the latter the candidate was presented to the com-
mander of the Council, and in answer to his interrogations made
solemn declaration that he had not married and would never marry
a woman not of the white race, and that he beheved in the
superiority of the white race. He promised never to vote for
any except a white man, and never to refrain from voting at
any election in which a negro candidate should oppose a white.
He further declared that he would devote his intelhgence, energy,
and influence to prevent political affairs from faUing into the hands
of the African race, and that he would protect persons of the white
race in their lives, rights, and property against encroachments from
any inferior race, especially the African. After the candidate had
made the proper declarations the final oath was administered,^ after
which he was pronounced a "Knight of the ."
1 It is said that the Ku Klux Klan had a number of negro members.
2 In making the presentation the following dialogue took place : Q. Who comes
there ? Ans. A son of your race. Q. What does he wish ? Ans. Peace and order ;
the observance of the laws of God ; the maintenance of the laws and Constitution as
established by the Patriots of 1776. Q. To obtain this, what must be done ? Ans. The
cause of our race must triumph. Q. And to secure its triumph, what must we do ?
Ans. We must be united as are the flowers that grow on the same stem, and, under all
circumstances, band ourselves together as brethren. Q. Will he join us ? Ans. He is
prepared to answer for himself, and under oath.
^ The oath : " I do solemnly swear, in the presence of these witnesses, never to
reveal, without authority, the existence of this Order, its objects, its acts, and signs of
recognition ; never to reveal or publish, in any manner whatsoever, what I shall see or
hear in this Council ; never to divulge the names of the members of the Order, or their
acts done in connection therewith ; I swear to maintain and defend the social and
political superiority of the White Race on this continent ; always and in all places to
observe a marked distinction between the White and African races ; to vote for none
but white men for any ofifice of honor, profit, or trust ; to devote my intelligence, energy,
6/2 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Commander next instructed the new members in the pr
ciples of the order, which he declared was destined to regenerate
the unfortunate country, and to reheve the white race from its humili-
ating condition. Its fundamental object was the "Maintenance
OF THE Supremacy of the White Race. "^ History and physi-
ology were called upon to show that the Caucasian race had always
been superior to, and had always exercised dominion over, inferior
races. No human laws could permanently change the great laws of
nature. The white race alone had achieved enduring civiHzation,
and of all subordinate races, the most imperfect was the African.
The government of the Republic was established by white men
for white men. It was never intended by its founders that it should
fall into the hands of an inferior race. Consequently, any attempt
to transfer the government to the blacks was an invasion of the
sacred rights guaranteed by the Constitution, as well as a violation
of the laws estabhshed by God himself, and no member of the white
race could submit, without humiliation and shame, to the subversion
of the established institutions of the Republic. It was the duty of
white men to resist attempts against their natural and legal rights
in order to maintain the supremacy of the Caucasian race and re-
strain the *' African race to that condition of social and political'
inferiority for which God has destined it." There was to be no
infringement of laws, no violations of right, no force employed,
except for purposes of legitimate and necessary defence.
As an essential condition of success, the Order proscribed abso-
lutely any social equality between the races. If any degree of social
equality should be granted, there would be no end to it; poHtical
equality was necessarily involved. Social equality meant finally
intermarriage and a degraded and ignoble population. The white
blood must be kept pure to preserve the natural superiority of the
and influence to instil these principles in the minds and hearts of others ; and to pro-
tect and defend persons of the White Race, in their lives, rights, and property, against
the encroachments and aggressions of persons of any inferior race. I swear, moreover,
to unite myself in heart, soul, and body with those who compose this Order ; to aid,
protect, and defend them in all places ; to obey the orders of those who, by our statutes,
will have the right of giving those orders ; to respond at the peril of my life, to a call,
sign, or cry coming from a fellow-member whose rights are violated ; and to do every-
thing in my power to assist him through life. And to the faithful performance of this
Oath I pledge my life and sacred honor."
1 The motto is printed in large capitals in the original text.
THE KNIGHTS OF THE WHITE CAMELIA 673
race. The obligation was therefore taken ''To Observe a Marked
Distinction between the two Races," ^ in pubHc and in private
life.
One of the most important duties of the members was to respect
the rights of the negroes, and in every instance give them their lawful
dues. It was only simple justice to deny them, none of their legiti-
mate privileges. There was no better way to show the inherent
superiority of the white race, than by deahng with the blacks in that
spirit of firmness, liberahty, and impartiality which characterizes
all superior organizations. It would be ungenerous to restrict them
in the exercise of certain privileges, without conceding to them at
the same time the fullest measure of their legitimate rights. A fair
construction of the white man's duty to the black would be, not
only to respect and observe their acknowledged rights, but also to
see that they were respected and observed by others.
These declarations give a good idea of what was in the minds
of the southern whites in 1867 and 1868, and later.^
Like the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Cameha dis-
banded when the objects of the order were accompHshed, or were
in a fair way toward accomplishment. In some counties it lived
a year or two longer than in others. In certain counties, by order
of its authorities, it was never organized. It did not extend north
of the Black Belt, though it existed in close proximity to the more
southerly of the Klans. As the oldest of the large secret orders, the
name of Ku Klux Klan was more widely known than the others,
and hence the name was applied indiscriminately to all. A local
body would assume the name of a large one when there was no direct
connection. The other organizations similar to Ku Klux in objects
and methods^ did not have a strong membership in Alabama.
1 Large capitals in the original text.
2 The Constitution and the Ritual of the Knights of the White Camelia are re-
printed in W. Va. Univ. Docs., No. i. They were preserved by Dr. G. P. L. Reid of
Perry County, Alabama, who buried his papers when the order was disbanded, and years
afterward dug them up. The secrets of the Knights of the White Camelia were more
closely kept than those of the Ku Klux Klan, and the Federal officials were unable to
find out anything about the order.
3 Constitutional Union Guards, Sons of '76, The '76 Association, Pale Faces, White
Boys, White Brotherhood, Regulators, White League, White Rose, etc. Sumarez de
Ilaviland, in an article on "Ku Klux Klan" in the Gentleman^ s Magazine, Vol. XL,
1888 (evidently based on Lester and Wilson), gives the names of a number of secret
2 X
674 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The Work of the Secret Orders
The task before the secret orders was to regulate the conduct
of the blacks and their leaders, in order that honor, life, and property
might be made secure. They planned to do this by playing upon
the fears, superstitions, and cowardice of the black race ; by creating
a white terror to offset the black one. To this end they made use of
strange and horrible disguises, mysterious and fearful conversation,
midnight rides and drills, and silent parades.
The costume varied with the locality, often with the individual.^
The Tennessee regalia was too fine for the backwoods Ku Klux to
duplicate. The cardboard hat was generally worn. It was funnel-
shaped, eighteen inches to two feet high, covered with white cloth,
and often ornamented with stars of gold, or by pictures of animals.
The mask over the face was sometimes white, with holes cut for
eyes, mouth, and nose. These holes were bound around with red
braid so as to give a horrible appearance. Other eyes, nose, and
mouth were painted higher up on the hat. Black cloth with white
or red braid was also used for the mask. Sometimes simply a
woman's veil was worn over the head and held down by an ordinary
woollen hat. The ''hill billy" Ku Kluxes did not adorn themselves
very much. To the sides of the cardboard hats horns were some-
times attached, and to the mask a fringe of quills, which looked Hke
enormous teeth and made a peculiar noise. The mask and the robe
were usually of different colors. Sometimes a black sack was drawn
societies, which he says were connected in some way; the first group was absorbed into
Ku Klux Klan ; the second consisted of opposing societies ; they existed before, during,
and after the Civil War. I. The Lost Clan of Cocletz, Knights of the Golden Circle,
Knights of the White Camelia, Centaurs of Caucasian Civilization, Angels of Avenging
Justice, etc. 2. The Underground Railroad, The Red String Band, The Union League,
The Black Avengers of Justice, etc.
" The generic name of Ku Klux was appUed to all secret organizations in the South
composed of white natives and having for their object the execution of the ' first law of
nature.' There were many organizations (principally of local origin) which had no
connection one with another ; others, again, were more extended in their influence and
operations. The one numerically the largest and which embraced the most territory
was the White Camelia." — Dr. G. P. L. Reid.
1 " Their robes used in these nocturnal campaigns consisted simply of sheets wrapped
around their bodies and belted around the waist. The lower portion reached to the
heels, whilst the upper had eyeholes through which to see, and mouth holes through
which to breathe. Of course, every man so caparisoned had one or more pistols in
holsters buckled to his waist." — Randolph.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS
675
over the head, and eyes, mouth, and nose holes cut in it. False or
painted beards were often worn. The robe consisted of a white or
colored gown, reaching nearly to the heels, and held by a belt around
the waist; it was usually made of fancy cahco; white gowns were
sometimes striped with red or black. As long as the negro went
into spasms of fear at the sight of a Ku Klux, the usual costume
Ku Klux Costumes.
Worn in Western Alabama.
seems to have been white; but after the negro became somewhat
accustomed to the Ku Klux, and learned that there were human
beings behind the robes, the regalia became only a disguise, and
less attention was devoted to making fearful costumes. As a rule
the ordinary clothes worn were underneath, but in Madison County
6j6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the Ghouls sported fancy red flannel trousers with white stripes,
while the west Alabama spirits were content with wearing ordinary
dark trousers, and shirts slashed with red. The white robe was
often a bed sheet held on by a belt. After a night ride the dis-
guise could be taken off and stowed about the person. The horses
were covered with sheets or white cloth, held on by the saddle and
by belts. There was, at times, a disguise which fitted the horse's
head, and the horses were sometimes painted. Skeleton sheep's
heads or cows' heads, or even human skulls, were frequently carried
on the saddle-bows. A framework was sometimes made to fit the
shoulders of a Ghoul and caused him to appear twelve feet high.
A skeleton wooden hand at the end of a stick served to greet negroes
at midnight. Every man had a small whistle. The costume was
completed by a brace of pistols worn under the robe.^
The trembling negro who ran into the Ku Klux on his return from
the love-feasts at the Loyal League meetings was informed that the
white-robed figures he saw were the spirits of the Confederate dead,
killed at Chickamauga or Shiloh, and that they were unable to rest
in their graves because of the conduct of the negroes. He was told
in a sepulchral voice of the necessity for his remaining at home more
and taking a less active part in various predatory excursions. In
the middle of the night the sleeping negro would wake to find his
house surrounded by the ghostly company, or find several standing
by his bedside, ready, as soon as he woke, to inform him that they
were the ghosts of men whom he had formerly known, killed at
Shiloh. They had scratched through from Hell to warn the negroes
of the consequences of their misconduct. Hell was a dry and thirsty
land; they asked him for water. Buckets of water went sizzHng
into a sack of leather, rawhide, or rubber, concealed within the
flowing robe. At other times. Hell froze over to give passage to
the spirits who were returning to earth. It was seldom necessary
at this early stage to use violence. The black population was in
an ecstacy of fear. A silent host of white-sheeted horsemen parad-
1 Ala. Test., pp. 149-152, 275, 452, 453, 535, 574, 579, 597, 668, 707, 919, 1048,
15535 Somers, "Southern States," p. 152; Report of Joint Committee, Alabama Legis-
lature, 1868 ; oral accounts. The Ku Klux costumes represented in Wilson's " History
of the American People," Vol. V, Ch, I, were captured after a Ku Klux parade in Hunts •
ville, Ala. When costumes were to be made, the materials were sometimes sent secretly
to the women, who made them according to directions and returned them secretly.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 6^^
ing the country roads at night was 'sufficient to reduce the black
to good behavior for weeks or months. One silent Ghoul, posted
near a League meeting place, would be the cause of the dissolution
of that club. Cow bones in a sack were rattled. A horrible being,
fifteen feet tall, walking through the night toward a place of con-
gregation, was pretty apt to find that every one vacated the place
before he arrived. A few figures, wrapped in bed sheets and sitting
on tombstones in a graveyard near which negroes passed, would
serve to keep the immediate community quiet for weeks, and give it
a reputation for "hants" which lasts perhaps until to-day. At
times the Klan paraded the streets of the towns, men and horses
perfectly disguised. The parades were always silent, and so con-
ducted as to give the impression of very large numbers. Regular
drills were held in town and country, and the men showed that
they had not forgotten their training in the Confederate army. There
were no commands unless in a very low tone or in a mysterious
language; usually they drilled by signs or by whistle signals.^
For a year or more, — until the spring of 1868, — the Klan was
successful so far as the negro was concerned, through its mysterious
methods. The carpet-bagger and the scalawag were harder problems.
They understood the nature of the secret order and knew its objects.
As long as the order did not use violence they were not to be moved
to any great extent. Then, too, the negro lost some of his fear of
the supernatural beings. Different methods were now used. In
March and April, 1868, there was an outbreak of Ku Kluxism over
a large part of the state.^ For the first time the newspapers were
filled with Ku Klux orders and warnings. The warnings were found
posted on the premises of obnoxious negroes or white Radicals.
The newspapers sometimes published them for the benefit of all
who might be interested. One warning was supposed to be suffi-
1 Ala. Test., pp. 352, 452, 453, 490, 533, 534 ; Beard, " Ku Klux Sketches" ; Brown,
" Lower South," Ch. IV ; Lester and Wilson, Ch. Ill ; Weir, " Old Times in Georgia,"
p. 32 ; accounts of former members.
2 " Concerning any elaborate organization, I am unable to state from any personal
experience. There were certain heads of departments or organizations, under heads or
chiefs bearing titles intended to strike awe into the minds of the ignorant. In some
instances organizers were sent to towns to establish the Klans. These latter were formed
into companies officered somewhat in military style. In (1868) I was honored by
being chosen leader of the Tuscaloosa Klan, and even at this late day I am gratified to
be able to say that my company did good service to Tuscaloosa." — Randolph.
678 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
}
3.
cient to cause the erring to ntend their ways/ If still obstinate in
their evil courses, a writ from the Klan followed and punishment was
inflicted. Warn-
ings were sent to
all whom the Klan
>^ /y^ ^i^ !M /^ thought should be
>-^V_ r\*^/ r^^^-x ->rr^ 5^ regulated — white or
^ ^ ^ \ ' f^ w,v^ black. The warn-
ings were written
in disguised hand-
writing and some-
times purposely
misspelled. The
following warning
was sent to I. D.
Sibley, a carpet-
bagger in Hunts-
ville : —
^^
"Dam Yoor Soul. The IIorriV)Io Scpuhhrc and Hloodj-. Moon has at last arrived.
Rome live to-day ta-morrow •'Die." Wc the unrtirsiKucd understand through our
Grand " Ci/r/ops " that von have rooomnicnded a bi^ Black Nigger for Stale agent on
onr nil roile ; wel, sir, iest you understand in time if ho gets on flic ro<lc you can
make up your mind to pull roapc. If you havo any thing to say in regard to the
Matter, meet tho Grand Cyclops and Conclave at Den No. 4 at 12 o'clock ipidnight,
Oct. Ist, 1871.
" When you .-wo in Calera wc. warn you to hold your toungo and not speak so ranch
with your luouth or otherwise you will Uo taken on suppriso .and led out by tho Klz.:i
aud learnt to stretch Lemn. Beware. Bowaro. Beware. Beware.
(Signed) " PHILLIP ISEXBAUM,
" Grand Cyclops.
"JOHN BANKSTOWN.
"ESAU DAVES.
"MARCUS THOMAS.
" BLOODY BONES.
'• Voti know who. And all others of tho Klan."
Ku Klux Warning.
Mr. Selblys you had better leave here. You are a thief and you know it.
If you don't leave in ten days, we will cut your throat. We aint after the negroes ;
but we intend for you damn carpet bag men to go back to your homes. You are
stealing everything you can find. We mean what we say. Mind your eye.
James Howsyn.
William Whereatnehr.
[Rude drawing of coffin.] John Mixemuhh.
SoLiMAN Wilson.
P. J. Solon.
Get away!
We ant no cu-cluxes but if you dont go we will make you.^
1 " We had regular meetings about once a week, at which the conduct of certain
offensive characters would be discussed, and if the majority voted to punish such, it
would be done accordingly on certain prescribed nights. Sometimes it was deemed nec-
essary only to post notices of warning, which, in some cases, were sufficient to alarm the
victims and to induce them to reform in their behavior. To the best of my recollection,
our company consisted of about sixty members. As soon as our object was effected, viz.,
got the negroes to behave themselves, we disbanded. I well remember those notices in
The Monitor, for they were concocted and ' posted by my own hand — disguised of
course." — Randolph.
2 Printed in Report of Joint Committee, Alabama Legislature, 1868. The warning
is not in the ordinary Ku Klux form. The purpose is clear, however. The illiteracy is
probably assumed, though not necessarily.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 679
The published orders of the Klan served a double purpose —
to notify the members of contemplated movements, and to frighten
the Radicals, white or black, who had made themselves offensive.
The newspapers usually pubhshed these orders with the remark
that the order had been found or had been sent to them with a request
tor pubHcation.^ Each Cyclops composed his own orders, but there
was a marked resemblance between the various decrees. The most
interesting and lively orders were concocted by the Cyclops editor of
the Tuscaloosa Independent Monitor."^ Some specimens are given below.
A Black Belt warning was in this shape: —
A'. K. K.
Friday, April 3rd, 1868
Warning — For one who understands.
26/3/68 No. 5 — 116
Recorded 8th / 16 / 24 — B.
K. K. K.
1 Headquarters S. V. W.,
Ancient Commandery,
Mother Earth.
1st Quarter New Moon.
1st year of Revenge.
Special Order :
The worldly medium for the expression of SOHXHaHN OdINION is notified to
publish for the eyes of humanity the orders of the offended Ghosts. Failing to do so,
let him prepare his soul for travelling beyond the limits of his corporosity.
Cyclops warns it — print it well,
Or glide instanter down to h — 1 !
By order of the Great
BLUFUSTIN
The Mighty Chief. "NnaooaoH
True Copy, 'ooiHaxati
S. K. K. K.
— Independent Monitor, April i, 1868.
2 "They [Ku Klux orders] had this meaning : the very night of the day on which
said notices made their appearance, three notably offensive negro men were dragged out
of their beds, escorted to the old boneyard (| mile from Tuscaloosa) and thrashed in
the regular ante-bellum style, until their unnatural nigger pride had a tumble, and
humbleness to the white man reigned supreme." — Randolph.
68o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The following order was posted in Tuscaloosa : —
KU KLUX.
Hell-a-Bulloo Hole — Den of Skulls.
Bloody Bones, Headquarters of the
Great Ku Klux Klan, No. looo
Windy Month — New Moon.
Cloudy Night — Thirteenth Hour.
General Orders, No. 2.
The great chief Simulacre summons you !
Be ready ! Crawl slowly ! Strike hard !
Fire around the pot !
Sweltered venom, sleeping got
Boil thou first i' the charmed pot !
Like a hell broth boil and bubble !
The Great High Priest Cyclops ! C. J. F. Y.
Grim Death calls for one, two, three !
Varnish, Tar, and Turpentine !
The fifth Ghost sounds his Trumpet !
The mighty Genii wants two black wethers !
Make them, make them, make them ! Presto !
The Great Giantess must have a white barrow. Make him, make him, make him !
Presto! •
Meet at once — the den of Shakes — the Giant's jungles — the hole of Hell ! The
second hobgoblin will be there, a mighty Ghost of valor. His eyes of fire, his voice of
thunder! Clean the streets — clean the serpents' dens.
Red hot pincers ! Bastinado ! ! Cut clean ! ! ! No more to be born. Fire and
brimstone.
Leave us, leave us, leave us ! One, two, and three to-night ! Others soon !
Hell freezes ! On with skates — glide on. Twenty from Atlanta. Call the roll.
Bene dicte ! The Great Ogre orders it !
By order of the Great
BLUFUSTIN.
G. S. K. K. K.
A true copy,
Peterloo.
P. S. K. K. K.
The following was circulated around Montgomery in April,
1868: —
K. K. K.
Clan of Vega.
Hdqr's K. K. K. Hospitallers.
Vega Clan, New Moon.
3rd Month, Anno K. K. K. i.
Order No. K. K.
Clansmen — Meet at the Trysting Spot when Orion Kisses the Zenith. The doom
of treason is Death. Dies Tree. The wolf is on his walk — the serpent coils to strike.
Action ! Action I ! Action ! ! ! By midnight and the Tomb ; by Sword and Torch and
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 68 1
the Sacred Oath at Forrester's Altar, I bid you come ! The clansmen of Glen Iran and
Alpine will greet you at the new-made grave.
Remember the Ides of April.
By command of the Grand D. I. H.
Cheg. V.
The military authorities forbade the newspapers to publish Ku
Klux orders/ and the Klan had to trust to messengers. Verbal
orders and warnings became the rule. The Den met and discussed
the condition of affairs in the community. The cases of violent
whites and negroes were brought up, one by one, and the Den decided
what was to be done. Except in the meeting the authority of the
Cyclops was absolute.
C. C. Sheets, a prominent scalawag, had been making speeches
to the negroes against the whites. The Klan visited him at his hotel
at Florence, caught him as he was trying to escape over the roof,
brought him back, and severely lectured him in regard to his conduct.
They explained to him that the Klan was a conservative organiza-
tion to hold society together. A promise was required of Sheets to
be more guarded in his language for the future. He saw the hght
and became a changed man.^ When a carpet-bagger became un-
bearable, he would be notified that he must go home, and he usually
went. If an official, he resigned or sold his office; the people of
the community would purchase a $ioo lot from him for $2500 in
order to pay for the office. The office was not always paid for; a
particularly bad man was lucky to get off safe and sound.^ Objec-
tionable candidates were forced to withdraw, or to take a conserva-
tion bondsman, who conducted the office.''
Before the close of 1868 the mysterious element in the power of
Ku Klux Klan ceased to be so effective. The negroes were learning.
Most of the mummery now was dropped. The Klan became purely
a body of regulators, wearing disguises. It was said that in order
1 Report of Meade, 1868.
2 Report of Joint Committee, 1868 ; Ala. Test., p. 876 (William M. Lowe).
^ In 1 869-1 870 there was an epidemic of resignations in the Black Belt. It was
in the rich Black Belt that the carpet-bagger flourished. The departing Radical could
always sell his property at a high price, the whites often uniting to purchase it. In
Perry, Pickens, Choctaw, Marengo, Hale, and other Black Belt counties the carpet-
baggers resigned and left. Ala. Test., pp. 103, 104.
■* The case of W. B. Jones of Marengo County was well known. See Ala. Test.,
p. 1455 ei passim.
682 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to have time to work for themselves, and in order not to frighten
away negro laborers, the Klan became accustomed to making its
rounds in the summer after the crops were laid by, and in the
winter after they were gathered/
The activities of the Klan were all-embracing. From regulating
bad negroes and their leaders they undertook a general supervision
of the morals of the community. Houses of ill-fame were visited,
the inmates, white or black, warned and sometimes whipped. Men
who frequented such places were thrashed. A white man Uving
with a negro woman was whipped, and a negro man living with a
white woman would be killed.^ A negro who aired his opinion in
regard to social equahty was sure to be punished. One negro in
north Alabama served in the Union army and, returning to Alabama,
boasted that he had a white wife up North and expected to see the
custom of mixed marriages grow down South. He was whipped
and allowed a short time in which to return North.^ White men
who were too lazy to support their famihes, or who drank too much
whiskey, or were cruel to their famihes, were visited and disciphned.
Such men were not always Radicals — not by any means.^ Special
attention was paid to the insolent and dangerous negro soldiers who
were mustered out in the state. As a rule they had imbibed too many
notions of liberty, equahty, and fraternity ever to become peaceable
citizens. They brought their arms back with them, made much
display of them, talked largely, drilled squads of blacks, fired their
hearts with tales of the North, and headed much of the deviltry. The
Klan visited such characters, warned them, thrashed them, and
disarmed them. Over north Alabama there was a general disarming
of negroes.®
1 Ala. Test., p. 935 (a Bureau agent). It is more likely that this was when the Klan
was dying out and the class of men composing it had no time to go on night rides while
the crops were needing their attention. During the leisure seasons time would hang
heavy on their hands, and they would begin their deviltry again.
2 I have learned of only two such cases ; one was in Tuscaloosa County. The
woman was a Bureau school-teacher from the North. Independent Monitor, May 24,.
1 87 1. The other was the case of America Trammell in east Alabama. Ala. Test.,.
p. 1 1 19.
8 Ala. Test., pp. 166,433, 459. 462, 476, 1125, 1126, 1749.
* Ala. Test., pp. 476, 1125, 11 26.
^ Ala. Test., pp. 922, 923, et passim. I have been told that in one place 20cx>
muskets were collected, taken from negroes.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 683
The tories or "unionists," who had never ceased to commit depre-
dations on their Confederate neighbors, were taken in hand by the
Klan. In parts of the white counties where there were neither negroes
nor carpet-baggers the Klan's excuse for existence was to hold in
check the white outlaws. For years after the war the Hves and prop-
erty of ex- Confederates were not safe. A smouldering civil war
existed for several years, and the Klan was only the ex- Confederate
side of it.
During the administration of Governor Smith there was no
organized militia. The mihtia laws favored the black counties at
the expense of the white ones, and Smith was afraid to organize
negro mihtia; he shared the dishke of his class for negroes. There
were not enough white reconstructionists to organize into mihtia
companies. The governor was afraid to accept organizations of
Conservatives ; they might overthrow his administration. So he rehed
entirely upon the small force of the Federal troops stationed in the
state to assist the state officials in preserving order. The Conserva-
tive companies, after their services were rejected, sometimes pro-
ceeded to drill without authority, and became a kind of extra- legal
mihtia. In this they were not secret. But the drills had a quieting
effect on marauders of all kinds, and the extra- legal mihtia of the
daytime easily became the illegal night riders of the Klan.*
The operations of the Klan, especially in the white counties which
had large negro populations, were sometimes directed against negro
churches and schoolhouses, and a number of these were bufned.^
This hostility may be explained in several ways: The element of
poor whites in the Klan did not approve of negro education; all
negro churches and schoolhouses were used as meeting places for
Union Leagues, pohtical gatherings, etc. ; they were the pohtical head-
quarters of the Radical Party ;^ again, the bad character of some
of the white teachers of negro schools or the incendiary teachings of
others was excuse for burning the schoolhouses. The burning of
school and church buildings took place almost exclusively in the white
counties of northern and eastern Alabama. The school and church
^ Ala. Test., p. 1179. The legal militia consisted of Major-General Dustan only.
2 Not nearly so many as is usually supposed. Lakin, who never underestimated
anything, could think of only six in all north Alabama.
* Ala. Test., 1138 ; Coburn-Buckner Report.
684 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
buildings of the whites were also burned.^ The negroes were in-
variably assisted by the whites in rebuilding the houses. Most of
the burnings were probably done by the so-called spurious Ku Klux.
The teachers of negro schools who taught revolutionary doctrines
or who became too intimate with the negroes with whom they had
to board were discipHned, and the negroes also with whom they
offended.^ It was hkewise the case with the northern missionaries,
especially the Northern Methodist preachers who were seeking to
disrupt the Southern Methodist Church. Parson Lakin when elected
president of the State University was chased away by the Ku Klux,
and life was made miserable for the Radical faculty.^ Thieves, black
and white, and those peculiar clandestine night traders who purchased
corn and cotton from the negroes after dark were punished."*
The quietest and most effective work was done in the Black Belt
principally by the Knights of the White CameHa. Nothing was
attempted beyond restraining the negroes and driving out the carpet-
baggers when they became unbearable. There were few cases of
violence, fewer still of riots or operations on a large scale. ^ In north-
ern and western Alabama were the most disordered conditions.^
The question was complicated in these latter regions by the presence
1 Several southern churches seized by Lakin for the northern church were burned.
2 Report of Joint Committee, i868 ; Ala. Test., p. 1138.
* Ala. Test., pp. 126, 127, 230, 418. See above, p. 612.
* Ala. Test., p. 1983.
^ " Of the acts of this Order much has been written which is untrue ; every disturb-
ance between the races was laid at its door ; every act of violence, in which the negro
or the northern man was the victim, it was charged with. I do not deny that extreme
measures were sometimes resorted to, but of such I have no personal knowledge. . . .
Four hours would have been in [Perry County] ample time to secure the assembly, at
any central point, of a thousand resolute men who would have done the bidding of
their commander whatever it might have been, yet in this time [three years] no single
act of violence was committed on the person or property of a negro or alien by its
order or which received its sanction or indorsement." — Dr. G. P. L. Reid.
^ However, in 1871 Governor Lindsay stated that there were in the state fewer feuds,
crimes, difficulties, etc., than since 181 9, when the state was admitted. This was especially
the case, he said, in northern Alabama, for this reason : the people of the mountain and
hill county were now prosperous ; cotton was selling for ^100 to ^150 a bale ; these
white mountaineers by their own labor were doing well. Such was not the case with
the planter who had to hire negro labor and pay high prices for provisions, farming im-
plements, and mules. Meat that cost the planter 22 cents a pound was raised by the
mountain people. Outrages against negroes were now very rare. Ala. Test., pp. 206-
207. It is certain that the prosperity of the white counties which in 1870 got rid of the
alien local officials had much to do with allaying disorder.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 685
of poor whites and planters, negroes, Radicals and Democrats,
Confederates and Unionists. Tuscaloosa County, the location of
the State University, is said to have suffered worst of all. A strong
organization of Ku Klux cleared it out. In the northern and western
sections of the state pohtics were more hkely to enter into the quarrels.
The Radicals — white and black — were more apt to be disciplined
because of politics than in the Black Belt. Negroes and offensive
whites were warned not to vote the Radical ticket. There was a
disposition to suppress, not to control, the negro vote as the Black
Belt wanted to do. There were more frequent colHsions, more
instances of violence.
The most famous parade and riot of the Ku Klux Klan occurred
in Hunts ville, in 1868, before the presidential election. A band of
1500 Ku Klux* rode into the city and paraded the streets. Both
men and horses were covered with sheets and masks. The drill
was silent; the evolutions were executed with a skill that called
forth praise from some United States army officers who were looking
on. The negroes were in a frenzy of fear, and one of them fired
a shot. Immediately a riot was on. The negroes fired indiscrimi-
nately at themselves and at the undisguised whites who were standing
around. The latter returned the fire ; the Ku Klux fired no shots,
but formed a line and looked on. Several negroes were wounded,
and Judge Thurlow, a scalawag, of Limestone County, was acciden-
tally killed by a chance shot from a negro's gun. The whites who
took part received only sHght wounds. Some of the Ghouls were
arrested by the military authorities, but were released.^ This was,
m the annals of the Radical party, a great Ku Klux outrage.
Another widely heralded Ku Klux outrage was the Patona or
Cross Plains affair, in Calhoun County, in 1870. It seems that at
Cross Plains a negro boy was hired to hold a horse for a white man.
He turned the horse loose, and was slapped by the white fellow.
Then the negro hit the white on the head with a brick. Other whites
came up and cuffed the negro, who went to Patona, a negro railway
1 The estimate is Lakin's.
2 Report Joint Committee of 1868 ; Ala. Test., p. 1 15 et passim. The A^. Y. Tribune^
Nov. 14, 1868, states that Gustavus Morton, the first Radical mayor of Mobile, was
killed in this riot. After the riot was over the United States troops appeared too late, as
they usually were in such cases.
686 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
village a mile away, and told his story. William Luke, a white]
Canadian, who was teaching a negro school at Patona, advised th(
negroes to arm themselves and go burn Cross Plains in revenge anc
for protection. Thirty or forty went, under the leadership of Luke,|
and made night hideous with threats of violence and burning, bul
finally went away without harming any one. The next night Luke
and his negroes returned, and fired into a congregation of whites
just dismissed from church. None were injured, but Luke and
several negroes were arrested. There were signs of premeditated
delay on the part of some of the civil authorities, so the Ku Klux
came and took the Canadian and four negroes from the officers, carried
them to a lonely spot, and hanged some and shot the rest.^
In Greene County the county solicitor, Alexander Boyd, an ex-
convict, claimed to have evidence against members of the Ku Klux
organization. He boasted about his plans, and the Ku Klux, hearing
of it, went to his hotel in Eutaw and shot him to death.^
Another famous outrage was the Eutaw riot in 1870. Both
Democrats and Radicals had advertised political meetings for the
same time and place. The Radicals, who seem to have been the
latest comers, asked the Democrats for a division of time. The
latter answered that the issues as to men or measures were not debat-
able. So the Democrats and Radicals held their meetings on oppo-
site sides of the court-house. The Democrats' meeting ended first,
and they stood at the edge of the crowd to hear the Radical speakers.
Some of the hot bloods came near the stand and made sarcastic
remarks. One man who was to speak, Charles Hays, was so obnox-
ious to the whites that even the Radicals were unwilling for him to
speak. He persisted, and some one, presumably a Conservative,
pulled his feet out from under him, and he fell off the table from
which he was speaking. The negroes, seeing his fall, rushed forward
with knives and pistols to protect him. A shot was fired, which struck
Major Pierce, a Democrat, in the pocket. Then the whites began
1 Ala. Test., pp. 77, 429 et passim ; Montgotiiery Mail, July 16, 1870. The mountain
people had another grudge against Luke. He associated constantly with negroes and
was said to be a miscegenationist. The mountain farmers had the greatest horror
of such.
2 Ala. Test., pp. 257, 266, 275, et passim. Boyd had many private enemies, among
them relatives of a man he had killed, and it was charged that they killed him. He was
a man of low character, and his own party was not sorry to lose him.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 68y
firing, principally into the air. The negroes tore down the fence
in their haste to get away. After the whites had chased the negroes
out of town the mihtary came leisurely in and quelled the riot.^ The
campaign report of casualties was five killed and fifty-four wounded.
As a matter of fact only one wounded negro was ever found, and
no dead ones.^
A common kind of outrage was that on James Alston, the negro
representative in the legislature from Macon County in 1870. Alston
was shot by negro pohtical rivals just after a League meeting in
Tuskegee. They were arrested, and Alston asked the whites to
protect him. The Democratic white citizens of Tuskegee guarded
him. The carpet-bag postmaster in Tuskegee saw the possibilities
of the situation and sent word to the country negroes to come in
armed, that Alston had been shot. They swarmed into Tuskegee,
and, thinking the whites had shot Alston, were about to burn the
town. The white women and children were sent to Montgomery
for safety. About the same time the negroes murdered three white
men. The excitement reached Montgomery, and a negro militia
company was hastily organized to go to the aid of the Tuskegee
negroes. General Clanton got hold of the sheriff, and they suc-
ceeded in turning back the negro volunteer company. The affair
passed off without further bloodshed, and Alston was notified to
leave Tuskegee.'
There were no collisions between the United States soldiers and
the night riders. At first they were on pretty good terms with one
another. The soldiers admired their drills and parades and the
way they scared the negroes. One impudent Cyclops rode his band
into Athens, and told the commanding officer that they were there to
assist in preserving order, and, if he needed them, would come if he
scratched on the ground with a stick.*
1 It was a marked fact that no resistance to the United States soldiers was ever
attempted. When the soldiers appeared, all violence ceased. The soldiers were as a
rule in favor of the whites and sometimes took a hand in the Ku Kluxing. They
usually appeared after the row was over.
2 Ala. Test., pp. 8 1, 221, ^/ passim ; Eutaio Whig, Oct. 27, 1870.
8 Ala. Test., p. 229 et passim. When he testfied before the Ku Klux Committee,
Alston swore that it was the men whom he had asked to protect him that had shot him,
— such men as General CuUen A. Battle.
* Ala. Test., p. 723.
688 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
While there was not much dependence upon central authority/
there was a loose bond of federation between the Dens. They
cooperated in their work ; a Den from Pickens County would operate
in Tuscaloosa or Greene and vice versa. Alabama Ku Kluxes went
into Mississippi and Tennessee, and those states returned such favors.
When the spurious organizations began to commit outrages, each
state claimed that the other one furnished the men.^
The oath taken by the Ku Klux demanded supreme allegiance
to the order so far as related to the problems before the South. Mem-
bers of the order sat on juries and refused to convict; were sum-
moned as witnesses and denied all knowledge of the order, were
members of the legislature, lawyers, etc. It is claimed that no
genuine members of the order were ever caught and convicted.^
Though the Klan was almost wholly a Democratic organization,"*
it took Httle share in the ordinary activities of politics, more perhaps
in the northern counties than elsewhere. In Fayette County, in
1870, the Klan went on a raid, and when returning stopped in the
court-house, took off disguises, resolved themselves into a conven-
tion, and nominated a county ticket.^ Nothing of the kind was done
in south Alabama; indeed, the constitution of the White Camelias
forbade interference in politics.® The Union League meetings were
broken up only when they were sources of disorder, thievery, etc.
When cases of outrage were investigated, it was almost invariably
found that they had no political significance. Governor Lindsay sent
an agent into every community where an outrage was reported, and
in not a single instance was a case of outrage by Ku Klux discovered.
It is' probably true that few, if any, of the leading Democratic
pohticians were members of the Klan or of any similar organization.
Under certain conditions they might be driven by force of circum-
1 "The company of K. K. K.'s which was organized in Tuscaloosa, was an indepen-
dent organization, i.e. it was altogether a local affair, having no connection with any
general Klan." — Randolph.
2 Miss. Test., pp. 60, 223, 249; Ala. Test., pp. 213, 1 822-1 824 ; Garner, "Recon-
struction in Mississippi," pp. 345, 346.
8 Ala. Test., p. 942 ; Lester and "Wilson, p. 78.
* The anti-negro bands of the hills and mountains were rather of the spurious Ku
Klux and were largely composed of tories and Radicals.
^ Ala. Test., p. 1763.
* Constitution, Article 76 ; Brown, " Ku Klux Movement," Atlantic Monthly, May,
1901.
THE WORK OF THE SECRET ORDERS 689
stances to join in local uprisings against the rule of the Radicals.
But as a rule they knew httle of the secret orders. There were various
reasons for this. The Conservative leaders saw the danger in such
an organization, though recognizing the value of its services. It
was sure to degenerate. It might become too powerful. It would
have a bad influence on politics and would furnish too much cam-
paign literature for the Radicals. It would result in harsh legisla-
tion against the South. The testimony of General Clanton ^ and
Governor Lindsay ^ shows just what the party leaders knew of the
order and what they thought of it. The Ku Klux leaders were not
the political leaders.^ The newspapers of importance opposed the
order. The opposition of the poHtical leaders to the Klan in its
early stages was not because of any wrong done by it to the Radicals,
but because of fear of its acting as a boomerang and injuring the white
party. It was the middle classes, so to speak, and later the lower
classes, who felt more severely the tyranny of the carpet-bag rule,
who formed and led the Klan. The political leaders thought that
in a few years political victories would give relief; the people who
suffered were unable to wait, and threw off the revolutionaiy govern-
ment by revolutionary means."*
The work of the secret orders was successful. It kept the negroes
quiet and freed them to some extent from the baleful influence of ahen
leaders ; the burning of houses, gins, mills, and stores ceased ; prop-
erty was more secure; people slept safely at night; women and
children were again somewhat safe when walking abroad, — they
had faith in the honor and protection of the Klan; the incendiary
agents who had worked among the negroes left the country, and
agitators, political, educational, and religious, became more moder-
ate; ''bad niggers" ceased to be bad; labor was less disorganized;
the carpet-baggers and scalawags ceased to batten on the southern
communities, and the worst ones were driven from the country.^ It
1 Ala. Test., pp. 226-257. "^ Ala. Test., pp. 159-225.
^ With the White Camelia in south Alabama the case was somewhat different.
* See Testimony of Lindsay and Clanton, cited above ; also Ala. Test., p. 376
(Pettus); p. 896 (Lowe).
^ Somers, "Southern States," pp. 4, 15, 21 ; Lester and Wilson, Chs. Ill, IV, V;
Sanders, " Early Settlers," p. 31. "The peaceful citizen knew that a faithful patrol had
guarded his premises while he slept." — Mrs. Stubbs. Brown, " Lower South," Ch. IV ;
Ala. Test., pp. 432, 1520, 1532, 1803.
2 Y
690 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was not so much a revolution as a conquest of revolution.^ Society
was bent back into the old historic grooves from which war and
Reconstruction had jarred it.
Spurious Ku Klux Organizations
After an existence of two or three years the Ku Klux Klan was
disbanded in March, 1869, by order of the Grand Wizard. It was
at that time illegal to print Ku Klux notices and orders in the news-
papers. It is probable, therefore, that the order to disband never
reached many Dens. However, one or two papers in north Alabama
did pubhsh the order of dissolution, and in this way the news ob-
tained a wider circulation.^ Many Dens disbanded simply because
their wor.k was done. Otherwise the order of the Grand Wizard
would have had no effect. Numbers of Dens had fallen into the
hands of lawless men who used the name and disguise for lawless
purposes. Private quarrels were fought out between armed bands
of disguised men. Negroes made use of Ku Klux methods and dis-
guises when punishing their Democratic colored brethren and when
on marauding expeditions.^ This, however, was not usual except
where the negroes were led by whites. Horse thieves in northern
and western Alabama, and thieves of every kind everywhere, began
to wear disguises and to announce themselves as Ku Klux. All
their proceedings were heralded abroad as Ku Klux outrages.^
In Morgan County a neighborhood feud was resolved into two
parties caUing themselves Ku Klux and Anti Ku Klux, and frequently
fights resulted. In Blount and Morgan counties (1869) former
members of the Ku Klux organized the Anti Ku Klux along the
lines of the Ku Klux, held regular meetings, and continued their
1 Throughout the pages of the Ku Klux Testimony are found assertions that Ku
Klux was not an organization, but merely the understanding of the southern people, the
spirit of the community, the concert of feeling of the whites, a state of mind in the
population.
2 Ala. Test., pp. 165, 380, 649, 724 ; Somers, " Southern States," p. 154. Governor
Lindsay said that the so-called Ku Klux who went over to Mississippi were roughs
and that the people were glad when they heard that one of them had been shot. In
1870-1871, while living in Alabama, General Forrest, the reputed Grand Wizard, re-
peatedly condemned in the strongest terms the conduct of the so-called Ku Klux. Ala.
Test., pp. 212, 213.
3 Ala. Test., pp. 162, 376. * Ala. Test., p. 719.
SPURIOUS KU KLUX ORGANIZATIONS 69I
midnight deviltry as before. It was composed largely of Union men
who had been Federal soldiers/ In Fayette County the Anti Ku
Klux order was styled, by themselves and others, "Mossy Backs"
or *'Moss Backs," in allusion to their war record. They were regu-
larly organized and had several colHsions with another organization
which they called the Ku Klux. The Radical sheriff summoned
the ''Moss Backs" as a posse to assist in the arrest of the Ku Klux,
as they called the ex- Confederates.^ As long as the Federal troops
were in the state it was the practice of bands of thieves to dress in
the army uniform and go on raids.
The Radicals took care that all lawlessness was charged to the
account of Ku Klux. It was to their interest that the outrages con-
tinue and furnish political capital. Governor Smith accused Senator
Spencer and Hinds and Sibley, of Huntsville, of fostering Ku Klux
outrages for pohtical purposes.^
The disordered condition of the country during and after the war
led to a general habit among the whites of carrying arms. This
fact and the drinking of bad whiskey accounts for much of the shoot-
ing in quarrels during the decade following the war. Few of these
quarrels had any connection with pohtics until they were catalogued
in the Ku Klux Report as Democratic outrages. As a matter of fact,
nearly all the whites killed by whites or by blacks were Democrats.
The white Radicals were too few in number to furnish many martyrs.*
The anti-negro feeling of the poorer whites found expression after
the war in movements against the blacks, called Ku Klux outrages.
In Winston County, a Republican stronghold, the white mountaineers
1 Ala. Test., pp. 610, 778.
2 Ala. Test., pp. 559, 560, 1229.
3 Ala. Test., p. 679. Governor Smith, a Radical, said in regard to the motives of
Senator George E. Spencer, I. D. Sibley, and J. J. Hinds, carpet-baggers : " My candid
opinion is that Sibley does not want the law executed, because that would put down
crime and crime is his life's bread. He would like very much to have a Ku Klux
outrage every week to assist him in keeping up strife between the whites and blacks,
that he might be more certain of the votes of the latter. He would like to have a few
colored men killed every week to furnish semblance of truth to wSpencer's libels upon
the people of the state generally. It is but proper in this connection that I should
speak in strong terms of condemnation of the conduct of two white men in Tuskegee a
few days ago, in advising the colored men to resist the authority of the sheriff ; these
men were not Ku Klux, but Republicans." Letter in Huntsville Advocate^ June 25,
1870. See also Herbert, " Solid South," p. 55.
* See Ala. Test., p. 433.
692 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
met and passed resolutions that no negro be allowed in the county
General Clanton stated that he found a similar prejudice in all
hill counties.^
In the Tennessee valley the planters found difficulty in securing
negro labor because of the operations of the spurious Ku Klux. In
Limestone, Madison, and Lauderdale counties the tory element hated
the negroes, who lived on the best land, and attempts were made to
drive them off. The tories were incensed against the planters
because they preferred negro labor.^ Judge W. S. Mudd of Jefferson
County testified that the anti-negro outrages in Walker and Fayette
counties were committed by the poorer whites, who did not like negroes
and wanted a purely white population there. In the white counties
generally the negro held no political power and hence the outrages
were not political, but because of racial prejudice. In the north
Alabama mountain counties the majority of the whites were in favor
of deportation and colonization of the blacks. But in nearly every
county there was also the large landholder, formerly a slaveholder,
who wanted the negro to stay and work, and who treated the ex-slave
kindly. The poorer whites who had never owned slaves nor much
property wanted the negro out of the way.^ As a general rule, where
the population was exclusively white, the people disliked the negro
and wanted no contact with the black race. They wanted a white
society, and all lands for the whites. In one precinct in Jefferson
County, where all the whites were Republican, an organization of
boys and young men was formed to drive out the negroes and keep
the precinct white. In the black counties exactly the opposite was
true. The secret orders merely wanted to control negro labor and
keep it, regulate society, and protect property. General Forney
stated that in Calhoun the small mountain farmers, non-slavehold-
ing, poorer whites, were intensely afraid of social equahty and hated
the negroes, who called them ''poor white trash." The feeling was
cordially returned by the negroes."*
From Tallapoosa County and from eastern Alabama generally,
^ Ala. Test., p. 230. In some communities a negro is still told that he must not let
the sun go down on him before leaving.
2 Ala. Test., pp. 944, 947, 948.
3 Ala. Test., pp. 1757, 1758, 1764, 1765, 1768. Judge Mudd was by no means a
representative of the old slaveholding element, but rather of the white county people.
* Ala. Test., p. 492.
ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE KU KLUX MOVEMENT 693
where the Black Cavalry and its successors flourished, there was a
general exodus of negroes who had lived on the richer lands of the
larger farms and plantations. The white renters and small farmers
were afraid, after slavery was abolished and the negroes were free,
that the latter would drag all others down to negro level. The
planters preferred negro labor. Therefore the poorer whites united
to drive out the negro. This was called Ku Kluxism. The whites
wanted higher pay.^ Wage-earners felt that they could not compete
with the negro, who could work for lower wages. General Crawford,
who commanded the United States troops in Alabama, stated that
the planter bore no antagonism toward the negro at all, but he wanted
his labor; that at present he saw the uselessness of interfering with
the negro's politics and was indifferent about whether the negro
voted or not; he looked forward to the time when the black voters
would fall away from their ahen leaders and would vote according
to the advice of their old masters; on the other hand, the poorer
whites, many of them from the hill country, were hostile to the negroes ;
they disliked to see them at work building the new railroads, and
on all the rich lands, and possessed of poHtical privileges. If rid
of the negro, they could be more prosperous and divide the pohtical
spoils now shared by the adventurers who controlled the black vote.
In north Alabama the negro was more generally kept away from the
polls.^ This feehng on the part of the poor whites was not new,
but had survived from slavery days, and its manifestations were now
called Ku Kluxism. The negro was no longer under the protection
of a master, and the former master was no longer able to protect
the negro. However, there was a general movement among the
ex-slaves, under the pressure, to return. to their old masters.
Attempts to suppress the Ku Klux Movement
In March and April, 1868, the operations of the Ku Klux Klan
came to the notice of General Meade, who was then in command of
the Third Mihtary District. By his direction General Shepherd
issued an order from Montgomery, requiring sheriffs, mayors, police,
constables, magistrates, marshals, etc., under penalty of being held
responsible, to suppress the ''iniquitous" organization and appre-
1 Ala. Test., pp. 1 1 27, 1 1 28, 1 1 39. 2 Ala. Test., pp. 1 1 75» " 79.
694 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
hend its members. The expenses of posses were to be charged
against the county. If the code of Alabama was silent on the subject
of the offence, the prisoners were to be turned over to the miHtary
authorities for trial by military commission. The state officers were!
reminded that the code of Alabama derived its vitality from the*
commanding general of the Third Military District, and in case of
a conflict between the code and military orders, the latter were para-
mount. The posting of placards and the printing in newspapers
of orders, warnings, and notices of Ku Klux Klans was forbidden. In
no case would ignorance be considered as an excuse. Citizens who
were not officers would not be held guiltless in case of outrage in their
community.^ This was a revival of the method of holding a com-
munity responsible for the misdeeds of individuals.
Troops were shifted about over northern and central Alabama
in an endeavor to suppress Ku Klux. Several arrests were made,
but there were no trials. There was much parade and night riding,
but as yet little violence. The soldiers could do nothing.
When the carpet-bag government was installed, the military forces
of the United States remained to support it. Every one called upon
the mihtary commands for aid — governor, sheriffs, judges, members
of Congress, justices of the peace, and prominent politicians. No
request from official sources was ever refused, and they were frequent.
From October 31, 1868, to October 31, 1869, there were fifteen dif-
ferent shiftings of bodies of troops for the purpose of checking the
Ku Klux movement. This does not include the movements made
in individual cases, but only changes of headquarters. These were
principally in northern and western Alabama — at Huntsville, Liv-
ingston, Guntersville, Lebanon, Edwardsville, Alpine, Summerfield,
Decatur, Marysville, Vienna, and Tuscaloosa.^
After a few months' experience of the carpet-bag government, the
bands of Ku Klux were excited to renewed activity. The legislature
which met in September, 1868, memorialized the President to send
an armed force to Alabama to execute the laws, and to preserve order,
etc., during the approaching presidential election. Governor Smith
with two members of the Senate and three of the lower house were
1 G. O. No. II, Sub-Dist. Ala,, April 4, 1868 ; Selma Times and Messenger, April 9^
1868 ; N, y. Herald, April 7, 1868.
2 Report of the Secretary of War, 1869, p. ^t^ et seq. ; Report of Meade, 1868.
ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE KU KLUX MOVEMENT 695
appointed to bear the application to the President.^ In December
an act was passed authorizing any justice of the peace to issue war-
rants running in any part of the state, and authorizing any sheriff
or constable to go into any county to execute such process.^ This
enabled a sheriff of proper politics to enter counties where the officials
were not of the proper faith, and arrest prisoners.
One of the members of the general assembly, M. T. Crossland,
was killed by the Klan, it was alleged. The legislature offered a
reward of $5000 for his slayers, and authorized the appointment
of a committee to investigate the recent alleged outrages and to report
by bill.^ The committee,'' after pretence of an examination of about
a dozen witnesses, all Radicals, some by affidavit only, reported that
there was in many portions of Alabama a secret organization, purely
political, known as Ku Klux Klan, and that Union men and Repub-
licans were the sole objects of its abuse, none of the opposite politics
being interfered with. It worked by means of threatening letters, warn-
ings, and beatings ; by intimidation and threats negroes were driven
from the polls; negro schoolhouses were burned; teachers were
threatened, ostracized, and driven from employment; officers of the
law were obstructed in the discharge of their duty and driven away.
In some parts of the state, the report declared, it was impossible for
the civil authorities to maintain order. The governor was authorized
and advised to declare martial law in the counties of Madison, Lau-
derdale, Butler, Tuscaloosa, and Pickens.^ The committee reported
a bill, which was passed, with a preamble of twenty-two lines reciting
the terrible condition of the state. To appear away from home in
1 Joint Resolution, Sept. 22, 1868, in Acts of Ala., p. 292. The delegation to
Washington did not provide themselves with an authenticated copy of the resolution
and had to wait for it. Governor Smith, who was with the delegation, spoiled every-
thing by declaring that there was no disorder except along the Tennessee River and in
southwestern Alabama and that troops were not needed. No officials had been resisted,
he said, and it would be imprudent to send troops. N. Y. Herald, Sept. 27, 1868. The
citizens of Montgomery held a mass-meeting and denied in toto the allegations of the
memorial, denouncing it as a move of partisan politics. The strangers were sure to fall
from power unless upheld by outside force. N. V. Herald, Sept. 25, 1868.
2 Act of Dec. 24, 1868 ; Acts of Ala., p. 439.
3 Joint Resolutions, Nov. 14 and Dec. 8, 1868 ; Acts of Ala., pp. 593, 594.
* J. DeF. Richards and G. R. McAfee of the Senate, and E. F. Jennings, W. R.
Chisholm, and G. W. Malone of the House.
* Report of Joint Committee on Outrages, 1868.
696 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
mask or disguise was made a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of
$100 and imprisonment from six months to one year. For a dis-
guised person to commit an assault was made a felony, and punish-
ment was fixed at a fine of $1000, and imprisonment from five
to twenty years. Any one might kill a person in disguise. The
penalty for destruction of property by disguised persons — burning
a schoolhouse or church — was imprisonment from ten to twenty
years. A warrant might be issued by any magistrate directed to any
lawful officer of the state to arrest disguised offenders, and in case of
refusal or neglect to perform his duty, the official was to forfeit his
office and be fined $500/
Two days later it was enacted that in case a person were killed
by an outlaw, or by a mob, or by disguised persons, or for political
opinion, the widow or next of kin should be entitled to recover of the
county in which the killing occurred the sum of $5000. The
claimants should bring action in the circuit court, and in case judg-
ment were rendered in favor of the claimants, the county commission-
ers should assess an additional tax sufficient to pay damages and costs.
Failure of any official to perform his duty in such cases was punish-
able by a fine of $100 or imprisonment for twelve months for every
thirty days of neglect or failure. In case of whipping the amount
of damages collectible from the county was $1000. But if the
offenders were arrested and punished, there could be no claim for
damages. And if the offenders were arrested during the pendency
of the suit for damages, the presiding judge might suspend proceed-
ings in the damage suit until the result of the trial of the offenders
was known. It was made the duty of the sohcitor to prosecute the
claim for the relatives, and his fee was fixed at 10 per cent of the
amount recovered; and if the relatives failed to sue within twelve
months, the solicitor was to prosecute in the name of the state, and
the damages were to go to the asylums for the insane, deaf, dumb,
and blind.^
1 Act Dec. 26, 1868 ; Acts of Ala., 444-446. A supplementary act had to be
passed allowing the probate judges to license for one dollar the wearing of masks or
disguises at balls, theatres, and circuses and other places of amusement, public and pri-
vate. Application had to be made at least three days beforehand by " three responsi-
ble persons of established character and reputation." Act Dec. 2>^i 1868 ; Acts of
Ala., p. 521.
'^ Act of Dec. 28, 1868 ; Acts of Ala., pp. 452-454.
ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE KU KLUX MOVEMENT 697
A number of arrests were made under these acts, but only one or
two convictions were secured. It resulted that most of the arrests
were of ignorant and penniless negroes, who were unable to pay
any fine whatever. Governor Lindsay defended several such cases.
The laws were so severe that the officials were unwilling to prose-
cute under them, but always prosecuted under the ordinary laws.
After 1868 there was no further anti-Ku-Klux legislation by
the state government, but in 1869-18 70 some of the southern states,
Alabama among them, began to show signs of going Democratic.
Virginia, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas had been forced to ratify
the Fifteenth Amendment in order to secure the requisite number
for its adoption.^ President Grant then sent in a message announcing
the ratification as ''the most important event that has occurred since
the nation came into life." ^ Congress responded to the hint in the
message by passing the first of the Enforcement Acts, which had
been hanging fire for nearly two years. The excuse for its passage
was that the Ku Klux organizations would prevent the blacks from
voting in the fall elections of 1870.^ The act, as approved on May
31, 1870, declared that all citizens were entitled to vote in all elections
without regard to color or race and provided that officials should
be held personally responsible that all citizens should have equal
opportunity to perform all tests or prerequisites to registration or
voting; election officials were held responsible for fair elections;
any person who hindered another in voting might be fined $500, to
go to the party aggrieved, and persons in disguise might be fined
$5000 or imprisoned for ten years, or both, and should be dis-
franchised besides. Federal courts were to have exclusive juris-
diction over cases arising under this law, and Federal officials were
to see to its execution ; the penalty for obstructing an official or assist-
ing an escape might be $500 fine and six months' imprisonment;
It
1 See Dunning, " Essays," pp. 243-246.
2 Messages and Papers, Vol. VII, pp. 55, 56, March 30, 1871.
3 The Nation, Feb. 4, 1875, ^" regard to the " Force" legislation : " It would not have
been possible for the most ingenious enemy of the blacks to draw up a code better cal-
culated to keep up and fan the spirit of strife and contention between the races."
James L. Pugh, later United States Senator from Alabama: The people were tired of
being reconstructed by President and by Congress. Now the Enforcement Laws punish
all for the crime of a few. They are an insult to a whole people, assuming them incor-
rigible. Alabama Testimony, pp. 407, 40^, 41 1.
698 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the President was given authority to use the army and navy to enforce
the law; the district attorneys of the United States were to proceed
by quo warranto against disfranchised persons who were holding
office, and such persons might be fined $1000 and imprisonment
for one year, — such cases were to have precedence on the docket ;
the same penalties were visited upon those who under color of any
law deprived a citizen of any right under this law; the Civil Rights
Bill of 1866, April 9, was reenacted;^ fraud, bribery, intimidation, or
undue influence or violation of any election law at Congressional
elections might be punished by a fine of $500 and imprisonment
for three years ; registrations — congressional, state, county, school,
or town — came under the same regulation, and officials of all degrees
who failed in their duty were liable to the same penalties ; a defeated
candidate might contest the election in the Federal courts when there
were cases of the negro having been hindered from voting.^
This act marked the arrival of the most ruthless period of Recon-
struction. Endowing the negro with full political rights had not
sufficed to overcome the white poHtical people. Disappointed in
that, an attempt was now to be made so to regulate southern elec-
tions as to put the mass of the white population permanently under
the control of the negroes, and their white leaders, and to secure the
permanent control of those states to the Repubhcan party. Ten-
nessee had already escaped from the Radical rule, and stringent meas-
ures were necessary to prevent like action in the other states. Not-
withstanding the Enforcement Act, Alabama, in the election of 1870,
went partially Democratic, which was to the Radical leaders prima
jacie evidence of the grossest frauds in elections. Other states were
in a similarly bad condition.
The supplementary Enforcement Act of February 28, 1871,
provided for the appointment of two supervisors to each precinct by
1 See Burgess, " Reconstruction," pp. 69-73.
2 Text of act in McPherson, pp. 549-550. This act was ostensibly to provide for
the enforcement of the Fourteenth and P'ifteenth amendments. Its constitutionality-
has been criticised on these grounds: (i) the amendments were directed against
s^a^es, not persons ; (2) the law enacted penalties not only against state ofifiicers, but
also against any person who might offend against the election laws of the state or
against this act ; (3) it is entirely out of the question to claim that the amendments
protect the right of a person within a state against infringement by other persons, or
even against the state itself unless on account of race, color, or previous condition.
See Burgess, pp. 253-255.
ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE KU KLUX MOVEMENT 699
the Federal circuit judge upon the appHcation of two persons; the
Federal courts were to be in session during elections for business
arising under this act; the supervisors were to have full authority
around the polls, and were to certify and send in the returns, and
report irregularities, which were to be investigated by the chief super-
visor, who was to keep all records ; the supervisors were to be assisted
in each precinct by two special deputy marshals appointed by the
United States marshal for that district. These deputies and also
the supervisors had full power to arrest any person and to summon
a posse if necessary. Offenders were haled at once before the Federal
court. Any election offence was punishable by a fine of $3000 and
imprisonment of two years, with costs. To refuse to give information
in an investigation subjected the person to a fine of $100 and thirty
days' imprisonment and costs. State courts were forbidden to try
cases coming under the act, and proceedings after warning, by state
officials, resulted in imprisonment and fine amounting to one year
and $500 to $1000, plus costs.^
It was feared that these acts might prove insufficient to carry
the southern states for the Repubhcan party in 1872. Grant was
becoming more and more . radical as the Republican nominating
convention and the elections drew nearer. Under the influence of
the Radical leaders, he sent, on March 23, 187 1, a message ^ to Con-
gress, declaring that in some of the states a condition of affairs existed
rendering Hfe and property insecure, and the carrying of mails and
collection of revenue dangerous ; the state governments were unable
to control these evils; and it was doubtful if the President had the
authority to interfere. He therefore asked for legislation to secure
life, property, and the enforcement of law.^
Congress came to the rescue with the Ku Klux Act of April 20,
1 Text of act in McPherson, " Handbook of Politics," 1872, pp. 3-8. While only
the congressional elections and all the registrations were to be guarded, the chief pur-
pose of the act was to control state elections, which were held at the same time and
place. See Burgess, " Reconstruction," pp. 256-257. This was so clearly the purpose
that after the rescue of the state government from carpet-bag rule the time of the state
and local elections was changed from November to August in order to escape Federal
espionage.
2 " Upon the basis of information which turned out to be very insufficient and un-
reliable."— Burgess, p. 257.
8 Messages and Papers, Vol. VU, pp. 127-128.
700 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1 87 1, ''in which Congress simply threw to the winds the constitu-
tional distribution of powers between the states and the United
States government in respect to civil liberty, crime, and punishment,
and assumed to legislate freely and without limitation for the preserva-
tion of civil and political rights within the state. " ^
It gave the President authority to declare the southern states
in rebelhon and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus — after a proc-
lamation against insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful com-
binations, and conspiracies. Such a state of affairs was declared a
rebelhon, and the President was authorized to use the army and
navy to suppress it. Heavy penalties were denounced ($500 to
$5000 fine, and six months' to six years' imprisonment) against
persons who conspired to overthrow or destroy the United States
government or to levy war against the United States ; or who hindered
the execution of the laws of the United States, seized its property,
prevented any one from accepting or holding office or discharging
official duties, drove away or injured, in person or property, any
official or any witness in court, went in disguise on highway or on
the premises of others, and hindered voting or office-holding. Any
person injured in person, property, or privilege had the right to sue
the conspirators for damages under the Civil Rights Bill. In Federal
courts the jurors had to take oath that they were not in any way
connected with such conspiracies, and the judges were empowered
to exclude suspected persons from the jury. Persons not connected
with such conspiracies, yet having knowledge of such things, were
hable to the injured party for all damages.^
On May 3, 187 1, Grant issued a proclamation calling attention
to the fact that the law was one of ''extraordinary pubHc importance"
and, while of general application, was directed at the southern states,
and stating that when necessary he would not hesitate to exhaust the
powers vested by the act in the executive. The failure of local com-
munities to protect all citizens would make it necessary for the national
government to interfere.^
1 Burgess, pp. 257, 258.
2 Text in McPherson, " Handbook," 1872, pp. 85-87. For criticism, Burgess, pp.
257» 259.
* Messages and Papers, Vol. VII, pp. 134, 135.
KU KLUX INVESTIGATION ^OI
Ku Klux Investigation
In order to justify the passage of the Enforcement Acts and to
obtain material for campaign use the next year, Congress appointed
a committee, which was organized on the day the Ku Klux Act was
approved, to investigate the condition of affairs in the southern states/
From June to August, 187 1, the committee took testimony in Wash-
ington. In the fall subcommittees visited the various southern
states selected for the inquisition. About one-fourth of the Alabama
testimony was taken in Washington, the rest was taken by the sub-
committee in Alabama.
The members of the subcommittee that took testimony in
Alabama were Senators Pratt and Rice, and Messrs. Blair, Beck,
and Buckley of the House. Blair and Beck, the Democratic mem-
bers, were never present together. So the subcommittee consisted
of three Republicans and one Democrat. C. W. Buckley was a
Radical Representative from Alabama, a former Bureau reverend,
who worked hard to convict the white people of the state of general
wickedness. The subcommittee held sessions in Huntsville, October
6-14; Montgomery, October 17-20; Demopolis, October 23-28;
Livingston, October 30 to November 3; and in Columbus, Mis-
sissippi, for west Alabama, November 11. All these places were in
black counties. Sessions were held only at easily accessible places,
and where scalawag, carpet-bag, and negro witnesses could easily
be secured. Testimony was also taken by the committee in Wash-
ington from June to August, 1871.
- It is generally beheved that the examination of witnesses by the
Ku Klux committees of Congress was a very one-sided affair, and
that the testimony is practically without value for the historian, on
account of the immense proportion of hearsay reports and manu-
factured tales embraced in it. Of course there is much that is worth-
less because untrue, and much that may be true but cannot be regarded
because of the character of the witnesses, whose statements are un-
supported. But, nevertheless, the 2008 pages of testimony taken in
Alabama furnish a mine of information concerning the social, reli-
gious, educational, political, legal, administrative, agricultural, and
financial conditions in Alabama from 1865 to 1871. The report
1 Report of the Committee, pp. i, 2.
702 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
itself, of 632 pages, contains much that is not in the testimony,
especially as regards railroad and cotton frauds, taxation, and the
pubHc debt, and much of this information can be secured nowhere
else.
The minority members of the subcommittee which took testi-
mony in Alabama, General Frank P. Blair and later Mr. Beck of
New^ York, caused to be summoned before the committee at Washing-
ton, and before the subcommittee in Alabama, the most prominent
men of the state — men who, on account of their positions, were
intimately acquainted with the condition of affairs. They took care
that the examination covered everything that had occurred since
the war. The Repubhcan members often protested against the
evidence that Blair proposed to introduce, and ruled it out. He
took exceptions, and sometimes the committee at Washington ad-
mitted it; sometimes he smuggled it in by means of cross-question-
ing, or else he incorporated it into the minority report. On the
other hand, the Repubhcan members of the subcommittee seem
to have felt that the object of the investigation was only to get
campaign material for the use of the Radical party in the coming
elections. They summoned a poor class of witnesses, a large propor-
tion of whom were ignorant negroes who could only tell what they
had heard or had feared. The more respectable of the Radicals
were not summoned, unless by the Democrats. In several instances
the Democrats caused to be summoned the prominent scalawags
and carpet-baggers, who usually gave testimony damaging to the
Radical cause.
An examination of the testimony shows that sixty-four Democrats
and Conservatives were called before the committee and subcom-
mittee. Of these, fifty-seven were southern men, five were northern
men residing in the state, and two were negroes. The Democrats
testified at great length, often twenty to fifty pages. Blair and Beck
tried to bring out everything concerning the character of carpet-bag
rule.^
1 Some of the Conservatives who testified were Gen. Cullen A. Battle, R. H.
Abercrombie, Gen. James H. Clanton, P. M. Dox, Gov. Robert B. Lindsay, Reuben
Chapman, Thomas Cobbs, Daniel Coleman, Jefferson M. Falkner, William H. Forney,
William M. Lowe, William Richardson, Francis S. Lyon, William S. Mudd, Gen.
Edmund W. Pettus, Turner Reavis, James L. Pugh, P. T. Sayre, R. W. Walker, — all
prominent men of high character.
KU KLUX INVESTIGATION 703
Thirty- four scalawags, fifteen carpet-baggers, and forty-one negro
Radicals came before the committee and subcommittee. Some of
these were summoned by Blair or Beck, and a number of them dis-
appointed the RepubHcan members of the committee by giving
Democratic testimony.^ The Radicals could only repeat, with varia-
tions, the story of the Eutaw riot, the Patona affair, the Huntsville
parade, etc. Of the prominent carpet-baggers and scalawags whose
testimony was anti-Democratic, most were men of clouded character.^
The testimony of the higher Federal officials was mostly in favor
of the Democratic contention.^ The negro testimony, however
worthless it may appear at first sight, becomes clear to any one who,
knowing the negro mind, remembers the influences then operating
upon it. From this class of testimony one gets valuable hints and
suggestions. The character of the white scalawag and carpet-bag
testimony is more complex, but if one has the history of the witness,
the testimony usually becomes intelligible. In many instances the
testimony gives a short history of the witness.
The material collected by the Ku Klux Committee, and other
committees that investigated affairs in the South after the war, can
be used with profit only by one who will go to the biographical books
and learn the social and political history of each person who testified.
When the personal history of an important witness is known, many
obscure things become plain. Unless this is known, one cannot
safely accept or reject any specific testimony. To one who works
in Alabama Reconstruction, Brewer's " Alabama," Garrett's " Remi-
niscences," the " Memorial Record," old newspaper files, and the
memories of old citizens are indispensable.
There is in the first volume of the Alabama Testimony a
delightfully partisan index of seventy-five pages. In it the summary
of Democratic testimony shows up almost as Radical as the most
partisan on the other side. It is meant only to bring out the violence
in the testimony. According to it, one would think all those killed
1 Some of those who gave, willingly or unwillingly, Democratic testimony : W. T.
Blackford (c). Judge Busteed (c), General Crawford, Nicholas Davis (s.), L. W.
Day (c), Samuel A. Hale (c), J. H. Speed (s.), Senator Willard Warner (c), N. L.
Whitfield (s.). (c.) = carpet-bagger; (s.)= scalawag.
2 Charles Hays (s.), W. B. Jones (s.), S. F. Rice (s.), John A. Minnis (c), A. S.
Lakin (c), B. W. Norris (c), L. E. Parsons (s.), E. W. Peck (s.), and L. R. Smith (c).
^ Day, Busteed, Van Valkenburg, General Crawford, etc.
704 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
or mistreated were Radicals. The same man frequently figures
three situations, as "shot," "outraged," and "killed." General
Clanton's testimony of thirty pages gets a summary of four inches,
which tells nothing; that of Wager, a Bureau agent, gets as much
for twelve pages, which tells something ; and that of Minnis, a scala-
wag, twice as much. There is very Httle to be found in the testimony
that relates directly to the Ku Klux Klan and similar organiza-
tions. Had the sessions of the subcommittee been held in the white
counties of north and southwest Alabama, where the Klans had
flourished, probably they might have found out something about
the organization. But the minority members were determined to
expose the actual condition of affairs in the state from 1865 to 187 1.
No matter how much the Radicals might discover concerning un-
lawful organizations, the Democrats stood ready with an immense
deal of facts concerning Radical misgovernment to show cause why
such organizations should arise. Consequently the three volumes
of testimony relating to Alabama are by no means pro-Radical,
except in the attitude of the majority of the examiners.^
Below is given a table of alleged Ku Klux outrages, compiled
from the testimony taken. The Ku Klux report classifies all violence
under the four heads: kiUing, shooting, outrage, whipping. The
same case frequently figures in two or more classes. Practically
every case of violence, whether political or not, is brought into the
testimony. The period covered is from 1865 to 1871. Radical
outrages as well as Democratic are hsted in the report as Ku Klux
outrages. In a number of cases Radical outrages are made to appear
as Democratic. Many of the cases are simply hearsay. It is not
likely that many instances of outrage escaped notice, for every case
of actual outrage was proven by many witnesses. Every violent
death of man, woman, or child, white or black. Democratic or Radical,
occurring between 1865 and 1871, appears in the hst as a Ku Klux
outrage. Evidently careful search had been made, and certain
witnesses had informed themselves about every actual deed of
violence. There were then sixty-four counties in the ^tate, and in
only twenty-nine of them were there alleged instances of Ku Klux
outrage.
1 Senate Report, No. 48, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., Pts. 8, 9, and 10, and House Report^
No. 22, 42d Cong., 2d Sess., Pts. 8, 9, and 10, contain the Alabama Testimony.
KU KLUX INVESTIGATION 705
Table of Alleged Outrages compiled from the Ku Klux Testimony
0
0
tn
0
13
25
i5
2
County
J
U
0
1
•<
1
County
z
<
0
S
<
Autauga .
—
I
I
Limestone (k)
7
I
I
9
Blount (k)
2
3
—
6
II
Macon (x)
I
4
I
I
7
Calhoun .
6
I
I
I
9
Madison (x) .
6
19
5
19
49
Chambers (k)
I
—
I
—
2
Marshall (k) .
I
I
I
3
Cherokee (k)
—
2
—
I
3
Marengo (x) .
I
6
—
4
II
Choctaw (x)
II
I
3
—
15
Montgomery (x)
—
I
—
I
Coosa
—
—
I
12
13
Morgan (k) .
4
2
I
3
ID
Colbert (k)
I
I
—
I
3
Perry (x) . .
2
—
2
2
6
Dallas (x)
I
I
—
—
2
Pickens (x)
—
—
' —
9
9
Fayette (k)
I
—
—
3
4
Sumter (x)
21
4
9
4
38
Greene (x)
II
4
I
3
19
St. Clair .
I
I
I
—
3
Hale (x) .
I
3
2
I
7
Tallapoosa (k)
—
—
—
I
Jackson
4
2
2
2
10
Tuscaloosa (k)
8
—
—
—
8
Lauderdale
—
—
—
I
I
Walker (k) .
—
—
—
I
I
Lawrence (k)
2
—
—
—
2
Total .
. . . 258
(x) = black counties, and (k) = white counties, where Ku Klux Klan operated.
The Ku Klux Committee reported a bill ^ providing for the execu-
tion of the Ku Klux Act until the close of the next session of Congress.
It passed the Senate May 21, 1872, and failed in the House on June 6.^
The act of February 28, 1871, was amended by extending the Federal
supervision of elections from towns to all election districts on apph-
cation of ten persons. Other unimportant amendments were made.^
The passage of these laws had no effect on the Ku Klux Klan
proper, which had died out in 1 869-1 870. Nor did they have any
effect in decreasing violence. It is quite likely that there was more
violence toward the negro in 1871 and 1872 than in 1869-1870. But
the laws did affect the elections. The entire machinery of elections
was again under Radical control, and in 1872 the state again sank
back into Radicalism. But it was the last Republican majority the
1 Feb. 17, 1872 ; Report of Committee, p. 626.
2 McPherson, " Handbook," 1872, pp. 89, 90.
^ McPherson, "Handbook," 1872, pp. 90, 91. These provisions had to be inserted
in the Sundry Civil Bill, which was approved June lo, 1872. Kellogg of Louisiana intro-
duced the "rider."
7o6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
state ever cast. The execution of these laws did much to hasten the
union of the whites against negro rule.
Few cases were tried under the Enforcement Acts, though Dis-
trict Attorney Minnis and United States Marshal Healy were very
active.^ Busteed, in 1871, testified that at Huntsville he had tried
several persons for an outrage upon a negro, and that there were still
untried two indictments under the Act of 1870. He stated that his
jurors and witnesses were never interfered with. One of his grand
juries, in 1871, encouraged by the attitude of Congress, reported that
while there was no organized conspiracy throughout the middle dis-
trict, there was such a thing in Macon, Coosa, and Tallapoosa. Two
of the jurors — Benjamin F. Noble and Ex- Governor WiUiam H.
Smith — objected to the report, and Busteed, the Federal judge, con-
demned it as unwarranted by the facts.^
Nearly all of the carpet-bag and scalawag witnesses who testified
on the Radical side before the Ku Klux Committee complained that
the courts would not punish Ku Klux when they were arrested, and
that juries would not indict them.^
In 1872 a gang of men in eastern Alabama, the home of the
Black Cavalry and the spurious Ku Klux Klan, burned a negro
meeting-house where political meetings were held. They were ar-
rested and tried under the Ku Klux Act. Four of them, R. G.
Young, S. D. Young, R. S. Gray, and Neil Hawkins, were fined
$5000 each and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary at Albany, New York. Ringold Young was fined $2000
1 For instances of petty annoyances to the people from marshals, deputy marshals,
and supervisors, see Sen. Ex. Doc, No. 119, 47th Cong, ist Sess., and Ho. Ex. Doc, No.
246, 48th Cong., 2d Sess. These annoyances lasted for several years.
2 Ku Klux Kept., pp. 320, 330.
^ In his Message, Nov. 15, 1869, Smith stated: "Nowhere have the courts
been interrupted. No resistance has been encountered by the officers of courts in
their effort to discharge the duties imposed upon them by law," Smith was criticised
by the carpet-baggers for not calling out the negro militia to " enforce the laws." He
stood out against them, and on July 25, 1870, he replied to their criticisms, denouncing
George E. Spencer (United States Senator), J. D. Sibley, J. J. Hinds, and others as
systematically uttering every conceivable falsehood. " During my entire administration
of the state government," he said, " but one officer had certified to me that he was
unable, on account of lawlessness, to execute his official duties. That officer was the
sheriff of Morgan County. I immediately made application to General Crawford for
troops. They were sent and the said sheriff refused their assistance." " Solid South,"
P- 55-
KU KLUX INVESTIGATION 707
and sent to prison for seven years. Blanks and Howard
were each fined $100 and imprisoned for five years. The prisoners
were taken from state officers by force, and during the trial there was
much parade by a guard of United States troops. There was com-
plaint that the evidence was insufficient, and the punishment dispro-
portionate to the offence even if proven.^
In the elections of 1872 and 1874 there were numerous arrests
of Democrats by the deputy marshals, who often made their arrests
before election day and paraded the prisoners about the country for
the information of the voters. I have been unable to find record of
any convictions.^
1 Montgomery Mail, July 3, 1872. The Black Cavalry and its spurious Ku Klux
successors infested those parts of eastern Alabama where, in 1903, the existence of a
system of peonage was discovered.
2 Tuskegee News, Sept. 3, 1874; Report of Joint Committee on Election of George
Spencer. During the remainder of Reconstruction under the Enforcement Acts, the
Federal government exercised supervision over all elections. Election outrages by the
Democrats probably decreased, while outrages by the Radicals tended to increase.
The Democrats put in their work of influence and intimidation in the summer and
early fall, and when the elections came were quiet, trusting to the influence brought to
bear some months previously. After the carpet-bag government collapsed, the Federal
Enforcement Acts still gave supervision of elections to the Washington government.
The Democrats in Congress were unable to secure the repeal of the force legislation.
"We do not expect to repeal any of the recent enactments [Force Laws]. They may
stand forever, but we intend by superior intelligence, stronger muscle, and greater
energy, to make them dead letter upon the statute books." Birmingham Neivs, quoted
in the State Journal, June 24, 1874. But in 1880 no appropriation was made for the
pay of the deputy marshals and supervisors.
In 1875 the supreme court in the case of United States vs. Reese declared the two
most important sections of the Enforcement Act of 1870 unconstitutional. In 1883, in
the case of the United States vs. Harris, the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, was declared
unconstitutional. In 1888, when House, Senate, and President were Republican, an
attempt was made by Mr. McKinley (afterward President) to pass a Force Bill to
enforce the old election laws, which were still on the statute book. The measure failed
to pass. It was in opposition to this Force Bill that Colonel Hilary A. Herbert of Ala-
bama and other southern congressmen wrote the work called " Why the Solid South ?
or Reconstruction and its Results." It is said that this book had some influence in
causing a halt in force legislation. It was the first attempt to write the history of the
Reconstruction period, and is still the best general account. In 1894, when House, Sen-
ate, and President were Democratic, the remnants of the Enforcement Acts were repealed,
and thus was swept away the last of the Radical system. See Dunning, "The Undoing
of Reconstruction," in the Atlantic Monthly, Oct., 1901.
708 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Later Organizations
While the Ku Klux Klan was disbanded by order in 1869, it
likely that the order of the White Camelia disbanded except whei
there was no longer any necessity for it. In one county it might dis
band; in another it might survive several years longer. It is sai
that its operations were by order suspended in counties when cond:
tions improved.
The White Brotherhood was a later organization, but had only i
limited extension over south Alabama. The most widely spread
the later organizations was the White League, which in some forn
seems to have spread over the entire state from 1872 to 1874. Thi
close connection between southwestern Alabama and Louisiani
accounts for the introduction of both the White Camelia and th
White League. In 1875 Arthur Bingham, the ex-carpet-bag-treas
urer of the state, stated that he had secured a copy of the constitutio:
of the White League and had published it in the State Journal. It
members were sworn not to regard obhgations taken in courts, an(
to clear one another by all means.*
The White League in Barbour and Mobile, in 1874, declared tha
no employment should be given to negro Radicals and no busines
done with white Radicals, and in Sumter County they were said t
have gone on raids Hke the K-U Klux of former days. Mihtary organi
zations of whites were enrolled and appHcations made to the Radi
cal Governor Lewis for arms. He rejected the services of thes
companies, but they remained in organization and drilled. Thi
Confederate gray uniforms were worn. In Tuskegee arms were pur
chased for the company by private subscription. By 1874 the whit
people of the state had become thoroughly united in the White Man'j
Party. There had been no compromises. The color and race lim
had been sharply drawn by the white counties, and the black coun
ties later fell into line. The campaign of 1874 was the most serious
of all. The whites intended to live no longer under Radical rule
and the whole state was practically a great Klan. There was bu
little violence, but there was a stern determination to defeat th<
Radicals at any cost; and if necessary, violence would have beer
used. At the inauguration of Governor Houston, in 1874, several o:
1 Coburn-Buckner Report, p. 238. The constitution is not in tht Journal, however,
LATER ORGANIZATIONS 709
the gray- coated White League companies appeared from different
parts of the state/
In several later elections the old Ku Klux methods were used,
and there was much mysterious talk of ''dark rainy nights and bloody
moons." The ^'Barbour County Fever" was prevalent for many
years : young men and boys would serenade the Radicals of the com-
munity and mortify them in every possible way, and their families
would refuse to recognize socially the families of carpet-baggers and
scalawags. They would not sit by them in church. The children
at school imitated their elders.^
The Ku Klux method of regulating society was nothing new; it
was as old as history; it had often been used before; it may be
used again ; when a people find themselves persecuted by aliens or
by the law, they will find some means outside the law for protecting
themselves; it is certain also that such experiences will result in a
great weakening of respect for law and in a return to more primitive
methods of justice.
1 Coburn-Buckner Report, pp. 7, 12, 19, 702, 882, 883.
2 Cameron Report, 1876, pp. 53, 108; oral accounts.
CHAPTER XXII
REORGANIZATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM
Break-Up of the Ante-bellum System
The cotton planter of the South, the master of many negro slaves,
organized a very efficient slave labor system. Each plantation was
an industrial community almost independent of the outside world;
the division of labor was minute, each servant being assigned a task
suited to his or her strength and training. Nothing but the most
skilful management could save a planter from ruin, for, though the
labor was efficient, it was very costly. The value of an overseer was
judged by the general condition, health, appearance, and manners of
the slaves ; the amount of work done with the least punishment ; the
condition of stock, buildings, and plantation; and the size of the
crops. All suppHes were raised on the plantation, — corn, bacon,
beef, and other food- stuffs ; farm implements and harness were made
and repaired by the skilled negroes in rainy weather when no out-
door work could be done; clothes were cut out in the *'big house'*
and made by the negro women under the direction of the mistress.
The skilled laborers were blacks. Work was usually done by tasks,
and industrious negroes were able to complete their daily allotment
and have three or four hours a day to work in their own gardens and
*' patches." They often earned money at odd jobs, and the church
records show that they contributed regularly. Negro children were
trained in the arts of industry and in sobriety by elderly negroes of
good judgment and firm character, usually women. ^ Children too
young to work were cared for by a competent mammy in the planta-
tion nursery while their parents were in the fields.
In the Black Belt there was httle hiring of extra labor and less
renting of land. Except on the borders, nearly all whites were of the
1 The accounts of the wild and idle negro children of the rice and tobacco districts
are not true of those in the Cotton Belt. The smallest tot could do a little in a cotton
field.
710
BREAK-UP OF THE ANTE-BELLUM SYSTEM 711
planting class. Their greater wealth had enabled them to outbid
the average farmer and secure the rich lands of the black prairies,
cane-brakes, and river bottoms. The small farmer who secured a
foothold in the Black Belt would find himself in a situation not alto-
gether pleasant, and, selHng out to the nearest planter, would go to
poorer and cheaper land in the hills and pine woods, where most of
the people were white.
In the Black Belt cotton was largely a surplus money crop, and
once the labor was paid for, the planter was a very rich man.* In the
white counties of the cotton states about the same crops were raised
as in the Black Belt, but the land was less fertile and the methods of
cultivation less skilful. In the richer parts of these white counties
there was something of the plantation system with some negro labor.
But slavery gradually drove white labor to the hill and mountain
country, the sand and pine barrens. No matter how poor a white
man was, he was excessively independent in spirit and wanted to
work only his own farm. This will account for the lack of renters
and hired white laborers in black or in white districts, and also for
the fact that the less fertile land was taken up by the whites who de-
sired to be their own employers. Land was cheap, and any man
could purchase it. There was some renting of land in the white coun-
ties, and the form it took was that now known as "third and fourth." ^
It was then called "shares." There was Httle or no tenancy "on
halves" or "standing rent." But the average farmer worked his
own land, often with the help of from three to ten slaves.
1 See Birmingham Age-Herald, March 31 and April 7, 1901 (J. W. DuBose) ;
Review of Reviews, Sept., 1903, on "The Cotton Crop of To-day," by R. H.
Edmonds; Ingle, "Southern Sidelights," p. 271; Address of President Thach, Ala-
bama Polytechnic Institute, before the American Economic Association, 1903; Tilling-
hast, "Negro in Africa and America," pp. 126, 143; Mallard, "Plantation Life before
Emancipation " ; Washington, " Up from Slavery," and " The Future of the American
Negro," passim. The immense cost of slave labor is seen when the value of the slaves
is compared with the value of the lands cultivated by their labor. In 1859 the cash
value of the lands in Alabama w^as ^175,824,622, and that of the slaves was ^2I5,540,(X50.
The larger portion of this land had not a negro on it, and if cultivated, was cultivated
exclusively by whites. See Census of i860. The effect of the loss of slaves on the wel-
fare of a planter is shown in the case of William L. Yancey. His slaves were acciden-
tally poisoned and died. The loss ruined him, and he was forced to sell his plantation
and engage in a profession. A farmer in a white county employing white labor would
have been injured only temporarily by such a loss of labor.
^ The tenant furnished labor, supplies, and teams, and paid the landlord a fourth
of the cotton and a third of the corn produced.
712 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
On the borders of the Black Belt in Alabama dwelt a peculiar
class called "squatters." They settled down with or without per-
mission on lots of poor and waste land, built cabins, cleared "patches,"
and made a precarious living by their little crops, by working as car-
penters, blacksmiths, etc. Some bought small lots of land on long-
time payments and never paid for them, but simply stayed where
they were. In the edge of the Black Belt in the busy season were
found numbers of white hired men working alongside of negro
slaves,^ for there was no prejudice against manual labor, that is, no
more than anywhere else in the world.^
As soon as the war was over the first concern of the returning
soldiers was to obtain food to relieve present wants and to secure sup-
plies to last until a crop could be made. In the white counties of the
state the situation was much worse than in the Black Belt. The soil
of the white counties was less fertile; the people were not wealthy
before the war, and during the war they had suffered from the depre-
dations of the enemy and from the operation of the tax-in-kind, which
bore heavily upon them when they had nothing to spare. The white
men went to the war and there were only women, children, and old
men to work the fields. The heaviest losses among the Alabama
Confederate troops were from the ranks of the white county soldiers.
In these districts there was destitution after the first year of the war,
and after 1862 from one-fourth to one-half of the soldiers' families
1 There was usually good feeling between the whites and blacks at work together ;
but the negroes, at heart, scorned the poor whites, and had to be closely watched to
keep them from insulting or abusing them. The negro had little respect for the man
who owned no slaves or who owned but few and worked with them in the fields. To
protect the slaves against outsiders was one reason why discipline was strict, supervision
close, passes required, etc. When both white and black were allowed to go at will over
the plantation and community, trouble was sure to result from the impudent behavior of
the negro to " white trash " and the consequent retaliation of the latter. The whites
often came to the master and wanted him to whip his best slaves for impudence to them.
The master, to prevent this, regulated the liberty of the slave by passes, etc., and the
whites, especially strangers, were expected not to trespass on a plantation where slaves
were.
2 The idea of the so-called " prejudice " against manual labor is perhaps due largely
to abolitionist theories and arguments, which have been partially accepted since the war
by some southerners who think it due to the old system to show its lofty attitude toward
the common things of life. But the negro had, and still has, a contempt for a white who
works as he does. And it has always been a custom of mankind, — white, yellow, or
black, — to get out of doing manual labor if there was anything else to do.
BREAK-UP OF THE ANTE-BELLUM SYSTEM 713
received aid from the state. The bountiful Black Belt furnished
enough for all, but transportation facihties were lacking. At the
close of hostilities the condition of the people in the poorer regions
was pitiable. Stock, fences, barns, and in many cases dwelHngs had
disappeared ; the fields were grown up in weeds ; and no suppHes were
available. How the people managed to live was a mystery. Some
walked twenty miles to get food, and there were cases of starvation.
No seeds and no farm implements were to be had. The best work
of the Freedmen's Bureau was done in relieving these people from
want until they could make a crop. -4;i|r
The Black Belt was the richest as well as the least exposed section
of the state and fared well until the end of the war. The laborers
were negroes, and these worked as well in war time as in peace. Im-
mense food crops were made in 1863 and 1864, and there was no
suffering among whites or blacks. Until 1865 there was no loss
from Federal invasion, but with the spring of 1865 misfortune came.
Four large armies marched through the central portions of the state,
burning, destroying, and confiscating. In June, 1865, the Black Belt
was in almost as bad condition as the white counties. All buildings
in the track of the armies had disappeared; the stores of provisions
were confiscated ; gin-houses and mills were burned ; cattle and horses
and mules were carried away ; and nothing much was left except the
negroes and the fertile land. The returning planter, like the farmer,
found his agricultural implements worn out and broken, and in all
the land there was no money to purchase the necessaries of life.
But in the portions of the black counties untouched by the armies
there were suppHes sufficient to last the people for a few months.
A few fortunate individuals had cotton, which was now bringing
fabulous prices, and it was the high price received for the few bales
not confiscated by the government that saved the Black Belt from
suffering as did the other counties.
Neither master nor slave knew exactly how to begin anew, and
for a while things simply drifted. Now that the question of slavery
was settled, many of the former masters felt a great relief from respon-
sibility, though for their former slaves they felt a profound pity. The
majority of them had no faith in free negro labor, yet all were willing
to give it a trial, and a few of the more strenuous ones said that the
energy and strength of the white man that had made the savage
714 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
negro an efficient laborer could make the free negro work fairly well ;
and if the free negro would work, they were willing to admit that the
change might be beneficial to both races.
During the spring and summer and fall the masters came strag-
gling home, and were met by friendly servants who gave them cordial
welcome. Each one called up his servants and told them that they
were free; and that they might stay with him and work for wages,
or find other homes. Except in the vicinity of the towns and army
posts the negroes usually chose to stay and work; and in the remote
districts of the Black Belt affairs were httle changed for several weeks
after the surrender, which there hardly caused a ripple on the surface
of society. Life and work went on as before. The staid negro
coachmen sat upon their boxes on Sunday as of old ; the field hands
went regularly about their appointed tasks. Labor was cheerful,
and the negroes went singing to the fields. ''The negro knew no
Appomattox. The Revolution sat lightly, — save in the presence
of vacant seats at home and silent graves in the churchyard, in the
memorials of destructive raids, in the wonder on the faces of a people
once free, now ruled, where ruled at all, by a Bureau agent." Here
it was that the master race believed that after all freedom of the
negro might be well.^ In other sections, where the negro was more
exposed to outside influences, people were not hopeful. The common
opinion was that with free negro labor cotton could not be cultivated
with success. The northerner often thought that it was a crop made
by forced labor and that no freeman would willingly perform such
labor; the southerner believed that the negro would neglect the crop
too much when not under strict supervision. Yet later years have
shown that free white labor is most successful in the cultivation of
cotton because of the care the whites expend upon their farms ; while
cotton is the only crop that the free negro has cultivated with any
degree of success, because some kind of a crop can be made by the
most careless cultivation.
At first no one knew just how to work the free negro ; innumer-
able plans were formed and many were tried. The old patriarchal
relations were preserved as far as possible. Truman,^ who made a
long stay in Alabama, reported that in most cases there was a genuine
attachment between masters and negroes; that the masters were
1 Accounts from old citizens, former planters. ^ xhe agent of President Johnson.
BREAK-UP OF THE ANTE-BELLUM SYSTEM 715
the best friends the negroes had ; and that, though they regarded the
blacks with much commiseration, they were inclined to encourage
them to collect around the big house on the old slavery terms, giving
food, clothes, quarters, medical attendance, and a little pay.^ At
that time no one could understand the freedom of the negro.^ As
one old master expressed it, he saw no "free negroes" ^ until the fall
of 1865, when the Bureau began to influence the blacks. But with
the extension of the Bureau and the spread of army posts, the negroes
became idle, neglected the crops that had been planted in the spring,
moved from their old homes and went to town to the Bureau, or went
wandering about the country. The house servants and the arti-
sans, who were the best and most intelHgent of the negroes, also
began to go to the towns. Negro women desiring to be as white
ladies, refused to work in the fields, to cook, to wash, or to perform
other menial duties. It was years before this "freedom" prejudice
of the negro women against domestic service died out.^ The negro
would work one or two days in the week, go to town two days, and
wander about the rest of the time. Under such conditions there
was no hope of continuing the old patriarchal system, and new plans,
modelled on what they had heard of free labor, were tried by the
planters. • In the white counties the ex-soldiers went to work as
before the war, but they had come home from the army too late to
plant full crops, and few had supplies enough to last until the crops
should be gathered. In most of the white counties the negroes were
so few as to escape the serious attention of the Bureau, and conse-
quently they worked fairly well at what they could get to do.^
1 Report to President, April 9, i866.
'^ Colonel Saunders, a noted slaveholder in one of the white counties in north Ala-
bama, established a patriarchal protectorate over his former slaves. He built a church
for them, and organized a monthly court, presided over by himself, in which the old negro
men tried delinquents. It is said that the findings of this court were often ludicrous in
the extreme, but order was preserved, and for a long while there was no resort to the
Bureau. Saunders, " Early Settlers," p. 31. Many similar protectorates were established
in the remote districts, but the policy of the Bureau was to break them up.
8 A term of contempt.
* See Sewanee Review, Jan., 1905, article on " Servant Problem in a Black Belt
Village."
6 N. V. Herald, July 17, 1865 ; Reid, "After the War," pp. 211, 218, 219; Tillet,
in Century Magazine, Vol. XI j Reports of General Swayne, 1865, 1866 ; Van de Graaf,
in Forum, Vol. XXI, pp. 330, 3395 DeBow's Review, Feb., 1866, p. 220; oral accounts.
7l6 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
The first work of the Bureau was to break up the labor system
that had been partially constructed, and to endeavor to establish a
new system based on the northern free labor system and the old slave-
hiring system with the addition of a good deal of pure theory. The
Bureau was to act as a labor clearing-house; it W3,s to have entire
control of labor; contracts must be written in accordance with the
minute regulations of the Bureau, and must be registered by the
agent, who charged large fees.^
The result of these regulations was to destroy industry where an
ahen Bureau agent was stationed, for the planters could not afford
to have their land worked on such terms. In some of the counties,
where the native magistrates served as Bureau agents, no attention
was paid to the rules of the Bureau, and the people floundered along,
trying to develop a workable basis of existence. In the districts
infested by the Bureau agents the negroes had fantastic notions of
what freedom meant. On one plantation they demanded that the
plantation bell be no longer rung to summon the hands to and from
work, because it was too much like slavery.^ In various places they
refused to work and congregated about the Bureau offices, awaiting
the expected division of property, when they would get the "forty
acres and one old gray mule." When wages were paid they believed
that each should receive the same amount, whether his labor had
been good or bad, whether the laborer was present or absent, sick
or well. In one instance a planter was paying his men in corn ac-
cording to the time each had worked. The negroes objected and
got an order from the Bureau agent that the division should be made
equally. The planter read the order (which the negroes could not
read), and at once directed the division as before. The negroes,
thinking that the Bureau had so ordered, were satisfied. In the cane-
brake region the agents were afraid of the great planters and did not
interfere with the negroes except to organize them into Union Leagues ;
1 For a description of the Bureau labor regulations, see Chapter XI, Sec. i. Also
Montgomery Mail, May 12, 1865 ; Howard's Circular, May 30, 1865 ; Circular No, II,
War Department, July 12, 1865 ; Huntsville Advocate, July 26, 1865 > Swayne's Reports,
1865, 1866; G. O. No. 12, Dept. Ala., Aug. 30, 1865 ; G. O. No. 13, Dept. Ala., Sept^
1865; Selma Times, Dec. 4, 1865. The so-called "Black Laws" passed by the legis- fl
lature in 1 865-1 866 to regulate labor were scarcely heard of by the people who hired \
negroes. 5
2 Somers,, " Southern States," 130.
NORTHERN AND FOREIGN IMMIGRATION
717
but elsewhere in the Black Belt the planter could not afford to hire
negroes on the terms fixed by the Bureau/
Northern and Foreign Immigration
With the break-up of the slave system the planter found himself
with much more land than he knew what to do with. He could get
no rehable labor, he had no cash capital, so in many cases he offered
his best lands for sale at low prices. The planters wanted to attract
northern and foreign immigration and capital into the country; the
cotton planter sought for a northern partner who could furnish the
capital. Owing to the almost religious regard of the negro for his
northern deliverers, many white landlords thought that northern
men, especially former soldiers, might be better able than southern
men to control negro labor. General Swayne, the head of the Bureau,
said that the negroes had more confidence in a "bluecoat" than in a
native, and that among the larger planters northern men as partners
or overseers were in great demand.^
For a short time after the close of the war northern men in con-
siderable numbers planned to go into the business of cotton raising.
DeBow ^ gives a description of the would-be cotton planters who
came from the North to show the southern people how to raise cotton
with free negro labor. They had note-books and guide-books full of
close and exact tables of costs and profits, and from them figured
out vast returns. They acknowledged that the negro might not
work for the southern man, but they were sure that he would work for
them. They were very self-confident, and would hsten to no advice
from experienced planters, whom they laughed at as old fogies, but
from their note-books and tables they gave one another much infor-
mation about the new machinery useful in cotton culture, about rules
for cultivation, how to control labor, etc. They estimated that each
laborer's family would make $1000 clear gain each year. DeBow
'^Southern Magazine, Jan., 1874 ; Selma Messenger, Nov. 15, 1865 ; Harper's
Monthly Magazine, ]2in., 1 874; Selma Times, Dec. 4, 1865; oral accounts; De Bend's
Review, Feb., 1866.
2 Swayne to A. F. Perry, N. V. Herald, Aug. 28, 1865 ; N. Y. Herald, July 17,
1865; Reid, "After the War," pp. 211-219; DeBow's Review, 1866, pp. 213, 220;
Somers, "Southern States," p. 131.
* DeBow'' s Review, Feb., 1866.
yi8 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
would not say they were wrong, but he said that he thought that the]
should hasten a little more slowly. Northern energy and capitol
flowed in; plantations were bought, and the various industries of
plantation life started; and mills and factories were established.
Because of the paralyzed condition of industry the southern people
welcomed these enterprises, but they were very sceptical of their final
success. The northern settler had confidence in the negro and gave
him unhmited credit or supplies; consequently, in a few years the
former was financially ruined and had to turn his attention to pohtics,
and to exploiting the negro in that field in order to make a living.^
Both as employer and as manager the northern men failed to control
negro labor. They expected the negro to be the equal of the Yankee
white. The negroes themselves were disgusted with northern em-
ployers. Truman reported, after an experience of one season, that
"it is the almost universal testimony of the negroes themselves, who
have been under the supervision of both classes, — and I have talked
with many with a view to this point, — that they prefer to labor for a
southern employer. " ^
Northern capital came in after the war, but northern labor did
not, though the planters offered every inducement. Land was offered
to white purchasers at ridiculously low rates, but the northern white
laborer did not come. He was afraid of the South with its planters
and negroes. The poorer classes of native whites, however, profited
by the low prices and secured a foothold on the better lands. So
general was the unbelief in the value of the free negro as a laborer,
especially in the Bureau districts, and so signally had all inducements
failed to bring native white laborers from the North, that determined
efforts were made to obtain white labor from abroad. Immigration
societies were formed with officers in the state and headquarters in
the northern cities. These societies undertook to send to the South
laboring people, principally German, in families at so much per head.
1 Many of the carpet-bag politicians were northern men who had failed at cotton
planting.
2 Report to the President, April 9, 1866; "Ten Years in a Georgia Plantation,"
by the Hon. Mrs. Leigh ; oral accounts. On account of the general failure of the
northern men who invested capital in the South in 1865 and 1866, there grew up in the
business world an unfavorable feeling against the South, and for the remainder of Recon-
struction days that section had to struggle against adverse business opinion. Harper's
Magazine, Jan., 1874.
NORTHERN AND FOREIGN IMMIGRATION 719
The planter turned with hope to white labor, of the superiority of
which he had so long been hearing, and he wished very much to give
it a trial. The advertisements in the newspapers read much like
the old slave advertisements: so many head of healthy, industrious
Germans of good character dehvered f.o.b. New York, at so much
per head. One of the white labor agencies in Alabama undertook
to furnish ''immigrants of any nativity and in any quantity" to take
the place of negroes. Children were priced at the rate of $50 a year ;
women, $100; men, $150, — they themselves providing board and
clothes. One of every six Germans was warranted to speak English.^
Most of these agencies were frauds and only wanted an advance pay-
ment on a car load of Germans who did not exist. In a few instances
some laborers were actually shipped in; but they at once demanded
an advance of pay, and then deserted. Like the bounty jumpers,
they played the game time and time again. The influence of the
Radical press of the North was also used to discourage emigration
to the South ; ^ consequently white immigration into the state did
not amount to anything,^ and the Black Belt received no help from
the North or from abroad, and had to fall back upon the free negro.
In the white counties there had been little hope or desire for
alien immigration. The people and the country were so desper-
ately poor that the stranger would never think of settling there.
Many of the whites in moderate circumstances, living near the Black
Belt, took advantage of the low price of rich lands, and acquired
small farms in the prairies, but there was no influx of white labor
to the Black Belt from the white counties.^ Nearly every man,
woman, and child in the white districts had to go to work to earn a
living. Many persons — lawyers, pubhc men, teachers, ministers,
1 Selma Times, Dec. 4, 1865. Nearly all the newspapers printed advertisements of
the immigration societies.
2 " Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 378.
8 Selma Times, Dec. 4, 1865 ; N. V. Times, July 2, 1866.
* The great evil of slavery was its tendency to drive the whites who were in mod-
erate circumstances away from the more fertile lands of the prairie and cane-brake and
river bottoms, leaving them to the few slaveholders and the immense number of slaves.
Emancipation thus left on the finest lands of the state a shiftless laboring population,
which still retains possession. Now, as in slavery times, the white prefers not to work
as a field hand in the Black Belt when he can get more independent work elsewhere.
And besides, he does not wish to live among the negroes. Slavery kept white farmers
from settling on the fertile lands ; the negro keeps whites from taking possession now.
720 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
physicians, merchants, overseers, managers, and even women-
who had never before worked in the fields or at manual occupations^'
were now forced to do so because of losses of property, or because
they could not live by their former occupations.^
While the number of white laborers had increased somewhat,
negro labor had decreased. Several thousand negro men had gone
with the armies; for various reasons thousands had drifted to the]
towns, where large numbers died in 1 865-1 866. The rural negro
had a promising outlook, for at any time he could get more work
than he could do; the city negro found work scarce even when he
wanted it.^
Attempts to organize a New System
Several attempts were made by the negroes in 1865 and 1866
to work farms and plantations on the cooperative system, that is,
to club work, but with no success. They were not accustomed to
independent labor, their faculty for organization had not been suffi-
ciently developed, and the dishonesty of their leading men some-
times caused failures of the schemes.^
'^Mobile Daily Times, Oct. 21, i860; Montgomery Advertiser, March 21, 1866;
De Bozo's Review, March i8, 1866.
Several young women of Montgomery, who were once wealthy, worked in the print-
ing-office of the Advertiser. One of them was a daughter of a former President of the
United States. Many women became teachers, displacing men, who then went to the
fields. Disabled soldiers generally tried teaching.
There seems to be a belief that emancipation had a good effect in driving to work
a certain " gentleman of leisure " class, who had been supported by the work of slaves
and who had scorned labor. (See W. B. Tillett, in the Century Magazine, Vol. XI,
p. 769.) It is a mistake to regard the slaveholding, planting class as, in any degree,
idle, unless from the point of view of the negro or the ignorant white, who believed
that any man who did not work with his hands was a gentleman of leisure. The Ala-
bama planter was and had to be a man of great energy, good judgment, and diligence.
It was a belief that a man who could not manage a plantation or other business should
not be intrusted with an official position. One of the most serious objections made by
the cotton planters to Jefferson Davis as President was that he had failed to manage his
plantation with success. See also Somers, " Southern States," p. 127.
^ DeB civ's Review, Feb. and March, 1866; Montgomery Advertiser, March 21,
1866; N. V. Herald, July 17, 1866. It was estimated that in the fall of 1865 the negro
male population of the state was reduced by 50,000 able-bodied men, who were hanging
around the cities and towns, doing nothing. At Mobile there were 10,000; at Meridian,.
Miss., 5000; at Montgomery, 10,000; at Selma, 5000; and at various smaller points,
20,000. Mobile Times, Oct. 21, 1865.
3 See also Reid, " After the War," p. 221.
ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE A NEW SYSTEM 72 1
In the summer of 1865 the Monroe County Agricultural Asso-
ciation was formed to regulate labor, and to protect the interests
of both employer and laborer. It was the duty of the executive
committee to look after the welfare of the freedmen, to see that
contracts were carried out and the freedmen protected in them,
and, in cases of dispute, to act as arbitrator. The members of
the association pledged themselves to see that the freedman received
his wages, and to aid him in case his employer refused to pay. They
were also to see that the freedman fulfilled his contract, unless there
was good reason why he should not. Homes and the necessaries
of Hfe were to be provided by the association for the aged and help-
less negroes, of whom there were several on every plantation. The
planters declared themselves in favor of schools for the negro children,
and a committee was appointed to devise a plan for their education.
Every planter in Monroe County belonged to the association.^ An
organization in Conecuh County adopted, word for word, the con-
stitution of the Monroe County association. In Clarke and Wilcox
counties similar organizations were formed, and in all counties
where negro labor was the main dependence some such plans were
devised.^ But it is noticeable that in those counties where the planters
first undertook to reorganize the labor system, there were no regular
agents of the Freedmen's Bureau and no garrisons.
The average negro quite naturally had httle or no sense of the
obligation of contracts. He would leave a growing crop at the
most critical period, and move into another county, or, working
his own crop "on shares," would leave it in the grass and go to work
for some one else in order to get small ''change" for tobacco, snuff,
and whiskey. After three years of experience of such conduct,
a meeting of citizens at Summerfield, Dallas County, decided that
laborers ought to be impressed with the necessity of complying
with contracts. They agreed that no laborers discharged for failure
to keep contracts would be hired again by other employers. They
declared it to be the duty of the whites to act in perfect good faith
1 Trowbridge, "The South," p. 431 et seq.
2 Trowbridge, "The South," p. 431 ; Reports of General Swayne, Dec. 26, 1865,
and Jan., 1866, in Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 70, 39th Cong., ist Sess. General Swayne strongly
approved the objects of these societies. He said there was not and never had been any
question of the right of the negro to hold property. Free negroes had held property
before the war.
3 A
722 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
in their relations with freedmen, to respect and uphold their rights,
and to promote good feeling/
Development of the Share System
At first the planters had demanded a system of contracts, thinking
that by law they might hold the negro to his agreements. But the \
Bureau contracts were one-sided, and the planters could not afford |
to enter into them. General Swayne early reported ^ a general break- \
down of the contract system, though he told the planters that in ;
case of dispute, where no contract was signed, he would exact pay-
ment for the negro at the highest rates. The ^' share" system was
discouraged, but where there were no Bureau agents it was develop-
ing. And so bad was the wage system, that even in the Bureau
districts, share hiring was done. The object of "share" renting
was to cause the laborer to take an interest in his crop and to relieve
the planter of disputes about loss of time, etc. Some of the negroes
also decided that the share system was the proper one. On the plan-
tations near Selma the negroes demanded "shares," threatening
to leave in case of refusal. General Hardee, who was living near,
proposed a plan for a verbal contract; wages should be one-fourth
of all crops, meat and bread to be furnished to the laborer, and his
share of crop to be paid to him in kind, or the net proceeds in cash ;
the planter to furnish land, teams, wagons, implements, and seed
to the laborer, who, in addition, had all the slavery privileges of
free wood, water, and pasturage, garden lot and truck patch, teams
to use on Sundays and for going to town. The absolute right
of management was reserved to the planter, it being understood
that this was no copartnership, but that the negro was hired for a
share of the crop ; consequently he had no right to interfere in the
management.^
On another plantation, where a share system similar to Hardee's
was in operation, the planter divided the workers into squads of
four men each. To each squad he assigned a hundred acres of
cotton and com, in the proportion of five acres of cotton to three
of corn, and forty acres of cotton for the women and children of
the four families. The squads were united to hoe and plough and
1 De Bow's Revieiv, Feb., 1868. 2 jan. 31, 1866.
3 I have this account from a planter of the district.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHARE SYSTEM 723
to pick the cotton, because they worked better in gangs. Wage
laborers were kept to look after fences and ditches, and to perform
odd jobs. A frequent source of trouble was the custom of allowing
the negro, as part of his pay, several acres of "outside crop," to
be worked on certain days of the week, as Fridays and Saturdays.
The planter was supposed to settle disputes among the negroes, give
them advice on every subject except politics and rehgion, on which
they had other advisers, pay their fines and get them out of jail when
arrested, and sometimes to thrash the recalcitrant.^
Several kinds of share systems were finally evolved from the
industrial chaos. They were much the same in black or white
districts, and the usual designations were "on halves," "third and
fourth," and "standing rent." The tenant "on halves" received
one-half the crop, did all the work, and furnished his own provisions.
The planter furnished land, houses to live in, seed, ploughs, hoes,
teams, wagons, ginned the cotton, paid for half the fertihzer, and
"went security" for the negro for a year's credit at the supply store
in town, or he furnished the supplies himself, and charged them
against the negro's share of the crop. The "third and fourth"
plan varied according to locality and time, and depended upon what
the tenant furnished. Sometimes the planter furnished everything,
while the negro gave only his labor and received one-fourth of the
crop; again, the planter furnished all except provisions and labor,
and gave the negro one-third of the crop. In such cases "third and
fourth" was a lower grade of tenancy than "on halves." Later
it developed to a higher grade: the tenant furnished teams and
farming implements, and the planter the rest, in which case the
planter received a third of the cotton, and a fourth of the com raised.
"Standing rent" was the highest form of tenancy, and only respon-
sible persons, white or black, could rent under that system. It called
1 Somers, an English traveller, thought that the economic relations of planter and
negro were startling, and that anywhere else they would be considered absurd. The
tenant, he said, was sure of a support, and did not much care if the crop failed. Even
his taxes, when he condescended to pay any, were paid by his master. For all work
outside of his crop he had to be paid, and often he went away and worked for some one
else for cash. And his privileges were innumerable. "The soul is often crushed out
of labor by penury and oppression. Here a soul cannot begin to be infused into it
through the sheer excess of privilege and license with which it is surrounded." " South-
ern States since the War," pp. 128, 129.
724, CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
for a fixed or "standing" rent for each acre or farm, to be paid in
money or in cotton. The unit of value in cotton was a 500-pound
bale of middling grade on October ist. Tenants who had farm
stock, farming implements, and supplies or good 'credit would nearly
always cultivate for ''standing rent." The planter exercised a con-
trolling direction over the labor and cultivation of a crop worked'
"on halves"; he exercised less direction over "third and fourth"
tenants, and was supposed to exercise no control over tenants who
paid "standing rent." In all cases the planter furnished a dwelHng-
house free, wood and water (paid for digging wells), and pasture
for the pigs and cows of the tenants. In all cases the renter had
a plot of ground of from one to three acres, rent free, for a vegetable
garden and "truck patch." Here could be raised watermelons,
sugar-cane, potatoes, sorghum, cabbage, and other vegetables. Every
tenant could keep a few pigs and a cow, chickens, turkeys, and
guineas, and especially dogs, and could hunt in all the woods around
and fish in all the waters. "On halves" was considered the safest
form of tenancy for both planter and tenant, for the latter was only
an average man, and this method allowed the superior direction
of the planter.^ Many negroes worked for wages; the less intelli-
gent and the unreliable could find no other way to work; and some
of the best of them preferred to work for wages paid at the end of
each week or month. Wage laborers worked under the immediate
oversight of the farmer or tenant who hired them. They received
$8 to $12 a month and were "found," that is, furnished with rations.
In the white counties the negro hired man was often fed in the
farmer's kitchen. The laborer, if hired by the year, had a. house,
1 My father's tenants, white and black, rented on all systems. The negroes usually
began as wage laborers or as tenants " on halves," for they had no supplies when they
came. Then the more industrious and thrifty would save and rent farms for " third and
fourth " or for "standing rent." The whites usually obtained the highest grade, and
the average white man would save enough of his earnings to purchase a team, wagon,
buggy, farm implements, and a year's supply and spend all else, though some saved
enough to buy land of their own in cheaper districts or to support themselves for a year
or two while opening up a homestead in the pine woods. The negro, as a rule, rented
" on halves," for he spent all his earnings and required supervision. The average negro
stays only a year or two at one place before he longs for change and removes to another
farm. About Christmas, or just before, the negroes and many of the whites begin to
move to new homes. For a description of conditions in Mississippi, where the negro
has somewhat better opportunities than in Alabama, see Mr. A. H. Stone's article in
the Quarterly Journal of Economics^ Feb., 1905.
DEVELQPMENT OF THE SHARE SYSTEM 725
\egetable garden, truck patch, chickens, a pig perhaps, always a
log, and he could hunt and fish anywhere in the vicinity. Some-
limes he was ''found"; sometimes he "found" himself. When
he was "found," the allowance for a week was three and a half
pounds of bacon, a peck of meal, half a gallon of syrup, and a plug
of tobacco ; his garden and truck patch furnished vegetables. This
allowance could be varied and commuted. The system was worked
out in the few years immediately following the war, and has lasted
almost without change. Where the negroes are found, the larger
plantations have not been broken up into small farms, the census
statistics to the contrary notwithstanding.^ The negro tenant or
laborer had too many privileges for his own good and for the good
of the planter. The negro should have been paid more money
or given a larger proportion of the crop, and fewer privileges. He
needed more control and supervision, and the result of giving him
a vegetable garden, a truck patch, a pasture, and the right of hunt-
ing and fishing, was that the negro took less interest in the crop;
the privileges were about all he wanted. Agricultural industry
was never brought to a real business basis.^
An essential part of the share system was the custom of advanc-
ing supplies to the tenant with the future crop as security. The
universal lack of capital after the war forced an extension of the
old ante-bellum credit or supply system. The merchant, who was
also a cotton buyer, advanced money or supplies until the crop was
gathered. Before the war his security was crop, land, and "slaves ;
after the war the crop was the principal security, for land was a
drug in the market. Consequently, the crop was more important
to the creditor. Cotton was the only good cash staple, and the
high prices encouraged all to raise it. It was to the interest of the
merchant, even when prices were low, to insist that his debtors raise
cotton to the exclusion of food crops, since much of his money was
made by selhng food suppHes to them. Before the war the planter
alone had much credit, and a successful one did not make use of
1 In the census each person cultivating a crop is counted as a farmer and the land
he cultivates as a farm. Thus a plantation might be represented in the census statistics
by from five to twenty-five farms.
2 See also Otken, "Ills of the South" ; Somers, "South since the War," p. 281 ;
Ilai'per's Monthly^ Jan., 1874 ; DeBow^s Reviewy Feb., 1868.
726 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
oHiave
the system ; but after the war all classes of cotton raisers had to
advances of supplies. The credit or crop lien system was good
to put an ambitious farmer on the way to independence, but it was
no incentive to the shiftless. Cotton became the universal crop
under the credit system, and even when the farmer became inde-
pendent, he seldom planted less of his staple crop, or raised more
supplies at home. i
Negro Farmers and White Farmers
At the end of the war everything was in favor of the negro cotton
raiser; and everything except the high price of cotton was against
the white farmer in the poorer counties. The soil had been used
most destructively in the white districts, and it had to be improved
before cotton could be raised successfully.^ The high price of cotton
caused the white farmer, who had formerly had only small cotton
patches, to plant large fields, and for several years the negro, was
not a serious competitor. The building of railroads through the
mineral regions afforded transportation to the white farmer for
crops and fertilizers, — an advantage that before this time had been
enjoyed only by the Black Belt, — and improved methods gradually
supplanted the wasteful frontier system of cultivation. The gradual
increase ^ of the cotton production after 1869 was due entirely to
white labor in the white counties, the black counties never again reach-
ing their former production, though the population of those counties
has doubled. Governor Lindsay said, in 187 1, that the white people
1 Any stick is good enough to beat slavery with, so it is usually stated that slavery
was responsible for the wasteful methods of cultivation that prevailed in the South before
the war. That can be true only indirectly, for the soil always received the worst treat-
ment in the white counties. Like frontiersmen everywhere, the Alabama white farmers
found it easier to clear new land or to move West than to fertilize worn-out soils. The
lack of transportation facilities in the white districts made it almost impossible to bring
in commercial fertilizers or to move the crops when made. The railroads had opened
up only the rich slave districts. If there had not been a negro in the state, the frontier
methods would have prevailed, as they still do among the farmers in some parts of the *
West. On the other hand, the rich lands worked by slave labor under intelligent direc-
tion were kept in good condition. Under free negro labor they are in the worst possi-
ble condition. Experience, necessity, the disappearance of free land, and the increase of
transportation facilities have caused the white county farmer to employ better methods,
and to keep up and increase the fertility of the land by using fertilizers.
2 But it was nearly forty years before the entire cotton crop of the state was as large
as in 1859.
NEGRO FARMERS AND WHITE FARMERS
727
of north Alabama, where but Httle had been produced before the
war, were becoming prosperous by raising cotton, and at the same
time raising suppHes that the planter on the rich lands with negro
labor had to buy from the West. This prosperity, he thought, had
done more than anything else to put an end to Ku Klux disturbances.
Somers reported, as early as 187 1, that the bulk of the cotton crop in
the Tennessee valley was made by white labor, not by black.^ As long
as there was plenty of cheap, thin land to be had, the poor but inde-
pendent white would not work the fertile land belonging to some
one else; and before and long after the war there was plenty of
practically free land.^ Therefore the tendency of the whites was
to remain on the less fertile land. Dr. E. A. Smith, in the Alabama
Geological Survey of 1 881-1882, and in the Report on Cotton Pro-
duction in Alabama (1884), shows the relation between race and
cotton production, and race location, with respect to fertihty of soil :
(i) On the most fertile lands the laboring population was black; the
farmers were shiftless, and no fertihzers were used; there the credit
evil was worse, and the yield per acre was less than on the poorest soils
cultivated by whites. (2) Where the races were about equal the
best system was found; the soils were medium, the farms were
small but well cultivated, and fertihzers were used. (3) On the
poorest soils only whites were found. These by industry and use
of fertilizers could produce about as much as the blacks on the rich
soils.
The average product per acre of the fertile Black Belt is lower
than the lowest in the poorest white counties. Only the best of
'^Southern Magazine, Jan., 1874; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 206, 207;
Somers, "Southern States," p. 117. In i860 it was estimated that of the whole cotton
crop 10 to 12 per cent was produced by white labor ; in 1876 the proportion of whites
to blacks in the cotton fields was 30 to 51 ; in 1883 white labor produced 44 per cent
of the cotton crop ; in 1884, 48 per cent; in 1885, 50 per cent; in 1893, 7° P^r cent.
And this was done by the whites on inferior lands. See W. B. Tillett, in Century Maga-
zine, Vol. XI, p. 771 ; Hammond, "The Cotton Industry," pp. 129, 130, 132.
2 DeBow estimated that the entire acreage of the cotton crop was as follows: —
1836. 2,000,000 acres 1850. 5,000,000 acres
1840. 4,500,000 acres i860. 6,968,000 acres
The Commissioner of Agriculture in 1876 estimated that the acreage in i860 was
13,000,000. Taking this estimate, which, while probably too large, is more nearly cor-
rect, only 4 per cent of the arable land was planted in cotton — the staple crop.
Hammond, "The Cotton Industry," p. 74.
■jl^ CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
soil, as in Clarke, Monroe, and Wilcox counties, is able to overcome
the bad labor system, and produce an average equal to that made
by the whites in Winston, the least fertile county in the state. In
white counties, where the average product per acre falls below the
average for the surrounding region, the fact is always explained by
the presence of blacks, segregated on the best soils, keeping down
the average product. For example, Madison County in 1880 had
a majority of blacks, and the average product per acre was 0.28
bale, as compared with 0.32 bale for the Tennessee valley, of which
Madison was the richest county; in Talledega, the most fertile
county of the Coosa valley, the average production per acre was
0.32, as compared with 0.40 for the rest of the valley; in Autauga,
where the blacks outnumbered the whites two to one, the average
fell below that of the country around, though the Autauga soil was
the best in the region. The average product of the rich prairie region
cultivated by the blacks was 0.27 bale per acre; the average prod-
uct in the poor mineral region cultivated by the whites was 0.26 to
0.28; in the short-leaf pine region the whites outnumber the blacks
two to one, and the average production is 0.34 bale, while in the
gravelly hill region, where the blacks are twice as numerous as the
whites, the production is 0.30, the soil in- the two sections being
about equal. In general, the fertility of the soil being equal, the
production varies inversely as the proportion of colored population
to white. Density of colored population is a sure sign of fertile
soil; predominance of white a sign of medium or poor soil. Out-
side of the Black Belt, white owners cultivate small farms, looking
closely after them. The negro seldom owns the land he cultivates,
and is more efficient when working under direction on the small
farm in the white county. In the Black Belt, nearly all land is
fertile and capable of cultivation, but in the white counties a large
percentage is rocky, in hills, forests, mountains, etc. Many soils
in southeast and in north Alabama, formerly considered unpro-
ductive, have been brought into cultivation by the use of fertiHzers,
hauled in wagons, in many cases, from twenty to a hundred miles.
FertiHzers have not yet come into general use in the Black Belt.
In the negro districts are still found horse-power gins and old wooden
cotton presses; in the white counties, steam and water power and
the latest machinery. In the white counties it has always been a
NEGRO FARMERS AND WHITE FARMERS 729
general custom to raise a part of the supplies on the farm; in the
Black Belt this has not been done since the war.^ Though many
of the white farmers remained under the crop Hen bondage, there
was a steady gain toward independence on the part of the more
industrious and economical. But not until toward the close of
, the century did emancipation come for many of the struggling whites.
I In other directions the whites did better. They opened the
mines of north Alabama, cut the timber of south Alabama, built
the railroads and factories, and to some extent engaged in com-
merce.^ Market gardening became a common occupation. Negro
labor in factories failed. It was the negro rather than slavery that
prevented and still prevents the establishment of manufactures.*
The development of manufactures in recent years has benefited
principally the poor people of the white counties. ''For this mill
people is not drawn from foreign immigrants, nor from distant
states, but it is drawn from the native-born white population, the
poor whites, that belated hill-folk from the ridges and hollows and
coves of the silent hills." ^ The negro artisan is giving way to the
white; even in the towns of the Black Belt, the occupations once
securely held by the negro are passing into the hands of the whites.
In the white counties, during Reconstruction, the relations between
the races became more strained than in the Black Belt. One of the
manifestations of the Ku Klux movement in the white counties
was the driving away of negro tenants from the more fertile dis-
tricts by the poorer classes of whites who wanted these lands. For
years immigration was discouraged by the northern press. For-
eigners were afraid to come to the ''benighted and savage South. "^
1 Smith, "Cotton Production in Alabama" (1884); Census, 1880; Smith in Ala.
<jeolog. Survey, 1 881-1882; Kelsey, "The Negro Farmer"; oral accounts and per-
sonal observation.
2 So poor were the people after the war that, even though the value of the mineral
and timber lands was well known, there was no native capital to develop them, and the
lion's share went to outsiders, who bought the lands at tax and mortgage sales during
and after the carpet-bag regime.
8 Slavery or negroes prevented the establishment of manufactures by crowding out
a white population capable of carrying on manufactures. The census shows that in
! i860 the white districts had a fair proportion of manufactures for a state less than forty
years old.
* Address of President C. C. Thach, Dec. 29, 1903.
5 " Northern Alabama Illustrated," p. 378 ; see article on " Immigration to the
Southern States" in the Political Science Quarterly^ June, 1905.
730 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
But in the '8o's the railroad companies began to induce Germanj
to settle on their lands in the poorest of the white counties. Latei
there has been a slow movement from the Northwest. As a rule
where the northerners and the Germans settle the wilderness blossoms
and the negro leaves.
After ploughing their hilltops until the soil was exhausted, the
whites, even before the war, decided that only by clearing the swamps
in the poorer districts could they get land worth cultivating. This
required much labor and money. After the war, with the increase
of transportation facilities, fertilizers came into use, the swamps
were deserted, and the farmers went back to the uplands. "By
the use of commercial fertilizers, vast regions once considered barren
have been brought into profitable cultivation, and really afford
more reliable and constant crop than the rich alluvial lands of the
old slave plantations. In nearly every agricultural county in the
South there is to be observed, on the one hand, this section of fertile
soils, once the heart of the old civilization, now largely abandoned
by the whites, held in tenantry by a dense negro population, full
of dilapidation and ruin ; while on the other hand, there is the region
of light, thin soils, occupied by the small white freeholder, filled
with schools, churches, and good roads, and all the elements of a
happy, enlightened country life." ^
The Decadence of the Black Belt
The patriarchal system failed in the Black Belt, the Bureau
system of contracts and prescribed wages failed, the planter's owa
wage system failed,^ and finally all settled down to the share system.
1 Address of President C. C. Thach, Dec. 29, 1903.
2 The decreasing value of the wage laborer is shown by the following table of wages r
Year
Men
Women
Youths, 14-20
i860 ....
$13^
^89
^66
I 865-1 866
150-2CX)
100-150
75-100
1867 ....
117
71
52
1868.
87
50
40
1890 ....
150
100
60-75
The figures of i860 are based on the wages of an able-bodied negro. The statistics
of 1 865- 1 866 are taken from tables of wages prescribed by the Freedmen's Bureau:
THE DECADENCE OF THE BLACK BELT 731
Tn this there was some encouragement to effort on the part of the
laborer, and in case of failure of the crop he bore a share of the loss.
After a few years' experience, the negroes were ready to go back
to the wage system, and labor conventions were held demanding
a return to that system.^ But whatever system was adopted, the
work of the negro was unsatisfactory. The skilled laborer left the
plantation, and the new generation knew nothing of the arts of
industry. Labor became migratory, and the negro farmer wanted
to change his location every year.^ Regular work was a thing of
the past. In two or three days each week a negro could work enough
to live, and the remainder of the time he rested from his labors,
often leaving much cotton in the fields to rot.^ He went to the field
when it suited him to go, gazed frequently at the sun to see if it was
time to stop for meals, went often to the spring for water, and spent
much time adjusting his plough or knocking the soil and pebbles
from his shoes. The negro women refused to work in the fields,
and yet did nothing to better the home life; the style of hving was
"from hand to mouth." Extra money went for whiskey, snuff,
tobacco, and finery, while the standard of Hving was not raised.''
The laborer would always stop to go to a circus, election, political
meeting, revival, or camp-meeting. A great desolation seemed to
rest upon the Black Belt country.^
In the interior of the state, the negroes worked better during
those for 1867 and 1868 show the dedine caused by the inefficiency of the free negro
laborer. Yet the demand for labor was always greater than the supply. In i860 cloth-
ing and rations were also given ; in 1 866-1 868 rations and no clothing. In 1890 noth-
ing was furnished. In 1866-1868 the currency was inflated, and the wages for 1868
were really much lower. Hammond, "The Cotton Industry," p. 124; Montgomery
Mail, May 16, 1865 ; Freedmen's Bureau Reports, 1 865-1870.
1 A convention held in Montgomery, in 1873, recommended that the share system be
abolished and a contract wage system be inaugurated ; wages should be secured by a
lien on the employer's crop; separate contracts should be made with each laborer, and
the "squad" system abolished. In this way the laborer would not be responsible for
bad crops. To aid the laborers, Congress was asked to pass the Sumner Civil Rights
Bill, providing for the recognition of certain social rights for negroes, to exempt home-
steads from tax action, and to increase the tax on property held by speculators. And
the Presitlent was asked to supply bread and meat to the negro farmers. Annual Cyclo-
paedia (1873), p. 19 ; Tuscaloosa Blade, Nov. 30, 1873.
=2 See Willet, "Workers of the Nation," Vol. II, pp. 701, 702.
3 Willet, Vol. II, p. 714.
* Washington, in Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 324-326.
^ Somers, p. 166.
732 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and after Reconstruction than where they were exposed to the minis-
trations of the various kinds of carpet-baggers.^ In the Tennessee
valley, where the negroes had taken a prominent part in politics,
and had not only seen much of the war, but many of them had
enlisted in the Federal army, cotton raising almost ceased for several
years. The only crops made were made by whites.^ In Sumter
County, where the black population was dense, it was, in 1870, almost
impossible to secure labor; those negroes who wished to work went
to the railways.^ A description of a "model negro farm" in 1874
was as follows: The farmer purchased an old mule on credit and
rented land on shares, or for so many bales of cotton ; any old tools
were used; corn, bacon, and other supplies were bought on credit,
and a lien given on the crop ; a month later, corn and cotton were
planted on soil not well broken up; the negro "would not pay for
no guano," to put on other people's land; by turns the farmer
planted and fished, ploughed and hunted, hoed and frolicked, or went
to "meeting." At the end of the year he sold his cotton, paid part
of his rent, and some of his debt, returned the mule to its owner,
and sang: —
" Nigger work hard all de year,
White man tote de money." *
If the negro made anything, his fellows were likely to steal it. Somers
said, "There can be no doubt that the negroes first steal one another's
share of the crop, and next the planter's, by way of general redress."®
Crop stealing was usually done at night. Stolen cotton, corn, pork,
etc., was carried to the doggeries kept on the outskirts of the plan-
tation by low white men, and there exchanged for bad whiskey,
tobacco, and cheap stuff of various kinds. These doggeries were
called "deadfalls," and their proprietors often became rich.® So
serious did the theft of crops become, that the legislature passed a
"sunset" law, making it a penal offence to purchase farm produce
^ Southern Magazine, Jan., 1874.
2 Somers, p. 117.
8 Somers, p. 159.
* Southern Magazine, March, 1874.
^ "Southern States," p. 131.
^ The prosperity of several large commercial houses in Alabama is said to date from
the corner groceries of the '70's.
THE DECADENCE OF THE BLACK BELT 733
after nightfall. Poultry, hogs, corn, mules, and horses were stolen
when left in the open.
Emancipation destroyed the agricultural supremacy of the Black
Belt. The uncertain returns from the plantations caused an exodus
of planters and their famihes to the cities, and formerly well-kept
plantations were divided into one- and two-house farms for negro
tenants, who allowed everything to go to ruin. The negro tenant
system was much more ruinous than the worst of the slavery system,
and none of the plantations ever again reached their former state
of productiveness. Ditches choked up, fences down, large stretches
of fertile fields growing up in weeds and bushes, cabins tumbhng in
and negro quarters deserted, corn choked by grass and weeds, cotton
not half as good as under slavery, — these were the reports from
travellers in the Black Belt, towards the close of Reconstruction.^
Other plantations were leased to managers, who also kept planta-
tion stores whence the negroes were furnished with suppHes. The
money lenders came into possession of many plantations. By the
crop lien and blanket mortgage, the negro became an industrial serf.
The "big house" fell into decay. For these and other reasons,
the former masters, who were the most useful friends of the negro,
left the Black Belt, and the black steadily declined.^ The unaided
negro has steadily grown worse ; but Tuskegee, Normal, Calhoun,
and similar bodies are endeavoring to assist the negro of the black
counties to become an efficient member of society. In the success
1 Somers, " Southern States," pp, 159, 272; Harper's Monthly Magazine, Jan., 1874;
King, " The Great South "; C. C. Smith, " Colonization of Negroes in Central Alabama ";
Southern Magazine, Jan., 1874 ; The Forum, Vol. XXI, p. 341 ; Hoffman, p. 261 ;
Hammond, p. 191. See also Appendix IL
2 A northern traveller in the Alabama Black Belt in recent years says of it : " The
white population is rapidly on the decrease and the negro population on the increase.
. . . There are hundreds of the * old mansion houses ' going to decay, the glass broken
in the windows, the doors off the hinges, the siding long unused to paint, the columns
of the verandas rotting away, and the bramble thickets encroaching to the very doors.
The people have sold their land for what little they could get and moved to the cities
and towns, that they may educate their children and escape the intolerable conditions
surrounding them at their old beloved homes. . . . These friends have largely gone
from the negro's life, and he is left alone in the wilderness, held down by crop liens and
mortgages given to the alien. Land rent is half its value; the tenant must purchase
from the creditor's store and raise cotton to pay for what he has already eaten and
worn." C. C. Smith, " Colonization of Negroes in Central Alabama," published by the
Christian Women's Board of Missions, Indianapolis, Ind.
734 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
of such efforts lies the only hope of the negro, and also of the white
of the Black Belt, if the negro is to continue to exclude white immi-
gration.^
1 See also Edmunds, in Review of Reviews, Sept., 1900; Dillingham, in Yale Review,
Vol. V, p. 190; Stone, "The Negro in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta"; Stone, in Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, Feb., 1905; Gunton's Magazine, Sept., 1902 (Dowd);
Brown, in North American Review, Dec, 1904; Census 19CX), Vol. VI, Pt. II, pp. 406-
416; Harper'' s Monthly Magazine, Jan., 1 874, and Jan., 1881; Stone, in South Atlantic
Quarter ly,]&n.,igos; Kelsey, "The Negro Farmer "; Hammond, "The Cotton Industry.'*
Another solution of the problem is often suggested, viz. the crowding out of the
blacks from the Black Belt by the whites — especially northerners and Germans — who
want to cultivate the Black Belt lands, who settle in colonies, and who have no place for
the negro in their plans of industrial society. The Black Belt landlords are becoming
weary of negro labor, and some are disposed to make special inducements to get whites
to settle in the Black Belt. In Louisiana and Mississippi, Italians have replaced
negroes on many sugar and cotton plantations. Georgia and Alabama, in order to make
the negro work, have recently passed stringent vagrancy laws, and the planters are
talking of Chinese labor. For the opinions of those who favor white immigration to the
South, see the Manufacturers Record, the Atlanta Constitution, and the Montgomery
Advertiser, during recent years. There is a general demand for foreigners who will
perform agricultural labor.
CHAPTER XXIII
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING
RECONSTRUCTION
Sec. I. Politics and Political Methods
During the war the administration of the state government gradu-
ally fell into the hands of officials elected by people more or less
disaffected toward the Confederacy. Provisional Governor Parsons,
who had been secretly disloyal to the Confederacy, retained in office
many of the old Confederate local officials, and appointed to
other offices men who had not strongly supported the Confeder-
acy. In the fall of 1865 and the spring of 1866 elections under the
provisional government placed in office a more energetic class of
second and third rate men who had had little experience and who were
not strong Confederates. Men who had opposed secession and who
had done little to support the war were, as a rule, sent to Congress
and placed in the higher offices of state. The ablest men were not
available, being disfranchised by the President's plan.
In 1868, with the estabHshment of the reconstructed government,
an entirely new class of officials secured control. Less than 5000
white voters, of more than 100,000 of voting age, supported the Radi-
cal programme, and, as more than 3000 officials were to be chosen,
the field for choice was limited. The elections having gone by de-
fault, the Radicals met with no opposition, except in three counties.
In all the other counties the entire Radical ticket was declared
elected, even though in several of them no formal elections had been
held.
William H. Smith, who was made governor under the Recon-
struction Acts, was a native of Georgia, a lawyer, formerly a Douglas
Democrat, and had opposed secession, but was a candidate for the
Confederate Congress. Defeated, he consoled himself by going over
to the Federals in 1862. Smith was a man of no executive ability,
735
736 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA }
careless of the duties of his office, and in few respects a fit person to
be governor. He disliked the Confederate element and also the
carpet-baggers, but as long as the latter would not ask for high offices, ,
he was at peace with them. It was his plan to carry on the state gov-
ernment with the 2000 or 3000 ''unionists" and the United States
troops. He did not hke the negroes, but could endure them as long
as they Hved in a different part of the state and voted for him. In
personal and private matters he was thoroughly honest, but his
course in regard to the issue of bonds showed that in pubHc affairs
he could be influenced to doubtful conduct. It is certain that he
never profited by any of the stealing that was carried on; he merely
made it easy for others to steal ; the dishonest ones were his friends,
and his enemies paid the taxes. As governor he had the respect of
neither party. He went too far to please the Democrats, and not far
enough to please the Radicals. He exercised no sort of control over
his local officials and shut his eyes to the plundering of the Black
Belt. He was emphatically governor of his small following of whites,
not of all the people, not even of the blacks. During his administra-
tion the whites complained that he was very active in protecting
Radicals from outrage, but paid no attention to the troubles of his
pohtical enemies. His government did not give adequate protec-
tion to Hfe and property.
His lieutenant-governor, A. J. Applegate of Ohio and Wisconsin,
was an iUiterate Federal soldier left stranded in Alabama by the
surrender. During the war he was taken ill in Mississippi and was
cared for by Mrs. Thompson, wife of a former Secretary of the
Treasury. Upon leaving the Thompson house he carried some
valuable papers with him, which, after the war, he tried to
sell to Mrs. Thompson for $10,000. Lowe, Walker, & Company,
a firm of lawyers in Alabama, gave Applegate $300, made him
sign a statement as to how he obtained the papers, and then
pubHshed all the correspondence.^ The charge of thievery did not
injure his candidacy. Before election he had been an attache of the
Freedmen's Bureau. After the constitution had been rejected in .
1868, Applegate went North, so far that he could not get back in
time for the first session of the legislature. A special act, however,
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 879 (Lowe); N. Y. World, Dec. 14, 1867, Aug.
15, 1868.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 737
authorized him to draw his pay as having been present. In a letter
written for the Associated Press, which was secured by the Democrats,
there were thirty-nine mistakes in spelhng. As a presiding officer
over the Senate, he was vulgar and undignified. His speeches were
ludicrous. When the conduct of the Radical senators pleased him,
he made known his pleasure by shouting, "Bully for Alabama!"
The secretary of state, Charles A. Miller, was a Bureau agent
from Maine; Bingham, the treasurer, was from New York; Rey-
nolds, the auditor, from Wisconsin; Keffer, the superintendent of
industrial resources, from Pennsylvania. Two natives of indiffer-
ent reputation — Morse and Cloud — were, respectively, attorney-
general and superintendent of pubHc instruction. Morse was
under indictment for murder and had to be reHeved by special act
of the legislature. The chief justice. Peck, was from New York;
Saffold and Peters were southern men; the senators and all of the
representatives in Congress were carpet-baggers. There were six
candidates for the short-term senatorship — all of them carpet-
baggers. Willard Warner of Ohio, who was elected, was probably
the most respectable of all the carpet-baggers, and was soon discarded
by the party. He had served in the Federal army and after the war
was elected to the Ohio Senate. His term expired in January, 1868;
in July, 1868, he was elected to the United States Senate from Ala-
bama. George E. Spencer was elected to the United States Senate
for the long term. He was from Massachusetts, Ohio, Iowa, and
Nebraska. In Iowa he had been clerk of the Senate, and in Ne-
braska, secretary to the governor. He entered the army as sutler
of the First Nebraska Infantry. Later he assisted in raising the
First Union Alabama Cavalry and was made its colonel. Spencer
was shrewd, coarse, and unscrupulous, and soon secured control of
Federal patronage for Alabama. He attacked his colleague, Warner,
as being lukewarm.
The representatives and their records were as follows: F. W.
Kellogg of Massachusetts and Michigan represented the latter state
in Congress from 1859 to 1865, when he was appointed collector of
internal revenue at Mobile. C. W. Buckley of New York and
Illinois was a Presbyterian preacher who had come to Alabama as
chaplain of a negro regiment. For two years he was a Bureau
official and an active agitator. He was a leading member in the
3»
738 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAxMA
convention of 1867. B. W. Norris of Skowhegan, Maine, was anj
oil-cloth maker and a land agent for Maine, a commissary, contrac-
tor, cemetery commissioner, and paymaster during the war. After]
the war he came South with C. A. Miller, his brother-in-law, and
both became Bureau agents. C. W. Pierce of Massachusetts and
Ilhnois was a Bureau official. Nothing more is known of him.
John B. CaUis of Wisconsin had served in the Federal army and
later in the Veteran Reserve Corps. After the war he became a
Bureau agent in Alabama, and when elected he was not a citizen of
the state, but was an army officer stationed in Mississippi. Thomas
Haughey of Scotland was a Confederate recruiting officer in 1861-1862
and later a surgeon in the Union army. He was killed in 1869 by
Collins, a member of the Radical Board of Education. It was said
that he was without race prejudice and consorted with negroes, but
he was the only one of the Alabama delegation whom Governor
Smith liked. The latter wrote that "our whole set of representa-
tives in Congress, with the exception of Haughey, are . . . un-
principled scoundrels having no regard for the state of the people." *
In the first Reconstruction legislature, which lasted for three
years, there were in the Senate 32 Radicals and i Democrat. In
the House there were 97 Radicals (only 94 served) and 3 Demo-
crats. The lone Democrat in the Senate was Worthy of Pike,
and to prevent him from engaging in debate, Applegate often
retired from his seat and called upon him to preside; the Demo-
crats in the House were Hubbard of Pike, Howard of Crenshaw,
and Reeves of Cherokee.^ In the Senate there was only i negro;
in the House there were 26, several of whom could not sign their
names. In the apportionment of representatives there was a
difference of 40 per cent in favor of the black counties. Hundreds
of negroes swarmed in to see the legislature begin, filling the gal-
leries, the windows, and the vacant seats, and crowding the aisles.
They were invited by resolution to fill the galleries and from that
place they took part in the affairs of the House, voting on every
1 For information in regard to the Radical congressmen : Barnes, " History of the
40th Congress," Index ; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test. (Clanton, Lowe, Lindsay) ; Har-
per's Weekly, May i, 1869 (picture of Spencer); Elyton Herald, , 1868; Mont-
gomery Mail, July 25, 1868; N. Y. World, Feb. 15 and Sept. 22, 1868; Alabama
Manual (1869), p. 32; N. V, Herald, , 1868.
2 Pike was the only county that never fell completely into the hands of the Radicals.
SCENES IN THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTED LEGISLATURE.
(Cartoons from "The Loil Legislature," by Captain B. H. Screws.)
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 739
measure with loud shouts. A scalawag from north Alabama wanted
the negroes to sit on one side of the House and the whites on
the other, but he was not listened to. The doorkeepers, sergeant-
at-arms, and other employees were usually negroes. The negro
members watched their white leaders and voted aye or no as they
voted. When tired they went to sleep and often had to be wakened
to vote. Both houses were usually opened with prayer by northern
Methodist ministers or by negro ministers. None but "loyal"
ministers were asked to officiate. Strobach, the Austrian mem-
ber, wearied of much poHtical prayer, moved that the chaplain cut
short his devotions.
The whites in the legislature were for the most part carpet-baggers
or unknown native whites. The entire taxes paid by the members
of the legislature were, it is said, less than $100. Applegate, the
lieutenant-governor, did not own a dollar's worth of property in the
state. Most of the carpet-bag members lived in Montgomery; the
rest of them lived in Mobile, Selma, and Huntsville. Few of them
saw the districts they represented after election; some did not see
them before or after the election. The representative from Jackson
County lived in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The state constitution
prohibited United States officials from holding state offices, but
nearly all Federal officers in the state also held state offices. This
was particularly the case in the southwestern counties, which were
represented by revenue and custom-house officials from Mobile.
Some of them were absent most of the time, but all drew pay; one
of the negro members, instead of attending, went regularly to school
after the roll was called. No less than twenty members had been
indicted or convicted, or were indicted during the session, of various
crimes, from adultery and stealing to murder. The legislature passed
special acts to relieve members from the penalties for stealing, adul-
tery, bigamy, arson, riot, illegal voting, assault, bribery, and murder.*
Bribery was common in the legislature. By custom a room in
the capitol was set apart for the accommodation of those who wished
1 "North Alabama Illustrated," p. 50; Montgomery Advertiser^ July 13, 1866;
N. V. World, April ii and July 23, 1868; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 187, 188, 881,
1815, 1956; Acts of Ala. (1868), p. 414; (1869-1870), pp. 157, 336; Beverly, "Ala-
bama," p. 203. A vivid description of the first session of the reconstructed legislature
was published by Capt. B. H. Screws, "The Loil Legislature."
740 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to ''interview" negro members/ There the agents of raiTroai
companies distributed conscience money in the form of loans which
were never to be paid back. Harrington, the speaker, boasted that
he received $1700 for engineering a bill through the House. A
lottery promoter said that it cost him only $600 to get his charter
through the legislature, and that no Radical, except one negro, re-
fused the small bribe he offered. Senator Sibley held his vote on
railroad measures at $500; Pennington, at $1000 ;.W. B. Jones, at
$500. Hardy of Dallas received $35,000 to ease the passage of a
railroad bond issue, and kept most of it for himself ; another received
enough to start a bank ; still another was given 640 acres of land, a
steam mill, and a side track on a railroad near his mill. Negro mem-
bers, as a rule, sold out very cheaply, and probably most often to
Democrats who wanted some minor measures passed to which the
Radical leaders would pay no attention. It was found best not to
pay the larger sums until the governor had signed the bill. A mem
ber accepted a gift as a matter of course, and no attention was paid
to charges of bribery.^
The election of February 4 and 5, 1868, at which the constitu-
tion was rejected on account of the whites' refraining from voting,
was in many counties a farce. The legislature, in order to remedy
any defects in the credentials of the Radical candidates, passed a
number of general and special acts legalizing the ''informal" elec-
tions of February 4 and 5, and declaring the Radical candidates
elected. In seven counties no votes had been counted, but this
made no difference.^
The presiding officers addressed the members as "Captain,
John, Mr. Jones," etc. Quarrels and fights were frequent. One
member chased another to the secretary's desk, trying to kill him, but
was prevented by the secretary. In the cloak-rooms and halls were
fruit and peanut stands, whiskey shops, and lunch counters. Legis-
lative action did not avail to clear out the sovereign negroes and
1 Tradition says that what is now known as the Davis Memorial Room was the one
thus used.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 231, 881, 141 1, 1424, 1468 ; Weekly Mail; March
24, 1869; Independent Monitor^ Jan. ii, 1870; Report of Investigating Committee;
Miller, " Alabama," p. 254 ; " Northern Alabama," p. 50; oral accounts of former
members.
8 Acts of Ala. (1868), pp. 67, 71, 79, 212, 305, 352.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS * 741
keep the halls clean. Political meetings were held in the capitol,
much to the damage of the furniture/
The only measures that excited general interest among the mem-
bers were the bond-issue bills. Other legislation was generally
purely perfunctory, except in case an election law or a Ku Klux law
was to be passed. There was much special legislation on account
of individual members, such as granting divorces, ordering release
from jail, reHeving from the "pains" of marriage with more than
one woman, trick legislation, vacating offices, etc. When, as in
Mobile, the Democrats controlled too many minor offices, the legis-
lature remedied the wrong by declaring the offices vacant and giving
the governor authority to make appointments to the vacancies. The
Mobile offices were vacated three times in this way. In con-
nection with the Mobile bill it was found that fraudulent inter-
polations were sometimes made in a bill after its passage. It would
be taken from the clerk's desk, changed, and then returned for
printing.^
Some of the law^s passed failed of their object because of mis-
takes in spelling. A committee was finally appointed to correct
mistakes in orthography. The House and Senate constantly re-
turned engrossed bills to one another for correction. A joint com-
mittee to investigate the education of the clerks reported that they
were unable to ascertain which of the clerks was illiterate, though they
discharged one of them. The minority report declared that the
fault was not with the clerks, but with the members, many of whom
could not write. Finally a spelling clerk was employed to rewrite
the bills submitted by the members.^ For making fun of the
ignorance of the Radical members, Ryland Randolph, a Demo-
cratic member, elected in a by-election, was expelled from the
House.
In 1868 the Radicals, fearing the result of the presidential elec-
tion anIS afraid of the Ku Klux movement which was beginning to
be felt, passed a bill giving to itself the power to choose presidential
1 Senate Journal (1868), pp. 168, 176, 297.
2 Acts of Ala. (1868), pp. 113, 129, 133, 350, 407, 414, 421 ; (1869-1870), p. 451 ;
Montgomery Mail, Feb. 24, 1870; Annual Cyclopgedia (1870), p. 12.
8 Annual Cyclopgedia (1870), p. 13; Journal (1869-1870), /<zwiw ; Brown, "Ala-
bama," p. 268.
742 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
electors. The negroes were aroused by the Radical leaders who*
were not in the legislature, and sufficient pressure was brought to
bear on the governor to induce him to veto the measure/
According to the constitution, the Senate was to classify at once
after organization, so that half should serve two years and half four
years. No one was willing to take the short term and lose the $8
per diem and other privileges. So in 1868 the Senate refused to
classify. Again in 1870 it refused to classify. The Radicals per-
mitted the usurpation because it was known that the Democrats
would carry the white counties in case the classification were made
and elections held. Then, too, it was feared that in 1870 the Demo-
crats would have a majority in the lower house; hence a Radical
Senate would be necessary to prevent the repudiation of the railroad
indorsation. So all senators held over until 1872, and by shrewd
manipulation and the use of Federal troops the Senate kept a Radical
majority until 1874.^
County and other local officials were incompetent and corrupt.
The policy of the whites in abstaining from voting on the constitu-
tion (1868) gave nearly every office in the state to incompetent men.
In the white counties it was as bad as in the black, because the Radicals
there despaired of carrying the elections and put up no regular can-
didates. However, in every. county some freaks offered themselves
as candidates, and at ''informal" elections received, or said they
received, a few votes. After the state was admitted in spite of the
rejection of the constitution, these people were put in office by the
legislature. Had the white people taken part in the elections instead
of relying upon the law of Congress in regard to ratification and not
refrained from voting, they could have secured nearly all the local
offices in the white counties. No other state had such an experience ;
no other state had such a low class of officials in the beginning of
Reconstruction. But the very incapacity of them worked in favor
of better government, for they had to be gotten rid of ana others
appointed. Not a single Bureau agent whose name is on record failed
to get some kind of an office. In Perry County most of the officials
were soldiers of a Wisconsin regiment discharged in the South; the
circuit clerk was under indictment for horse stealing. In Greene
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1870), p. 19; N. Y. Herald, Aug. 17, 1868.
2 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 90, 91, 187; Senate Journals (1868-1874).
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 743
County a superintendent of education had to be imported under
contract from Massachusetts, there being no competent Radical.
In Sumter County one Price, who had a negro wife, was registrar,
superintendent of education, postmaster, and circuit clerk. A carpet-
bagger, elected probate judge, went home to Ohio, after the sup-
posed rejection of the constitution, and never returned. The sheriff
and the soliciter were negroes who could not read. Another Radical
was at once circuit clerk, register in chancery, notary public, justice
of the peace, keeper of the county poorhouse, and guardian ad
litem. In Elmore County the probate judge was under indictment
for murder. In Montgomery, Brainard, the circuit clerk, killed his
brother-in-law and tried to kill Widmer, the collector of internal
revenue. The Radical chancellor and marshal were scalawags —
one a former slave trader, the other a former divine-right slave owner.
The sheriff of Madison could not write. In Dallas the illiterate negro
commissioners voted for a higher rate of taxation, though their names
were not on the tax books; their scalawag associates voted for the
lower rate. Thus it was all over Alabama.
In July, 1868, the Reconstruction legislature continued in force
the code of Alabama, which provided for heavy official bonds. But
the adventurers could not make bond. So a special law was passed
authorizing the supreme court, chancellors, and circuit judges to
"fix and prescribe" the bonds of all ''judicial and county officials."
Later the suspended code went into effect, and the Democrats suc-
ceeded in turning out many newly elected Radicals who could not
make bond. Almost at the beginning the Democrats began the
plan of refusing to make bond for Radicals, and thus made it almost
impossible for the latter to hold office until the legislature again
came to their relief.
There were many vacancies and few white Radicals to fill them ;
the scalawags thought that the negro ought to be content with voting.
Smith had many vacancies to fill by appointment. Most of the paying
ones were given to Radicals, and many of the others were given to
Democrats, whom he preferred to negroes. In the black counties
the property owners and the Ku Klux began to make the most ob-
noxious officials sell out and leave, and Governor Smith would, by
agreement, appoint some Democrat to such vacancies. This custom
became frequent, and, in spite of himself, Smith's "lily white" sen-
744 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
timents were undermining the rule of his party.^ An argument used
by the more liberal of the Radicals in favor of removal of disabilities
was that in some counties the local offices could not be filled on
account of the operation of the disfranchising laws.^
The Federal judiciary was represented by Richard Busteed, an
Irishman, who was made Federal judge in 1864. He came South
in 1865 with bloodthirsty threats and at once began prosecutions
for treason. More than 900 cases were brought before him. There
were no convictions, but a rich harvest of costs. He was ignorant
of law, and in the court room was arbitrary and tyrannical to law-
yers, witnesses, and prisoners. It was charged that he was in part-
nership with the district attorney. Bribery was proven against
him. The leading lawyers, both Radical and Democratic, asked
Congress to impeach him, but to no effect. It was his custom to
solicit men to bring causes before him. A Selma editor was brought
before him and severely lectured for writing a disrespectful article
about Busteed's grand jury. There was one Democratic lawyer whom
Busteed feared — General James H. Clanton. Clanton paid no
attention to Busteed's vagaries, but sat on the bench with him, advised
him and made him take his advice, won all his cases, and bullied Bus-
teed unrebuked. The latter was afraid he would be killed if he
angered Clanton, and Clanton played upon his fears. At first a
great negrophile, Busteed became more and more obnoxious to the
Radical party, and was soon accused of being a Democrat and re-
moved. Another Federal officer. Wells, the United States district
attorney, had been discharged from the Union army on the ground
of insanity.^
The new constitution made all judgeships elective and also
provided for the election of a solicitor in each county. The result
was seen in the number of incapable judges and illiterate solicitors.
The probate judge of Madison was "a. common jack-plane carpenter
from Oregon," and his sheriff could not write. Many of the judges
had never studied law and had never practised. Public meetings
1 Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test,, pp. 189, 239, 240, 324, 435, 523, 962, 1421, 1590,
1816, 1819, 1820, 1957; Herbert, "Solid South," p. 53; Coburn Report, p. 256; N. Y.
World, April 11, 1868; Montgomery Mail, April 21, 1 870.
2 Annual Cyclopaedia (1870), p. 13.
^ Ku Kluj^ Kept., Ala. Test., p. 510; Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, June 13,
1866; Selma 7'imes and Messenger, ]\xne g, 1868.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 745
were held to protest against incompetent judges and to demand their
resignations. Governor Smith usually appointed better men, and
not always those of his own party, to the places vacated by resigna-
tion, sale, or otherwise. Before the war the state judiciary had
stood high in the estimation of the people, and judicial officers were
forbidden by public opinion to take part in party poHtics. Under
the Reconstruction government the judicial officials took an active
part in political campaigns, every one of them, from Busteed and
the supreme court to a county judge, making political speeches and
holding office in the party organization. From a party point of
view the scarcity of white Radicals made this necessary. Notaries
public, who also had the powers of justices of the peace, were appointed
by the governor. Their powers were great and indefinite, and in
consequence they almost drove the justices out of activity. Some
of them issued warrants running into all parts of the state, causing
men to be brought forty to fifty miles to appear before them on tri-
fling charges.
The Reconstruction judiciary generally held that a jury without
a negro on it was not legal. In the white counties such juries were
hard to form. Northern newspaper correspondents wrote of the
ludicrous appearance of Busteed's half negro jur^- struggling with
intricate points of maritime law, insurance, constitutional questions,
exchange, and the relative value of a Prussian guilder to a pound
sterling. When they were bored they went to sleep. The negro
jurors recognized their own incompetence and usually agreed to any
verdict decided upon by the white jurors. Had the latter been respect-
able men, no harm would have been done, but usually they were not.
A negro jury would not convict a member of the Union League — he
had only to give the sign — nor a negro prosecuted by a white man
or indicted by a jury; but many negroes prosecuted by their own
race were convicted by black juries. For many years it was impos-
sible to secure a respectable Federal jury on account of the test oath
required, which excluded nearly all Confederates of ability. As an
example of the working of a local court, the criminal court of Dallas
may be taken. The jurisdiction extended to capital offences. Cor-
bin, the judge, was an old Virginian who had never read law. He
refused to allow one Roderick Thomas, colored, to be tried by a
mixed jury, demanding a full negro jury. The prosecution was
746 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
then dropped because all twelve negroes drawn were of bad charac-
ter. Corbin then entered on the record that Thomas was "ac-
quitted." Thomas had stolen cotton, and the fact had been proven
but he soon became clerk of Corbin's court and later took Corbin's
place as judge, with another negro for clerk. Nearly every Radica
official in Dallas County was indicted for corruption in office by a
Radical or mixed jury, but negro juries refused to convict them.^
An elaborate militia system was provided for by the carpet-bag-
gers^ with General Dustin of Iowa, a carpet-bagger, as major-general
The strength of organization was to be in the black counties, but
Governor Smith persistently refused to organize the negro militia
He was afraid of the effect on his slender white following, and he did
not think that the negro ought to do anything but vote. He was
also afraid of Democratic militia, afraid that it would overturn the
hated state government. He tried to get several friendly white
companies to organize, but failed, and during the rest of his term
relied exclusively upon Federal troops. Even before the Reconstruct
tion government was set going it was seen that the whites would b
restless. Forcing the rejected constitution and the low-class stat
government upon the people against the will of the majority had a
very bad effect. They recognized it as the government de jacto only
and they so considered it all during the Reconstruction. Then the
Ku Klux movement began, and north Alabama especially was dis
turbed for several years. Smith sometimes threatened to call out the
militia, but never did so. However, he kept the Federal troops busy
answering his calls. After the election of Grant the army was al
ways at the service of the. state officials, who used detachments as
police, marshals, and posses. The government had not the respect
of its own party, and had to be upheld by military force. It was a
fixed custom to call in the military when the law was to be enforced
— governor, congressmen, marshals, sheriff, judge, justice of peace,
politicians, all calling for and obtaining troops. It was distasteful
duty to the Federal officers and soldiers. Though the people knew
that only the soldiers upheld the state government, yet they were
not, as a rule, sorry to see the soldiers come in. The military rule
was preferable to the civil rule, and acted as a check on Radical
1 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 93, 103, 104, 358, 435, 1878; AT. V. Worlds
Nov. 3, 1868; Coburn Report, p, 512; Herbert, "Solid South," p. 60.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS
747
misgovernment. The whites were often sorry to see the soldiers
leave, even though they were instruments of oppression. Wholesale
arrests by the army were not as frequent during Smith's administra-
tion as later.^
The state government was shaken to its foundations by the presi-
dential campaign and election of 1868. The whites had waked up
and gone to work in ear-
nest. It was the first elec-
tion in which the races
voted against one another.
Busteed, Strobach, and
other carpet-baggers
toured the North, predict-
ing chains and slavery for
the blacks and butchery
for the "loyal" whites in
case Seymour were elected.
The Union League whipped
the negroes in to line. Brass
bands lent enthusiasm to
Radical parades. The
negroes were afraid that
they would "lose their
rights " and be reenslaved,
that their wives would
have to work the roads and
not be allowed to wear
hoopskirts. The Radicals
urged upon the Demo-
crats the view that those
who did not believe in negro suffrage could not take the voter's
oath. Many Democrats refused to register because of the oath.
There were numbers who would not vote against Grant because
they believed that he was the only possible check against Con-
gress. Others felt that so far as Alabama was concerned the
^ Annual Cyclop.Tedia (1870), p. 14; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 91, 1177, 1178,
1 179, 1242; A^. y. Herald, Sept. 27 and Oct. 26, 1868; Report of Sec. of War, 1869,
vol. I, p. 88.
EEECTIOX FOR PRESIDENT, 1868.
I I Democratic majority
Republican majority
g^ About evenly divideil. electing some
candidates on each ticket.
O Black counties.
Grant, Republican 76,306. i
Seymour, Deiuocrat 78,086. *
748 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
election was cut and dried for Grant. But nevertheless a majority
of the whites determined to resist further Africanization in govern-
ment. Their natural leaders were disfranchised, but a strong
compaign was made. The hope was held out of overthrowing the
irregular revolutionary state government and driving out the carpet-
baggers in case Seymour became President. North Alabama de-
clared that a vote for Grant was a vote against the whites and formed
a boycott of all Radicals. The south Alabama leaders tried to
secure a part of the negro vote, and urged that imprudent talk be
avoided and that carpet-baggers and scalawags be let alone, and the
negroes be treated kindly as being responsible for none of the evils.
Orders purporting to be signed by General Grant were sent out
among the negroes, bidding them to beware of the promises of the
whites and directing them to vote for him. Some rascally whites
made large sums of money by selling Grant badges to the blacks.
They had been sent down for free distribution ; but the negroes, or-
dered, as they believed, by the general, purchased his pictures at
$2 each, or less. The carpet-baggers were afraid of losing the
state. Some left and went home. Others wanted the legislature to
choose electors. Still others wanted to have no election at all, pre-
ferring to let it go by default ; but the higher military commanders,
Terry and Grant, were sympathetic and troops were so distrib-
uted over the state as to bring out the negro vote. Army officers
assisted at Radical political meetings, and the negro was informed
by his advisers that General Grant had sent the troops to see that
they voted properly. The result was that the state went for Grant
by a safe majority.^
During the administration of Smith the incompatibiHty of the
elements of the Radical party began to show more clearly. The
native whites began to desert as soon as the convention of 1867
showed that the negro vote would be controlled by the carpet-bag-
gers. The genuine Unionist voters resented the leadership of rene-
gade secessionists. The carpet-baggers demanded the lion's share
of the spoils and were angered because Smith vetoed some of their
1 McPherson's scrap-book, "Campaign of 1868," Vol. I, p. 156; Vol. V, pp. 43, 45,
46, 48, 49 ; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 95, 360, 502, 1956; N. Y. World, Sept. 12,
1868; G. O. No. 27, Dept. of the South, Oct. 8, 1868 ; G. O. No. 38, Dept. of the South,
Nov. 10, 1868; Tuskegee News, July 29, 1876.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 749
measures; the scalawags upheld him. The carpet-baggers felt
that since they controlled the negro voters they were entitled to the
greater consideration. Their manipulation of the Union League
alarmed the native Radicals.
The negroes were becoming conscious of their power and were
inclined to demand a larger share of the offices than the carpet-
baggers wanted to give them. Some of the negroes were desirous
of voting with the whites. Negro leaders were aspiring to judge-
ships, to the state Senate, to be postmasters, to go to Congress. Even
now the party was held together only by the knowledge that it would
be destroyed if divided.^
In 1868 Governor Smith and other Radical leaders, convinced
that they were permanently in power, secured the passage of a law
providing for the gradual removal of disabilities imposed by state
law. The same year a complete registration had been made for the
purpose of excluding the leading whites. After disabilities were
removed, so far as state action was concerned there was no advan-
tage to Radicals in a registration of voters. On the other hand, it
threatened to become a powerful aid to the Democrats, who began
to attend the polls and demand that only registered voters be allowed
to cast ballots, thus preventing repeating. Consequently, as a prepa-
ration for the first general election in the fall of 1870, the legislature
passed a law forbidding the use of registration lists by any official at
any election. No one was to be asked if he were registered. No
one was to be required to show a registration certificate. The as-
sertion of the would-be voter was to be taken as sufficient. And it
was made a misdemeanor to challenge a voter, thus interfering
with the freedom of elections. After this a negro might vote under
any name he pleased as often as he pleased. This election system
was in force until 1874, when the Democrats came into power.^
To the Forty-first Congress in 1869 returned only one of the
former carpet-bag delegation, C. W. Buckley. Two so-called Demo-
crats were chosen, two scalawags, and a new carpet-bagger. P. M.
Dox, one of the Democrats, was a northern man who had lived in the
South before the war, who was neutral during the war ; and after the
1 N. Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1868 (speech of Jutlge T. M. Peters).
2Nordhoff, "Cotton States in 1870," pp. 85, 86; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp.
185, 209, 210, 434, 435, 1879.
750
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
was also from north Alabama
army. His opponent was J
J-
war he posed as a "Unionist." Congressional timber was scarce on
account of the test oath and the Fourteenth Amendment, so Dox
secured a nomination. His opponent was a negro, which helped
him in north Alabama. The other Democrat, W. C. Sherrod, who
had served in the Confederate
Hinds, one of the most disUked
of the carpet-baggers.
Robert S. Heflin, one
of the scalawags, was
from that section
where the Peace So-
ciety flourished during
the war. x\t first a
Confederate, in 1864
he deserted and went
within the Federal
lines. Charles Hays,
the other scalawag,
became the most no-
torious of the Recon-
struction representa-
tives in Congress. He
was a cotton planter
in one of the densest
black districts and
managed to stay in
Congress for four
years. He is chiefly
remembered because
of the Hays-Hawley
correspondence in 1874. Alfred E. Buck of Maine had been an
officer of negro troops. He served only one term and after defeat
passed into the Federal service. He died as minister to Japan in
1902. This delegation was weaker in abihty and in morals than
the carpet-bag delegation to the Fortieth Congress.
In the fall of 1870 Governor Smith was a candidate for reelection
against Robert Burns Lindsay, Democrat. The hostility of Smith
to carpet-baggers weakened the party. The ticket was not accept-
ELECTION OP 1870 FOE GOVERNOR.
I I Demoratic Majority
^^ Kadical Majority O Black Counties.
^>^ Nearly evenly divided
Xindsay (Dem), 77,721; Smith, (Rep.), 76,292
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 75 1
able to the whites because Rapier, a negro, was candidate for
secretary of state. The genuine Unionists were becoming uUra
Democrats, because of the prominence given in their party to former
secessionists like Parsons, Sam Rice, and Hays, and to negroes and
carpet-baggers. Lindsay was from north Alabama, which supported
him as a 'Svhite man's candidate." The negroes had been taught
to distrust scalawags, as being little better than Democrats. Smith
was asked why he ran on a ticket with a negro. He replied that now
that was the only way to get office. He also called attention to the
fact that in north Alabama the Democrats drew the color line, and
called themselves the " white man's party," while in the black coun-
ties they made an earnest effort to secure the negro vote. The
Union League, through Keffer, sent out warning that whatever
would suit "Rebels" would not suit ''union men," who must treat
their "fine professions as coming from the Prince of Darkness him-
self," and that if Lindsay were elected, the "condition of union men
would be like unto hell itself." Smith and Senator Warner said
that the Democrats would repudiate railroad bonds, destroy the
schools, and repeal the Amendments and the Reconstruction Acts.
In the white counties the Radical speakers were generally insulted,
and soon the white districts were given up as permanently lost. The
Black Belt alone was now the stronghold of the Radicals. Strict
inspection here prevented the negroes from voting Democratic, as
some were disposed to do. Negroes in the white counties voted for
Democrats with many misgivings. An old man told a candidate,
"I intend to vote for you; I liked your speech; but if you put me
back into slavery, I'll never forgive you." Federal troops were again
judiciously distributed in the Black Belt and in the white counties
when there was a large negro vote. As a result the election was
very close, Lindsay winning by a vote of 76,977 to 75,568.
Ex-Governor Parsons, who had now become a Radical, advised
Smith not to submit to the seating of Lindsay, but to force a contest,
and meanwhile to prevent the vote from being counted by the legis-
lature. So, by injunction from the supreme court, the Radical presi-
dent of the Senate, Barr, was forbidden to count the votes for
governor. But the houses in joint session counted the rest of the
votes, and E. H. Moren, Democrat, was declared elected lieutenant-
governor. A majority of the House was anti-Radical. The old
752 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Senate, refusing to classify, held over. As soon as Moren was declan
elected, Barr arose and left, followed by most of the Radical sem
tors, saying that he was forbidden to count the vote for governoi
Moren at once appeared, took the oath, and the joint meeting nc
having been regularly adjourned, he ordered the count for governoi
to proceed. A few Radical senators had lingered out of curiosityjl
and were retained. Thus Lindsay was counted in, and at once took
the oath of office. By the advice of Parsons, Smith, though willing
to retire, refused to give place to Lindsay. The Radical senators
recognized Smith; the House recognized Lindsay. Smith brought
Federal troops into the state-house to keep Lindsay out, and for
two or three weeks there were rival governors. Finally Smith was
forced to retire by a writ from the carpet-bag circuit court of Mont-
gomery.*
Lindsay was born in Scotland and educated at the University of
St. Andrews. He lived in Alabama for fifteen years before the war,
opposed secession, and gave only a half-hearted support to the Con-
federacy. As he said: '*I would rather not tell my military history,
for there was very little glory in it. . . . I do not know that I
can say much about my soldiering." ^ Lindsay was a scholar, a
good lawyer, and a pure man, but a weak executive. In this respect
he was better than Smith, however, who was supported by a unani-
mous Radical legislature. Under Lindsay the Senate was Radical
and the House doubtful. The Radical auditor held over; Demo-
crats were elected to the offices of treasurer, secretary of state,
attorney-general, and superintendent of public instruction. W. W.
Allen, a Confederate major-general, was placed in command of the
militia and organized some white companies.
The Democratic and independent majority of the House had
some able leaders, but many of the rank and file were timid and inex-
perienced. Several thousand of the best citizens were still disfran-
chised. There were too many young men in public office, half-educated
and inexperienced. In the House there were only fourteen- ne-
1 Miller, "Alabama," p. 256; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., pp. 84, 182, 183, 2t6, 232,
311, 356, 357, 378, 379, 512, 531, 1038, 1625; McPherson's scrap-book, "Campaign of
1870," Vol. I, pp. 55, 61; Annual Cyclopaedia (1870), pp. 16, 17; "Northern Alabama,"
p. 50; Montgomery Mail, Aug. 20, 1870 (Union League Appeal).
2 Somers, "Southern States," p. 132; Ku Klux Kept., Ala. Test., p. 225; Miller,
" Alabama," p. 256.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS
753
groes. So far as the legislature was concerned, there would be a
deadlock for two years. The Radicals would consent to no repeal
of injurious legislation, and thus the evil effects of the laws relating
to schools, railroads, and elections continued. Governor Lindsay
tried to bring some order into the state finances, but the Democrats
were divided on the subject of repudiating the fraudulent bond issues,
while the Radicals upheld all of the bond steaHng. Lindsay was
blamed by the people for not dealing more firmly with the question,
but, as a matter of fact, he did as well as any man in his position
could do.
One cause of weakness to the administration was the fact that
some of the attorneys for the railroads were prominent Democrats
who insisted upon the recognition of the fraudulent bonds. These
attorneys were few in number, but they caused a division among the
leaders. The selfish motive was very evident, though for the sake of
appearance they talked of ''upholding the state's credit," "the fair
name of Alabama, " etc. It is difficult to see that their conduct was
in any way on a higher plane than that of the carpet-baggers, who
issued the bonds with intent to defraud. In order to protect them-
selves they mercilessly criticised Lindsay.
Most of the local officials held over from 1868 to 1872 ; in by-
elections it was clearly shown that the Radicals had lost all except
the Black Belt, where they continued to roll up large majorities, but
even here they were losing by resignation, sale of offices, Ku Kluxing,
and removal. The more decent carpet-baggers were leaving for the
North; the white Radicals were distinctly lower in character than
before, having been joined by the dregs of the Democrats while
losing their best white county men. Lindsay made many appoint-
ments, thus gradually changing for the better the local administra-
tion. Owing to the peculiar methods by which the first set of officials
got into office, the local administration was never again as bad, except
in some of the black counties, as it was in 1 868-1 869. As the personnel
of the Radical party ran lower and lower, more and more Democrats
entered into the local administration. But in spite of the fact that
they secured representation in the state government, they were unable
to make any important reforms until they gained control of all de-
partments. The results of one or two local elections may be noticed.
In Mobile, which. had a white majority, the carpet-bag and negro
3c
754 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
government was overthrown in 1870. Though prohibited by law
from challenging fraudulent voters, the Democrats intimidated the
negroes by standing near the polls and fastening a fish-hook into the
coat of each negro who voted. The negroes were frightened. Rumor
said that those who were hooked were marked for jail. Repeating was
thus prevented; many of them did not vote at all. In Selma the
Democrats came into power. Property was then made safe, the
streets were cleaned, and the negroes found out that they would not
be reenslaved. Governor Lindsay endeavored to reform the local
judicial administration by getting rid of worthless young sohcitors
and incompetent judges, but the Radical Senate defeated his efforts.
He was unable to secure any good legislation during his term, and all
reform was limited to the reduction of administration expenses,
the checking of bad legislation, and the appointment of better men to
fill vacancies.^
To the Forty-second Congress Buckley, Hays, and Dox were
reelected. The new congressmen were Turner, negro, Handley, Demo-
crat, and Sloss, Independent. Turner had been a slave in North
Carolina and Alabama and had secured a fair education before the
war. He had at first entered pohtics as a Democrat, and advised
the negroes against ahen leaders. To succeed Warner, George
Goldthwaite, Democrat, was chosen to the United States Senate.
In 1872 the Democrats nominated for governor, Thomas H.
Herndon of Mobile, who was in favor of a more aggressive poHcy than
Lindsay. He was a south Alabama man and hence lost votes in
north Alabama. David P. Lewis, the Radical nominee, was from
north Alabama and in politics a turncoat. Opposed to secession
in 1 86 1, he nevertheless signed the ordinance and was chosen to the
Confederate Congress; later he was a Confederate judge; in 1864
he went within the Federal Hnes; in 1867-1868 he was a Democrat,
but changed about 1870. He was victorious for several reasons:
the administration was blamed for the division in the party and for
not reforming abuses ; Herndon did not draw out the full north Ala-
bama vote; the presidential election was held at the same time and
isomers, "Southern States," pp. 167, 186; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., 214, 232,
381, 423, 1299, 1371, 1558-1561 (see also the whole of Lindsay's testimony); "North-
ern Alabama," p. 50; Annual Cyclopaedia (1871), p. Ii ; Miller, "Alabama," pp. 259-
261 ; Beverly, " Alabama," p. 204.
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS
755
the Democrats were disgusted at the nomination of Horace Greeley ;
Federal troops were distributed over the state for months before the
election, and the Enforcement Acts were so executed as to intimidate
many white voters. The full Radical ticket was elected. All were
scalawags, except the treasurer. In a speech, C. C. Sheets said of
the Radical candidates, ''Fellow-citizens, they are as pure, as spot-
less, as stainless, as
the immaculate Son
of God."^
In both houses of
the legislature the
Democrats had by the
returns a majority at
last. The Radicals
were in a desperate
position. A United
States Senator was to
be elected, and Spen-
cer wanted to succeed
himself. He had spent
thousands of dollars to
secure the support of
the Radicals, and a
majority of the Radi-
cal members were de-
voted to him. Most
scalawags were op-
posed to his reelec-
tion, but it was known
that he controlled the
negro members, and to prevent division all agreed to support him.
But how to overcome the Democratic majorities in both houses?
Parsons was equal to the occasion. He advised that the Radical
members refuse to meet with the Democrats and instead organize
separately. So the Democrats met in the capitol and the Radicals
in the United States court-house, as had been previously arranged.
The Senate consisted of 33 members and the House of 100. The
1 Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 23, 1872.
ELECTION OF 1872 FOR GOVEBNOB.
I I Democratic Majority.
Radical Majority.
[ Nearly evenly divided,
O Black Counties,
Herndon (Dam), 81,371 ; Lewis, (Rad), 89,878
756 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Democrats organized with 19 senators and 54 members in the House,
all bearing proper certificates of election, and each house having
more than a quorum. At the court-house the Radicals had 14
senators and 45 or 46 representatives who had certificates of election.
There were 4 negroes in the Senate and 27 in the House. In neither
Radical house was there a quorum ; so each body summoned 5
Radfcals who had been candidates, to make up a quorum. It was
hard to find enough, and some custom-house officials from Mobile
had to secure leave of absence and come to Montgomery to complete
the quorum.
The regular (Democratic) organization at the capitol counted
the votes and declared all the Radical state officials elected. Lewis and
McKinstry, lieutenant-governor, accepted the count and took the
oath and at once recognized the court-house body as the general
assembly. Lindsay had recognized the regular organization, but had
taken no steps to protect it from the Radical schemes. The mihtia
was ready to support the regular body, but Lewis was more energetic
than Lindsay. He telegraphed to the nearest Federal troops, at
Opehka, to come ; when they came, he stationed them on the capitol
grounds. He proposed to the Democrats that they admit the entire
Radical body, expelHng enough Democrats to put the latter in a
minority. Upon their refusal, he told the court-house body to go
ahead with legislation. Some of the Radicals — one or two whites
and four or five negroes — were dubious about the security of their
per diem and showed signs of a desire to go to the capitol. These were
guarded to keep them in line, and were also paid in money and prom-
ises of Federal offices. The weak-kneed negroes were shut up in a
room and guarded, to keep them from going to the capitol.
Spencer was determined to be elected and would not wait for the
trouble to be settled. On December 3, 1872, the court-house Radicals
chose him to succeed himself. The next thing was to prevent the
regular assembly from electing a Senator who might contest. Two
of that body had died; one or two were indifferent and easily kept
away from a joint session; others were called away by telegrams
(forged by the Radicals) about illness in their families; three
members were arrested before reaching the city; one member was
drugged and nearly killed. By such methods a quorum was defeated
in both houses at the capitol until December 10, when the absent
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 75/
members came in, and F. W. Sykes was chosen to the United States
Senate.
Meanwhile Lewis and the Radical members had appealed to
President Grant to be sustained. By his direction United States
Attorney- General Williams prepared a plan of compromise skilfully
designed to destroy the Democratic majority in the House and pro-
duce a tie in the Senate. Lewis was assured that the plan would be
supported by the Federal authorities. The plan was as follows:
(i) Both bodies were to continue separate organizations until a
fusion was effected. (2) On a certain day, both parties of the
House were to meet in the capitol, and in the usual manner form a
temporary organization — but the Democrats whose seats were con-
tested but who had certificates of election were to be excluded, while
the Radical contestants were to be seated. This would give a Radical
majority. Then the contests were to be decided and a permanent
organization formed. (3) In the same way the Senate was to be
temporarily organized, the regularly elected Democrats being excluded,
while their contestants were seated, except in the case of the Democratic
senator from Conecuh and Butler, who was to sit but not to vote.
By this arrangement there was a bare chance that the Democrats might
secure a majority of one in the Senate. (4) As soon as the fusion
was thus made, the permanent organization was to be effected.
Nothing was said about the legahty of past legislation by each body,
but the understanding was that all was to be considered void.
Meanwhile Lewis had tried to obtain forcible possession of the
capitol, but Strobach, the sheriff whom he sent, was arrested by order
of the House and imprisoned until he apologized. The Democrats
were plainly informed that the "gentle intimations of the convictions
of the law officer of the United States" would be enforced by the use
of Federal troops, and there was nothing to do but give way. The
plan was put into operation on December 17.
In the House contests the Democrats lost their majority, as was
intended. In the Senate they lost all except one by the plan itself.
To unseat Senator Martin from Conecuh would be a flagrant outrage.
So his case went over until after Christmas. The Democrats elected
the clerks, doorkeepers, and pages. The Radicals still kept up their
separate organization, not meaning to abide by the fusion unless they
could gain the entire legislature. During the vacation Lieutenant-
758 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
]
Governor McKinstry wrote to Attorney- General Williams asking if
the Federal government v^ould support him in case he himself should
decide as to the rightful senator from Conecuh. He explained that a
majority of the committee on elections was going to report in favor
of Martin, Democrat, who held the certificate of election. Further,
he said that if the Senate were allowed to vote on the question, the
Democratic senator would remain seated. He proposed to decide
the contest himself upon the report made, and not allow the Senate
to vote. Williams was now becoming weary of the conduct of the
Radicals; he told McKinstry that the course proposed was contrary
to both parliamentary and statute law, and said that Federal troops
would not be furnished to support such a ruhng. Moreover, he
expressed strong disapproval of the course of the Radicals in keeping
up their separate organization contrary to the plan of compromise.
He ordered the marshal not to allow the Federal court-house to be
used by the Radicals, but the marshal paid no attention to the order.
After the holidays the Democrats and anti-Spencer Radicals
hoped to bring about a new election for Senator. On February ii,
1873, Hunter of Lowndes, a Radical member of the House, proposed
that the legislature proceed to the election of a Senator. Parsons,
the speaker, refused to entertain the motion and ordered Hunter under
arrest. McKinstry refused to consider the Senate as permanently or-
ganized until Martin was disposed of, fearing a joint session. The
Radical solicitor of Montgomery secured several indictments against
Spencer's agents for bribery, and summoned several members of the
legislature as witnesses. Parsons ordered Knox, the solicitor, and
Strobach, the sheriff, to be arrested for invading the privileges of the
House. Next, Hunter, who had been arrested for proposing to elect a
Senator, had Parsons arrested for violation of the Enforcement Acts
in preventing the election of a Senator. Busteed, Federal judge,
discharged Parsons "for lack of evidence."
In the Senate the Radicals matured a plan to get rid of Martin.
A caucus decided to sustain McKinstry in all his ruhngs. It was
known that Edwards, a Democratic senator, wanted to visit his home.
So Glass, a Radical senator, proposed to pair with him, and at the
same time both get leave of absence for ten days. Edwards and
Glass went ofT at the same time, in different directions. A mile
outside of town, Glass left the train, returned to Montgomery, and
POLITICS AND POLITICAL METHODS 759
went into hiding. Now was the time. The reports on the Martin
contest were called up. A Democrat moved the adoption of the
majority report in favor of Martin ; a Radical moved that the minority
report be substituted in the motion. The Democrats were voting under
protest because they wanted debate and wanted Edwards, one of the
writers of the majority report, to return. In order to move a recon-
sideration, Cobb, a Democrat, fearing treachery, voted with the Radi-
cals ; Glass appeared before his name was reached, broke his pair, and
voted; McKinstry refused to entertain Cobb's motion for a recon-
sideration, and though the effect of the voting was only to put the
minority report before the Senate to be voted upon, McKinstry declared
that Martin by the vote was unseated and Miller admitted. The
temporary Radical majority sustained him in all his rulings, and thus
the Democrats lost their majority in the Senate. The whole thing
had been planned beforehand; McKinstry had arms in his desk;
the cloak-rooms were filled with roughs to support the Radicals in case
the Democrats made a fight; the Federal troops were at the doors
in spite of what Wilhams had said. McKinstry now announced
that the Senate was permanently organized and the schism healed.
Glass was expelled by the Masonic order for breaking the pair.
Spencer was safe, since the Repubhcan Senate at Washington was
sure to admit him.
In the course of the contest Spencer had spent many thousands
of dollars in defeating dissatisfied Radical candidates for the legislature
and in purchasing voters. The money he used came from the National
Republican executive committee, from the state committee, and from
the government funds of the post-office at Mobile and the internal
revenue offices in Mobile and Montgomery. More than $20,000 of
United States funds were used for Spencer, who, after his election,
refused to reimburse the postmaster and the two collectors, who were
prosecuted and ruined. Every Federal office-holder was assessed from
one-fifth to one-third of his pay during the fall months for campaign
expenses. They were notified that unless they paid the assessments
their resignations would be accepted. Spencer refused to pay the bills
of a negro saloon-keeper who had, at his orders, "refreshed" the
negro members of the legislature. But of those who voted for Spen-
cer in the Radical ''legislature" more than thirty secured Federal
appointments. Of other agents about twenty secured Federal
76o CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
appointments. One of them, Robert Barbour, was given a positic
in the custom-house at Mobile with the understanding that he w^o\
not have to go there. His pay was sent to him at Montgomery.
As a preparation for the autumn presidential contest, Spencer
worked upon the fears of Grant and secured the promise of troops,
though he had some difficulty. His letters are not at all compli-
mentary to Grant. Finally he wrote, "Grant is scared and will
do what we want." The deputy marshals manufactured Ku Klux
outrages and planned the arrest of Democratic poHticians, of whom
scores were gotten out of the way, for a week or two, but none were
prosecuted. There was no election of Senator other than that of
Spencer by the irregular body and that of Sykes by the regular
organization at the capitol, neither of which took place on the day
appointed by law. The Senate admitted Spencer on the ground that
Governor Lewis had recognized the court-house aggregation. Sykes
contested and of course failed ; the Senate refused for several years
to vote his expenses, as was customary. In 1885, Senator Hoar
secured $7,132 for Spencer as expenses in the contest. In 1875 the
Alabama legislature. Radical and Democratic, united in an address
to the United States Senate, asking that Spencer's seat be declared
vacant.*
Under Lewis the Radical administration went to pieces. The
enormous issues of bonds, fraudulent and otherwise, by Smith and
Lewis which destroyed the credit of the state; ignorant negroes in
public office;, drunken judges on the benches; convicts as officials;
teachers and school officers unable to read; intermarriage of whites
and blacks declared legal by the supreme court; the low character
of the Federal officials; constant arrests of respectable whites for
political purposes; use of Federal troops; packed juries; purchase
and sale of offices ; defaulters in every Radical county ; riots instigated
^ Report of Joint Committee in regard to election of George E. Spencer ; Taft,
" Senate Election Cases," pp. 558, 562, 574-578 ; Annual Cyclopaedia (1872), pp. 11, 12;
(1873), 16-18; Memorial of General Assembly (Radical) to President, November, 1872;
Coburn Report, p. 716 ; Senate Journal (1872-1873), pp. 15-86 (" Court-House Sen-
ate") ; Senate Journal, 1871 ("Capitol Senate"), Appendix; McPherson, "Handbook
of Politics" (1874), pp. 85, 86 ; Acts of Ala. (1872-1873), p. 532 ; Acts of Ala., 1873,
p. 156; Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. 12 and 24, 1872; Jan. 4, Feb. 22 and 23, 1873;
Southern Argus, ^oy. 22, 1872; Jan. 10, 1873; Herbert, "Solid South," pp. 57-59;
Miller, ''Alabama," p. 261.
Governor R. M. Patton.
General James H. Clanton,
Organizer of the present Demo-
cratic Party in Alabama.
Governor R. B. Lindsay.
Major J. R. Crowe, now of Sheffield,
Ala., one of the founders of the Ku
Klux Klan at Pulaski, Tenn.
DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE LEADERS.
SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 761
by the Radical leaders ; heavy taxes, — all these burdens bore to the
ground the Lewis administration before the end of its term. The
last year was simply a standstill while the whites were preparing to
overthrow the Radical government, which was demoraHzed and
disabled also by constant aid and interference from the Federal
administration.
Lewis appointed a lower class of officials than Smith had ap-
pointed, among them many ignorant negroes for minor offices. Car-
pet-baggers and scalawags were becoming scarce. The white counties
under their own local government were slowly recovering; the
formerly wealthy Black Belt counties were being ruined under the
burden of local, state, and municipal taxation.^
To the Forty-second Congress Alabama, now entitled to eight rep-
resentatives, sent four scalawags, Pelham, Hays, White, and Sheets;
one negro. Rapier; and three Democrats or Independents, Bromberg,
Caldwell, and Glass ; carpet-baggers were now at a discount ; scalawags
and negroes wanted all the spoils.
In the spring of 1874 the whites began to organize to overthrow
Radical rule. They were firmly determined that there should not be
another Radical administration. In the Radical party only a few
whites were left to hold the negroes together. Some of the negroes
were disgusted because of promises unfulfilled ; others were grasping
at office ; the Union League disciphne was missed ; ''outrages" were no
longer so effective. The Radicals had no new issues to present. The
state credit was destroyed ; the negroes no longer beUeved so seriously
the stories of reenslavement ; the northern pubHc was becoming more
indifferent, or more sympathetic toward the whites. The time for
the overthrow of Radical rule was at hand.
Sec. 2. Social Conditions during Reconstruction
In previous chapters something has been said of social and eco-
nomic matters, especially concerning labor, education, religion, and race
relations. Some supplementary facts and observations may be of use.
The central figure of Reconstruction was the negro. How was
his life affected by the conditions of Reconstruction? In the first
1 Coburn Report, pp. 230, 262, 267, 271, 274, 280, 525, 528, 529 ; "Northern Ala-
bama," p. 51 ; Tuscaloosa Blade, Nov. 27, 1873 ; Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 27, 1872.
762
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
place, crime among the blacks increased, as was to be expected.
Removed from the restraints and punishments of slavery, with criminal
leaders, the negro, even under the most African of governments,
became the chief criminal. The crime of rape became common,
caused largely, the whites believed, by the social equality theories
of the reconstructionists. Personal conflicts among blacks and
between blacks and whites were common, though probably decreasing
for a time in the early '70's. Stealing was the most frequent crime,
with murder a close second. During the last year of negro rule the
report of the penitentiary inspectors gave the following statistics : —
Crimes
Whites
Negroes
Murder
Assault
Burglary and grand larceny
Arson
Rape
Other felonies
II
2
15
I
0
2
43
21
199
4
6
14
Total
31
287
Thus I white to 16,936 of population was in prison for felony;
I black to 2294; felonies, i white to 8 blacks; misdemeanors,
I white to 64 blacks. In Montgomery jail were confined about 12
blacks to I white. These statistics do not show the real state of
affairs, since most convictions of blacks were in cases prosecuted by
blacks. To be prosecuted by a white was equivalent to persecution —
so reasoned the negro jury in the Black Belt. Under the instigation
of low white leaders, the negroes frequently burned the houses and
other property of whites who were disliked by the Radical leaders.
Several attempts, more or less successful, were made to burn the white
villages in the Black Belt ; hardly a single one wholly escaped. For
several years the whites had to picket the towns in time of political
excitement. The worst negro criminals were the discharged negro
soldiers, who sometimes settled in gangs together in the Black
Belt. More charges were made of crimes by blacks against whites,
than by whites against blacks. Most criminals did not go to prison
after conviction. The Radical legislature passed a law allowing the
SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 763
sale of the convict's labor to relatives. A good old negro could buy the
time of a worthless son for ten cents a day and have him released.
The marriage relations of the negroes were hardly satisfactory,
judged by white standards. The white legislatures in 1 865-1 866
had declared slave marriages binding. The reconstructionists de-
nounced this as a great cruelty and repealed the law. Marriages
were then made to date from the passage of the Reconstruction Acts.
Many negro men had had several wives before that date. They
were relieved from the various penalties of desertion, bigamy, adultery,
etc. And after the passage of these laws, numerous prominent negroes
were relieved of the penalties for promiscuous marriages. Divorces
became common among the negroes who were in politics. During
one session of the legislature seventy-five divorces were granted.
This was cheaper than going through the courts, and more certain.
The average negro divorced himself or herself without formality;
some of them were divorced by their churches, as in slavery.
Upon the negro woman fell the burden of supporting the children.
Her husband or husbands had other duties. Children then began to
be unwelcome and foeticide and child murder were common crimes.
The small number of negro children during the decade of Recon-
struction was generally remarked. Negro women began to flock
to towns; how they lived no one can tell; immorality was general
among them. The conditions of Reconstruction were unfavorable
to honesty and morality among the negroes, both male and female.
The health of the negroes was injured during the period 1 865-1 875.
In the towns the standard of Uving was low ; sanitary arrangements
were bad; disease, especially consumption and venereal diseases,
killed large numbers and permanently injured the negro constitution.
Negro women took freedom even more seriously than the men.
It was considered slavery by many of them to work in the fields ; do-
mestic service was beneath the freedwomen — especially were washing
and milking the cows tabooed. To live like their former mistresses,
to wear fine clothes and go often to church, was the ambition of a
negro lady. After Reconstruction was fully established the negro women
were a strong support to the Union League, and took a leading part
in the prosecution of negro Democrats. Negro women never were as
well-mannered, nor, on the whole, as good-tempered and cheerful, as
the negro men. Both sexes during Reconstruction lost much of their
764 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
cheerfulness; the men gradually ceased to go "holloing" to the
fields; some of the blacks, especially the women, became impudent
and insulting toward the whites. While many of the negroes for
a time seemed to consider it a mark of servility to behave decently
to the whites, toward the close of Reconstruction and later conditions
changed, and the negro men especially were in general well-behaved
and well-mannered in their relations with whites except in time of
political excitement.
The entire black race was wild for education in 1865 and 1866,
but most of them found that the necessary work — which they had
not expected — was too hard, and by the close of Reconstruction they
were becoming indifferent. The education acquired was of doubtful
value. There was in 1865-1867 a religious furor among the negroes,
and several negro denominations were organized. The chief result, as
stated at length elsewhere, was to separate from the white churches,
discard the old conservative black preachers, and take up the smooth-
tongued, ranting, emotional, immoral preachers who could stir con-
gregations. The negro church has not yet recovered from the damage
done by these ministers. Negro health was affected by the night
meetings and religious debauches. In general it may be said that the
negro speech grew more like that of the whites, on account of schools,
speeches, much travel, and contact with white leaders. The negro
leaders acquired much superficial civilization, and very quickly
mastered the art of political intrigue.
A very delicate question to both races was that of the exact position
of the negro in the social system. The convention of 1867 had con-
tained a number of equal-rights members, and there had been much
discussion. A proposition to have separate schools was not made
obligatory. A measure to prevent the intermarriage of the races
was lost, and the supreme court of the state declared that marriages
between whites and blacks were lawful. Laws were passed to
prevent the separation of the races on street cars, steamers, and rail-
way cars, but the whites always resisted the enforcement of such laws.
Some negroes, especially the mulattoes, dreamed of having white
wives, but the average pure negro was not moved by such a desire.
When the Coburn investigation was being made, Cobum, the chair-
man, was trying to convince a negro who had declared against the
policy and the necessity of the Civil Rights Bill. The negro retorted
SOCIAL CONDITIONS DURING RECONSTRUCTION 765
by asking how he would Hke to see him sitting by his (Coburn's)
daughter's side. The black declared that he would not Hke to be
sitting by Miss Coburn and have some young man who was courting
her come along and knock over the big black negro ; further he did
not want to eat at the table nor sit in cars with the whites, prefer-
ring to sit by his own color. Some of the negroes were displeased at
the proposed Civil Rights Bill, thinking that it was meant to force
the negro to go among the whites.^ There were negro police in the
larger towns, Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile, who irritated the whites
by their arrests and by discrimination in favor of blacks. The negroes,
in many cases, had ceased to care for the good opinion of the whites
and, following disreputable leaders, suffered morally. The color
line began to be strictly drawn in politics, which increased the estrange-
ment of the races, though individuals were getting along better to-
gether.^
The white carpet-baggers and scalawags never formed a large
section of the Radical party and constantly decreased in numbers, —
the natives returning to the white party, the aliens returning to the
North. The native Radicals were found principally in the cities
and holding Federal offices, and in the white counties were still a few
genuine Kepublican Unionist voters. The carpet-baggers were found
almost entirely in the Black Belt and in Federal offices. As their
numbers decreased the general character was lowered. Some of
the white Radicals were sincere and honest men, but none of this
sort stood any chance for office. If they themselves would not steal,
they must arrange for others to steal. The most respectable of
the Radicals were a few old Whigs who had always disliked Demo-
crats and who preferred to vote with the negroes. Such a man was
Benjamin Gardner, who became attorney-general in 1872.
All white Radicals suffered the most bitter ostracism — in business,
in society, in church; their children in the schools were persecuted
by other children because of their fathers' sins. The scalawag, being
a renegade,was scorned more than a carpet-bagger. In every possible
1 See Coburn Report, pp. 154, l6l.
2 Montgomery Advertiser, March, 1870 ; Report of Inspector of Penitentiary, 1873-
1874; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 230, 244, 1220, 1380, 1384; Acts of Ala. (1869-
.'870), p. 28 ; Washington, "Up from Slavery," pp. 83-90 ; N. Y. World, Feb. 22 and
April."' 1868; Tuscaloosa Monitor, Dec. 18, 1867 ; Coburn Report, pp. 108, no, i6l,
203, 204, ^yj-j ; Clowes, " Black America," pp. 131, 140 ; Herbert, " Solid South," p. 59.
'j66 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
way they were made to feel the weight of the displeasure of the whites.
Small boys were unchecked when badgering a white Radical. One
Radical complained that the youngsters would come near him to hold
a spelling class. The word would be given out: ''Spell damned
rascaW^ It would be spelled. ''Spell damned Radical.''^ That
would be spelled. "They are nearly alike, aren't they?"
The blacks always felt that the carpet-bagger was more friendly
to them than the scalawag was, for the carpet-baggers associated
more closely with the negroes. The alien white teachers boarded
with negroes ; some of the politicians made it a practice to live among
the negroes in order to get their votes. The candidates for sheriff
and tax collector in Montgomery went to negro picnics, baptizings,
and church services, drank from the same bottle of whiskey with
negroes, had the negro leaders to visit their homes, where they dined
together, and the white women furnished music. The carpet-baggers
seldom had families with them, and, excluded from white society, began
to contract unofficial affiances among the blacks. Scarcely an ahen
office-holder in the Black Belt but was charged with immorality and
the charges proven. Numbers were relieved by the legislature of the
penalties for adultery. The average Radical politician was in time
quite thoroughly Africanized. They spoke of "us niggers," "we
niggers, " at first from policy, later from habit. When Lewis was
elected, in 1872, a white Radical cried out in his joy, "We niggers have
beat 'em." Two years later white Radicals marched with negro
processions and sang the song : —
** The white man's day has passed ;
The negro's day has come at last." ^
One effect of Reconstruction was to fuse the whites into a single
homogeneous party. Before the war political divisions were sharply
drawn and feeling often bitter, so also in 1865-1867 and to a certain
extent during the early period of Reconstruction. At first there was
no "Solid South"; within the white man's party there were grave
differences between old Whig and old Democrat, Radical and Con-
servative. There were different local problems before the whites of
1 Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 71, 233, 390, 391, 881, 1815, 1816; Coburn Re-
port, p. 861; Huntsville Democrat, 1872; Straker, "The New South Investigated," pp.
24, 41, 57; Ala. State Journal, May 20, 1874; McPherson's Scrap-book, "Campaign of
1869," Vol. I, p. 57.
SOCIAL CONDITIONS UNDER RECONSTRUCTION y^J
the various sections that for a while prevented the formation of a
unanimous white man's party. There were the whites of the Black
Belt, the former slaveholders, who wished well to the negro, favored
negro education, and looked upon his political activity as a joke, but
who came nearer than any other white people to recognizing the
possibility of permanent political privileges for the black. They
believed that they could sooner or later regain moral control over their
former slaves and thus do away with the evils of carpet-bag government.
It must be said that the former slaveholding class had more con-
sideration, then, before, and since, for the poor negro than for the
poor white, probably because the negroes only were always with them.
The poorest whites felt that the negro was not only their social but
also their economic enemy, and, the protection of the owner removed,
the blacks suffered more from these people than ever before. The
negro in school, the negro in politics, the negro on the best lands —
all this was not liked by the poorest white people, whose opportunities
were not as good as those of the blacks. Between these two extremes
was the mass of the whites, displeased at the way negro suffrage, edu-
cation, etc., was imposed, but willing to put up with the results if good.
The later years of Reconstruction found the temper of the whites
more and more exasperated. They were tired of Reconstruction, new
amendments, force bills. Federal troops, and of being ruled as a con-
quered province by the least fit. ^very measure aimed at the South
seemed to them to mean that they were considered incorrigible, not
worthy of trust, and when necessary to punish some whites, all were
punished. And strong opposition to proscriptive measures was called
fresh rebeUion. ''When the Jacobins say and do low and bitter things,
their charge of want of loyalty in the South because our people grumble
back a little seems to me as unreasonable as the complaint of the
litde boy: 'Mamma, make Bob 'have hisself. He makes mouths
at me every time I hit him with my stick. ' " Probably the grind was
harder on the young men, who had all Hfe before them and who were
growing up with slight opportunities in any line of activity. Sidney
Lanier, then an Alabama school-teacher, wrote to Bayard Taylor,
"Perhaps you know that with us of the young generation in the South,
since the war, pretty much the whole of life has been merely not dy-
ing." Negro and alien rule was a constant insult to the intelligence
of the country. The taxpayers were non-participants. Some people
ym CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
withdrew entirely from public life, went to their farms or plantations,
kept away from towns and from speech-making, waiting for the end
to come. I know old men who refused for several years to read the
newspapers, so unpleasant was the news. The good feeling produced
by the magnanimity of Grant at Appomattox was destroyed by his
southern poHcy when President. There was no gratitude for any so-
called leniency of the North, no repentance for the war, no desire for
humihation, for sackcloth and ashes and confession of wrong. The
insistence of the Radicals upon a confession of depravity only made
things much worse. There was not a single measure of Congress
during Reconstruction designed or received in a concihatory spirit.
Under the Reconstruction regime the poHtical, and to some extent
the social, morality of the whites dechned. Constant fighting fire
with fire scorched all. While in one way the bitter disciphne of
Reconstruction was not lost, yet with it the pleasantest of southern
life went out. During the war and Reconstruction there was a
radical change in southern temperament toward the severe. Hos-
pitality has declined ; old southern life was never on a strictly business
basis, the new southern life is more so ; the old individuality is partially
lost; class distinctions are less felt. The white people, by the fires
of Reconstruction, have been welded into a homogeneous society.^
The material evils of Reconstruction are by no means the more lasting ;
the state debt may be paid and "wasted resources renewed ; but the
moral and intellectual results will be the permanent ones.
In spite of the misgovernment during the Reconstruction, there
was in most of the white counties a slow movement toward industrial
development. All over the state in 1865-1868 and 1871-1874 there
were poor crops. The white counties gradually found themselves
better able to stand bad seasons. The decadence of the Black Belt
gave the white farmer an opportunity. The railroads now began to
open up the mineral and timber districts, rather than the cotton
counties. During the last four years of negro rule the coal and iron
of the northern part of the state began to attract northern capital and
rapid development began. The timber of the white counties now began
'^International Monthly, Vol. V, p, 220 ; Coburn Report, p. 527; "The Land
We Love," Vol. I, p. 446; Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 390, 391, 405, 411, 926;
Riley, " Baptists of Alabama," pp. 321, 322, 329; Clowes, "Black America," pp. 53,
131, 140, 144; Murphy, "The Present South."
SOCIAL CONDITIONS UNDER RECONSTRUCTION 769
to be cut. In the mines, on the railroads, and in the forests many
whites were profitably employed. Farmers in the white counties,
having thrown off the local Reconstruction government, began to or-
ganize agricultural societies, Patrons of Husbandry, Grangers, etc., and
to hold county fairs. The Radicals maintained that this granger
movement was only another manifestation of Ku Klux, and it was,
in a way.^
Immigration from the North or from abroad amounted to nothing ;
disturbed political conditions and the presence of the negroes pre-
vented it. Nor did the Reconstruction rulers desire immigration;
their rule would be the sooner overthrown. There were two move-
ments of emigration from the state — culminating in 1869 and in
1 873-1 874. Those were the gloomiest periods of Reconstruction,
especially for the white man in the Black Belt. Most of the emigrants
went to Texas, others to Mexico, to Brazil, to the North, and to Tennes-
see and Georgia, where the whites were in power. It was estimated
that in this emigration the state lost more of its population than
by war.
In the Black Belt the condition of the whites grew worse. Fre-
quent elections demoralized negro labor, and crops often failed for
lack of laborers. The more skilful negroes went to the towns, rail-
roads, mines, and lumber mills. On account of this migration and
the gradual dying off of slavery-trained negroes, negro agricultural
labor was less and less satisfactory. The negro woman often refused
to work in the fields. The white population of the Black Belt de-
creased in comparison with the numbers of blacks. The whites
deserted the plantations, going to the towns or gathering in villages.
Taxation was heavy, tax sales became frequent. One of the worst
evils that afflicted the Black Belt was the so-called "deadfall."
A "deadfall" was a low shop or store where a white thief encouraged
black people to steal all kinds of farm produce and exchange it with
him for bad whiskey, bad candy, brass jewellery, etc. This evil was
found all over the state where there were negroes. Whites and
industrious blacks lost hogs, poultry, cattle, corn in the fields, cotton
in the fields and in the gin. The business of the "deadfall" was
usually done at night. The thirsty negro would go into a cotton field
and pick a sack of cotton worth a dollar, or take a bushel of corn from
1 See also Ch. XXII.
3i>
770 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the nearest field, and exchange it at a "deadfall" for a glass of whiskey,
a plug of tobacco, or a dime. These " deadfalls " were in the woods oi
swamps on the edges of the large plantations. It was not possible toj
guard against them. The ''deadfall" keepers often became rich,]
the harvests of some amounting to 30 to 80 bales of cotton for each,
besides farm produce. Careful estimates by grand juries and business
men placed the average annual loss at one-fifth of the crop. A bill
was introduced into the legislature to prohibit the purchase after dark
of farm produce from any one but the producer. The measure was
unanimously opposed by the Radicals, on the ground that it was class
legislation aimed at the negroes. The debates show that some of|
them considered it proper for a negro to steal from his employer.
After the Democratic victory in 1874 a law was passed aboHshing
"deadfalls."^
1 Charge of Judge H. D. Clayton to Barbour County grand jury in Coburn Report,
p. 839 ; Report of Montgomery grand jury in Advertiser, Oct. 20, 1871 ; Tuskegee
News, March 16, 1876; Little, "History of Butler County," p. iii ; Tuscaloosa Blade,
Nov. 19, 1874; Coburn Report, pp. 524, 1219; Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. 27, 1873;
Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test., pp. 230, 1175, 1179; Scribner^s Monthly, Sept., 1874;
Herbert, " Solid South," pp. 63, 67.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE OVERTHROW OF RECONSTRUCTION
The Republican Party in 1874
The Republican party of Alabama went into the campaign of
1874 weakened by dissensions within its own ranks and by the lessen-
ing of the sympathy of the northern Radicals. During the previous six
years the opposition to the radical Reconstruction policy had gradually
gained strength. The industrial expansion that followed the war,
the dissatisfaction with the administration of Grant, the disclosure
of serious corruption on the part of public officials, and the revela-
tions of the real conditions in the South — these had resulted in the
formation of a party of opposition to the administration, which called
itself the "Liberal Republican" party and which advocated home
rule for the southern states. The Democratic party, somewhat dis-
credited by its course during the war, had now regained the confi-
dence of its former members by accepting as final the decisions of
the war on the questions involved and by bringing out conservative
candidates on practical platforms. By 1874 nine northern states
had gone Democratic in the elections; from 1869 to 1872, five south-
ern states returned to the Democratic columns. The lower house of
Congress was soon to be safely Democratic and no more radical
legislation was to be expected ; the executive department of the gov-
ernment alone was in active sympathy with the Reconstruction
regime in the southern states.
The divisions within the party in the state were due to various
causes. In the first place, the action of the more respectable of the
whites in deserting the party left it with too few able men to hold the
organization well together. By 1874 all but about 4000 whites had
forsaken the Republicans and returned to the Democrats. These
whites were mainly in north Alabama, though there were some few
in the Black Belt, — five, for instance, in Marengo County, and fifty
in Dallas. A further source of weakness was the disposition of the
771
772 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
black politician to demand more consideration than had hitherto
been accorded to him. The blacks had received much political
training of a certain kind since 1867, and the negro leaders were no j
longer the helpless dupes of the carpet-bagger and the scalawag.
A meeting of the negro politicians, called the "Equal Rights Union,"
was held in Montgomery in January, 1874. The resolutions adopted
demanded that the blacks have first choice of the nominations in
black counties and a proportional share in all other counties. They
expressed themselves as opposed to the efforts of the carpet-baggers
to organize new secret political societies, "having found no good to
result from such since the disbursement [sic] of the Union League." ^
If the negroes should be able to obtain these demands, nothing would
be left for the white members of the party. The rank and file of the
blacks had lost much of their faith in their white leaders and were
disposed to listen to candidates of their own color. Closely con-
nected with the negroes' demands for ofhce were their demands for
social rights. The state supreme court had decided that whites and
blacks might lawfully intermarry, and there had been several instances
of such marriages between low persons of each race.^ Noisy negro
speakers were demanding the passage of the Civil Rights Bill then
pending in Congress. A Mobile negro declared that he wanted to
drink in white men's saloons, ride in cars with whites, and go to the
same balls. The white Radicals in convention and legislature were
disposed to avoid the subject when the blacks brought up the ques-
tion of "mixed accommodations." The negroes constantly reminded
the white Radicals that the latter were very willing to associate with
them in the legislature and in political meetings. The speeches of
Boutwell of Massachusetts and Morton of Indiana in favor of mixed
schools were quoted by the negro speakers, who now became impatient
of the constant request of their leaders not to offend north Alabama
and drive out of the party the whites of that region. Lewis, a negro
member of the legislature, declared that they were weary of waiting
for their rights ; that the state would not grant them, but the United
States would ; and then they would take their proper places along-
side the whites, and "we intend to do it in defiance of the immaculate
^ A/a. State Journal, Jan. 14, 1874.
2 State Journal, March 10, 1874. The justice who performed the ceremony in one
case gave as his excuse that the woman was so bad that nothing she could do would
make her worse.
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IN 1874 773
white people of north Alabama. . . . Hereafter we intend to de-
mand [our rights] and we are going to press them on every occasion,
and preserve them inviolate if we can. The day is not far distant
when you will find on the bench of the supreme court of the state a
man as black as I am, and north Alabama may help herself if she
can." ^ An "Equal Rights Convention," from which w^hite Radi-
cals were excluded, met in Montgomery in June, 1874. The various
speakers demanded that colored youths be admitted to the State
University, to the Agricultural and Mechanical College, and to all
other schools on an equal footing with the wdiites, "in order that the
idea of the inferiority of the negro might be broken up." Several
delegates expressed themselves as in favor of mixed schools, but
advised delay in order not to drive out the white members of the party.
A negro preacher from Jackson County said that he wanted to hold
on to the north Alabama w^hites "until their stomachs grew strong
enough to take Civil Rights straight." ^ In 1867 and 1868 there
had been some blacks w^ho had opposed the agitation of social matters
on the ground that their civil and political rights would be endan-
gered, but these were no longer in politics. The result of the agita-
tion in 1874 was to irritate the w^hites generally and to cause the
defection of north Alabama Republicans.
Another cause of weakness in the Radical party was the quarrel
among the Reconstruction newspapers of the state over the distribu-
tion of the money for printing the session laws of Congress. The
State Journal and the Mountain Home lost the printing, which, by
direction of the Alabama delegation in Congress, was given to the
Huntsville Advocate and the National Republican, "to aid needy
newspapers in other localities for the benefit of the Republican party."
The result was discord among the editors and a lukewarm support
of the party from those dissatisfied.^
In 1874 in each county where there was a strong Republican
vote discord arose among those who wanted office. Every white
Radical wanted a nomination and the negroes also wanted a share.
The results were temporary splits everywhere in the county organiza-
1 Montgomery Advertiser and other Montgomery papers of March 5, 1873.
2 Coburn Report on Affairs in Alabama, 1874, pp. xiv, 341, 519,520,521, 743;
Montgomery Advertiser ^ Oct. 23, 1902.
^ See State Journal^ Jan. 10 and Feb, i, 1874.
774 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
II
tions, which were usually mended before the elections, but which
seriously weakened the party. The Strobach-Robinson division in
Montgomery County may be taken as typical. Strobach was the
carpet-bag sheriff of Montgomery County, which was overwhelmingly
black. There was reason to believe that Strobach was being pur-
chased by the Democrats.^ The stalwarts accused -him of conspiring
with the Democrats to sell the administration to them. They charged
that he would not allow the negroes to use the court-house for political
meetings, that entirely too many Republicans were indicted at his
instance, and that he summoned as jurors too many Democrats
and "Strobach traitors" and too few Republicans. As leader of
the regular organization Strobach had considerable influence in spite
of these charges, and his enemies undertook to form a new organiza-
tion. The leaders of the bolters, known as the Robinson faction,
were Busteed, Buckley, Barbour, and Robinson. They made the
fairest promises and secured the support of the majority of the negroes,
though Strobach still controlled many. Between the two factions
there was practically civil war during 1874. The bolters organized
their negroes in the "National Guards," a semi-military society —
5000 or 6000 strong. This body broke up the Strobach meetings,
and serious disturbances occurred at Wilson's Station, Elam Church,
and at Union Springs. At the latter place the bolters attempted to
take forcible possession of the congressional nominating convention.
The negroes, led by a few whites, invaded the town, firing guns and
pistols and making threats until it seemed as if a three-cornered
fight would result between the whites and the two factions of the
blacks. Rapier, the negro congressman, made peace by agreeing
to support the Robinson- Buckley faction provided they kept the peace
and allowed him to receive the nomination for Congress from the
other faction. They forced him to sign an agreement to that effect,
which he repudiated a few days later. The bolters were not ad-
mitted to the state convention in 1874, and thus weakness resulted.
During the summer and fall of 1874, ten or twelve negroes were killed
and numbers injured in the fights between the factions.^
1 A few years ago Strobach offered to tell me all about his political career in ex-
change for ^50, but died before he could begin the account.
■^ Coburn Report, pp. 225, 230, 272, 280-282 ; State Journal, May 20 and 27, 1874;
Alontgoinery Advertiser, Oct. 23, 1902.
THE NEGROES IN 1874 jj^
The Democrats naturally did all that was possible to encourage
such division in the ranks of the enemy. Bolting candidates and
independent candidates, especially negroes, were secretly supported
by advice and funds. Carpet-bag and scalawag leaders were pur-
chased, and agreed to use their influence to divide their party. To
some of them it was clear that the whites would soon be in control,
and meanwhile they were willing to profit by selling out their party.^
For two or three years it had been a practice in the Black Belt for
the Radical office-holders to farm out their offices to the Democrats,
who appointed deputies to conduct such offices. The stalwarts now
endeavored to cast these men out of the party, but only succeeded
in weakening it.
The Negroes in 1874
In spite of all adverse influence, however, the great majority of
the negroes remained faithful to the Republican party and voted for
Governor Lewis in the fall elections. They missed the rigid organiza-
tion of former years, and many of them were greatly dissatisfied be-
cause of unfulfilled promises made by their leaders ; but the Radical
office-holders, realizing clearly the desperate situation, made strong
efforts to bring out the entire negro vote. The Union League methods
were again used to drive negro men into line. They were again
promised that if their party succeeded in the elections, there would
be a division of property. Some believed that equal rights in cars,
hotels, theatres, and churches would be obtained. Clothes, bacon
and flour, free homes, mixed schools, and public office were offered
as inducements to voters. In Opelika, A. B. Griffin told the negroes
that after the election all things would be divided and that each Lee
County negro would receive a house in Opelika. To one man he
promised ''forty acres and an old gray horse." Heyman, a Radical
leader of Opelika, told the blacks that if the elections resulted prop-
erly, the land would be taxed so heavily that the owners would be
obliged to leave the state, and then the negroes and northerners
would get the land.^
1 See Coburn Report, pp. 225, 282-288.
2 Coburn Report, pp. 118, 135, 145, 151, 279. When the Coburn Committee was in
Opelika, Washington Jones, colored, appeared before it and demanded that the promises
made to him be fulfilled. lie wanted the mule, the land, " overflow " bacon, etc. The
committee got rid of him in a hurry. See Coburn Report, p. 135.
yje CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Promises of good not being sufficient to hold the blacks in line,
threats of evil were added. Circulars were sent out, purporting to]
be signed by General Grant, threatening the blacks with reenslave-^
ment unless they voted for him. The United States deputy marshals
informed the blacks of Marengo County that if they voted for W. B.
Jones, a scalawag candidate who had been purchased by the whites,
they would be reenslaved. Heyman of Opelika declared that defeat
would result in the negroes' having their ears cut off, in whipping
posts and slavery. Pelham, a white congressman, told the blacks
that if the Democrats carried the elections, Jefferson Davis would
come to Montgomery and reorganize the Confederate government.
So industriously were such tales told that many of the negroes became
genuinely alarmed, and it was asserted that negro women began to^
hide their children as the election approached.^
The negro women and the negro preachers were more enthusi-
astic than the negro men, and through clubs and churches brought
considerable pressure to bear on the doubtful and indifferent. They
agreed that negro children should not go to schools where the teachers
were Democrats. In Opelika a negro women's club was formed of
those whose husbands were Democrats or were about to be. The
initiate swore to leave her husband if he voted for a Democrat. This
club was formed by a white Radical, John O. D. Smith, and the
negroes were made to believe that General Grant ordered it. A
similar organization in Chambers County had a printed constitution
by which a member, if married, was made to promise to desert her
husband should he vote for a Democrat, and a single woman promised
not to marry a Democratic negro or to have anything to do with one.
The negro women were used as agents to distribute tickets to voters.
These tickets had Spencer's picture on them, which they believed
was Grant's.^
In the negro churches to be a Democrat was to become liable to
discipline. Some preachers preferred regular charges against those
members who were suspected of Democracy. The average negro
still believed that it was a crime ''to vote against their race" and
offenders were sure of expulsion from church unless, as happened
1 Coburn Report, pp. 59, 63, 106, Ii8, 122, 142, 181, 641 ; State Journal, June 10,
1874.
2 Coburn Report, pp. 58, 59, 92, 106, 136, 275, 295, 296, 416, 641.
THE NEGROES IN 1874 J'J'J
sometimes, the bolters were strong enough to turn the Republicans
out. Nearly every church had its political club to which the men
belonged and sometimes the women. Robert Bennett of Lee County
related his experience to the Coburn Committee. He wanted to
vote the Democratic ticket, he said, and for that offence was put on
trial in his church. The ''ministers and exhorters" told him that
he must not do so, saying, "We had rather you wouldn't vote at all;
if you won't go with us to vote with us, you are against us; the Bible
says so. . . . We can have you arrested. We have got you; if
you won't say you won't vote or will vote with us, we will have you
arrested. . . . All who won't vote with us we will kick out of the
society — and turn them out of church;" and so it happened to
Robert Bennett.^
The efforts made to hold the negroes under control indicate that
numbers of them were becoming restless and desirous of change.
This was especially the case with the former house- servant class
and those who owned property. One negro, in accounting for his
change of politics, said, "Honestly, I love my race, but the way the
colored people have taken a stand against the white people . . . will
not do." Of the white Radicals he said, "They know that we are a
parcel of poor ignorant people, and I think it is a bad thing for them
to take advantage of a poor ignorant person, and I do not think they
are honest men; they cannot be." He said that the Radicals prom-
ised much and gave httle; that they never helped him. The Demo-
crats gave him credit and paid his doctor's bills; so that it was to
his interest to vote for the Democrats — "I done it because it was to
my interest. I wanted a change." Another negro explained his
change of politics by saying that bad government kept up the price of
pork, and allowed sorry negroes to steal what industrious negroes
made and saved — eggs, chickens, and cotton. When Adam Kirk,
of Chambers County, was asked why be belonged to the "white
man's party," he answered: "I was raised in the house of old man
Billy Kirk. He raised me as a body servant. The class that he
belongs to feels nearer to me than the northern white man, and actually,
since the war, everything that I have got is by their aid and assistance.
They have helped me raise up my family and have stood by me,
and whenever I want a doctor, no matter what hour of the day or
1 Coburn Report, pp. 58, 59, 106, 203, 204.
1
778 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
night, he is called in whether I have got a cent or not. I think they
have got better principles and better character than the Repubhcans." ^
There is no doubt that these represented the sentiments of several
thousand negroes who had mustered up courage to remain away from
the polls or perhaps to vote for the Democrats. And while in white
counties the campaign was made on the race issue, in the Black Belt
the whites, as Strobach said, ''were more than kind" to negro bolters.
They encouraged and paid the expenses of negro Democratic speakers,
and gave barbecues to the blacks who would promise to vote for the
"white man's party." Numerous Democratic clubs were formed
for the negroes and financed by the whites. Of these there were
several in each black county, but none in the white counties. Though
safer than ever before since enfranchisement, negro Democrats still
received rather harsh treatment from those of their color who sin-
cerely believed that a negro Democrat was a traitor and an enemy to
his race. Negro Democratic speakers were insulted, stoned, and
sometimes killed. At night they had to hide out. Their pohtical
meetings were broken up ; their houses were shot into ; their families
were ostracized in negro society, churches, and schools. One negro
complained that his children were beaten by other children at school,
and that the teacher explained to him that nothing better could be
expected as long as he, the father, remained a Democrat. Some
negro Democrats were driven away from home and others were
whipped. Most of them found it necessary to keep quiet about
politics; and the members of Democratic clubs were usually sworn
to secrecy.^ The colored Methodist Episcopal Church, which was
under the guardianship of the white Methodist Church, suffered
from negro persecution ; several of its buildings were burned and its
ministers insulted.
The Democratic and Conservative Party in 1874
If the Republican party was weaker in this campaign than ever
before, the Democrats, on the other hand, were more united and more
firmly determined to carry the elections, peaceably if possible, by
force if necessary. There are evidences that the state government
1 Coburn Report," pp. 59, 63, 109, 1 18, 1 19. See also Ku Klux Rept., Ala. Test.,
pp. 1072-1075.
'-^ Coburn Report, pp. 58, 59, 61, 118, 278, 280, 308, 317, 320, 446.
THE DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1874 779
in Alabama would have been overthrown early in 1874 if the Louisiana
revolution of that year had not been crushed by the Federal govern-
ment. The different sections of the state were now more closely
united than ever before, owing to the completion of two of the rail-
roads which had cost the state treasury so much. The people of
the northern white counties now came down into central Alabama
and learned what negro government really was, and it was now made
clear to the Unionist Repubhcan element of the mountain counties
that while they had local white government they were supporting
a state government by the negro and the ahen, both of whom they
dishked. In order to gain the support of north Alabama, the opposi-
tion of the whites in the Black Belt to a campaign on the race issue
was disregarded, and the campaign, especially in the white counties,
was made on the simple issue — Shall black or white rule the state ?
It may be of interest here to examine the attitude of the whites
toward the blacks since the war. In 1865, the whites would grant
civil rights to the negro, but would have special legislation for the race
on the theory that it needed a period of guardianship ; by 1866, many
far-sighted men were willing to think of poHtical rights for the negro
after the proper preparation; by 1867, there was serious thought of
an immediate qualified suffrage for the black, the object being to
increase the representation in Congress, to disarm the Radicals, —
the native whites believing that they could control the negro vote.
This shifting of position was checked by the grant of suffrage to the
negroes by Congress, and during the campaigns of 1867 and 1868
the whites held aloof, meaning to try to influence the negro vote
later, when the opportunity offered. From 1869 to 1872 there was
an increasing tendency, especially in the Black Belt, to appeal to
the negro for political support, but, though the former personal
relations were to some extent resumed, the effort always ended in
practicdl failure. The result was that by 1873-1874, the whites de-
spaired of dividing the black vote and many of the Black Belt whites
were willing to join those of the white counties in drawing the color
line in politics.^
The Democrats were aided in presenting the race issue to north
Alabama by the attitude, above referred to, of the negroes in dc-
1 The State Journal of Aug. i, 1874, has a list of extracts from Democratic papers
from 1868 to 1874, showing the change of attitude in regard to the negro.
780 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
manding office and social privileges and by the fact that a strong
effort had been made in Congress and would again be made to enact
a stringent civil rights law securing equal rights to negroes in cars,
theatres, hotels, schools, etc. The Alabama members of Congress,
who were Repubhcans, had voted for such a bill. The Democrats
made the most of the issue. The speeches of Boutwell, Morton,
and Sumner were circulated among the whites as campaign docu-
ments, and were most effective in securing the unionists and inde-
pendents of north Alabama.^
The following extracts from state papers will indicate the state
of mind of the whites. The Montgomery Advertiser of February 19,
1874, declared that ''the great struggle in the South is the race strug-
gle of white against black for political supremacy. It is all in vain
to protest that the southern wing of the Radical party is not essentially
a party of black men arrayed against their white neighbors in a close
and bitter struggle for power. The struggle going on around us
is not a mere contest for the triumph of this or that platform of party
principles. It is a contest between antagonistic races and for that
which is held dearer than life by the white race. If the negro must
rule Alabama permanently, whether in person or by proxy, the white
man must ultimately leave the state." "Old Whig" protested in
the Opelika Daily Times of June 6, 1874, against the rule of the mob
of 80,000 yelling negroes who, at scalawag mandate, and in the name
of liberty, deposited ballots against southern white men. Another
writer declared that "all of the good men of Alabama are for the
white man's party. Outcasts, libellers, liars, handcuffers, and
traitors to blood are for the negro party." Pinned down by bayonets
and bound by tyranny, the whites had been forced to silence and
expedients and humiliation until wrath burned "like a seven-fold
furnace in the bosom of the people." The negro must be expelled
from the government. The white was a God-made prince; the
black, a God-made subordinate. "What right hath Dahomey to
give laws to Runny mede, or Bosworth Field to take a lesson from
Congo-Ashan? Shall Bill Turner give laws to Watts, Elmore,
Barnes, Morgan, and the many mighty men of the South?" "When
1 Tuskegee News, June 4, and Aug. 20, and Sept. 10, 1874 ; Coburn Report, pp.
120, 860, 861, 1231, 1232, et passim ; Eufaula Times, July 30, 1874, quoting from the
Birmingham N'ews, Shelby Guide, and Eutaxu Whig ; State Journal, June 24, 1874.
THE DEMOCRATIC AND CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN 1874 78 1
Alabama goes down the white men of Alabama will go with
her." '
The whites who still remained with the negro party were sub-
jected to more merciless ostracism than ever before. No one would
have business relations with a Repubhcan; no one beheved in his
honor or honesty; his children were taunted by their schoolmates;
his family were socially ostracized ; no one would sit by them at
church or in pubhc gatherings.^ In the white counties numerous
conventions adopted a series of resolutions in regard to ostracism,
known as the "Pike County Platform," which first was adopted in
June, 1874, by the Democratic convention in Pike County. It read in
part as follows: ''Resolved that nothing is left to the white man's
party but social ostracism of all those who act, sympathize, or side
with the negro party, or who support or advocate the odious, unjust,
and unreasonable measure known as the Civil Rights Bill ; and that
henceforth we will hold all such persons as the enemies of our race,
and will not for the future have intercourse with them in any of the
social relations of life." ^
With the changed conditions in 1874 appeared a considerable
number of "independent" candidates and voters. These were
(i) those whites who had wearied of radicahsm, and, foreseeing
defeat, had left their party, yet were unwilhng to join the Demo-
crats; (2) certain half-hearted Democrats who did not want to see
the old Democratic leaders come back to power; (3) disappointed
pohticians, especially old Whigs of strong prejudices, who dishked
the Democrats from ante-bellum days. These people, foreseeing
the defeat of the Radicals, hastened to offer themselves as indepen-
dent candidates and voters. They hoped to get the votes of the bulk
of the Radicals and many Democrats and thus get into power. The
Radicals, otherwise certain of defeat, showed some disposition to meet
those people halfway, and a partial success was possible if the Demo-
1 Opelika Times, Aug. 22, 1874, condensed ; Coburn Report, pp. 97, lOO, 104.
2 See testimony of Dunbar and Gardner in Coburn Report, pp. 101, 209, 210, 300,
302 ; Opelika Daily Times, Sept. 30, 1874.
3 State Journal, June 16, 1874. For a typical readoption of this platform see the
resolutions of the Tuscaloosa County Democrats in State Journal, June 24, 1874. " Old
Whig " in the Opelika Daily Times, Sept. 30, 1874, proposed that the whites " fall back
upon the old Wesleyan doctrine ' to prefer one another in business'; " "Give the Radi-
cals no support ; " " The adder that stings should find no warmth in the bosom of the
dying victim."
782 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
crats could not whip the ''independents" into Hne. This was sue
cessfully done. The following dissertation on "independents"
is offered as typical: The independent is the Brutus of the South,
"the protege of radicahsm, the spawn of corruption or poverty,
or passion, or ignorance, come forth as leaders of ignorant or deluded
blacks, to attack and plunder for avarice. There may be no God
to avenge the South, but there is a devil to punish independents."
The independents are only the tools of the Radicals, they are hke
bloodhounds, — to be used and then killed, for no sooner than their
work is done the Radicals will knife them. "Satan hath been in
the Democratic camp and, taking these independents from guard
duty, led them up into the mountains and shown them the kingdoms
of Radicalism, his silver and gold, storehouses and bacon, and all
these promised to give if they would fall down and worship him ; and
they worshipped him, throwing down the altars of their fathers and
tramphng them under their feet." ^
The Campaign of 1874
The Democrats nominated for governor George S. Houston of
north Alabama, a "Union" man whose "unionism" had not been
very strong, and the RepubHcans renominated Governor D. P.
Lewis, also of north Alabama. The Democratic convention met in
July, 1874, and put forth a declaration and a platform declaring that
the Radicals had for years inflamed the passions and prejudices of
the races until it was now necessary for the whites to unite in self-
defence. The convention denied the power of Congress to legislate
for the social equality of the races and denounced the Civil Rights
Bill then pending in Congress as an attempt to force social union.
Legislation on social matters was condemned as unnecessary and
criminal. The, Radical state administration was blamed for ex-
travagance and corruption, and a declaration was made that
fraudulent state debts would not be paid if the Democrats were
successful.^
The fact that the race issue was the principal one is borne out
by the county platforms. In Barbour County the "white man's
1 Opelika Times, Oct. 14, 1874; Coburn Report, pp. 97, 103-104.
2 Coburn Report, p. 8565 Annual Cyclopaedia (1874), p. 15.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1874 783
party" declared that the issue was "white vs. black"; that if the
whites were defeated, the county would no longer be endurable and
would be abandoned to the blacks ; that a conflict of races would be
deplorable, but that the whites must protect themselves, and that
though in the past some had stayed away from the polls through dis-
gust, those who did not vote would be reckoned as of the negro party ;
that the whites would be ready to protect themselves and their ballots
by force if necessary. In Lee County the convention declared that
the Democrats had long avoided the race issue, but that now it had
been forced upon them by the Radicals; that "this county is the
white man's and the white man must rule over it," and that whites
or blacks who aid the negro party "are the pohtical and social ene-
mies of the white race." In the same county a local club declared
that peace was wanted, but not peace purchased by "unconditional
surrender of every freeman's privilege to fraud, Federal bayonets,
and intimidation." ^
The Republican state convention in August pronounced itself
in favor of the Civil Rights Bill and the civil and political equality
of all, men without regard to race, declared that the race issue was an
invention of the Democrats which would result in war with the United
States, and accused the Democrats of being responsible for the bad
condition of the state finances. The Equal Rights convention and
the Union Labor convention declared for the Civil Rights Bill and
indorsed Charles Sumner and J. T. Rapier, the negro congress-
man.^
In preparation for the fall elections the Radical members of
Congress had secured the passage of a resolution by Congress appro-
priating money for the relief of the sufferers from floods on the Ala-
bama, Warrior, and Tombigbee rivers. The floods occurred in the
early spring; the appropriation became available in May, but as
late as July the governor had not appointed agents to distribute the
bacon which had been purchased with the appropriation. The
members of Congress from the state met and agreed upon a division
of the bacon without reference to flooded districts, but with reference
1 Coburn Report, pp. 99, loi, 856, 859 ; Opelika Daily Times, June 29 and Oct. 3,
1874 ; Montgomery Advertiser, Oct. 23, 1902.
2 State Journal, June 4 and 27, 1874 ; Coburn Report, p. 881 ; Annual Cyclopx-dia
(1874), pp. 15, 16; Tuskegee News, July 2, 1874.
784
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
to the political conditions in the various counties.^ Their agents
were to distribute the bacon, but the governor was unable to get their
names until August. The purpose was to hold the bacon until near
the election. The governor and other Republican leaders were
opposed to the use of bacon in the campaign, and the state refused
to pay transportation; so the agents had to sell part of the bacon
to pay expenses. In Lewis's last message to the legislature, he said
pointedly, ''Our beloved state has been free from pestilence, floods,
and extensive disasters to labor." ^ As a matter of fact, there had
been the regular spring freshets, but there were no sufferers. The
loss fell upon the planters, who were under contract to furnish food,
stock, and implements to their tenants. In August, Captain Gentry
of the Nineteenth Infantry was sent by the War Department, which was
supplying the bacon, to investigate the matter of the "political"
bacon. He found no suffering, and no one was able to tell him where
the suffering was, though the members of Congress were positive
that there was suffering. The crops were doing well. In Mont-
gomery Captain Gentry found that the agents in charge of Congress-
man Rapier's share of the bacon were J. C. Hendrix and Holland
Thompson (colored), both active politicians. Distribution had been
delayed because Rapier thought that he had not received his share.
Congressman Hays had bacon sent to Calera, Brierfield, and Marion,
none of the places being near flowing water. He sent quantities to
Perry, Shelby, and Bibb counties, but none to Fayette and Baker
(Chilton). As he wrote to his agent, "Of course the overflowed
districts will need more than those not overflowed." When the War
Department discovered the use that had been made of the bacon,
Captain Gentry was directed to seize the bacon in dry districts that
1 The division was as follows : —
District
Distributing Points
Pounds
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth and sixth ....
Mobile, Selma, Camden
Montgomery
Opelika, Talladega, Scale .
Demopolis
Decatur
55.851
44,402
41,802
53,663
31.278
2 Senate Journal, 1 874-1 875, p. 7.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1874
785
was being held until the election. At Eufaula, 80 miles from the
nearest flooded district, he seized 5348 pounds that Rapier had stored
there; at Scale, 7638 pounds were seized; and at Opelika, 9792
pounds; but not all was discovered at either place.^
An Opelika negro thus described the method of using the bacon :
It was understood that only the faithful could get any of it. This
negro was considered doubtful, but was told, "If you will come along
and do right, you will get two or three shoulders." Bacon suppers
were held at negro churches, to which only those were admitted who
promised to vote the Republican ticket.^
The use of bacon in the campaign injured the Republican cause
more than it aided it ; the supply of bacon was too small to go around,
and the whites were infuriated because the negroes stopped work
so long while trying to get some of it.
In previous campaigns the Republicans had used with success
the "southern outrage" issue; stories of murder, cruelty, and fraud
by the whites were carried to Washington and found ready believers,
and Federal troops and deputy marshals were sent to assist the south-
ern Republicans in the elections by making arrests, thus intimidating
the whites and encouraging the blacks. In the campaign of 1874
such assistance was more than ever necessary to the black man's
party in Alabama. The race line was now distinctly drawn and most
1 For full account of the bacon question see Ho. Doc, No. no, 43d Cong., 2d Sess.;
also 7'tiskegee News, June 4, Aug. 27, and Sept. 24, 1874 ; Coburn Report, pp. 36, 50,
69, 207, 241.
The following list shows how one distribution was made in October, just before the
elections : —
County
Montgomery . . . .
Lowndes
Butler
Dale (to P. King, Haw Ridge)
Barbour
Bullock
Pike (to Gardner and Wiley)
Henry
Clay
Pounds
14,151
8,283
4,235
2,482
4,527
5,169
2,066
1,036
3,000
County
Randolph
Coosa
Elmore
Talladega
Lee (to W. H.
Russell (to W.
Walker
" To G. P. Plowman, by order
of Charles Pelham, M.C." .
Pounds
2,000
3,000
3,500
7,500
9,792
2,390
2,178
1,000
2 Coburn Report, pp. 59, 60.
3E
ym CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
1
of the whites had forsaken the black man's party. The blacks,
many of them, were indifferent ; the whites were determined to over^^
throw the Reconstruction rule. i^B
The leaders of the whites were confident of success and strongly
advised against every appearance of violence, since it would work to
the advantage of the hostile party. There were some, however, who
did not object to the tales of outrage, since they would cause investiga-
tion and the sending of Federal troops. These would, in the black
districts, really protect the whites, and any kind of an investigation
would result in damage to the Radical party.
Pursuing its plan of a peaceable campaign, the Democratic execu-
tive committee, on August 29, 1874, issued an address as follows:
*'We especially urge upon you carefully to avoid all injuries to others
while you are attempting to preserve your own rights. Let our
people avoid all just causes of complaint. Turmoil and strife with
those who oppose us in this contest will only weaken the moral force
of our efforts. Let us avoid personal conflicts ; and if these should be
forced upon us, let us only act in that line of just self-defence which
is recognized and provided for by the laws of the land. We could
not please our enemies better than by becoming parties to conflicts
of violence, and thus furnish them plausible pretext for asking the
interference of Federal power in our domestic affairs. Let us so act
that all shall see and that all whose opinions are entitled to any
respect shall admit that ours is a party of peace, and that we only
seek to preserve our rights and liberties by the peaceful but efficient
power of the ballot-box." ^ There is no doubt but that the whites
engaged in less violence in this campaign than in former election
years and less than was to be expected considering their temper in
1874. But there is also no doubt that very little incentive would have
been necessary to have precipitated serious conflict. The whites
were determined to win, peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary.
This very determination made them inclined to peace as long as
possible and made the opposite party cautious about giving causes
for conflict.
The Repubhcan leaders industriously circulated in the North
stories of ''outrages" in Alabama. The most comprehensive "out-
rage" story was that of Charles Hays, member of Congress, published
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1874), p. 13; Coburn Report, pp. 247-254.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1874 j'^y
in the famous ''Hays-Hawley letter" of September 7, 1874. Hays
had borne a bad character in Alabama while a slaveholder and had
been ostracized for being cruel to his slaves, and as a Confederate
-oldier he had a doubtful record. Naturally, in Reconstruction he
had sided against the whites, and the negroes, with few exceptions,
forgot his past history. In order to get campaign material. Senator
Joseph Hawley of Connecticut wrote to Hays to get facts for publi-
cation, — ''I want to pubHsh it at home and give it to my neighbors
and constituents as the account of a gentleman of unimpeachable
honor." Hays responded in a long letter, filled with minute details
of hortible outrages that occurred within his personal observation.
The spirit of rebellion still exists, he said ; riots, murders, assassina-
tions, torturings, are more common than ever; the half cannot be
told; unless the Federal government interposes there is no hope for
loyal men. The letter created a sensation. Senator Hawley sent
it out with his indorsement of Hays as a gentleman. The New York
Tribune^ then "Liberal" in politics, sent "a thoroughly competent
and trustworthy correspondent who is a lifelong Republican" to
investigate the charges made by Hays. The charges of Hays were
as follows: (i) for political reasons, one Allen was beaten nearly
to death with pistols; (2) five negroes were brutally murdered in
Sumter County, for no reason ; (3) "No white man in Pickens County
ever cast a Repubhcan vote and lived after;" (4) in Hale County a
negro benevolent society was ordered to meet no more; (5) masked
men drove James Bliss, a negro, from Hale County; (6) J. G. Stokes,
a Republican speaker, was warned by armed ruffians not to make
another Radical speech in Hale County; (7) in Choctaw County
10 negroes had been killed and 13 wounded by whites in ambuscade;
(8) in Marengo County W. A. Lipscomb was killed for being a Repub-
lican; (9) "Simon Edward and Monroe Keeton were killed in Sum-
ter County for poKtical effect;" (10) in Pickens County negroes were
killed, tied to logs, and sent floating down the river with the following
inscription, "To Mobile with the compliments of Pickens;" (11)
W. P. Billings, a northern Republican, was killed in Sumter County
on account of his politics, and Ivey, a negro mail agent, was also
killed for his politics in Sumter; (12) there were numerous outrages
in Coffee, Macon, and Russell counties; (13) near Carrollton, two
negro speakers were hanged. Hays also declared that "only an
y88 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
i
occasional murder leaks out;" Republican speakers were always
''rotten- egged" or shot at, while not a single Democrat was injured;
the Associated Press agents were all ''rebels and Democrats," and
systematically misrepresented the Radical party to the North. J
The Tribune after investigation pronounced the Hays-Hawley^
letter "a tissue of lies from beginning to end." The correspondent
sent to Alabama investigated each reported outrage and found that
the facts were as follows : (i) Allen said that he was beaten for private
reasons by one person with the weapons of nature; (2) three negroes
were Idlled by negroes and two were shot while stealing corn; (3)
since 1867 there had been white Republican voters and officials in
Sumter County; (4) the negro societies in Hale County denied that
any of them had been ordered to disband; (5) James Bliss himself
denied that he had been driven from Hale County; (6) affidavits
of the Republican officials of Hale County denied the Stokes story;
(7) in regard to the "10 killed and 13 wounded" outrage, affidavits
were obtained from the "killed and wounded" denying that the
reported outrage had occurred (the truth was, a negro w^as beaten
by other negroes, and when the sheriff had attempted to arrest them,
they resisted and one shot was fired; the negroes swore that they
had told Hays that none was injured) ; (8) Lipscomb in person
denied that he had been murdered or injured ; (9) Edward and Keeton
lived in Mississippi and there was no evidence that either had been
murdered; (10) the story of the dead negroes tied to floating logs
was not heard in Pickens County before Hays published it, and no
foundation for it could be discovered; (11) Billings was killed by
unknown persons for purposes of robbery, and Republican officials
testified that the killing of Ivey was not political; (12) nothing could
be found to support the statement about outrages in Coffee, Macon,
and Russell counties; (13) the hanging of the two negroes near
Carrollton was denied by the Republicans of that district. The
Tribune correspondent asserted that Hays "knew that his statements
were lies when he made them"; that the whites were exercising
remarkable restraint ; that they were trying hard to keep the peace ;
that counties in Hays's district were showing signs of going Democratic,
and since his was the strongest RepubKcan district, desperate meas-
ures were necessary to hold the Republicans in line; and that the
administration press "had grossly slandered the people of the state."
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1874 789
Governor Lewis and a few of the Republicans had opposed the ''out-
rage" issue, and though troops were sent to the state it was against
the wishes of Lewis/
The Washington administration readily listened to the "outrage"
•stories and prepared to interfere in Alabama affairs, though Governor
Lewis could not be persuaded to ask for troops. President Grant
wrote, on September 3, 1874, to Belknap, Secretary of War, directing
him to hold troops in readiness to suppress the " atrocities " in Alabama,
Georgia, and South Carolina. Early in September Attorney- General
Williams began to encourage United States Marshal Healy to make
arrests under the Enforcement Acts, and on September 29, 1874,
he instructed Healy to appoint special deputies at all points where
troops were to be stationed. He promised that the deputies would
be supported by the infantry and cavalry. During October the
state was filled with deputy marshals, agents of the Department of
Justice and of the Post-office Department, and Secret Service men,
most of them in disguise, searching for opportunities to arrest whites.
Most of these men were of the lowest class, since only men of that
kind would do the work required of them. The deputies were ap-
pointed, ten to twenty-five in each county, by Marshal Healy on the
recommendation of the officials of the RepubHcan party. Charles
E. Mayer of Mobile, chairman of the Republican executive com-
mittee, nominated and secured the appointment of 217 deputy mar-
shals, vouching for them as good Republicans, all except four
Democrats who were warranted to be "mild, i.e. honest." Robert
Barbour of Montgomery and Isaac Heyman of Opelika also nomi-
nated deputies.^
The marshals did some effective work during October. In Dallas
County, where the Democrats had encouraged a bolting negro can-
didate with the intention of purchasing his office from him, the negro
bolter and General John T. Morgan were arrested for violation of
the Enforcement Acts.' In Sumter County, John Little, a negro
1 T/ie Tribune, Oct. 7, 8, and 12, 1874; The Nation, Aug. 27, and Oct. 15 and 27,
1874; Annual Cyclopaedia (1874), p. 12; Foulke, "Life of O. P. Morton," Vol. II,
p. 350. The Hays-Hawley letter was first published in the Hartford Courant and in the
Boston Daily Advertiser. It is also in the Coburn Report, pp. 1 254-1 260.
2 N. V. Tribune, Oct. 7, 1874; Coburn Report, pp. 244, 245, 1221, 1226, 1241,
1247, 1264, 1266.
^ Coburn Report, p. 512.
790 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
who had started a negro Democratic club called the ''Independent?
Thinkers," was arrested and the club was broken up.^ From Eu-
faula several prominent whites were taken, among them General
Alpheus Baker, J. M. Buford, G. L. Comer, W. H. Courtney, and
E. J. Black.'
In Livingston, where a Democratic convention was being held in
the court-house, the deputy marshals came in, pretended to search
through the whole room, and finally arrested Renfroe and Bullock,
whom, with Chiles, they handcuffed and paraded about the county,
exposing them to insult from gangs of negroes. The jailer in Sumter
County refused to give up the jail to the use of the deputy marshals
and was imprisoned in his own jail.^ About the same time Colonel
Wedmore, chairman of the Democratic county executive committee,
was arrested with forty-two other prominent Democrats, thus almost
destroying the party organization in Sumter County. Though there
were three United States commissioners in Sumter County, Wedmore
and others were carried to Mobile for trial before a United States
commissioner there, and, instead of being carried by the shortest
route, they were for political effect taken on a long detour via De-
mopolis, Selma, and Montgomery. Those arrested were never tried,
but were released just before or soon after the election.^ The whites
were thoroughly intimidated in the black districts, but were not seri-
ously molested in the white counties. The houses of nearly all the
Democrats in the Black Belt were searched by the deputies and soldiers,
and the women frightened and insulted. The officers of the army
were disgusted with the nature of the work.*"^
Such was the intimidation practised by the officials of the Federal
government. The Republican state administration took little part in
the persecutions, because it was weak, because it was not desirous
of being held responsible, and because some of the prominent officials
were certain that the intimidation policy would injure their party.
In the white counties there w^as considerably less effort to influence the
elections. But by no means was all of the intimidation on the Repub-
1 Coburn Report, p. 931.
2 Ezifaula News, Sept. 3, 1874; Coburn Report, p. 855.
8 Coburn Report, pp. 679, 681, 746.
* Coburn Report, pp. 514, 515, 681, 1239.
^ Coburn Report, pp. 680, 682 ; •* An appeal to Governor Lewis from the People of
Sumter."
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1874 791
lican side. In the counties where the whites were numerous the
determination was freely expressed that the elections were to be carried
by the whites. There were few open threats, very little violence, and
none of the kind of persecution employed by the other side. But the
whites had made up their minds, and the other side knew it, or rather
felt it in the air, and were thereby intimidated. Besides the silent
forces of ostracism, etc., already described, the whites found many
other means of influencing the voters on both sides. Where Radical
posters were put up announcing speakers and principles, the Democrats
would tear them down and post instead caricatures of Spencer, Lewis,
Hays, or Rapier, or declarations against ''social equality enforced
by law." In white districts some obnoxious speakers were "rotten-
egged," others forbidden to speak and asked to leave. One Radical
speaks complained that whites in numbers came to hear him, sat on
the front seats with guns across their knees, blew tin horns, and asked
him embarrassing questions about "political bacon" and race equahty
under the Civil Rights Bill. "Blacklists" of active negro politicians
were kept and the whites warned against employing them; "pledge
meetings" were held in some counties and negroes strenuously advised
to sign the "pledge" to vote for the white man's party. "The
Barbour County Fever" spread over the state. This was a term used
for any process for making life miserable for white Radicals. There
was something like a revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the White Leagues
or clubs whose members were sworn to uphold "white" principles.
In many towns these clubs were organized as military companies.
Some of them applied to Governor Lewis for arms and for enrolment
as militia. But he was afraid to organize any white militia because it
might overthrow his administration, and, on the other hand, he also
refused to give arms to negro militia because he feared race conflicts.
By private subscription, often with money from the North, the white
companies were armed and equipped. They drilled regularly and
made long practice marches through the country. They kept the
peace, they made no threats, but their influence was none the less
forcible. The Democratic politicians were gpposed to these organ-
izations, but the latter persisted and several companies went in uni-
form to Houston's inauguration. The Republicans found cause for
anxiety in the increasing frequency of Confederate veterans' reunions,
and it is said that cavalry companies and squadrons of ex-Confcd-
792 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
^
erates began to drill again, much to the alarm of the blacks.^ In
truth, some of the whites were exasperated to the point where they
were about ready to fight again. As one man expressed it: "The
attempt to force upon the country this social equality, miscalled
Civil Rights Bill, may result in another war. The southern people
do not desire to take up arms again, but may be driven to
desperation."^
The feelings of the poorer whites and those who had suffered most
from Radical rule are reflected in the following speeches. A negro
who was canvassing for Rapier, the negro congressman, was told by
a white: "You might as well quit. We have made up our minds to
carry the state or kill half of you negroes on election day. We begged
you long enough and have persuaded you, but you will vote for the
Radical party." Another white man said to negro Republicans,
"God damn you, you have voted my land down to half a dollar an
acre, and I wish the last one of you was down in the bottom of hell. "^
The Democratic campaign was managed by W. L. Bragg, an able
organizer, assisted by a competent staff. The state had not been so
thoroughly canvassed since 1861. The campaign fund was the largest
in the history of the state ; every man who was able, and many who
were not, contributed ; assistance also came from northern Democrats,
and northern capitalists who had investments in the South or who
owned part of the legal bonds of the state. The election officials
were all Radicals and with Federal aid had absolute control over the
election. If inclined to fraud, as in 1868-1872, they could easily count
themselves in, but they clearly understood that no fraud would be tol-
erated. To prevent the importation of negroes from Georgia and
Mississippi guards were stationed all around the state. To prevent
"repeating," which had formerly been done by massing the negroes
at the county seat for their first vote and then sending them home
to vote again, the whites made lists of all voters, white and black,
kept an accurate account of all Democratic votes cast, and demanded
that the votes be thus counted. So well did the Democrats know their
resources that a week before the election an estimate of the vote was
made that turned out to be almost exactly correct. In Randolph
1 Coburn Report, pp. 236, 244, 245, 289, 291, 702, 1201, 1231-1235.
2 Union Springs Herald and Times, quoted in State Journal, June 13, 1 874.
8 Coburn Report, pp. 130, 948.
THE ELECTION OF 1874 793
County, several days before the election, the Democratic manager
reported a certain number of votes for the Democrats; on election
day two votes more than he estimated were cast.
Tons of campaign literature were distributed mainly by freight,
express, and messengers, the mails having proved unsafe, being in the
hands of the Radicals. For the same reason pohtical messages were
sent by telegraph. Every man who could speak had to "go on
the stump. " Toward the close of the campaign a hundred speeches a
day were made by speakers sent out from headquarters. The lawyers
did little or no business during October ; it is said that of seventy-five
lawyers in Montgomery all but ten were usually out of the city making
speeches.^
The Election of 1874
The election of 1874 passed off with less violence than was expected ;
in fact, it was quieter than any previous campaign. The Democrats
were assured of success and had no desire to lose the fruits of victory
on account of riots and disorder. So the responsible people strained
every nerve to preserve the peace. A regiment of soldiers was scattered
throughout the Black Belt and showed a disposition to neglect the
affairs of the blacks. But here, in the counties where the numerous
arrests had been made, the blacks voted in full strength. In fact, with
few exceptions, both parties voted in full strength, and, as regards the
counting of the votes, it was the fairest election since the negroes began
to vote. There were instances in white counties of negroes being
forced to vote for the Democrats, while in the Black Belt negro
Democrats were mobbed and driven from the polls. But the negro
Democrats resorted to expedients to get in their tickets. In one
county where the Democratic tickets were smooth at the top and the
negro tickets perforated, the Democrats prepared perforated tickets
for negro Democrats which went unquestioned. In other places
special tickets were printed for the use of negro Democrats with the
picture of General Grant or of Spencer on them and these passed the
hurried Radical inspection and were cast for the Democrats. In
Marengo County the Democrats purchased a Republican candidate,
1 For information in regard to the campaign of 1874 I am indebted to several of
those who took part in it, and especially to Mr. T. J. Rutledge, now state bank exami-
ncr, who was then secretary of the Democratic campaign committee.
794
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
who agreed for $300 that he would not be elected. By his " sign of the
button," sent out among the negroes, the latter were instructed to
vote a certain colored ticket which did not conform to law and hence
was not counted. Other candidates agreed not to qualify aft
election, thus leaving the appointment to the governor.
In the Black Belt, now as before, the negroes were marshalled in
regiments of 300 to 1 500 under men who wrote orders purporting to be
signed by General Grant, directing the negroes to vote for him. In
Greene County 1400 uniformed negroes took possession of the polls,
and excluded the few whites.^ A riot in Mobile was brought on by
the close supervision over election affairs, which was objected to by a
drunken negro who wanted to vote twice, and who declared that he
wanted "to wade in blood up to his boot tops." The negro was
killed. A conflict at Belmont, where a negro was killed, and another
at Gainesville were probably caused by the endeavor of the whites to
exclude negroes who had been imported from Mississippi. By
rioting the Republicans had everything to gain and the Democrats
everything to lose, and while it is impossible in most cases to ascertain
which party fired the first shot or struck the first blow, the evidence
is clear that the desperate Radical whites encouraged the blacks to
violent conduct in order to cause collisions between the races and thus
secure Federal interference. In Eufaula occurred the most serious
riot of the Reconstruction period that occurred in Alabama. The
negroes came armed and threatening to the polls, which were held by
a Republican sheriff and forty Republican deputies. Judge Keils,
a carpet-bagger, had advised the blacks to come to Eufaula to vote:
''You go to town; there are several troops of Yankees there; these
damned Democrats won't shoot a frog. You come armed and do as
you please. " The Democrats were glad to have the troops, who were
disgusted with the intimidation work of the previous month. Order
was kept until a negro tried to vote the Democratic ticket and was
discovered and mobbed by other blacks. The whites tried to protect
him and some negro fired a shot. Then the riot began. The few
whites were heavily armed and the negroes also. The deputies, it
was said, lost their heads and fired indiscriminately. When the fight
was over it was found that ten whites were wounded, and four negroes
killed and sixty wounded. The Federal troops came leisurely in after
1 Coburn Report, pp. 125, 530.
THE ELECTION OF 1874
795
it was over, and surrounded the polls. The course of the Federal
troops in Eufaula was much as it was elsewhere. They camped some
distance from the polls, and when their aid was demanded by the
Republicans the captain either directly refused to interfere, or con-
sulted his orders or his telegrams or his law dictionary. At last he
offered to notify the white men wanted by the marshal to meet the
latter and be arrested.
Another commander,
who took possession of
the polls in Opelika
in order to prevent a
riot, was censured by
General McDowell,
the department com-
mander. The troops
were weary of such
work, and their orders
from General McDow-
ell were very vague. ^
After the election, as
was to be expected,
an outcry arose from
the Radicals that the
troops had in every
case failed to do their
duty.
When the votes
were counted, it ap-
peared that the Demo-
crats had triumphed.
Houston had 107,118
votes to 93,928 for Lewis. Two years before Herndon (Democrat)
had received 81,371 votes to 89,868 for Lewis. The presidential
campaign in 1872 had assisted Lewis. Grant ran far ahead of the
Radical state ticket. The legislature of 1874-187 5 was to be com-
posed as follows: Senate, 13 Republicans (of whom 6 were negroes)
1 Coburn Report, pp. xix, 43, 80-84, 427, 434, 476, 794, 850, 851, 949, 1 200-1 204;
Tuskegee A^eius, Nov. 5, 1874; State Journal ^ Oct. and Nov., 1874.
ELECTION OF 1874 FOR GOVERNOB.
I I Democratic Majority.
Radical Majority, Houston, (Dem). 107,118.
^:ggj Nearly evenly divided, Lewis, (Rad). 93^928.
O Black Counties.
® U.S. Troops posted.
796 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
and 20 Democrats; House, 40 Republicans (of whom 29 were ne-
groes) and 60 Democrats.^
The whites were exceedingly pleased with their victory, while
the Republicans took defeat as something expected. There were,
of course, the usual charges of outrage, Ku Kluxism, and the intimi-
dation of the negro vote, but these were fewer than ever before.
There was consider-
able complaint that
the Federal troops had
sided always with the
whites in the election
troubles. The Repub-
lican leaders knew, of
course, that for their
own time at least Ala-
bama was to remain
in the hands of the
whites. The blacks
were surprisingly in-
different after they
discovered that there
was to be no return
to slavery, so much
so that many whites
feared that their indif-
ference masked some
deep-laid scheme
against the victors.
The heart of the
Black Belt still re-
mained under the rule
of the carpet-bagger and the black. The Democratic state executive
Committee considered that enough had been gained for one election,
so it ordered that no whites should contest on technical grounds
alone the offices in those black counties. Other methods gradually
gave the Black Belt to the whites. No Democrat would now go on
the bond of a Republican official and numbers were unable to make
1 Annual Cyclopaedia (1874), p. 17 ; Tribune Almanac, 1875.
ELECTION OF 1876 FOB GOVERNOR.
O Black Counties
I I Democratic Majority.
Republican Majority.
undei-scoring lines, a heavy mlnorityvote,
85!? to 49^.
Houston (Dem.), P9,255, Woodrtlfr,(Rep), 55,582.
No Republican vote in 1878.
THE ELECTION OF 1874 797
bond; their offices thus becoming vacant, the governor appointed
Democrats. Others sold out to the whites, or neglected to make
bond, or made bonds which were later condemned by grand juries.
This resulted in many offices going to the whites, though most of them
were still in the hands of the Republicans.^
Houston's two terms were devoted to setting affairs in order.
The administration was painfully economical. Not a cent was spent
beyond what was absolutely necessary. Numerous superfluous
offices were cut off at once and salaries reduced. The question' of
the public debt was settled. To prevent future interference by
Federal authorities the time for state elections was changed from
November, the time of the Federal elections, to August, and this
separation is still in force. The whites now demanded a new con-
stitution. Their ob^'ections to the constitution of 1868 were numerous :
it was forced upon the whites, who had no voice in framing it; it
'' reminds us of unparalleled wrongs"; it had not secured good gov-
ernment; it was a patchwork unsuited to the needs of the state;
it had wrecked the credit of the state by allowing the indorsement*
of private corporations; it provided for a costly administration,
especially for a complicated and unworkable school system which
had destroyed the schools ; there was no power of expansion for the
judiciary; and above all, it was not legally adopted.^
The Republicans declared against a new constitution as meant
to destroy the school system, provide imprisonment for debt, abolish
exemption from taxation, disfranchise and otherwise degrade the
blacks. By a vote of 77,763 to 59,928, a convention was ordered
by the people, and to it were elected 80 Democrats, 12 Republicans,
and 7 Independents. A new constitution was framed and adopted
in 1875.^
1 Coburn Report, pp. 239, 253, 701, 703; The Nation.^ov. 30, 1874; Tuskegee
Neivs, Dec, 10, 1874.
2 In the code of Alabama (1876), pp. 100-120, is printed the "Constitution (so-
called) of the State of Alabama, 1868," as the code terms it. The last three amend-
ments are thus noted, "Adoption proclaimed by the Secretary of State, Dec. 18, 1865 "
(or July 20, 1868, or March 30, 1870). The other amendments have notes stating date
of submission and date of ratification by the state. See code of 1876, pp. 27, 28 ; also
code of 1896.
8 The negroes voted against it. Some of them were told that, if adopted, a war
with Spain would result and that the blacks, being the " only truly loyal," would have to
do most of the fighting against the Spanish, who would land at Apalachicola, Milton,
798
CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
Later Phases of State Politics
From 1875 to 1889 neither national party was able to control
both houses of Congress. Consequently no "force" legislation
could be directed against the white people of Alabama, who had con-
trol and were making secure their control of the state administration.
The black vote was not
^
eliminated, but gradually
fell under the control of
the • native whites when
the carpet-bagger and
scalawag left the Black
Belt. In order to gain
control of the black vote,
carpet-bag methods were
sometimes resorted to,
though there was not as
much fraud and violence
used as is believed, for
the simple reason that it
was not necessary; it
was little more difficult
now to make the blacks
vote for the Democrats
than it had been to make
Republicans of them ;
the mass of them voted,
in both cases, as the
stronger power willed it.
The Black Belt came finally into Democratic control in 1880, when
the party leaders ordered the Alabama Republicans to vote the
Greenback ticket. The negroes did not understand the meaning
of the manoeuvre, did not vote in force, and lost their last strong-
hold. A few white Republicans and a few black leaders united
to maintain the Republican state organization in order that they
and Eufaula. See Tuskegee News, Dec. 9, 1875. ^^^ ^^^ ^" regard to the new consti-
tution, Tuskegee News, June 3, 1875; "Northern Alabama Illustrated," pp. 51, 52;
Annual Cyclopaedia (1875), P- ^4 J Ho. Ex. Doc, No. 46,43d Cong., 2d Sess. ; " Report
of the Joint Committee in regard to the Amendment of the Constitution."
ELECTION OF 1880 FOR GOVERNOR
I I Democratic majority O Black Cos
Republican - Greenback majority.
Dem. =133,878 to 42,303 Rep.
Underscoring lines, a heavy minority
vote, 25^ to 49 5!.
LATER PHASES OF STATE POLITICS
799
might control the division of spoils coming from the Republican
administration at Washington. Most of them were or became
Federal officials within the state. It was not to their interest that
their numbers should increase, for the shares in the spoils would
then be smaller. Success in the elections was now the last thing
desired.
This clique of office-holders was almost destroyed by the two
Democratic administrations under Cleveland, and has been unhappy
under later Republican
administrations ; but the
Federal administration
in the state is not yet
respectable. Dissatisfac-
tion on the part of the
genuine Republicans in
the northern counties re-
sulted in the formation of
a ''Lily White" faction
which demanded that the
negro be dropped as a
campaign issue and that
an attempt be made to
build up a decent white
Republican party. The
opposing faction has been
called "The Black and
Tans," and has held to
the negro. The national
party organization and
the administration have
refused to recognize the
demands of the ''Lily Whites"; and it would be exceedingly embar-
rassing to go back on the record of the past in regard to the negro as
the basis of the Republican party in the South. In consequence
the growth of a reputable white party has been hindered.
The Populist movement promised to cause a healthy division of
the whites into two parties. But the tactics of the national Republi-
can organization in trying to profit by this division, by running in
O Black Counties.
□ Dem. majority, vote = 139,910
Rep. majority, vote = 42,440
Underscoring lines, a heavy minority
vote. 25% to 49^.
800 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA
the negroes, resulted in a close reunion of the discordant whites,
the Populists furnishing to the reunited party some new principles
and many new leaders, while the Democrats furnished the name,
traditions, and organization.
To make possible some sort of division and debate among the
whites the system of primary elections was adopted. In these elec-
tions the whites were able
to decide according to the
merits of the candidate and
the issues involved. The
candidate of the whites
chosen in the primaries
was easily elected. This
plan had tlie merit of plac-
ing the real contest among
the whites, and there was
no danger of race troubles
in elections. In the Black
Belt the primary system
was legalized and served
by its regulations to con-
fine the election contests
to regularly nominated
candidates, and hence to
whites, the blacks having
lost their organization.
The Fourteenth and
Fifteenth amendments in
their operation gave un-
due political influence to
the whites of the Black Belt, and this was opposed by whites of other
districts. It also resulted in serious corruption in elections. There
was always danger in the Black Belt that the Republicans, taking
advantage of divisions among the whites, would run in the negroes
again. There were instances when the whites simply counted out
the negro vote or used ''shotgun" methods to prevent a return to
the intolerable conditions of Reconstruction. The people grew weary
of the eternal "negro in the woodpile," and a demand arose for a
I I Democratic majority-vote =67,763
Republican majority-vote =24,421
Underscoring lines, heavy minority,
vote -= 25^ to 50^
Black counties
ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR 1902.
UNDER NEW CONSTITUTION
LATER PHASES OF STATE POLITICS 8oi
revision of the constitution in order to eliminate the mass of the
negro voters, to do away with corruption in the elections and to leave
the whites free. The conservative leaders, like Governors Jones and
Oates, were rather opposed to a disfranchising movement. The
Black Belt whites were somewhat doubtful, but the mass of the
whites were determined, and the work was done ; the stamp of legality
was thus placed upon the long-finished work of necessity, and the
"white man's movement" had reached its logical end.^
The mistakes and failures of Reconstruction are clear to all.
Whether any successes were achieved by the Congressional plan
has been a matter for debate. It has been strongly asserted that
Reconstruction, though failing in many important particulars, suc-
ceeded in others. The successes claimed may be summarized as
follows: (i) there was no more legislation for the negro similar to
that of 1865-66, that following the Reconstruction being "infinitely
milder"; (2) Reconstruction gave the negroes a civil status that a
century of "restoration" would not have accomplished, for though
the right to vote is a nulhty, other undisputed rights of the black are
due to the Reconstruction; the unchangeable organic laws of the
state and of the United States favor negro suffrage, which will come
the sooner for being thus theoretically made possible ; (3) Reconstruc-
tion prevented the southern leaders from returning to Washington
as irreconcilables, and gave them troubles enough to keep them busy
until a new generation grew up which accepted the results of war;
(4) by organizing the blacks it made them independent of white con-
trol in politics; (5) it gave the negro an independent church; (6) it
gave the negro a right to education and gave to both races the public
school system; (7) it made the negro economically free and showed
that free labor was better than slave labor; (8) it destroyed the former
1 Most whites believe that eliminating the negro has solved the problem of the negro
in politics. It seems to me that this is a superficial view. The black counties are still
represented in party conventions and legislature in proportion to population. The white
counties are jealous of this undue influence and would like to reduce this representation.
The party leaders have been able to repress this jealousy, but it is not forgotten. Before
it will submit to loss of representation the Black Belt, it is believed, will gradually admit
to the franchise those negroes who have been excluded, and they will vote with the
whites. Such a course will undoubtedly cause political realignments. Notice on the
maps that the Republican strongholds are now in the white counties. The "Lily
Whites " are increasing in numbers.
3F
802 CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION IN ALABAMA '
leaders of the whites and "freed them from the baleful influence
of old political leaders"; in general, as Sumner said, the ballot to
the negro was "a peacemaker, a schoolmaster, a protector," soon
making him a fairly good citizen, and secured peace and order — the
"political hell" through which the whites passed being a neces-
sary discipline which secured the greatest good to the greatest
number.^
On the other hand, it may be maintained (i) that the intent of the
legislation of 1 865-1 866 has been entirely misunderstood, that it was
intended on the whole for the benefit of the negro as well as of the
white, and that it has been left permanently off the statute book, not
because the whites have been taught better by Reconstruction, but
because of the amendments which prohibit in theory what has all
along been practised (hence the gross abuses of peonage) ;
(2) that the theoretical rights of the negro have been no inducement
to grant him actual privileges, and that these theoretical rights have
not proven so permanent as was supposed before the disfranchising
movement spread through the South; (3) that the generation after
Reconstruction is more irreconcilable than the conservative leaders
who were put out of politics in 1865-1867 — that the latter were will-
ing to give the negro a chance, while the former, able, radical, and
supported by the people, find less and less place for the negro ; (4) that
if the blacks were united, so were the whites, and in each case the
advantage may be questioned ; (5) that the value of the negro church
is doubtful; (6) that as in politics, so in education, the negro has no
opportunities now that were not freely offered him in 1 865-1 866, and
the school system is not a product of Reconstruction, but came near
being destroyed by it; (7) that negro free labor is not as efficient
as slave labor was, and the negro as a cotton producer has lost his
supremacy and his economic position is not at all assured; (8) that
the whites have acquired new leaders, but the change has been on
the whole from conservatives to radicals, from friends of the negro
to those indifferent to him. In short, a careful study of conditions
in Alabama since 1865 will not lead one to the conclusion that the
1 These views are set forth most clearly by Alexander Johnston in Lalor's " Cyclo-
paedia of Political Science," Vol. Ill, p. 556. See also McCall, " Thaddeus Stevens," and
his article in the Atlantic Monthly, June, 1901 ; Blaine, "Twenty Years"; Schurz,
in Mc duress Magazine, Jan., 1905 ; Grosvenor, in Forufn, Aug., 1900.
LATER PHASES OF STATE POLITICS 803
black race in that state has any rights or privileges or advantages
that were not offered by the native whites in 1 865-1 866.
For the misgovernment of Reconstruction, the negro, who was in
no way to blame, has been made to suffer, since those who were really
responsible could not be reached; so politically the races are hostile;
the Black Belt has had, until recently, an undue and disturbing
influence in white poHtics ; the Federal official body and the Repub-
iican organization in the state have not been respectable, and the
growth of a white Republican party has been prevented ; the whites
have for thirty-five years distrusted and disliked the Federal admin-
istration which, until recent years, showed Httle disposition to treat
them with any consideration ; ^ the rule of the carpet-bagger, scala-
wag, and negro, and the methods used to overthrow that rule, weak-
ened the respect of the people for the ballot, for law, for government ;
the estrangement of the races and the social-equality teachings of
the reconstructionists have made it much less safe than in slavery
for whites to reside near negro communities, and the negro is more
exposed to imposition by low whites.
In recent years there have been many signs of improvement, but
only in proportion as the principles and practices that the white
people of the state understand are those of Reconstruction are re-
jected or superseded. To the northern man Reconstruction probably
meant and still means something quite different from what the white
man of Alabama understands by the term. But as the latter under-
stands it, he has accepted none of its essential principles and intends
to accept none of its so-called successes.
In destroying all that was old. Reconstruction probably removed
some abuses; from the new order some permanent good must have
resulted. But credit for neither can rightfully be claimed until it
can be shown that those results were impossible under the regime
destroyed.
1 For a belated recognition of the reasons for this, see H. L. Nelson, " Three
Months of Roosevelt," in the Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1902.
I
APPENDIX I
:
PRODUCTION OF COTTON IN ALABAMA. 1860-1900
{a) Typical black counties with boundaries unchanged. (^) Typical white countie
County
i860
1870
1880
1890
1900
bales
bales
bales
bales
bales
Autauga
17,329
7,965
7,944
10,431
14,348
Baker (Chilton)
—
1,360
3,534
6,233
9,932
Baldwin
2,172
87
638
1,663
531
Barbour (a)
44,518
17,011
26,063
33,440
29,395
Bibb .
8,303
3,973
4,843
5,216
6,535
Blount {b) .
1,071
950
4,442
9,748
11,449
Bullock
—
17,972
22,578
30,547
31,774
Butler
13,489
5,854
11,895
18,200
21,147
Calhoun
",573
3,038
10,848
",504
",554
Chambers .
24,589
7,868
19,476
27,276
30,676
Cherokee {b)
10,562
1,807
10,777
11,870
12,767
Choctaw (rt)
17,252
6,439
9,054
13,586
13,091
Clarke {a) .
16,225
5,713
11,097
16,380
16,594
Clay {b) .
—
1,143
4,973
8,250
io,459
Cleburne {b)
—
873
3,600
5,389
5,035
Coffee {b) .
5,294
2,004
4,788
11,791
16,747
Colbert
—
3,936
9,OI2
3,956
9,234
Conecuh {b)
6,850
1,539
4,633
8,167
9,801
Coosa .
13,990
3,893
8,411
10,141
",370
Covington {b)
2,021
689
1,158
2,740
5,969
Crenshaw (^b)
—
4,638
8,173
13,442
18,909
Cullman (^)
—
—
378
5,268
9,374
Dale {b) .
7,836
4,273
6,224
16,259
17,868
Dallas (a) .
63,410
24,819
33,534
42,819
48,273
De Kalb {b)
1,498
205
2,859
4,573
9,860
Elmore (^b) .
—
7,295
9,771
16,871
18,458
Escambia .
—
605
94
462
1,131
Etowah {b) .
—
1,383
6,571
8,482
11,651
P'ayette {b)
5,462
1,909
4,268
6,141 •
9,128
Franklin
15,592
2,072
3,603
2,669
6,047
Geneva {b) .
—
420
1,112
7,158
9,813
804
APPENDIX
805
County
i860
1870
1880
1890
1900
bales
bales
bales
bales
bales
Greene {a) .
57,858
9,910
15,811
20,901
23,681
Hale ....
—
18,573
18,093
28,973
28,645
Henry {b) . . .
13,034
7,127
12,573
23,738
27,281
Jackson {b)
2,713
2,339
6,235
5,358
5,602
Jefferson {b)
4,940
1,470
5,333
4,829
7,044
Lamar (Sanford) {b) .
—
1,825
5,015
6,998
10,118
Lauderdale .
11,050
5,457
9,270
5,156
9,708
Lawrence .
15,434
9,243
13,791
9,248
12,541
Lee .
—
",591
13,189
18,332
22,431
Limestone .
i5,"5
7,319
15,724
8,093
14,887
Lowndes {a)
53,664
18,369
29,356
40,388
39,839
Macon {a) .
41,119
11,872
14,580
19,099
20,434
Madison
22,119
12,180
20,679
13,150
20,842
Marengo {a)
62,428
23,614
23,481
31,651
38,392
Marion (Z*)
4,285
463
2,240
4,454
6,309
Marshall {b)
4,931
2,340
5,358
8,118
13,318
Mobile
440
^^1
I
24
116
Monroe {a)
18,226
6,172
10,421
15,919
17,101
Montgomery (a).
58,880
25,517
31,732
45,827
39,202
Morgan {b)
6,326
4,389
6,133
6,227
9,313
Perry {a) .
44,603
13,449
21,627
24,873
29,690
Pickens (a)
29,843
8,263
17,283
18,904
21,485
Pike {b) .
24,527
7,192
15,136
25,879
34,757
Randolph (3)
6,427
2,246
7,475
10,348
17,148
Russell {a).
38,728
20,796
19,442
20,521
21,174
Shelby {b) . . ■ .
6,463
2,194
6,643
7,308
10,193
St. Clair {b)
4,189
1,244
6,028
7,136
9,411
Sumter (a) . .
36,584
11,647
22,211
25,768
31,906
Talladega .
18,243
5,697
11,832
15,686
21,563
Tallapoosa {b) .
17,399
5,446
14,161
20,337
24,955
Tuscaloosa .
26,035
6,458
^^^31
13,008
20,041
Walker {b) ,
2,766
928
2,754
3,2"
4,746
Washington
3,449
1,803
1,246
2,030
2,213
Wilcox {a).
48,749
20,095
26,745
32,582
35,005
Winston {b)
352
205
568
1,464
3,686
Totals .
989,955
429,482
699,654
915,210
1,093.697
APPENDIX II
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION
Males of Voting Age in 1900
Registered Voters in 1905
County
White
Black
White
Black
Autauga ....
1,524
2,3"
1,554
35
Baldwin
2,096
991
1,390
206
Barbour
2,889
4,20I
2,846
46
Bibb .
2,701
1,598
2,725
59
Blount .
4,401
417
3,182
—
Bullock
1,415
5,168
1,291
14
Butler .
2,766
2,617
2,739
2
Calhoun
5.390
2,380
4,892
130
Chambers
3,441
3,380
3,098
28
Cherokee
3.896
702
3,004
27
Chilton
2,852
707
2,970
I
Choctaw
1,697
1,929
1,496
29
Clarke .
2,652
3,103
2,485
158
Clay .
3,220
393
3,501
—
Cleburne
2,565
181
2,280
—
Coffee .
3,508
996
3,334
—
Colbert
2,927
2,030
2,233
22
Conecuh
2,110
1,608
2,079
7
Coosa .
2,338
942
2,134
—
Covington
2,803
786
2,857
3
Crenshaw
3,062
1,156
2,982
—
Cullman
3,359
5
4,641
4
Dale .
3,492
1,002
3,021
II
Dallas
2,360
9,871
2,419
52
De Kalb
4,819
226
2,758
4,388
3,030
—
Elmore
3,202
54
Escambia
1,628
821
1,676
46
Etowah
5,140
1,031
4,186
39
Fayette
2,698
338
2,563
7
Franklin
2,989
634
2,600
12
Geneva
3,355
981
2,873
30
Greene
852
4,344
739
104
806
APPENDIX
807
Males of Voting Age in 1900
Registered Voters in 1905
C •NTt-W
White
Black
White
Black
Hale
1,358
5,370
1,362
92
Henry \
Houston J
4,904
2,933
2,072
—
(new
county)
2,757
—
Jackson
5,939
731
4,704
73
Jefferson
21,036
18,472
18,315
352
Lamar
2,715
592
2,356
7
Lauderdale
4,235
1,586
3,305
76
Lawrence
2,761
1,426
2,367
49
Lee .
2,988
3,472
2,652
12
Limestone
2,832
2,050
2,722
28
Lowndes
1,121
6,455
1,085
57
Macon
1,042
3,782
917
65
Madison
5,788
4,397
4,479
112
Marengo
2,095
6,143
2,043
302
Marion
2,735
144
2,698
25
Marshall
4,595
333
4,251
—
Mobile
7,934
7,371
7,295
193
Monroe
2,307
2,570
2,178
40
Montgomery
5,087
11,429
4,995
53
Morgan
4,987
h7^3
4,506
60
Perry .
1,574
5,028
1,659
90
Pickens
2,408
2,846
2,217
III
Pike .
3,598
2,611
3,126
26
Randolph
3,457
978
3.363
13
Russell
1,433
3,961
1,170
191
Shelby
3,611
1,672
3,712
19
St. Clair
3,777
712
3,340
50
Sumter
1,391
5,304
1,244
57
Talladega
3,934
3,814
3,303
81
Tallapoosa
4,185
2,056
4,166
33
Tuscaloosa
5,100
3,413
4,153
165
Walker
4,582
1,351
4,894
I
Washington
1,386
1,179
1,339
53
Wilcox
1,686
5,967
1,522
41
Winston
1,884
3
1,833
I
Totals
224,212
181,471
205,278
3,654
Number of whites of voting age not registered, estimated at 45,000.
Number of blacks of voting age not registered, estimated at 190,000.
Foreign whites of voting age, 8082.
Number of whites registered but unable to comply with other requirements for voting,
estimated at 60,000.
INDEX
Abolition sentiment in Alabama, lo.
Agriculture, during the war, 232; since the
war, 710-734.
Alabama, admitted to Union, 7; secedes, 36;
readmitted, 547.
Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad, 591-600.
American Missionary Association and negro
education, 459, 462, 463, 617, 620.
Amnesty proclamation of President Johnson,
349; published by military commanders
in Alabama, 409.
Amusements during the war, 241.
Andrew, Bishop, and the separation of the
Methodist church, 22.
Anti Ku Klux, 690.
Anti-slavery sentiment in Alabama, 10.
Applegate, A. J., lieutenant-governor, 736.
Army, U. S., and the civic authorities, 410;
in conflict with Federal court, 414; rela-
tions with the people, 417-420; used in
elections, 694-701, 746, 756, 789, 794.
Athens sacked by Colonel Turchin, 63.
Bacon used to influence elections, 785.
Banks and banking during the war, 162.
Baptist church, separation of, 22; declaration
in regard to the state of the country, 222 ;
during Reconstruction, 639 ; relations with
negroes, 642.
" Barbour County Fever," 709.
Bingham, D. H., mentioned, 346, 350, 402;
in convention of 1867, 526 ; in Union
League, 557.
Birney, James G., mentioned, 10.
Black Belt, during slavery, 710 ; at the end of
the war, 713; share system in, 722; de-
cadence of, during Reconstruction, 726.
" Black Code," or " Black Laws," 378.
" Black Republican " party arraigned, 20.
Blockade-running, 183.
Bonded debt of Alabama, 580-586.
Bonds, of state, 580; of counties and towns,
580, 581; fraudulent issues, 581, 582; of
railroads, 587-607 ; fraudulent indorse-
ments, 596-606.
Boyd, Alexander, killed by Ku Klux, 686.
Bragg, W. L., Democratic campaign man-
ager, 793.
Brooks, William M., president of convention
of 1861, 28 ; letter to President Davis, 112 ;
advocates limited negro suffrage, 388.
Brown, John, plans negro uprising in Ala-
bama, 18.
Buchanan, Admiral Franklin, at battle of
Mobile Bay, 69.
Buck, A. E., carpet-bagger, in convention of
1867, 518 ; elected to Congress, 750.
Buckley, C. W., carpet-bagger, agent of
Freedmen's Bureau, 426, 437, 440, 448,
458 ; in convention of 1867, 518 ; elected
to Congress, 737 ; on Ku Klux Committee,
702; sides with the Robinson faction, 774.
Bulger, M. J., in secession convention, 29, 31,
33, 38 ; candidate for governor, 372 ; in
politics, 513.
Busteed, Richard, Federal judge, on Four-
teenth Amendment, 394; in Radical poli-
tics, 511. 744. 774.
Byrd, William M., " Union " leader, 15.
Calhoun Democrats, 11.
Callis, John B., carpet-bagger, agent of Freed-
men's Bureau, 426; in Union League, 557;
elected to Congress, 738.
Campaign, of 1867, 503-516 ; of 1868, 493, 747 ;
of 1870, 751; of 1872, 754; of 1874, 782-
797-
Carpet-bag and negro rule, 571 et seq.
Carpet-baggers, in convention of 1867, 517,
518, 530; in Congress, 738, 749, 754. 761.
See also Republicans.
Chain gang abolished, 393.
Charleston convention of i860, 18.
Churches, separation of, '21-2.^; during the
war, 222; seized by the Federal army and
the northern churches, 227 ; condition
after the war, 325, 326 ; attitude toward
negro education and religion, 225, 457,
641 ; during Reconstruction, 636-652.
Civil Rights Bill of 1866, 393.
Civil War in Alabama, 61-78 ; seizure of the
forts, 61; operations in north Alabama,
62; Streight's Raid, 67 ; Rousseau's Raid,
68; operations in south Alabama, 69;
Wilson's Raid, 71 ; destruction by the
armies, 74.
Clanton, Gen. James H., organizes opposition
to Radicals, 508,512; on negro education,
625, 630; on the religious situation, 638.
Clay, Senator C. C, speech on witlidrawal
from U. S. Senate, 25 ; arrested by Feder-
als, 262.
809
8io
INDEX
I
Clayton, Judge Henry D., charge to the Pike
County grand jury on the negro question,
385.
Clemens, Jere (or Jeremiah), in secession
convention, 29, 34, 47; mentioned, 64, iii ;
deserter, 125, 127, 143; advocates Recon-
struction, 125, 144, 145.
Clews & Company, financial agents, 592, 596,
597.
Cloud, N. B., superintendent of public in-
struction, 610-632.
Cobb, W. R. W., "Union" leader, 16; dis-
loyal to Confederacy, 139.
Colleges during the war, 212.
Colonies of negroes, 421, 444.
Color line in politics, 779.
Commercial conventions, 25.
Commissioners sent to southern states, 46, 48.
Composition of population of Alabama, 3, 4.
Concentration camps of negroes, 421, 422,
444.
" Condition of Affairs in the South," 311.
Confederate property confiscated, 285.
Confederate States, established, 39-42 ; Con-
gress of, 130 ; enrolment laws, 92, 98 ;
finance in Alabama, 162-183.
Confederate text-books, 217.
Confiscation, proposed in secession conven-
tion, 48; by United States, 284 et seq.;
frauds, 284, 290; of cotton, 290; of lands,
425; supports Freedmen's Bureau, 431;
belief of negroes in, 446, 447; for taxes,
578.
Congress, C. S., Alabama delegation to, 130.
Congress, U. S., rejects Johnson's plan, 377,
405 ; imposes new conditions, 391 ; forces
carpet-bag government on Alabama, 547-
552 ; members of, from Alabama, 737, 749,
754,761.
" Conquered province " theory of Reconstruc-
tion, 339.
Conscription, 92-108 ; enrolment laws, 92-98 ;
trouble between state and Confederate
authorities, 96-98.
Conservative party, 398, 401, 512. See also
Democratic party.
Constitution, of 1865, 366, 367; of 1868, 535,
vote on, 538, rejected, 541 ; imposed by
Congress, 547-552, 797; of 1875, 797; of
1902, 800.
Contraband trade, 189.
" Convention " candidates in 1868, 493, 530.
Convention, of 1861, 27 ; of 1865, 359 ; of 1867,
491,517; of 1875, 797.
Cooperationists, 28 ; policy of, in secession
convention, 30 ; speeches of, 32 et seq.
" Cotton is King," 184.
Cotton, exported through the lines, 187, 191-
193; confiscated, 290^/ j^(/.; agents prose-
cuted for stealing, 297, 413; cotton tax.
303 ; production of, in Alabama, 710-734,
804.
County and local officials during Reconstruc-
tion, 742, 743, 753, 761, 796.
County and town debts, 580, 581, 604, 605.
Crowe, J. R., one of the founders of Ku Klux
Klan, 661.
Curry, J. L. M., in Confederate Congress, 131 ;
defeated, 134; on negro education, 457,
467, 468, 625, 631.
Dargan, E. S., in secession convention, 29, 40,
41 ; on impressment, 175.
Davis, Nicholas, in Nashville convention, 14;
in secession convention, 29, 33, 38, 54; in
Radical politics, 403, 511; opposed by
Union League, 564 ; opinion of Rev. A. S.
Lakin, 612.
" Deadfalls," 769.
Debt commission, work of, 583-586.
Debt of Alabama, 580-586.
Democratic party, ante-bellum, 7 <?/ seq.;
reorganized, 398, 401 ; during Reconstruc-
tion, 748, 750, 755, 778 ; Populist influence,
799-
Department of Negro Affairs, 421,
Deserters, 1 12-130; outrages by, 119; promi-
nent men, 124; numbers, 127.
Destitution, during the war, 196-205 ; after the
war, 277.
Destruction of property, 74, 253.
Disaffection toward the Confederacy, 108-130,
136, 137-
Disfranchisement of whites, 489, 524, 806; of
negroes, 801, 806.
" Disintegration and absorption " policy of
the northern churches, 636,
Domestic life during the war, 230-247.
Drugs and medicines, 239.
Economic and social conditions, 1861-1865,
149-247 ; in 1865, 251 ; during Reconstruc-
tion, 710-734, 761-770.
Education, during the war, 212; during Re-
construction, 579, 606-632, 684 ; discussion
of, in convention of 1867,522 ; of the negro,
456-468, 624.
Election, of Lincoln, 19, 20; of 1861, 131; of
1863, 134; of 1865, 373-375 ; of 1867, 491 ;
of 1868, 493, 747; of 1870, 750; of 1872,
754 ; of 1874, 793 ; of 1876, 796 ; of 1880,
798 ; of 1890, 799 ; of 1902, 800.
Election methods, 748, 751,754, 755. See also
Union League.
Emancipation, economic effects of, 710-734.
Emigration of whites from Alabama, 769.
Enforcement laws, state, 695 ; Federal, 697.
Enrolment of soldiers from Alabama, 78-87;
laws relating to, 92, 95.
Episcopal church, divided, 24; closed by the
INDEX
8ll
Federal army, 325 ; loses its negro mem-
bers, 646.
Eufaula riot, 794.
Eutaw riot, 686.
Exemption from military service, 101-108 ;
numbers exempted, 107.
Expenditures of the Reconstruction regime,
574. 575. 577.
Factories during the war, 149-162.
Farms and plantations during the war, 232.
Federal army closes churches, 226.
Federal courts and the army, 413.
Finances during the war, 162-183 ; banks and
banking, 162; bonds and notes, 164; sala-
ries, 168 ; taxation, 169 ; impressment, 174 ;
debts, stay laws, sequestration, 176; trade,
barter, prices, 178 ; during Reconstruction,
571-606.
Financial settlement, 1874-1876, 583-586.
Fitzpatrick, Benjamin, in Nashville conven-
tion, 14; arrested, 262; president of con-
vention of 1865, 360.
Florida, negotiations for purchase of West
Florida, 577.
Force laws, state and Federal, 695, 697.
" Forfeited rights " theory of Reconstruction,
341-
Forsyth, John, on Fourteenth Amendment,
394; mayor of Mobile, 430.
" Forty acres and a mule," 447, 515.
Fourteenth Amendment, proposed, 394; re-
jected, 396, 397 ; adopted by reconstructed
legislature, 552.
Fowler, W. H., estimates of number of sol-
diers from Alabama, 78, 81.
Freedmen, see Negroes.
Freedmen's aid societies, 459.
Freedmen's Bureau, 392, 421-470; organiza-
tion of, in Alabama, 423-427 ; supported
by confiscations, 431 ; character of agents
of, 448; native officials of, 428, 429; rela-
tions with the civil authorities, 427 ; ad-
ministration of justice, 438-441 ; the labor
problem, 433-438; care of the sick, 441;
issue of rations, 442,- demoralization
caused, 444; effect on negro education,
456-468; connection with the Union
League, 557, 567, 568.
Freedmen's codes, 378.
" PYeedmen's Home Colonies," 422, 439, 444.
Freedmen's Savings-bank, 451-455; bank
book, 452 ; good effect of, 453 ; failure,
455-
General officers from Alabama in the Con-
federate service, 85.
Giers, J. J., tory, 119, 147.
Gordon, Gen. John B., speech on negro edu-
cation, 625.
Grant, Gen. U. S., letter on condition of the
South, 311; elected President, 747 ; orders
troops to Alabama, 789.
Haughey, Thomas, scalawag, deserter, elected
to Congress, 488.
Hayden, Gen. Julius, in charge of Freedmen's
Bureau, 426.
Hays, Charles, scalawag, in Eutaw riot, 686;
member of Congress, 749, 754; letter to
Senator Joseph Hawley on outrages in
Alabama, 786-788.
Herndon, Thomas H., candidate for governor,
754.
Hilliard, Henry W., " Union " leader, 15.
Hodgson, Joseph, mentioned, 512; superin-
tendent of public instruction, 631.
Home life during the war, 230-247.
Houston, George S., "Union" leader, 16;
elected to U, S. Senate, 374; on Debt
Commission, 582; elected governor, 782,
795-
Humphreys, D. C, deserter, 126, 143, 350.
Huntsville parade of Ku Klux Klan, 686.
Immigration to Alabama, 321, 717, 734; not
desired by Radicals, 769.
Impressment by Confederate authorities,
174.
" Independents " in 1874, 781.
Indian question and nullification, 8, 9.
Indorsement of railroad bonds, 596-606.
Industrial development during the war, 149-
162,234; military industries, 149; private
enterprises, 156.
Industrial reconstruction, 710-734, 804.
Intimidation, by Federal authorities, 789; by
Democrats, 791.
" Iron-clad " test oath, 369.
Jemison, Robert, in secession convention, 28,
29, 40, 49, 54 ; elected to Confederate Sen-
ate, 134.
Johnson, President Andrew, plan of restora-
tion, 337; amnesty proclamation, 349;
grants pardons, 356, 410; interferes with
provisional governments, 375, 419; his
work rejected by Congress, 377, 405,
406.
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, report
on affairs in the South, 313.
Jones, Capt. C. ap R., at the Selma arsenal,
152-
Juries, of both races ordered by Pope, 480;
during Reconstruction, 745.
Keffer, John C, mentioned, 506, 518, 524,
554. 737. 751-
Kelly, Judge, in Mobile riot, 481, 509.
" King Cotton," confidence in, 184.
8l2
INDEX
Knights of the White Camelia, 669, 684. See
also Ku KIux Klan.
Ku Klux Klan, causes, 653 ; origin and
growth, 660; disguises, 675; warnings,
678 ; parade at Huntsville, 685 ; Cross
Plains or Patona affair, 685 ; drives carpet-
baggers from the State University, 612-
615; burns negro schoolhouses, 628 ;
table of alleged outrages, 705; Ku Klux
investigation, 701 ; results of the Ku Klux
revolution, 674.
Labor laws, 380, 381.
Labor of negroes and whites compared, 710-
734-
Labor regulations of Freedmen's Bureau, 433-
438.
Lakin, Rev. A. S., Northern Methodist mis-
sionary, 637, 639, 648, 650; in Union
League, 557 ; elected president of State
University, 612; Davis's opinion of, 612.
Lands confiscated for taxes, 578.
Lane, George W., Unionist, Federal judge,
125, 127.
Lawlessness in 1865, 262.
Legislation, by convention of 1861,49; of 1865,
366 ; of 1867, 528 ; about freedmen, 379.
Legislature during Reconstruction, 738-741,
752. 755. 795-
Lewis, D. P., in secession convention, 29;
deserter, 126; repudiates Union League,
563 ; elected governor in 1872, 754.
IJfe, loss of, in war, 251.
Lincoln, effect of election of, 20; his plan of
Reconstruction, 336.
Lindsay, R, B, taxation under, 573-576;
action on railroad bonds, 594-600; elected
governor, 1870, 751.
Literary activity during the war, 211.
Loss of life and property, 251.
"Loyalists," during the war, 112, 113; after
the war, 316.
McKinstry, Alexander, lieutenant-governor,
assists to elect Spencer, 756-760,
McTyeire, Bishop H. N., on negro education,
457. 467-
Meade, Gen. George G., in command of
Third Military District, 493; his ad-
ministration, 493-502; installs the recon-
structed government, 552.
Medicines and drugs in war time, 239.
Methodist church, separation, 22; during
Reconstruction, 637 ; favors negro educa-
tion, 648.
Military cTommissions, see Military govern-
ment.
Military government, 1865-1866, 407-420;
trials by military commissions, 413-415;
objections to, 416-417.
Military government under the Reconst
tion Acts, 473-502 ; Pope's administration,
473-493; Meade's administration, 493-502;
control over the civil government, 477,
495 ; Pope's trouble with the newspapers,
485; trials by military commissions,
487, 498.
Militia system during the Civil War, 88-92;
during Reconstruction, 746.
Miller, C. A., carpet-bagger, agent of the
Freedmen's Bureau, 425, 426 ; in conven-
tion of 1867, 518 ; elected secretary of
state, 737.
Mitchell, Gen. O. M., 62-65.
Mobile Bay, battle of, 69.
Mobile riot, 481, 509.
Mobile schools during Reconstruction, 617.
Moore, A. B , governor, calls secession con-
vention, 27 ; orders forts seized, 61 ; objects
to blockade-running, 184 ; arrested by
Federal authorities, 262.
Morgan, John T., in secession convention, 29,
40, 42, 49.
Morse, Joshua, scalawag, attorney-general,
737-
Mossbacks, tories, and unionists, 112, 113;
numbers, 127.
Nashville convention of 1850, 14.
" National Guards," a negro organization,
774-
National Union movement, 400, 401.
Negro Affairs, Department of, 421. See also
Freedmen's Bureau.
Negro criminality, 762, 763; negro labor,
710-734 ; family relations, 763 ; church in
politics, 777; women in politics, 776.
Negro education, favored by southern whites,
457, 626, 627 ; native white teachers, 463 ;
Freedmen's Bureau teaching, 456-468;
opposition to, 628 ; character of, 464, 465,
625-630.
Negroes during the war, 205-212; in the
army, 86, 87, 205; on the farms, 209;
fidelity of, 210; in the churches, 225 ; home
life, 243.
Negroes under the provisional government,
test their freedom, 269; suffering among
them, 273; colonies of, 421, 444; civil
status of, 383, 384; insurrection feared,
368, 412; not to be arrested by civil au-
thorities, 411; attitude of army to, 410-
413; negro suffrage in 1866, 386.
Negroes during Reconstruction, controlled
by the Union League, 553-568 ; first vote,
514; in the convention of 1867, 518,521,
530; in the campaign of 1874, 775, 776;
negro Democrats, 777, 778 ; punished by
Ku Klux Klan, 682; negro juries, 480,
745 ; disfranchised, 801, 806.
INDEX
I
813
Negroes, social rights of, allowed in street
cars, 393 ; not allowed at hotel table, 417 ;
demand social privileges, 522, 764, 780,
783.
Negroes and the churches, 642, 777.
Newspapers, during the war, 218 ; under
Pope's administration, 485.
Nick-a-Jack, a proposed new state, iii.
Nitre making, 152.
Non-slaveholders uphold slavery, 10, 11.
Norris, B. W., carpet-bagger, agent P>eed-
men's Bureau, 426; elected to Congress,
738.
North Alabama, anti-slavery sentiment in, 10;
in secession convention, 53; during the
Civil War, 109; during Reconstruction,
403, 404, 748, 770, 779.
Northern men, treatment of, 318, 400.
Nullification, on Indian question, 8, 9 ; divides
the Democratic party, 11.
Oath, " iron-clad," 369 ; prescribed for voters,
475. 527-
Ordinance of Secession, 36, 37 ; declared null
and void, 360.
Painted stakes sold to negroes, 448.
Pardons by President Johnson, 356, 410.
Parsons, L. E., obstructionist and " Peace
Society " man, 143, 147, 343 ; provisional
governor, 350, 353 ; elected to U. S. Senate,
374 ; speaks in the North, 392, 401 ; advises
rejection of Fourteenth Amendment, 396;
originates " White Man's Movement," 536 ;
Radical politician, 735, 751, 755-760.
Parties in the Convention of 1861, 28 ; of
1865, 359.
Patona, or Cross Plains, affair, 686.
Patton, R. M., mentioned, 281 ; elected gov-
ernor, 373 ; vetoes legislation for blacks,
378, 379; on the Fourteenth Amendment,
395-397 ; advises Congressional Recon-
struction, 502.
Peace Society, 137-143.
Pike County grand jury. Judge Clayton's
charge to, 384.
" Pike County Platform," 781,
" Political bacon," 783 785.
Political beliefs of early settlers, 7.
Politics, during the war, 130-148 ; 1865-1867,
398 ; 1868-1874, 735 et seq.
Pope, General John, in command of Third
Military District, 473-475; his administra-
tion, 473-493; quarrel with the news-
papers, 485 ; removed, 492.
Population, composition of, 3, 4.
Populist movement, 799.
Presbyterian church, separation, 22, 23, 24;
during Reconstruction, 640; altitude
toward negroes, 645.
Prescript of Ku Klux Klan, 664, 665.
President's plan of reconstruction, 333 et seq. ;
rejected by Congress, 377; fails, 405, 406.
Prices during the war, 178.
Property, lost in war, 251 ; decreases in value
during Reconstruction, 578.
Provisional government, 351, 376.
Pryor, Roger A., debate with Yancey, 17.
Public bonded debt, 580-586.
Publishing-houses during the war, 221.
Race question, in convention of 1867, 521 ; in
the campaign of 1874, 679-782.
Races, segregation of, see maps in text.
Radical party organized, 505. See also Re-
publican party.
Railroad legislation and frauds, 587-606.
Railroads aided by state, counties, and towns
during Reconstruction, 591-606.
RaiIroads,built during the war, 155 ; destroyed,
259.
Randolph, Ryland, a member of Ku Klux
Klan, 612, 667, 668; expelled from legis-
lature, 741.
Rapier, J. T., negro member of Congress,
mentioned, 488, 521, 523, 524; supports
Robinson-Buckley faction, 774.
Rations issued by Freedmen's Bureau, 442,
445-
Reconstruction, sentiment during the war,
143-148 ; theories of, 333-339 ; early at-
tempts at, 341 ; Reconstruction Acts, 473-
475, 490; Reconstruction Convention, 491,
517-530; constitution rejected, 494; com-
pleted by Congress, 531, 550-552; its suc-
cesses and failures, 801.
Reconstruction, and education, 606-632; and
the churches, 637-653.
Registration of voters, 488, 491, 493.
Regulators, see Ku Klux Klan.
Reid, Dr. G. P. L., on Knights of the White
Camelia, 684.
Religious conditions, during the war, 222-230 ;
in 1865,324; during Reconstruction, 637-
653-
Republican party in Alabama, organized, 402-
405; numbers, 735, 765; in the legisla-
ture, 738, 752, 755; divisions in, 771, 775;
" Lily Whites " and " Black and Tans,"
799.
"Restoration," by the President, 349 et seq.;
convention, 358; completed, 367; rejected,
377-
Restiictions on trade in 1865, 284.
Riot, at Eufaula, 794; at Eutaw, 686; at
Mobile, 481, 509.
Roddy, Gen. P. D., mentioned, 62, 68.
Roman Catholic church and the negroes,
646.
Rousseau's Raid, 68.
8i4
INDEX
n
Salt making, 158.
Sansom, Miss Emma, guides General Forrest,
67.
Savings-bank, Freedmen's, 451-455.
Scalawags, in convention of 1867, 518, 529,
530. See also Republicans.
Schools, see Education.
Schurz's report on the condition of the South,
312.
Secession, 14, 15, 19, 27-57 ; convention called,
27, 28 ; ordinance passed, 36, 37 ; debate
on, in 1865, 360.
Secession convention, parties in, 23, 29; polit-
ical theories of members, 34; slave trade
prohibited, 42 ; sends commission to Wash-
ington, 48; legislation, 49-53.
Secessionists, 28 ; policy in secession conven-
tion, 30.
Secret societies, see Union League and Ku
Klux Klan.
Segregation of races, 710-734. See also the
maps in the text.
Seibels, J. J., favors cooperation, 15 ; obstruc-
tionist, 143, 147, 343.
Sequestration of enemies' property, 176.
Share system of farming, 723.
Sheets, C. C, tory, 115, 126; in convention
of 1865,365 ; visited by Ku Klux Klan, 681.
Shorter, John G., elected governor, 131 ; de-
feated, 134; arrested by Federal authori-
ties, 262.
Slaveholders and non-slaveholders, location
of, 6.
Slavery, and politics, 10-14; upheld by non-
slaveholders, lo-ii; abolished, 362.
Slaves, see Negroes.
Slave trade prohibited by secession conven-
tion, 42,
Smith, William H., deserter, 350, 510, 534;
a registration official, 488 ; first Recon-
struction governor, 735 ; indorses railroad
bonds, 591, 595, 601; opinion of Senator
Spencer, 692.
Smith, William R., "Union" leader, 16;
cooperationist leader in secession con-
vention, 29, 33, 43, 49; candidate for gov-
ernor, 372; president of State University,
612.
Social and economic conditions, during the
war, 149-247; in 1865, 251 et seq.; during
Reconstruction, 710-734, 761 et passim.
Social effects of Reconstruction, on whites,
767 ; on blacks, 761 et seq. ; on carpet-
baggers, 766.
Social rights for negroes, 523, 772, 775.
Soldiers from Alabama, numbers, character,
organization, 78-87.
Southern Aid Society, 23.
" Southern outrages," 399, 555, 786.
" Southern theory" of Reconstruction, 334.
4
" Southern Unionists' " convention, 1866, 402.
Speed, Joseph H., superintendent of public
instruction, 633.
Spencer, G. E., carpet-bagger, election
U. S. Senate, 737, 755, 760; Governor
Smith's opinion of, 691.
State Rights Democrats, 11, 12; led by
Yancey, 12, 13.
" State Suicide " theory of Reconstruction,
338.
Statistics of cotton frauds, 279,
Status, of freedmen, 384; of the provisional
government, 376.
Steedman and Fullerton's report on the
Freedmen's Bureau, 449.
Stevens's plan of Reconstruction, 339.
Streight, Col. A. D., raids into Alabama, 67.
Strobach-Robinson division in the Radical
party, 774.
Suffrage for negroes in 1866, 387.
Sumner's plan of Reconstruction, 338.
Swayne, Gen, Wager, assistant commissioner
of Freedmen's Bureau, 424, 425 ; on the
temper of the people, 315 ; opinion of the
laws relating to freedmen, 379, 380,384;
fears negro insurrection, 369 ; in command
of Alabama, 407, 476 ; attitude toward civil
authorities, 428, 439; forces negro edu-
cation, 459; enters politics, 404, 511; re-
moved, 492.
Sykes, F. W.,in Radical politics, 510; elected
to U. S. Senate, 757, 760.
Taxation during the war, 169 ; during Recon-
struction, 571-579; amounts to confisca-
tion, 578.
Temper of the people after the war, 308.
Test oath, iron-clad, 369, 370, 527.
Text-books, Confederate, 217 ; Radical, 624.
Theories of Reconstruction, 333 et seq.
Third Military District, under the Reconstruc-
tion Acts, 473-502.
Thomas, Gen. G. H., mentioned, 325, 407,
408, 474.
Tories and deserters, 108-430 ; in north
Alabama, 109; definition, 112, 113; out-
rages by, 119; numbers, 127.
Trade through the lines, 189.
Treasury agents prosecuted, 297.
Trials by military commission, 413, 414, 487,
498.
Tribune, of New York, investigates the
" Hays-Hawley letter," 788.
Truman, Benjamin, report on the South, 312.
Turchin, Col. J. B., allows Athens to be
sacked, 63.
Underground railway in Alabama, 18.
Union League of America, 553-568; white
members, 556; negroes admitted, 557;
INDEX
815
ceremonies, 559 ; organization and method,
561 ; influence over negroes, 568 ; control
over elections, 514, 515 ; resolutions of
Alabama Council, 307.
Union troops from Alabama, 87.
Unionists, tories, mossbacks, 112, 113.
University of Alabama under the Reconstruc-
tion regime, 612.
Wages of freedmen, 422, 433, 720, 731.
Walker, L. P., in Nashville convention, 14;
at Charleston convention, 18 ; on negro
suffrage, 389.
Wards of the nation, 421-470.
Warner, Willard, carpet-bagger, elected to
U. S. Senate, 737.
Watts, Thomas H., "Union" leader, 15; in
secession convention, 29, 35, 45, 48; de-
feated for governor, 131; elected, 134;
supports the Confederacy, 135 ; troubles
over militia with conscript officials, 91, 97,
104 ; favors blockade-running, 185 ; speech
in 1865, 341 ; arrested by Federal authori-
ties, 262.
Whig party, appears, 11; its progress on the
slavery question, 12; breaks up, 16, 17.
White Brotherhood, 708.
White Camelia, 670.
White counties, agriculture in, 727 ; destitution
in, 196-205 ; politics in, see maps.
White labor superior to negro labor, 726.
White League, 709.
" White Man's Government," 364.
" White man's party," 536, 778, 779.
Wilmer, Bishop R. H., 24; trouble with mili-
tary authorities, 325-329 ; suspended,
325.
Wilson's Raid, 71.
Women, interest in public questions, 230.
Women's Gunboat, 245.
Yancey, William Lowndes, leader of State
Rights Democrats, 12, 13; author of Ala-
bama Platform of 1848, 13 ; advocates
secession, 14, 15 ; debate with Roger A.
Pryor, 17; offered nomination for vice-
presidency, 19; in secession convention,
29. 31. 36. 39, 44. 46, 57.
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